international migration and (re)integration issues …...international migration is a complex...
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Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University (Phase2) 龍谷大学アフラシア多文化社会研究センター
研究シリーズ 3
Edited by
Pauline Kent, Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos,Masako Otaki and Shincha Park
Ryukoku University Afrasian Research CentreSecond International Workshop
International Migration and (Re)Integration Issuesin the Philippines
Research SeriesStudies on Multicultural Societies No.3
The logo mark of Afrasian Research Centre is adopted from an Adinkra symbol of “Siamese crocodiles” in the ancient kingdom of Asante that existed in what is now the Republic of Ghana, West Africa. It is a popular symbol of peace and unity, as Siamese crocodiles share a stomach, or the same ultimate goal, even if they tend to fight with each other.
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Research Series
Studies on Multicultural Societies No.3
Ryukoku University Afrasian Research Centre Second International Workshop
International Migration and (Re)Integration Issues
in the Philippines
February 3-5, 2013
Mobile Workshop Metro Manila and Laguna, Philippines
Edited by
Pauline Kent, Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos, Masako Otaki and Shincha Park
Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University (Phase 2)
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©2013 Afrasian Research Centre Ryukoku University 1-5 Yokotani, Seta Oe-cho, Otsu, Shiga, JAPAN All rights reserved. ISBN 978-4-904945-38-4
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Afrasian Research Centre. No part of this publication shall be reproduced in any form without the permission of the author/s and Afrasian Research Centre. This publication has been supported by the Project for Strategic Research Base Formation Support at Private Universities at Ryukoku University “Research into the Possibilities of Establishing Multicultural Societies in the Asia-Pacific Region: Conflict, Negotiation and Migration” initiated and funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (2011-2013).
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PREFACE After holding our first workshop in Turkey in 2012, Group One held its Second Afrasian International Workshop in the Philippines. Our Workshop was designed to examine integral parts of the complicated puzzle of migration issues that affect life in the Philippines and thus we “migrated” from one venue to the next in an effort to understand how these various pieces fitted in the overall picture of international migration. During our three-day “mobile” workshop, our delegation met and held discussions with key international migration stakeholders in a series of field visits within Metro Manila and in Laguna Province. We also held a joint forum with the Third World Studies Center of the University of the Philippines, Diliman.
Through the activities in the Workshop, we sought to gain first-hand information about international migration from the sending country perspective. The field visits were aimed at identifying issues and concerns of those who are most intimate with migration issues, such as: the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (the government agency in-charge of permanent emigration); Maligaya House (an international organization concerned with reconnecting children with their Japanese fathers); Atikha (a grassroots NGO that is working to bridge gaps between the different stakeholders); as well as the international migrants, themselves, and other families left behind. Besides our field trips, we also took the opportunity to exchange research ideas in a Forum held in collaboration with the Third World Studies Center. This proved a fruitful exercise for both us and other researchers present. At the Forum we were able to share research findings from the fields of sociology, economics, political science and behavioral studies, as well as discuss policy directions and possible research collaboration on international migration.
The Philippines is a compelling case because it is one of the largest migrant-sending countries in the world, with the latest wave of emigration beginning in the early 1970s. As such, the impact of international migration is widely felt and visible in the daily lives of Filipinos. While being perceived by other sending countries as a model source country, as a pioneer the Philippines also has to deal with important emerging issues not yet experienced by other countries, such as return migration of retired overseas contract workers along with the pressing issue of linking migration, via remittances and networks, to socioeconomic development, especially in rural areas. It also has to address the long-term negative social and economic consequences of international migration on all levels, from problems of children and spouses left behind, to the decline in economic activities and depopulation, especially in
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rural farming villages. As Group One seeks to understand the micro aspects of migration, our trip to “the other
side” gave us insight into not only the immediate policy concerns, but also how a variety of groups are attempting to improve lives by trying to find solutions to problems related to international migration. More importantly, this Workshop enabled us to adopt a more balanced and comprehensive approach in analysing micro-level conflicts arising from international migration and in addressing the economic, social and cultural determinants and impacts of international migration. These topics are central to the research agenda of Group One. Through our efforts in examining these issues from different perspectives and academic disciplines and on different levels, we hope to contribute to Afrasia’s general research objective of discovering possibilities of resolving complex and multifaceted conflicts for the purpose of establishing multicultural societies in the Asia-Pacific Region.
Pauline Kent Head of Group One, Afrasian Research Centre
Ryukoku University
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE……………………………………………………………………………………. Pauline Kent
Ryukoku University
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW…………………………………………………….. “The Philippines’ Experience as a Migrant-Sending Country: Trends, Issues and Challenges”
Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos Ryukoku University
FORUM………………………………………………………………………………………. “The Governance of International Migration in the Philippines”.............................................
Jorge V. Tigno University of the Philippines Diliman
“Migration Governance to Migration Diplomacy: Bangladeshi Migrant Workers in the UAE” …………………………………………..
Habibul Haque Khondker Zayed University, Abu Dhabi
Summary, Comments, and Synthesis “Governance of International Migration: Perspectives of Sending Countries”………………...
