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Case Study:

Genocide in Rwanda, 1994

Summary

The genocide in the tiny Central African country of Rwanda was one of the most intensive

killing campaigns -- possibly the mostintensive -- in human history. Few people realize,

however, that the genocide included a marked gendercidal component; it was predominantly oroverwhelmingly Tutsi and moderate Hutu males who were targeted by the perpetrators of the

mass slaughter. The gendercidal pattern was also evident in the reprisal killings carried out by

the Tutsi-led RPF guerrillas during and after the holocaust.

The background

The roots of Rwanda's genocide lie in its colonial experience.

First occupied and colonized by the Germans (1894-1916),during World War I the country was taken over by the Belgians,who ruled until independence in 1962. Utilizing the classic

strategy of "divide and rule," the Belgians granted preferential

status to the Tutsi minority (constituting somewhere between 8and 14 percent of the population at the time of the 1994genocide). In pre-colonial Rwanda, the Tutsis had dominated the

small Rwandan aristocracy, but ethnic divisions between them and the majority Hutus (at least

85 percent of the population in 1999) were always fluid, and the two populations cannot beconsidered distinct "tribes." Nor was inter-communal conflict rife. As Stephen D. Wrage states,

"It is often remarked that the violence between Hutus and Tutsis goes back to time immemorial

and can never be averted, but Belgian records show that in fact there was a strong sense amongRwandans ... of belonging to a Rwandan nation, and that before around 1960, violence [along]ethnic lines was uncommon and mass murder of the sort seen in 1994 was unheard of." (Wrage,

"Genocide in Rwanda: Draft Case Study for Teaching Ethics and International Affairs,"

unpublished paper, 2000.)

Whatever communal cleavages existed were sharply heightened by Belgian colonial policy. AsGrard Prunier notes, "Using physical characteristics as a guide -- the Tutsi were generally tall,

thin, and more 'European' in their appearance than the shorter, stockier Hutu -- the colonizers

decided that the Tutsi and the Hutu were two different races. According to the racial theories of

the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Tutsi, with their more 'European' appearance, weredeemed the 'master race' ... By 1930 Belgium's Rwandan auxiliaries were almost entirely Tutsi, a

status that earned them the durable hatred of the Hutu." (Prunier, "Rwanda's Struggle to Recover

from Genocide," Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 99.) It was also the Belgians who (in 1933)

instituted the identity-card system that designated every Rwandan as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa (thelast of these is an aboriginal group that in 1990 comprised about 1 percent of the Rwandan

population). The identity cards were retained into the post-independence era, and provided

crucial assistance to the architects of genocide as they sought to isolate their Tutsi victims.


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As Africa moved towards decolonization after World War II, it was the better-educated and more

prosperous Tutsis who led the struggle for independence. Accordingly, the Belgians switched

their allegiance to the Hutus. Vengeful Hutu elements murdered about 15,000 Tutsis between1959 and 1962, and more than 100,000 Tutsis fled to neighbouring countries, notably Uganda

andBurundi. Tutsis remaining in Rwanda were stripped of much of their wealth and status

under the regime of Juvnal Habyarimana, installed in 1973. An estimated one million Tutsisfled the country (it is in part this massive outflow that makes the proportion of Tutsis in Rwandain 1994 so difficult to determine). After 1986, Tutsis in Uganda formed a guerrilla organization,

the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which aimed to invade Rwanda and overthrow the

Habyarimana regime.

In 1990, the RPF launched its invasion, occupying zones in the northeast of Rwanda. In August

1993, at the Tanzanian town of Arusha, Habyarimana finally accepted an internationally-mediated peace treaty which granted the RPF a share of political power and a military presence

in the capital, Kigali. Some 5,000 U.N. peacekeepers (UNAMIR, the United Nations Assistance

Mission to Rwanda) were dispatched to bolster the accord. "But Hutu extremists in

[Habyarimana's] government did not accept the peace agreement," writes Prunier. "Some ofthese extremists, who were high-level government officials and military personnel, had begun

devising their own solution to the 'Tutsi problem' as early as 1992. Habyarimana's controversialdecision to make peace with the RPF won others over to their side, including opposition leaders.Many of those involved in planning the 1994 genocide saw themselves as patriots, defending

their country against outside aggression. Moderate Hutus who supported peace with the RPF also

became their targets." (Prunier, "Rwanda's Struggle ...") This was the so-called "Hutu Power"movement that organized and supervised the

holocaust of April-July 1994.

Genocide and gendercide

The mass and majesty of this world, all

That carries weight and always weighs the same

Lay in the hands of others; they were small

And could not hope for help and no help came:What their foes liked to do was done, their shame

Was all the worst could wish; they lost their pride

And died as men before their bodies died.- W.H. Auden, The Shield of Achilles

On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana's plane

was shot down by a surface-to-air missile as it approached Kigali airport. Responsibility for theassassination has never been confirmed, but the speed with which the genocide was subsequently

launched strongly suggests that the Hutu extremists had decided to rid themselves of their

accommodationist president, and implement a "final solution" to the Tutsi "problem" in Rwanda.

Interahamwe militiamen at a roadblock in Kigali, April 1994.Within 24 hours of Habyarimana's jet being downed, roadblocks sprang up around Kigali,

manned by the so-called interahamwemilitia (the name means "those who attack together").
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Tutsis were separated from Hutus and hacked to death with machetes at roadside (although many

taller Hutus were presumed to be Tutsis and were also killed). "Doing murder with a machete is

exhausting, so the militias were organized to work in shifts. At the day's end, the Achillestendons of unprocessed victims were sometimes cut before the murderers retired to rest, to feast

on the victims' cattle and to drink. Victims who could afford to pay often chose to die from a

bullet." (Wrage, "Genocide in Rwanda.") Meanwhile, death-squads working from carefully-prepared lists went from neighbourhood to neighbourhood in Kigali. They murdered not onlyTutsis but moderate Hutus, including the prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The prime

minister was guarded by a detachment of Belgian soldiers; these were arrested, disarmed,

tortured, and murdered, prompting Belgium -- as intended -- to withdraw the remainder of itsU.N. troops from Rwanda.

With breathtaking rapidity, the genocide expanded from Kigali to the countryside. Governmentradio encouraged Tutsis to congregate at churches, schools, and stadiums, pledging that these

would serve as places of refuge. Thus concentrated, the helpless civilians could be more easily

targeted -- although many miraculously managed to resist with only sticks and stones for days or

even weeks, until the forces of the Rwandan army and presidential guard were brought in toexterminate them with machine-guns and grenades. By April 21 -- that is, in just two weeks --

perhaps a quarter of a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been slaughtered. Together withthe mass murder ofSoviet prisoners-of-warduring World War II, it was the most concentratedact of genocide in human history: "the dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate

of Jewish dead during theHolocaust." (Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That

Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda [Farrar, Straus andGiroux, 1998], p. 3.) (Grard Prunier provides an even higher estimate: "the daily killing rate

was at least five times that of the Nazi death camps." Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a

Genocide [Columbia University Press, 1995], p. 261.) By the end of April, according to Human

Rights Watch, "the worst massacres had finished ... perhaps half of the Tutsi population ofRwanda" had been murdered.

Rwandan men killed at one of the thousandsof massacre sites.

The gender dimension of the killings is one

of the least-known and least-investigatedaspects of the Rwanda genocide. But an

increasing number of sources have

acknowledged, with Ronit Lentin, that"Throughout the genocide, it was Tutsi men

who were the primary target." (Lentin,

"Introduction: (En)gendering Genocides," in

Lentin, ed., Gender & Catastrophe [ZedBooks, 1997], p. 12.) Judy El-Bushra writes

that

During the war of 1994, and particularly as a

result of the genocidal massacres which

precipitated it, it was principally the men of the targeted populations who lost their lives or fled
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to other countries in fear. ... This targeting of men for slaughter was not confined to adults: boys

were similarly decimated, raising the possibility that the demographic imbalance will continue

for generations. Large numbers of women also lost their lives; however, mutilation and rapewere the principal strategies used against women, and these did not necessarily result in death.

(Judy El-Bushra, "Transformed Conflict: Some Thoughts on a Gendered Understanding of

Conflict Processes," in Susie Jacobset al., eds., States of Conflict: Gender, Violence andResistance[Zed Books, 2000], p. 73.)

