aspects of india's economy

8282015 Aspects of Indias Economy No 48

httprupeshyindiaorg48atomichtml 128

No 48 January 2010

No 48(January2010)

The IndianRulers Role atCopenhagen

Indiarsquos AtomicEnergyProgrammeClaims andReality

Indiarsquos Atomic Energy Programme Claims and RealitymdashSuvrat Raju

[Note crore = 10 million lakh = 100000]

1 IntroductionWithin Indiarsquos dominant discourse atomic energy has long been depicted as a ticket tomodernity and great power status While inaugurating Indiarsquos first nuclear reactor in1957 Nehru explained that the ldquoAtomic Revolutionrdquo was like the ldquoIndustrialRevolutionrdquo if India did not develop atomic energy it would lose out once againldquoEither you go ahead with it or you succumb and others go ahead and you fall backand gradually drag yourself along in the trailrdquo1

These two themes were strongly revived in the debate over the nuclear deal Forexample when George Bush visited India in 2006 the Times of India ran a prominentinterview with him2 About a quarter of the front page was taken up by a singlequestion ldquoTOI to Bush Do you consider India a responsible nuclear nationrdquo Thereply mdash ldquoI Dordquo3 mdash was typeset to be about four times as large as the other headlineson the front page Undoubtedly it also sent the TOI editors and parts of the Indianestablishment into paroxysms of pleasure

However the Congress leadershiprecognized that greatshypowerarguments were insufficient to winbroad political support So itclaimed the deal would not onlyend lsquonuclear apartheidrsquo but wasnecessary for lsquodevelopmentrsquoWhile laying the foundation stonefor a coal power plant in JhajjarSonia Gandhi explained thatelectricity was required fordevelopment and the nuclear dealwas required for electricityConsequently opponents of thedeal were ldquoenemies of progressand developmentrdquo4

This thread was also prominent inthe Lok Sabha debates on the



nuclear deal In a major debate (on 28 November 2007) Jyotiraditya Scindia the firstspeaker from the Congress said that for growth at the ldquograss root levelrdquo the ldquociviliannuclear optionrdquo was necessary and claimed that by 2020 India would have a nuclearpowershygenerating capacity of 30000ndash40000 MW For Scindia though it was ldquofarmore important [that] the Deal raised the stature of Indiardquo5 Pranab Mukherjeeopening the debate for the Government in the confidence motion (on 21 July 2008)explained that ldquopower is needed for everythingrdquo and pointed to the grim danger thatby 2050 without nuclear power ldquoour energy deficit would be 412000 megawattsrdquoNuclear power would ldquoreduce the deficit to only 7000 megawattsrdquo and hence solvethe energy crisis6

These figures originate with the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) but are theyrealistic This question remains important even after the political victory of theCongress First the change in the American administration has slowed down nuclearnegotiations between India and the US more than a year after the nuclear deal wasactuated these negotiations have not concluded In fact one of the focal points ofManmohan Singhrsquos visit to the US in November 2009 was to resolve differences overthe reprocessing of spent fuel of American origin7 Separately the Government hasalready signed nuclear pacts with seven countries Companies from the US Franceand Russia have been allocated land for setting up nuclear plants8

It is imperative in this context to review the hopes for atomic energy that areprojected by the Government What is the history of atomic energy in India and is itlikely to play a major role in Indiarsquos energyshybasket in the near future What is the linkbetween the civilian and military programme and how does the nuclear deal bear uponweaponization If the Government does go ahead with massive nuclear expansionwill this necessarily make India dependent on imperialist powers We discuss some ofthese questions below

2 Atomic Energy ProjectionsWe start by discussing the Governmentrsquos argument for atomic energy As wementioned above the DAE has made some very ambitious projections for atomicenergy over the next few decades These projections underlie the argument that Indiamust divert resources towards nuclear energy

In 2004 the DAE surveying various studies estimated that India would need 8 trillionkilowattshyhours (kWh) of electricity per year by 20509 10 The DAE study mentionedthat electricity generation in 2002ndash 2003 was about 06 trillion kWh it projected thatthis would grow about 13 times After factoring in the increase in population (whichwas projected to stabilize at about 15 billion) the DAE projected that per capitaelectricity consumption would rise about nine times mdash from about 614 kWh to 5305kWh

The study argued that it would be very difficult to meet these great demands withoutnuclear power and estimated that atomic energy would meet about 25 per cent of thetotal demand by 2050 This translates to about 2 trillion kWh of electricity per yearwith an installed capacity of 275 GW

However this initial study was published in 2004 before the nuclear agreement



between Bush and Manmohan Singh was signed During the debate on the nucleardeal these projections were revised upward The figures that are quoted today comefrom these new projections

Anil Kakodkar the head of the DAE till November 2009 in a talk given at the IndianAcademy of Science11 (on 4 July 2008 just after the Government decided to breakwith the Left parties and push the nuclear deal) and a similar talk given at the TataInstitute of Fundamental Research (in June 2009) retained the electricity demandprojections but increased the projections for the total installed nuclear capacity byalmost 250 per cent Kakodkar claimed that if the nuclear deal went through and Indiawas allowed to import a specified number of lightshywater reactors (LWR) and fuel thenthe recycling of fuel from these reactors would lead to an installed capacity of 650GW These are the figures that were used by Pranab Mukherjee in the parliamentarydebate about two weeks later So Kakodkar predicted that nuclear energy wouldprovide more than 50 per cent of Indiarsquos power generating capacity by 2050 Note thatthis is about 150 times the current nuclear power capacity of 412 GW that provides264 per cent of the countryrsquos power generating capacity12 We reproduce two keygraphs from Kakodkarrsquos talk in Figure 1

Similar figures have been repeatedly mentioned at the highest levels of the Indiangovernment The Prime Minister recently predicted13 that atomic power could generate470 GW of electricity by 2050 The exact origins of this figure are unclear but thismight be related to a second possibility corresponding to a different importshypattern forLWRs mentioned by Kakodkar in his talk

Figure 1





3 A Brief History of Atomic ProjectionsThe DAE has made ambitious predictions of this kind several times in the past HomiBhabha the first secretary of the DAE announced in 1962 that installed capacitywould be 18ndash 20 GW by 198714 In actuality the installed capacity in 1987 was 106GW15 which corresponds to about 5 per cent of Bhabharsquos predictions VikramSarabhai who succeeded Bhabha already had to admit in 1970 that ldquothe programmehas slipped badly in relation to targetsrdquo16 A little earlier Sarabhai had concluded thatthe DAE needed to construct large reactors with a capacity of 500 MW to recoupcapital costs So he announced17 that ldquowe have a formidable task to provide a newatomic power station of approximately 500 MW capacity each year after 1972ndash 73rdquo Infact Indiarsquos first 500 MW reactor mdash Tarapur 4 mdash went online in 2005 almost 35years later

This failure is sometimes explained away by noting that foreign cooperation in civiliannuclear energy declined after the 1974 Pokhran explosions However in 1984 theDAE announced through a nuclear power ldquoprofilerdquo that it would set up a powergenerating capacity of 10000 MW by 2000 In 1989 a DAEshy appointed committeereviewed this found that the target continued to be feasible and even increased theprojected capacity slightly This figure was repeatedly quoted publicly For examplethe chairperson of the Atomic Energy Commission wrote in 1989 that ldquowhile nuclear energy constitutes about 3 of the countryrsquos total electrical power generationwork is on hand to increase it to about 10 by the year 2000 by implement ing the10000 MWe nuclear power programmerdquo18

Almost 15 years after the profile was launched the Comptroller and Auditor Generalof India reviewed its progress and concluded that ldquothe actual additional generation ofpower under the lsquoProfilersquo as of March 1998 was nil in spite of having incurred anexpenditure of Rs 529148 crorerdquo19 (emphasis added) Moreover even in 2009nuclear energy continues to account for only about 3 per cent of Indiarsquos total electricitygeneration

The DAE has been unable to meet targets even over the very short run For examplein 2003 Kakodkar predicted that ldquoin about four years from now DAE will reach aninstalled capacity of 6800 MWerdquo20 Six years later nuclear capacity is only 4120MW21

4 The ThreeshyStage Nuclear ProgrammeIt is evident that DAE has been unable to keep its previous promises In light of thisare the current projections realistic The first obvious point is that the DAErsquos figuresare very ambitious and quite out of step with international expectations For examplea large multishydisciplinary Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study in 2003projected that worldwide nuclear power capacity would increase to 1000 GW by205022 In contrast the DAE projects that India alone would have an installed capacityof about 650 GW or 65 per cent of the worldwide figure above

The DAErsquos projections are based on a threeshy stage nuclear programme first proposedby Bhabha in 1954 We review this programme in greater detail below but theessential facts are as follows Of the three planned stages only the first stage



comprises conventional nuclear reactors that use uranium as a fuel The second andthird stages were to consist of fast breeder reactors and thorium reactors Of thesethree stages only the first stage has been implemented albeit somewhatunsuccessfully after more than 50 years

The second and third stages use technology that is not used commercially on a largescale anywhere in the world Fast breeder reactors were tried and abandoned inseveral countries Thorium reactors of the kind envisioned in India have never beenused commercially at all

However in the energy projections above the contribution of the first stage is veryinsignificant About 90 per cent of the powershycapacity projected is to come from thesecond and third stages of the nuclear programme So the DAErsquos energy projectionsare based overwhelmingly on technology that either does not exist or has beenabandoned in favour of more conventional nuclear technology

