IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

APPELLATE DIVISION

Appellate Case No: 12­CA­012000 (Division X) Lower Tribunal Case No: 11­CC­000000 (Division I)

JANE DOE,

APPELLANT

v.

FIRSTSECOND CREDIT UNION

(Successor by merger to XYZ Credit Union)

APPELLEE.

APPELLANT’S INITIAL BRIEF

Jane Doe, pro se

4218 Druid Road

Temple Terrace, Florida 33559

Telephone: (813) 999­9999

E­mail: jane299.doe@gmail.com

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Appellant, JANE DOE, will be referred to herein as “Defendant,” and

FIRSTSECOND CREDIT UNION will be referred to as the “Plaintiff”. For

purposes of this brief, the following abbreviations have the following meanings:

R = Record

A = Appendix

References to the Appendix are required because parts of the record were

omitted. The omissions were discovered only a few days before this brief was

due. Defendant has filed a Motion to Supplement the Record. The omitted

documents are included in the Appendix for the convenience of the Court.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

This is an appeal of two orders: (1) denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss

for failure to state a cause of action and (2) a final summary judgment for

Plaintiff.

Factual History: Defendant executed a loan contract with XYZ Credit

Union. (R: 10­22). Plaintiff, claiming to succeed XYZ Credit Union by virtue of

merger, sued Defendant for failure to repay the loan. (R: 5­23). Plaintiff later

filed a certificate of merger in the official records of Hillsborough County. (R:

57­59).

Procedural History: On January 12, 2011, Plaintiff filed its original

complaint against Defendant for failure to repay an installment loan. (R: 5­23).

Defendant denied the claim generally and moved to dismiss for failure to state a

cause of action on the grounds that Plaintiff was not the true owner of the claim,

the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case and Plaintiff failed to

establish standing by virtue of exhibits attached to its complaint. (R: 24­31).

On March 11th, Defendant filed an amended answer with affirmative

defenses. (R: 39­41). After oral arguments on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the

court dismissed the case with leave to amend the complaint. (R: 43). On April

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13th, Plaintiff filed an amended statement of claim, attaching to it a certificate of

merger. (R: 44­49).

On April 29t2011, Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that the

certificate of merger attached to the complaint had not been filed in Hillsborough

County as required by § 657.065 Fla. Stat. (R: 50­53). On June 1st, Plaintiff filed

a notice that the certificate of merger had been recorded in Hillsborough County

the prior day (R: 57­59). In lieu of answering the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff

scheduled a hearing on the issue for June 14th. (R: 62). After oral arguments, the

Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (R: 63).

On June 29, 2011, Defendant filed amended affirmative defenses (R:

64­66) and discovery requests. (R: 67­70) (A: A&B). Plaintiff responded to the

discovery requests on July 6th and July 8th. (R: 71­72; 73­78; 79). Plaintiff filed

for summary judgment on July 20th. (R: 82­83). On August 2nd, Defendant filed

a second discovery request, a motion to compel discovery, and a motion to strike

an affidavit purporting to authenticate the alleged debt. (A: E&F) (R: 87­89;

90­92; 93­96). Defendant responded to the summary judgment motion on August

2 nd . (R: 84­86).

The summary judgment hearing was held on August 30th. (R: 101).

Plaintiff submitted a verified petition for attorney’s fees on September 1st. (R:

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102­105). On September 9th, the trial court entered final judgment granting

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and attorney’s fees. (R: 110­111).

Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. (R: 112­116).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The trial court committed several errors, culminating in two orders under

review: (1) the lower court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss on grounds of

Plaintiff’s failure to state a cause of action and that courts in Hillsborough

County had no jurisdiction to hear the case, and (2) the lower court granted

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment despite its lack of particularity, its

failure to address affirmative defenses, outstanding discovery and issues of

material fact regarding the existence of the debt and amounts owed.

