chapter five policy evaluation i: challenge of...
TRANSCRIPT
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Chapter Five
Policy Evaluation I: Challenge of MGNREGA and UP
Writing a letter to the then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in October, 2011 Union
Minister for Rural Development began his letter with a sentence, “I write to you in great
anguish regarding the implementation of MG-NREGA in the state of Uttar Pradesh…”
and he continues that tone in his letter writing “…the overall feedback that we have so far
reveals that the implementation of MG-NREGA in Uttar Pradesh has been far from
satisfactory…”1. In a strong rebuttal to this letter, the U.P. Chief Minister Ms. Mayawati
responded by writing to the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in following words, “I wish
to bring to your notice, the utter disregard of propriety shown by the Minister for Rural
Development, GOI who, vide his letter dated 24 October, 2011 has attempted to score
political points by alleging misuse of funds received by the State of UP, under the
MGNREGA scheme...” She further emphasised, “UP has been a pioneer in the
implementation of MGNREGA. The progress of the last three years in implementing this
scheme has clearly placed Uttar Pradesh in the top performing bracket, way above most
other states. I am attaching a chart summarizing the key performance indicators available
on the website of the Rural Development Ministry, GOI. The achievement of the State in
terms of household coverage, employment generation and expenditure incurred is clearly
evident.”2
1 The full text of the letter was made available to media and can be viewed on
Was this letter war between the U.P. Government and the Centre government
http://ibnlive.in.com/news/full-text-jairam-rameshs-letter-to-mayawati/196322-53.html 2 Full text of the letter can be viewed on http://ibnlive.in.com/news/rameshs-letter-on-nregs-baseless-maya-tells-pm/196985-37-64.html
173
merely a political exercise?, this question we would deal in much great detail in later part
of this chapter, however, it has been mentioned here to suggest the two diametrically
divergent view points on the status of implementation of MGNREGA in U.P. Before we
discuss the politics of MGNREGA, it would be worth to examine the other challenges
that are faced in implementation of the Scheme and thus in this chapter first a brief
overview of U.P.’s profile and experience with social safety net is explained. Secondly an
attempt is made to summarise the various initiatives that were taken by the Government
in U.P. for implementation of the Scheme and while doing so the structural-institutional
challenge, centre- state relationship, politicisation of the policy is discussed in detail.
Uttar Pradesh : Overview of Poverty and its Status in Context of MGNREGA
Uttar Pradesh with a total geographical area of 241 lac hectares consists of 75 districts,
822 blocks and 52000 Gram Panchayats. The present population of the state is 199
million out of which 104 million is male & 0.94 million female. The economy of Uttar
Pradesh is primarily agriculture based with about 79% of its population living in rural
areas dependent upon agriculture and allied activities, which is contributing about 30.4%
to the State’s GDP. In-spite of rich in natural resources (Land, water and bio-diversity),
high population density, has resulted into high rural poverty rate. Therefore, poverty
alleviation continues to be the top priority item on the agenda of State Government for
development. A summary of demographic profile of the State is presented in table 5.1 on
the next page.
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Uttar Pradesh: Statistical Profile at a Glance (table 5.1)3
3 The statistical data is taken from the document planning atlas of Uttar Pradesh, prepared by Planning Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh available on http://planning.up.nic.in/planning_atlas/atlas_main.htm, downloaded on February 24, 2013.
Population* 19,95,81,477
Male Population 10,45,96,415
Female Population* 9,49,85,062
Per Capita Income 16182
Density of Population 828 per sqk.m.
Decadal growth rate 20.09
No. of Districts 75
No. of Sub divisions (Tehsil) 312
No. of Blocks 822
No. of Villages 97941
No. of Gram Panchayat 51976
Total Geographical Area 241 lac hectares
Cultivable Land 167 lac hectares
Forest 21833 sqk.m.
Net Irrigated Area 131.2 lac hectares
Net gross Irrigated Area 189 lac hectares
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Thestatistical profile of Uttar Pradesh clearly suggests that in terms of the size and
comparative resources, the state has major role to play in country’s endeavour towards
social development and reduction of poverty.
While poverty studies have mainly analysed poverty in the state in terms of measurable
‘objective’ indicators (consumption, education, health etc.), some recent participatory
studies have focused on how the poor themselves perceive poverty (N. Srivastava 1997,
Kozel and Parker, 2002 ; Rao, Sharma and Srivastava, 1999)4. Analysing the poverty
issues of rural poor a report prepared by Planning Commission suggests, “For the rural
poor in UP, their social status (caste) and land ownership are the two most signifiers of
poverty. In addition, the poor identify poverty with a number of other characteristics such
as the nature of occupation, the participation of women and children in low paid work,
nature of access to education, health etc. Most of all, the poor (men and women) equate
poverty not only with material prerequisites but with lack of human dignity, which has
multiple dimensions rooted in social, political and economic freedom.”5
4 For detail studies see, Drèze, Jean and P. V. Srinivasan (1995), ‘Poverty in India: Regional Estimates, 1987-8’, Working Paper No. 36, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, New Delhi; Srivastava, Nisha (1997), “Qualitative Assessment of Poverty in Chitauri Village, Allahabad”. Report prepared for the World Bank Study on Qualitative Assessment of Poverty in Some of India’s Poor regions (mimeo); Kozel, Valerie and B. Parker (2002), “A Profile and Diagnostic of Poverty in Uttar Pradesh”, Paper presented at the Workshop on Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation, Planning Commission and World Bank, January. New Delhi; Rao, V. M., Sharma, A. N. and Srivastava, Ravi (1999), Voices of the Poor, Report prepared for the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, New Delhi.
Estimates of
poverty in 1993-94 show that Uttar Pradesh has the highest number of people below the
poverty line. An estimated 60 million people in the state live below the official poverty
5 Srivastava, Ravi. S, ‘Report of the Planning Commission Research Project on: Anti-poverty Programmes in Uttar Pradesh: An Evaluation’, Institute of Human Development, New Delhi.
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line, and over 80 percent of the poor are in rural areas. UP alone accounts for 18.9
percent of the poor in India, and an estimated 9 percent of the poor worldwide. Between
1957-58 and 1993-94, according to figures based on World Bank (1997), UP’s
achievement in poverty reduction has lagged behind the rest of India by about 6 percent.
Most of the slow-down in UP’s comparative performance can be attributed to the most
recent period. Between 1957-58 and 1987-88, UP achieved a reduction in poverty by 13.6
percent (from 55 percent to 41.6 percent). In comparison, the rest of the country achieved
a reduction in poverty by 16.6 percent. Between 1987-88 and 1993-94, the rest of the
country achieved a further reduction in poverty by 3.2 percent. During the same period,
poverty in UP rose slightly by 0.2 percent6
Not only does the State have a large absolute burden of income poverty, it ranks low
among Indian States in other indicators of deprivation. While the slow-down in the
overall growth and poverty reduction performance in the State are worrying, UP is
characterised by large variations in growth and poverty reduction performance across
regions, districts and sub-districts. The figure below gives the changes in rural poverty
across regions in Uttar Pradesh for 1972-73, 1987-88 and 1993-94. Notably,
Bundelkhand and Eastern Uttar Pradesh were among only four regions in the country
which experienced an increase in the incidence of poverty between 1972-73 and 1987-88.
.
The incidence of poverty is much higher among SC/ST, compared to other castes, both in
rural as well as in urban areas. Land is the principal productive asset in the rural areas and
landed households have a stronger chance of entering remunerative non-agricultural
occupations. Poverty is the highest among casual labour households (table5.2), both in
6 Ibid., pp.5-6.
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rural and urban areas, whereas regular and salaried workers are the lowest poor
households living in poorer localities typically had far worse physical access to these
facilities than did households living in better off localities. Drèze and Gazdar opine that
“Uttar Pradesh can also be seen as a case study of development in a region of India that
currently lags behind much of the rest of country in terms of a number of important
aspects of well-being and social progress.”7
Table 5.2: Uttar Pradesh: Rural Poverty Incidence by Land Ownership
1983/84 Poverty
Incidence
Percentage
of: 1993/94
Poverty
Incidence
Percentage
of:
Amt. of land
owned Popl'n Poor
Amt. of land
owned Popl'n Poor
No land owned 37.6 3 2 No land
owned
51.5 6 8
0 - 0.4 hectares 57.4 24 28 0 - 0.4
hectares
52.7 37 46
0.4 - 1 hectares 58.5 13 15 0.4 - 1
hectares
41.5 25 24
1 - 2 hectares 51.7 18 20 1 - 2 hectares 34.6 17 14
2 - 4 hectares 45.6 20 19 2 - 4 hectares 24.8 10 6
4+ hectares 30.7 23 15 4+ hectares 19.8 5 2
Overall 47.5 100 100 Overall 42.4 100 100
Source: Kozel and Parker (2002).