This leads to another issue The threeshystage programme was envisioned at a time whenselfshysufficiency was considered exceedingly important Indiarsquos uranium resources arevery poor both in quantity and quality Since uranium is what is used in nuclearreactors worldwide it is impossible for India to sustain a large indigenous atomicenergy programme The second stage of the programme was designed to squeeze themaximum possible energy from this lowshyquality fuel while the third stage focused onthorium which is widely available in India

However uranium is available plentifully in the world and so these other technologieswere not pursued elsewhere In fact it is unlikely that these technologies will come toprominence in the near future The MIT study cited above emphasized that ldquoover atleast the next 50 years the best choice is the open onceshythrough fuel cyclerdquo ieconventional uranium reactors

Since India has failed to develop the second and third stages indigenously it is safe tosay that the threeshystage programme has failed However what is more important is thatthe threeshystage programme is not relevant to policyshymakers any more This is becausethe emphasis on selfshysufficiency has been extensively diluted in the past two decades

In fact one of the major consequences of the nuclear deal was to allow India toparticipate in international uranium trade and import nuclear reactors from abroadSince energy produced this way (even though imported) is likely to be cheaper thanenergy from fast breeder reactors or thorium reactors it is quite likely that India willquietly abandon the focus on the threeshystage programmei

Nevertheless we discuss the three stages of the Indian programme below

41 Brief Technical Description The threeshy stage programme was based on the recognition that Indiarsquos uraniumresources are poor As Kakodkar put it ldquofor nuclear energy there is hardly anyUranium in Indiardquo23 On the other hand India has one of the largest deposits ofthorium in the world The threeshystage process was designed to take advantage of thisfact



An excellent review of the idea behind this programme can be found in the book byVenkataraman24 Another review may be found at the website of the Bhabha AtomicResearch Centre (BARC)25 We summarize this very briefly here The first stage of thenuclear programme involves the use of pressurized heavyshywater reactors (PHWRs)Naturally occurring uranium contains about 07 uraniumshy235 (U235) with the restii

being U238 The fissile fuel is U235 and often naturally occurring uranium is enriched(via centrifuges for example) to separate the U238 and increase the percentage of U235A PHWR can use this fuel directly without enrichment This saves some expense butthe disadvantage is that this kind of reactor uses heavyshywater which is expensive as amoderator Bhabha chose these reactors because some of the U238 is transmuted toplutoniumshy239 (Pu239) in the operation of the reactor

In the second stage this Pu239 is fed into a fast breeder reactor (FBR) together withthe waste U238from the first stage The reaction in the breeder reactor uses the Pu239

for energy and converts the U238 into Pu239 thus breeding its own fuel Theoreticallythis process squeezes all the energy out of naturally found uranium by using U238 also

The third stage involves another kind of breeding The core of the FBR can bewrapped with thoriumshy232 (Th232) In the operation of the FBR this undergoestransmutation to U233 (another isotope of uranium ) which is fissile This startingstockpile of U233 is fed into the third stage This thirdshystage U233 reactor is alsowrapped in a thorium blanket and so the operation of the reactor produces more U233Bhabha suggested that this threeshystage process would allow the utilization of Indiarsquosextensive thorium resources

It is clear in hindsight that Bhabharsquos proposals for the threeshystage programme werepremature and impractical Fiftyshyfive years after these proposals were made theprogramme is still stuck at the first stage

5 The First StageThe first stage was just meant to get the threeshystage programme started and it made uponly a tiny part of Bhabharsquos grand scheme The DAE estimates that the uraniumavailable in India will allow it to build up a powershycapacity of only about 10 GW mdashabout 2 per cent of Kakodkarrsquos final prediction for 2050 The DAE plans tosupplement this indigenous capacity with imported reactors and fuel At least publiclythe DAE insists that the imported reactors too will make up a negligible fraction of thenuclear capacity by 2050

Nevertheless the first stage of the nuclear programme is the only stage to have beencommercially implemented As we described above and will discuss in more detailbelow this is likely to continue being the case So in effect the practical debate onnuclear electricity production in India is confined to the first stage of the nuclearprogramme Since this stage uses conventional technology (as opposed to the secondand third stages) this debate meshes with the worldwide debate on nuclear energy



We consider the following key questions

Why has the idea of nuclear energy seen a worldwide revival What is the economics of nuclear power What about the safety and environmental impact of nuclear installations How do these factors apply to India

51 The Nuclear RenaissanceAfter years of stagnation due to high costs and safety concerns the nuclear industryhas seen something of a revival especially in the Westiii Partly this is because ofconcerns about climate change and greenhouse gas emissions A second oftenunstated reason is geopolitical As the Economist put it27 ldquoWestern governments areconcerned [that] oil and gas is in the hands of hostile governments Much of thenuclear industryrsquos raw material is located in friendly places such as Australia andCanadardquo

While these arguments have been widely discussed over the past few years withconcomitant changes in policy the muchshy touted nuclear renaissance is fast runninginto severe problems Areva the French company that is supposed to build a reactor inJaitapur Maharashtra is also building a reactor in Finland mdash the first generation IIIplant in the world However this plant is now expected to be three years late and is 60per cent over budget

In Britain the construction of new plants by Areva and Westinghouse (an Americancompany that is also expected to build a plant in India) has run into regulatorydifficulties The British Health and Safety Executive (HSE) recently issued a report onthe construction of proposed plants by these companies The HSE was dissatisfiedwith both designs stating in similar reports that ldquowe have identified a significantnumber of issues with the safety features of the design If these are not progressedsatisfactorily then we would not issue a lsquoDesign Acceptance Confirmationrsquo rdquo28 29 (Asummary of these reports was carried by The Guardian30)

The argument that nuclear energy is the best way to fight climate change has also beenvigorously challenged For example Lovins and Sheikh argue in favour of alternativesources of energy including wind and small hydroshypower projects31 In spite of allthis it appears likely that barring an accident or a technological breakthrough in adifferent field the nuclear industry will build several new nuclear reactors in the nextfew decades

So it is important to ask first whether nuclear energy is costshyeffective and safe andsecond how the global debate over nuclear energy appl ies to India Indiarsquosobligations under climate treaties are likely to be different from those of developedcountries at least over the next few decades Second given Indiarsquos poor uraniumresources a largeshy scale nuclear programme would make the country dependent onimperialist countries for fuel this is evidently not desirable We discuss this and someother issues below



52 Economics of Nuclear PowerThe central fact related to the cost of nuclear power is that nuclear power plants havehigher construction costs but are then cheaper to run than say coal plants So tocompare the costs of nuclear energy with other sources of power it is standard to usethe ldquolevelized cost of energyrdquo More precisely the levelized cost of energy l is definedby

where Ct is the total expenditure incurred (whether in construction maintenance fuelor otherwise in year t Et is the electricity generated in year t n is the lifetime of theplant and r is called the discount rate

The idea here is simple The capital invested in the nuclear plant could have been usedelsewhere Hence operating costs must be cheap enough to account for the return thatcould have been earned on this capital This rate of return is captured by the discountrate

A simple example might help to elucidate this concept Say that a coalshyplant costs Rs100 to construct and Rs 10 to run every year while a nuclear plant costs Rs 150 toconstruct and Rs 5 to run Furthermore let us assume that both plants are constructedovernight and run for 15 years after that producing the same amount of electricityeach year Now in absolute terms more is spent on the coal plant (Rs 250) than onthe nuclear plant (Rs 225) However this ignores the fact that the additional Rs 50spent upfront on the nuclear plant could have been used elsewhere With a discountrate of 10 per cent as the reader can check with the formula above the energyproduced by the nuclear plant is more expensive while with a discount rate of 5 percent the coal plant is more expensive The crossover occurs at a discount rate of 556per cent

521 Economics of Nuclear Power in IndiaAs we mentioned above India uses slightly nonshystandard reactors These reactors havethe advantage that they can work with naturally occurring uranium without the needfor enrichment While this saves some expense these reactors use heavyshywater whichis expensive The DAE plans to construct more such pressurized heavyshywater reactorsin the future

The economics of nuclear power in India is particularly complicated by two factorsFirst it is hard to obtain an accurate estimate of the subsidies that go into variousaspects of nuclear power including heavyshywater production32 Second the DAE uses asoshycalled ldquoclosed cyclerdquo where the spent fuel is reprocessed This reprocessing is veryexpensive but is not included in the official estimation of the cost of power Thereasoning behind this is that the reprocessed fuel will eventually be useful in thesecond stage of the nuclear programme since this second stage has not yet becomeoperational this is rather specious

It is sometimes argued that nuclear power is costshycompetitive with coal33 34 Underreasonable assumptions for the subsidy that goes into heavyshywater production nuclear



power is not costshycompetitive with coal even for (real) discount rates as low as 3 percent This conclusion holds even if the costs involved in reprocessing are completelyneglected3536

This is consistent with the international pattern that we describe below

522 Economics of Nuclear Power InternationallyThe large MIT study of 2003 referred to above concluded by studying a range ofdiscount rates that ldquoin deregulated markets nuclear power is not now cost competitivewith coal and natural gasrdquo An extensive study performed at the University of Chicagocame to the same conclusion It noted that except for France ldquofor most othercountries the high capital costs of nuclear power prohibit it from being costshycompetitive with coal and natural gasshyfired technologiesrdquo37 Moreover the studypointed out that even in the ldquomost favorable caserdquo the cost of the first new nuclearplants in the US would be above the highest coal and gas costsiv

