india's parliament as a representative

Published in: India Review, vol. 7, no. 2, April-June 2008, pp. 91-114

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India’sParliamentasaRepresentativeInstitution

JessicaWallack1

February2008

“Voicingtheconstituents’concernsonthefloorofthehouseistheprimaryparliamentaryduty

ofanelectedrepresentative.”

–LokSabhaRulebook

“OneoftheimportantfunctionsofRajyaSabhaistofocuspublicattentiononmajorproblems

affectingpoliciesoftheGovernmentandadministrationandtoprovideaforumforventilation

ofpublicgrievances.”

‐RajyaSabhaRulebook

India’sparliamentisnotfunctioningwellasarepresentativeinstitution.Itisfailingasa

platformforaggregatingcitizenpreferencesintopublicpolicy:deliberationsareshorterand

moresparselyattendedthaneveranddisruptionsseemtobemorefrequent.Publicireison

theriseandinstitutional“shortcuts”toachievepolicychangewithoutlegislationorlegislative

oversightseemtobeincreasinglyaccepted.

WhilemuchofthepubliccriticismfocusesontheMembersofParliament(MPs),this

paperturnstolookatpossibleinstitutionaldeterminantsforthemalfunction.Inparticular,I

documenthowIndia’sparliamentcomparestoothersintherulesandproceduresfor

aggregatingrepresentatives’inputsviadeliberationtoformpolicy.India’sparliamentary

proceduresstandoutamongparliamentsaroundtheworldinthelimitationstheyplaceon

mostmembers’abilitytorepresenttheirconstituentsinthenormalcourseofdebateor

policymaking.ItsindividualMPsareelectedrepresentatives,butitsrulesandnormsfor

1CentreforDevelopmentFinance,Chennai,India&UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego.jwallack@ucsd.edu.IthankJayPandaandtwoanonymousrefereesfortheirvaluablecommentswithoutimplicatingtheminanyofthefactualerrorsormistakenconclusions.SudhaYadavprovidedveryhelpfulresearchassistance.


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aggregatingthesemembers’inputsintopolicylimittheextenttowhichtheinstitution’s

decisionscanberepresentativeofthemembers.

ThereisastronglogicalbasisforalinkbetweenIndia’sparliamentaryrulesandthe

observedabsenteeism,curtaileddebate,andfrequentdisruptions.Parliamentaryrulesare

unlikelytobethesolereasonfortheunprofessionalbehavior–otherparliamentssharesome

oftheIndianparliament’sfeatureswithoutsharingitsbehaviors–buttheyareaveryplausible

andoften‐overlookedcontributingfactor.

First,therulesarethemeansbywhichthegovernmentcanlimitdebate.These

limitationsareoneoftheoft‐citedsymptomsofParliamentarydecline.Asdiscussedbelowin

moredetail,thegovernmentexercisessubstantialcontroloverwhatissuesgetdiscussed,

when,andforhowlong.Italsohasthepowertocircumscribecommitteedeliberations.

Second,therulesandtheirapplicationarealsolikelytolimitMP’sincentivestoprepare

forandparticipateindebate.Theobservedabsenteeism,disruptions,anddirectinterference

withthebureaucracycouldbeseenatleastinpartasreasonableresponsestoParliament’s

failuresasarepresentativeinstitution.Rushingthewell,disregardingtherulesofdebate,and

other“wastesoftime”couldbeanalogoustotheriots,rebellions,andvigilantismthatKohli

(1990)arguesarecitizens’responsetothefailureofotherchannelsforpoliticalvoice.Heand

otheranalystsofIndianpoliticstypicallyfocusondisenfranchisementofcitizens;Iarguethat

Parliamentalsoseemstodisenfranchiseatleastsomeoftheirrepresentatives.''The

governmentisstubborn.Itdoesnotlistentous.Sowegetinthewell,''saidoneMPwhen

askedaboutthedisruptions.2

Therelativedifficultyofinfluencingpolicythroughdebatecouldalsoaffectindividual

MPs’incentivestofocusonconstituencyservice.Focusingondirectpolicyinfluencemakes

senseasastrategyifthereisnoreasonablewayforarepresentativetoensurethatconstituent

preferenceswilleverbeheardinadebate.India’sfirst‐past‐the‐postelectoralsystemalso

placesparticularpressureonIndia’sMPstodeliveridentifiablereturnsfortheirconstituents.3

2StatementfromShanavazHussain,anMPfromanoppositionparty(BJP).AsecondMPfromapartyalliedwiththegovernment(MohdSalim,CPM)questionedthislogic,asking“What'stheneedtorushtothewell?Thereareotherplatformstoprotest.''BothquotedinShrivastava(2007).3SeeCareyandShugart(1995)andWallacketal(2003)onthestrengthofconstituencyserviceincentivescreatedbyvariouselectoralsystems.


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VariousanalysesofParliamentaryfunctioninothercountriessharethisassumptionthat

tightgovernmentcontrolovercontentiousdebateswillcreateincentivesfortheoppositionto

disruptproceedings.DiPalma(1976),forexample,arguesthattheItaliangovernmentatthat

timeavoideddisruptionfromthesignificantminoritypartyintheoppositionbyfocusingon

legislationaboutuncontroversialissues.Doring(1995)notesthattimeisavaluablecommodity

thattheoppositioncansquanderthroughobstruction,leavingthegovernmentwithan

incentivetoavoidexercisingtheagendacontrolpowershedocumentsinawaythatprovokes

disruption.Actualdisruptionsarerareonlybecausegovernmentsareassumedtotailortheir

strategytostopshortofprovokingdisruption.Avoidingdisruption,however,dependsonthe

governmentactingcoherently,somethingthattheincreasinglyfractiouscoalitiongovernments

inIndiamaynotbecapableof.4

Thenewimportanceoftheparliamentaryrulesrelativetointra‐partynegotiationsin

aggregatingrepresentatives’preferencesmayalsohavecontributedtotheriseindisruption.

Theformalruleshavebecomemoreimportantforstructuringpoliticaldebateastheone‐party

dominantsystemhasgivenwaytoanewrealityofhundredsofpartiesfieldingcandidates,and

tensofpartiesrepresentedineachhouse.InteractionsbetweenMembersofParliamentare

nowmorelikelytobeinter‐partydiscussionsthanintra‐partydebatesresolvedaccordingto

partypractices.

ItisdifficulttoempiricallyvalidateanyexplanationforthedeclineofParliament,but

importanttoconsiderallplausiblereasonsfortheparliamentaryfailings.Parliament’sdeclining

performanceandtheincreasingcriticismoftheinstitutionisworrisomeforIndia’sdemocracy.

Complaintsabout“thegovernment”aggregatedissatisfactionwithcourts,bureaucrats,and

politiciansatalllevels,resultingindiffusecriticismunlikelytoleadtoasubstantivealternative.

InthewordsofWinstonChurchill,“Democracyistheworstsystemexceptforallothers.”The

increasinglysharpcritiqueofParliament’sactivities,however,istargetedatakeylinkinthe

chainofdelegationfromcitizentobureaucrat.Asdiscussedinthefollowingsection,thereare

alsospecificandincreasinglyacceptedbypassesforthisperceivedweaklink.

4Coalitionsdonotalwaysseemtohavemuchofasharedideology.ManyofthepartiesinthecurrentCongress‐ledcoalition,forexample,werefoundedatleastinpartinoppositiontothethen‐dominantCongress(manybyexploitingparticularcaste,ethnic,regionalorotheridentities).Chakrabarty(2005).