Chizuko Sato Institute of Developing Economies
Aysun Uyar Doshisha University
FIELD ACTIVITIES………………………………………………………………………… “The Philippine Government’s Roles in Emigration: Programs and Activities of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO)”…………
Viktoriya Kim Osaka University
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“Bridging the Gaps: The Atikha Experience in Migration and Development in the Philippines”……………………………………….………………
Maria Makabenta Ikeda University of Hyogo
“Issues and Concerns of Filipino-Japanese Children and Their (Re)Acquisition of Japanese Nationality”………..…………………………….
Akihiro Asakawa Nagoya University
APPENDIX……………….………………………………..………………………………….. Program of Activities…….…..………………………………………………………………… List of Suggested Readings…..………………………………………………………………… List of Participants…………….………………………………………………………………..
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The Philippines’ Experience as a Migrant-Sending Country: Trends, Issues and Challenges
Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos
Ryukoku University International migration is a complex phenomenon that includes economic, social, and political dimensions which affect countries that send and receive immigrants, as well as the movers, settlers, and family left behind. Thus, international migration has developed into one of the most highly researched areas in the social sciences. It has attracted the attention, interest, and concern of academics, policymakers, and stakeholders in both sending and receiving countries. However, although issues related to international migration based on host countries’ perspectives (in particular, issues related to migrants’ admission and integration) have been widely discussed in international economic and political arenas, only limited efforts have been made to address issues related to the countries from which migrants originate. These trends might be attributed to the nature of international migration because problems (e.g., unemployment and security) are more visible in host countries. It also tends to be more difficult to achieve national consensus on immigration issues because stakeholders may possess varied interests and lobbying powers.
In this Workshop, we turned on our attention to the sending countries and examined issues related to international migration from their perspective. Among the plethora of common and relevant issues that exist that are very common and relevant among these countries, we focused on the following three key themes in this Workshop:
(1) Migration and development; (2) Integration/reintegration of migrants and their families; and (3) Governance of migration.
Sending governments’ increasing interest in the issue of migration and development
was triggered by their realization that the diaspora can play a significant potential role in the socioeconomic development of those sending countries. The impact of migration on sending countries’ development occurs due to the transfer of people (T1), the transfer of skills and knowledge (T2), and the transfer of financial resources (T3). Each of these factors can affect national development in a variety of ways and by a variety of mechanisms (International Organization for Migration IOM 2010, 16). Emigration itself (T1) relieves unemployment
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and overpopulation problems in sending countries. However, the physical absence of mothers or fathers, due to migration, cause disruptions in family social care systems that might lead to psychological, emotional, and social problems for family left behind. The emotional deficits experienced by migrants’ children within the context of the global care chain have been highlighted in literature focused on the social impacts of international migration (Parreñas 2005; Hochschild 2000). On the other hand, the transfer of skills and knowledge (T2) has more frequently been examined from the perspectives of brain drain and deskilling as negative impacts of emigration, rather than from perspectives that acknowledge returning migrants’ contributions (either permanent or temporary returns) to human capital accumulation in home countries (i.e., brain gain). Finally, remittances from abroad (a major component of T3) can raise the incomes of those left behind and assure governments of relatively stable sources of foreign reserves. Yet, simultaneously, they might also create non-productive populations that remain largely dependent on money sent by relatives overseas, as well as weak economies that possess small production bases and low saving rates. Therefore, sending countries’ governments must balance these negative and positive impacts to maximize the contributions of emigration to national development.
The choice to explore the integration/reintegration of emigrants and family left behind as one of the themes of this Workshop, was inspired by the fact that the extent to which emigration can lead and facilitate sending countries’ development is heavily dependent on the ways emigrants and family left behind live, work, and how they are treated in the countries in which they reside. Thus, the protection of emigrants’ rights in both host and sending countries (e.g., providing the right to vote and access to social welfare programs in the home country to migrants who reside overseas) has become a primary concern. It also serves as a strong political tool that states can use to connect the diaspora to home countries. The trend towards the mainstreaming of human rights in migration and development (i.e., the human-rights approach) resulted from the intensification of pressures by intergovernmental organizations such as IOM, OECD, ILO, and WHO; the governments of the US and EU countries; and international and local NGOs (e.g., Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and MIGRANTE International Alliance of Filipino Migrant Associations) that seek for equal economic, social and political rights for both permanent1 and temporary2 migrants. These movements have forced sending governments to address issues such as human trafficking, migrant abuse, and exploitation, as well as problems that face second- and third-generation descendants.
Simultaneously, many sending countries have focused additional attention on the integration and welfare of family left behind because they believe appropriate policy interventions can (at least) mitigate or compensate for their psychological and social burdens.
1 Immigrants, dual citizenship holders, or legal permanent residents abroad whose stays are not dependent on work contracts. 2 Overseas Filipino Workers (hereafter, OFWs), students, entrepreneurs, trainees and their dependents whose overseas stays extend for more than six months and are expected to return to the Philippines at the end of their contracts.
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Some examples of programs implemented in a number of sending countries include educational and training scholarships, health insurance, financial literacy programs and business start-up campaigns. Finally, contributions made to socioeconomic development by returnees from overseas, in the areas of financial investments and human capital largely depend on the attractiveness of retirement, ownership, and investment schemes offered upon their return.
