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Afternoon Session - 1994 Meeting

Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting_1994collect by macbookpro2100

BerkshireHathaway

Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger answer questions about Berkshire's investments in SalomonBrothers and Coca-Cola. (This session is audio only because a video recording is not available.)

1. No comment on Guinness investment 1.没有评论吉尼斯投资

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2 now.Well, I don't know where zone 2 is, but we'll — (laughs) WARREN BUFFETT：现在是第2区。好吧，我不知道2区在哪里，但我们会 - （笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you feel basically the same about your investment in Guinness now aswhen you made the investment, in terms of the company?

听众会员：就您在公司方面的投资而言，您现在对您在吉尼斯的投资感觉基本相同吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wouldn't like to comment on anything that we own, in terms of how werate them as desirability or anything.I mean, whether it’s Coke or Gillette or anything that — wemade decisions at a given time, at a given price, which you can figure out by looking at ourpurchases.

WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我不想评论我们拥有的任何东西，就我们如何评价它们的可取性或任何东西而言。我的意思是，无论是可乐还是吉列，还是其他任何东西 - 我们在特定时间以给定价格做出决定，你可以通过查看我们的购买来弄清楚。

But we may be buying or selling any of those securities right as we talk.And we simply don't thinkit's in the interest of Berkshire shareholders as a group to be talking about things that we could bebuying or selling.

但是，正如我们所说，我们可能正在购买或出售任何证券。我们根本不认为这是一个集团谈论我们可以购买或出售的东西符合伯克希尔股东的利益。

2. World Book's sales slide: "I wish I knew the answer" 2. World Book的销售幻灯片：“我希望我知道答案”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK? WARREN BUFFETT：好吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, David Winters, from Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. 听众：嗨，大卫温特斯，来自新泽西州的Mountain Lakes。

Just wondering, World Book’s had a tough time lately, and I'm wondering if there's things you'redoing to try to improve that.

只是想知道，World Book最近经历了一段艰难时期，我想知道你是否正在努力改善这一点。

And also, The Buffalo News has been fabulous.And I'm kind of wondering what's driving TheBuffalo News?

此外，布法罗新闻一直很精彩。我有点想知道是什么推动了布法罗新闻？

WARREN BUFFETT: Buffalo News is doing what? WARREN BUFFETT：布法罗新闻正在做什么？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Fabulously. 观众成员：非常棒。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it's doing well, right.Well, I would say you got to give credit Stan Lipsey— I'm not sure whether Stan's here right now, but — who's been running the News.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的，它做得很好，对。好吧，我会说你得信任Stan Lipsey - 我不确定Stan现在是否在这里，但是 - 谁一直在运行新闻。

World Book, in terms of unit sales — as we put in the report — have fallen off significantly the lastfew years.It's actually surprising, in a sense, how well the profits have held up because they'vedone a good job, a very good job, in that respect.

世界图书，就单位销售而言 - 正如我们在报告中所述 - 在过去几年中大幅下降。从某种意义上说，实际上令人惊讶的是，由于他们在这方面做得很好，做得很好，所以利润有多好。

And as we put in the report, we don't know the answer, precisely.We are, Ralph Schey is — hastaken some actions — is taking some actions — that he thinks will improve the operations.Ralph'srecord as a manager is absolutely at the top of the list.I mean, it — I wrote about it in the 1992report.

正如我们在报告中提到的那样，我们确切地知道答案。我们是，拉尔夫·谢伊 - 采取了一些行动 - 采取了一些行动 - 他认为这将改善行动。拉尔夫作为经理的记录绝对是最重要的。我的意思是，它 - 我在1992年的报告中写过它。

In 1993, Ralph did even better.I mean, it was a — fabulous.I think, probably, may have been 110 orso million pre-tax on 90-some million of average equity capital, or something of the sort.So it's afabulous record.

1993年，拉尔夫做得更好。我的意思是，这太棒了。我认为，对于90-百万美元的平均权益资本，或者类似的东西，可能已经有110亿左右的税前税。所以这是一个非常棒的记录。

But Encyclopedia Britannica, as you probably know, ran at a loss last year.The encyclopediabusiness has been very — has been poor.Could be due to electronic competition, could be due torecruiting problems for salespeople.Obviously, it can be a combination of many factors.

但你可能知道，不列颠百科全书（Encyclopedia Britannica）去年亏损了。百科全书业务一直很差。可能是由于电子竞争，可能是由于招聘人员的问题。显然，它可以是许多因素的组合。

If we knew the answer, we'd have — you wouldn't be seeing those figures right now.But it is a topitem of attention for Ralph.He takes anything that's not performing as well as before veryseriously.And we will see what happens.

如果我们知道答案，我们就会 - 你现在不会看到这些数字。但这是拉尔夫最关注的项目。他认为任何表现都不如以前那么严重的表现。我们会看到会发生什么。

But I don't have a prediction on it.I wish I knew the answer.I don't see any variables to, in anyintelligent way, tell you or — we put in the report the best we could do on that.

但我没有预测。我希望我知道答案。我没有看到任何变量，以任何聪明的方式告诉你或 - 我们在报告中尽我们所能做的最好。

The profitability has, like I say, has been pretty good.But obviously, current trends of new sales willcatch up with us at some point, unless we boost unit sales.

像我说的那样，盈利能力一直很好。但显然，除非我们提高销量，否则目前的新销售趋势将在某个时候赶上我们。

I don't think our market share, if you look at print encyclopedias, has fallen.But I can't be sure ofthat, but I think that's probably true.But there are an awful lot of encyclopedias going out there aspart of a bundled product with computer sales.

如果你看一下印刷百科全书，我认为我们的市场份额已经下降了。但我不能确定，但我认为这可能是真的。但是，有大量的百科全书作为计算机销售捆绑产品的一部分出现在那里。

3. Breaking up Berkshire wouldn't help 打破伯克希尔无济于事

WARREN BUFFETT: How are we going to do this, is there? WARREN BUFFETT：我们怎么做，是吗？

VOICE: We got three now. 声音：我们现在有三个。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, I'll let you hand the mic to whomever, you — WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我会让你把麦克风交给任何人，你 -

VOICE: (Inaudible) three. 声音:(听不清）三。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Lee again, from Palo Alto.By Omaha standards you are a relatively youngman.

观众成员：Lee再次来自Palo Alto。根据奥马哈的标准，你是一个相对年轻的人。

And every year, you point out that Berkshire’s size now precludes you from making the great,relatively small trades which made your reputation.

每年，你都会指出，伯克希尔的规模现在使你不能做出能够赢得声誉的伟大，相对较小的交易。

How much thought have you given to breaking up Berkshire into smaller entities? 你有多想过将伯克希尔分拆成更小的实体？

WARREN BUFFETT: How much what? WARREN BUFFETT：多少钱？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: How much thought have you given into breaking up Berkshire into smallerentities, which would allow you to make those nice, small, wonderful trades that you made from thebeginning?

观众成员：你有多少想法将伯克希尔分解成更小的实体，这可以让你从一开始就做出那些美好，小巧，精彩的交易？

WARREN BUFFETT: It wouldn't do any good to break into smaller entities, because I'd still own,you know, we'd still have 10 billion-plus of capital to be responsible for, wherever it would be.

WARREN BUFFETT：闯入较小的实体是没有任何好处的，因为我仍然拥有，你知道，无论在哪里，我们仍然有100亿美元的资本负责。

So, the — we could distribute it out to the shareholders, and let them make their own decisions,obviously.And any time we thought that we weren't going to get more than a dollar of value per

dollar retained, that, obviously, would be the course to follow. 所以， - 我们可以将它分发给股东，让他们自己做出决定。任何时候我们都认为我们不会保留每美元

超过1美元的价值，显然，这将是接下来的路线。

But there's no magic to creating multiple little — I mean, we could call Berkshire Two, BerkshireThree, Berkshire Four, but you still got the problem.There's $10 billion to invest, and it doesn't reallysolve anything.

但创造多个小小的东西并没有什么魔力 - 我的意思是，我们可以打电话给Berkshire Two，BerkshireThree，Berkshire Four，但你仍然遇到了问题。投资100亿美元，并没有真正解决任何问题。

Charlie, do you have any thoughts on that? 查理，你有什么想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, the — Berkshire is incredibly decentralized, in the — in terms of powerand decisions resting in the operating divisions.In terms of the marketable securities, it's incrediblycentralized.

CHARLIE MUNGER：不，伯克希尔在权力和决策方面处于非常分散的地位。就有价证券而言，它非常集中。

And so far, we have not had any big penalty from not being able to do the things that we did whenwe were young.Eventually we will reach the penalty.

到目前为止，我们没有受到任何重大的惩罚，因为我们不能做我们年轻时所做的事情。最终我们将达到惩罚。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think we’re — there's no question we could earn higher percentagereturns working with $100,000, though, than $10 billion.But, yeah — but it hasn't hurt us as muchas we thought it would, as size has increased.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我认为我们 - 毫无疑问，我们可以获得更高的回报百分比，而不是100亿美元。但是，是的 - 但随着规模的增加，它并没有像我们想象的那样伤害我们。

But your universe of opportunity shrinks.But it shrinks no matter — I mean, you can set it up in 20bank accounts or one bank account, but you still — the universe still has to fit the 10 billion, inaggregate.