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Doe, a resident of Hillsborough County,

had an unpaid debt to XYZ Credit Union and that Plaintiff was the successor by

merger to XYZ Credit Union. Plaintiff had been allowed to amend his original

complaint by attaching a certificate of merger that would give him standing to

sue. The certificate, however, had not been filed in the official records of

Hillsborough County as required by § 657.065 Fla. Stat. (7).

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The consummation clause of the Florida statute governing the merger of

credit unions requires, in clear, unambiguous language, that a certificate of

merger “must” be recorded in the public records of all counties in which the

merging credit union owned property. No certificate of merger between Plaintiff

and XYZ Credit Union had been filed prior to commencement of the case. Since

no certificate of merger was filed in Hillsborough County prior to

commencement of the case, no court in that county had jurisdiction to hear the

case. Attachment of an unrecorded certificate of merger contradicted Plaintiff’s

assertion of standing, and thus the Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. The

trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. By failing to dismiss

the case, the trial court prevented any mediation that could have taken place

between the date of the dismissal and the date of Plaintiff’s potential refiling.

Instead, the case was allowed to continue for months and accumulate attorneys’

fees that were then assessed to the Defendant.

The trial court’s second error was the grant of summary judgment in favor

of Plaintiff despite (1) Plaintiff’s failure to state with particularity the grounds

and laws upon which his motion was based, (2) Plaintiff’s failure to address

affirmative defenses, (3) an outstanding motion to strike an affidavit purporting

to authenticate the amounts owed, and (2) outstanding relevant discovery requests

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from Defendant. Thus, there were genuine issues of material fact and the trial

court erred in granting summary judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to

dismiss should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss. In

the alternative, the trial court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed

and the case remanded for trial.

ARGUMENTS

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS.

A. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the cause of

action relied upon a merger that had not been recorded in the Official

Records of Hillsborough County.

Plaintiff amended its original complaint to include an unrecorded

merger certificate. (R: 44­49). The statute defining consummation of a

merger of credit unions, § 657.065 Fla. Stat. (7), states as follows:

A merger with a resulting state credit union may not take place

or be effective unless approved by the National Credit Union

Administration and the office issues a certificate of merger.

Upon consummation of the merger, the certificate of

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authorization of the merged credit union shall be returned to the

proper authority to be canceled. Also, at consummation, all

property and property rights of, and members’ interest in, the

merged credit union shall vest in the surviving credit union

without deed, endorsement, or other instrument of transfer, and

all debts, obligations, and liabilities of the merged credit union

must be assumed by the surviving credit union under the

certificate of authorization under which the merger was affected.

All members of the surviving credit union have the same rights,

privileges, and responsibilities after the merger is completed.

The certificate of merger must be recorded in the public records

of all counties in which the merging credit union owned any real

property at the effective date of the merger . [Italics added.]

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the last mandate in this section is

undisputed. Plaintiff filed a certificate of merger in the Official Records of

Hillsborough County on or about May 31, 2011, more than four months after

the case was filed (R: 57­59). One cannot acquire standing after a case has

been filed. Progressive Express Insurance Company v. McGrath Community

Chiropractic , 913 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

In § 657.065 Fla. Stat. (7) the Legislature used the term “must” in

regards to filing the certificate of merger in “...all counties in which the

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merging credit union owned any real property at the effective date of the

merger.” “Must” is clear and unambiguous. It is one of common usage that

means it is mandatory, not discretionary, that someone do something. The

Legislature also used the word “consummate”. According to West's

Encyclopedia of American Law , “To consummate an agreement is to carry it

out completely, as in a consummated sale. It is to bring to completion

whatever was either intended or undertaken to be done.” Black’s Law

Dictionary defines “consummate” as “ to bring to completion”. Likewise,

Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines it as “to complete; to carry out, as,

to consummate an agreement for the exchange of property.” Ballantine's

cites Connor v. Riggins , 21 Cal App 756, 760, 132 P. 849 (1913).