7 Dreze, Jean and Harris Gazdar (1996) ‘Uttar Pradesh: The Burden of Inertia’ in Dreze, Jean and Sen, Amartya (eds.) (1996) Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives, Delhi: Oxford University Press, p.-33.
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An analysis of poverty data suggests that poverty declined by 24% for rural all-India in
2004-05 and corresponding figures for rural UP were about 22%. But poverty gap and
squared poverty gap declined more in rural UP than in all-India. This indicates that rural
UP has made comparatively more progress in reducing the depth and severity of poverty
that rural all-India.
“The problem of low commitment to social needs in termsof government policy is
amplified by ineffective implementation at the local level.”8 The general notion of
‘inertia of development’ put forth by Drèze and Gazdar(1996) is still valid in UP. The
state is a case of governance problems. World Bank opines that governance is the way in
which power is exercised in the management of economic and social resources of a
country, notably with the aim of achieving development9.The level and pattern of
expenditure on social sector is an indicative of the priority assigned by the government to
human development. UP falls in middle category state (in which the ratio of social sector
expenditure to gross state domestic product [GSDP] is between 5% to 6%) whereas other
poor states like Bihar, Rajasthan and Orissa spend more than 8% of their GSDP on social
sector. Madhya Pradesh spends between 7% to 8% of its GSDP. The low ratio of
expenditure on social sectorin UP depicts government’s inclination towards human
development. UP-HDR mentions that another indicator of fiscal priority accorded to
social sector by a state is ratio of social sector expenditure to total expenditure. UP
belongs to low expenditure category (less than 30%) states in this indicator10
8 Ibid,.p-93
.
9 See for details, Government of Uttar Pradesh(2006), Human Development Report 2006 Uttar Pradesh, Planning Department, Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, p.161. 10 Ibid., p.12.
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The challenge of development in Uttar Pradesh is not only related to absolute vast figure
of its poor households but a critical factor is related to the inter regional disparities and
inequality among different regions of Uttar Pradesh. This has been highlighted notably in
a study in following words, “Uttar Pradesh has suffered from regional disparities and
inequality and even six decades after independence, some of the regions of this state are
very backward and the abode of the largest proportion of poor in the country. The
challenges raised by intra-regional disparities and their compounding implications on
living conditions and governance are enormous”11. Studying the development pattern of
different regions the author finds that the region and division-wise distribution of these
districts suggests that there is no most backward district in the western region. Of five
divisions, three do not even have low medium developed districts. On the contrary, most
of the districts in the eastern and Bundelkhand regions are most backward or low medium
developed. This indicates significant gaps and a neglect of backward regions in the state,
which has an important bearing on quality of life. The eastern region had the highest
incidence; above 60% poverty in rural labour households, followed by the central,
western and Bundelkhand regions, the last with the lowest of 39%. In urban areas, casual
labour households had the highest incidence of poverty. The intra-regional distribution
suggests that the highest incidence of poverty among casual labour was in the eastern
region, followed by Bundelkhand. The real challenge is to address the intra-regional
horizontal and vertical disparities at the district level which are hardly explicit in macro
level data for the state as a whole12
11 Diwakar, D. M. (2009), Intra-Regional Disparities, Inequality and Poverty in Uttar Pradesh, June 27, 2009, vol. xliv, no. 26 & 27, pp. 264- 273.
.
12 Ibid., p.272.
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Uttar Pradesh and public work programmes before MGNREGA:
A study of Sampooran Gramin Rojgar Yojna(SGRY) data available from MORD
suggests following findings about implementation of earlier public works programme.
A very small proportion of households in Uttar Pradesh has access and avail themselves
of public works programs. 1.3 percent of all households and 1.6 percent of rural
households, have at least one member of the household benefiting from public works
programs. Less than 6 households are beneficiaries of public works schemes per 100 BPL
cardholders in the state. Administrative data suggests that of the Rs. 5 billion in available
funds for public works schemes, only about 57 percent are actually utilized.13 As a
result, there appears to be scope for scale up of the program, which the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) attempts to achieve. However, Based on the
household survey data and official statistics of implantation of public works programme
an evaluation study of SGRY suggests following discrepancy in implementation14
The proportion of households receiving benefits from public works programs varies with
socioeconomic characteristics. The findings on incidence of public works programs in
UP are as follows:
.
• Participation in public works schemes is not strictly progressive across
welfare quintiles, but a higher proportion of poor households are benefiting
from the scheme than non-poor households. Across household welfare
quintiles, almost 2 percent of the poorest households have at least one 13 Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India (2003), ‘Annul Report 2002-2003’ New Delhi, India 14 Ajwad, Mohamed Ihsan (2007), Performance of Social Safety Net Programs in Uttar Pradesh, SP DISCUSSION PAPER, No.0714, World Bank, pp. 11-14.
181
beneficiary of public works, while only 0.7 percent of the richest households
have at least one beneficiary.
• Public works coverage is higher in the poorest Eastern region and the Central
region. Of all households, 1.9 and 1.6 percent of households in the Eastern and
Central regions are benefiting from public works schemes. While only 0.5
and 0.7 percent of all households in the Western and Southern (richest)
regions receive any benefits from public works. Per BPL cardholder too, the
geographic disparities remain broadly similar, with a larger fraction of
households in the Eastern and Central region benefiting from public works
schemes (around 6.3 percent of all BPL cardholders), while in the Southern
region only 2.6 percent of all BPL cardholders benefit from public works
schemes. On the other hand, the Western region’s relatively smaller fraction
of BPL cardholders leads to a higher proportion of BPL cardholders benefiting
from public works.
• SC/STs and OBC are well represented. The NSS 2004-05 reveals that almost
200,000 and 143,000 households benefiting from public works schemes are
SC/ST and OBC, respectively. These two groups make up about more than 95
percent of all public works beneficiaries, while these groups only make up 75
percent of all households in UP. This may reflect the emphasis public works
programs place on ensuring that the SC/ST population is especially targeted
by the programs. Thus 2.7 percent of SC/ST households have at least one
beneficiary. Across other backward castes and across non-backward castes 1
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percent and 0.2 percent of households have at least one public works
beneficiary.
• The realized number of days of paid work by households is less than a 10th
of
the 100 days of employment that the program is intended to provide to
households. SGRY schemes were intended to offer a maximum of 100 days of
work to at most two members of the households. However, among
households with at least one public works beneficiary, the median number of
days of work by males was 8 days. In addition the 30 percent of the
employment opportunities generated are intended for women, but according to
the NSS 2002-03 data, the number of women benefiting from the program is
very marginal. And, females worked less than a day in the preceding year.
Comparing the SGRY work days generated across the 20 states for which data
are available, UP ranks around the middle, even though it is one of the poorest
states.
• Among the few beneficiaries of public works schemes, there is variation in the
number of days of work. The median number of days of work in public works
programs ranged from 4 days in the Western region to 15 in the Southern
region. Across household welfare quintiles, the median number of days of
public works was 8 days of the year for quintiles 1, 2 and 3, but a high of 12
for those in quintile 4. Finally, there was little variation in the median number
of days of work between non backward casts, SC/STs and OBCs.
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• The wages received by public works participants are actually far lower than the
stipulated Rs. 60 per day. The median for the sample of public works
beneficiaries is Rs. 40. However, there is very large variation in the wage rates
across the sample of public works participants, with about 85 percent of the
sample receiving a wage below the stipulated wage of Rs. 60 per day.
However, to estimate the impact of the public works program on household
welfare, when in fact households receive the full allocation of wages, we
would assume that current participants in the program receive Rs. 60 per day
of work as stipulated and we assume that on average 10 days are worked each
year. Therefore, the Rs. 600 per year amounts to around 2.5 percent of total
household expenditures per annum.