但是你的机会范围缩小了。但它无论如何都会缩小 - 我的意思是，你可以在20个银行账户或一个银行账户中设置它，但你仍然 - 宇宙仍然需要总计100亿。

4. "Absolutely sensational job" by General Dynamics management 4.通用动力公司管理层的“绝对耸人听闻的工作”

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, how are we doing this?Do we have another zone over there?Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：现在，我们如何做到这一点？我们那边有另一个区吗？是啊。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Michael Bunyaner (PH), New York City. 观众成员：纽约市Michael Bunyaner（PH）。

Two questions.One, last year you discussed in your annual report your investment in GeneralDynamics.And you also gave your proxy to the company and its management.This year, it appearsyou have sold the stock.

两个问题。一，去年您在年度报告中讨论了您对通用动力的投资。您还将您的代理人交给了公司及其管理层。今年，看来你卖掉了股票。

WARREN BUFFETT: This year, what? 沃伦巴菲特：今年，什么？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: This year, it appears that you have sold the stock in General Dynamics. 观众成员：今年，您似乎已经在通用动力公司出售了该股票。

What has changed that you sold 20 percent of your stake?This is question number one, and I havenumber two.

你卖出20％的股份有什么变化？这是第一个问题，我有第二个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Probably inappropriate to be talking about what we're buying or selling,except to the extent that we make a public — have to make a public announcement, which, onsomething like General Dynamics, we've got 13G requirements if wechange by more than 5percent.

WARREN BUFFETT：谈论我们购买或出售的东西可能不合适，除非我们公开宣传 - 必须公开宣布，就像通用动力公司这样，我们有13G的要求，如果我们变化超过5％。

And we also have — as long as we own more than 10 percent — we have monthly reportingrequirements under Form 4.

我们也有 - 只要我们拥有超过10％ - 我们在表格4下有月度报告要求。

We think the management of General Dynamics has done an absolutely sensational job. 我们认为通用动力公司的管理层做了绝对耸人听闻的工作。

Obviously, also it isn't the kind of business, basically, that we have a 20-year view on, or somethingof the sort.So, it’s — the shareholders of General Dynamics have been extraordinarily well-servedby the management of that company.And we’ve — we're thankful, because we prosperedaccordingly.

显然，基本上，这不是一种商业，我们有20年的观点，或类似的东西。因此，通用动力公司的股东得到了该公司管理层的极好服务。而且我们 - 我们很感激，因为我们相应地繁荣了。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But should I take from this comment that you have changed your viewabout the business itself?

听众会员：但是，我应该从这条评论中了解到您已经改变了对业务本身的看法吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Pardon me? WARREN BUFFETT：请原谅我？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Should I take from your comment that you have changed your view aboutthe business itself?

听众会员：我是否应该从您的评论中了解您已经改变了对业务本身的看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, no.I think you take my comments as saying just what I’ve said.(Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT：不，不。我想你的评论就像我说的那样。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK.(Laughter) 听众会员：好的。（笑声）

Question number two, could you tell me — 问题二，你能告诉我 -

WARREN BUFFETT: I think we want to give people a chance around the room, and then when, inthe zone you're in, when a second question comes along, it will be fine.But we want to get as manypeople in this hour as we can, because this is the hard core here.

WARREN BUFFETT：我想我们想让人们有机会在房间里，然后在你所在的区域，当第二个问题出现时，它会没事的。但我们希望尽可能多的人在这个时间内获得，因为这是这里的核心。

5. No encouragement for short-term stockholders 5.不鼓励短期股东

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：第1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It appeared to me that in 1993 the variation between the stock price for thehigh and the low was much greater than years in the past.Would you mind commenting on that?

观众成员：在我看来，在1993年，高价和低价的股价之间的差异远大于过去几年。你介意评论一下吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there was more volatility in the price of Berkshire last year.And as I putin the annual report, the stock overperformed the business last year.

沃伦巴菲特：嗯，去年伯克希尔的价格波动更大。正如我在年度报告中提到的那样，该股票去年的业绩超过了该业务。

Now, over any 10 or 20 or 30-year history, every year the stock is going to perform a littledifferently, at least, from the business.I mean, it may slightly underperform, or slightly overperform.

现在，在任何10年，20年或30年的历史中，每年至少从业务开始，股票的表现会有所不同。我的意思是，它可能略微表现不佳，或稍微超出表现。

We would prefer that those variations be as small as possible.But there was more variability lastyear than historically's been the case.Although we've had one or two other — we had a few yearslike that.We —

我们希望这些变化尽可能小。但去年的变化幅度超过了历史上的变化。虽然我们有一两个 - 我们有几年这样的。我们 -

Our best way to handle that is to give all the information we can to shareholders and prospectiveshareholders, and follow policies that we think will induce the investment-oriented with long timehorizons to join us, and not to encourage other people.But, occasionally — you know, we can'tguarantee that result.

我们处理这一问题的最佳方式是向股东和潜在股东提供我们所能提供的所有信息，并遵循我们认为将引导投资导向并具有长期视野的政策加入我们，而不是鼓励其他人。但是，偶尔 - 你知道，我们不能保证结果。

One of the things that was interesting to me, I don't know whether it was three months ago or when,but I happened to be talking to the [NYSE] specialist, terrific specialist, Jimmy Maguire.He had toleave, but he was here earlier in the session.

对我来说很有意思的事情之一，我不知道是在三个月前还是在三十个月之前，但我碰巧正在与[纽约证券交易所]专家，极好的专家Jimmy Maguire交谈。他不得不离开，但他早些时候在这里。

And I think, at the time, the stock was around 16,000 or something like that.And he had somerather significant stop-loss orders on the books at 15-5, or thereabouts, involving some hundreds ofshares.

我认为，当时股票大约是16,000或类似的东西。并且他在15-5或者左右的账簿上有一些相当重要的止损订单，涉及数百股。

And that to me is a signal that, you know, we have some people that are — in my view — are notreally the kind of owners that we would like to attract.Because why somebody wants to put in anorder to sell something for 15,500 that they don't want to sell at 16,000 is beyond me, but —(Laughter)

对我而言，这是一个信号，你知道，我们有一些人 - 在我看来 - 并不是我们想吸引的那种业主。因为为什么有人想订购15,500件他们不想以16,000卖出的东西超出了我，但是 - （笑声）

The idea of people using stop-loss orders with Berkshire, obviously — it tells me that we've gotsome people in that are using it as trading vehicle of some sort, or have some totally non-investment-type calculations in their mind.

显然人们使用伯克希尔的止损订单的想法 - 它告诉我，我们有一些人正在使用它作为某种交易工具，或者在他们的脑海中有一些完全非投资类型的计算。

I don't think we have very many of them.But obviously, if we have enough people like that, you willhave a more volatile stock than if you have a whole bunch of people who look at it as somethingthat they're going to hold for the rest of their life.

我不认为我们有很多。但很明显，如果我们有足够多的人这样，那么你的股票就会变得更加不稳定，而不是有一大群人把它看作是他们将要度过余生的东西。

And the stock did go down at that time and hit 15,500.And there were — that — I think it was closeto 300 shares, which is 4 1/2 million dollars' worth of stock.

当时库存确实下降并达到15,500。而且 - 我认为它接近300股，这是价值4到30万美元的股票。

And somebody made a decision, apparently, that they — or some small number of people — madea decision that they wanted to sell something at 15,500 that they could have sold for 16,000.Thelower it went, the better they liked it, apparently.I mean, the better they liked the sale.(Laughter)

显然，有人做出了一个决定，即他们 - 或者是少数人 - 做出了一个决定，他们想要出售15,500件他们本可以卖出16,000件的东西。它越低，他们就越喜欢它，显然。我的意思是，他们更喜欢这次拍卖。（笑声）

Which, you know, has always struck me as like having a house that you like, and you're living in,and, you know, it's worth $100,000 and you tell your broker, you know, if anybody ever comes alongand offers 90, you want to sell it.I mean, it doesn't — (laughter) — make any sense to me.

你知道，这总是让我印象深刻，就像拥有一个你喜欢的房子，你住在那里，而且，你知道，它价值10万美元你告诉你的经纪人，你知道，如果有人出现并提供90 ，你想卖掉它。我的意思是，它没有- （笑声） - 对我有意义。

But it has — I would say that there's been some small — I think, relatively small — tendency forpeople to get — relatively few people — but to get more interested in the price of the stock in termsof — and thinking of it in termsof whether it's going to go up or down in the next six months, thanmight formerly have been the case.

但它有 - 我会说有一些小的 - 我认为，相对较小 - 倾向于人们 - 相对较少的人 - 但是对股票的价格更感兴趣 - 并且用它来思考它它是否会在未来六个月内上升或下降，而不是以前的情况。

I think we're unusually well-blessed in that respect, in that we've got people who basically want toown it for a very long time.