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ThenextsectionprovidesabriefoverviewofParliamentarymalfunctionandits

consequences.SectionThreediscussesthecurrentdiagnosesoftheunderlyingcausesofthe

declineindebateandarguesthatweneedtoconsidertheinstitutionaswellastheindividuals

tounderstandthefailureofrepresentationinpolicymaking.SectionFourgivesaninstitutional

overviewofIndia’sParliamentasarepresentativeinstitutionincomparativeperspective.I

focusonhowtheParliamentaryrulesaffectindividualmembers’abilitytoconveytheir

constituents’preferencesandrepresenttheirconstituentsastheirbetter‐informedagentsin

morecomplexpolicydecisions.Theconcludingsectiondiscussessomeinstitutionalchanges

thatmightimproveParliament’sabilitytoserveasarepresentativeinstitution.

Thepaperisnotthefirsttonotethepopulardisdainfortheinstitution,norisitthefirst

toaskhowwellParliamentrepresentsitsconstituents.Itismoreunusualinthatitdrawsonthe

formalcomparativepoliticsliterature’semphasisontheconsequencesofhowstateinstitutions

arestructuredratherthanfocusingontheinterfacebetweencitizenandstate.Thisapproachis

rarelyappliedtostudiesofIndianpolitics;cleavagesincivilsociety,thepowerofindividual

leadersortechnocrats,andthelackofindividualswith“politicalwill”seemtobemore

commonframeworksforexplainpolicychange(orlackthereof)inIndia.5

ParliamentaryMalfunction

TheParliament’smalfunctionasaninstitutionhasbeenwell‐documentedbyprevious

studies,mostofwhichhighlightadeclineinperformanceoverthepastdecadeorso.Members

spendlesstimesittingtodeliberateandthedeliberationsthatdooccuraresparselyattended.

Actualdaysofsittingtodeliberateareathirdofwhattheywereinthe1950s,eventhough

otheraspectsofconstituencyrepresentationsuchastravellingtoandcommunicatingwith

constituentshavegotteneasier.6Systematicdataonabsenteeismandquorumviolationsare

notrecorded,butMehtaandKapur(2006)recountanumberofanecdotesthattheyassert

“couldbemultipliedendlessly”basedontheinterviewstheycarriedout.(18)Shourie(2007)

5KapurandMehta,eds(2005)isanexception.SeeWallackandSingh(2007)foranoverviewoftheliterature.6MehtaandKapur(2006).


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reportsthattherearetwinconventionsonquorum:thepresidingofficerdoesnotchecktosee

ifenoughmembersarepresenttoconstituteaquorumunlessamemberdrawshisattentionto

thematter,andnomembereverdrawshisattentiontothematter.

Mehta(2007)arguesthatParliamenthasbecomeincreasinglyunprofessional,passing

budgetswithalmostnoscrutinyamongothersignsofdecline.7Nineteenbills,includinga

constitutionalamendment,werepassedononedayinMarchduringthe9thLokSabha.8

NationalSocialWatchCoalition(NSWC,2007)estimatesthatmorethan40%ofbillswere

passedintheLokSabhain2006withlessthananhourofdebate,while65%ofmembersofthe

lowerhouseneversaidanythingaboutanylegislationduringthatyear.Eveninadditiontothe

disruptions,muchofthetimespentinsessionsseemstobespentonactivitiesotherthan

legislativedebate.Madhukar(2007)estimatesthattheLokSabhaspentjust20%ofitstime

debatinglegislativeissuesandtheRajyaSabha23%overthelastsevensessions.

Parliamentalsoseemstobeabdicatingitsresponsibilitytoprovideguidancetothe

bureaucracy,insteadleavingmanysubstantivedecisionstounelectedcivilservicemembers.

Legislationatcenterandstatestendstoassignresidualandrule‐makingpowertothe

concernedministry,leavingtheministriestomakenewrules,createnewpublicagencies,and

makedecisionswithdistributionalconsequences.Guidancebythreatorpromiseoftransfer

seemstobethemorecommonwayforpoliticianstooverseethebureaucracy.Atleasthalfof

theIASofficersservingbetween1978and1996spentlessthat1yearintheirjobsaccordingto

Das(1998).Fourhundredtwentyoutof500IASofficersinUttarPradeshweretransferred

everyyearbetween1992and1998byBardhan(2006)’scalculations.Anybodywhohasworked

withcivilserviceofficialshasatleastafewanecdotesofpoliticizedtransferstoshare.

“Transferisanindustryinsomestates!”notesoneformerSecretarytotheGovernmentof

India.9

7Mehtaarguesthatthisbehaviorwouldbedetrimentalforfiscaldiscipline.Manyotherscholarsofporkbarrelpoliticswouldsuggestthattheoppositeistrue‐thatthetightcontroloverthebudgetswouldlimitincentivesforlogrollingrelativetoafree‐for‐all.Inanycase,thepointisthatIndiaisademocracy,andthebudgetisoneofthemajorpolicystatementsofademocracy,soelectedleadersshouldbepayingattention.8Agrawal(2005).Perhapstheformaldiscussionofthebillisnottherealdiscussionofthebill:thingshavebeenpre‐negotiatedwithintherulingcoalition,sothereisnoneedforfurtheramendment.Thepoliticalcontroltakesplacethroughtheseinformaldiscussions.9Dr.G.Sundaram,in“MythsAboutIndianCivilServices.”


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Stallingseemstobereplacingdebateasatacticfordealingwithconflict,evenasthe

numberofissuesthatneedtobedebatedandputtorestincreases.TheEleventhLokSabha

lostfivepercentofitstimetodisruption,theTwelfthtenpercentandthe(current)Thirteenth

22.4%.10SpeakerstotheParliamentwerethreatenedtwiceinoneweekinMarch2007,for

example:marshalsweresummonedonMarch12,2007whenCPI(M)membersstormedthe

wellandthreatenedtheMinisterofShipping.Hispartymembersformedahumanwallto

protecthim.MembersoftheBJPandotheroppositionpartiesreportedly“rushed

threateningly”towardtheFinanceMinisteronMarch19,2007.11The2007MonsoonSession

adjournedfourdaysearlyfollowingdisruptionsthatcostit42hours.LokSabhaSpeaker

SomnathChatterjeeraisedquestionsaboutthe“utilityofoursystemofParliamentary

democracyanditsfuture,”andcalledthecontinueddisruptiona“disease”inhisconcluding

speech.12The2007wintersessionofParliamentadjournedsinedieafterjust17sittings,many

ofwhichwerealsodisrupted.13

Stallingasatacticdoesnotseemtobeamatterofthecurrentpoliticalconfiguration.

ThecurrentwaveofcritiquesfocusondisruptionsundertheCongress‐ledgovernment,but

Parliamentwasstalledforfourdaysin2002undertheBJP‐ledgovernmentasoppositionMPs

pushedfordiscussionandavoteonresponsibilityforviolenceinGujaratandforaweekin2001

overanarmsscandal.

Thecostofthesedisruptionshasbecomefront‐pagenewsinsomeoftheelitemedia.