There is also a significant disparity in performance indicators across administrative data
and the NSS household data. Administrative data suggests that 31.3 million man-days of
work were generated in 2001-02, while the NSS data for 2002-03 suggests that less the 3
million man-days were generated.15 Although the data sources are from two different
years, the disparity is remarkably large. Planning Commission suggests that part of the
discrepancy is due to the fictitious muster rolls created at the local level to justify
receipt16
15 Ibid.,p-14.
.
16 Planning Commission, Government of India (2002), ‘Study on Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS)’, New Delhi.
184
With the above analysis one can conclude following points about the rural poverty in
context of Uttar Pradesh:
A. The rural poverty in U.P. has been major challenge in terms of its persistence and
size.
B. The rural poverty has been significantly linked to the social group where due to
caste identities and historical deprivation on the basis of caste the incidence
poverty is much higher in the SC/ST group. Apart from caste, because of lack of
industrial growth the rural economy is primarily an agrarian economy and land
holdings are linked to poverty so the incidence of poverty is much higher in rural
landless households.
C. There is poor social infrastructure related to basic amenities like, access to safe
drinking water, literacy, primary health and other social development
programmes.
D. Not only U.P. lack is social infrastructure but also the quality of governance and
public service delivery has been unsatisfactory.
E. There is an absence of strong civil society structure that could enhance and
empower the rural poor.
F. The earlier wage employment programme has suffered poor implementation on
account of administrative as well as PRIs’capacities on ground to deliver the
programmes properly as intended leading to significant gaps in outlays versus
outcome.
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In democracy where there are different political parties working and ruling in Centre and
States the competition for taking credit as well as ownership of a policy to convey a
political message for voters is bound to happen and thus MGNREGA since its inception
has been subject to this political tussle. The scholars have analysed the politics of
MGNREGA from the perspective of political party particularly the Congress Party role in
taking credit for MGNREGA
MGNREGA and Politics of Centre – State Relations: A Macro-view
17
, however, in this section I have tried to analyse
parliamentary debate/speech, government circulars, initiatives to suggest that the politics
of policy implementation matters a lot in day to day delivery of the programme
particularly the role of political leadership in politicisation of a policy or programme like
MGNREGA creates a challenge in its implementation. The politics of MGNREGA and
its implementation in U.P. can be broadly described in three phases. The first relates to
formulation of the Act and its implementation in UP till May 2007, when there was a
Samajvadi Party rule in the State led by the then Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav.
The second phase relates to the beginning of Bahujan Samajvadi Party rule and a visible
increase in performance of MGNREGA in State till 2010. The third phase may be
described as the increasing tension between the State government and the Centre
government on the issue of MGNREGA where the State government started blaming the
Centre for not releasing it’s due share of fund in sufficient manner and the Centre citing
charges of massive leakage and corruption in implementation of the Scheme in the State.
17 For details see, Khera, Reetika (2013), ‘Democratic Politics and Legal Rights: Employment guarantee and food security in India’, IEG Working Paper No. 327; and Chopra, Deepta (2011), ‘Policy Making in India: A Dynamic Process of Statecraft, Pacific Affairs, Volume 84, 2011, No. 1.
186
In its report on the Draft Bill of NREGA in Lok Sabha, the Standing Committee on Rural
Development, Chaired by Shri Kalyan Singh (M.P.) made a very significant observation
in following words, “The Committee, however feel that before drafting such an important
and historical legislation, adequate preparation should have been done. The Department
did not even bother to obtain impact assessment/evaluation study of a similar scheme of
the Maharashtra Government and problems faced by that Government in the
implementation of that scheme. The success of the guarantee scheme proposed in the Bill
depends on the cooperation of State Governments and Union Territory Administrations
which may be implementing the provisions of the Bill. In spite of the fact that
serious concerns were expressed by the State Secretaries in informal meetings with
regard to the implementation of the guarantee legislation as enumerated above, the
Department did not care to have formal consultation and find out ways to address
various problems indicated by the State Governments.”
Politics of Formulation and Enactment of MGNREGA and U.P.
18
18 LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT NEW DELHI (June, 2005), THIRTEENTH REPORT, STANDING COMMITTEE ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT (2004-2005) (FOURTEENTH LOK SABHA) MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT (DEPARTMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT) THE NATIONAL RURAL EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE BILL, 2004, p.- 19.
This observation entails the
politics of MGNREGA formulation as the Central Government led by the Congress party
wanted to take credit for initiating and enacting this historic Act so despite the role of the
State Governments in implementation of the Act on the ground there was no formal
discussion in preparation of the Draft Bill with the States. This posed serious challenge
for the State Governments to administer the Scheme on ground because of lack of
orientation about a rights based policy different from the earlier wage employment
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programmes also due to preparedness to mobilise the administrative capacities and
resources required to implement the Scheme properly in field.
The politics of MGNREGA enactment is clearly evident when one analyses the debate on
the Bill in the Parliament. Although the Bill was passed unanimously, however, the
speech of the Congress party leaders on the Bill was related only to eulogise the leaders
of their party and particularly Shrimati Sonia Gandhi. It is worth to quote a few for
understanding of the tone that was there in the debate in both Houses of the Parliament.
Shri Jairam Ramesh M.P. said, “…I do want to introduce one element of party politics.
And, that is the only element of party politics that I want to introduce. The fact of the
matter is that the only political party, in whose manifesto the idea of Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme figures, is the Congress Party.”19 Shri R.K. Dhawan said, “ …the
present Bill…has been given a statutory shape under the inspiring leadership ofthe UPA
Chairperson and Congress(l) President, Shrimati Sonia Gandhi.”20 Shri Jyotiraditya
M.Scindia in his speech said “I have no qualms in stating that the credit for this single-
minded, dogged pursuit, dedication and vision for this Bill goes to none other than
Shrimati Sonia Gandhi.”21
19 Jairam Ramesh speech in Rajya Sabha Debates on The National Rural Employment Guarantee Bill,2005, session 205, August 24th, 2005.
The language in Parliamentary debate by the Congress Party
member’s reached to its height with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s speech in
RajyaSabha in which he said “…History will remember Soniaji for this landmark
20 Ibid. 21 Ibid.
188
Legislation, and if this Government is to be remembered for a single law or policy, it will
be this one.”22
The rhetoric and credit taking of MGNREGA by the Congress party and its’ leaders in
Parliament was significant in terms of policy implementation as wherever the State
governments were not ruled by the Congress party there was a dilemma for MGNREGA
as there was an apprehension that the dividends of this historic Act would go to the
Congress party. Thus we find that in U.P. which was led by Samajvadi Party, there was
no initiative taken for preparedness. The basic structures related to implementation of the
Scheme were never put in place. The State Employment Guarantee Council was not
constituted, neither any positive attempt was made for dedicated staffing to be done at
any level by the State Government during the Samajvadi Party rule. Assembly election
were due in the State in 2007 so the Samajvadi Party’s political move was to introduce an
ambitious scheme of dolling unemployment allowance for all unemployed educated
youths.
The political language and discourse of MGNREGA was not limited to the Parliamentary
debates only but it has been followed in the administrative instructions and management
of the Scheme continuously. Thus, one can find that when the Central Government found
that BJP led State of Madhya Pradesh is introducing projects/state schemes with different
names under MGNGREA and it feared that the M.P. government may get credit for the
Scheme, the MORD issued a circular to all state governments asking that no other name
than NREGS should be used for any project under the Scheme.
22 PM Manmohan Singh’s speech in Rajya Sabha Debates on The National Rural Employment Guarantee Bill,2005, session 205, August 24th, 2005.
189
The evidence of politicisation of the Scheme was not just limited in name or taking credit
for it but it extended to the day to day implementation as well. The Act envisaged a
provision of an apex body the “Central Employment Guarantee Council(CEGC)” for
monitoring the proper implementation of the Scheme. As per the provisions of the Act,
the Central Government is to nominate fifteen(15) non official members in the CEGC,
however, the nomination of non official members was often limited to the active party
members of the Congress Partyso much so that in 2011 when eight such members were
nominated the news paper Indian Express carried the news with heading “CP Joshi’s
Congress Employment Council”23
23 Tiwari,
. The nomination of active Congress party men in the
CEGC not only politicised the apex monitoring body but also it set an example for the
State’s to follow similar trend with formation of “State Employment Guarantee Council”
at State level, thus the idea of domain experts as nonofficial member who could have
acted as independent watchdogs and would have helped in providing proper feedback and
consultation for better implementation of the Scheme was severely restricted and
narrowed due to the political nominees filling this body. Another important development
that happened due to this was that some of these politically nominated members in the
CEGC started field visits only in those States which were ruled by opposite parties and
thus during their visit they often accused in media the State Governments for poor
implementation of the Scheme. Thus Mr.Madhushudan Mistri visited Gujrat and Mr.