我认为我们在这方面非常幸运，因为我们有很多人基本上想要拥有它很长一段时间。

But to the extent that you get people who were owning it because they think the stock market'sgoing to go up, or something of that sort's going to happen, that is not good news from ourstandpoint, and it will increase the volatility in it.

但是，如果你因为他们认为股票市场将会上涨，或者某种类似的事情将要发生而让你拥有它的人，从我们的角度来看，这不是好消息，而且会增加它的波动性。

We will do nothing to encourage that. 我们不会做任何事情来鼓励这一点。

6. Berkshire benefits when the stock market falls 6.当股市下跌时，伯克希尔受益

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Mr. Buffett, Steve Lang (PH) from Toronto. 观众：是的，巴菲特先生，来自多伦多的史蒂夫朗（PH）。

I was just curious about when you were saying that one of the best things that could happen toshareholders is the — the market goes down and you're able to buy good businesses at foolishprices.

我只是好奇当你说股东可能遇到的最好的事情之一就是 - 市场萧条，你能够以愚蠢的价格购买好的企业。

And then a little on, you were saying that we could judge your ability to do what it is that you feelyou should be doing by how much cash you have in the account at any given point in time, and —

然后再说一点，你说我们可以判断你在任何特定时间点你在帐户中拥有多少现金的能力，你应该做的事情，并且 -

WARREN BUFFETT: By what? WARREN BUFFETT：通过什么？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: By the amount of cash that you have in the account.In other words, I guess,what you feel you're supposed to be doing is investing the cash in good businesses.

观众会员：您在账户中拥有的现金金额。换句话说，我想，你认为你应该做的就是把现金投入到好的企业中。

So I'm just wondering about that kind of dichotomy.Where does the cash come from if the marketdoes go down, if you've been successful in your first ability?Would that be from the cash flow onthe operations of the business from the float?

所以我只是想知道那种二分法。如果你的第一个能力成功，如果市场确实下跌，现金来自哪里？那会是来自浮动业务运营的现金流吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is that —? 听众：那是 - ？


AUDIENCE MEMBER: So really, the success of the company then is, to some degree, the fact thatyou're able to dollar-cost average into the market on an ongoing basis?Is that right?

听众会员：那么，在某种程度上，公司的成功是否能够持续地将美元成本平均投入市场？是对的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it isn't that precise.But A, we do generate cash in considerableamounts, so that we will not husband cash, simply because we think the market's going to godown, in order to buy something.

WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，这不是那么精确。但是，A，我们确实会产生相当数量的现金，因此我们不会因为我们认为市场会下跌而不是为了买东西而现金。

But obviously, as cash comes in, we're always looking for things to do.And the cheaper that themarket is generally, the more likely it is that we will find something that we understand and that welike, and that the price will be attractive, and that we will do it.

但显然，随着现金的流入，我们总是在寻找可以做的事情。而且市场普遍越便宜，我们就越有可能找到我们理解和喜欢的东西，而且价格会很有吸引力，而且我们会这样做。

But it isn't like we can change around the whole portfolio then, because that doesn't gain usanything.I mean, we'd be selling things at lower prices to buy things at lower prices.

但这并不是说我们可以改变整个投资组合，因为这并没有给我们带来任何好处。我的意思是，我们会以较低的价格出售东西，以较低的价格购买东西。

But to the extent that we have net cash coming in — which we do, and which we will have — onbalance, we're, you know, we're adding to our businesses at more attractive prices than would bethe other case.

但是，如果我们有净现金 - 我们这样做，我们将拥有 - 平衡，我们，你知道，我们以比其他情况更具吸引力的价格增加我们的业务。

And it's no prediction on any given company.I mean, whether it's Gillette or Coke, or anything.Itmight be something we already own, it might be something we don't own.But we welcome thechance to buy more shares.

这对任何一家公司都没有预测。我的意思是，无论是吉列还是可乐，还是其他任何东西。它可能是我们已经拥有的东西，也可能是我们不拥有的东西。但我们欢迎有机会购买更多股票。

We're not wishing it on anybody.But if you asked us next month whether Berkshire would be betteroff if the whole stock market were down 50 percent or where it is now, we would be better off if itwas down 50 percent, whether we had any cash on hand now or not, because we would begenerating cash to buy things.

我们不希望任何人。但如果你下个月问我们，如果整个股市下跌50％或者现在的情况下伯克希尔会好一些，那么如果它下跌了50％我们会好一些，不管我们现在有没有现金因为我们会赚钱买东西。

7. Salomon's compensation: "Far from ideal" 萨洛蒙的赔偿：“远非理想”


AUDIENCE MEMBER: Byron Ransdell (PH) from Raleigh, North Carolina.Thanks for yourhospitality to this weekend.

听众：来自北卡罗来纳州罗利市的Byron Ransdell（PH）。感谢您对本周末的热情款待。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we thank you for coming, too. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们也感谢你的到来。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question concerns Salomon, Inc., and more specifically, SalomonBrothers.I know that you were on the board of directors, I think, from '87 to the current time.Verymuch interested in compensation there, and maybe on the compensation committee.

听众：我的问题涉及Salomon，Inc。，更具体地说是Salomon Brothers。我知道你从87年到现在都是董事会成员。对那里的薪酬非常感兴趣，也许还有薪酬委员会。

Between 1987 and 1992, Salomon's financial results were quite dismal in a very lumpy way, butoverall, quite dismal.

在1987年至1992年间，所罗门的财务业绩非常惨淡，但总的来说，非常令人沮丧。

In your opinion, if the compensation had been rational during this time, would Salomon have shownresults that would make it a quite decent business?

在您看来，如果在此期间赔偿是合理的，所罗门公司是否会显示出能够使其成为相当不错的业务的结果？

WARREN BUFFETT: Would Salomon — if the compensation — WARREN BUFFETT：所罗门 - 如果赔偿 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: If the past compensation — CHARLIE MUNGER：如果过去的赔偿 -

WARREN BUFFETT: — had been more rational — WARREN BUFFETT： - 更合理 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: — decisions had been more rational, '87 to the current time, would Salomonhave done better?Yeah, was that it?

CHARLIE MUNGER： - 决定更加理性，到目前为止，所罗门已经做得更好了吗？是的，是吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, sir. 听众：是的，先生。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would — yeah, I would say that, if the present people and the presentcompensation philosophy — which allows for very large payments for very large results — I thinkthe company would have done better, yeah.

WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我会 - 是的，我会说，如果现在的人和目前的薪酬理念 - 允许非常大的结果付出非常大的代价 - 我认为公司会做得更好，是的。

It — you're going to see very big numbers paid in Wall Street.That's the nature of it.The trick is topay them only when you're getting very big results for the owners.I mean, it — there's no wayyou're going to pay numbers that look like numbers in other industries, and get great results forowners.

它 - 你会看到在华尔街支付非常多的数字。这就是它的本质。诀窍是只有当你为业主获得非常大的结果时付钱。我的意思是，它 - 你不可能在其他行业支付看起来像数字的数字，并为业主取得好成绩。

But if you pay these big numbers, I think you should be getting very good results for owners. 但如果你支付这些大数字，我认为你应该为业主取得非常好的结果。

And there — the old system was not — I mean, it wasn't totally off the mark on that.But it was farfrom an ideal system, in my view.

那里 - 旧系统不是 - 我的意思是，它并没有完全脱离标记。但在我看来，它远非一个理想的系统。

8. Unlikely to write put options on Coca-Cola again 8.不太可能再次在可口可乐上写下看跌期权


AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren, I have one question. 听众：沃伦，我有一个问题。

Last year you were using Coca-Cola puts as a way to increase income, and conversely, if theywere exercised, as a way of increasing your position.Do you still use puts in this type oninvestments you wish to add to?

去年你使用可口可乐套餐作为增加收入的方式，相反，如果他们被行使，作为增加你的头寸的一种方式。对于您希望添加的投资，您是否仍然使用此类型的看跌期权？

(BREAK IN RECORDING) （记录中的突破）

WARREN BUFFETT: — five million shares, as I remember, of Coke sometime in the early fall orthereby — I don't remember exactly — last year.And the puts, I think the premium was around 7 1/2million dollars, and they were priced around 35.

沃伦·巴菲特： - 据我记得的那样， - 在初秋的某个时候或可能的时候 - 可靠的500万股 - 我记不清楚- 去年。而看跌期权，我认为溢价约为750万美元，而它们的定价约为35美元。

We have not done that very often, and we're unlikely to do very much of it.For one thing, there areposition limits on puts, which don't apply to us, but they apply to the brokers for which we dothem.And those position limits were not clear before that.But we could probably write puts on thatsame amount by doing it through a bunch of different brokers.

我们没有经常这样做，我们不太可能做很多。一方面，看跌期权有头寸限制，不适用于我们，但它们

适用于我们这样做的经纪人。那之前的那些位置限制并不清楚。但是我们可以通过一堆不同的经纪人

来做相同数量的看跌期权。

It's not something we're really very likely to do.I was happy to do it, and in that particular case, wemade 7 1/2 million dollars.