The trend had been evident throughout the 1990-94 period, when numerous smaller-scalemassacres of Tutsis took place, and when, according to Human Rights Watch and other

observers, Tutsi males were targeted almost exclusively, as presumed or "potential" members of

the RPF guerrilla force.

This Tutsi man survived an attack

by machete-wielding assailants.

There are strong indications that the gendering of the Rwandan

genocide evolved between April and June 1994, with adult malestargeted almost exclusively before the genocide and predominantly

in its early stages, but with more children and women swept up inthe later stages. (For somewhat similar trends, see

theArmeniaandJewish holocaustcase studies.) In a

comprehensive 1999 report on the genocide, Alison Des Forges

wrote: "In the past Rwandans had not usually killed women inconflicts and at the beginning of the genocide assailants often spared them. When militia had

wanted to kill women during an attack in Kigali in late April, for example, Renzaho [a principal

leader of the genocide] had intervened to stop it. Killers in Gikongoro told a woman that she wassafe because 'Sex has no ethnic group.' The number of attacks against women [from mid-May

onwards], all at about the same time, indicates that a decision to kill women had been made at

the national level and was being implemented in local communities." (See Human Rights

Watch,"Mid-May Slaughter: Women and Children as Victims,"inLeave None to Tell the Story:Genocide in Rwanda.)

It must be stressed that if such a new stage of killing can indeed be isolated, this does not mean

that women and girls were immune to mass murder until that point. Although the number of

women actually killed was substantially lower than the number of murdered men, many women

(along with girl children) were massacred from the outset. They were also exposed to a widerange of horrific (if generally non-fatal) abuses. Notes Human Rights Watch:

testimonies from survivors confirm that rape was extremely widespread and that thousands ofwomen were individually raped, gang-raped, raped with objects such as sharpened sticks or gun

barrels, held in sexual slavery (either collectively or through forced "marriage") or sexually

mutilated. These crimes were frequently part of a pattern in which Tutsi women were raped after

they had witnessed the torture and killings of their relatives and the destruction and looting oftheir homes. According to witnesses, many women were killed immediately after being raped.

Other women managed to survive, only to be told that they were being allowed to live so that

they would "die of sadness." Often women were subjected to sexual slavery and held collectively
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by a militia group or were singled out by one militia man, at checkpoints or other sites where

people were being maimed or slaughtered, and held for personal sexual service. The militiamen

would force women to submit sexually with threats that they would be killed if they refused.These forced "marriages," as this form of sexual slavery is often called in Rwanda, lasted for

anywhere from a few days to the duration of the genocide, and in some cases longer. Rapes were

sometimes followed by sexual mutilation, including mutilation of the vagina and pelvic area withmachetes, knives, sticks, boiling water, and in one case, acid. (Human Rights Watch,ShatteredLives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath[Human Rights Watch,

1996].)

Rwanda may in fact stand as the paradigmatic example of "genocidal rape," owing to the fact

that many of the Tutsi women who were gang-raped have subsequently tested positive for the

HIV virus. According to the UKGuardian, "rape was a weapon of genocide as brutal as themachete." "I was raped by so many interahamwe and soldiers that I lost count," said one

survivor, Olive Uwera. "I was in hospital for a year afterwards. A few months after my child was

born the doctors told me I was HIV-positive." Tests conducted on the 25,000 Tutsi women

members of the Widows of Genocide organisation (Avega) showed that "two-thirds were foundto be HIV-positive. ... Soon there will be tens of thousands of children who have lost their fathers

to the machete and their mothers to Aids." (See Chris McGreal,"A Pearl in Rwanda's GenocideHorror",The Guardian [UK], December 5, 2001.

Reprisal killings of Hutus

As soon as the genocide broke out, the Tutsi-led RPF launched a concerted drive on Kigali,

crushing Rwandan government resistance and bringing a halt to the genocide in successive areasof the country. RPF forces based in Kigali also took up arms, and succeeded in protecting a large

number of residents from the holocaust. On July 4, 1994, Kigali fell to the RPF, and the genocide

and "war" finally came to an end on July 18. There followed a massive flight of Hutus toneighboring countries, notably to refugee camps in Zaire, as well as largescale reprisals against

Hutus who were alleged to have participated in the holocaust. Most of these reprisal killings also

had strong gendercidal overtones. For example, in the town of Mututu, according to Human

Rights Watch (Leave None to Tell the Story):

RPF soldiers asked children to go bring back the adults in their families who were hiding in thefields and bush. On June 10, after several hundred adults had returned, the soldiers directed them

to assemble at the commercial center to be transported to a safer location to the east. The RPF

reportedly killed a number of young men at the market place late in the afternoon and tied up

some of the others. The crowd was directed to set out for the commune, about one hour away by

foot. The soldiers reportedly killed some men on the way and threw their bodies in latrines or ina compost heap at a reservoir. In another report from the same area, witnesses said that RPF

soldiers and armed civilians gathered men and adolescent boys at the home of a man named

Rutekereza and then killed them.

In another case, a witness reported that "I saw the the RPF soldiers bringing bodies in trucks atnight and throwing them in toilets at Mwogo, near where they had dug their trenches. They

brought men already wounded with their arms tied behind their backs. They brought no women."
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Various other incidents cited by the Human Rights Watch investigators attest to the broad

gendercidal pattern. In other instances, however, "The [RPF] soldiers killed without regard to

age, sex, or ethnic group." (Human Rights Watch,Leave None to Tell the Story.) Theorganization cites sources to the effect that between 25,000 and 45,000 Hutus were killed in all,

though other estimates are higher.

How many died?

According to Grard Prunier, "Because of the chaotic nature of the genocide, the total number of

people killed has never been systematically assessed, but most experts believe the total was

around 800,000 people. This includes about 750,000 Tutsis and approximately 50,000 politicallymoderate Hutus who did not support the genocide. ... Only about 130,000 Tutsis survived the

massacres." Some, though, have taken issue with Prunier's (and others') estimates, alleging that

the number of Tutsis in Rwanda was lower at the outbreak of the genocide than is generally

believed. By these measures, "an estimated 500,000 Rwandan Tutsi were killed, or more thanthree-quarters of their population. ... The number of Hutu killed during the genocide and civil

war is even less certain, with estimates ranging from 10,000 to well over 100,000." (Alan J.Kuperman, "Genocide in Rwanda and the Limits of Humanitarian Military Intervention,"

unpublished paper, 2000; see also Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect,"Foreign Affairs,January/February 2000.)

In February 2002, the Rwandan government released the results of the first major census that

sought to establish the number of people killed in the genocide and during its prelude period

(1990-94). It found that 1,074,017 people -- approximately one-seventh of the total population --

were murdered, with Tutsis accounting for 94 percent of the victims. ("More Than One MillionRwandans Killed in 1990's," Associated Press dispatch, February 14, 2002.)

The proportion of males among those killed can only be guessed at, but was probably in thevicinity of 75 or 80 percent.

Who was responsible?

The genocidal and gendercidal strategy was conceived and implemented by a small coterie of

Rwandan government officials, led by the Hutu extremist Theoneste Bagosora, "a retired army

Colonel who held the post of acting defense minister on the day Habyarimana was killed. In the

hours and days after the assassination, Bagosora apparently orchestrated both the genocide andformation of an interim government to support it." Another key organizer of the holocaust was

Mme. Agathe Habyarimana, wife of the murdered president and one of the very few women who

have played a central role in the planning and perpetration of genocide. These leaders were ableto exploit the highly-centralized nature of the Rwandan state (probably unparalleled anywhere inthe world outside the state-socialist bloc): "The genocide happened not because the state was

weak, but on the contrary because it was so totalitarian and strong that it had the capacity to

make its subjects obey absolutely any order, including one of mass slaughter." (Prunier, TheRwanda Crisis, pp. 353-54.)


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The generally "low-tech" means by which the killing was carried out -- the murderers standardly

used machetes or hoes -- required the involvement of a large proportion of the Hutu population.

"Videotapes of the killings show that three or more killers often hacked on a single victim. Sincethe organizers wished to implicate as many people in the killing as possible, there may have been

many more killers than victims." (Wrage, "Genocide in Rwanda.")