Sanjay Dixit made his visits in U.P. and both of them were not only highly critical of the
State Government functioning but they also often demanded the MORD to do inquiries in
these States on their alleged cases of leakage and corruption. This was seen by the State
Ravish, The Indian Express, 14 September, 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/cp-joshis-congress-employment-guarantee-council/516571/1.
190
Governments as propaganda and their findings or reports regarding lapses in the
implementation of the Scheme were not taken seriously but merely as political vendetta.
It reduced the credibility of the apex body created for effective monitoring of the Scheme.
Although, the Central Government prohibited the States to use any other name than
MGNREGS for projects under the Act, however, in the year 2009 it amended the list of
permissible worksunder the Act to include Gram Panchayat and Block level knowledge
resource centres to be named “Bharat Nirman Rajiv Gandhi Seva Kendra.” This move of
the MORD was viewed politically motivated and one of the greatest supporter of the Act
Jean Dreze also made serious objection on this project suggesting that the material
intensive nature of it being contractor prone and against the interests of the workers24
.
In case of U.P. the politics also had an impact on smooth fund flow from the MORD to
the State Government as was told by a senior state level bureaucrat to this researcher in
interview25
24 See, Dreze, Jean (2011), ‘The Perils of Gandhigiri’, in Khera (ed.), The Battle for Employment Guarantee, op.cit., pp.257- 260.
. He cited an example of financial releases in year 2010-11 to the State. As
per his views the MORD wanted to implement one of its scheme called Providing Urban
Amenities to Rural Areas(PURA) in the district Raibareli which has been the
parliamentary constituency of Shrimati Sonia Gandhi, however, to implement this
scheme as per guideline it was required that the State Government agrees for an MOU.
The State Government had selected other districts and did not agree for Raibareli so the
fund transfer under MGNREGS was delayed deliberately for a very long period and
25 The events and reports cited in this section are based on the personal interview with senior IAS officers of Department of Rural Development, Uttar Pradesh, however, the sensitivity of the discussion involved need to protect the identity of the officials as per their requests.
191
when after much delay it was released, the release was much short than the requirement
of the State. Another, significant instance of politically motivated working of the MORD
was cited during the interview relates to an inquiry by K.B. Saxena committee set up by
the MORD . This reference is significant as this was one of the major inquiry conducted
by the MORD about implementation of the Scheme in U.P.. Mr. K.B. Saxena who has
been a retired IAS has a reputation of being extremely pro-poor activists who has worked
for rights of tribal and marginal groups. Why was he selected by MORD to conduct an
inquiry into U.P. is a puzzle because he was nominated only once by MORD for this
inquiry and he never conducted any inquiries on implementation of the Scheme before
that or after that. The terms of reference of the inquiry committee was to look into
complaints of irregularity in implementation of the Scheme in four districts(Sulatnpur,
Raibarely, Pratapgarh and Allahabad) in Uttar Pradesh. It is interesting to find that there
was no specific complaint provided to the inquiry committee to inquire into, however, the
committee after its visit in May, 2010 submitted its report after almost three months. The
report of Saxena committee made a serious and quite damaging comments on the
implementation of the Scheme in the State. Making extremely critical observations on
implementation of various legal and transparency provisions of the Act, the report said,
“The Mahatma GandhiNREGS was expected to liberate the latter from the oppressive
grip of the former by reducing their dependence for livelihood on the land owners and
giving them a better wage than what they would receive working on the private fields.
But, the capture of Panchayati Raj institutions by the landed elite and the indifferent
implementation of the programme have defeated this objective. Far from neutralising the
power structure, the manner of implementation of programme has added to its strength.”
As per version of a senior IAS officer of the State, although there were deficiency in
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programme implementation but it was not so serious as mentioned by Mr.Saxena and
according to him the report was more ideologically oriented making comments on
problems of inequity, social structures, and weak panchayti raj structures which is true
for any State and are not specific to U.P. only, however, the MORD kept delaying the
fund transfer to U.P. during the year 2010-11 on the plea of findings of Saxena
committee. The point made by State official was that although under the Act, the Centre
has power to stop fund to specific area but the MORD never ever made any such order
and more so the committee had just visited four districts so even if fund release was to be
delayed or stopped, it should have been limited to these four districts and not the entire
State. Examining the whole case from an objective point of view It is difficult to make a
clear judgement on the purpose and ideological content of Saxena committee, however, it
is suffice to say here that the implementation of the Scheme faced major challenges due
to the federal nature of polity in the country where there were different political parties in
the Centre and the State.
In this section it is argued that the administrative burden-an individual’s experience of
policy implementation as onerous-is an important consideration foradministrators, and it
influences their views on policy and governance options. This proposition was found
while doing the field study and conducting the interview with the officials from the State
headquarters up-to the Gram Panchayat officials and functionaries. It was found that the
perceived administrative burden of policy implementation is associated with a
Administrative Burden and Challenge in implementation: A View from the field:
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preference to shift responsibilities to others, perceptions of greater flaws and lesser merit
in policy that have created the burden, and resistance to related policy innovations or
constrain in implementing the innovation that would have been helpful in success of
achieving the goals of MGNREGA.
“I wanted to stress very strongly that I feel the MGNREGA have become a huge burden
for me”, this sentiment and sentence was echoed by almost all the functionaries
responsible for implementation of the Scheme, however, it was insisted in its strongest
tone by all the pradhans and panchayat secretaries in the surveyed villages. In one of
the gram panchyat like other pradhans, one of them said “We live in a rural area, this is
a part-time job for me and the added duties are making me wonder if I want to continue
as gram pradhan. Every year, it gets more complicated!” His experience was not
unusual. Another official said: “The MGNREGA process has created a burden for the
gram panchayat and takes too much time to prepare for and complete any work till end
and the job is not over with the completion but due to Management Information
Systems(MIS) feeding and the verification of work alongwith the documentation and
provisions of social audit it seems to never end.” Commenting on the constrains of
skilled and capable field level officials and the pradhans one of the block development
official (BDO) said It is very difficult to get workers that are qualified and can handle
all the paperwork related to the documentation of the Scheme as required in the Act.”
To understand the constrains and perception about administrative burden the empirical
component of local officials and block level as well gram panchayat level
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functionaries entrusted with the various role and responsibilities for implementation of
MGNREGS were interviewed with different set of questioners26
a. Regardless of their role and designation every-one of the officials
answered that they find the MGNREGS burdensome in their present
capacity to deliver.
. In all of the five
districts of filed study, twenty BDOs, twenty gram panchayat secretaries, twenty gram
pradhans, twenty technical assistants and twenty gram rojgar sevaks were interviewed.