As the Economist summarized ldquoSince the 1970s far from being ldquotoo cheap to meterrdquomdash as it proponents once blithely claimed mdash nuclear power has proved too expensiveto matterrdquo42 It is as a result of this that no new applications for plantshyconstruction weremade in the US for almost three decades

The other question is whether putting a price on carbon emissions would change thesecalculations Here the Economist points out ldquoThe price of carbon under Europersquosemissionsshytrading scheme is currently around euro14 per tonne far short of the euro50 thatpowershyindustry bosses think would make nuclear plants attractive43

So there is a wide consensus internationally that nuclear power is more expensivethan coalv India conforms to this pattern While this has dampened the growth of thenuclear industry it has not stopped new nuclear plants from being constructed To thecontrary at times the fact that nuclear power is more expensive has been seen as arationale for futher policy assistance and subsidies

53 Safety and Environmental ImpactAs we mentioned above concerns about climate change have partly driven the revivalin the nuclear industry in recent times Atomic energy does have the advantage of notproducing greenhouse gases As a result of this (and other pecuniary reasons) someenvironmentalists like Patrick Moore an influential former member of Greenpeacehave become advocates of nuclear energy However Greenpeace itself and most otherenvironmental groups still disavow nuclear energy One of their primary objections isto the waste that is generated

Nuclear reactors produce radioactive waste some of which remains hazardous for avery long time For example Pu239 (which is produced in nuclear reactors) has a halfshylife of 24000 years (which means that the radioactivity from a lump of this materialdecreases by half every 24000 years)

Unfortunately there is no established technique of disposing this waste In the long



run there is some agreement among nuclear planners that the waste should be putinto a stable geological repository Only one such repository mdash the Waste IsolationPilot Plant in the US mdash exists but operates only with military waste The US plans todispose of some of its radioactive civil waste in the Yucca mountain repository butthis has not yet been constructed A discussion of the logistics of these programmescan be found in the Nuclear Engineering Handbook44

In India the spent fuel from reactors is reprocessed However this process stillproduces dangerous radioactive waste This volume is currently small In 2001 it wasestimated45 that about 5000 m3 of ldquohighshylevelshywasterdquo had been generated in India (thisis about two Olympic size swimming pools) However this is likely to go up sharplyIn 2004 the DAE estimated that by 2011 it would produce about 700 m3 of highshylevel waste every year Although the DAE claims that it will finally dispose of thiswaste in a deep geological repository it is forced to admit that ldquodemonstration offeasibility and safety of deep geological disposal is a major challenge aheadrdquo46

Another concern regarding nuclear energy is the safety of nuclear plants The 1986accident at Chernobyl (in the Ukraine then part of the Soviet Union) sent up a hugeamount of radioactive material into the atmosphere This radioactive material carriedacross the Soviet border into other countries and as far north as Sweden In 2006 theWHO estimated that there would be ldquoabout 4000 [excess] deaths over the lifetimesof the some 600000 persons most affected by the accidentrdquo due to cancer caused byexposure to radiation Beyond this over the lifetime of the population of the more than6 million people in ldquoother contaminated areasrdquo it estimated that there would be about5000 excess deaths (Table 12 of the WHO report47) However as Greenpeace pointedout48 with a disaster of this magnitude ldquoany description which attempts to present theconsequences as a single lsquoeasy to understandrsquo estimation of excess cancer deaths will inevitably provide a gross oversimplification of the breadth of human sufferingexperiencedrdquovi

The accident at Chernobyl probably happened because of poor design and operatorerror In particular the reactor was not enclosed within proper containment Also atthe time of the accident it seems to have had a positive void coefficient49 which meantthat the escaping coolant increased the intensity of the reaction which in turn causedmore of the coolant to escape thus leading to catastrophic positive feedback Newerreactors seem to be better contained and designed One can only hope that the nuclearindustry has learned its engineering lessons well

As we have described above nuclear power is inherently hazardous However in anydiscussion about the safety of nuclear plants there is a point made by proponents ofnuclear energy that cannot be overlooked Nuclear energy is most commonlycompared to coal as we have also done above However coal is also hazardous

This is because thousands of people lose their lives in coalshymines every year China isthe most egregious example According to official statistics there were 4746 fatalitiesin China in 200650 and 3786 fatalities in 200751

Coal mining affects hundreds of people in India also Statistics on coal mining in Indiaare somewhat problematic According to the Ministry of Coal coalshymining in India isso safe that fatalities per manshyshift are considerably lower than in the US and about as



low as they are in Australia52 This is not entirely believable However even taking theministryrsquos figures53 at face value there were 128 fatalities and 966 serious injuries incoalshymining in 2006 In 2007 there were 69 fatalities and 904 serious injuriesvii

This is partly a result of the tremendous inequality that exists in our society today Anuclear meltdown would be catastrophic and would affect everyone So a greatamount of attention is paid to safety in nuclear installations However hundreds ofpeople lose their lives in coalshymining around the world each year Since these peopleare overwhelmingly poor and dispossessed this does not attract anywhere near thesame level of protest or attention

54 Factors Specific to IndiaThere are two factors that modify the debate regarding the desirability of nuclearpower in India

The first factor has to do with the poor uranium resources of the country As we havealready mentioned uranium deposits in India are not only rare they are of poorquality The report of the Kirit Parikhshy led expert committee on energy policyappointed by the Planning Commission pointed out that ldquoIndia is poorly endowedwith Uranium Available Uranium supply can fuel only 10000 MW of the PressurisedHeavyshyWater Reactors (PHWR) Further India is extracting Uranium from extremelylow grade ores (as low as 01 Uranium) compared to ores with up to 12shy14Uranium in certain resources abroad This makes Indian nuclear fuel 2ndash3 times costlierthan international suppliesrdquo54 It is evident then that a large nuclear programme canonly be sustained on the basis of imported fuel Of course this makes nuclear energymore expensive However more seriously importing fuel will make India dependenton imperialist countries for fuel supplies After the nuclear tests in 1974 the USstopped fuel supplies to the Tarapur plant Last year India was given a waiver by theNuclear Suppliers Groupviiiallowing it to engage in nuclear trade only because it wasstrategically allied with the US A large scale nuclear programme relying on importedfuel would make it difficult for any future government to extricate itself from thisrelationship

The second important issue in India is the lack of a strong regulatory framework Onceagain this poor institutional design can be traced to Bhabha and Nehru In 1948Bhabha wrote to Nehru stating that ldquothe development of atomic energy should beentrusted to a very small and highshypowered body composed of say three people withexecutive power and answerable directly to the Prime Minister without anyintervening link this body may be referred to as the Atomic Energy Commissionrdquo55(emphasis added) Evidently Bhabha was no great believer in democracy In this caseas in many others he used his personal closeness to Nehru to free himself of even theminimal checks and balances that existed in other parts of the Government The AECwas set up in 1954 and 55 years later this small opaque clique of bureaucratscontinues to oversee all aspects of atomic energy in the countryix

In fact for decades the atomic energy establishment did not even see the need to havean independent regulatory body The DAE was in charge of both the construction andregulation of nuclear power plants It was only after the serious nuclear accident at



Three Mile Island (Pennsylvania US) in 1979 that the DAE started the process ofsetting up a separate Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)57 However theAERB which was set up in 1983 with the mission of ensuring the safety of atomicenergy reports directly to the AEC which is chaired by the head of the DAE Thismakes its claim of being independent of the DAE somewhat specious

In 1995 the AERB under a proactive chairperson A Gopalakrishnan compiled areport citing 130 safety issues in Indian nuclear installations with about 95 being toppriority It is unclear what if any action was taken on the AERB report

Later after leaving the AERB Gopalakrishnan wrote that ldquothe safety status in theDAErsquos facilities is far below international standardsrdquo Further he said that ldquothe lack ofa truly independent nuclear regulatory mechanism and the unprecedented powers andinfluence of the DAE coupled with the widespread use of the Official Secrets Act tocover up the realities are the primary reasons for this grave situationrdquo58 In itsresponse the Nuclear Power Corporation dismissed these concerns as ldquoalarmistrdquo andexpressed its sorrow that Gopalakrishnan was ldquotilting at windmillsrdquo Moreover itstated that ldquowe do not consider the AERB as being adversaries We are all part of asingle scientific fraternity that has been mandated by the founding fathers of the nationto develop and deliver the numerous benefits of nuclear energy to the nation in aneconomical and safe mannerrdquo59

While this evocation of fraternal cooperation is undoubtedly touching it is somewhatproblematic for the regulators and builders of a hazardous technology like atomicenergy to be so cozy In fact as Gopalakrishnan points out this is in violation of theinternational convention on nuclear safety that asks every contracting party (includingIndia) to take ldquoappropriate steps to ensure an effective separation between the regulatory body and any other body concerned with the utilization of nuclearenergyrdquo60

Nuclear accidents are a lowshyprobability event So it is often possible to get away withviolations of safety norms as the DAE has been doing However the reason these lowprobabilities are taken so seriously is that the consequences of a single nuclearaccident can be disastrous The current regulatory framework is clearly broken andthis makes the planned expansion in the atomic energy programme particularlyalarming