这不是我们真正非常可能做的事情。我很乐意这样做，在那个特殊情况下，我们赚了7到30万美元。

But we're better off, probably — if we like something well enough to write a put on it, we're probablybetter off buying the security itself, and particularly since we can't do it in the kind of quantities thatreally wouldmake it meaningful to Berkshire.

但是我们可能会更好 - 可能 - 如果我们喜欢写得好的东西，我们可能会更好地购买安全本身，特别是因为我们不能以真正的数量来做这件事。让它对伯克希尔有意义。

There are securities I would not mind writing puts for 10 million shares or something, but I — thatprobably — it's probably allowable for us to do it.It's not allowed — we'd probably have to do itthrough multiple brokers to get the job done.

有些证券我不介意为1000万股或者其他东西写点票，但我 - 可能 - 我们可能会这样做。这是不允许的 - 我们可能不得不通过多个经纪人来完成工作。

And on balance, I don't think it's as useful a way to spend my time as just looking for securities tobuy outright.

总而言之，我并不认为将时间花在寻找证券来直接购买上是一种有用的方式。

Charlie, you have anything? 查理，你有什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有。

9. Don't believe reports on what we're buying or selling 9.不要相信我们买卖什么的报道


AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I'm from West Point.And my name is Rogers. 听众：巴菲特先生，我来自西点军校。而我的名字是罗杰斯。

A couple of months ago, there were stories in The World-Herald that Berkshire Hathaway hadtaken a large position in Philip Morris, and UST.But in your annual report, I don't see anything aboutthat.Can you comment?

几个月前，“世界先驱报”报道了伯克希尔哈撒韦公司在菲利普莫里斯和UST担任重要职务。但是在你的年度报告中，我没有看到任何相关内容。你能评论吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say, in the last two years maybe — I'm just approximating —I've probably seen reports in either The Wall Street Journal, or USA Today — maybe picked up byThe Associated Press, or in TheHerald, but in papers of some significance — I've probably seenstories that we were buying maybe any one of 10 companies in aggregate over that period of time.Iwould say a significant majority were erroneous.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我想说，在过去的两年里，也许 - 我只是近似了 - 我可能已经看过“华尔街日报”或“今日美国”的报道 - 可能是由美联社或在The先驱，但在一些有意义的论文中 - 我可能已经看到了我们在这段时间内总共购买的10家公司中的任何一家的故事。我想说绝大多数都是错误的。

We don't correct the erroneous ones, because if we don't correct the erroneous ones — if wecorrect the erroneous ones, and don't say anything about the correct ones, in effect we're

identifying the correct ones, too. 我们不纠正错误的错误，因为如果我们不纠正错误的错误 - 如果我们纠正了错误的错误，并且没有说

出正确错误的那些，实际上我们也正在识别错误的错误。

So we will never comment on those stories, no matter how ridiculous they are. 因此，无论这些故事多么荒谬，我们都不会评论这些故事。

And it's interesting because, you know, they keep getting printed.And frankly, from our standpoint,the fact that most of them are inaccurate is probably useful to us.We don't do anything toencourage it, but it — the fact that people are reading that we are buying A, B, C, or X, Y, Z whenwe aren't — you know, that's — I don'tthink people should be buying stocks because they'rereading in the paper that we're buying something.But if they do, they may get cured of it at somepoint.

它很有趣，因为，你知道，它们一直在打印。坦率地说，从我们的角度来看，大多数都不准确的事实对我们来说可能是有用的。我们没有做任何事情来鼓励它，但事实上人们正在阅读我们正在购买A，B，C或X，Y，Z当我们不是 - 你知道，那是 - 我不我认为人们应该购买股票，因为他们正在阅读我们正在买东西的报纸。但如果他们这样做，他们可能会在某些时候得到治愈。

Maybe the newspapers will even get cured of writing the stories when they don't know, you know,what the facts are.

也许报纸甚至可以在他们不知道，事实是什么时知道这些故事。

But it's something we live with, and we'll probably continue to live with. 但这是我们生活的东西，我们可能会继续生活。

And I would say that based on history, if you read something about us buying or selling something,other than through reports we've filed with the SEC or regulatory bodies, the chances are well over50 percent — that I can tell you, basedon history, is correct — well over 50 percent that it's wrong.

我会说，基于历史，如果你读到关于我们购买或出售某些东西的东西，除了通过我们向美国证券交易委员会或监管机构提交的报告之外，我可以告诉你的机会超过50％。在历史上，是正确的 - 超过50％，这是错误的。

10. Unlikely Berkshire will be a Dow or S&P 500 stock 10.伯克希尔不太可能成为道琼斯指数或标准普尔500指数的股票


AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you expect that Berkshire will become one of the Standard & Poor 500stocks, or a Dow Jones stock?

听众会员：您是否预计伯克希尔将成为标准普尔500股票或道琼斯股票？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it's unlikely it ever becomes a Dow Jones stock. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我认为它不太可能成为道琼斯股票。

I don't know what the criteria are for the S&P 500. But I imagine there's some reason why we don'tfit.I don't know whether they have questions about number of shares outstanding or — I've neverchecked with S&P.

我不知道标准普尔500指数的标准是什么。但我想有一些我们不合适的原因。我不知道他们是否对已发行股票的数量有疑问，或者 - 我从未向标准普尔公司查询过。

I wouldn't be surprised if we have the largest market capitalization of any company that isn't in theS&P, although I don't know that.But they may have some criteria that preclude Berkshire being partof it.

如果我们拥有不属于标准普尔指数的任何公司的最大市值，我不会感到惊讶，尽管我不知道。但他们

可能有一些标准阻止伯克希尔参与其中。

I've always thought it would be very interesting, for those of you who like to think about such things,that if we were part of the S&P 500, and enough people became indexed so that 60 percent of themarket was indexed, and ifCharlie and I wouldn't sell, which we wouldn't, it'd be an interestingproposition as to how the index funds would ever get their 60 percent if they tried to replicate theS&P.

我一直认为，对于那些喜欢考虑这些事情的人来说，如果我们是标准普尔500指数的一部分，并且有足够多的人被编入索引以便60％的市场被编入索引，并且如果查理和我不会出售，我们不会，如果他们试图复制标准普尔指数基金将如何获得60％的指数基金，这将是一个有趣的主张。

It’d be — I don't know whether they have rules even about concentration of ownership.That sameline of thinking might have applied to Walmart, or some company.

它是 - 我不知道他们是否有关于所有权集中的规则。同样的想法可能适用于沃尔玛或某些公司。

Because just take the extreme example of a company that had 90 percent of its stock owned byone individual, and 12 percent of the money in the market were indexed, and the 90 percentwouldn't sell, it would bring back the Northern Pacific Corneror something of the sort.

因为只举一个公司的一个极端例子，其中90％的股票由一个人拥有，并且市场上12％的资金被编入索引，而90％的股票不会出售，它将带回北太平洋角落或类似的东西。

In any event, I don't think that's going to be a problem.And I don't think we are going to end upbeing in either index, so —

无论如何，我认为这不会成为一个问题。而且我认为我们最终不会进入任何一个指数，所以 -

11. Diversify if you don't understand businesses 11.如果您不了解企业，请多元化

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, zone 1? WARREN BUFFETT：是的，1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Aaron Morris (PH).I'm from California. 听众：巴菲特先生，我叫Aaron Morris（PH）。我来自加利福尼亚州。

What I wanted to know was how you think about how large a position you're willing to take in agiven security, both in your case, where you have new cash coming in that you can invest, and inthe case of an investor,where they have a fixed amount of capital, and they're trying to decidewhat's the most (inaudible) security that they really love?

我想知道的是你如何看待你愿意在特定证券中持有多大头寸，在你的情况下，你有新的现金可以投资，而在投资者的情况下，他们有固定数量的资本，他们试图决定他们真正喜欢的最安全（听不清）

的安全性是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie and I have — probably at our present size, we will never findanything that we get as much money into as we want.Don't you think that's probably true, Charlie?Ifwe really like it?

沃伦巴菲特：嗯，查理和我有 - 可能是我们目前的规模，我们永远找不到任何我们得到的东西。查理，难道你不认为这可能是真的吗？如果我们真的喜欢它？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think that's quite likely. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我觉得很有可能。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, so we will probably never hit the limit.We would love to.We'd love tofind something we felt that strongly about, and occasionally we do.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的，所以我们可能永远不会达到极限。我们很乐意。我们很想找到我们强烈关注的东西，偶尔也会找到。

But we won't get as much money into it as we would wish, or as if we were running a million dollarsof our own money or some number like that, so —

但是，我们不会像我们希望的那样获得足够的资金，或者好像我们运行了一百万美元的自有资金或类似的数字，所以 -

We are willing to put a lot of money into a single security.When I ran the partnership, the limit I gotto was about 40 percent in a single stock.I think Charlie, when you ran your partnership, you hadmore than 40 percent in —

我们愿意为单一证券投入大量资金。当我执行合作伙伴关系时，我获得的限制在单一股票中约为40％。我认为查理，当你合作时，你有超过40％ -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：当然。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And we would do the same thing if we were running smaller partnerships, orour own capital were smaller and we were running that ourselves.