The interview was based on set of designed questioners to understand their perception
and constrains. On the basis of their answer following it was found that:
b. The BDOs/Gram Pardhans and Gram Panchyat Secretary
unanimously suggested that they have many other schemes and thus
the energy and resource in terms of time and capacity that is required
to implement the rights based provisions of the MGNREGS is not
possible for them. This aspect clearly demonstrates the point that
without a fully dedicated staff only for the MGNREGS at every level
from panchayat to block, district and state level it is not possible to
implement the provisions of the Act in its right spirit, however,
staffing so much manpower as discussed earlier would entail a huge
administrative cost and that has been major constrain of the state
governments.
c. All the BDOs that were interviewed said that it is impossible to check
all works in their block as per the provisions of the MGNREGS as
26 The set of questioners is in Appendix -
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there are almost hundreds of works at a time going on and even if
they only do verification of MGNREGS work and nothing else, it
won’t be possible then as well.
d. All the BDOs and other senior officials at district and state level said
that the role that was envisaged in the Scheme for PRIs has not been
commensurate to the capacity of the PRIs and the institutional
structure of the PRIs is still too weak for delivery of such right based
policy.
e. It was suggested by almost all functionaries and Gram Pradhans that
the technical measurement of works in time bound manner and
project preparation is severely constrained due to shortage of J.E.s.
f. All the Gram Pradhans said that lack of proper building of Panchyat
and lack of staff at the panhayat level has severely constrained their
performance in implementation of the Scheme.
g. The problem of smooth fund transfer and uncertainty about the fund
availability along-with fear of unemployment allowance was
suggested as the prime reason for not mandating the rights of the
worker in terms of providing proper opportunity for demand of work
and giving due acknowledgement receipt.
h. Eighty percent of the Gram Pradhans that were interviewed suggested
that they find a challenge in deciding the work priorities in open
Gaon Sabha meetings because of the priorities advised by the
panchayat secretary and block level officials being accorded
preference also almost all of them suggested that the villagers first
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preference is rural connectivity and not water conservation and
creation of natural resource base as suggested in the Act.
i. Almost all the officials and Pradhans suggested that the
wage:material ratio of 60:40 is a challenging task in maintaining the
quality of the assets created and almost all of them had preference for
material intensive work rather than labour incentive works. This
clearly suggests that the people who are entrusted with the
responsibility of the implementation of the Act on ground, are not
properly aware or sympathetic to the spirit of the Act.
j. The MGNREGA- MIS that has been created for proper transparency
and process monitoring of the Scheme was viewed by the filed level
functionaries as too complex and burdensome. Lack of power in
block and gram panchayat, lack of data entry operators, lack of
proper IT-infrastructure and internet connectivity at gram panchayat
and block level coupled with improper understanding of the MIS
system due to lack of proper training, all this was cited by almost all
of the field level functionary as major burden for them.
k. The contractual staff that was hired as Gram Rojgar Sahayak and
technical assistants also opined their problems. Apart from
complaining about very meagre salary and delay of their salary
payment , the interview with these contractual staff clearly
highlighted the point that the State machinery has not prepared
proper rules for role and responsibility of contractual employees
working under the Scheme. The skill and training of the contractual
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staff was never done properly and most of them were not even
properly aware of the provisions of the Act. They performed their
task on the instructions of the panchayat secretary or the pradhan at
gram panchayat level on as and when told basis. Similar was true for
technical assistants who only functioned on the instructions of either
the BDOs or the J.E. of the region. No independent role and
responsibilities were played in any effective manner by these
contractual staff .
l. In the interview with the gram panchayat secretaries it was found that
due to several accounts for every panchayat and being in-charge of
several panchayats at one time, the secretaries were extremely
burdened. They mentioned that scholarship distribution, schemes of
Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan, various kind of pensioners verification(old
age, widow, physically handicapped), all survey related works of
government (during the course of field visits socio-economic
survey/preparation of RSBY smart card/electoral roll revision were
cited as an exemplar), election related work, hand-pump and tube-
well verification, tail feeding of canal verification, and other works
were cited as major functions apart from the rural development
schemes and panchayati raj schemes that the panchayat secretary is
responsible for at panchayat level. Thus, maintaining the multiple
accounts of all these running schemes and over all implementation of
so many schemes had already made the secretary a multiple role
playing functionary and above all he is in-charge for the MGNREGS
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at gram panchayat level. This is certainly a challenging task for him
to perform and function in an effective manner.
Administrative Initiatives and Burden of implementation of the MGNREGS in U.P.
The districts of Uttar Pradesh were included in the MGNREGA in three phases. In the
first phase (February, 2006)22 districts were included, another 17 districts were added in
year 2007-08 and from April 1, 2008 the MGNREGA was implemented in all the
districts of the State. An overview of the study of the initiatives undertaken by the State
suggests clearly that when the Act was introduced, there was a Samajvadi Party rule and
as discussed earlier the political will was not much enthusiastic about the MGNREGS.
Neither the State Employment Guarantee Council was constituted nor any other
preparatory measures like hiring of Gram Rojgar Sahayak or Technical Assistants were
initiated in any active manner till the Samajvadi Party rule. In fact one can find that the
assembly elections were due in one year from February 2007 and by
November/December, 2006 model code of conduct came into operation. This being the
election preparation year we find that the then Chief Minister Mr.Mulayam Singh
focussed much on his introduced scheme of unemployment allowance and kanya-
vidaydhan. He was visiting district after district in mega events organised for distribution
of the cheques to the beneficiaries of these “schemes”and the entire administration was
busy in organising those mega camps.
In May, 2007 when the new regime of Bahujan Samaj Party came into power and Ms
Mayawati became the Chief Minister of the State a significant development related to the
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MGNREGA took place. The minimum wages was revised from rupees fifty eight (58)to
eighty (80) first and within two month another revision was done to make it hundred
(100) per day. This was a revolutionary step as demand for wage employment
programmes is directly linked to the wage rate offered and this almost doubling of wages
within span of two months made a great impact in the interests of MGNREGS in U.P..
Jean Dreze observed the developments in following words, “it was a shrewd political
move, which created unprecedented interest in the programme among the rural poor and
took the wind out of the sails of the Congress Party as far as taking credit for NREGA in
Uttar Pradesh is concerned. This was also an interesting U-turn, considering that
Mayawati (and her predecessor, Mulayam Singh) initially ignored and even disparaged
NREGA a hare-brained imitative of the Congress Party.”27
It is worth reflecting how there were various other administrative initiatives evolved in
the subsequent period in Uttar Pradesh for implementation of the Scheme and what
challenges it brought to the Government. This can be discus in three major aspects of the
MGNREA. First, the administrative initiatives and capacity in terms of adequate
dedicated staff and functionaries to discharge the duty of demand capture and providing
employment as per the provisions and spirit of the Act. Secondly, the financial capacity
not only in terms of overall capacity to provide sufficient and timely fund for the projects
undertaken but also in terms of financial arrangements to be made for timely payment of
the wages and creation of durable assets. Finally, the issue of monitoring of the Scheme
while ensuring the transparency and accountability along with proper grievance redressal
mechanisms to address the complaints and grievances.
27 See, Dreze, Jean and Oldiges, Christian (2011), ‘NREGA: the Official picture’, in Khera(ed.), The Battle for Employment Guarantee, op.cit., p.36.
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Because of the size and nature of rights based entitlements to be delivered in due time it
was clear in the formulation of the Act that there would be dedicated staff and
administrative structures from State level to Gram Panchayat level for the implementation
of the Scheme.
Staff and administrative capability:
This may be understood in terms of four-tier structure existing:
Structure/Set up in UP to run the scheme:
(STATE/DISTRICT/BLOCK/GP)
1. All the policy decisions are taken by state rural development department headed by
Principal Secretary Rural Development (PSRD). State Employment Guarantee council
was constituted in May, 2006 itself under chairmanship of Agriculture Production
Commissioner(APC), the senior most administrative functionary in state bureaucracy
after the Chief Secretary however, the council initially had only official members and
the non-official member got nominated only in the year 2008 but the inclusion of non –
official members was again on done with political loyalists of the ruling party BSP. Thus
the input dividend desired from the wisdom of non-official members as envisaged in the
Act, was in serious deficit in terms of its quality.
STATE LEVEL:
2. For day to day functioning at the head quarter level there is an office of Commissioner
Rural Development and a state level MGNGRES cell has been constituted with an Add.
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Commissioner (an IAS officer) and supporting staff to monitor and see the execution of
the scheme.
3. At District level, during the initial years of the implementation the Chief Development
Officer was nominated as District Programme Co-ordinator, however, it was experienced
that without the leadership of District Magistrates who otherwise or the key leader in
field or in a district to head the government programme and policy implementation, it was
not working so the decisions was made in year 2008 to nominated the District Magistrate
as DPC and the Chief Development officer as ADPC(Additional District Programme
Coordinator), and Project Director District Rural Development Authority (DRDA) as
joint DPC. In UP there would about 20 CDOs from PDS (Provincial Development
Service) cadre(promoted from BDO cadre), about 7 to 8 CDO from IAS cadre and rest
are senior PCS (Provincial Civil Services) officers with about almost 20 years of
seniority in the service.
4. At block level, BDO has been nominated Programme Officer. There are 820 Blocks
and out of these 820 blocks about 378 of them are headed by direct recruits from state
public service commission. About 300 are promoted. But there was almost lack of two
hundred BDOs against the number of Blocks and this has seriously affected the
programme implantations as most of the BDOs were working in charge of more than one
Block.