6 The Second and Third StagesAs we mentioned above the first stage of the nuclear power programme is the smallestof the three planned stages In the proposals by the DAE described above most of theenergy is supposed to come from the second and third stages comprising fast breederreactors and thorium reactors Unfortunately 55 years after Bhabharsquos initial proposalthe technology for both these stages remains nascent Except for one 30shy year shyold fastbreeder reactor in Russia61 neither of these two technologies is in commercial useanywhere in the world

The technology for the second stage is somewhat more developed than the technologyfor the third stage Several countries did build prototype fast breeder reactors but soonabandoned them Nevertheless India is now building its own prototype fast breeder



reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam No one has even tried to build a thorium reactor of thekind envisaged in the third stage To implement the thorium fuel cycle commerciallywould require a massive research effort and without technological breakthroughs athorium reactor would be considerably more expensive than a conventional uraniumreactor Given that uranium is available plentifully in the world (although not in India)there is no worldwide economic impetus for this India is one of the only countries inthe world that has continued to pursue research into a thorium reactor programme

The DAE portrays this state of affairs by stating that the first stage involves ldquoWorldClass Performancerdquo the second stage involves ldquoGlobally Advanced Technologyrdquo andthe third stage is ldquoGlobally Uniquerdquo

61 The Second StageIndia has been planning to build a PFBR for many years The ldquoProfile for the Decade1970ndash 80rdquo had as one of its targets the ldquoDesign and Construction of a large 500 MWprototype fast breeder test reactorrdquo Since the PFBR at Kalpakkam is now scheduledto come online in 2010 it is at least 30 years late

In fact even this deadline is unlikely to be met since true to form this project isdelayed and heavily over budget In March 2009 the Ministry of ProgrammeImplementation summarized that the PFBR project was on schedule for completion inSeptember 2010 and within the allocated budget of Rs 3492 crores62 However a fewmonths later the 2009 annual report of Bhavini (the public sector corporation set up tooversee this project) was forced to state63 that ldquothe revised project cost is estimated tobe of Rs 5677 croresrdquo This is more than 60 per cent above the original budgetMoreover this annual report also states that ldquoas on 31 May 2009 the overall physicalprogress achieved by the Project is 45 as compared to 35 progress achieved on 31May 2008rdquo Extrapolating from here it is safe to predict that the project will not becompleted by September 2010 It is useful to review the history of fast breeder reactorsin other parts of the world Several countries have built prototype fast breeder reactorsThe fast reactor database of the IAEA64 helpfully reviews this history FranceGermany UK US Soviet Union and Japan started building commercial size prototypefast breeder reactors in the eighties Each of these programmes failed The Frenchreactor was shut down in 1998 after popular protests The German reactor wascompleted but despite the large expense involved in construction it was never madeoperational The Japanese reactor suffered a serious accident in 1995 and has beenshut since then The American programme also petered out and a 30shy year shyoldRussian reactor is now the only commercial fast breeder reactor in existence TheIAEA summary is forced to state that ldquoit has to be admitted that there simply was noeconomic need for fast breeder reactorsrdquo The PFBR at Kalpakkam was not expectedto be an economical source of energy even with the original cost estimates for theproject65 The revised cost estimates above only serve to exacerbate this state ofaffairs

There are very serious issues about the safety of the PFBR Kumar and Ramana arguethat the DAE has designed the PFBR with a weak containment wall to save money66According to their calculations the containment of the reactor could be breached in theevent of a severe accident releasing radioactivity into the atmosphere A very seriousproblem that these authors discuss is that the PFBR has a positive void coefficient



As we described above this was one of the characteristics that led to the Chernobylexplosion The DAE in its design statement67 claims that ldquovoiding of the core ishighly improbablerdquo and states that this ldquois of concern only in the case of hypotheticalcore disruptive accidentrdquo Given that this ldquohypotheticalrdquo case could be catastrophicone would expect that great care would be taken in analyzing it The DAE merelystates (citing unspecified ldquostudiesrdquo) that the ldquopositive void coefficient is consideredadmissiblerdquo

We should emphasize that the second stage of the nuclear programme is meant toprovide most of the energy shygenerating capacity projected by the DAE It is probablyclear to the reader by now that this should not be taken too seriously However evenif one were to believe the DAE Ramana and Suchitra argue that their predictions aresimply inconsistent68 Briefly the DAErsquos estimates for the growth of fast breederreactors are based on the notion of a doublingshytime As described above these reactorsbreed their own fuel so after a while a breeder reactor produces plutonium that can beused to fuel another reactor

However what is important is that the process above (doubling) involves a delay Theplutonium for the first reactor must be set aside some time in advance Second onlyafter the reactor has operated for a while can the plutonium from its core be extractedThis must then be reprocessed for use in another reactor The DAE seems to haveneglected this delay and the paper above points out that if the DAErsquos projections wereto come true they would ldquoresult in negative balances of plutoniumrdquo Ramana andSuchitra argue that the DAE cannot achieve possibly achieve more than 40 per cent ofits projections of course the other factors discussed above imply that this too isextremely unlikely

The fast breeder reactor programme also has an important link with the weaponizationprogramme that we discuss below

62 The Third StageThe technology for the use of thorium as a nuclear fuel is even less developedThorium is far more abundant than uranium in the Earthrsquos crust However the reasonthat the thorium fuelshycycle has not been developed widely is simple With uranium thefissionable U235 occurs naturally So to go from the ore to the fuel requirespurification of the naturally occurring ore The situation with thorium is differentNaturally occurring thorium cannot be used as a nuclear fuel It is uraniumshy233 (U233)that is produced when thorium undergoes a nuclear reaction that is fissionable Soproducing fuel from thorium ore does not require just physical or chemical processesbut rather a nuclear reaction itself Moreover even this process is riddled with complications This is for two reasons Thefirst is that the nuclear reaction that produces U233also produces another isotope ofuranium mdash U232 The decay of this isotope leads to high amounts of gamma radiationHence fuel fabrication and reprocessing has to be handled remotely Second the thorium fuel cycle must involve breeding of the kind described aboveAfter an initial batch of (very expensive and remotely prepared) fuel is fed into thereactor the spent fuel must be reprocessed and fed back in However apart from theproblems with gamma radiation thorium dioxide is very inert and hard to dissolve and



process chemically

Given these facts it is not surprising that no other country in the world has an activeprogramme to utilize thorium What is surprising is that India has steadfastlycontinued to pursue this path As the World Nuclear Association points out ldquofor manyyears India has been the only sponsor of major research efforts to use it [thorium]rdquo69

The DAE claims that it has made some progress on the issues described above70 and itis now planning to build an advanced heavyshywater reactor (AHWR) to gain experiencewith the thorium cycle Nevertheless it is clear that surmounting all these difficultieswill require a massive and very expensive research effort the uranium fuel cycle wasdeveloped only after the Manhattan project

It is quite unclear whether at the end of this research thoriumshybased power will everbe economically competitive Is the massive expense involved in developing thethorium fuel cycle indigenously justified Unfortunately given the lack oftransparency and democratic debate in India it seems unlikely that this question willbe asked or debated openly

7 WeaponizationIt is very hard to separate the civilian aspect of atomic energy from the military aspectof nuclear bombs Both Bhabha and Nehru recognized this As Bhabha himselfpointed out ldquothe rise of an atomic power industry will put into the hands of manynations quantities of fissile material from which the making of atomic bombs will bebut a relatively easy steprdquo71 Nehru for his part said at the opening of the AtomicEnergy Establishment in Trombay (later renamed the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre) that ldquoI should like to say on behalf of my government [and] with some assuranceon behalf of any future Government of India [that] we shall never use this atomicenergy for evil purposesrdquo1 Of course Nehru also recognized that the civilian andmilitary aspects of nuclear energy could not be separated Several years earlier in theConstituent Assembly debates he conceded ldquo I do not know how you are todistinguish between the two [peaceful and military applications of atomic energy] rdquo(p 4972)

Nevertheless for four decades successive Indian governments sought to publiclymaintain this distinction In 1974 at the time of the first Pokhran nuclear test theIndian government argued that it was testing nuclear explosives for possible civilianuses This is why this explosion was called a ldquopeaceful nuclear explosionrdquoxldquoAbsolutely categorically I can say we do not have a nuclear weaponrdquo Rajiv Gandhideclared in 1985 (p 26773) This ended with the 1998 Pokhran blasts PramodMahajan a representative of the ldquofuture governmentrdquo of the time clarified that thatnuclear weapons were ldquonot about securityrdquo rather the significance of the Pokhranblasts was that ldquono Indian has to show his passport [since] the whole world now knowswhere India isrdquo74

The research for both the ldquopeaceful nuclear explosionrdquo of 1974 and the later atomictests of 1998 was largely performed at BARC In fact as PK Iyengar a formerchairperson of the Atomic Energy Commission helpfully explains75 ldquothe exercise ofdetonating a nuclear explosive was a small deviation from the normal work carried



out by many scientists and engineers at Trombay This was the reason the wholeproject remained a secretrdquo

Other than the issue of overlapping research there is the important issue of the buildupof fissile materials Indiarsquos nuclear explosions have used plutonium The plutoniumthat is most commonly used in nuclear bombs is called weaponsshygrade plutonium andby definition this contains more than 93 per cent Pu239

As we described above Pu239is produced even in electricityshygenerating reactors whenU238 absorbs a neutron However when a reactor is meant to generate electricity theuranium fuelshyrods are kept in for a long time to use up as much of the uranium aspossible In this time other nuclear reactions happen and the spent fuel in reactorsends up also containing other isotopes of plutonium including Pu240 The presence ofthese other isotopes makes it difficult to make bombs with this kind of reactorshygradeplutonium (See pp 37ndash39 of a US Department of Energy declassified document fora discussion on this76)