As is always true in cases of genocide and mass killing, the overwhelming majority of direct

killers were male. According to Human Rights Watch,

[Rwandan] authorities offered tangible incentives to participants. They delivered food, drink, and

other intoxicants, parts of military uniforms and small payments in cash to hungry, jobless young

men. ... Many poor young men responded readily to the promise of rewards. Of the nearly 60percent of Rwandans under the age of twenty, tens of thousands had little hope of obtaining the

land needed to establish their own households or the jobs necessary to provide for a family. Such

young men, including many displaced by the war and living in camps near the capital provided

many of the early recruits to the Interahamwe, trained in the months before and in the days

immediately after the genocide began. (Human Rights Watch,Leave None to Tell the Story.)

Grard Prunier similarly emphasizes both the class and gender dimension of the recruitment forgenocide:

The social aspect of the killings has often been overlooked. In Kigali theInterahamwe ... hadtended to recruit mostly among the poor. As soon as they went into action, they drew around

them a cloud of even poorer people, a lumpenproletariatof street boys, rag-pickers, car-washers

and homeless unemployed. For these people [men] the genocide was the best thing that couldever happen to them. They had the blessings of a form of authority to take revenge on socially

powerful people as long as they were on the wrong side of the political fence. They could steal,

they could kill with minimum justification, they could rape and they could get drunk for free.This was wonderful. The political aims pursued by the masters of this dark carnival were quitebeyond their scope. They just went along, knowing it would not last. (Prunier, The Rwanda

Crisis, pp. 231-32.)

But it was not only such men who perpetrated the atrocities. One of the most unusual aspects of

the Rwanda genocide is the prominent role of women in the slaughter. The major study of thisphenomenon was carried out by African Rights in 1995. Summarizing its findings, the

organization reported:

A substantial number of women, and even girls, were involved in the slaughter in countlessways, inflicting extraordinary cruelty on other women, as well as children and men. Women of

every social category took part in the killings. ... The extent to which women were involved in

the killings is unprecedented anywhere in the world. This is not accidental. The architects of theholocaust sought to implicate as much of the population as possible, including women and even

children. ... Some women killed with their own hands. ... Women and girls in their teens joined

the crowds that surrounded churches, hospitals and other places of refuge. Wielding machetesand nail-studded clubs, they excelled as "cheerleaders" of the genocide, ululating the killers into

action. They entered churches, schools, football stadiums and hospitals to finish off the


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wounded, hacking women, children and even men to death. Some women have been accused of

killing or betraying their own husbands and children. Above all, women and girls stripped the

dead -- and the barely living -- stealing their jewellery, money and clothes. Other women told thekillers where people were hiding, often screaming out their names as the terrified quarry ran for

their lives. Some women, including a nun currently hiding in Belgium, provided the petrol with

which people were burnt alive. ... There is no evidence that women were more willing to giverefuge to the hunted than men. Some mothers and grandmothers even refused to hide their ownTutsi children and grandchildren. Some women forced out people taken in by their husbands.

Many nurses at the CHK Hospital in Kigali and at Butare's University Hospital gave the militia

and soldiers lists of patients, colleagues and refugees to be killed. (Excerpts from summary ofAfrican Rights report,Rwanda - Not So Innocent: When Women Become Killers, August 1995.)

The culpability of these women has been obscured by some feminists' attempts to depict womenas the main victims of the mass slaughter. As Ronit Lentin notes, "Describing women and girls

as the principal victims of the genocide ... obscured their roles as aggressors ... The involvement

of women in the genocide and murder of Hutu political opponents failed to attract national and

international attention, precisely because of the construction of women as the universal victimsof that particular catastrophe." (Lentin, "Introduction," pp. 12-13.)

Controversy has raged since 1994 over the role of foreign governments and the United Nations

in allowing the genocide to proceed. According to Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch,

During the early weeks of slaughter international leaders did not use the word "genocide," as if

avoiding the term could eliminate the obligation to confront the crime. The major international

actors -- policymakers in Belgium, the U.S., France, and the U.N. -- all understood the gravity of

the crisis within the first twenty-four hours even if they could not have predicted the massive tollthat the slaughter would eventually take. They could have used national troops or UNAMIR or a

combined force of both to confront the killers and immediately save lives. By disrupting thekilling campaign at its central and most essential point, the foreign soldiers could have disabled itthroughout the country. ... Major international leaders were ready to collaborate on the common

goal of evacuating their own citizens and expatriate employees, but they refused any joint

intervention to save Rwandan lives. Instead they focused on issues of immediate importance fortheir own countries: Belgium on extricating its peacekeepers with a minimum of dishonor; the

U.S. on avoiding committing resources to a crisis remote from U.S. concerns; and France on

protecting its client and its zone of Francophone influence. Meanwhile most staff at the U.N.

were fixed on averting another failure in peacekeeping operations, even at the cost of Rwandanlives. (See Human Rights Watch,"Ignoring Genocide", inLeave None to Tell the Story.)

On April 7, 2000, the sixth anniversary of the outbreak of the genocide, Belgium's primeminister apologized for the international community's failure to intervene. Guy Verhofstadt told

a crowd of thousands at the site of Rwanda's planned memorial to the genocide that "A dramatic

combination of negligence, incompetence and hesitation created the conditions for the tragedy."

(Hrvoje Hranjski, "Belgium Apologizes for World's Inaction During Rwanda Chaos," AssociatedPress dispatch, April 8, 2000.)
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As concerns the reprisal killings of Hutus by RPF forces, no central direction has been

established analogous to the clear top-down direction of the genocide against Tutsis.

Nonetheless, the apologetics and obfuscation proffered by top RPF leaders, including (now-president) Paul Kagame, strongly indicate a willingness to "turn a blind eye" to atrocities

committed by RPF officers (both senior and

junior) and common soldiers.

The aftermath

In the wake of the holocaust, the U.N.

established the International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda (ICTR), based in Arusha, Tanzania.

In September 1998, the Tribunal issued its first

conviction on charges of genocide, against the

former mayor of the Rwandan town of Taba,Jean-Paul Akayesu. AsRudy

Brueggemannpoints out, this marked "the first time ever [that] a suspect was convicted by aninternational tribunal for the crime of genocide." A day later, the ICTR sentenced the former

Hutu prime minister, Jean Kambanda, to life in prison; he had pled guilty to "genocide,conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in

genocide and two charges of crimes against humanity." A total of thirty-two other Rwandan

Hutu officials are currently awaiting trial. However, according to thePublic EducationCenterofThe New York Times, "after five years, the Tribunal's accomplishments are still often

overshadowed by its failures. Its operations are slow, unwieldy, and at the worst of times

unprofessional, and its own limited mandate conspires with international indifference to

undermine its core message."

In Rwanda itself, some 120,000 people were jailed on allegations of participation in thegenocide, and thousands died in the brutal and unsanitary conditions of the jails. As of April

2000, some 2,500 people had been tried, with about 300 of them receiving death sentences.

The scars of the genocide and subsequent reprisals will remain with Rwandans for generations,

and may yet provoke another round of mass killing. Prunier writes: "Rwanda's economy remains

badly damaged, with little hope of a quick recovery. There are several reasons for this, includingthe lack of roads, bridges, and telephone lines. Education is also suffering due to a shortage of

schools, educational materials, and teachers, many of whom died in the genocide. ... Many Tutsis

are increasingly convinced that the only way to ensure their survival is to repress the Hutus.

Many Hutus believe they have been proclaimed guilty by association and that no one cares about

their sufferings under the current Tutsi-led government. Extremists on both sides retain the beliefthat the only solution is the annihilation of the other. These groups are preparing for a future

struggle, one that could include another wave of mass slaughter." (Prunier, "Rwanda's Struggle

...")

As noted by Judy El-Bushra, the gendercidal strategies pursued throughout the conflict haveproduced "a demographic imbalance [that may] continue for generations." (El-Bushra,

"Transforming Conflict," p. 73.) According to David Gough, in certain parts of "Gitarama
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district in central Rwanda, scene of some of the worst excesses in 1994 ... adult males make up a

mere 20% of the population." (Gough,"Husband-hiring hastens the spread of Aids in

Rwanda",The Guardian [UK], February 8, 2000.)