5. At Gram Panchyat(GP) level: The Gram Pradhan and Gram Panchayat secretary
(Sachiv)operate the NREGS account. The Panchyati Raj structure existing today is
administratively challenging as there are about 52000 GPs and only about 16000 Sachiv
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posts sanctioned and not all these are also filled(about 13000 filled). Thus, one Sachiv is
in-charge for more than 4-5 or sometimes 7-8 GPs. During field study in District
Sonbhadra it was found in that one Gram Panchayat Secreatry was handling charge of
twenty two Gram Panchayats and the feed back from the field functionaries has been that
it is not quite uncommon where due to lack to sanctioned and filled post there are more
than ten Gram Panchayats that are managed by one Gram Panchayat Secretary.
The Act and operational guidelines of the MGNREGS asked states to hire contractual
dedicated staff in terms of Gram Rojgar Sahayak at GP level, Technical Assistants (TAs)
at cluster of GP level and Assistant Programme officers(APOs), accountants and data
entry operators at Block level so that the implementation of the Scheme does not suffer
because of lack of the administrative human resource. This idea of hiring contractual staff
initially appeared to be good in theory but as with experience of its practice in actual field
we find that it posed major challenges in terms of recruitment, service conditions and
capacity to hire. In Uttar Pradesh following initiatives were tried in this regard:
Dedicated contractual Staff for MGNREGS and their status:
For the Gram Rojgar Sahayak(GRS): the Gram RojgarSahyak is appointed at GP
level. The selection process involves inviting application at GP level and preparing a
merit list on the basis of high school and intermediate marks. He is appointed by GP but
the list is approved by District level committee. The reservation criteria was followed so
in GP reserved for the category of Pradhan the GRS was selected of the same category.
At present he receives salary of about 2500 pm.
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While doing this research it was found that there is a major crisis on GRS as the initial
decision of its appointment mentioned the maximum term for three years and in most of
the districts the three year period got over in 2010-11 and the union of GRS began its
demand to let them continue. There were various court cases on the issue and in the High
court the Government Order was up held, however, the GRS Union has challenged it in
Supreme Court. The Government had began a time bound recruitment process but again a
stay of high court was done and there is a lot of uncertainty at present.
The salary of GRS was tentatively suggested in initial circular of the MORD as 2000 per
month, however, during the study it was found that within one year of the hiring of the
GRS they formed a union and there has been constant demand by the union not only to
raise more salary but also for various other benefits including their regularization as
government servant. There has been many strong protests and demonstration dharna by
the union and sometimes it has led to violent turn in State capital Lucknow on the issue.
The constrain of administrative fund availability also compounded the problem of
staffing as given the regional variation of Uttar Pradesh and number of Gram Panchyats.
In the western U.P. districts and the districts with large number of Gram Panchayats but
less labour budget found that due the lesser labour budget they could not recruit
because their share of administrative fund is too low as its only 6 percent of the total
budget. Those districts who initially hired GRS soon realized that they are not able to pay
the salary because of constrain of administrative fund as it was observed in Gorakhpur
where the salaries of the GRS was almost delayed beyond six moth to one year.
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This was the second category of contractual staff recruited in Uttar Pradesh. The initial
recruitment process was creating a panel of Technical Assistants (on 7-8 GP). The panel
was to prepared by district administration. The salary provision was fixed on performance
basis. Now it is changed from performance to fixed salary 8000.
Technical Assistant:
Involving Service Providers and Litigation
In 2008 it was observed that there was lesser number of Technical
Assistants functioning. Also the other category of staff at Block level (APO/Computer
operator/accountant) were planned to be recruited. It was decided to recruit these staffs
through service providers to avoid the problems of hiring direct contract employees as in
case of GRR. The bidding and process of service providers selection for providing staff
of these category started and at various places the staff got in place through service
provider. However, even this category of staffing could not be smooth and a long legal
battle started between the employees and the Government. The High Court stayed
involvement of service provider than when the decision of government was finally up-
held in special appeal, the decision got stayed in Supreme Court. In the mean-time the
employees who were hired through service provider have got a stay for their continuance
from high court. As service provider could provide about 30 percent of staff required
before it got stayed so the government finally decided that the recruitment would be done
through District Magistrates on contract. Thus, as of now we have various kind of
people(mode of recruitment) working on contract. It was observed during the research
that the problem is compounded with not having any Human Resource(HR) policy in
:
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place for the hiring and service conditions of the contractual staff. To illustrate the
example- the Government Order issued to recruit people doses not prescribe any format
of contract and traveling allowance rules or leave rules. Till date whatever sketchy
standard format was made it was only limited to contract format of GRS and for other
employees it is not existing.
The staffing problem was just one part of the challenge, another major challenge has been
to build up the capacity and technical know-how expertise for the existing and hired staff.
A review of this aspect suggests that as far as senior official of the districts that is DM,
CDOs, PDs, and BDOs, are concerned there was never any dedicated training organized
for them on the various aspects of the MGNREGA. An interaction with the State level
in-charge officer suggested following issues on this point:
a. There has been not one single DPC level workshop on MGNREGS. On the
basis on anonymity he suggested that “there is a catch -22 situation. CM
Mayawati wanted to implement the MGNREGA in field as the Scheme
benefits were to reach to the vote bank base of the BSP in the state; i.e., the
rural land-less agriculture labour which comprised in majority by
ScheduledCasts(SCs) and Scheduled Tribes(STs). The wage rate hike was
linked to this aspect, however, at the same time there has been politically a
hesitation about who would get credit of the scheme(Central Government or
State Government) so it was never made politically or otherwise openly a
priority item for the ruling BSP.” Whatever sensitisation of the senior officials
in districts about the rights based provisions of the Scheme was done was
through efforts of communication(letters/circulars) and follow-up.
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b. No training could be formally organized for other officers like CDOs/BDOs
involved in implementation. So if a new PCS officer who has never been a
CDO is posted all of sudden as CDO than he never had any opportunity to be
trained on the various aspects of the Act. There is no formal structure existing
to train newly appointed officials involved in implementation of the scheme.
c. Given the design and nature of the Act it was desired that the State
Government would undertake the capacity building of officials on priority
basis for the proper implementation of the Scheme on the ground, however, as
the State Governments never had any such precedence for any other policy or
the programme so there simply existed no such structure or institutional
arrangement to undertake this aspect and as the Scheme was left to be
implemented like any other government programme. It was found while
interaction with officials that the understanding of most of the CDOs, PDs and
BDOs requires a constant effort as many of them don’t understand the use of
IT applications as envisaged in monitoring of the Scheme and this seriously
affected not only the implementation in terms of timely MIS inputs but also
the lack of understanding on rights based provisions to be implemented
properly.
d. There are promoted BDOs whose capacity is severely challenged to work as
Programme Officer and there training could never be organised because they
were in charge of various other programmes at Block level and given the
shortage of BDOs, it was felt by the government that any formal training is
unnecessarily a burden as they can’t be taken out for even one week short
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duration training programme from the regular routine job that there were
performing.
e. Similarly we find that there was never any formal training imparted to the
other field level functionaries like Gram Pradhan, Gram Panchayat
Secretaries, and other contractual staff. This was mainly because neither the
training modules are the technical capacity was there for undertaking such a
large capacity building programme nor there was any realization of the value
of the training as more than training it was programme implementation in day
to day official work that was considered more significant.
The above details about the institutional capability of the State Government in having
recruitment of adequate staff and skilled officials clearly highlights the point that the
provisions of the Act has been such that it has posed a great challenge for the State
Government. As the Central Government makes provisions of the Schemes, it rather than
taking into considerations of the problems of the State Governments often makes
provisions of the contractual hiring of staff for supporting administrative capacity of the
States, however, the provision has not worked as intended because in most of the cases
the salary structure is too low in comparison to similar full time government employee.
This leads to forming of union by contractual staff and agitations for better service
condition. The attraction to get hired in contractual position is that it would enhance the
prospects of being permanent some day in the department against the vacant post or over
a period of time it may lead to regularization of the contract as full time government
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employee. So be it Integrated Childe Development Scheme(ICDS) where
Anganvadi workers are hired, or it is Sarv Siksha Abhiyan (SSA) in which para-
teachers are recruited or health programme in which ASHA as rural health
workers are functioning one can find that in all such Schemes the contractual staff
has become a burden for State Governments.
