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Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE רררר ררררJoint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

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Page 1: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Cryptography and Sudoku

Moni NaorWEIZMANN INSTITUTEOF SCIENCE

מוני נאור

Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Page 2: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

What is Cryptography?

Traditionally: how to maintain secrecy in communication

Alice and Bob talk while Eve tries to listen

AliceBob

EveEve

Page 3: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Cryptography

Very ancient occupation

Biblical times: Atbash in Jeremiah

ותתפש תהלת כל הארץששךאיך נלכדה

בגוייםבבלאיך היתה לשמה

Egyptian Hieroglyphs

Unusual ones

...

Many interesting books and sources, especially about the Enigma (WW2)

Page 4: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Modern Times

Up to the mid 70’s: classified military work

Exception: Shannon, Turing*

Since then - explosive growth

Commercial applications

Scientific work: tight relationship with Computational Complexity Theory

Major works: Diffie-Hellman, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA)

Recently: more involved models for more diverse tasks.

How to maintain the secrecy, integrity and functionality in computer and communication system.

Prevalence of the Internet:•Cryptography is in the news (daily!)•Cryptography is relevant to ``everyone” - security and privacy issues for individuals

The Study of the resources needed to solve computational problems

Page 5: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Computational Complexity Theory

Study the resources needed to solve computational problems

Computer time

Computer memory

Communication

Parallelism

Randomness

Identify problems that are infeasible to compute by any reasonable machine

Taxonomy: classify problems into classes with similar properties wrt the resource requirements

Help find the most efficient algorithm for a problem

A computational problem:

•multiplying two numbers,

•selecting a move in a chess position

•Find the shortest tour visiting all cities

P=NP?

Page 6: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

The Crypto Arms Race: ~3000 BC - ~1980“Secure” System

“Break”

Traditional crypto: 8 attack 9defense

Modern crypto (1976 -): 9 defense 8attack

“Secure” System+

“Secure” System+

+

“Break+”“Break++”

“Secure” System

“Secure” System+

Page 7: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Sudoku

Fill in the empty entries in the grid so that         every row,         every column, and         every 3 x 3 subgridcontains the digits 1 through 9.

Page 8: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Sudoku

Fill in the empty entries in the grid so that         every row,         every column, and         every 3 x 3 subgridcontain the digits 1 through 9.

Can be generalized to an nn grid, where n=k2.

The size of an instance is O(n2log(n)) bits.

Nothing special about the numbers 1…9.

Page 9: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

The Plot

I know the solution!

Oh yeah?Prove it!

Well, I could

show you, but…

…I don’t want to tell you

how to solve it…

Veronica

Paul

Page 10: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Paul wants to prove that “A is true”

If “A is true”: Veronica is convinced, but doesn’t learn about A! She can’t prove that “A is true”.

Blah Blah?

BlahBlah?

Blah!

Oh!

Page 11: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Authentication: prove your identity to someone using secret information, without revealing the secret

Force malicious adversaries to act according to protocol

Why study zero-knowledge for Sudoku?

It has nice properties

It’s educational – everybody knows Sudoku

It’s FUN!

Why Study Zero-Knowledge Proofs?

Design protocol with benign adversaries.

Then compile to withstand malicious ones

Page 12: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Outline

Definitions

Physical model

A basic protocol

2 variations

Page 13: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Interactive Proof

Probabilistic protocol between 2 parties: Prover and Verifier

Both know instance of a problem

Prover might know a witness/solution

Players “chat”, and at the end, verifier accepts or rejects

Completeness: probability that honest verifier accepts correct proof

Soundness error: probability that verifier accepts incorrect proof

Page 14: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Zero-Knowledge Proof

Interactive Proof

Zero-knowledge property:

Whatever Verifier learned from Prover,

could have learned by himself

Exists efficient Simulator that can simulate conversation, without access to Prover

zero-knowledge proof for all NP

Proof of 3-colorability

Proof for HamiltonicitySet of problems that

have efficient verification

Page 15: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Sudoku and Complexity

Sudoku is in NP

Means: easy to verify solutions In fact: Sudoku is NP Complete – not all that relevant

There are zero-knowledge proofs for all problems in NP

Therefore there is a ZK proof for Sudoku.

Direct ZK proofs for Sudoku are preferable:

Efficiency: avoiding the overhead of the reduction

Practicality: Implementable without the aid of computers

Understandability (by non-experts!): Ensure that participants have intuitive understanding of the proof.

Page 16: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Physical Objects

Typical Cryptographic metaphor:

Physical “locked box”

Hard to find physical locked box that:

Can never be opened

Are readily available

Have transparent operation

Tamper-evident seal

Tampering is evident

Can open, but can’t reseal

Scratch-off card, sealed envelope

Page 17: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Scratch-Off Cards

Can’t tell them apart (until unsealed)

Can shuffle them effectively

Like picking a random permutation

Can triplicate them

Stronger requirement

Used in perfect soundness protocol

Page 18: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Human Behavior

Paul and Veronica are in same room

Shuffling: Paul wants a fair shuffle, Veronica wants to make sure no cards were switched

More benign adversary:

Either protocol works, or cheating player is labeled a “cheater”

Page 19: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Playing Cards

Can use playing cards instead of scratch-off cards:

Sealing = turning card face down

Revealing = turning it face up

Not really tamper evident

Works when players in same room, watching each other

Page 20: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

A Simple Physical Protocol

Flip coin: rows or

columns?