To address issues related to migration and development and the integration/reintegration of migrants and family left behind, discussions related to governance and management (the third issue addressed in this Workshop) become imperative because they provide a framework and describe conditions that make emigration advantageous for sending countries. In this Workshop, we specifically examined the possibilities and challenges that face international migration governance in a Forum co-sponsored by the Third World Studies Center at the University of the Philippines.
The topic of the international governance of international migration, with the exception of governance for refugees, was almost completely ignored in the global policy agenda until the beginning of the twenty-first century (Newland 2005, 1). Two conventions on migrant workers initiated by the International Labor Organization (ILO) were ratified in 1949 and 1975, respectively, as well as by the UN during its Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers (2004). However, these conventions were ratified by a mere handful of countries. The conventions were largely ignored by major host countries and this limited their ability to protect and promote the rights of international migrants.
In recent years, interest has surged on the topic of the global governance of international migration in fora and in dialogues initiated by the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), the UN General Assembly, the UN Development Program, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank. This trend was triggered by increasing concerns for migrants’ human rights, as well as by international migration’s strong links with development. In the case of goods and services, the countries involved make significant efforts to discover ways to expand and promote trade. However, based on the initiatives and collective efforts of sending and host country governments, it is apparent that the export and import of labor receives much less attention. The few agreements that do exist are limited in scope (i.e., occupations and geographical regions). They focus on the mutual recognition of skills in ASEAN, as well as on the Colombo Process that involves labor-sending countries located in South and Southeast Asia and recently, the labor-receiving countries located in the Middle East. Jagdish Baghwati (2003) suggests the development of a supranational body similar to the World Trade Organization that would oversee international migration. However, considering the pronounced differences that exist in sending and host countries’ economic and political interests, it is highly unlikely that this type of multilateral organization could ever be established.
Therefore, presently, international arrangements on international migration that occurs on a bilateral basis (i.e., one labor-sending country and one labor-receiving country) are the most popular modes of international governance of international migration. A spectrum of
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bilateral arrangements exists. They range from Bilateral Labor Agreements (hereafter BLAs) that are more formal, binding, and closer to treaty status, to Memoranda of Understanding (hereafter MOU) and Memoranda of Agreement (hereafter MOA) that are less formal, do not require ratification, and, therefore, are less binding. Bilateral arrangements can be further divided into two categories: (1) labor arrangements that address the recruitment, deployment, and employment of workers and address mutual skills recognition, and (2) social security arrangements (hereafter SSAs)3 that address the portability of pensions and other social security benefits for migrants who reside in both countries. Although BLAs were popular in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s, and became popular again during the past two decades (beginning in the 1990s), bilateral agreements are rare in Asia and the Middle East (Wickramasekara 2012).
Because only one labor-sending and one labor-receiving county would be involved in a negotiation, a bilateral arrangement may require a shorter negotiation period in comparison with a multilateral arrangement. Moreover, since the provisions are specifically tailored to the needs and interests of only two parties, some believe implementation is easier. However, the political and economic imbalances that may exist between the two parties during negotiations, and the fact that the forms of most of these types of bilateral arrangements are less binding, might make these arrangements less superior and as ineffective as multilateral arrangements (Wickramasekara 2012).
Since it can be difficult for a labor sending country to rely on multilateral and bilateral agreements, many sending countries must unilaterally address management of the governance of international emigration. Most policies are focused on the national level (e.g., policies focused on the regulation of domestic stakeholders, particularly recruiters, financial intermediaries, migrants, and family left behind). Many sending countries have established special government agencies that attempt to engage in special regulation of the labor emigration industry by screening international recruiters and policing their activities, maintaining deployed workers’ records, and monitoring deployed workers in destination countries. These agencies can act as recruiters and promoters in the international labor market for workers who hope to depart and work overseas. These agencies also serve as arbiters between workers and overseas employers. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of unilateral governance remains unlikely given the varied interests of numerous domestic stakeholders and the limited power it maintains over conditions in host countries.
3 Social security arrangements are complementary to bilateral labor agreements. They ensure reciprocal equal treatment of migrant workers in each respective country, enhance migrants’ abilities to file welfare and pension claims by enabling beneficiaries to lodge them in respective agencies in both countries, and provide continuation of benefits regardless of where migrant workers reside (the Philippines, the other country, or a third country). They also add periods of participation in the social security system in both countries required to calculate eligibility for benefits (GFMD, 2008).
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Figure 1: Global Mapping of Overseas Filipino Emigrants (2011)
Source: CFO website. http://www.cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view
=category&id=134&Itemid=814, date accessed May 1, 2013. The Philippine Experience
In this Workshop, we examined the three interlinked issues mentioned above in the
case the Philippines. Among studies conducted based on the perspective of sending countries in Asia, emigration from the Philippines tends to be the most widely discussed topic (Asis and Piper 2008). This tendency is easier to understand if we examine this country’s long history of emigration and the magnitude of Filipinos who live and work overseas. International migration has become part and parcel of many Filipinos’ lives. It highlights the fact that their impact is more visible and equally encompassing than migrants who reside in other countries. The “culture of migration” is deeply rooted in Filipino society, as evidenced by the well-developed international migration industry that involves families, schools, recruitment agencies, review and skills training institutions, and, most of all, the state (Carlos 2012). No other country’s people who reside overseas have been accorded honor and recognition by the determination of four days each year as special days4 on which tribute is paid to overseas Filipinos hailed as ang bagong bayani (new heroes).