“When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and

conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to

the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be

given its plain and obvious meaning.” Knowles v. Beverly

Enterprises­Florida, Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 30 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Holly v.

Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) ). In Knowles , the

“Words of common usage, when used in a statute, should be

construed in the plain and ordinary sense, because it must be assumed that

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the Legislature knows the plain and ordinary meaning of words used in

statutes and that it intended the plain and obvious meaning of the words

used.” Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co ., 945 So.2d

1216 ( Fla. 2006).

Though the words “must” and “consummation” may be clear, whether

the Legislature intended the final statement of § 657.065 Fla. Stat. (7) as a

condition of consummation is ambiguous. Since the Legislature did not

actually use the word “consummation” in the sentence, its importance may be

subject to interpretation. If parts of a statute are ambiguous, the court may

apply various rules to determine the intent of the Legislature in enacting the

statute. Thus, the language of the statute and placement of words is

important. The word “consummation” has additional import in that it can be

assumed that the entirety of section 7 describes the conditions and

implications of consummating or completing a merger. The second statement

is not isolated from the rest of the paragraph. Section 7 consists of five

statements. The first: “A merger with a resulting state credit union may not

take place or be effective unless approved by the National Credit Union

Administration and the office issues a certificate of merger.” This statement

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is a mandate and prescribes conditions precedent to completing the merger. If

those conditions are not met, the merger is ineffective.

The second sentence: “Upon consummation of the merger, the

certificate of authorization of the merged credit union shall be returned to

the proper authority to be canceled.” This statement is a mandate and

prescribes a condition precedent to completing the merger. If the condition is

not met, the merged credit union still exists and the merger is ineffective.

The third and fourth sentences: “Also, at consummation, all property

and property rights of, and members’ interest in, the merged credit union

shall vest in the surviving credit union without deed, endorsement, or other

instrument of transfer, and all debts, obligations, and liabilities of the

merged credit union must be assumed by the surviving credit union under

the certificate of authorization under which the merger was affected. All

members of the surviving credit union have the same rights, privileges, and

responsibilities after the merger is completed.” Neither statement is a

mandate, but each describes the implications of consummating the merger.

Like the first and second sentences, the final sentence is a mandate. It

states, “The certificate of merger must be recorded in the public records of

all counties in which the merging credit union owned any real property at the

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effective date of the merger.” The Legislature intended the Certificate of

Merger to be filed in Hillsborough County in relation to consummation of

the merger agreement. There must be a consequence to not following the

mandate of a statue. In the words of Alexander Hamilton,

“Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to

the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other

words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no

penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands

which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more

than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may

be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts

and ministers of justice, or by military force; by

the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of

arms.” 1

§ 657.065 Fla. Stat. does not state specific consequences of failing to

record the certificate of merger. However, case law is instructive. For

1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 15: Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union, Independent Journal (Dec. 1, 1787). http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa15.htm

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instance, § 766.316 Fla. Stat. states that “[e]ach hospital with a participating

physician on its staff and each participating physician, other than residents,

assistant residents, and interns deemed to be participating physicians under §

766.316 Fla. Stat. (4)(c), under the Florida Birth­Related Neurological Injury

Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the

limited no­fault alternative for birth­related neurological injuries.” Nowhere

does the statute prescribe consequences for failing to provide the required

notice. However, case law regards this notice requirement as a condition

precedent to invoking NICA as a patient’s exclusive remedy for injuries.

Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff , 696 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1997). In Galen , the

parents of a patient who suffered brain damage as a result of negligence by

physicians filed a medical malpractice suit against the doctors. The doctors

moved to dismiss on the grounds that § 766.303 Fla. Stat. ( 2 ) provided an

exclusive remedy for birth­related neurological injury to physicians

participating in the Florida Birth­Related Neurological Injury Compensation

Plan (NICA). The Supreme Court held that the health care providers were

required by § 766.316 Fla. Stat. to give patients notice of their participation

in NICA as a condition precedent to invoking NICA as a patient's exclusive

remedy. As a result, the physicians were not allowed to invoke a privilege

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given to them by § 766.316 Fla. Stat. until they complied with the notice

provision in the statute.