The burden placed upon women survivors of the carnage has attracted considerable attention

since 1994. Writes El-Bushra ("Transforming Conflict," p. 73): "In the areas most affected by themassacres -- for example in Bugasera in eastern Rwanda -- the proportion of women who have

been widowed, raped or physically handicapped is very high. It is to a large extent these women

on whom the responsibility for producing food is now falling. Their psychological as well astheir physical status is therefore a major issue for the community's survival in the current stage."

El-Bushra also notes that "a major issue of concern to women in Rwanda is the impact of thedemographic imbalance on marriages. Polygamy, which is not legally permitted in Rwanda, is

often suggested as a means of solving the problems of the large number of widows and younger

women whose prospects of marriage have become drastically reduced. Rivalry between women

over potential husbands has become common, and an issue which sparks off heated debate." (El-

Bushra, "Transforming Conflict," p. 74.) David Gough's profile of the Gitarama district (seeabove) states that "with so many men killed during the genocide, or later imprisoned for their

part in it ... the practice of sharing men, known as kwinjira, has become so widespread ... thathealth officials say that it represents the greatest challenge to their efforts to combat the spread of

Aids." Gough adds,

The spread of Aids and ofkwinjira are also fuelled by poverty. With an annual income of 180

dollars (110) per person, Rwanda is ranked by the World Bank as the world's third poorest

country. Seventy per cent of all households fall below the poverty line. "If a woman has land and

maybe some money then she can attract the services of young men," said Jerome Ndabagariya ofCARE. "He does some work for her in the field and then some more work in the bedroom." A

more affluent woman will give a man some food, maybe some beer or, in rare cases, money. Inreturn he may well give her the Aids virus.

______________________________________________________________________________

Reference:

Jones, Adam, Case Study: Genocide in Rwanda, 1994, 2002,

(accessed 16/05/2012).
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Case Study:

East Timor (1975-99)

Summary

This case study of the events in East Timor in September 1999

is necessarily the most ambiguous of our studies of

"gendercide." Indeed, it is impossible to state with certainty that a fully-fledged gendercide didoccur, and on what scale. Nonetheless, in the opinion of Gendercide Watch, there are grounds

not only for believing that genocidal atrocities occurred during the period immediately following

Timor's independence vote, but that they were widespread, pre-planned, and systematic -- and

were strongly gendercidal in character. We also devote extended attention to the quarter-century

of Indonesian occupation preceding the independence vote of August 30, 1999, in whichgendercidal atrocities were prominent, though not predominant.

The background

East Timor owes its territorial distinctiveness from the rest of Timor, and the Indonesian

archipelago as a whole, to the fact that it was colonized by the Portuguese, not the Dutch,

beginning in the mid-17th century. (An agreement dividing the island between the two powerswas signed in 1915.) In alliance with local chieftains, the Portuguese established an increasinglyharsh regime of exploitation andcorve (forced) labourthat, by the turn of the twentieth

century, swept up the entire able-bodied male population. The colonial regime was replaced by

the Japanese during World War II, whose occupation spawned a resistance movement thatresulted in the deaths of 60,000 Timorese, or 13 percent of the entire population.

After the war, the Dutch East Indies rapidly became the independent republic of Indonesia. ThePortuguese, meanwhile, re-established control over East Timor; but in April 1974, the

Portuguese armed forces mounted a coup dtat against the fascist government in Lisbon, andannounced their intention of rapidly divesting Portugal of its overseas empire (including Angola

and Mozambique). Indigenous political parties rapidly sprang up in Timor. Elections for a
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National Constituent Assembly were set for 1976, with full independence anticipated three years

thereafter. By 1975, the leading political force in the territory was Fretilin (the Revolutionary

Front of Independent East Timor), which had established strong grassroots support throughoutthe countryside with progressive policies aimed at improving the lives of the peasantry. In

January 1975, Fretilin formed an alliance with the other main political grouping, the UDT

(Timorese Democratic Union), and local elections were held under the supervision of thePortuguese parliament's Decolonization Committee.

In May 1975, however, the UDT withdrew from the coalition, and when Fretilin candidates won55 percent of the vote in the local elections, the UDT launched a coup attempt, apparently with

the connivance of the Indonesian government. Fretilin forces crushed the revolt and expelled the

UDT to Indonesian West Timor. This was followed by a declaration of independence on

November 28. Just over a week later, on December 7, the Indonesians invaded East Timor inforce, with military aid and tacit political approval from the Ford administration in the U.S.

(Secret government documents published in 1980 showed that the Australian government also

"had an extensive knowledge of, and acquiesced in, events prior to the invasion," according to

John Taylor [East Timor: The Price of Freedom, p. 204.)

Fretilin forces were pushed deep into the countryside, and Indonesian president Suharto declaredEast Timor's annexation by Indonesia in July 1976. By November of that year, relief agencies in

East Timor estimated that an extraordinary 100,000 Timorese had been killed since the

Indonesian invasion less than a year earlier. What followed was a protracted guerrilla war by

Fretilin forces, who eventually succeeded in establishing control over about half the remainingTimorese population. Indonesian "counterinsurgency" strategies reached a genocidal scale,

causing widespread starvation. Indeed, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman argued in their

1980 book, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, that the Indonesian assaulthad taken a greater per-capita toll -- killing about a third of the Timorese population -- than any

genocide since theJewish holocaust. But the slaughter took place at a time when western

governments and media were resolutely focused on the atrocities committed by the communist

Khmer Rouge in Cambodia/Kampuchea, and attracted barely a whisper of notice or officialcondemnation.

Despite repeated calls from the United Nations, Indonesia refused to withdraw from East Timor

or allow a plebiscite on the territory's future. But the credibility of Indonesia's claim to the

territory began to weaken noticeably with the November 12, 1991 mass killing of some 270

civilians at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the East Timorese capital. As part of a newcrackdown, Indonesia began to rely more and more on locally-raised paramilitary forces (ninjas)

to terrorize the population. These were supplied and overseen by Kopassus, the elite Indonesian

army force that would play a critical role in the atrocities of

September 1999.

In 1996, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the leader of

the East Timor Catholic Church, Bishop Belo, and Fretilin'sleader-in-exile, Jos Ramos-Horta. The renewed publicity

given to the Timorese cause was bolstered in 1998 when,

with Indonesia suffering an economic meltdown, longtime
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dictator General Suharto resigned in favour of his vice-president, B.J. Habibie. As part of a wide-

ranging liberalization program, Habibie first offered East Timor "special status" within a united

Indonesia, a move that was rejected by the Timorese opposition. Finally, in January 1999,Habibie declared Indonesia's willingness to "let East Timor go" if its people chose independence.

The United Nations, together with Portugal, rapidly announced their willingness to conduct a

direct plebiscite, offering the Timorese autonomy within Indonesia or fully-fledgedindependence. After several delays, the vote was finally scheduled for August 30, and U.N.officials under the banner of UNAMET (The United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor)

arrived to supervise the process.

In the run-up to the plebiscite, the Indonesian military raised and supplied a number of new

paramilitary groups, consisting mostly of Timorese collaborators and Kopassus commandos.

(For an overview of the founding and training of these notorious "militias," see Human RightsWatch,"Background: The Indonesian Army and Civilian Militias in East Timor", April 1999.)

The militias that played the greatest role in fomenting violence during the pre- and post-

plebiscite periods included theBesi Merah Putih ("Iron Rod for the Red and

White"),Mahidi ("Live or Die for Integration with Indonesia"), and theHalintar("Thunderbolt").An estimated 5,000 Timorese were murdered by these forces and their army allies in 1998 and

the first eight months of 1999, and an estimated 60,000 displaced from their homes. Despitethese widespread atrocities, the U.N. chose to designate the Indonesian armed forces responsiblefor providing "security" before, during, and after the plebiscite. This proved a disastrous

decision; when an organized campaign of mass destruction, and possibly genocide, erupted in the

aftermath of the vote, it would be orchestrated by these same "security" forces.

Gendercide in East Timor (I),

1975-1998

Gendercidal massacres of males, and in at least one case of females, were prominent in theperiod immediately following the Indonesian invasion of December 1975. "One of the most

bizarre and gruesome ... atrocities" of the Indonesian invasion itself "occurred within 24 hours of

the invasion and involved the killing of about 150 people. This shocking spectacle began withthe execution of more than 20 women who, from various accounts, were selected at random ...