The Philippines maintains one of the world’s largest overseas populations as a percentage of its total population. The Commission on Filipinos Overseas (hereafter CFO) estimates that, in 2011, 10.44 million Philippine-born Filipinos overseas (hereafter OFs) comprised about 10% of its domestic population. These Filipinos reside in more than 200
4 One of these special days occurs on December 18 annually. This day is called International Migrants’ Day, and it is now celebrated across the globe. The first International Migrant’s Day was held in 1997 in the Philippines.
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countries across the globe. Figure 1 shows the distribution of OFs in 2011 as reported by the CFO. The United States, the most popular destination, is the host to 3,430,864 OFs. The majority of these Filipinos are permanent migrants. Saudi Arabia, the second-most popular destination, was the host of 1,550,572 OFs in 2011. Saudi Arabia hosts the highest number of temporary workers.
Permanent emigration to the United States occurred even prior to World War II when the Philippines remained under Commonwealth rule. In contrast, the current wave of temporary emigration began in the 1970s when the administration of then-president Ferdinand Marcos actively sent workers to the Middle East. Many of these temporary migrants were contract workers who extended their stays in their destinations. In later years, particularly beginning in the 1980s, many Filipinos traveled abroad to engage in international marriages, to study, and to join family who resided abroad.
A study of the Philippines is relevant to the formulation of policies and the identification of future problems and issues, particularly for sending countries that have followed in the footsteps of the Philippines. This country has remained in the forefront of migration studies based on sending countries’ perspectives. The Philippines has become a “model” for other migrant-sending Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia (Acacio 2008). However, at the same time, as a country that remains in the forefront, the Philippines has also undergone issues/problems that other migrant-sending countries have not yet experienced, such as problems related to returning migrants, as well as second- and later-generation migrants. In the past decade, it is notable that the state has been aggressively searching for markets and destinations for its people. It has also attempted to determine an ideal set of emigration policies that would range from methods to tap huge amounts of migrant remittances for economic development, to the implementation of laws and guidelines to protect migrants, to efforts aimed at the involvement of the diaspora in national politics and society. However, it is important to note that the current state of international migration from the Philippines, as well as state-related policies, may be incongruent with two official state pronouncements that address international migration: (1) Freedom to migrate overseas is a basic human right (Carlos and Sato 2008). Working abroad should be a choice, rather than a necessity.5 (2) The State “does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and achieve national development” (Section 2.a of Republic Act No. 8042, known as the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995”).
In this Workshop, we closely examined events on the ground in a comprehensive and integrated manner through a series of academic discussions with experts and/or practitioners from academia (University of the Philippines), a government agency (CFO), and non-governmental organizations (Maligaya House and ATIKHA). We also engaged in some interactions with a number of migrants and their families and we made a field visit to a
5 Point No. 10 in the “Social Contract with the Filipino People” President Benigno Aquino III Platform of Government, http://www.gov.ph/about/gov/exec/bsaiii/platform-of-government/
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migrant community. The varied academic backgrounds of Workshop participants helped us observe these issues from several perspectives (sociology, economics, political science, and international relations). We identified and confirmed some problems and challenges and examine how they are addressed by both the Philippine government and by Filipino society. We attempted to develop some implications for other sending countries. By examining the Filipino experience, we hope to identify several possible areas of cooperation that might occur between sending and host countries based on the wider perspective of the governance of international migration.
To set the stage for discussions, based on individual reports provided in this Proceedings, we will present an overview of the Philippines’ international emigration experience. We will focus on significant changes that occurred in trends after 2000, as well as on related issues in the remainder of this paper.
From Temporary to Permanent Migration Although temporary migrants comprised the highest percentage of OFs during the 1990s, this trend changed in 2004 (see Figure 2) when the number of permanent migrants began to exceed the number of temporary migrants. The number of both permanent and temporary migrants has steadily increased. However, the number of permanent migrants that represent a percentage of the total has remained slightly higher since 2005. In 2011, permanent migrants accounted for 47% (4.86 million) of Filipinos who reside abroad. Temporary migrants numbered 4.51 million (43%). The number of irregular migrants6 was estimated to account for 10% (1.07 million) of the total number of OFs.
This shift in composition based on the migration status of OFs has usually been attributed to increases in the number of former temporary migrants who, once they have resided and worked in a destination for some time, seek permanent resident status or citizenship (Asis 2008). In countries such as Canada and Australia, permanent skilled worker migration programs have been actively offered to, and availed of, by an increasing number of Filipinos who aspire to reside overseas. This shift might also result from stricter foreign labor employment policies enacted in popular destinations such as the US and Japan. These policies may have encouraged OFs to travel to, and remain in, these destinations through other migration pathways, such as international marriage and educational activities. The US, Canada, Australia, and most European countries have also promoted family reunification. As a result, many permanent migrants and dual citizens who reside abroad have petitioned for their families to join them. Because these current policies and programs have been enacted in host countries, it is expected that the number of OFs who will engage in permanent migration will continue to increase over time.