Mint,alocalEnglish‐languagepartneroftheWallStreetJournal,prominentlydisplaysa

“ParliamentWasteTracker”monitoringthecostperminuteofdebateandofdisruptions.One

ofthepaper’srecent“QuickEdits”askedwhythemembersarepaidsalariesandperksfornot

working,goingontonotethatnearly26%ofParliament’stimewaslostduetodisruptions.The

“wasted”timecosttaxpayersRs.26,000perminute.14CNN‐IBNreportedthatthedisruptions

duringthe2007MonsoonsessioncostthecountryRs.18crore,whiletheHindureporteda

10NationalSocialWatchCoalition(2007)11ReportedinDivan(2007).12“ParliamentSessionsCurtailed,SpeakerCallsDisruptions‘ADisease’.”13TheHindu(2008)reportsatotalof130hourslosttodisruptioninbothhousesin2007.14“ParliamentTakesitEasy.”Theseestimatesseemtohaveescalatedsignificantlyoverthepastfewyears.OneactivistestimatedthecostofdisruptionatUS$350/minute(aboutRs15,600atthethenexchangerates)in2002.(H.D.Shourie,quotedin“ParliamentImpasseCostsIndia.”)


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figureofRs.20crore.15Onereader’slettertotheIndiaTodaySept10,2007issueasked“Since

therearenorealdiscussionsinParliament,whyisthetax‐payers’hardearnedmoneybeing

squanderedtryingtorunit?Itisbettertoscrapsuchdiscussionsandmeetings.”(p.8)

Thereareobviouslyotherlessquantifiablecostsduetodelayedpoliciesandlimited

accountability.BBC’scoverageof2002disruptionsquotedonebusinessman’squestion,“With

theoppositionbayingforblood,whenwill[Parliament]everreconvenetotakeupimportant

economiclegislation?”16NDTV’scoverageofparliamentarydisruptionsinSeptember2007

pointedlyobservedthat“Over1200peopledeadinfloods,68,000livestocklost,thelossto

cropsandpropertyisestimatedtobeRs1200crore,terrorstrikeinHyderabadandspiraling

prices‐allremainedunheardinsideParliament.IftheIndo‐USnucleardealwasthereasonfor

thestrife,eventhatcriticalissuewasneverdiscussed.”17ArunShourie,aprominentpolitical

commentator,formerMinister,andcurrentmemberoftheRajyaSabha,summarizesthe

situation:“…thesechambersarenownotlegislaturesthatholdgovernmentstoaccount,they

arenowhallsinwhichthemotionsaregonethrough,inwhichputonmelodramasare

enacted.”18

Parliament’sdysfunctionalsoseemstohaveincreasedsupportforalternativemeansof

policymaking.Thejudiciaryisincreasinglyactive.19Courtshavegotteninvolvedinbureaucratic

oversight,orderingthePowerMinistertoaccelerateconstructionofelectricityplants in2007

andtakingaroleinDelhiurbanplanners’decisionsaboutmixed‐usedesignations,forexample,

inlatesummer2006.Theyhavegainedpopularsupportasavenueforcitizenstoexpresstheir

policy demands through Public Interest Litigations (PILs). The “post‐democratic delegation

revolution”ofpolicymakingtonon‐electedindependentregulatorybodiesisalsoinfullswingin

India.20Politicians’and theParliament’s ineffectiveness seems tobedrawingmoreandmore

calls to remove state services from political oversight. V.S. Malimath, the Chairman of the

15“ParliamentDisruptionsCostNationRs.18Crore,”and“ParliamentdisruptionscostsRs.20crtoexchequer.”16“ParliamentImpasseCostsIndia.”17Shrivastava(2007).18Shourie(2007),p.2719Mehta(2005)providesadetailedhistoryandanalysisofactivismoverthepastdecades.Theactivismisnotnew,butseemstobeontherise.20(KapurandMehta,2006,30)


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Committee for Reforms of Criminal Justice and former Chief Justice of Kerala and Karnataka

High Courts, for example, suggested removing the criminal justice system from political

oversight.21

Someofthemappeartobeimprovements.EvenMehta(2007),generallyacriticof

judicialactivism,writesthat"representativeinstitutionsaresooftenburdenedwiththe

imperativesofmoney,power,andinertiathattocalltheirdecisionsdemocraticandinthe

publicinterestisoftensomethingofajoke."(80)Hisessaystruggleswiththequestionof

whetherjudicialactivismmightbejustifiedinthefaceofParliamentaryabdication.22Intheend,

however,heconcludesthatatleastParliamentrepresentsthepeoples’willbetterthan

unelectedcourtssotemporaryefficacydoesnotjustifybypassingParliamentinpolicymaking:

"Representativeinstitutionsare,afterall,theessenceofdemocracy,andjudgesdonotstandin

thesamerelationtousaslegislators."(80)Shourie(2007)’svehementcritiqueofParliament

doesnotevencedethispointtoParliament–severalchaptersofthebookwarnagainst

“romanticizingthepeople.”

Inanycase,thenumberofbypassesamongtheexistingdemocraticsetupislimited.

Whatisthenextoptionwhenjudicialactivismbecomesincapableofhandlingtherisingtidesof

demands?Howmanypeacefuloutsideoptionsarethere?“Peopleinthecountryarefastlosing

faithinthejudiciary,”writeJusticesA.K.MathurandMarkandeyKatjuoftheSupremeCourt.23

Thesamearticledocumentstheriseofvigilantism–tacitly‐sanctionedpunishmentsreflecting

cynicismabouttheeffectivenessofthelaw–inadditiontotheflash‐pointsofangerabout

particularincidents.“Thepublic’s‘grievanceredressalmechanism’hascollapsed,”noted

PramodKumaroftheInstituteofDevelopmentandCommunicationinChandigarh–henoted

thatpoliticalandbureaucraticinterventionhasbeenseenasineffective,sopeopletakethings

intotheirownhands.24

Individuals,Institutions,andRepresentation

21“Needed:AStrongMoralFibre.”22Mehta(2007),forexample,citesIndianlegalscholarUpendraBaxi’sstatementthatjudicialactivismis"chemotherapyforacarcinogenicbodypolitic."23“MobRule.”24Ibid,p.48.


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Manyofthecritiquesassumethatindividualfailingsareattheheartoftheproblem.

Mediareportspointtotheincreasingcriminalizationofpolitics,manycitinga2004studythat

quarteroftheMembersofParliamenthaveacriminalbackground.25Votersdon’talwayshave

greatoptionstochoosefromandtheirchoicesdonotalwaysseemideal.ColumnistTavleen

Singhreportsoneillustrativeanecdote:

"DuringanearlierelectioninUttarPradesh,IstoppedatateashopinYadav’s

constituencytoaskwhypeoplevotedforamaninfamousforhisillicitactivitiesandthe

oldmansaid,‘Becausethemanwhoisstandingagainsthimisalsoacriminal,sowemay

aswellvoteforastrongerandbettercriminal.’"26

MehtaandKapur(2006)’scomprehensiveassessmentofParliamentasaninstitutionof

accountabilityfocusesondescribingtheindividualmembers’characteristicsmorethanthe

institution’sfailures.Theydonotexplicitly“blame”individuals,butitisstrikingthattheydonot

discusstherulesofprocedurealongwiththemembers’characteristicsaspossibleinputsinto

thepooroutcomes.Shourie(2007)’scritiqueofParliamentismorepointed.Henotesthat

manyMembersofParliamentrepresentaminorityoftheirconstituencies.Morethanhalf‐

60%‐ofmembersoftheLokSabhaelectedin2004gainedofficewithlessthan50%ofthe

votesfromtheirconstituency.Almostall–99%‐gainedofficewiththevotesoflessthanhalf

thepotentialvotersintheirconstituencies.27

Thenear‐exclusivefocusonindividualsasthefailurestemsfromacommonconflation

ofrepresentativesandrepresentativeinstitutions.“Representation”inthepoliticaleconomy

literatureusuallyreferstoindividualactivities.Someuseitasasynonymforresponsivenessto

constituentdemandsandcommunication.28Othersuseittodenoteakindofinformation

servicetransmittingconstituents’statedpolicyrequeststothelargerpolicymakingforumon