The women were led out to the edge of the jetty and shot one at a time, with the crowd of

shocked onlookers being forced at gun-point to count [out] loud as each execution took place."(Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor[Zed Books, 1984], pp.

128-29.) Immediately thereafter, however, a typical gendercidal massacre of males took place,

according to a source quoted by John Taylor inEast Timor: The Price of Freedom (p. 68):

At 2 p.m., 59 men, both Chinese and Timorese, were brought on to the wharf ... These men wereshot one by one, with the crowd, believed amounting to 500, being ordered to count. The victims

were ordered to stand on the edge of the pier facing the sea, so that when they were shot theirbodies fell into the water. Indonesian soldiers stood by and fired at the bodies in the water in the

event that there was any sign of life.

In the wider slaughter in Dili, males appear to have been targeted overwhelmingly. According to

John Taylor (East Timor: The Price of Freedom, pp. 68-69), one of the main killing sites "was
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the area surrounding the Portuguese police barracks in the south of the capital," where one

survivor claimed that

At about 12 noon, the green berets began to land. ... They advanced to where I was. They ordered

us all out of our homes, to gather in the street. We were taken to an open space, women, children,

old people and men, including me. ... There were about fifty of us then, all men, just picked up atrandom. All able-bodied men. ... Then the soldiers, there were three of them, started spraying us

with bullets. Many died on the spot, some managed to run off, falling as they fled because they

had been hit. As far as I know, only 3 or 4 out of the 50 men are still alive. (Taylor, pp. 68-69.)

Jill Jolliffe writes in her bookEast Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism(University of

Queensland Press, 1978) that "in late 1976, letters smuggled via [the West Timorese town of]Kupang reached relatives in Darwin [Australia], listing whole families killed during the invasion.

... [One letter] said that many of the inhabitants of Dili had fled to the mountains before the

invasion but that of those remaining 80% of the men were killed by Indonesian troops" (p. 279).

According to Taylor (p. 68), the death-toll in Dili reached "2000 men." In May 1976, a further

"67 boys were shot in Suai" (Taylor, p. 71).

The trend continued into the 1980s. In July 1984, a priest described military actions against theKota Boot tribe "from March 1984, [when] many men and youths were imprisoned and killed ...

almost all men and youths disappeared. They were taken by Indonesian soldiers, killed and

thrown on a fallow piece of land. There are eye-witnesses to what happened." (Quoted in Taylor,pp. 102-03.)

A particularly massive roundup of Timorese males was conducted as part ofOperasiKeamanan ("Operation Security") in March-April 1981, when "virtually the entire male

population from the ages of 15 to 50 was pressed into service. In some places, boys as young as

9 and men as old as 60 were ordered to join." (Budiardjo and Liem, p. 41.) "Those recruitedforOperasi Keamanan were given no advanced warning," writes Taylor. "The army marchedinto villages, ordered together all men and boys and took them to the region from which the [so-

called] fence of legs was to begin. Once assembled, they were organized into small groups and

forced to walk in front of units of soldiers, searching the countryside for Fretilin cadres. ... Sincethey were forced to leave without any notice, they were unable to take with them supplies of

food or clothing. Provided with the most meagre food rations, many died of starvation." (East

Timor: The Price of Freedom, p. 117.) Many thousands of Timorese, also overwhelmingly "able-bodied" males, were rounded up for brutal torture and incarceration -- although many younger

women also suffered this fate, being exposed especially to sexual torture and rape.

Thus, when the Indonesian occupying forces discriminated according to gender, the victims of

the most serious abuses were generally male. But to present this period as one

ofpredominantly gender-selective violence would be deeply misleading. Entire families of

"Fretilin suspects" were often annihilated together with the suspects themselves, or out offrustration at the Indonesian soldiers' inability to locate them. In many cases, whole village

populations were targeted for savage atrocities -- most massively, in the region of Aitana in July

1981, where "a ghastly massacre occurred ... They murdered everyone, from tiny babies to theelderly, unarmed people who were not involved in the fighting but were there simply because


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they had stayed with Fretilin and wanted to live freely in the mountains." Perhaps 10,000 people

died. (Source cited in Taylor, p. 118). At Lacluta near Dili in September of the same year, "at

least 400 people were killed, mostly women and children." (Taylor, p. 101.) And at Malim Luroin August 1983, "after plundering the population of all their belongings, [Indonesian troops]

firmly tied up men, women and children, numbering more than sixty people. They made them lie

on the ground and then drove a bulldozer over them, and then used it to place a few centimetresof earth on top of the totally crushed corpses." (Source cited in Taylor, p. 103.)

The most destructive strategy of all was the starvation and heavy bombing inflicted onpopulations remaining in the "liberated zones" outside the Indonesians' control, or in

concentration camps set up, in classic counterinsurgency fashion, to separate the Fretilin

guerrillas from their "base of support." Many tens of thousands of Timorese died as a result of

this "'generalized warfare' of encirclements, bombing, uprooting of the population, malnutritionand generalized brutalities" (Taylor, p. 151), constituting the bulk of the estimated 200,000

victims of Indonesia's genocidal occupation policies between 1975 and 1999.

Gendercide in East Timor (II)?After the plebiscite

Atrocity in Dili, September 1999: the decapitated body of a

young Timorese male is dragged behind a motorcycle by anIndonesian policeman and his accomplice.

The events in East Timor in September 1999,

particularly the issue of genocidal killing, arestill clouded by considerable uncertainty. Indeed,

it is impossible to say with full confidence that

largescale gendercidal slaughter did occur. The

difficulty arises in part from the unwillingness ofthe international community, particularly the

United Nations, to conduct a wide-ranging

investigation into the atrocities. A key purpose oflaunching this Gendercide Watch case-study,

with its attendantpress release, is to encourage

such an investigation.

On August 31, 1999, East Timorese went to the polls to vote for autonomy within Indonesia or

fully-fledged independence. But as noted, despite clear signals that the Indonesian military and

its Timorese militia allies would respond with violence to a vote for full independence, the U.N.

assigned responsibility for "security" to the Indonesian armed forces. When widespread violenceand destruction broke out on September 2, the U.N. and the international community were

therefore unable (and initially unwilling) to address the consequences of the plebiscite that theythemselves had overseen.

East Timorese voted almost en bloc, with more than 98 percent of those eligible casting a ballot,and 78.5 percent voting for independence. When the results of the plebiscite were made public,

the Indonesian military and its allies implemented a well-prepared and systematic policy of
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murder and destruction ("Operation Global Clean-Sweep") aimed at preserving Indonesian

control over the territory, or at least a substantial portion of it.

Scorched earth, East Timor, September 1999.

The gender-selective character of the atrocities was

evident from the outset. (Note: Extensive excerpts frommost of the following reports can be found in"Gender-

Selective Atrocities in East Timor", a news digest

compiled throughout the crisis, and afterwards, byGendercide Watch executive director Adam Jones.)

On September 4, Matt Frei of BBC Online providedgruesome eyewitness testimony of the murder of a

young Timorese independence supporter. "While I was

running towards the UN compound a pro-independence

supporter was being hunted down like an animal. The

young man fell after being hit on the head with amachete. Then six black T-shirts descended on him. A

colleague hiding in a shack just opposite the gates to theUN compound filmed the whole thing. It took only 30

seconds to hack the man to pieces. The attack was so

ferocious that bits of him were literally flying off. The

sound reminded me of a butchers' shop -- the thud ofcleaved meat, I'll never forget it." (Frei, "Face to Face with Timor Terror," BBC Online,

September 4, 1999.) Also on September 4, Joao Brito, a young Timorese man, claimed to have

witnessed the killing of possibly hundreds of people in the town of Ermera. Indonesian soldiers"called house-to-house and they burned out the political leaders," he said later. "When the houses

burnt, they let the women and children out, but they pushed the men back into the fire where they

died." (Dennis Schulz, "Refugees Recall the Flames of Death," The Age [Melbourne], September

16, 1999.)