6 Filipinos who do not possess proper documentation, do not possess valid residence or work permits, or who have overstayed in foreign countries.
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Figure 2: Composition of Overseas Filipinos based on Immigration Status (% of world total, 2000-2011).
Source: Compiled from the CFO website. “Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos.”
http://www.cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1340%3Astock-estimate-of-overseas-filipinos&catid=134&Itemid=814. (Accessed January 28, 2013.)
In case of Japan we can observe the same trend that permanent migrants comprise the highest number and greatest percentage of the total number of migrants in the case of OFs. The number of Filipino permanent migrants began to exceed the number of temporary migrants in 2006. In 2011, almost 70% of all OFs who resided in Japan were permanent migrants. Yet, only about 26% were temporary workers. This huge and significant difference resulted from Japan’s stricter implementation of rules related to the issuance of entertainers’ visas. Beginning in 2005, applicants were required to prove that they engaged in at least two years of study in educational institutions specializing on the work for which they intended to apply (such as fine arts or dance), or that they had at least two years’ experience in this type of work outside Japan. In 2006, Japan’s Ministry of Justice also began to impose stricter requirements for business establishments that hoped to hire foreign entertainers. Therefore, the number of registered OFs with status of stay as entertainers declined from a peak of 82,741 in 2004 to almost half the number in the following year. In 2011, only 4,188 Filipinos who resided in Japan held entertainers’ visas.
In 2008, the revision of Japan’s Nationality Law became another factor that contributed to the increase in permanent migrants. Under the revised law, a child born out-of-wedlock whose father is Japanese and whose mother is a Filipina can now apply for Japanese nationality, provided the father recognizes him/her as his child. Moreover, a legitimate child of Japanese and foreign heritage, whose birth was not reported within three months thereby losing their Japanese nationality, is now eligible to reacquire Japanese nationality. Children
34.56 36.92 37.02 36.91 44.86 48.84 48.99 47.63 47.73 47.29 46.80 46.55
40.51 41.14 41.78 43.60 40.59
42.18 42.48 44.02 44.29 45.04 45.75 43.16
24.93 21.94 21.20 19.49 14.55 8.98 8.54 8.36 7.98 7.67 7.46 10.28
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Permanent Temporary Irregular
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who reside in the Philippines who were born under these circumstances are popularly referred to as Japanese-Filipino children (hereafter JFC). The exact number of Shin-nikkeijin (new generations of Japanese descendants or Japinos), is unknown. However, NGOs that work for this cause have estimated that the number of JFCs may range between 100,000 and 400,000 (JFC Multisectoral Networking Project n.d. and Shin-nikkeijin Network Association n.d.). As Japanese nationals, these children and their Filipino guardians (mothers) are permitted to reside in Japan. In most cases, they can reside in independent locations from their Japanese fathers. Because many consider these situations opportunities to earn livelihoods in Japan, a surge in applications for the acquisition/reacquisition of Japanese nationality has occurred since the law was revised.7 Asakawa reports the details of these children’s situations, as well as details of the legal and related problems they encounter when they attempt to acquire/reacquire Japanese citizenship.
Filipinos Overseas after the 2008 Global Crisis Economic conditions in destination countries are generally perceived to be countercyclical with demands for foreign workers. However, with respect to OFs, if we examine changes in their numbers, the global economic crisis that occurred in 2008 appeared to have solely exerted a temporary (short-term) effect (see Figure 3). In general, the numbers for all permanent, temporary, and irregular workers only declined in 2009. Those numbers have been increasing since that time. According to Asis (2011), the international demand for Filipino workers has persisted even during the current crisis because many are employed in service industries such as healthcare and household services that tend to experience fewer effects from economic downturns in comparison to manufacturing industries. In addition, the impact of the global crisis on major destinations of Filipino workers, such as the Middle East and East Asia, have been less severe than the effects on EU countries, Japan, and the United States.
Alternatively, in all likelihood, the number of irregular OFs dramatically increased beginning in 2009 (see Figure 3 below) because of the enactment of stricter immigration (entry, visa extension, and citizenship) rules in destination countries. This may have encouraged additional irregular OFs to enter and remain in these destinations despite the fact that they did not possess proper documents.8 In some destination countries located in the Middle East, declines in the number of OFs could be attributed to their forced repatriation and suspensions of deployment because of unstable political situations caused by civil wars, rather than to the 2008 global economic crisis alone. 7 Media reports have revealed their poor living conditions in the Philippines. They have also described their experiences in Japan and their relationships with their long-lost fathers. See, e.g., “International Marriage: Japanese-Filipino children pay for their fathers’ mistakes,” Asahi Shimbun, June 25, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/ article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201206250001 8 However, it is expected that the number will decline in the near future when many host countries, (particularly Saudi Arabia, and, most likely, the United States in the near future) implement measures that will provide legalization pathways for immigrants.
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Figure 3: Stock Estimates of Overseas Filipinos based on Immigration Status (in thousands, 2000-2011)
Source: Compiled from the CFO website. “Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos.”
http://www.cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1340%3Astock-estimate-of-overseas-filipinos&catid=134&Itemid=814 (Accessed January 28, 2013).