Page 21: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

A Simple Physical Protocol

3 21

2 13

23

1

Page 22: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

A Simple Physical Protocol

Props: 81 sealed scratch-off cards, and a board with 81 cells (like Sudoku)

P places a sealed card on each cell

Corresponding to his solution

“filled-in” values are unsealed

V chooses one of rows/cols/subgrids

P makes packet for each row, shuffles it

V takes each packet, unseals cards, verifies that each contains cards 1…9

If yes -- accept, otherwise reject

Page 23: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Analysis

Completeness: perfect

Soundness: cheating P must cheat in one of rows, columns, or subgrids

P is caught with probability ≥ 1/3

Zero-knowledge: V only sees some permuted values of 1…9

Page 24: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Better Soundness

Page 25: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Better Soundness

3 21

2 13

23

1

32 1

321

231

Page 26: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Better Soundness

Props: 81 scratch-off cards

P places 3 cards on each cell, corresponding to solution

For each cell, V assigns each card to one of rows/cols/subgrids, collects to corresponding packet

P shuffles each of 27 packets

V takes each packet, unseals cards, verifies that each contains 1…9

If yes -- accept, otherwise reject

Page 27: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Analysis of Soundness

P can no longer cheat as before

New way to cheat: 3 cards on a cell are not the same value

Say some cell gets 3 values, not all the same.

One of three cards is different from others

Belongs to one of rows/cols/subgrids

o/w P is always caught cheating

V assigns card to correct row/col/subgrid with probability at most 1/3

⇒ Cheating P caught with probability 2/3

Actually: can show that P is caught with probability 8/9

At least 2 cells are mislabeled

o/w P is always caught cheating

Page 28: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Reducing Number of Shuffles

Previous protocol required 27 shuffles. Too much!

New protocol: same as before –

3 cards on each cell

V assigns each to row/col/subgrid

Make 27 packets

For each packet, V assigns a random number 1…c

For each i, P assembles all packets with number i

P shuffles each of c piles

V takes each pile, unseals cards, verifies that each contains correct number of cards 1…9.

If yes -- accept, otherwise reject

Page 29: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Analysis

Only c shuffles required

Soundness:

With probability 8/9, some packet j is unbalanced

However, two unbalanced packets, if shuffled together, may balance each other

Suppose all packets except j are assigned to one of c piles

If piles are balanced, then assigning j will cause imbalance ⇒ P will be caught

If 2+ piles are unbalanced ⇒ P will be caught

If 1 pile is unbalanced, j will balance it only if assigned to it, with probability 1/c

⇒ Cheating P is caught with probability 8(c-1)/9c

Page 30: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Perfect Soundness

If 3 cards on each cell are guaranteed to have same value, cheating P would always get caught!

Implementing triplicate:

With trusted setup: 3 cards (with same value) are connected and can be torn apart

Without trusted setup:

Use colors instead of numbers

Each card is a circle, prepared by P

V cuts each card into 3 equal pieces (randomly)

If card was not uniformly colored, random cut will reveal non-uniformity when card is scratched

3

3

3

Page 31: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Perfect Soundness with a trusted copy machine:

Prepare three copies of the solution.

Puzzle should be printed on the back.

One copy is cut along the rows

One copy is cut along the columns

One copy is cut along the subgrids

Each strip is then cut into cells

The cells are shuffled (or sorted by the prover)

Verifier checks that

all values 1…9 are there

The “filled-in” cells have the same values on both sides

To prove that the correct puzzle was solved

Page 32: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

EncryptionAuthenticationDigital signatures

Protocols Zero-knowledge proofs Secure computation

Cryptographic Protocols

ALICE BOB

Cryptographic protocols: proceed by exchanging digital message

Assumptions needed: existence of a one-way

function

Page 33: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Open problems:

Implement physical protocol over the mail?

Parties need not be in the same room

Possible to implement commitments from scratch-off cards.

However, an amplification stage requires many repetitions

Not easy for humans

Other puzzles?

Page 34: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Cryptography Today

phlegmon of the pharynx

Page 35: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Cryptography Today

Cryptography is a very active research area

Research activities range:

providing firm foundations

Relationship with complexity theory

providing actual constructions and analysis for specific needs.

Some recent topics

Obfuscation of programs

Maintaining privacy of released data

Voting Schemes

Page 36: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Any questions?

Page 37: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Based on:

R.Gradwohl, M. Naor, B. Pinkas and G. Rothblum, Cryptographic and Physical Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems for Solutions of Sudoku Puzzles, FUN 2007.

Available:

www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PAPERS/sudoku_abs.html

Page 38: Cryptography and Sudoku Moni Naor WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE מוני נאור Joint work with: Ronen Gradwohl, Benny Pinkas, Guy Rothblum

Thank you

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