25Studyofthe2004LokSabhabythePublicAffairsCentre,Bangalore,citedinBeharetal,2006.GowdaandSridharan(2007)arguethatpartiestodayaremorelikelytochoosecriminalsbecausethesepeoplehavetheclouttowinconstituenciesthatthepartyreputation(whichmaynotexistforsomenewparties)cannotsway.26Singh(2007).27P.28‐29.Thisisnotanentirelynewphenomenon,thoughfragmentationofvoteshareshasincreasedsomewhatwiththeproliferationofparties.India’sfirstpastthepostelectoralsystemallowsthecandidatewiththemostvotestowinandhasnomajorityrunoffrequirement.28Pitkin(1967),EulauandKarps(1977),Searing(1985).


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behalfofthosewhocouldnotbepresent.“Representation”canalsomeanactingasanagent;

decidingwhatconstituentswouldhavedecidediftheyhadalloftheinformationavailablethat

therepresentativehas.Manin,Przeworski,andStokes(1999)’scomprehensiveoverviewlabels

thefirsttwothe“mandateconceptionofrepresentation”andthethirdthe“accountability

concept.”29

Thesedefinitionsdescribehowindividualrepresentativesshouldbehavevisavistheir

constituents,butdonotprovideanybenchmarkforevaluatinghowthecollectivedecisionsof

representativesshouldrelatetothecollectivepreferencesoftherepresented.Theliterature

hastendedtoblurindividualrepresentativenessandinstitutionalrepresentativeness.Manin,

Przeworski,andStokesopentheirbookbysummarizingtheprevailingunderstandingof

representativenessas:“Governmentsarerepresentativebecausetheyareelected…[such

governments]willactinthebestinterestofthepeople.”(29)Evenstudiesthatexplicitlyseek

tostudyinstitutionalrepresentativeness,suchasLoewenbergandKim(1978),focuson

individuals.Theyintendtoconsiderthe“representativerelationship…asitexistsbetween

parliamentsascollectivitiesandgroupsofconstituents,”butusemeasuresofindividual

responsivenesstoconstituentsintheirempiricalanalysis.30

Peopleelectrepresentatives,butparliaments’actionsaretheproductoftherulesfor

aggregatingtheserepresentatives’inputsasmuchastheinputsthemselves.Arepresentative

institutionshouldallowalloftheserepresentativestoactivelyrepresenttheirconstituentsin

thegroup’sdecisionmaking.Itsdecisionsasawholeshouldbesummariesofitsmembers’

inputs.Ataminimum,itsmembersshouldbeabletoshapepolicydebatesbyconveyingtheir

constituents’viewsintwoways:proposingpoliciesandcommentingonthosepoliciesproposed

byothers.Arepresentativeinstitutionshouldalsoenableitsmemberstoeffectivelyserveas

29Notethatneitherconceptofrepresentationnecessarilymeansgoodpolicyinasocialwelfaresense.Themandatedpolicymaynotalwaysactuallybethebestpolicyforvotersbecausecircumstancesmightchangeorvotersmightbemisinformed.Theagent’schoiceofpolicyismorelikelytobethebestpolicyforthedecisivevoter(ifrepresentationisstrong)becauseittakesadvantageofavailableinformation,butitisnotnecessarilythemostwelfare‐enhancingpolicyforsociety.30P.27TheauthorsfindthatMPs’conceptionsabout“constituency,”receptivenesstoideasfromconstituents,andchannelsofcommunicationsvarymoreacrossParliamentsthanwithin,andinterpretthisasevidencethatsomethingabouttheParliamentsismoreorlessrepresentative.Itcouldalsobeinterpretedasafindingabouttheincentiveeffectsofelectoralsystemsoranyothercross‐countryinstitutionalvariation.


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agentsbyenablingthemtoacquireandusespecializedinformationtochoosepoliciesbasedon

theirconstituents’preferences.

ThechallengeinassessingParliament’sfunctionalityasarepresentativeinstitutionisin

measuringinstitutionalrepresentativeness.Thereisnoclearoutcomebenchmark,noalternate

viewofwhatthepeoples’willistobecomparedtotheexpressionofthepeoples’willthrough

Parliament.Itisalsohardertotesttheoriesaboutwhatmakesfora“representativeinstitution”

sincetherearefewerinstitutionsthanindividualstoincludeinfeasibledatasets,andmore

degreesoffreedomtocontrolfor.

Thispaperusesadifferenttactic:focusingontheextenttowhichtheinstitutionenables

representativestoactuallyrepresenttheirconstituents.Ilookatboththequantityandquality

ofindividualmembers’opportunitiestorepresenttheirconstituents.“Quantity”of

opportunitiesissimplytheamountoftimethatmemberscanexpecttobeabletospeakin

committeeorindebateonthefloor.The“quality”ofrepresentationopportunitiesisfarmore

importantanddependsonvariousfactors.Theabilitytopropose,amend,andframethe

decisionstobevotedonallaffecttheimpactthatarepresentativecanhavewithacertain

numberofminutesofspeech.IalsoconsiderParliaments’supportforindividualmembers’

effortstobecomeinformedagentsfortheirconstituents.

Thediscussionofthe“quality”ofMP’stimeinthenextsectionsynthesizespastworkon

Parliamentaryinstitutionsandtheirinfluenceonthepoliciesthatemergefromdebate.Some

formofagendacontrol,orcontrolovertheitemsfordiscussion,sequenceofdiscussion,

opportunitiesforamendments,andabilitytoinfluencethetimingofthefinalvote,isalmost

universallyrecognizedasadeterminantofthefinaldecisions.LaverandShepsle(1994)focus

oncontroloftheplenarytimetableasthekeytothegovernment’sinfluenceonthe

Parliament’sdecisions.Doring(1995)andTsebelis(2002)dissectagendacontrolintothepower

tointroducebills,thepowertoamendbills,thepowertolimitcommitteediscussion,andthe

powertoforcevotestocurtaildebate.Tsebelis(2002)considersthevoteofnoconfidenceto

bethegovernment’smostpowerfulweaponofallsinceittransformsavoteonanyparticular

issueintoamuchlargerquestionofconfidenceinthecoalition(andpotentialfordestroying

one’sownjob).


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MyfocusonopportunitiesforMPstorepresenttheirconstituenciesasameasureofan

institution’srepresentativenessisparalleltothepracticeofmeasuringanindividualMPs’

“representativeness”asafunctionoffreeandfairelections.Itisexplicitlycomparativeinan

efforttobenchmarkthefunctionalityofIndia’sinstitutions.TheliteratureonParliaments

containsanumberofcomparativesurveysofrules,somecitedhere,butthesehavenever

includedIndiaamongthecomparison.Theanalysishighlightssomeplausiblyconsequential

waysinwhichIndia’sversionofparliamentarydemocracystandsout.