A similar interpretation should be made in the present case, especially

in light of the stronger word “must” in § 657.065 Fla. Stat . rather than

“shall” in § 766.316 Fla. Stat. Recording the certificate of merger in

Hillsborough County is a condition precedent to the Court’s jurisdiction to

enforce Plaintiff’s claim on any merged assets in Hillsborough County. To

repeat, Hillsborough County courts lacked jurisdiction to enforce a claim on

the alleged merged assets until the Plaintiff complied with the merger

statute. Because the merger was improperly consummated, a question

remained as to whether Plaintiff even had a claim on the assets of XYZ

Credit Union when the case was filed. Plaintiff's failure to consummate or

bring to completion the merger with XYZ Credit Union before filing suit

created a defect in the complaint that could not be cured within the case. The

date of the filing of a case cannot be amended. As a result, Plaintiff failed to

state a cause of action.

B. Plaintiff's attachment of an unrecorded Certificate of Merger to the

complaint contradicted and thereby cancelled his assertion of standing, so

the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

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The complaint asserted Plaintiff’s ownership of the subject note based

on completion of the merger (R: 44­49). The Plaintiff alleged that (1)

FirstSecond Credit Union is the successor by Merger to XYZ Credit Union;

and (2) FirstSecond Credit Union owned and held the loan documents. Yet,

the complaint included as an exhibit a certificate of merger that did not

comply with the requirements of § 657.065 Fla. Stat. (7), showing that the

Plaintiff did not have standing to bring the action on the date it was filed.

Since the merger between FirstSecond Credit Union and XYZ Credit

Union had not been recorded at the time the complaint was filed, the

allegation that FirstSecond Credit Union was successor to XYZ Credit

Union and that it thereby owned and held the loan documents was

contradicted by attachment of the unrecorded certificate of merger.

Exhibits attached to a pleading become a part of the pleading for all

purposes. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.130 (b). “Where a document on which the

pleader relies in the complaint directly conflicts with the allegations of the

complaint, the variance is fatal and the complaint is subject to dismissal for

failure to state a cause of action.” Appel v. Lexington Ins. Co ., 29 So.3d 377

(Fla. 5th DCA 2010). See also Arvanetes v. Gilbert, 143 So.2d 825 (Fla. 3d

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DCA 1962) (holding that a lease attached to complaint was part of the

complaint for all purposes).

The trial court should have dismissed the case and required Plaintiff

to refile its complaint. By failing to dismiss the case, the trial court

prevented any mediation that could have taken place in the interval between

dismissal and Plaintiff’s potential refiling. Instead, the case was allowed to

continue for months and accumulate attorneys’ fees that were then assessed

to the Defendant.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF.

A. Summary judgment is improper where the movant fails to state with

particularity the grounds and laws upon which the motion is based.

The full text of Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion was as follows:

Plaintiff, FIRSTSECOND Credit Union, Successor by

Merger to XYZ Credit Union, by and through its

undersigned attorney, moves that this Honorable Court

enter a Summary Judgment against Defendant, Jane Doe,

on the grounds that the pleadings, admissions and

affidavits previously filed herein and filed herewith show

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that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that

the Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter

of law. (R: 82­83).

In regards to summary judgments, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510

(c) states in pertinent part:

The motion shall state with particularity the grounds upon

which it is based and the substantial matters of law to be

argued and shall specifically identify any affidavits,

answers to interrogatories, admissions, depositions, and

other materials as would be admissible in evidence

(“summary judgment evidence”) on which the movant

relies.

The purpose of this rule is to place the nonmoving party on notice of

issues, facts and substantial matters of law to be argued at the summary

judgment hearing. City of Cooper City v. Sunshine Wireless Co., Inc., 654

So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), wherein the court reversed summary

judgment against a city because the Plaintiff did not state with particularity

all issues that were the subject of the motion for summary judgment.