Timorese leader Jos Ramos-Horta spoke on September 5 of "information that many males havebeen disposed of, have been killed and dumped into the sea." (Quoted in Stephen Powell,

"International Pressure Builds on Timor Crisis," Reuters dispatch, September 7, 1999.) The

Guardian's John Aglionby wrote on September 9 of "Villagers [who told] of men being marched

to the waterfront in Dili and gunned down out of view of observers trapped inside safe houses."(Aglionby, "City's Destruction Now Complete," The Guardian, September 9, 1999.) The

following day, Aglionby described "a young man [who] ran into the house telling a terrible story.

He had come from the port, where he and some pro-independence friends had been trying to

leave on a ship. The women boarded, but the men were dragged away. Five were stabbed todeath in front of him and their bodies dumped in the sea." (Aglionby, "To Survive I Knew I Had

to Get Out," The Guardian, September 10, 1999.) Craig Skehan and Malcolm Brown ofThe

Sydney Morning Heraldreported that

One distraught young mother said she witnessed the murder of two refugees on the back of a

truck inside West Timor. She said she saw the two men tied up in a truck by militiamen on a
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road inside West Timor. "Suddenly, in front of lots of people, a militia member drew a sword

and slowly stabbed one of the people in the truck. Lots of blood began gushing, flooding the

floor of the truck until it began to drip out," she said. "The other man's hands and feet were tiedlike a pig and he was thrown like a bag of rice onto the asphalt then thrown into another truck."

Another man said he watched terrified at the West Timor port of Akapupu, near Atumbua at the

northern end of the border, as militia used machetes to kill men alleged to be independencesupporters. They were among East Timorese disembarking from a ship which had come fromDili. "Other men had their hands tied and they were put on trucks and taken away," said one

source, who is collecting accounts for presentation to the international community. (Skehan and

Brown, "Refugee Plight Compared to Nazi Terror Against Jews," The Sydney Morning Herald,September 10, 1999.)

Agence France-Presse cited "reports [that] menin UN gear were loading young men into C-130

aircraft for unknown destinations." ("Refugees

Starving in East Timor Mountains, Living Off

Roots," AFP dispatch, September 13, 1999.) Inan "urgent action" of September 14, the East

Timor Human Rights Centre in Australiareported that "Indonesian military, police andmilitia are patrolling both Kupang and Atambua

[in West Timor], and are carrying out operations,

particularly at night, where they search for East Timorese men, including independencesupporters. Between Monday September 6 and Thursday September 9, the streets were deserted,

and the town extremely tense. Sources fear that East Timorese men and independence supporters

are being rounded up to be assassinated."

On September 10, a confirmed gendercidal killing took place at Passabe in the enclave of

Oecussi. Reporting investigators' findings in February 2000, Mark Dodd wrote: "Evidence

gathered so far indicated the victims were mostly men taken on September 8 from villages nearPassabe, identified by Indonesian authorities as pro-independence strongholds. According to

accounts from independence supporters, between 52 and 56 men were marched across the nearby

border into West Timor for registration. Their hands were then bound with palm twine and theywere marched a short distance back into East Timor where they were executed." (Mark Dodd,

"Passabe Massacre: Marked for Killing Frenzy," The Sydney Morning Herald, February 9,

2000.)

One of the most detailed and powerful reports of gendercidal atrocities was published in The

Washington Poston September 14, 1999:

Jani thought he was safe on the ferry. After three days of terror in East Timor, the boat would

take him and two college friends to safety, he thought. Then the militiamen boarded. No young

men may leave East Timor, they announced as the boat prepared to depart. Jani, 27, tried to hide;the militiamen caught his friends. "Are there any others?" they demanded, Jani recalls. "No, no

other young men," his friends replied in a last gift of kindness. They marched Armando Gomez,

29, and Armando DiSilva, 30, to the front of the boat and killed them as 200 refugees watched.


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Gomez's body was dumped into the sea, DiSilva's on the ground by the dock. Jani raced through

the boat. "Please help me," he whispered to the other refugees. A woman motioned to him to

hide between her and her children. The searching militiamen walked by.

The account of Jani, now a fearful refugee in western Timor, adds to the mounting evidence that

victims of the murderous rampage by militia gangs in East Timor following the territory'soverwhelming vote for independence from Indonesia were systematically culled from the

population at large. Young men, political opponents of the Jakarta government, Roman Catholic

clergy and anyone else suspected of favoring the independence opposed by the militias weretargeted, in a chilling echo of the techniques of systematic killing seen in Kosovo. (Doug Struck

and Keith B. Richburg, "Refugees Describe Method to Murderous Rampage in E. Timor," The

Washington Post, September 14, 1999.)

On September 24, Amnesty International detailed "credible reports that 35 young East Timorese

men were killed on board a ship bound for Kupang from Dili on 11 September. According to an

eyewitness account, the bodies of the victims were dumped overboard. Amnesty International

has collected accounts of other incidents of East Timorese being beaten and killed on boatsleaving Dili." (Amnesty International, "Fear, Intimidation and Forced Relocation in the

[Indonesian] Archipelago," AI Index: ASA 21/166/99, September 24, 1999.)

The situation in the concentration camps of West Timor, to which much of the Timorese

population had been abducted by Indonesian forces, was no less grievous. John Aglionby wroteof the "refugees" being "herded, sifted, and cut off." He cited one witness's testimony that "Many

of the men are [being] 'taken away for questioning' ... The women have no idea what happens to

their husbands. Many have not returned." One woman reported a militia camp guard's comment

that "You may have got your country but it will be a land full of widows." (Aglionby, "Herded,Sifted, and Cut Off," The Guardian, September 10, 1999.) A detainee who returned safely,

Domingos Dos Santos, told Agence France-Presse that "pro-Indonesian militias were huntingdown male refugees and planned to kill them all." ("Timor Refugees 'Can Return'," BBC Online,October 3, 1999.) On October 10, Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao spoke of "more than 230,000

East Timorese [having] been taken to camps in Atambua, Kefa, Kupang, Alor, Wetar and Kisar

where the men were selectively murdered, leaving only women, children and the elderly."("Gusmao Appeals to Indonesia to Free East Timorese from Camps," Agence France-Presse

dispatch, October 11, 1999.)

Occasional concerns for the fate of Timor's men were expressed by prominent figures in the

international community. The Deputy British representative to the United Nations, Stewart

Eldon, told the U.N. Security Council on September 11 that "There are reports of women and

children being forced into trucks to be taken to West Timor while men and boys are left behind.We know and we fear -- fromKosovo-- what that may mean." Most dramatically, in mid-

September the Canadian ambassador to Indonesia, Kenneth Sunquist, raised the alarm over an

apparent deficit of adult men in the West Timor camps. His account appeared in the

Toronto Globe and Mailunder the headline, "The Chilling Disappearance of East Timor's YoungMen":
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Thousands of East Timorese men have disappeared en route to the relative safety of refugee

camps in the western section of the embattled island, Canada's ambassador to Indonesia said

after a tour of the area. Ken Sunquist and Norway's ambassador here are the first foreigndiplomats to visit the camps in the West Timorese capital of Kupang, home to more than 100,000

refugees fleeing anti-independence militias responsible for an orgy of violence in neighbouring

East Timor over the past two weeks. "The refugee camps themselves are filled overwhelminglywith women and children, so we're wondering where the men are, whether they've beensegregated elsewhere, whether they're up in the hills in East Timor or if there's some more

sinister explanation," Mr. Sunquist said after touring three Kupang-area refugee camps on

Tuesday. "We tried to ask these questions on several occasions but it's clear that the people feltwe were putting them at risk even talking to them. There were lots of police around everywhere

we went."

Most of refugees seen by the joint mission, which accompanied five Indonesian cabinet ministers

to Kupang, were older men, women and boys under the age of 16, he said. "While we were at the

airport, for example, a plane came in with 171 people aboard, 150 of whom were children under

the age of 10, older women and several younger men who appeared to have been wounded, butwhether this was done by the militias before they left or not we couldn't tell," he said. (Paul

Dillon and Jeff Sallot, "The Chilling Disappearance of East Timor's Young Men," The Globe andMail, September 16, 1999.)