ParliamentasaRepresentativeInstitution

India’sParliamentfallsshortasarepresentativeinstitutioninaggregatingitsmembers’

informationandinensuringthattheserepresentativeshaveadequateinformationtoactas

agentsfortheirconstituents.Whilethequantityoftimeforrepresentationisallocated

proportionallytopartyrepresentation,thequalityofopportunitiesforcontributingto

parliamentarydiscussionareunevenlydividedbetweenGovernmentandOpposition,aswellas

betweenpartyleadersandrankandfile.BothhousesofParliamentemphasizethedutyofeach

electedrepresentativetoactivelyvoicetheirconstituents’voicesandconcerns,buttherules

makeitdifficultforalltodoso.Thefirstpartofthissectionfocusesonvariousdimensionsof

thequalityofopportunitiesforoppositionMPstorepresenttheirconstituents,whilethe

secondturnstothelevelofsupportforMPsasinformedagentsoftheirconstituents.

DeterminingIssuesontheAgenda

GovernmentandoppositionleaderssitontheBusinessAdvisoryCommitteeandwork

outtheagendafordiscussionundertheguidanceoftheSpeakerintheLokSabhaandtheVice

PresidentintheRajyaSabha.Timeisallocatedproportionallytorepresentationandopposition

partiesareassuredofopportunitiestospeakbutthegovernmentretainssubstantialcontrol

overqualityoftime.


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ThegovernmentholdsamajorityofseatsontheBusinessAdvisoryCommittee–nineof

thefifteenmembersofthecommitteeinthecurrentLokSabhaarefromthecoalition.31This

arrangementaffordslessgovernmentcontrolovertheagendathansomeParliaments–the

governmentalonedeterminestheplenaryagendaintheUKandIreland,forexample,onmost

days–butmorethanmost.Austria,Belgium,Germany,Norway,andSpainseekconsensual

agreementontheagenda,althoughtheplenarymajorityhastherighttooverturnthis

decision.32PartyleadershavetodecideunanimouslyontheagendainItaly,thoughtheydoso

underthethreatthatPresidentoftheChamber(amemberofthegovernment)getstodecideif

theycannotagreeandanysubsequentamendmentstotheagendaforthedayrequire¾

majorities.33TheentirechambercollectivelydecidestheagendaintheNetherlands.34

Theopposition’sabilitytoplacetheirstatementsstrategicallyarounddecisionpoints

dependsontheirbargainingpowerratherthananyparticularguaranteethatexplicitrulesof

debateprovide.Thereisroomforthegovernmenttoresistdiscussiononsomeissuesifthe

SpeakerandVicePresidentarenotsympathetic,thoughthistendstoattractpubliccriticism.

Withinpartiesthesenior‐mostmembersgetfarmoreopportunitiestorepresenttheir

constituentsthanjuniormembers.

Questionhouristhemainexceptiontothisrule.India’sMPscanposequestionstothe

governmentduringthefirsthourofeverymeeting.AnyMembercansubmitaquestiontoany

Minister,requestinganoralorawrittenanswer.TheSpeakeroftheHouseandtheBusiness

AdvisoryCommitteeselectandorderthequestions(submittedatleasttendaysinadvance)by

lottery.Someareslatedfororaldelivery,allowingroomfordiscussion,butmostgetanswered

inwritingwithnodiscussion.TheSpeakermayallowaseparatehalf‐hourdiscussionoutsideof

QuestionHour,butisnotrequiredto.Hemayalsoallowa“ShortNoticeQuestion”forurgent

31ThisincludesCPImembersaspartofthecoalition,thoughtechnicallytheyaresupportingthegovernmentfromtheoutside.32Portugalalsorequiredaconsensusontheagendauntil1985,accordingtoDoring(1995)33Italianlawstatesthatspeakersmusttakethegovernment’sprioritiesintoaccountwhensettingtheagenda.Doring(1995)reportsthatthePresidentoftheChamberfrequentlydoesnotexecutethegovernment’srequests,however,sothisthreatmaynotactuallybethethreatofgovernmentcontrolovertheagendabutofparticularparties’controlovertheagenda.34Doring(1995)quotesoneMPassayingthatthechamber“doesnotevensharethepowertodeterminetheagendawithitsownspeaker.”(231)


- 14 -

matters,buthedetermineswhatisurgentandtheconcernedMinisterdecideswhetherheor

sheispreparedtoansweritatshortnotice.

Thequestionsappeartobevaluableopportunitiestoraiseissuesforpublicscrutinyor

extractionofassurancesfromthegovernment:elevenMPswereexpelledin2006foraccepting

bribestoaskquestions.35Nevertheless,someunwrittenconvention(perhapspartydiscipline)

seemstoaffectaccesstotheopportunity.Datta(2006)findsthatgovernmentcoalition“front‐

benchers”–politicianswhoarelikelytogoontobecomeMinistersorotherwisenationally

prominent–tendedtoaskmorequestionsthananyothergroupinthe10thLokSabhaand

RajyaSabha.GovernmentMinisterswereespeciallylikelytoaskeachotherquestionsduring

televisedsessions.

India’sexceptionforQuestionHourdoesnotcounteractitsrelativelyhighdegreeof

governmentcontroloverplacementofissuesontheagenda.QuestionHourissimilartothe

PrimeMinister’sQuestionsintheUKHouseofCommons,QuestionTimeinNewZealand,and

theQuestionPeriodinCanada.OtherParliaments,evensomeofthestricterParliaments,also

haveatleastsomedaysthatoppositiongetmorecontrolovertheagenda.Britainhas20

statutory“OppositionDays”inwhichoppositionpartiescandecidewhichtopicsaretobe

debated.Betweentheseandthe“PrivateMemberDays”discussedbelow,oppositionmembers

orgovernmentback‐bencherscanspeakuproughly15%ofthetimeParliamentisinsession.

TheGreekParliamentspendsonedaypermonthonpendingoppositionbills.Portugal’s

legislativesystemincludesseveral“parliamentarygroupdays”persessioninwhichopposition

groupsaregivenmoretimethangovernmentgroups.

IntroductionofBills

35Onegovernmentwebsite(http://www.parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/intro/p6.htm)givesthefollowingadvertisementforthesesessions:“TheQuestionHourisaninterestingpartoftheParliamentaryproceedings…therearemanyatimelivelyandquicksilverreparteesbetweentheMembersaskingthequestionsandtheMinistersansweringthem.Thesereparteesaresometimescoupledwithflashesofwitandhumour.”


- 15 -

AnyMemberofParliamentinIndia‐governingparty,opposition,individualmember–

canproposeabillthatdoesnotimplyanincreaseinexpenditureoftaxation.36Inpracticethe

governmentintroducesmostofthebills.37Only2½hoursperweekareavailabletodiscuss

privatemembers’billsandresolutions.38Privatemembers’billsdonottraditionallygetpassed

andaregenerallywithdrawnafterthegovernmentgivesassurancesthatitwillconsiderthe

issueandperhapsintroduceasimilarbill.