However research reactors in which the fuelshyrods are pulled out after lowshyburnup canbe used to produce weaponsshygrade plutonium The fissile material for the 1974Pokhran explosions came from the research reactor CIRUS The history of CIRUS isquite interesting CIRUS stands for ldquoCanadian Indian reactor USrdquo because the designwas Canadian the heavyshywater used was American and the fuel was Indian TheCanadian negotiators imposed no explicit conditions on how the fuel from this reactorcould be used In fact an Indian commitment that the fuel would be used peacefullywas placed in a secret annex to the treaty Furthermore while the initial idea was thatthe fuel would be supplied by the Canadians the Indian side preshyempted this andsucceeded in fabricated indigenous fuel rods in time for use in the reactor Thisallowed India to argue that it could do as it wished with the spent fuel from the reactorbecause the fuel after all was Indian

This use of the plutonium from CIRUS is often discussed in the context ofproliferationxi caused by the supply of peaceful nuclear technology Some accountssuch as that of Abraham (cited above) portray this sequence of events by suggestingthat the well intentioned but somewhat injudicious Canadians were outman oeuvred bythe nefarious Indians This conclusion arises from the axiom that Western countriesare always wellshyintentioned

These narratives need not be taken seriously The Canadian technology transfer wasundoubtedly done with the full knowledge that it would help India produce weaponsshygrade fissile material A more pertinent question to ask is ldquoWhat were the calculationsthat led the imperialist world to encourage India to arm itself with nuclear weapons rdquo

In fact a few years later the Americans almost directly provided India with a nuclearbomb Perkovich describes (pp 90ndash 93) that in 1964 the US defense departmentconducted a secret study examining the ldquopossibilities of providing nuclear weaponsunder US custodyrdquo to ldquofriendly Asianrdquo military forces for use against China At thesame time the US Atomic Energy Commission was independently exploring thepossibility of helping India conduct nuclear explosions for lsquocivilianrsquo purposes Whileneither of these two initiatives w as brought to fruition this goes to show that the



commonly made assumption that the US ruling elite is uncomfortable with Indiannuclear weapons is incorrect There are opposing forces within the Americanestablishment and as we will discuss below very similar tensions continue to operatetoday In 1985 India built a companion to CIRUS called Dhruva Dhruva adjoinsCIRUS but is significantly larger and can also be used to produce weaponsshygradeplutonium A study by Mian et al77 estimates that India has built up a stockpile of 500kg of weaponsshy grade plutonium from CIRUS and Dhruva This is enough for morethan a hundred nuclear warheads

As we mentioned above it is hard to build nuclear weapons with the plutonium that isproduced in powershyreactors However this is not impossible bombs using reactorshygrade plutonium can be built In fact there is some evidence that in the 1998 blastsreactorshygrade plutonium was used If this is true then the amount of fissile materialavailable to the Indian government is considerably larger than the estimate abovesince large stockpiles of spent reactor fuel are available The fast breeder programmewhich constitutes the second stage of the threeshystage programme is quite importanthere As we mentioned fast breeder reactors work with a fuel core and also a blanketof uranium This blanket breeds weaponsshygrade plutonium Glaser and Ramana estimate78 that the PFBR under construction at Kalpakkam might itself allow India toproduce 140 kg of plutonium every year This would allow the Indian government togreatly increase its nuclear arsenal In this context it is relevant to note that one of thekey initial disagreements between the US and India was over whether the FBRprogramme would come under IAEA safeguards79 When asked whether the breederswould be put under safeguards Kakodkar replied ldquono way because it hurts ourstrategic interestsrdquo and suggested that he would rather have the deal sink80

In the final deal breeder reactors were kept out of IAEA safeguards Once again it issomewhat naive to attribute this to Indiarsquos negotiating skills or American innocenceand simpleshymindedness There was evidently disagreement between different sectionsof the American ruling elite Stephen Cohen from the influential BrookingsInstitution claimed that ldquowe [the US] probably could have put more restraints on thefast breeder reactor programrdquo However ldquoBush stopped the negotiationsrdquo81 Hencethis was a political decision As in the case of CIRUS a section of the imperialistrulingshyclass seems to have decided that it was in its interests to allow India to armitself with nuclear weapons In both cases it is quite plausible that this was intended tobuild India into a nuclear armed regional counterweight to China

Highly enriched uranium can also be used for military purposes Indiarsquos facilities toenrich uranium are somewhat poor India has two gas centrifuge enrichment facilitiesOne is at BARC and the other is at Rattehalli near Mysore According to Mian et alIndia could have built up a stockpile of about 400ndash700 kg of 45ndash30 per cent enricheduranium Another study estimated that India might have 94 kg of 90 per cent enricheduranium82 This enriched uranium was undoubtedly used in Indiarsquos nuclear submarineproject and can also be used to make bombs To summarize this section it is clear thatthe Indian atomic energy programme has had a major weapons component In somecases like the fast breeder reactor the objective of the reactor seems to be not toproduce energy but rather to use energy as a veneer to cover up a weaponsshy makingfactory More broadly it is quite possible that despite the failure to produceelectricity the atomic energy programme has received state patronage because of itscontribution to Indiarsquos nuclear bomb An unconfirmed anecdote might be relevant



here Ashok Parthasarathi an adviser to Indira Gandhi at the time of Sarabhai andHomi Sethna claims that he repeatedly brought up the DAErsquos failure to produceatomic energy and objected to its plans for future expansion He claims that he wasfinally overridden by PN Haksar who explained to him that ldquothere are largerobjectives to our nuclear programme than nuclear power and those objectives cannotbe compromised at any costrdquo83 (emphasis in the original)

8 ConclusionsThe atomic energy discourse in India is marked by a high level of disingenuity TheDepartment of Atomic Energy has repeatedly made fantastic projections for theamount of energy it will produce only to fall far short each time Predictions of thiskind were used to argue in favour of the nuclear deal last year

Nevertheless the Government seems determined to invest heavily in atomic energyThe DAE claims that the nuclear expansion will be through a threeshystage programmebut this is very unlikely A far more likely scenario is that nuclear energy will developthrough conventional indigenous and imported reactors using uranium as a fuel

Although there has been a partial revival of interest in nuclear energy worldwidebecause of concerns about climateshychange it remains more expensive than comparablesources of energy like coal Since Indiarsquos uranium resources are very poor a largescale expansion of atomic energy in India will necessarily lead to dependence onimperialist countries Furthermore safety considerations in India are exacerbated bythe absence of a proper regulatory framework

The civilian and military aspects of the nuclear programme have always been linkedand weaponization is an extremely important aspect of the planned nuclear expansionThe new prototype fast breeder reactor and the increased availability of uranium afterthe nuclear deal will allow India to build up a large weapons stockpile The US hasactively encouraged this weaponization programme and this holds the danger ofsetting off a weaponsshyrace in Asia

We should emphasize that our discussion of atomic energy here has been almostentirely within the framework of the current system In particular liberal capitalistdevelopment requires ever increasing amounts of energy While energy is required tomeet many human needs the current model of development extrapolates this toinfinity this should be challenged vigorously Unfortunately even within thisframework the planned nuclear expansion makes for poor policy

Appendix9 Politics of the Nuclear DealThe analysis above raises an interesting question ldquoWhy was the nuclear deal soimportant for the Government that it was willing to risk its very survival to ensure itspassage rdquo This is slightly outside the main line of this article but is interesting andimportant in its own right This question has also been discussed elsewhere 84

We emphasize that this discussion must be placed in its proper context When the



Government decided to go ahead with the nuclear deal (in midshy2008) this precipitateda political crisis because the Left parties withdrew their support to the UPAgovernment While the Congress eventually emerged unscathed from this crisis andeven returned to power with an enhanced majority this was not at all clear at the timethe Government could well have fallen Moreover the time was hardly propitious forelections Among other things inflation was at a 13 year high85 Surely it was suicidalfor the Congress to destabilize its government in such a scenario What were thestrong forces that impelled it to undertake this bizarre behaviour

As we saw in Section 1 the Government argued that the nuclear deal was necessaryfor energy security However from the analysis above it is quite clear that atomicenergy is rather unimportant for Indiarsquos energy needs and is likely to remain so Thenuclear deal was not even critical for the weapons programme While the availabilityof international uranium will free domestic resources for use in weapons the primarybuildup in fissile materials is likely to come from indigenous fast breeder reactors

One argument is that the Government was taken in by its own propaganda Howeverthe data presented above is so public and well known that this seems unlikelyMoreover even going by the DAErsquos figures atomic energy will not contributesignificantly to Indiarsquos energy mix for many years to come So this argument leads tothe conclusion that the Congress was so perspicacious that it was willing to sacrificeits government for a small gain in Indiarsquos energyshysecurity several decades laterEvidently the argument is incorrect