The regional imbalance and shortage of fund on administrative account also leads
to uncertainty at State level. The MGNREGS initially has 2 percent provision and
subsequently it has been increased and fixed at 6 percent of the programme fund
but this 6 percent of the labour budget at district level created a challenge for
various districts because of large number of GPs and less labour budget. While
discussing the problem and requirement of the administrative budget one of the
official at State MGNREGS Cell suggest that if the State Government follows the
hiring of the staff as per the operational guidelines of the Act than it would have
led at the minimum following requirement of funds in the beginning of the
programme (shown in tabular form on next page):
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Requirement of Administrative Fund Under MGNREGS : A Draft Calculation(table 5.3)
S.L. Level Posts Required Posts Sanctioned Cost per Person
Per Month in lakh
Tentative Administrative cost salary and other
1 2 3 4 5 (in Lakh) 1 State Level Experts 8 0.30 28.80
MIS Experts 3 0.30 10.80
Social Audit Co-ordinator 1 0.25 3.00
0.00 2 District Level MIS Experts 71 0.20 170.40
Social Audit Co-ordinator 71 0.15 127.80
0.00 3 Block Level T.A.s 10000 0.09 10800.00
MIS Operator 820 0.08 787.20 Social Audit Off. 820 0.10 984.00 0.00
4 GP level Social Auditor (Rs. 4000 *2)Per Panchayat per year 41600.00
RozgarSewak 52000 0.025 15600.00 Total on salary 70112.00
SUBJECT OF EXPENDITURE
ESTIMATED EXP. PER
BLOCK/ PER YEAR
ESTIMATED EXP. PER GRAM
PANCHAYAT/ PER YEAR
TOTAL EXP. DURING THE
YEAR OF STATE
Amount converted into lakh
1 POL/ VECHILE 180000 147600000 1476
2 TELEPHONE /
INTERNET 18000 14760000 147.6 3 IEC ACTIVITY 2500 130000000 1300
4 SOCIAL AUDIT 5000 260000000 2600
5 STATIONERY 2000 104000000 1040 6 MIS 200000 164000000 1640 7 SANDRY 25000 20500000 205
GRAND TOTAL 840860000 8408.6
Total requirement 78520.60
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This indicative calculation was based on the salary structure and other expense calculated
in the year 2010-11. Since its inception the maximum expenditure of U.P. in a year has
not been more than 5900 Crore so calculating it from the provisions of the Scheme(6
percent could maximum be spent on administrative cost) there was never more than 400
Crore maximum available whereas need has been always double of it. This constrain has
been a major challenge in putting systems in place as mandated in the Act.
During the initial period for the inception of the MGNREGS, the MORD made
arrangements of transferring the funds directly to the districts as other centrally sponsored
programme, however, the provision of demand based allocation led to major challenge in
smooth transfer of funds as the Ministry’s way of calculation of due amount of a district
was quite different for the MGNREGS than other schemes. It’s important to understand
this aspect because of not only its different nature but also because in the field it was
found that the timely availability of the budget was one of the most critical component in
ensuring the rights of the workers.
Financial provisions and challenge for the State:
In all other schemes (except MGNREGS)the districts have been use to simple formula of
two installments, in which, once the budget for the year is approved, the Ministry
calculates the opening balance(the unspent balance at the beginning of the financial year;
i.e. on April 1 ) and adds up the remaining amount that is due as first installment for the
scheme (in most schemes it is equal to fifty percent of the annual allocation) and once the
district utilizes about sixty percent (60%) of the first installments it gets the remaining
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release of its annual budget. To illustrate it as an example: if a district ‘A’ gets approval
of say 30 crore as annual budget for a scheme say ‘x’ and the central share due was 25
crore for the year and in the beginning of the financial year if the opening balance of the
district under the scheme was 5 crore than the MORD calculates the first installment due
as 12.5 crore of the Centre share component but as the opening balance is 5 crore already
with the district so it would release 7.5 crore as first installment and once the district
utilizes 60 % of 15 crore that is 9 crore it would demand remaining share of the central
release and the MORD would release the second tranche as 12.5 crore. This formula has
been in practice for all the schemes implemented by MORD, however, with MGNREGS
this arrangement changed in such a manner that most of the district level officials
involved in implementation of the Scheme could never understood why they were
allocated lesser budget than approved annual budget. Although it is difficult to
understand how the MORD has been deciding to release funds under MGNREGS,
however, a standard procedure to understand it in simple manner is as following:
The districts prepared the annual labour budget(this was the total project fund for a
financial year) month wise detailing how many persondays would be generated in which
month. This was burdensome because not only number of households was to be
calculated month-wise but also the persondays for every month based on the anticipated
demand. The projects that would be undertaken were to be for meeting this anticipated
demand along-with the annual labour budget was to be passed in the Gaon Sabha
meeting. The field functionaries have never had any experience of such detail
preparation experience in any other previous wage employment programmes so it was a
constrain for them to follow this properly.
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The MORD always looked at the previous year performance of persondays generated and
either approved the similar or a mild increase in the labour budget. So to illustrate it as an
example if a district projected annual labour budget of generation of two crorepersondays
and if it had generated only Ninty Lacs persondays in the previous year than the MORD
approved its labour budget around one crore persondays. Once, the labour budget
approved the MORD examines the monthly demand and it would calculate the first six
months demand as first tranche of the scheme so the fund required till September 30th is
released taking into account the opening balance. This part is crucial for understanding
the challenge of fund release as historically given the nature of climatic conditions in
northern part of India, due to excessive summers first and then due to rain the wage
employment has often been low till September. It is also because during monsoon due to
rains the projects that have earthen work component could not be undertaken and most of
the labour intensive projects under the Scheme are such work. So an analysis of labour
budgets of the districts and the State suggests that almost forty percent demand is
projected till first half that is till September 30th and remaining sixty percent demand is
projected during October to March. Thus, if one crore persondays labour budget was
approved the first six month would be projected to be around 40 lacs personday. The
MORD would release fund as mentioned earlier for forty lacs personday. Once the
districts used the sixty percent of the available fund they were eligible for second tranche
but here the MORD use to examine the proposals of district demands on various
parameters as what has been the rate of employment in the first six month and than what
is the remaining fund in hand with the district and what is the possibility of the district
generating the persondays in remaining financial year. All this calculation was so much
complicated that the districts could never be sure of what is going to be the next tranche
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release and often it use to be so low that the uncertainty of fund release remain a major
challenge with implementing authorities to plan and execute the Scheme on the ground.
Again, it led to multiple installments in one financial year. In initial years of the
implementation of the Scheme we find that there were districts like Unnao who received
almost eight installments of the MGNREGS funds in one financial year. To overcome
the challenge of smooth fund transfer the MORD has tried various options. It asked the
States to create a state fund where the MORD would transfer the fund and then the States
were suppose to transfer it to district. It has made a software for on line submission of the
demands. It has now enforced Electronic Fund Transfer Mechanism where the entire fund
disbursal is now based on MIS transactions. All this has only increased the burden on
implementing agencies as due to lack of basic infrastructure and training at the Gram
Panchayat level this increasing application of IT and MIS only leads to challenge of
operationalization of the desired goals. There has been a growing feeling among the
officials at the State and district level related to implementation of the programme that
the MORD is facing shortage of fund for the Scheme so it is making the provisions as
cumbersome as possible for delaying and cutting the fund release. This feeling does not
seems to be completely unfounded as the budget for the Scheme was increased
significantly only during the year 2008-09 when it was decided to implement in all the
districts and since than it has been kept at that level only in next four financial years
where as the wage and other components related to the programme has been rising every
year.
Fund transfer from Centre to the State and district is just one part of the challenge faced
in the scheme. The other set of problems were at the field level to allocate fund to
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implementing agencies. There has been too much discretion at district level because of
given nature of the Scheme and it was experienced that often this discretion of fund
release was used in poor manner based on local political and other ulterior motives of the
officials. When the authorities realized this problem at state level in UP there was another
innovation done and the State decided to transfer fund directly to Gram Panchayat
account from the State level. It was a herculean task to transfer fund properly to nearly
fifty two thousands of Gram Panchayat but here despite the challenge the state level
officials did remarkable job worked hard to ensure a transparent and proper system. This
innovation of the State was studied by National Institute of Rural Development and it
commended the provision. However, during field interviews it was found that the district
and block level officials were not very happy as they lost the discretion of the fund
transfer to GPs and this had made them disoriented towards the Scheme to some extent.