India’streatment of bill introduction is fairly standard. Thecountry’srulesonmoney

billsareonthestrictside,butsharedbyFrance,theU.K.,Ireland,Portugal,andSpain.Itsde

factotreatmentofprivatemembers’billsislessunusual.Swedenrestrictsintroductionof

privatemembers’billsto15daysaroundthetimeoftheBudgetBillinJanuary.39Anybodycan

submitabillinIceland,butbillsneedtheconsentofamajoritytobeplacedonthefloorafter6

monthsintotheAlthingisession.Privatemembers’billsinFrancehavetogetapprovalfromthe

governmentbeforebeingdiscussed.TheU.K.allowsdebateonprivatemember’sbillsfor10

Fridays,about5%ofthetimeahouseisinsession.Thereisaraffletodeterminetherightto

introduceabillduringoneoftheseFridays.TheGreekParliamentdebatesindividuallawsonce

amonth,withsomerestrictionsontheopposition’sabilitytointroducemoneybills.Ireland

discussesthesefor1hour,twiceaweek.40

ControloverAmendments

TheGovernment’sbillsoftenpassthroughtheParliamentintact.Afterthefirstreading’s

introductionofthebillanditsaimsandthesecondreading’sproposalforconsideration,thebill

36TheSpeakerdecideswhatdoesanddoesnotconstitutea“moneybill.”Moneybillscanonlybeintroducedinthelowerhouse.37Thepracticecouldbeafunctionofitssize:largeParliamentsof300ormoretendtodiscourageindividualmembersinitiativesmorethansmallerParliaments.Therationale:toomanyprivatebillsmakesParliamentinefficient.38Agrawal(2006).39Privatemembers’billscanonlybeintroducedlateriftheyarerelatedtothetopicofGovernmentproposedlegislation.Mattson(1995)ratesSwedenasoneofthecountriesthatismostfriendlytoindividualmembers’initiatives.40ThisparagraphdrawsonMattson(1995).


- 16 -

canthenbevotedonimmediately,circulatedforpubliccomment,orreferredtoanadhocor

(moreoften)astandingcommittee.

Billsdonothavetobeconsideredbycommittees.Non‐financialbillsarereferredto

committeesontherecommendationoftheSpeakeroftheLokSabhaortheChairmanofthe

RajyaSabha.Rules272and331GoftheRulesofProcedureandConductofBusinessinthe

RajyaSabhaandLokSabharespectivelystatethatgrantstoministriesanddepartmentshaveto

beexaminedandreportedonbytheconcernedstandingcommitteesofParliament,butboth

rulescanbesuspendedbymajority.Mostotherparliamentsrequirecommitteestoconsider

bills.41

Althoughoppositionmemberscaninfluencethecommittees,thebodiesseemedtobe

primarilyinstrumentsfordelayuntilrecently.KapurandMehta(2006)reportthatthe

executiverefersbillstothesecommitteesinordertogetthemstuck.Thecommitteeswere

expectedbyconventiontogiveaunanimousamendment,whichwasdifficultgiventhepartisan

composition.Thisconventionhasstartedtogivewaytomajorityopinionreportswithattached

dissentnotes,perhapsfurtherunderminingtheroleoftheoppositioninthecommitteessince

thegovernmentcoalitionwouldtypicallyhaveamajority.Inanycase,therecommendations

arenotbindingeventhoughtheyareoftenrespected.IndividualMP’scanalsooffer

amendmentswhenabillisplacedbeforeParliament,butthesealsomustbeapprovedbythe

Cabinetinordertobeincorporatedforthefinalvote.

Greeceistheonlycountrywithsimilarprovisions–amendmentsmustbesubmitted

priortodebateandtheGovernmenthastoagreetotheirbeingdiscussed.Francestrikesa

middlegroundinthatcommitteescanproposeamendments,buttheGovernmentcanstipulate

afinalvoteonaversionthatretainsonlyamendmentsitproposesoraccepts.42The

Governmentcanalsorejectanyamendmentthatincreasesexpendituresordepletesresources.

ParliamentsintheU.K.,Ireland,Denmark,andtheNetherlandsappeartorestrictcommittee

amendmentsless:theirparliamentsconsidertheGovernmentbillwithcommitteeamendments

41AlloftheParliamentsconsideredbyDoring(1995)exceptDenmark,Ireland,SpainandtheUKrequirecommitteedeliberation.42Heller(2001),Table1,Mattson(1995).


- 17 -

added.43Spainbanishescommitteeamendmentstoanannexseparatefromthereportingof

theoriginalbill,buttheamendmentsarereported.EvenIreland’sadhoccommitteeshavethe

righttoinsertamendmentsthatmustbeconsideredbythefullhouse.Austria,Portugaland

Luxembourgallowcommitteestoofferthehouseasubstitutebillthatisconsideredin

comparisontothegovernmentbill.Thelargestgroupofparliaments–Belgium,Finland,

Germany,Iceland,Italy,Norway,Spain,Sweden,andSwitzerland–allowscommitteesto

rewritegovernmenttextforpresentationtothehouse.44

TimingoftheFinalVote

Governmentcanalsounilaterally(bymajorityvote)suspenddebate.Thegovernment

decidedtorevisethebusinessofParliamentinMarch2006,forexample,topasstheBudget

andFinanceBillsbyvoicevoteswithnodiscussion.ItalsopassedthecontroversialOfficeof

ProfitBillduringthistime.45ItreconvenedParliamentafewdayslatertodiscussthebillsasif

theyhadnotalreadybeenpassed–standingcommitteeswereevenaskedtoconsiderthe

bills.46

ThisabilityputsIndiaamongtheparliamentswithmoregovernmentcontrolalongwith

France,Greece,Ireland,andtheUK.ThemajorityofParliaments(Austria,Belgium,Denmark,

Germany,Iceland,Italy,Luxembourg,Norway,Portugal,Spain,andSwitzerland)require

supermajoritiesorconsensustosuspenddebate.Finland,Netherlands,Swedenhaveno

provisionsatallforrushingbillsthrough.47

Individuals’RightstoVotetheirConstituents’Preferences

43TheU.K.andIreland’sformulationofthecommitteejurisdictionleaveslittleroomforsubstantialchange.(MattsonandStrom,1995;Saalberg,2000).44Doring(1995),Table7.4,MattsonandStrom(1995)45TheOfficeofProfitBillwasreturnedbythePresident,andParliamentdidreconsideritinthenextsessionbutthenpasseditintheoriginalform.46Jalan(2007)providesablow‐by‐blowdescriptionoftheeposide,widelyregardedasoneofthenadirsofParliament.(131)47Doring(1995)


- 18 -

India’sdefactorulesforvotesofnoconfidencealsoconstraincoalitionmembers’ability

torepresenttheirconstituents.Thevoteofnoconfidenceeffectivelypreventsasubsetofthe

governmentfromengagingwiththeoppositiononissuesthatmightbesupportedbyan

alternatemajorityofpartofthegovernmentcoalitionandpartoftheopposition.Coalition

members’powerstodissentarelimitedtothe“nuclearoption”ofbringingdownthe

government,whichmaynotalwaysbeacrediblethreat.

Disagreementwiththegovernmentisadefactovoteofnoconfidenceandthereare

fewoptionsforcriticizingthebureaucracyshortoftakingthisdrasticstep.48Theoptionsfor

holdingupthebudget,apotentialinstrumentofParliamentaryoversight,arealsolimited:a

failedbudgetproposalisautomaticallyavoteofnoconfidence.Thethreatofnotsupporting

thebudgetunlesscertainprovisionsareinsertedisthusnotcredible.