WARREN BUFFETT：如果我们经营的是较小的合伙企业，或者我们自己的资本规模较小而我们自己也在运营，那么我们会做同样的事情。

Because, no, we're not going to do that unless we think we understand the business very well, andwe think the nature of the business, what we're paying for it, the people running it, and all of thatlead upto virtually no risk, and —

因为，不，我们不会这样做，除非我们认为我们非常了解业务，我们认为业务的性质，我们为此付出的代价，运营它的人，以及所有这些几乎没有风险， -

But you find those things, occasionally.And we would put — assuming it were that much moreattractive than the second, and third, and fourth choices — we would put a big percentage of ournet worth in it.

但你偶尔会发现这些东西。而且我们会认为 - 假设它比第二，第三和第四选择更有吸引力 - 我们将把我们净资产的很大一部分放在其中。

We only advise you to do that — well, we probably don't advise you to do it all, maybe — but wewould only advise you to do it, if you're doing it based on your conclusions about — your own ideasofvalue, and something that you really feel you know enough to buy the whole business, if yourfunds were sufficient, and it was being offered to you.You ought to really understand the business.

我们只建议你这样做 - 好吧，我们可能不会建议你这么做，也许 - 但我们只会建议你这样做，如果你是根据你的结论做的 - 你自己的想法价值，以及你真正感觉自己知道足以购买整个业务的东西，如果你的资金充足，并且它正在提供给你。你应该真正了解这项业务。

But people do that all the time, incidentally, in private businesses, which have got terribleprospects.I mean, they buy dry cleaning establishments, or filling stations, or whatever, and theyput very high —franchises of some kind — they put a very high percentage of their net worth intosomething — a business that's very risky, basically.I mean, it —

但是，顺便提一下，人们在私营企业中这样做，这些企业的前景非常糟糕。我的意思是，他们购买干洗店，或加油站，或其他任何东西，并且他们投入了非常高的某种类型的特许经营权 - 他们将很高比例的净资产投入到某种东西中 - 基本上这是一项非常冒险的业务。我是认真的 -

People put all their money in a farm, you know.It's a business.It's subject to all kinds of businessrisk.

你知道，人们把所有的钱都放在农场里。这是一项业务。它受到各种商业风险的影响。

So it's not crazy, if you understand the business well, and if the price is sufficiently attractive, to puta very significant percentage of your net worth in. If you don't understand businesses, then you'rebetter off diversifying and fairly widelydiversifying.

所以，如果你了解业务，并且价格足够吸引人，你的净资产占很大比例，那就不是疯了。如果你不了解业务，那么你最好多元化并且相当广泛多样化。

Zone — go ahead.Sorry 区域 - 继续。抱歉

CHARLIE: Berkshire has a substantial shareholder whose father accumulated the original position,and when he died he left a very large estate, practically all of which was in two securities, Berkshireand one other outstanding company.

查理：伯克希尔有一个主要的股东，他的父亲积累了原来的职位，当他去世时，他留下了一个非常大的房产，几乎所有的房产都是两个证券，伯克希尔和另一个杰出的公司。

A bank was co-trustee.And the bank trust officer said you've got to diversify this.And, you know, itwas a very large estate.

银行是共同受托人。银行信托官员说你必须多元化这个。而且，你知道，这是一个非常大的庄园。

And the young man who was co-trustee with the bank said, "Well," he says, "you know, if my fatherbelieved the way you do, he might have been a trust officer in a bank instead of — (laughter)—leaving this large estate."(Applause)

那位与银行共同受托的年轻人说：“好吧，”他说，“你知道，如果我父亲相信你的方式，他可能会成为银行里的信托官而不是 - （笑） - 离开这个大房子。“ （掌声）

And that young man holds the Berkshire to this day.And I suppose the bank is still giving the sameadvice.(Laughter)

那个年轻人至今仍持有伯克希尔。我想银行仍在提供同样的建议。（笑声）

12. We don't like to "give you our answers" on Coca-Cola 12.我们不喜欢在可口可乐上“给你我们的答案”


AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, this is Chuck Peterson (PH) from Omaha. 听众：巴菲特先生，这是来自奥马哈的查克彼得森（PH）。

And I was just wondering if you could comment on the Coca-Cola Company — you haven't reallytalked about it too much today — in regards to what you foresee over the next five years, theearnings per share growth, and where this growthis, perhaps, going to come from.

而我只是想知道你是否可以评论可口可乐公司 - 你今天没有真正谈论它 - 关于你未来五年的预测，每股收益的增长以及这种增长的方式也许，或许会来自。

WARREN BUFFETT: Was that the question, about the growth of Coke? WARREN BUFFETT：这是关于可口可乐增长的问题吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: You really have to come to your own conclusion. WARREN BUFFETT：你真的必须得出自己的结论。

Coca-Cola Company writes — their annual reports are extremely good.I mean, they're veryinformative.You know, you —

可口可乐公司写道 - 他们的年度报告非常好。我的意思是，它们非常有用。你了解你自己 -

My guess is that, at least, if you read a few of the reports, you'd absolutely know as much about theCoca-Cola Company as I would.

我的猜测是，至少，如果您阅读了一些报告，您对我所知道的可口可乐公司一无所知。

But in the end, you have to make your own decisions about growth potential, profitability potential,and all that.

但最终，你必须自己决定增长潜力，盈利潜力以及所有这些。

But the one thing I can assure you is that, probably, if you spend a relatively small amount of timeon it, the facts that you will have available to you for making a decision on that question will be justas good, essentially, asthe facts you'd get if you'd worked at the Coca-Cola Company for 20 years,or if you were a food and beverage analyst in Wall Street or anything of the sort.

但是我可以向你保证的一点是，如果你花费相对较少的时间，你可以用来做出关于这个问题的决定的事实也同样好，基本上就像如果你在可口可乐公司工作了20年，或者你是华尔街的食品和饮料分析师或者其他类似的东西，你会得到的事实。

That's the kind of businesses we like to look at, are things that we think we can understand thatway.And they're also businesses that, usually, I think you could understand that way.

这就是我们喜欢看的业务，我们认为我们可以通过这种方式理解这些业务。而且他们也是通常认为你能理解这种方式的企业。

But we don't like you to give you our answers.I mean, that would not be a good idea. 但是我们不希望你给我们答案。我的意思是，这不是一个好主意。

13. Allianz deal was "close to a wash" 安联的交易“接近洗漱”


AUDIENCE MEMBER: David — I'm sorry — David Swab (PH) from Austin, Texas. 观众：大卫 - 对不起 - 来自德克萨斯州奥斯汀的David Swab（PH）。

I have a question pertaining to the convertible bonds that were outstanding for about four years. 我有一个关于可转换债券的问题，这些债券已经发行了大约四年。

Any thoughts on, if you're a teacher, to grade if that was a good deal, bad deal, how the money wasemployed compared to the cost of getting out of the bonds?Any thoughts?

如果你是老师，任何想法，如果这是一个很好的交易，糟糕的交易，如何使用资金与退出债券的成本相比评分？有什么想法吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie what?Did you get that? WARREN BUFFETT：查理什么？你明白了吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: He wants to know if you think, in retrospect, your deal with Allianz was a gooddeal for Berkshire.

CHARLIE MUNGER：他想知道你是否认为，回想起来，你与安联的交易对伯克希尔来说是一笔好交易。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I would say that if I knew everything at the time that we did the Allianzdeal — which was a convertible shareholder coupon debenture — if I knew everything now — then— that I know now, would we have done it?Probably pretty close.We had relatively few bondsconverted when we called — when he called them.And so — that — it really wasn't a negative inthat sense.

WARREN BUFFETT：不，我会说，如果我知道我们做过Allianz交易时的所有事情 - 这是一个可转

换的股东优惠券债券 - 如果我现在知道一切 - 那么 - 我现在知道了，我们会做到吗？可能非常接近。当我们打电话给他们时，我们转换的债券相对较少。所以 - 从那个意义上来说，它确实不是消极的。

But if we'd had more — we could have easily had a lot more converted.And that would not havebeen so good, obviously, if we'd ended up selling a lot of stock at 11,800 or whatever it was.

但如果我们有更多 - 我们可以很容易地转换更多。如果我们最终以11,800或者其他任何东西出售大量股票，那显然不会那么好。

It's very hard to measure exactly what we did with the 400 million or so that we took in at thetime.So, money being fungible, separating that 400 million from other resources to measure the —what happened on the plus side from having the money — is hard to do.

我们很难准确衡量我们当时采用的4亿左右的情况。因此，金钱是可以互换的，将4亿美元与其他资源分开来衡量 - 从有钱的方面发生的事情 - 很难做到。

But my guess is, if you could play the whole hand over again, it probably was maybe a tiny minusto have issued them.What do you think, Charlie?