.
In particular, with respect to OFs who reside in Japan, it can be difficult to assess whether changes in their composition resulted from the global crisis. Beginning in 2008, it was apparent that the number of permanent migrants consistently increased. However, the number of temporary and irregular migrants continually decreased (see Figure 4). However, this trend began to be apparent in 2006. Therefore, it can be difficult to determine the extent to which the 2008 global crisis affected Filipinos who reside in Japan. Following the crisis, even if the Japanese government had been able to limit the number of temporary migrants (primarily workers) by controlling the number of new visa and visa extension permits issued, and, even if the government had aggressively apprehended irregular Filipino migrants, the aggregated/total number of registered OFs in this country decreased minimally to about 1,000 annually. It has become more difficult to deal with permanent migrants because their entries, residence status, and returns are not dependent on their employment in Japan. Many permanent migrants (in particular, target earners in families) have chosen to remain in the country and apply for welfare benefits such as child subsidies (jidoteate), livelihood assistance (seikatsuhogo), housing subsidies, and other benefits they can apply for based on their permanent immigration status (Carlos 2013a, forthcoming).
2,551,549
2,736,528
2,807,356
2,865,412
3,204,326
3,407,967
3,568,388
3,693,015
3,907,842
4,056,940
4,423,680
4,867,645
2,991,125
3,049,622
3,167,978
3,385,001
2,899,620
2,943,151
3,093,921
3,413,079
3,626,259
3,864,068
4,324,388
4,513,171
1,840,448
1,625,936
1,607,170
1,512,765
1,039,191
626,389
621,713
648,169
653,609
658,370
704,916
1,074,972
0 2,000,000 4,000,000 6,000,000 8,000,000 10,000,000
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Figure 4: Stock estimates of Filipinos who resided in Japan (2006-2011)9
Source: Compiled from Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice website (in Japanese, various years).
http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri01_00013.html (Accessed on March 2, 2013).
Growing Concerns about the Integration and Reintegration of Permanent Migrants In the 1970s, the Philippine government began to explore the international labor market for Filipino workers. During that period, the Overseas Employment Development Board was established. Later, this agency was restructured to become the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (hereafter POEA). The POEA was expected to regulate the foreign recruitment industry, facilitate the deployment of Filipino workers, and protect their rights overseas. To complement the POEA’s efforts, and, in particular, its protection of workers, the Philippine government established the Overseas Workers’ Welfare Administration (hereafter OWWA) in 1977. As the number of Filipino workers increased and many returned upon completion of their contracts or because of emergency repatriation, OWWA’s role expanded from the provision of healthcare benefits, insurance, and emergency assistance to workers in distress to the provision of programs such as financial literacy and
9 Notes: (1)Number of Registered Foreigners who resided in Japan, based on Nationalities (various years)
(2)Number of Overstayers (various years) ( ) (3)The number of permanent OFs equals the total number of Filipino nationals as of December 31 of the respective year whose status was any of the following: permanent resident, spouse or child of a Japanese national, spouse or child of a permanent resident, long-term resident, or special permanent resident. (4)The number of temporary OFs equals the total number of Registered Filipinos minus the number of permanent OFs as computed in (1) above. (5)The number of irregular Filipinos was estimated based on the number of overstayers from the Philippines as estimated by Japan’s Ministry of Justice as of January 1 of the succeeding year. (6)This data excludes Japanese descendants and other Filipinos who currently hold Japanese citizenship.
140,936
153613
164,017
170,375
174,823
180,575
52,552
48979
46,600
41,341
35,358
28,801
30,777
28,491
17,287
12,842
9,329
6,908
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Permanent Temporary Irregular
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technical skills training that would prepare these workers for their reintegration while they resided in host countries. These programs would also facilitate their reintegration upon their return. OWWA also began to implement programs that promoted the interests of those left behind, including the provision of training and educational scholarships, financial literacy programs, and family counseling. In 2011, the Philippine government allotted two billion pesos (about US$50 million) to initiate a Reintegration Loan Fund that would be used as seed capital for returning migrants who hoped to establish businesses (Veniles 2011).
Alarmed by the continuously growing number of permanent OFs and the pressing need to attend to their needs, and motivated by the potential of the permanent overseas Filipino population as vital contributors to national development, the state began active engagement of the diaspora through a series of programs administered by the CFO, the government agency under the Office of the President that manages the affairs of permanent Filipinos who reside abroad (as opposed to the POEA, the agency under the Department of Labor and Employment that cares for OFWs). Prior to the 1990s, government programs were focused on temporary migrants (overseas Filipino workers).
Some of the more prominent reintegration programs in the Philippines are: (1) Pre-departure orientation programs for individuals who leave the country with immigrant
visas, visas for spouses, fiancées, and partners of foreign nationals, US exchange visitor visas and au pair visas.