In an interview on September 20, Sunquist expanded on his perceptions of the situation:

The question is, for instance, the camps have women and children but no men. What's happened

to those men? You can either take one approach, which is most of them went up in the hills to

fight. That is probably true for a lot of them. A second one is that they were segregated. There's alot of reports that say the men were segregated. ... In fact, from what we've now heard, there are

some camps along the border which are almost entirely male. So maybe the husbands, fathers,brothers, were segregated and are sitting in camps by themselves. I really hope that's true. Andthen there's the third one, that they were killed. No one, I mean, not anyone is willing to say that

they were killed, because they don't know what happened

to them. The wives don't know. They know they aremissing. But they don't know where they are. And that's

what a commission of inquiry [is needed for]. (Quoted in

Richard S. Ehrlich,"The Military and East Timor's

Militias",The Laissez Faire City Times, 3: 38 [September27, 1999].)

A Timorese man displays empty shell cartridgesfrom the massacre at Suai, September 6, 1999.

In addition to the apparent largescale gendercide of

Timorese males, at least one sizable massacre

predominantly targeted females, at the church in Suai onSeptember 6. Up to 200 people who had taken refuge in

the church were attacked by militia members and

massacred. "The number of victims and their identities
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are uncertain," reportedThe Globe and Mail's Michael Valpy. "What is known is that most were

women and girls [and, according to other reports, elderly men]. The evidence attests to that: the

jumble of bras, underpants and sanitary napkins on the steps leading up to the church; thechildren's leg bones; a hank of a woman's hair; the scorched skeletal remains of two women

behind the church; the thick bloodstain on a schoolroom door, covered by bougainvillea petals

baking beneath the sun. ... What happened was male savagery as old as history -- rape, killing,burning, razing -- in a church, a school, in the adjacent huge, grey, concrete shell of a cathedralcalled Ave Maria under construction to the glory of God. Savagery against the defenceless, as

women and children usually are; vengeance on a people who voted for independence from their

Indonesian military overlords and landowners." Afterwards, surviving "women and childrenwere carted away on trucks to Indonesia's neighbouring West Timor province, about 30

kilometres away, where they are still being held. The whereabouts of many of the men is not

known." (Valpy, "Rape and Murder in the Sight of Our Lady," The Globe and Mail, November

1, 1999.)

A number of younger Timorese women are reported to have been killed as known or suspected

independence supporters. Reports also reached the international media of young Timoresewomen being raped, or abducted for use as sex-slaves. A representative of the aid agency World

Vision stated in mid-October that "Apparently when the militias went on their rampage, theyherded people into the marketplace to make forced evacuations and during that time, manyyoung girls were dragged away and raped by the pro-integrationist forces." ("Aid Agency Claims

to Have Evidence of Mass Rape by Militias," ABC [Australia] News Online, October 20, 1999.)

Some of the worst cases of sexual assault, accompanied by mass killing, occurred at Suai onSeptember 6 (see above). Rape was also allegedly widespread in the detention camps in West

Timor, according to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women,

Radhika Coomaraswamy, who was sent to Dili to file a report in November. (No special U.N.

rapporteur on violence against men was appointed, and no report on the subject filed.)

How many died?

Were the atrocities that took place in East Timor in September-October 1999 on a "genocidal"

scale? The consensus position of internatonal commentators has been "no" -- that in fact, thedeaths amounted to no more than a few hundred people, perhaps only "dozens," as an Associated

Press report claimed in mid-2000. Gendercide Watch considers these estimations to be highly

suspect, and deriving in part from the desire of the international community (especially the U.N.)to avoid blame for its failure to intervene promptly in the slaughter and destruction.

The evidence is threefold that killings occurred on a much larger scale than has been generally

recognized. First, independent investigators, operating with very few resources, have uncoveredsubsantially greater evidence of mass killings than has the tiny group of investigators dispatched

by the United Nations -- but most death-count estimates have been based on the U.N. efforts.

Second, there is strong physical, eyewitness, and circumstantial evidence of bodies beingdisposed of in large numbers at sea, or otherwise destroyed and hidden by Indonesian forces and

Timorese militia-members. Last, and most significant, tens of thousands of Timorese remain

"missing" and "unaccounted for" a year after the horror -- though this subject has attracted noattention in international media for many months.


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The physical evidence. The possibility of turning up extensive forensic evidence of the atrocitieshas diminished drastically since September 1999, as a result of two factors: the apparently

systematic attempts by Indonesian forces and militia to destroy such evidence; and thepathetically inadequate efforts by the U.N. to investigate atrocities on the ground.

Reports of the destruction of evidence are widespread. According to Australian doctor AndrewMcNaughtan, "It is very clear that there has been a very organized, orchestrated, systematic

cleanup of bodies" by Indonesian forces. (Jackie Woods, "Human Rights Activists Decry Slow

U.N. Probe," Kyodo News Service, November 2, 1999.) Australian army lawyer Jens Streittold The Washington Postin October 1999 that "The great lengths the militias have gone to to

hide and destroy the bodies makes it very difficult for us to figure out what happened. We have

eyewitness accounts, but other than things like shell casings and blood stains, we don't have a lot

of physical evidence. ... The Indonesians are extremely concerned about saving face. They wantto be able to deny any of this happened." (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "A Killing Ground Without

Corpses: Bodies of E. Timor Victims Apparently Burned, Dumped,"The Washington Post,

October 22, 1999.) It is also certain that many victims were trucked across the border to West

Timor and buried there: in late November 1999, 25 bodies were discovered by Indonesian non-governmental investigators in three mass graves on the western side of the border. Recall also the

frequent testimony, already cited, of young men being taken out to sea to be killed, and theirbodies dumped overboard.

As for international investigations, in marked contrast to the hundreds of forensics experts who

were rushed toKosovoin the wake of the Serb killing campaign earlier in 1999, only a handfulof investigators were made available by InterFET (the International Force in East Timor), most

with no forensics training. "Requests to the U.N. headquarters in New York for forensic

investigators" went unheeded. (Woods, "Human Rights Activists Decry Slow U.N. Probe.")After nearly three months of stalling, a special U.N. advisory team toured the territory for a mere

ten days in late November, gathering information and evidence for a possible war-crimes tribunal

along the lines ofBosniaandRwanda. In all, InterFET and U.N. investigators have recovered

some 120 bodies across East Timor. ("You know what we call it when we find a well stuffedwith dead people?" an Australian soldier askedThe Laissez Faire City Times. "A manhole.")

Many international observers have expressed exasperation at the limited scale and glacial pace of

the investigations. "It's like you come home, the house is burnt down, grandma's been murderedand the kids have been kidnapped and you know who did it," said one American intelligence

officer. "But everyone just keeps saying, 'Oh, how awful. She's dead, the house is burnt, the kids

are gone -- they should just have more kids and build another house.' I say use the evidence todrag the murderer, the arsonist, the kidnapper into court then lock his ass in jail." (Quoted in Paul

Daley, "U.N. Stalling Holds Up Horror Inquiry," The Sydney Morning Herald, November 13,

1999.)

The limited international efforts were cast into sharp relief by the work of the East Timor Human

Rights Commission, a group of 79 Timorese volunteers, mainly students, who on their own

"found evidence of 364 recent killings in Dili" and vicinity alone. Bodies found on beaches werenot included in the total. (Paul Daley,"Massacre Evidence Grows",The Age, November 12,

1999.)
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I ntell igence data. Some of the most significant evidence of the Indonesian killing campaign inSeptember 1999 almost certainly resides with U.S. and Australian intelligence agencies. A key

component of any serious investigation into the atrocities must be to call for these agencies toturn over all relevant data to investigators. What has surfaced so far, through media sources, may

be taken as indicative of the wealth of information currently held in secret files.