但是我的猜测是，如果你可以再玩一遍，那可能是一个很小的减去发布它们。你觉得怎么样，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It's certainly close to a wash. CHARLIE MUNGER：这肯定接近于清洗。


CHARLIE MUNGER: Now, you could ask about USAir, and that is one we would have been well toduck.(Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER：现在，你可以询问一下USAir，这是我们本来应该好好的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: And I might say Charlie had nothing to do with that decision.(Laughter) Hedidn't even know about it till I did it.And when he knew about it, hmmm.(Laughter)

沃伦巴菲特：我可能会说查理与这个决定毫无关系。（笑声）在我做之前他甚至都不知道。当他知道这件事时，嗯。（笑声）

14. "Size is a disadvantage" in buying and selling 14.买入和卖出的“规模是一个劣势”


AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I'm Joe Sirdevan from Toronto. 听众：巴菲特先生，我是多伦多的Joe Sirdevan。

With respect to Berkshire's non-permanent, but large — and therefore, illiquid — holdings, what isyour strategy for managing market impact on sales, given the intense scrutiny that Berkshire'sunder by the market?

关于伯克希尔的非永久性，但大型 - 因此，非流动性 - 持股，鉴于伯克希尔对市场的严格审查，您对管理市场对销售的影响的策略是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: I didn't get that either.You get that? WARREN BUFFETT：我也没说。你明白了吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I'm not hearing that very well. CHARLIE MUNGER：我听不太清楚。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t know whether you’re too close to the mic — we’re having a littletrouble on that.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我不知道你是否离麦克风太近了 - 我们在这方面遇到了一些麻烦。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Speak a little more slowly. CHARLIE MUNGER：说得慢一点。

WARREN BUFFETT: Or maybe the monitor can repeat that and — would you repeat the question? WARREN BUFFETT：也许显示器可以重复这一点 - 你会重复这个问题吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sorry.Just with respect to Berkshire's large non-permanent holdings thatare, therefore, illiquid, I'm just wondering what your strategy is for managing market impact whenyou do decide to sell portions of those holdings, given the intense scrutiny you're under?

听众会员：对不起。关于伯克希尔的大型非永久性持股，因此非流动性，我只是想知道当你决定出售部分持股时，你的策略是如何管理市场影响的，因为你受到了严格的审查？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, question about the things we might sell, and what's going to happen tothe market when we sell them.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的，关于我们可能销售的东西的问题，以及当我们出售它们时市场会发生什么。

That depends.I mean, it can be a very significant impact.It can be a negligible impact. 那要看。我的意思是，这可能是一个非常重要的影响。这可能是一个微不足道的影响。

And it depends on market conditions, it depends on whether we might sell in a couple of largeblocks to some institutions, it depends on — it could be, you know, there could be a tender off orsomething of the sort we would sell through.So, it's hard to measure.

这取决于市场条件，这取决于我们是否可以向一些机构出售几个大块，这取决于 - 它可能是，你知道，可能有一个投标或我们将通过销售的那种东西。所以，很难衡量。

But it is a disadvantage.Size is a disadvantage, you're absolutely correct in the basic point, both inbuying and in selling.And we don't know any way around that.

但这是一个缺点。大小是一个缺点，你在购买和销售的基本点上都是绝对正确的。我们不知道有什么办法。

We allow for it, in terms of what we expect, you know, the kind of possibilities we need to see.Andwe do — we sell so infrequently, that it's not a crusher of a negative point, but it's a negative wehave that you do not.

根据我们的预期，我们允许它，我们需要看到的那种可能性。而且我们这样做 - 我们卖得很少，这不是一个负面的破坏者，但是我们拥有你不做的消极。

15. No key man insurance for Buffett and Munger 15.巴菲特和芒格没有关键人物保险


AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Anna (inaudible).I'm from Roanoke, Virginia. 观众：我的名字是安娜（听不清）。我来自弗吉尼亚州的罗阿诺克。

Does Berkshire Hathaway or any of its subsidiaries have key man insurance on you and Mr.Munger?

伯克希尔哈撒韦公司或其任何子公司是否为您和芒格先生提供重要人员保险？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Does Berkshire have key man insurance on — CHARLIE MUNGER：伯克希尔是否有关键的人保险 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, no.No. We have no life insurance, to my knowledge, on anyone exceptthe maybe standard — the group life contracts people have.We have no key man insurance.

WARREN BUFFETT：哦，不。没有。据我所知，除了可能的标准之外，我们没有人寿保险 - 人们拥有的团体生活合同。我们没有关键的人保险。

It really doesn't — it wouldn't be material. 它确实没有 - 它不会是物质的。

I mean, that if we have a market value of 18 billion or something like that, if it really didn’t — if it —a one — if it made a 1 percent difference, it'd be $180 million.

我的意思是，如果我们的市值达到180亿或类似的东西，如果它真的没有 - 如果它 - 一个 - 如果它产生1％的差异，它将是1.8亿美元。

And basically, the math of intelligently selling insurance is better than the math of intelligentlybuying insurance.(Laughter and applause)

基本上，智能销售保险的数学优于智能购买保险的数学计算。（笑声和掌声）

16. Guinness-VNMH restructuring was "logical" 16.吉尼斯 - VNMH重组是“合乎逻辑的”


AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I'm Barry Siskind (PH) from Mesa, Arizona.Long-time admirer ofyours.Question pertains to Guinness.

听众：巴菲特先生，我是来自亚利桑那州梅萨的Barry Siskind（PH）。你的长期崇拜者。问题与吉尼斯有关。

I remember reading in a publication I greatly respect, Outstanding Investor Digest by [editor] HenryEmerson in New York, that back in — I think it was '58 or '59, you made an investment in Cuba,decided to never to make aninvestment outside the United States again at that time.

我记得在一篇我非常尊重的出版物中阅读，纽约的[编辑] Henry Emerson的杰出投资者摘要，我想回到 - 我认为是'58或'59，你在古巴做了一笔投资，决定永远不做当时在美国以外再次投资。

Have subsequently invested in Guinness.I'm a fellow investor in Guinness.I've invested inGuinness for — and its sister company, Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy — for over five years.And I'mvery happy with those investments, by the way.

随后投资了吉尼斯。我是吉尼斯的投资人。我已经为吉尼斯投资了 - 以及它的姊妹公司路易威登MoëtHennessy--已经有五年多了。顺便说一句，我对这些投资非常满意。

There's been a restructuring, as you know, of the Guinness-LVMH relationship, where Guinness nolonger owns 24 percent of LVMH.Rather, it owns only its distilling, or I should say, alcoholicbeverage-related businesses —

正如你所知，吉尼斯 - 路易斯安那州的关系正在进行重组，吉尼斯不再拥有24％的LVMH。相反，它只拥有其提炼，或者我应该说，与酒精饮料有关的业务 -

WARREN BUFFETT: The Moët Hennessy part. WARREN BUFFETT：Mo悦轩尼诗的一部分。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Right, the Moët Hennessy part. 观众成员：对，Mo悦轩尼诗的一部分。

The other parts of LVMH are showing better results these days, namely the Louis Vuitton luggage,as well as the Christian Dior perfume.They've also expanded into the newspaper business this pastyear, a business that you understand.

LVMH的其他部分现在显示出更好的效果，即Louis Vuitton行李箱以及Christian Dior香水。他们去年也扩展到了报业，这是你理解的业务。

Do you intend to look at the possibility, first of all, of participating in those businesses that you nolonger own now — with the restructured Guinness-LVMH deal — through some other form?

您是否打算首先考虑参与那些您不再拥有的业务的可能性 - 通过重组的Guinness-LVMH交易 - 通过其他形式？

And the second question relates to the currency risk inherent in the Guinness investment, havingbought it at about $1.80, as you mentioned, pound sterling now down to about $1.48.

而第二个问题涉及吉尼斯投资所固有的货币风险，如你所说，以约1.80美元的价格买入，英镑现在下跌至1.48美元左右。

The cost of hedging foreign currency through the FX has diminished through the combination oflower interest rates in the U.K., and higher interest rates, most recently in the U.S., to just aboutzero.

通过英国较低的利率和最近在美国的较高利率（几乎为零）相结合，通过外汇对冲外汇的成本已经减少。

I take it we're all investors in companies, not speculators in currencies.So, the second part of thequestion is, do you intend to do anything about the currency risk portion of that investment?

我认为我们都是公司的投资者，而不是货币的投机者。那么，问题的第二部分是，您是否打算对该投资的货币风险部分采取任何措施？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well LVMH, which as you mentioned was 24 percent owned by Guinness —you know, that's one of thousands of securities that we could be a buyer or a seller of.So, I reallydon't want to comment on LVMH's specific attractiveness, or lack thereof.

WARREN BUFFETT：LVMH，正如你所提到的，吉尼斯拥有24％的股份 - 你知道，这是我们可能成为买家或卖家的数千种证券之一。所以，我真的不想评论LVMH的具体吸引力或缺乏吸引力。

And Guinness, I think what Guinness did was quite logical.I mean, their interest in that operationwas basically through the distribution advantages that it gave to Guinness's own brands around theworld, to be hooked up with Moët Hennessy, and vice versa.So, I think what they did was logical.