All departing Filipinos who hold any of the visas mentioned above are required to attend half-day to two-day orientation seminars at the CFO, depending on their destinations and visa types. Seminars provide advance information related to travel regulations, immigration procedures, cultural differences, settlement concerns, employment and social security concerns, and the rights and obligations of Filipino migrants. Seminars also focus on financial literacy, human trafficking, and available support networks (e.g., Filipino organizations, churches, embassies, and consulates). Filipino spouses and other partners of foreign nationals are obliged to attend guidance and counseling programs that provide advice related to the realities of cross-cultural marriages. The Philippine government believes that, by providing departing Filipinos with these types of orientation programs, departing Filipinos will be better prepared to deal with integration issues that might occur in their destinations. This government initiative is unique because, in general, orientation programs for migrants are conducted by host governments and NGOs after the migrants’ arrival.
(2) Dual Citizenship Scheme developed under the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Republic Act No. 9225 (2003).
The “dual nationality” scheme is one of several important programs spearheaded by the state. It attempts to engage permanent migrants who reside overseas in national political and
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economic affairs. It provides opportunities for native-born Filipinos who are currently naturalized citizens of other countries to maintain or regain their Philippine citizenship. The possession of dual citizenship permits these Filipinos to reside, own land and property, conduct business, vote in national elections, and benefit from other rights accorded to Filipino citizens. On the other hand, the Philippine government hopes to benefit from this scheme by attracting funds (investments) from the diaspora. (3) Special Resident Retirees’ Visa (SRRV) Scheme.
The SRRV scheme was originally designed to attract foreign retirees. It has since expanded to cover former Filipino nationals who choose not to maintain their Filipino citizenship. In comparison with foreign nationals, former Filipino citizens are permitted to obtain SRRVs once they have paid US$1,500 as visa deposits, as well as annual membership fees of US$10. These fees are much lower than fees paid by foreign nationals. Moreover, the minimum age requirement has been lowered to 35 to encourage younger generations (including second-generation Filipinos) to reside in the country. (4) Diaspora-to-Development (D-2-D) Program.
This project has been actively spearheaded and run by the CFO. It hopes to engage the diaspora in national development. It addresses a number of areas of concerns, such as homeland philanthropy (the provision of donations and medical missions by hometown associations to local government units), the provision of mentoring and skill-sharing by migrants, the promotion of Philippine heritage, arts, and cultural awareness, particularly for second- and third-generation OFs, and networking among Filipino diasporas in different countries. As part of the program, leaders of Filipino associations worldwide gather once per year to discuss and share their issues and concerns as permanent migrants. They also promote the awareness of second- and third-generation OFs of their Filipino roots and attempt to inspire them to play active roles in the development of their homeland. (5) The provision of missions in destination countries to orient Filipino migrants about
financial literacy and welfare programs available for migrants and family left behind.
This program primarily attempts to prepare migrants for their eventual reintegration. It focuses on their wise use of earnings for savings and investments. It also explains the provision of economic safety nets such as health insurance and pension for migrants and their families.
In the immediate future, the Philippine government and the civil society should address
the concerns of retirees. These workers left the country in the 1970s as contract workers in their 20s. They are now ready to retire and are expected to return to the country within the
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next ten years. Although many were classified as temporary migrants in the official data because they left as contractual workers, they continue to reside and work overseas by extending their contracts or moving from one destination to another. In particular, for migrants who work in Middle Eastern and Asian countries that maintain strict policies related to naturalization, these workers have no options other than to return to the Philippines. As the numbers of these “de facto” permanent migrants continue to increase, the government has been forced to address issues related to care-giving, pensions, healthcare, and other integration issues.
Moreover, although the government understands the great potential that might be derived from return migrants who can contribute to socioeconomic development of the home country, efforts to tap returnees’ skills, knowledge, and savings by reintegration programs appear to have had very limited results. Asis (2008, 84) suggests that only a limited amount of information (data) related to returnees is available that might aid research efforts and policy formulation. In any case, this aspect of international migration has become increasingly important. Thus, a more intense research study should be focused on this issue.
Several chapters in the Proceedings will discuss the efforts of governmental and non-governmental organizations that focus on issues related to the integration and reintegration of migrants and family left behind, as well as international migration and development. Kim reports on the activities of the CFO. She focuses particular attention on the contents and conduct of two PDOS attended by Workshop participants. In contrast, a report by Ikeda describes the links that connect international migration and local development by examining the case of ATIKHA, an NGO that works to improve local development in San Pablo City, Laguna. This NGO engages migrants and family left behind in local development by implementing projects designed to tap migrant remittances. It provides financial literacy programs and livelihood projects. It also provides a number of social and psychological support programs for family left behind. This NGO also links government agencies at all levels (national, regional, provincial, and local). Private companies, organizations, and migrant families work together to further the local development process. In these reports, we can see that, in the case of the Philippines, unilateral management of international migration, at both national and sub-national levels, continues to be the major governance mechanism used by sending countries. Governance Based on Bilateral/Multilateral Arrangements Although governance of international migration based on bilateral and multilateral arrangements has long been a practice employed in many European countries, this practice is new in Asia. The Philippines is the most successful country in Asia with respect to the number of bilateral arrangements it has entered into with labor-receiving countries (Go 2011). As of March 2013, it had entered into 45 such bilateral arrangements with 23 countries and four Canadian states. Of these arrangements, 40 were focused on land-based workers and five were focused on sea-based workers.