The ambiguity about the fund availability in the Scheme often led to the delay in project
sanction and it also severely affected the timely payment of wages. With MGNREGS
fund there was a growing interests in convergence of the MGNREGS fund with various
other progrmmes of different departments that were having projects related to labour
intensive nature. Forest Department, Irrigation, Minor Irrigation, Horticulture, Public
Works Department and others started looking for MGNRES fund for labour component.
This convergence was promoted as good provision of the Scheme by MORD as well. The
logic has been simple that the MGNREGS fund convergence with these different
programmes would add up to the quality of assets created and it would be maximum
utilisaiton of the resources available with different Ministries.
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This aspect of MGNREGS and push for convergence created major challenge at field
level because of following issues:
A) The line departments have never had any training about the rights based
programme and the prime focus of creating wage employment opportunities.
MGNREGS fund were just a means for them to fulfill their departmental targets.
These departments and there officials had a system of contractor driven project
execution and thus they found it extremely difficult to work without a contractor.
B) The wage provisions of the Scheme posed a serious challenge for the departments
as their own financial rules were never designed for such programmes so in forest
department it is only a Divisional Forest Official who under departmental
financial rules has been given power to operate account. Thus in districts like
Sonbhadra and Jhansi where large scale forest work was undertaken the timely
issue of cheque for labourers was never possible as the number of workers was
almost nearly fifty thousands and there was no way possible for one single person
to sign so many cheques. Similar has been the story with Minor irrigation or
Irrigation department where only a district level Executive Engineer is authorized
to issue cheques and thus preparing and passing of cheques in time for so many
works and so many labourere at GP level by these officials was nearly impossible.
This kind of administrative challenge was never before these departments and
they were not prepared for such Scheme.
C) Problem of fund devolution and timely payment of wages become a challenge in
field also in terms of paying wages only trough bank accounts. To check the fraud
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and misappropriation of money by putting bogus names in muster rolls the
Ministry issued a directive in year 2008 for payment of wages only through bank
or post office accounts. This was intended as positive measure, however, opening
of bank accounts for so many families was a great task for administration. In
Uttar Pradesh more than One Crore bank accounts were opened by the year 2011-
12. The lack of rural branches and man power in the banks often led to delay of
wages to a great extent. This was massive problem in poor and geographically
backward regions like district Sonbhadra and Jhansi where there large number of
workers but lesser number of bank branches. In these districts in most of the rural
braches where only two bank staff was there the number of workers was often
more than five thousand. On any given day there would be more than 200 to four
hundred or more worker visit these branches for getting their wage withdrawal.
This put tremendous pressure on authorities and a major challenge to timely
disburse the wages. The bank payments were also not free from irregularities as
was found in the field survey. A exclusive study on this aspect also found that,
“…the social context has an important bearing on the functioning of the system of
bank payments. Once a labourer’s wage are withdrawn from the bank account, it
is her relationship with (say) the Sarpanch or contractor that determines her
share.”28
The above points on the financial capability and challenges posed by the provisions of the
Act clearly demonstrate the fact that the implementing agencies were not prepared for the
institutional design required not only for proper fund availability required for such
28 Adhikari, Anindita and Bhatia, Kartika (2010), ‘NREGA Wage Payments: Can we Bank on the Banks?’ In khera (ed.), The Battle for Employment Guarantee, op.cit., p.148.
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programmed in field but also the provisions and administrative arrangements have been
quite burdensome for timely payment of wages to the workers.
The Act has many significant innovative provisions related to monitoring, accountability
and transparency of the implementation of the Scheme, however, as found in the field
survey it is this aspect that has been the most difficult and challenging aspect of the
Scheme to be implemented. As mentioned earlier it has been desired in the Act that from
apex level Central Employment Guarantee Council (CEGC) up-to the GP level vigilance
and monitoring committees(VMC) to be formed and function in a vibrant manner for
proper monitoring of the Scheme. Being innovative and first of its kind these
arrangements could never function properly. The spirit and design of the Act has been
that the people at village level would exercise control over the planning and executions of
works through Gaon Sabha and its related institutions like VMCs, however, the
Panchayati Raj System in India and particularly in U.P. is still not strong enough and the
Gram Pradhan is all powerful whereas GaonSabha is hardly empowered. Weaken Gaon
Sabha structure and lack of administrative and institutional arrangements like sufficient
number of Gram Panchayat Secretary and Gram Panchyat Bhavan to organize Gaon
Sabha meetings on regular interval seriously undermined the provisions of monitoring
and transparency.
Monitoring, Accountability and Transparency Challenge:
The MORD have deployed National level monitors for field verification, however, there
number is too few and most of them are retired army officials who are not through with
the administrative and institutional mechanisms at grassroots level. The Scheme have
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some of the extremely strenuous provisions like hundred percent verification by
Programme officer at block level. This can not be practically done, for example in the
year 2011-12 number of works in the State under the MGNREGS was about 76 lacs and
number of BDOs who functioned as programme officer was about 650. Even if we
include all the block it would be about almost 1000 works in a year to monitor in each of
the 820 Blocks. This is an impossible challenge for a single person functioning at Block
level to verify each project.
The record keeping and MIS has been major challenge due to lack of capacity of the staff
and basic IT infrastructure. The provisions of social audit could never be properly
implemented because it involved hiring of staff to conduct the social audit and the State
government had already faced serious challenge in recruitment of staff earlier so lack of
sufficient administrative fund and hesitation of administrative burden of contractual staff
that would be deployed for social audit led the state government to delay its
institutionalization as far as possible. The solace to the State Government has been that
except the state of Andhra Pradesh there is no other state where social audit mechanism
was evolved. The lack of monitoring structure and transparency provisions are as much a
result of lack of resources in the State as they are due to lack of political will as ensuring
it would have mounted a pressure on the State Government to build Gram Pachayat
Bhavans as functional secretariat of Gram Panchayat and that would have involved
financial burden in creating the physical infrastructure as well as recruitment of staff such
as more Gram Panchayat Secretaries and engineers. This burden of having dedicated
human resource along with creation of IT and physical infrastructure has been a major
challenge for the State Government in implementation process of the Act.
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Policy implementation requires someone to do the job of implementing. This job might
be welcome or unwelcome, hard or easy. The burdens of policy implementation are
embedded into the day-to-day existence of the implementer. It surely, has an influence on
bureaucratic preferences and actions related to these policies. And yet, the concept of
administrative burden has been given little direct attention in administrative scholarship.
In this chapter, based on the field survey and interviews with stake holders entrusted with
responsibility to implement the Act an attempt was made to understand the existing
challenge of MGNREGA implementation from bureaucratic perspective as they
perceived. It is argued that the administrators experience of policy implementation as
onerous is an important variable in understanding bureaucratic policy preferences. There
are existing theory that emphasizes the importance of a match between the individual and
the substantive values of the task in fostering workplace attitudes and effort (Brehm and
Gates 1997)
Conclusion:
29
29 Brehm, John, and Gates, Scott (1997), Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
but has largely neglected how the perceived burden of a task might matter.
For example, agency theory assumes the potential for shirking among employees, but
does not consider onerous work as a sourceof shirking. Second, rather than focus on
commonly studied indicators of employee task and behaviour – such as job satisfaction,
turnover, or commitment – instead it was examined how administrative burden frames
employee attitudes about policy and governance issues. It was found that higher
perceived administrative burdens cause the government officials to prefer shifting
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responsibilities to others, perceive greater flaws and lesser merit in policies that have
created the burden, and oppose policy innovations perceived as increasing workload.
Thus, it was found that the priority of transparency and monitoring provisions were never
followed citing the challenge or the administrative burden involve in it as a reason. In the
following chapter a deconstruction of policy design has been presented from gender
perspective to illustrate that how despite tall claims a policy in formulation and
implementation is affected because of lack of sensitivity in putting required provisions in
policy and how this becomes a challenge when the policy is implemented. As the
leakage and corruption in the Scheme has been one of the most debated issue about its
implementation challenge, it has been discussed in detail in a separate section in the next
chapter of this study.