Another argument is that the nuclear deal was pushed by the Indian atomic energyestablishment which desperately required a lifeline for its civilian energyprogramme86 While this might have been a factor it seems unlikely that a majorpolitical decision of this sort was taken under the influence of technocrats A far morebelievable answer was given by Ashley Tellis87 an important adviser to the Bushadministration Tellis noted that the deal was ldquoextremely importantrdquo He went on tosay ldquoIt is the centerpiece of everything for the simple reason that it goesfundamentally to the Presidentrsquos and the prime ministerrsquos efforts to build a new senseof trust In my view this is the ultimate reason why it cannot fail why it must notfail because both leaders have staked a lot in trying to do something really importantmdash something that implicates issues of credibility issues of commitment and finallyissues of confidence for the future of the relationshiprdquoHowever what do terms like ldquocredibilityrdquo and ldquocommitmentrdquo really mean in thecontext of an alliance with the US The answer is quite clear and forms a cornerstoneof American foreign policy

Credible governments are those that do not allow domestic political compulsions toprevent them from adhering to American interests This is extremely important TheAmerican ruling elite does not enjoy dealing with the vagaries of third world denizensA lsquotrustworthy allyrsquo is a country that manages domestic politics well and keeps itslsquointernational commitmentsrsquo As Chomsky pointed out88 ldquoattitudes toward democracywere revealed with unusual clarity during the mobilization for [the Iraq] warrdquo Evenold Western allies like France and Germany were pushed off to ldquoOld Europerdquo becausedomestic considerations prevented them from supporting the Iraq war Chomskynoticed that ldquothe governments of Old and New Europe were distinguished by a simplecriterion a government joined Old Europe in its iniquity if and only if it took the sameposition as the vast majority of its population and refused to follow orders from



Washingtonrdquo

Influential figures on both the American and Indian side were in agreement on thisissue Ronen Sen Indiarsquos ambassador to the US explained89 that the failure of the dealwould leave India with ldquozero credibilityrdquo He pointed out that the despite havingldquorevolving doorrdquo governments ldquoone thing that distinguishes India is that we havealways honoured our commitments not just that it is a democracyrdquo He regretted thatat the state level this had not always been true and that in ldquoone instance after anelection a state government changed one contract and that is Enronrdquo Evidentlyaccording to Sen elections and the wishes of the people should not come in the way offulfilling obligations however onerous or unjustified to multinational corporations orthe U S government Ashton Carter a member of the Clinton administrationexplained90 to the US senate that ldquoIndiarsquos bureaucracies and diplomats are fabled fortheir stubborn adherence to independent positions regarding the world order economicdevelopment and nuclear securityrdquo He lamented that the fact that ldquoIndia is ademocracyrdquo meant that ldquono government in Delhi can commit to a broad set ofactions in support of US interestsrdquo

The Indian ruling elite was very unhappy with this fact also When the Left partiesstalled the nuclear deal Chidambaram went on record91 stating that ldquoIndian democracy has often paralyzed decision making this approach must changerdquoManmohan Singh was so upset that he began to question the efficacy of a multishypartysystem itself In a conference on federalism he asked92 ldquodoes a single party state haveany advantagesrdquo and wondered whether ldquoa coalition [was] capable of providingthe unity of purpose that nationshystates have to often demonstraterdquo

What is almost conclusive is that after a long stalemate the Congress chose toprecipitate a showdown with the Left parties exactly a week before Manmohan Singhwas to attend a G8 summit in Japan As the Times of India explained ldquo the primeminister has consistently cited the possibility of an embarrassing loss of face with theinternational community to lobby the Congress leadershiprdquo93 Evidently the reasonthat Manmohan Singh was desperate to pass the nuclear deal had nothing to do withelectricity but was related to maintaining his credentials as a reliable imperialistallyThe Indian parliamentary system for all its iniquities is based on the notion thatgovernments privilege their survival over all else The fact that the Congress waswilling to violate this tenet and imperil the existence of its own government to fulfillcommitments made to the US is a revealing indicator of the strength of its ties toimperialism

Notes

Suvrat Raju is a physicist and an activist He can be reached at suvratrajugmailcom (back)

i Fast breeder reactors (from the second stage) continue to be of importance for Indiarsquos weapons programme as we



describe below So apart from the prototype reactor currently under construction it is possible that a few others willbe built This is not of much relevance to the energy projections above (back)

ii These are two common isotopes of uranium ie they have identical chemical properties but different physicalproperties The number in the superscript gives the total number of protons+neutrons in the nucleus For the purposesof this article it is sufficient for the reader to know that U235 is the form that is useful as fissile fuel (back)

iii Some developing countries like China have also announced ambitious plans for nuclear expansion26 (back)

iv The Chicago study used data from an OECD estimate of electricity generation costs from 199838 By 2005 theOECD estimates had changed and its report on projected electricity generating costs found nuclear power to becheaper in several countries39 The OECD bases its conclusions on questionnaires sent to different countries and thedata used in the 2005 report is rather suspect For example on page 43 the overnight construction cost for a nuclearplant in Finland is taken to be about 2000 USDkW The Areva plant current under construction in Finland is expectedto cost more than USD 6 billion40 and provide 1600 MW of power41 leading to a cost per kW that is almost twice aslarge as the cost used by the OECD (back)

v However nuclear power does continue to be considerably cheaper than some alternative forms of energy like solarpower (back)

vi The same report also suggests a significantly higher deathshytoll for the Chernobyl accident However RussiaUkraine and Belarus experienced a sharp increase in mortality and decrease in lifeshyexpectancy after 1991 unrelated toChernobyl following the collapse of the Soviet Union Some of the original studies cited in the Greenpeace report arenot available to us but at times it seems possible (as in the discussion on page 25) that these effects have not beendistinguished (back)

vii Of course uranium mining is also hazardous However because it is carried out on so much smaller a scale thancoalshymining accidents are fewer (back)

viii A cartel dominated by the US and other imperialist countries that controls international nuclear trade (back)

ix The AEC has since been somewhat enlarged As of December 2009 it had 12 members including the chairpersonwho is the head of the DAE and one MP mdash Prithviraj Chavan mdash the minister of state in the PMO for science andtechnology56 (back)

x Contrary to a widespread belief this oxymoronic term was not invented by the Indian government The Americangovernment had for long argued for the use of nuclear devices for civilian purposes such as broadening canalsBhabha simply adopted the terminology from an American study on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Explosions73 (back)

xi The word ldquoproliferationrdquo is of course problematic because it is applied only to the spread of weapons of massdestruction outside the control of imperialist governments (back)

References

Where possible we have provided Internet links to the references below After some time we expect that some ofthese links will change or stop working If a lsquoGoogle searchrsquo does not reveal the information elsewhere on the WorldWide Web the reader may be able to obtain an archived copy of the page via the Web Archivehttpwwwarchiveorg

1 Jawaharlal Nehru ldquo Significance of the Atomic Revolutionrdquo Speech at the opening of the Atomic EnergyEstablishment 20 January 1957 (back)

2 Chidanand Rajghatta ldquoTimes Interview with George Bushrdquo Times of India 24 February 2006 (back)

3 Susan Piver The Hard Questions 100 Questions to Ask Before You Say ldquoI Dordquo Tarcher 2007(back)



4 Neha Sinha ldquoSonia targets Left Deal critics are enemies of Cong progressrdquo Indian Express 8 October 2007Available from httpwwwindianexpresscomnewssoniashytargetsshyleftshydealshycriticsshyareshyenemies225861 [accessed 22December 2009] (back)

5 ldquoDiscussion regarding IndoshyUS Nuclear Agreementrdquo Lok Sabha debate on 28 November 2007 Available fromhttp16410047132LssNewpsearchresult14aspxdbsl=9110 [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

6 ldquoMotion of confidence in the Council of Ministersrdquo Lok Sabha debate on 21 July 2008 Available fromhttp16410047132LssNewpsearchresult14aspxdbsl=10235 [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

7ldquoNshydeal India says reprocessing talks will take timerdquo The Hindu 24 November 2009 Available fromhttpbetathehinducomnewsnationalarticle53980ece [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

8 ldquoUS welcomes site allocation for nuclear plantsrdquo The Hindu 18 October 2009 Available fromhttpbetathehinducomnewsnationalarticle35557ece [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

9 R B Grover and Subash Chandra A strategy for growth of electrical energy in India Department of AtomicEnergy 2004 Available from httpwwwdaegovinpubldoc10 [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

10 R B Grover and Subhash Chandra ldquoScenario for growth of electricity in Indiardquo Energy Policy vol 34 no 17pp 2834 ndash 2847 2006 (back)

11 Anil Kakodkar ldquoEvolving Indian Nuclear Programme Rationale and Perspectivesrdquo Talk at Indian Academy ofSciences Bangalore July 2008 Available from httpwwwdaegovinlectureiascpdf [accessed 22 December2009] (back)

12 ldquoMonthly Review Of Power Sector (Executive Summary)rdquo Ministry of Power November 2009 Available fromhttpwwwceanicinpower_sec_reportsexecutive_summary2009_119shy10pdf [accessed 22 December 2009](back)

13 Sandeep Dikshit ldquoBig scope for rise in nuclear energyrdquo The Hindu 30 September 2009 Available fromhttpwwwthehinducom20090930stories2009093057790100htm [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

14 Lord Penney ldquoHomi Jehangir Bhabha 1909ndash1966rdquo Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Societyvol 13 November 1967 (back)

15 International Atomic Energy Agency ldquoPower Reactor Information Systemrdquo [online accessed 22 December2009] Available from httpwwwiaeaorgprogrammesa2indexhtml (back)