In a chilling report in the MelbourneAge, reporter Paul Daley wrote that "Evidence of hundreds

of killings in Dili alone -- and potentially many more at sea -- confirms the view of Australian

intelligence figures that thousands, rather than hundreds, of East Timorese have died in recentmonths." Citing "allegations that the Indonesian military (TNI), police and militias killed a large

number of East Timorese students aboard a passenger ferry on route from Java to East Timor on

7 September, before dumping them at sea," Daley added:

The allegation is given weight by Australian signals intelligence, whch specifically indicates a

large number of East Timorese students were killed at sea. The signals intelligence generally

points to many other East Timorese being killed on boats -- or land -- before being dumped into

the ocean. The Australian intelligence officers believe the discovery of more than 90 bodies onbeaches on the north and south coasts of East Timor in recent weeks, also indicates a large

number of people were disposed of at sea. "You have a situation where, in some cases hands andfeet were tied, in other cases bodies have wounds or were burnt. It leads to the conclusion that

large numbers of East Timorese could be dead -- some killed at sea, others killed on land, then

burnt and hidden at sea," an intelligence figure told The Age. "This takes some effort and it

points to a systematic cover-up." (Daley,"Massacre Evidence Grows",The Age, November 12,1999.)

In a subsequent story, Daley cited another intelligence officer who told him that "The bodiesfound [by InterFET] weren't meant to be found -- that is, they were stuffed in drains, dumped in

wells, buried in shallow graves and charred in burnt buildings. We believe they are the ones thatthe Indonesians themselves missed after cleaning up what they thought were all the bodies,before InterFET arrived and while journalists had been forced out of the place."

"It is possible to reach only one conclusion," Daley wrote. "East Timor is the scene of a massivecrime against humanity -- and an even bigger attempt at cover-up -- by Indonesia's security

forces." (Daley, "U.N. Stalling Holds Up Horror Inquiry.")

The missing. Of all the data to emerge from East Timor since the Indonesian onslaught ofSeptember 1999, estimates of the missing are the most disturbing. (For an in-depth examination

of the phenomenon, see Adam Jones,"East Timor: Where Are the People?",ZNet, November 15,1999.)

The voting drive conducted by the U.N. mission in East Timor registered 438,000 Timorese whowere of voting age -- over 17 -- and who expressed a desire to cast a ballot. The U.N. then

estimated the total population of East Timor as between 850,000 and 890,000, in keeping with

standard "Third World" demographic trends in which 50 or even 60 percent of the population areminors. Thus, the international community never had as clear an idea of the number of Timorese
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in the territory as at the very point when the slaughter broke out at the beginning of September

1999.

In the early days of the September crisis, estimates of Timorese "unaccounted for" ranged from

200,000 to as high as 600,000. In October, Jos Ramos Horta spoke of the possible

"disappearance" of 100,000 people in the territory. As the Indonesian armed forces prepared todepart, many thousands of Timorese subsequently returned from hiding to their shattered

communities. But on November 3, the head of InterFET, Maj.-Gen. Peter Cosgrove, told media

that "There is a discrepancy, we feel, of about 80,000 [people]. Are these in the hills or justunlocated? We are not sure. There could be more in West Timor than we've found, there could

be more in the hills, or in the wider area of the Indonesia archipelago." But he also mentioned

"speculation about a fourth fate." Cosgrove, it must be noted, was basing his estimate on a total

Timorese population of800,000 -- some 50,000 to 90,000 fewer than the U.N. estimates made atthe time of the voter-registration drive. On November 5, The Sydney Morning Heraldreported:

"Different U.N. officials calculate that the human cost of Indonesia's bloody withdrawal could be

close to 200,000." As the East Timor Observatory (a Portuguese body created to monitor the

transition process) noted grimly, "Whatever figures are used, the difference is in the region oftens of thousands, probably many tens of thousands. It would be illogical to dismiss the

possibility of genocide before finding out what has really happened to all the 'disappeared.'"

The last mention of the missing that Gendercide Watch has unearthed in the international press

was on January 29, 2000 (Marian Wilkinson, "Justice Must Be Done," The Melbourne Age). The

article stated: "Tens of thousands of Timorese are still unaccounted for since September. Whilethese figures are now thought [sic: claimed] to be the result of statistical errors, even InterFET's

General Cosgrove says the numbers still trouble him." Since that time, the issue -- barely visible

for two months prior to Wilkinson's article -- has entirely evaporated from media coverage. Theconundrum, however, remains unsolved, and the so-called "statistical errors" that may have led

to a miscount have never been explained.

If tens of thousands of Timorese are indeed "missing," where might they have gone? One

possibility is that large numbers were forcibly dispersed to distant corners of the Indonesian

archipelago. Some may simply not have been listed as "accounted for" within East Timor itself.But Dr. William Maley of the Australian Defence Force Academy has been quoted as saying that

"a lot" of the missing could have been murdered. He cites the obviously extensive planning that

underlay the terror campaign of September as "one reason I think it would have been possible to

kill a lot of people in a short period of time. It wasn't just a ragged-edge exercise with a fewpeople running amok because they were disappointed with the result. ... At the early stages of a

genocide investigation one does not start with body one and then go on to count a pile of bodies.

It's in terms of population estimates and population deficits. If you have a population of, say,

880,000 and then you count everyone and there are only 700,000, that doesn't mean you canexplain at this stage what happened to every individual. But it is very strong evidence that

something very nasty has happened. People don't disappear into thin air if they are alive."

(Quoted in Brendan Nicholson,"Grim View on Timor's Missing 80,000",The Age[Melbourne],November 12, 1999.)
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A snapshot of the quandary was provided by Sydney Morning Heraldreporter Lindsay Murdoch

in April 2000. Writing from the district of Liquica, 40 kilometres west of Dili, Murdoch noted

that "almost every day people trail into the Liquica police station to tell the United Nationspolice stationed there about new grave sites." According to a U.S. police officer assigned to the

force, Alan Williams, "Officially we must stay with the number of bodies that we have actually

lifted, but the total number of people killed in this district is much, much higher than that,perhaps even astronomical." (Murdoch,"Horror Lives on for Town of Liquica",The SydneyMorning Herald, April 8, 2000.)

With most of the physical and forensic evidence of atrocities washed away by monsoon rains, the

only feasible way of determining the scale of the killings in East Timor is by conducting a

fullscale census of the Timorese population. Such a survey "is necessary and urgent," the East

Timor Observatory proclaimed in November 1999. This would take no more effort than theefficient voter-registration drive carried out immediately prior to the plebiscite, which permitted

an accurate estimate to be made of the overall Timorese population.

Who was responsible?

The major share of responsibility for the genocide in East Timor since 1975 rests with the

Indonesian military, which has long been the dominant force in national politics and, over the

long years of occupation, amassed a wide range of lucrative economic interests in East Timor.The Commander of the Armed Forces and Defence Minister, General Wiranto, oversaw the

atrocities of 1999 conducted under the aegis ofOperasi Sapu Jagad("Operation Global Clean-

Sweep"). As well, "senior generals playing active roles included Lieutenant-General Tyasno

Sudarso, head of military intelligence, his predecessor Lieutenant-General Zacky AnwarMakarim, and Major-General Adam Damiri, commander of the Udayana military command

which includes East Timor. This group was strongly supported by influential retired Generals Tri

Sutrisno and Benny Burdani, the latter having been intimately involved in East Timor operationsever since 1974. Despite his exile, sacked Lieutenant [sic: Major]-General Prabowo [former

commander of the Kopassus special-forces unit, and son-in-law of deposed President Suharto]

gave advice at every stage of the campaign. Lieutenant-General Yunus Yosfiah, Information

Minister in the Habibie cabinet, also played an active role ... Crucial local military commanderswere Lieutenant Colonels Asep Kuswanto in Liquica, Burhanudin Siagan in Bobonaro,

Muhammed Nur in Emera, and Colonel Mudjino, Dili deputy commander." (Taylor,East Timor:

The Price of Freedom, pp. xix-xx.)

On August 18, 2000, the People's Consultative Assembly in Jakarta issued a blanket amnesty for

all human-rights abuses committed by the armed forces, in Indonesia as well as in East Timor.

"Top serving and retired officers ... put enormous pressure on politicians to pass the decreebanning retroactive prosecution of human rights cases ... The ban effectively rules out charges

against senior officers, because Indonesia's criminal code does not recognise culpability by those

in command. Only those who carried out orders could be charged and prosecuted." (See LindsayMurdoch,"Blanket Amnesty for Officers: They Were Only Issuing Orders",The Sydney

Morning Herald, August 19, 2000.) The United Nations responded by appointing a senior

prosecutor, Mohamed Ottman, to investigate atrocities over the entire period of the Indonesianoccupation of East Timor. There were hopes that the investigation would lead to the creation of a
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