MostotherParliamentarydemocraciesmakesomedistinctionbetweencriticismand

votesofnoconfidence.Germany,Spainand(since1995)Belgium,forexample,requirean

explicitconstructivevoteofnoconfidenceinwhichtheParliamentelectsanewgovernment

simultaneouslywithdismissingtheold.49ConventionsinDenmark,Finland,Ireland,and

SwedenrequireanabsolutemajorityofMembersofParliamenttovotetocensurethe

government.50

Finally,India’srulesregardingdefectionfrompartiesalsolimitMPs’abilitytorepresent

theirconstituentsiftheirinterestsdepartfromparties’interestsonanyparticularissue.MPs

havetovotewiththeirpartieswhenthepartywhipisinvokedortheylosetheirseatsforthe

remainderoftheterm.Theycandissentonlyinthecaseofa“genuinepartysplit”inwhicha

thirdofthemembersvoteagainsttheparty.India’spartieshaveneverbeenseenas

particularlyinternallydemocraticsovotingwiththepartyleadersdoesnotnecessarilymean

votingwithrepresentativesofrepresentatives.51

48Politicianscananddodisciplineindividualbureaucratsbyrecommendingorpressingforindividualtransfers.Thepracticeisnosubstituteforagency‐wideoversight–itcanbeusedarbitrarilyagainstindividuals,regardlessoftheirobjectiveachievements,andcannotchangetheorganizationalprocessesthataffectoverallbureaucraticperformance.KrishnanandSomanathan(2006).49Saalfeld(2000).50Saalfeld(2000).51ItisnotclearwhythiskindofpartyleaderautocracysurvivesinIndia,giventhefactthatMPsareelectedinfirst‐past‐the‐postcontestsratherthanchosenonthebasisofnationwidevotetotals.Onewouldexpectthat


- 19 -

EmpoweringMPsasAgents

AllmembersofIndia’sParliamentfaceunusualtroubleinrepresentingtheir

constituentsasagentswhomakethedecisionsthatconstituentswouldhavemadeiftheyhad

expertiseintheparticularpolicyarea.Theyhaverelativelylittlesupportforacquiringthe

specializedknowledgetoserveasanagent.Individualmembersaregivenanallowancefora

personalassistant,freeairtravel,andfreetelephonecallsamongotherperks,butthereisno

fundingforaresearchstaff.

NWSC(2007)’sreviewofquestionsaskedduringquestionhoursuggeststhatmany

membersarenotmakingupforthislackofsupportthroughpersonalorpartyinitiative.The

reportfindsthat“mostofthequestionswereformerestatisticalderivations,theinformation

whichcouldhaveeasilybeenderivedfromtheadministrativechannels”andsomeofthe

questionsconcernedallocationoffundsforprogramsthathadbeenstoppedyearsago.The

reportblamestheMembersofParliament,statingthat“Thesekindsofquestionsshowthe

ignoranceandcompletelackofhomeworkofouresteemedparliamentarians.”(18)

India’sparliamentarycommitteesaresimilarlyhandicapped.Thesearepotentially

powerfulinstrumentsofoversight,andoppositionmembersaretraditionallychairpersonsof

someofthemostpotentiallypowerfulcommitteessuchastheCommitteeonPublic

Accounts.52Thecommitteesareunderstaffed,however,andhavealimitedresearchbudget

andstaffforassistancetohelpwithevaluatingthebill.Theydohavesomeresourcestoinvite

specialiststopresentexperttestimony,butmostoftheresearchonthepolicyisdonebythe

departmentsthemselves.53Thecommittees’membershipalsochangeseveryyear,makingit

moredifficulttobuilduppoliticalcapitalinnegotiatingwiththeagenciesorintereststhatthe

partyleaderswouldbemoreresponsivetoindividualswhocouldwinlocalelections,andtherefore“represent”theseindividuals’constituents’demandsbetter.52ThecommitteehasamandatetoensurethatthesumsgrantedbyParliamenttotheGovernmenthavebeenusedprudentlyandeconomically.ItsmembersareselectedfromtheLokSabha(15)andtheRajyaSabha(7)bysingletransferablevote.Thecommitteecancreatesubcommitteesandworkinggroupstolookintoparticularmatters,andalsocanusetheComptrollerandAuditorGeneralforexaminingwitnessesandreviewingfinancialstatements.53Agrawal,2005.


- 20 -

policyaffects.Theyalsocannotbuildupdomainknowledgetoserveasaneffective

counterpointtotheMinister’sproposals.

MostParliamentarycommitteesinWesternEurope,incontrast,havesomeprofessional

staffsupport.Theycansolicitinformationfromavarietyofsources:notonlyMinistries(asin

India)butalsooutsideexperts,interestgroups,andothers.IndividualFrenchMPsgethelpfrom

parliamentaryattachesinpreparingbills.54

TowardaMoreRepresentativeInstitution

India’sParliamenthasnever,tomyknowledge,beenexplicitlyincludedinanyofthe

cross‐countrycomparisonsofgovernmentcontroloverParliamentarybusiness.LiketheBritish

systemthatitwasobviouslyinfluencedby,itsrulestendtoprovidethegovernmentwith

substantialcontroloverthecollectivedecisionsofthepeoples’representatives.The

governmentcancontroltheissuesthatappearontheagenda,limitintroductionofthe

opposition’sbills,andstymieattemptsatamendments.TheParliamentarycommitteesare

weakerthanmostasrepositoriesofspecializedexpertiseandassourcesofalternativestothe

government’sproposedpolicies.IarguethatthissetofruleslimitsIndia’spotentialasa

representativeinstitutionbylimitingtheinputsofnon‐governmentMPsinpolicydebatesand

especiallyinthecollectivedecisions.Thegovernmentneednotalwaysexercisethiscontrol,

andmaynotalwaysappeartouseitsfullpowers,butthefactthatithastherightscastsa

shadowovertheabilityofallrepresentativestorepresent.

Therulesmayalsoexplainpartofthecurrentparliamentarydysfunction.Popularand

academicexplanationsfortheincreaseindisruptionsanddeclineinquantumandqualityof

debatetendtofocusonindividualMPswithoutconsideringtheopportunitiesandincentives

theyhavetoactuallyfullyparticipateindebate.

TheIndianParliamentmightfunctionbetterasarepresentativeinstitutionsimplyby

becomingmorelikeotherParliamentsaroundtheworld:allowingmoreroomforopposition

memberstoparticipatemeaningfullyindebatesaswellasproposeandamendbills,developing

54Mattson,1995.


- 21 -

astrongerandbetter‐fundedcommitteesystem,andseparatingvotesofnoconfidencefrom

votesofdisagreementwithaparticularissue.Someofchangesmightleadtomorecontentious

debatesintheshortterm,butatleastitwouldbeinstitutionalizeddiscussionofalternative

policyproposalsratherthancacophonyontheflooranddismissaloftheParliament.

Severalchanges,bothaimedatrestrictingthevoteofnoconfidencehaveinfactbeen

discussedinformally.Onewouldintroducearequirementthateveryno‐confidencemotion

wouldhavetobeaccompaniedbyapositivevoteofconfidenceinanalternativeprime

minister.AnotherwouldfixtheLokSabhatermforfiveyears.Bothareostensiblyaimedat

makingthegovernmentmorestableandassertive.Theadditionalstabilitymightalsoenable

theboundarybetween“government”and“opposition”tobemorefluidsothatissuescouldbe

decidedontheirmeritsforconstituenciesratherthantheexigenciesofmaintainingaparticular

coalition.