而吉尼斯，我认为吉尼斯做的事情是合情合理的。我的意思是，他们对这项行动的兴趣基本上是通过它给全世界的吉尼斯自有品牌带来的分销优势，与Mo悦轩尼诗联系起来，反之亦然。所以，我认为他们所做的是合乎逻辑的。

You can — the question of the exchange rate and all of that — the exchange rate, in terms of whatthey got in the spirits business, versus what they gave up in the luggage business, as in ChristianDior and a few things.You can form your own opinion on that.

你可以 - 汇率问题和所有这些 - 汇率，就他们在烈酒业中所获得的，与他们在行李箱业务中所放弃的相比，如Christian Dior和一些事情。你可以对此形成自己的看法。

But I think the logic was sound.But in terms of whether we want to be in LVMH by itself, that's likeany other security, which we really can't answer.

但我认为逻辑是合理的。但就我们是否希望自己在LVMH中而言，这就像任何其他安全性一样，我们实际上无法回答。

17. Berkshire doesn't hedge currencies 17.伯克希尔不对冲货币

WARREN BUFFETT: Second question related to — WARREN BUFFETT：第二个问题涉及 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Hedging. CHARLIE MUNGER：对冲。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hedge.Yeah, the hedging of currency — WARREN BUFFETT：对冲。是的，货币对冲 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Do we hedge? CHARLIE MUNGER：我们对冲吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: The answer to that is we don't.And Coca-Cola, as I mentioned, gets 80percent of their earnings from a variety of currencies, the yen and the mark being two veryimportant ones.They're going to be getting a very high percentage five years from now, 10 yearsfrom now.

WARREN BUFFETT：答案是我们不这样做。正如我所提到的，可口可乐从各种货币中获得80％的收益，日元和商标是两个非常重要的货币。从现在起10年后，他们将在五年后获得很高的比例。

They do certain currency transactions, but it's a practical matter.If you own Coca-Cola, you own abunch of foreign bonds with coupons on them, denominated in local currencies, that go on forever.

他们做某些货币交易，但这是一个实际问题。如果你拥有可口可乐，你就拥有一堆外国债券，上面有优惠券，以当地货币计价，永远持续下去。

Now, should you try and engage in currency swaps on all those coupons — you don't know whatthose coupons are yet, because you don't know how much they're going to earn in Japan orGermany, but you do know it'sgoing to go on for decades, and it's — they're going to be verysignificant sums.

现在，如果您尝试在所有优惠券上进行货币掉期 - 您还不知道这些优惠券是什么，因为您不知道他们将在日本或德国赚多少钱，但您确实知道这是将持续数十年，而且 - 它们将是非常重要的数额。

Should you try and engage in a whole bunch of currency swaps to go on out and convert all thatstream into dollars or anything?

你是否应该尝试进行一大堆货币掉期交易并将所有流转换成美元或任何东西？

We basically don't think it's worth it.We don't think our opinion on currencies is any good.We don'tthink — we think the market probably know — well, we know it knows as much about it — itprobably knows more about currencies, but it — we don't know — we do not know more than themarket does aboutcurrencies.

我们基本上认为这不值得。我们认为我们对货币的看法没有任何好处。我们不认为 - 我们认为市场可能知道 - 嗯，我们知道它对此了解得多 - 它可能对货币有更多了解，但它 - 我们不知道 - 我们不知道市场对此有何了解货币。

So there are costs to hedging.And even though interest rate structures may cause the curve to lookflat going out forward, so that, in effect, there's no contango on it, there's still the cost — there arecosts in it.Now, it's a relatively efficient market, so that they're not huge.

因此，套期保值需要付出代价。即使利率结构可能导致曲线向前看变平，因此，实际上，它没有任何正交值，仍然存在成本 - 其中存在成本。现在，它是一个相对有效的市场，因此它们并不庞大。

But we see no reason to incur those costs with what we regard as a — totally, a 50-50proposition.And it really doesn't go out that far anyway.I mean, we could do it for a couple of years.

但是我们认为没有理由用我们认为的 - 完全是50-50的命题来承担这些成本。无论如何它真的不会走得那么远。我的意思是，我们可以做几年。

But if you take that — the way we look at businesses, being the discounted flow of future cash outbetween now and Judgment Day, we can't really hedge that kind of a risk anyway.We could keeprolling hedges, but there's a cost to it that we don't want to incur.

但是，如果你采取这种方式 - 我们看待企业的方式，即从现在到审判日之间的未来现金折扣流，我们无论如何都无法真正对冲那种风险。我们可以继续滚动对冲，但是我们不想承担它的成本。

We don't — we wouldn't worry a whole lot about whether some portion of our earnings, whether it'sfrom Guinness, whether it's from Coke, whether it's from Gillette, are denominated at some mixtureof marks, and pounds, and yen,and dollars, or whether they're all in dollars.

我们不会 - 我们不会担心我们的一部分收入，无论是来自吉尼斯，是否来自可口可乐，是否来自吉列，都是以某种商标，英镑和日元计价的，和美元，或者他们是否都是美元。

We'd slightly prefer if it were all in dollars, but we don't lose sleep over the fact that it may becoming from a mix of currencies like that.We wouldn't like it, in terms of, obviously, some very weakcurrencies.

我们稍微倾向于它是否都是美元，但我们不会因为它可能来自这样的货币组合而失眠。显然，我们不会喜欢一些非常弱的货币。

18. Insurance intrinsic value far exceeds book value 18.保险内在价值远远超过账面价值


AUDIENCE MEMBER: Lawrence Grawning (PH), Mill Valley, California. 观众成员：劳伦斯格拉文（PH），加利福尼亚州米尔谷。

On page 13 of the annual report, in — talking about the insurance operation, you say that itpossesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a "large amount — larger, in fact, thanis the case at any other Berkshire business."

在年度报告的第13页，谈到保险业务，你说它拥有的内在价值超过其账面价值“大量 - 实际上比任何其他伯克希尔业务的情况都要大。 “

To refine an earlier question that was asked, could you tell me whether you mean that it is larger in— by a percentage or in absolute dollars, that is —

为了完善先前提出的问题，您能否告诉我您是否意味着它更大 - 按百分比或以绝对美元计算，即 -

WARREN BUFFETT: By absolute dollars.And — WARREN BUFFETT：绝对美元。而且 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: That's what you're referring to? 听众会员：那就是你所指的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, by absolute — it's very hard to stick a percentage figure on theinsurance business, because we have so much capital in there that —

WARREN BUFFETT：是的，绝对 - 在保险业务中保持一个百分比很难，因为我们在那里拥有如此多的资本 -

And then — and we have other businesses.I think that the — we've got businesses with a bookvalue of in the tens of millions that are worth in the many hundreds of millions.So, you couldn'tapply that to the insurance company (Inaudible).So, it's absolute dollars.

然后 - 我们还有其他业务。我认为 - 我们的企业账面价值数以千万计，价值数亿美元。因此，您无法将其应用于保险公司（听不清）。所以，这是绝对的美元。

But in terms of absolute dollars, we think the excess of intrinsic value over carrying value — at leastI do — is substantially greater for the insurance business than any other business we own.

但就绝对美元而言，我们认为保险业务的内在价值超过账面价值（至少我所做的）超过我们拥有的任何其他业务。

Charlie, do you have any — 查理，你有什么 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: No — CHARLIE MUNGER：不 -

WARREN BUFFETT: — thoughts on that? WARREN BUFFETT： - 想一想吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: — that's exactly right. CHARLIE MUNGER： - 这是完全正确的。

19. No concerns on Coca-Cola succession 19.不关心可口可乐的继承

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Joe Little (PH), Vancouver, Canada. 听众：Joe Little（PH），加拿大温哥华。

Does the management succession issue for the top job at Coca-Cola concern you? 可口可乐最高职位的管理层继任问题是否与您有关？

WARREN BUFFETT: Management picture, you'd do what with the —? WARREN BUFFETT：管理图片，你用 - 做什么？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The management succession issue over the next several years. 听众会员：未来几年的管理层继任问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：哦，是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The top job.Does that concern you? 听众会员：最重要的工作。这关系到你了吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: At Coca-Cola — WARREN BUFFETT：在可口可乐公司 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. 听众会员：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think any announcement that — from that would come with — from Coca-Cola.

WARREN BUFFETT：我认为可以从可口可乐那里宣布 - 从那时起 - 。

CHARLIE MUNGER: He said do you like it? CHARLIE MUNGER：他说你喜欢吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Does it concern you? 听众会员：这与您有关系吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Does it concern you? CHARLIE MUNGER：你关心吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I'm not concerned at all, no.No, Coca-Cola is very well managed.(Laughs)

WARREN BUFFETT：哦，我根本不关心，不。不，可口可乐管理得很好。（笑）

20. Salomon CEO's $24M bonus target "hellishly hard to hit" 20.所罗门首席执行官的2400万美元红利目标“难以击中”


AUDIENCE MEMBER: Chris Stavrou (PH) from New York. 听众：来自纽约的Chris Stavrou（PH）。

According to the latest Salomon Brothers proxy, if [Chairman and CEO] Deryck [Maughan] earns30 percent on allocated equity of Salomon Brothers, provided that that's at least 10 percent abovethe return for competitors, he could earn a bonus of $24 million.