16 Atomic Energy Commission Atomic Energy and Space Research A Profile for the Decade 1970shy80 1970(back)

17 Vikram Sarabhai Nuclear Power in Developing Countries Atomic Energy Commission 1969 (back)

18 M R Srinivasan ldquoRemembering Pandit Nehru and Dr Bhabhardquo Nuclear India vol 26 October 1989 (back)

19 Comptroller and Auditor General of India Report on the Union Government (Scientific Departments) for the yearended March 1998 Chapter 2 Department of Atomic Energy 1999 Available fromhttpwwwcaggovinreportsscientific1999_book1chap2htm [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

20 Anil Kakodkar ldquoFive Decades of the DAErdquo Nuclear India vol 34 SeptembershyOctober 2003 Available fromhttpwwwdaegovinninisep03nisep03pdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

21 Nuclear Power Corporation of India ldquoPlants Under Operationrdquo [online accessed 22 December 2009] Availablefrom httpwwwnpcilnicinmainAllProjectOperationDisplayaspx An older page with the same information isarchived at httpwebarchiveorgweb20080728074238wwwnpcilnicinPlantsInOperationasp (back)

22 Stephen Ansolabehere John Deutch Michael Driscoll et al ldquoThe future of nuclear power an interdisciplinaryMIT studyrdquo tech rep Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2003 Available from



httpwebmitedunuclearpowerpdfnuclearpowershyfullpdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

23 ldquoThe Heart Of The Matterrdquo Outlook 3 October 2009 Available fromhttpbusinessoutlookindiacomarticleaspx261872 [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

24 G Venkataraman Bhabha and his Magnificent Obsessions Universities Press 2008 (back)

25 Bhabha Atomic Research Center ldquoAtomic Energy in Indiardquo [online accessed 22 December 2009] Availablefrom httpwwwbarcernetinaboutanu1htm (back)

26 Keith Bradsher ldquoNuclear Power Expansion in China Stirs Concernsrdquo New York Times 15 December 2009Available from httpwwwnytimescom20091216businessglobal16chinanukehtml [accessed 22 December2009] (back)

27 ldquoNuclear powerrsquos new agerdquo The Economist 6 September 2007 Available fromhttpwwweconomistcombackgrounddisplaystorycfmstory_id=9767699 [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

28 Health and Safety Executive UK Generic Design Assessment of New Nuclear Reactor Designs AREVA NPSAS and EDF SA UK EPR Nuclear Reactor 2009 Available fromhttpwwwhsegovuknewreactorsreportsstep3shyedfshyarevashypublicshyreportshygdapdf [accessed 22 December 2009](back)

29 Health and Safety Executive UK Generic Design Assessment of New Nuclear Reactor Designs WestinghouseElectric Company LLC AP1000 Nuclear Reactor 2009 Available fromhttpwwwhsegovuknewreactorsreportsstep3shywestinghouseshypublicshyreportshygdapdf [accessed 22 December 2009](back)

30 ldquoNuclear reactors contain safety flaws watchdog revealsrdquo The Guardian 27 November 2009 Available fromhttpwwwguardiancoukbusiness2009nov27nuclearshyreactorsshycontainshysafetyshyflaws [accessed 22 December2009] (back)

31 Amory B Lovins and Imran Sheikh ldquoThe nuclear illusionrdquo tech rep Rocky Mountain Institute 27 May 2008Available from httpwwwrmiorgrmiLibraryE08shy01_NuclearIllusion [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

32 M V Ramana ldquoHeavy Subsidies The Cost of Heavy Water Productionrdquo Economic and Political Weekly 25August 2007 (back)

33 M R Srinivasan R B Grover and S A Bharadwaj ldquoNuclear power in India Winds of changerdquo Economic andPolitical Weekly vol 3 p 5184 2005 (back)

34 Sudhinder Thakur ldquoEconomics of Nuclear Power in India The Real Picturerdquo Economic and Political Weeklyvol 40 no 49 p 5209 2005 (back)

35 M V Ramana A DrsquoSa and A K N Reddy ldquoEconomics of nuclear power from heavy water reactorsrdquoEconomic and Political Weekly vol 40 no 17 pp 1763ndash73 2005 (back)

36 M V Ramana ldquoEconomics of Nuclear Power Subsidies and Competitivenessrdquo Economic and Political Weeklyvol 42 no 2 p 169 2007 (back)

37 George S Tolley Donald W Jones et al ldquoThe Economic Future of Nuclear Powerrdquo tech rep University ofChicago 2004 Available from httpwwwrcfeconcomNucEconFullpdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

38 ldquoProjected Costs of Generating Electricity update 1998rdquo OECD 1998 (back)


40 James Kanter ldquoIn Finland Nuclear Renaissance Runs Into Troublerdquo New York Times 28 May 2009 Availablefrom httpwwwnytimescom20090529businessenergyshyenvironment29nukehtml [accessed 22 December 2009](back)



41 Lizette Alvarez ldquoFinlandrsquos decision powers nuclear debaterdquo New York Times 12 December 2005 Availablefrom httpwwwnytimescom20051212businessworldbusiness12ihtshynukehtml [accessed 22 December 2009](back)

42 ldquoAtomic renaissancerdquo The Economist 6 September 2007 Available fromhttpwwweconomistcomdisplayStorycfmStory_ID=9762843ampsource=login_payBarrier [accessed 22 December2009] (back)

43 ldquoSplitting the costrdquo The Economist 12 November 2009 Available fromhttpwwweconomistcomworldbritaindisplaystorycfmstory_id=14859289 [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

44 Kenneth Kok ed Nuclear Engineering Handbook CRC Press 2009 (back)

45 M V Ramana Dennis George Thomas and Susy Varughese ldquoEstimating nuclear waste production in IndiardquoCurrent Science vol 81 no 11 p 1458 2001 (back)

46 Department of Atomic Energy Our Collective Vision August 2004 Available fromhttpwwwdaegovinpubldoc11indexhtm [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

47 World Health Organization Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes2006 Report of the UN Chernobyl Form Expert Group ldquoHealthrdquo Available fromhttpwwwwhointionizing_radiationchernobylwho_chernobyl_report_2006pdf [accessed 22 December 2009](back)

48 Greenpeace The Chernobyl Catastrophe Consequences on Human Health April 2006 Available fromhttpwwwgreenpeaceorgrawcontentinternationalpressreportschernobylhealthreportpdf [accessed 22 December2009] (back)

49 International Atomic Energy Agency The Chernobyl Accident Updating of INSAGshy1 1992 A report by theInternational Nuclear Safety Advisory Group Available from httpwwwshypubiaeaorgMTCDpublicationsPDFPub913e_webpdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

50 Ted Plafker ldquoChinese coal industry in need of a helping handrdquo New York Times 19 June 2007 Available fromhttpwwwnytimescom20070619businessworldbusiness19ihtshyrnrgcoal16204819html [accessed 22 December2009] (back)

51 Jim Yardley ldquoAs most of China celebrates new year a scramble continues in coal countryrdquo New York Times 9February 2008 Available from httpwwwnytimescom20080209worldasia09ihtshy09china9891162html[accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

52 Ministry of Coal ldquoThe fatality rates per 3 lakh manshift in the coal mines of India and that of other countriesrdquo[online accessed 22 December 2009] Available from httpcoalnicinweboflifeshyminessafetyfatality_rates_per_3_lakh_manshihtm (back)

53 Ministry of Coal ldquoAnnual Report 2007shy08rdquo 2008 Available from httpcoalnicinannrep0708pdf [accessed 22December 2009] (back)

54 Kirit S Parikh T L Sankar Amit Mitra et al Integrated Energy Policy Report of the Expert CommitteePlanning Commission August 2006 Available fromhttpplanningcommissiongovinreportsgenreprep_intengypdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

55 Homi Bhabha ldquoNote on the Organization of Atomic Research in Indiardquo 26 April 1948 reproduced in NuclearIndia vol 26 1989 (back)

56 ldquoWebsite of the atomic energy commissionrdquo [online accessed 22 December 2009] Available fromhttpwwwaecgovin (back)

57 Atomic Energy Regulatory Board ldquoThe Formation of AERB Down the Memory Lanerdquo [online accessed 22December 2009] Available from httpwwwaerbgovincgishybinaboutaerbAboutAERBasp (back)



58 A Gopalakrishnan ldquoIssues of nuclear safetyrdquo Frontline vol 16 13 March 1999 Available fromhttpwwwhinduonnetcomflinefl160616060820htm [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

59 M Das ldquoAn alarmist view on nuclear safety NPC speaksrdquo Frontline vol 16 8 May 1999 Available fromhttpwwwhinduonnetcomflinefl161016101060htm [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

60 ldquoConvention on nuclear safetyrdquo INFCIRC449 5 July 1994 Available fromhttpwwwiaeaorgPublicationsDocumentsInfcircsOthersinf449shtml [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

61 World Nuclear Association ldquoFast Neutron Reactorsrdquo [online accessed 22 December 2009] Available fromhttpwwwworldshynuclearorginfoinf98html (back)

62 Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation Project Implementation Status Report Of Central SectorProjects Costing Rs20 Crore amp Above (JanuaryshyMarch 2009) Available fromhttpwwwmospigovinQSR_jan_march_2009pdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

63 Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited 6th Annual Report 2008shy2009 Available fromhttpwwwbhavininicinattachmentsBhavini20shy20Finalpdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

64 International Atomic Energy Agency ldquoBrief History of IAEArsquos Project on rdquoTechnology Advances in FastReactors and Accelerator Driven Systemsrdquordquo [online accessed 22 December 2009] Available from httpwwwshyfrdbiaeaorgauxiliaryhistoryhtml Fast Reactor Database 2006 Update (back)