India’spartiesmightalsoconsiderrelaxingtheanti‐defectionlawstoleaveparty

disciplineuptopartyleadersratherthanmandatingdirepunishment(lossofseat)forvoting

againsttheparty.ThisisunlikelytoactuallyhappeninIndia,giventhecollectivememoryof

horse‐tradinginMPsbeforeanti‐defectionlawswereputintoplace,butitwouldbeworthre‐

considering.Theanti‐defectionlawsaremerelypromotingadifferentkindofdefection:

creationofsmallerparties.

Relaxingtheanti‐defectionlawwouldallowindividualMembersofParliamentto

balancetheirconstituents’interestswiththepartyplatform.Theywouldbeunlikelyto

completelyabandonthegeneralpartylinebecausepartyleaderswouldstillcontrolcampaign

financeaswellasnominationsformeaningfulpartylabels.Anotheralternativewouldbeto

allowMPstorepresenttheirconstituenciesovertheirpartiesinalimitednumberofcases–

givingthema“differenceallowance”ofsomesort.

Indiamightalsoconsideradoptingsomefeaturesofpresidentialsystemstoensurea

morerepresentativesystem.Parliaments’abilitytoberepresentativeinstitutionsisinherently

limitedbytheirdefiningfeature:thatamajoritycoalitioninthelegislatureistheexecutive

branchanditssurvivaldependsonthatmajorityvotingtogether.Theinsecurityoftenure

allowsminoritieswithinthecoalitiontoholduppoliciescreatesarationaleforlimitingagenda


- 22 -

accesstopreventproposalsfromtheoppositionthatcouldsplitthecoalition.Thereisnoroom

forrepresentativestoformdifferentgroupsondifferentissues,astheymightinapresidential

systemwheresuchpolicy‐specificre‐alignmentsdonothaveanycatastrophicconsequences

likeprovokingachangeingovernment.Frequentre‐alignmentneednotmeanthatpartylabels

losetheirmeaning(sincepartiescansticktogetherbutre‐align)nordoesitnecessarilymean

incoherenceinpolicymaking.

Amorepresidentialsystemwouldhaveamoreindependentexecutivethatdidnot

requireconstantre‐affirmation.Legislaturesinpresidentialsystemscanairallofthegrievances

theywish,orvoteagainsttheexecutivebranchonanyparticularissuewithoutbringingdown

thegovernment.Legislatorsdonothavetocurbtheirdissentforfearoflosingtheirjobs.

Legislaturesinpresidentialsystemalsotendtohavelooserrestrictionsonintroductionand

amendmentofbillsbynon‐majoritypartymembersthanParliaments.Parliamentscan’tafford

tohavebillsthatthegovernmentwoulddisagreeabout–andmayhavetofallover‐

introducedtoooften;Presidentialsystemscan.Issuescanbeconsideredcasebycaseontheir

meritsratherthanasvotesofconfidenceintherulingcoalition.

Ironically,amovetowardpresidentialisminIndiamightreduceoneoftheproblems

thatpresidentialismisoftenpresumedtocreate.Linz(1994)’sfamouscritiquearguesthat

presidentialismencouragesawinner‐take‐allmentalityinpolitics.India’sparliamentaryrules

actuallyallowthewinnerto“takeall”insettingthelegislativeagenda.55Moreover,theyallow

smallcoalitionpartners‐non‐winners‐to“takealot”byexercisingthethreattodefectfrom

thecoalition.

Therearepotentialtrade‐offswithgrantingthiskindofindependencetotheexecutive.

Theexecutivecouldremaininpowerandcontinuetoinfluencepolicyevenwhenthemajority

ofthelegislatureconsistentlydisagreeswithit.56Muchdependsontheexactdesignofthe

presidentialsystem.57

55MainwaringandShugart(1997)makeasimilarpointaboutparliamentarysystemsingeneralintheircritiqueofLinz,addingthatexecutivesinParliamentsactuallymayhavemorepowerthaninpresidentialsystemsbecausetheycanstrategicallytimeelectionstomaximizeprobabilityofre‐election.56Linz(1994)arguesthatexecutiveindependencecreatespotentialforconflictsthatcannotberesolvedwithininstitutions,andsoislikelytodisruptthem.57SeeMainwaringandShugart(1997),Shugart(2006).


- 23 -

Morethanwhattodo,however,thequestioniswherethesechangeswouldcomefrom.

ThecurrentfocusonblamingindividualMembersofParliamenthamperstheprospectsfor

changingtheParliamentaryrulestobeeffective.Therearethreepossibleforcesfor

institutionalreform:crusadersinParliamentorincivilsociety;increasedpoliticalcompetition;

anduniversalrecognitionofimpedingcrisis.Successfulcrusadersmightbringthe

disenfranchisementofsomerepresentativestothepubliceyeandprovokesomepressureto

changethelaws.Increasedpoliticalcompetitionmightcreateincentivesforpartiesintheruling

coalitiontotempersomeoftherulesthatcouldbeusedagainstthemwhentheywereinthe

opposition.MPscurrentlyseemtoberewardedmorefortheirindividualfavorstoconstituents

thanfortheirroleinParliamentarydiscussion.Spendingtimelobbyingformoreresearch

funding,orputtingtogetheracoalitionforstrongerstandingcommitteesmightnotbeonthe

topofanybutacrusader’sagenda,butimpendingcrisissuchasdismantlingoftheinstitution’s

policymakingprerogativesmightinspirecollectiveactiontoensureamorelevelplayingfieldfor

allrepresentatives.

Theprospectsforacrusaderseemdim.Suchacrusaderwouldhavetocreatesome

publicsympathyforMPsandrecognitionthateventhosewhoactivelytrytorepresenttheir

constituentsorserveasinformedagentsfaceobstacles.Thisisfarfromthecurrentpublic

discussionofMPsasoverpaid,lazy,andoftencriminal.

Suddencollectiveactionduetorecognitionofanimpendingcrisisalsoseemsunlikely.

Publicdisrespectfortheinstitutionisaccumulatinggradually,asarealternativemethodsof

policymaking.TherearenoimmediatethreatstotheexistenceofParliamentasaninstitution

thatmightinspireitsmemberstotakeaction.Itisalsounlikelythatachangeintherulesof

debatewouldbethefirstresponsetoaperceivedthreatifonewererecognized.Giventhe

perceptionthatmembersareatfault,thefirststepwouldprobablybetoadjusteligibility

requirementsortheelectoralsystemandtocrackdownoncriminalityandcorruption.

Politicalcompetitiondoesseemtobeontherise,however.Themajorpartieshave

morereasontofearspendingsometimeontheoutsideoftherulingcoalitionwherethey

wouldunabletopredictablygettheirconstituents’concernsontheagendaorproposepolicies

andamendmentsontheirbehalf.Whethertheycangettheirsmallercoalitionpartnersto


- 24 -

agreetoanyofthechangesisanothermatter.Smallerpartiesarelikelytobeloathtoagreeto

anymodificationsofthevoteofnoconfidenceprocedure,sincetheirthreattodefectisthe

sourceoftheirleverageovertherestofthecoalition.Thecoalitionsmightbemoreableto

agreeonrulestorelaxagendacontrol,increaselatitudeforamendments,andstrengthen

committees.

ItispossiblethatIndia’sParliamentwillself‐correctasarepresentativeinstitution,but

firstitsleadershavetorecognizetheimportanceoftheinstitutionalarrangementsaswellas

theindividualcharacteristicsforsuccessfulrepresentation.


- 25 -

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