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Because Plaintiff’s motion lacked particularity and failed to show that

there were no genuine issues of material fact, Plaintiff did not meet the

burden required for a summary judgment. The trial court erred in granting

summary judgment based on a general statement in the motion.

B. Summary judgment for a plaintiff is improper where affirmative

defenses remain unaddressed.

In response to the complaint, the Defendant alleged three affirmative

defenses: (1) failure to state a cause of action by failing to comply with the

merger consummation requirements of § 657.065 Fla. Stat. ; (2) lack of privity

by the transfer of a defaulted note pursuant to § 687.071 Fla. Stat . (b)(3); and

(3) extortionate extension of credit pursuant to § 687.061 Fla. Stat . and §

802.014 Fla. Stat . (R: 64­66). Neither the summary judgment motion nor the

trial court’s final order addressed any of these defenses.

“It is well established that summary final judgment is appropriate

only where each affirmative defense has been conclusively refuted on the

record. ” Pandol Bros. v. NCNB Nat’l Bank of Fla., 450 So.2d 592 (Fla. 4 th

DCA 1984) quoting Spear v. Martin, 330 So.2d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).

In Pandol , the court overturned an order of summary judgment on a

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determination that an issue raised by way of affirmative defense was never

addressed. The moving party must establish that the affirmative defenses

are legally insufficient. Morroni v. Household Fin. Corp. III , 903 So. 2d

311, 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (reversing an order of summary judgment

where a finance company never factually refuted the defendants’

affirmative defenses or established that they were legally insufficient.) See

also Emile v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami, 126 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d DCA

1961) (reversing a grant of summary judgment where the defendant raised

an affirmative defense and the plaintiff had not presented any evidence in

contradiction or opposition to that defense). Likewise, in Alejandre v.

Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas , 44 So. 3d 1288, 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA

2010), the court reversed a grant of summary judgment because the

plaintiff did not address the defendant’s affirmative defenses. In the current

case, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment without a

refutation by Plaintiff of affirmative defenses.

C. Summary judgment is improper where authentication of the

amounts due is in question.

When summary judgment was entered for Plaintiff , a motion to

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strike the affidavit of David Hass was in the record and unheard. (R:

93­96). The purpose of the affidavit (R: 80­81) was to verify the loan

documents and amounts owed. Defendant’s motion to strike argued that

neither Hass nor the Plaintiff (1) were engaged by XYZ Credit Union for

the purpose of executing the subject loan with the Defendant; or (2) had

any contact with the Defendant with respect to the underlying transaction

between XYZ Credit Union and Defendant. Thus, the evidence for the

amount owed had been brought into question by Defendant’s motion to

strike the affidavit.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510 (e) reads in pertinent part that “ Supporting and

opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated

therein.” See also Zoda v. Hedden, 596 So.2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 2d DCA

1992). In Zoda , the court reversed a grant of summary judgment where an

affidavit was based on an affiant’s review of public records, not on

personal knowledge.

Additionally, a corporate officer’s affidavit that merely states

conclusions or opinion is not sufficient, even if it is based on personal

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knowledge. Nour v. All State Supply Co ., So. 2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1986), wherein an affidavit that amounted to a statement that the

allegations of the complaint were true and that the affiant was personally

knowledgeable was insufficient to support summary judgment.

In this case, Defendant’s motion to strike argued that Hass was in

no position to witness or take part in transactions between the Defendant

and XYZ Credit Union. Thus, it was argued, Hass’ statements in the

Affidavit were not based upon personal knowledge. The affidavit was

conclusory and incomplete, and if stricken from evidence, would have

deprived Plaintiff of its only means to authenticate the loan documents or

the amounts owed. Further, the motion to strike presented a genuine issue

of material fact regarding the amount owed. The trial court erred in

granting summary judgment without first ruling on the motion to strike

Hass’ affidavit.