根据最新的所罗门兄弟代理人，如果[董事长兼首席执行官] Deryck [Maughan]在所罗门兄弟的分配股权上获得30％的收益，只要它比竞争对手的回报高出至少10％，他就可以获得2400万美元的奖金。

My question is whether that return number is reduced by a charge for preferred dividends? 我的问题是，对于优先股股息，这个回报数是否减少了？

WARREN BUFFETT: I, Charlie, do you remember on the comp committee —? WARREN BUFFETT：我，查理，你还记得在委员会 - ？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I can't remember the detail on that. CHARLIE MUNGER：我不记得那个细节了。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think the equity — I — my — I'm fairly sure, but I'm not positive, that theequity figure would include our preferred, but not non-convertible preferreds.

WARREN BUFFETT：我认为股权 - 我 - 我 - 我相当肯定，但我不是肯定的，股权数字将包括我们的首选，但不是不可兑换的首选。

And it would apply to the earnings applicable to the — to our preferred plus common, but not — butit would be after dividends on non-convertible preferred.

它将适用于 - 适用于我们的首选加上共同的收益，但不适用 - 但它将是在不可转换优先股的股息之后。

But I, you know, I'm not on the comp committee, and I have not read the description that carefully. 但是，我知道，我不在comp委员会，而且我没有仔细阅读这些描述。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I am, and I can't remember.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我是，我不记得了。（笑声）

But I will tell you, one thing I do remember about that, and that is a target which would be one —would be hellishly hard to hit.

但是我会告诉你，有一点我记得那件事，那就是一个目标 - 一个人会很难被击中。

WARREN BUFFETT: It'd be unbelievable.I mean — 沃伦巴菲特：这真是令人难以置信。我的意思是 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: That's is, you're talking about Babe Ruth — CHARLIE MUNGER：就是这样，你在谈论Babe Ruth -

WARREN BUFFETT: Squared. WARREN BUFFETT：平方。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, doing 150 home runs in a season instead of a — if that happens, you'llbe very glad to pay the money.(Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，在一个赛季而不是一个赛季做150次本垒打 - 如果发生这种情况，你会很乐意付钱。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Very.Under either calculation, yeah.It really — but it, you know, I'm glad it'sthere.(Laughs)

WARREN BUFFETT：非常。在任何一种计算下，是的。它真的 - 但它，你知道，我很高兴它在那里。（笑）

I hope Deryck's paying attention to it. 我希望Deryck能够关注它。

21. Salomon is a "better company than it was some years back" 萨洛蒙是一个“比几年前更好的公司”


AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Chris Davis again, from New York. 观众成员：嗨，我是来自纽约的克里斯戴维斯。

I wanted to ask if you — I feel there's such a huge discrepancy between the valuation of some ofyour holdings versus others, in terms of the market valuation, in terms of price-to-earnings, price-to-book.

我想问你是否 - 我认为你的一些持股与其他持股的估值在市场估值方面，在市盈率，价格与账面价值方面存在巨大的差异。

In your opinion, do the growth prospects of Salomon Brothers, or the quality — or your anticipationof your ability to clip the coupons at Salomon Brothers — justify such a dramatic discount to thegrowth prospects of Coca-Cola or Gillette, in terms of ourability as Berkshire shareholders to clipthose coupons?

在您看来，所罗门兄弟的增长前景，或者您对所罗门兄弟公司优惠券能力的预期，以及我们对可口可乐或吉列的增长前景的大幅折扣是合理的。能否像伯克希尔股东一样削减这些优惠券？

And if you could explain, or perhaps share your thoughts on why the market perception, if it is —justifies that distinction?

如果你可以解释，或者可能分享你对市场认知的看法，如果是 - 证明这种区别是正确的吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I'm not sure I can answer that question without getting into a discussionof the relative merits of the two companies — or the three companies — you mentioned, at theseprices, but —

WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我不确定如果不以这些价格讨论两家公司（或三家公司）的相对优点，我不能回答这个问题，但是 -

Salomon and Coca-Cola are obviously very different kinds of businesses, or Salomon andGillette.And Charlie and I do our best to try to understand the businesses.

所罗门和可口可乐显然是非常不同的企业，或所罗门和吉列。查理和我尽力尝试了解这些业务。

Obviously, it's easier to understand the future of a Coca-Cola than it is a Salomon.But that doesn'tmean it's a better buy.

显然，理解可口可乐的未来比所罗门更容易。但这并不意味着它更好买。

And what you see at any given time in our holdings is partly the historical accident, even, of whenwe bought, and when we had money available, and all that.But it reflected an affirmative decision atthat point, obviously.

你在我们所持有的任何特定时间看到的部分是历史性事故，甚至是我们买的时候，以及当我们有钱的时候，以及所有这些。但它显然反映了那时的肯定决定。

Our guess would be that the — you know, we would feel reasonably good about anything that weowned, in terms of the price at which we bought it, and the facts at the time we bought it.And thefacts change over time.

我们的猜测是 - 你知道，我们在购买它的价格和我们购买它时的事实方面对我们拥有的任何东西感觉相当不错。事实随着时间的推移而变化。

Salomon, I think, is a better company now than it was some years back.But it's still in a businessthat’s — can be very volatile, and it has a small amount — as does any investment banking firmand as any commercial banking firm — of systemic risk.I mean, you can't get rid of that.

我认为，所罗门公司现在比几年前更好。但它仍处于一项业务中 - 可能非常不稳定，并且它的数量很少 - 与任何投资银行公司和任何商业银行公司一样 - 存在系统性风险。我的意思是，你无法摆脱它。

Charlie, you want to? 查理，你想要吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I've got nothing to add. CHARLIE MUNGER：不，我没有什么可补充的。

22. Calculating intrinsic value 22.计算内在价值


AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.Sean Barry, Regina, Canada. 听众会员：谢谢。 Sean Barry，加拿大里贾纳。

Mr. Buffett, you've indicated that most of us in this room could acquire a lot of the information thatyou and Charlie acquire through the annual reports.Yet you both also indicated that the GAAPrules, a lot of times, leave a little to be desired.

巴菲特先生，您已经表示，我们这个会议室的大多数人都可以通过年度报告获得您和查理获得的大量信息。然而，你们两人也表示，GAAP规则很多时候都有一些不足之处。

Could you perhaps give an indication as to how you and Charlie come up with the economic value,or the intrinsic value, of the businesses that you finally decide to invest in?And a little bit about theprocess that you go through with that?Thank you.

您是否可以指出您和查理如何提出您最终决定投资的业务的经济价值或内在价值？还有一点关于你经历过的过程？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the — in the 1992 annual report, we discuss that a fair amount. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，在1992年年度报告中，我们讨论了相当数量的问题。

But the economic value of any asset, essentially, is the present value, the appropriate interest rate,of all the future streams of cash going in or out of the business.

但是，任何资产的经济价值，实质上都是进出业务的所有未来现金流的现值，即适当的利率。

And there are all kinds of businesses that Charlie and I don't think we have the faintest idea whatthat future stream will look like.And if we don't have the faintest idea what the future stream is goingto look like, we don't have the faintest idea what it's worth, now.Now that —

查理和我认为，各种各样的企业都不认为我们对未来的流将会是什么样子。如果我们不了解未来的流将会是什么样子，那么我们现在对于它的价值并不是最微弱的想法。现在 -

So, if you think you know what the price of a stock should be today, but you don't think you haveany idea what the stream of cash will be over the next 20 years, you've got cognitive dissonance, Iguess,is what they call it.(Laughter) The —

所以，如果你认为你知道今天股票的价格应该是多少，但是你认为你不知道未来20年的现金流会是什么，那么你认为，我认为你会有认知失调，就是他们所说的。（笑声） -

So we are looking for things where we feel — fairly high degree of probability — that we can comewithin a range of looking at those numbers out over a period of time, and then we discount themback.

因此，我们正在寻找我们感觉到的事情 - 相当高的概率 - 我们可以在一段时间内查看这些数字，然后我们将它们折回。

And we are more concerned with the certainty of those numbers than we are with getting the onethat looks absolutely the cheapest, but based upon numbers that we don't have any — we don’thave great confidence in.

而且我们更关心的是这些数字的确定性，而不是我们获得看起来绝对最便宜的数字，但基于我们没有任何数字的数字 - 我们没有很大的信心。

And that's basically what economic value is all about. 这基本上就是经济价值所在。

The numbers in any accounting report mean nothing, per se, as to economic value.They areguidelines to tell you something about how to get at economic value.

任何会计报告中的数字本身对经济价值都没有任何意义。它们是指导您如何获得经济价值的指南。

But they don't tell you anything.It — there are no answers in the financial statements.There areguidelines to enable you to figure out the answer.And to figure out that answer, you have tounderstand something about business.

但他们没有告诉你任何事情。它 - 财务报表中没有答案。有一些指导方针可以帮助您找到答案。要想出答案，你必须了解一些关于商业的事情。

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