65 M V Ramana ldquoThe Indian Nuclear Industry Status and Prospectsrdquo December 9 2009 Nuclear Energy FuturesPaper 9 Available from httpwwwcigionlineorgpublications200912indianshynuclearshyindustryshystatusshyandshyprospects [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

66 Ashwin Kumar and M V Ramana ldquoCompromising Safety Design Choices and Severe Accident Possibilities inIndiarsquos Prototype Fast Breeder Reactorrdquo Science and Global Security vol 16 no 3 pp 87ndash114 2008 (back)

67 S Raghupathy Om Pal Singh S Govindarajanand S C Chetal and S B Bhoje ldquoDesign Of 500 MwePrototype Fast Breeder Reactorrdquo Nuclear India vol 37 April 2004 Available fromhttpwwwdaegovinninimar04designpdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

68 M V Ramana and J Y Suchitra ldquoSlow and stunted Plutonium accounting and the growth of fast breederreactors in Indiardquo Energy Policy 2009 (back)

69 World Nuclear Association ldquoThoriumrdquo [online accessed 22 December 2009] Available fromhttpwwwworldshynuclearorginfoinf62html (back)

70 K Anantharaman V Shivakumar and D Saha ldquoUtilisation of thorium in reactorsrdquo Journal of NuclearMaterials vol 383 no 1shy2 pp 119ndash121 2008 (back)

71 Homi Bhabha ldquoPeaceful Uses of Atomic Energyrdquo Presidential Address to the International Conference on thePeaceful uses of Atomic Energy 8 August 1955 (back)

72 Itty Abraham The making of the Indian atomic bomb Science secrecy and the postcolonial state OrientLongman 1999 (back)

73 George Perkovich Indiarsquos nuclear bomb the impact on global proliferation Univ of California Pr 2002 (back)

74 Anand Patwardhan ldquoWar and Peacerdquo Transcript of Chapter 1 ldquoNonshyviolence to Nuclear Nationalismrdquo (back)

75 P K Iyengar ldquoBriefings on Nuclear Technology in Indiardquo [online] May 2009 [accessed 22 December 2009]Available from httppkiyengarinyahoo_site_adminassetsdocsNew_version_book_May_2009124232514pdf(back)

76 US Department of Energy Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of WeaponsshyUsable Fissile MaterialStorage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives January 1997 Available from



httpwwwfissilematerialsorgipfmsite_downdoe97pdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

77 Zia Mian A H Nayyar R Rajaraman and M V Ramana ldquoFissile materials in South Asia The Implications ofthe USshyIndia Nuclear Dealrdquo tech rep International Panel on Fissile Materials September 2006 Available fromhttpwwwfissilematerialsorgipfmsite_downrr01pdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

78 Alexander Glaser and M V Ramana ldquoWeaponshyGrade Plutonium Production Potential in the Indian PrototypeFast Breeder Reactorrdquo Science and Global Security vol 15 no 2 p 85 2007 (back)

79 Siddharth Varadarajan ldquoSafeguards for breeder reactors a key obstaclerdquo The Hindu 21 January 2006 Availablefrom httpwwwhinducom20060121stories2006012120610100htm [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

80 Pallava Bagla ldquoAnil Kakodkar Interview Breaking Up (a Nuclear Program) Is Hard to Dordquo Science vol 311no 5762 pp 765ndash766 2006 (back)

81 Richard Stone and Pallava Bagla ldquoProliferation LastshyMinute Nuclear Deal Has LongshyTerm RepercussionsrdquoScience vol 311 no 5766 pp 1356ndash1357 2006 (back)

82 Taraknath V K Woddi William S Charlton and Paul Nelson Indiarsquos Nuclear Fuel Cycle Unraveling the Impactof the USshyIndia Nuclear Accord No 1 in Synthesis Lectures on Nuclear Technology and Society Morgan ampClaypool Publishers 2009 (back)

83 Ashok Parthasarathi Technology at the core science amp technology with Indira Gandhi Pearson Longman 2007(back)

84 Suvrat Raju ldquoThe Nuclear Deal and Democracyrdquo Countercurrents 10 July 2008 Available fromhttpwwwcountercurrentsorgraju100708htm [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

85 Andrew Buncombe ldquoFuel costs push Indiarsquos inflation rate to 13shyyear highrdquo The Independent 5 July 2008Available from httpwwwindependentcouknewsbusinessnewsfuelshycostsshypushshyindiasshyinflationshyrateshytoshy13yearshyhighshy860595html [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

86 Zia Mian and M V Ramana ldquoWrong ends means and needs Behind the US nuclear deal with Indiardquo ArmsControl Today vol 36 JanuaryFebruary 2006 Available from httpwwwarmscontrolorgact2006_01shy02JANFEBshyIndiaFeature [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

87 Aziz Haniffa ldquoInterview with Ashley J Tellisrdquo India Abroad 20 July 2007 Available fromhttpwwwcarnegieendowmentorgfilestellis_india_abroadpdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

88 Noam Chomsky ldquoThe Iraq War and Contempt for Democracyrdquo Znet 31 October 2003 Available fromhttpwwwchomskyinfoarticles20031031htm [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

89 Aziz Haniffa ldquoAmbassador Sen lsquoWe will have zero credibilityrsquordquo Rediff News 20 August 2007 Available fromhttpwwwrediffcomnews2007aug20interhtm [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

90 Ashton Carter ldquoThe India Deal Looking at the Big Picturerdquo Testimony before the Committee on ForeignRelations US Senate 2 November 2005 Available fromhttpwwwglobalsecurityorgwmdlibrarycongress2005_h051102shycarterpdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

91 P Chidambaram ldquoConvocation Address IIM Ahmedabadrdquo 31 March 2007 (back)

92 Manmohan Singh ldquoInaugural addressrdquo in 4th International Conference on Federalism 5 November 2007Available from httpwwwforumfedorgpubsIndia_PMSingh_addresspdf [accessed 22 December 2009] (back)

93 ldquoGovt bites Nshybullet to go to IAEA in Julyrdquo Times of India 29 June 2008 Available fromhttptimesofindiaindiatimescomindiaGovtshybitesshyNshybulletshytoshygoshytoshyIAEAshyinshyJulyarticleshow3176099cms[accessed 22 December 2009] (back)



BACK TO Table of Contents

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All material copy copyright 2015 by Research Unit for Political Economy



nuclear deal In a major debate (on 28 November 2007) Jyotiraditya Scindia the firstspeaker from the Congress said that for growth at the ldquograss root levelrdquo the ldquociviliannuclear optionrdquo was necessary and claimed that by 2020 India would have a nuclearpowershygenerating capacity of 30000ndash40000 MW For Scindia though it was ldquofarmore important [that] the Deal raised the stature of Indiardquo5 Pranab Mukherjeeopening the debate for the Government in the confidence motion (on 21 July 2008)explained that ldquopower is needed for everythingrdquo and pointed to the grim danger thatby 2050 without nuclear power ldquoour energy deficit would be 412000 megawattsrdquoNuclear power would ldquoreduce the deficit to only 7000 megawattsrdquo and hence solvethe energy crisis6

These figures originate with the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) but are theyrealistic This question remains important even after the political victory of theCongress First the change in the American administration has slowed down nuclearnegotiations between India and the US more than a year after the nuclear deal wasactuated these negotiations have not concluded In fact one of the focal points ofManmohan Singhrsquos visit to the US in November 2009 was to resolve differences overthe reprocessing of spent fuel of American origin7 Separately the Government hasalready signed nuclear pacts with seven countries Companies from the US Franceand Russia have been allocated land for setting up nuclear plants8

It is imperative in this context to review the hopes for atomic energy that areprojected by the Government What is the history of atomic energy in India and is itlikely to play a major role in Indiarsquos energyshybasket in the near future What is the linkbetween the civilian and military programme and how does the nuclear deal bear uponweaponization If the Government does go ahead with massive nuclear expansionwill this necessarily make India dependent on imperialist powers We discuss some ofthese questions below

2 Atomic Energy ProjectionsWe start by discussing the Governmentrsquos argument for atomic energy As wementioned above the DAE has made some very ambitious projections for atomicenergy over the next few decades These projections underlie the argument that Indiamust divert resources towards nuclear energy

In 2004 the DAE surveying various studies estimated that India would need 8 trillionkilowattshyhours (kWh) of electricity per year by 20509 10 The DAE study mentionedthat electricity generation in 2002ndash 2003 was about 06 trillion kWh it projected thatthis would grow about 13 times After factoring in the increase in population (whichwas projected to stabilize at about 15 billion) the DAE projected that per capitaelectricity consumption would rise about nine times mdash from about 614 kWh to 5305kWh

The study argued that it would be very difficult to meet these great demands withoutnuclear power and estimated that atomic energy would meet about 25 per cent of thetotal demand by 2050 This translates to about 2 trillion kWh of electricity per yearwith an installed capacity of 275 GW

However this initial study was published in 2004 before the nuclear agreement






Figure 1







































































































process chemically









































Washingtonrdquo




Notes
















References





















































































































Figure 1







































































































process chemically









































Washingtonrdquo




Notes
















References






















































































































































































































process chemically









































Washingtonrdquo




Notes
















References


















































































































































Washingtonrdquo




Notes
















References





























































































































References














































































