D. Summary judgment is improper where relevant discovery is

outstanding.

Discovery was expected to result in additional defenses or facts

underlying existing defenses, but before Plaintiff responded to the second

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set of discovery requests, the trial court granted summary judgment. (R:

110­111).

The following questions were asked in Defendant’s Continuing

Interrogatories to Plaintiff (A: E2):

(8) How did the affiant, David Hass, come to have personal

knowledge of the facts to which he affied in Plaintiff’s Affidavit of

Amounts Due?

(9) When did the affiant, David Hass, occupy his current position?

(10) What was the affiant, David Hass’, previous position and for

how long?

The goal of this line of questioning was to determine whether the

affiant, the credit union’s representative, was competent to testify on

matters regarding the agreement between XYZ Credit Union and

Defendant. The questions are relevant to the Motion to Strike Affidavit,

which raises issues of material fact. Yet, Plaintiff did not respond to them,

stating that they are irrelevant, etc. (R: 110).

“Where discovery is still pending, the entry of summary judgment is

premature.” See Payne v. Cudjoe Gardens Property Owners Ass'n,

Inc., 837 So.2d 458, 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), wherein the court reversed a

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grant of summary judgment in an association's action to enforce a deed

restriction set­back against homeowners because it was entered before

completion of discovery.

“Unless the facts of a case have been developed sufficiently to

enable the trial court to determine that no issues of fact exist, summary

judgment must not be entered.” Kimball v. Publix Super Markets, Inc .,

901 So.2d 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that summary judgment was

premature in a personal injury case in which a supermarket had not

complied with a customer’s discovery request). It is reversible error to

enter summary judgment when relevant discovery is pending. Abbate v.

Publix Super Mkts., Inc. , 632 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), wherein

the court reversed a grant of summary judgment against a grocery store,

holding that it was premature where a motion to compel answer to

interrogatory was pending. See also Arguelles v. City of Orlando , 855

So.2d 1202 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that summary judgment in

favor of a city was premature where landowners had scheduled

depositions).

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Summary judgment is premature where discovery is ongoing and

there may be genuine issues of fact yet to be discovered. Thus, the trial

court erred in granting summary judgment that interrupted discovery.

CONCLUSION

The trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss should be reversed

and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss the case. At the time of filing

the complaint, Plaintiff had not complied with the Florida statute governing the

merger of credit unions. The statute required that a certificate of merger be

recorded in the public records of Hillsborough County. Because the Plaintiff

failed to comply with this requirement, Hillsborough County courts lacked

jurisdiction to enforce a claim on the alleged merged assets. Further, Plaintiff's

failure to consummate or bring to completion the merger with XYZ Credit Union

before filing suit created a defect in the complaint that could not be cured within

the case.

In the alternative, the lower court's grant of summary judgment to the

Plaintiff should be reversed and the case remanded for further discovery and trial.

The lower court erred in granting Plaintiff's summary judgment motion despite

(1) the failure to show that no genuine issues of fact existed, (2) unaddressed

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affirmative defenses, (3) an outstanding motion to strike the affidavit

authenticating amounts owed and (4) outstanding discovery.

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT this computer­generated brief complies with the

requirements of Fla. R. App. P. 9.210 and uses Times New Roman 14­point font,

a font that is proportionately spaced.

___________________________

Jane Doe, pro se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed

this 14 th day of December, 2011 to

o Millicent J. Barbie, Esq., 2505 West Hanover Avenue, Tampa, FL 33613,

Attorney for Plaintiff.

o Valerie J. Lacil, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiff, 4533 Pine Bluff Blvd., Suite

1000, Orlando, FL 32801 .

___________________________

Jane Doe, pro se

4218 Druid Road

Temple Terrace, Florida 33559

Telephone: (813) 999­9999

Email: jane299.doe@gmail.com

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