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The following current trends in bilateral arrangements made by the Philippines are apparent. First, 30 out of 40 of these arrangements were entered into beginning in 2000 (see Table 1). This finding suggests that the Philippines’ and partner countries’ interest in these governance instruments grew stronger, particularly after the turn of the twenty-first century. It is also interesting to note that Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, some of the top importers of Filipino workers, have not yet entered into any bilateral arrangements with the Philippines. Indeed, many labor-receiving countries are reluctant to negotiate with labor-sending countries based on arguments that propose that migrant workers should be subject to the same laws as local workers, and that government intervention is unnecessary. Moreover, labor-receiving countries believe that entering into agreements with labor-sending countries may trigger a rush of proposals from other sending countries (Go 2011).
In addition, almost all of these arrangements are MOUs and MOAs (see Table 1). This implies that the Philippines is faced with a huge challenge. It must convince partner countries to enter into more formal and more binding arrangements, such as bilateral labor agreements. The Philippines can benefit from these bilateral arrangements by guaranteeing continuous access to host countries’ labor markets and by helping to promote the rights and welfare of its workers. However, because these arrangements are MOUs/MOAs, they may exert less impact on the Philippines in comparison with the impact of bilateral labor agreements and labor treaties. Even if these arrangements were to be entered into, there is no guarantee that their provisions will be implemented because they are not legally binding. Moreover, during bilateral negotiations, dominant parties are usually the receiving countries. Therefore, the Philippines is faced with a huge challenge to extract the greatest amount of benefits possible during negotiations related to the scope and terms of these arrangements.
One particular area of international migration that could benefit from examination is the health workforce. This represents a major concern for the Philippines because anecdotal evidence has revealed that distortions in the country’s human health resources caused by nurse migrations are one of several causes of its weak health system (Pittman et al. 2007). If this is true, then the Philippine government should find ways to compensate for the loss of nurses, especially for the loss of skilled nurses. For example, it could request reinvestments from foreign recruiters and employers to provide for Filipino nurse education programs and additional hospitals. It could also request further development aid assistance that could be negotiated within the framework of bilateral arrangements.
However, although the Philippines and nurse-receiving countries realize the negative impacts of “poaching” nurses from the Philippines, as well as the need for an internationally coordinated global response to the global nurse shortage, very little has been achieved by the enactment of bilateral arrangements. In addition, very little progress has occurred in the implementation of multilateral initiatives such as the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel10 that was adopted by the 63rd World Health 10 “The Code aims to establish and promote voluntary principles and practices for the ethical international recruitment of health personnel and to facilitate the strengthening of health systems. Member States should discourage active recruitment of health personnel from developing countries facing critical shortages of health
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Assembly on May 21, 2010. So far, six bilateral arrangements related to the healthcare workforce have been entered into by the Philippines. These arrangements are focused on nurses and were entered into by the Philippines and six destination countries. Four of these arrangements are memoranda of understanding (MOUs entered into with Bahrain in 2007, the United Kingdom in 2003, Japan in 2009, and Spain in 2006). Two are recruitment agreements (entered into with the United Kingdom in 2002 and with Norway in 2001). One is a general agreement (entered into with Germany in 2013).
Based on a comparison of earlier and later agreements, it is apparent that the protection of migrants’ rights has gradually become more important. Clauses that focused on broader workers. The Code was designed by Member States to serve as a continuous and dynamic framework for global dialogue and cooperation.” (Source: World Health Organization website Last accessed: March 2, 2013. http://www.who.int/hrh/migration/code/practice/en/)
Table 1: Philippines’ Bilateral Labor Arrangements
A. For Land-based Workers Memoranda of Agreement (5) Memoranda of Understanding (26)
Bahrain (2007), Canada-Alberta (2008), Iraq (1982), Republic of Korea (2005), New Zealand (2008)
Canada-British Columbia (2008), Canada-Manitoba (2008, 2010), Canada-Saskatchewan (2006), Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (1994, 2000), Indonesia (2003), Japan (2009), Jordan (1981, 2010), Republic of Korea (2004, 2006, 2009, 2009), Kuwait (1997, 1997), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (2005), Lebanon (2012), Libya (2006,), Papua New Guinea (1979), Spain (2006), Taiwan (1991, 2001, 2003), United Arab Emirates (2007), UK (2003)
Others (9) Agreement: Jordan (1988), Norway (2001), Qatar (1997), Switzerland (2002), UK (2002), USA (1968)
Principles and Controls for Regulations: Jordan (2012) Agenda for Cooperation: Libya (1979) Additional Protocol: Qatar (2008)
B. For Sea-based Workers Others (3) Memoranda of Understanding (2)
Agreement: Cyprus (1984) Liberia (1985), Netherland (2000) Undertaking on Mutual Recognition of Skills: Denmark (2000) Memorandum of Cooperation: Japan (2009)
PHILIPPINES’ BILATERAL SOCIAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS (5) Austria (1980, 1982 and 2000), Belgium (2001), Canada (1999), France (1990), Netherlands (2001), Spain (1988), Switzerland, 2001), UK (1985) Sources: For labor arrangements: POEA website http://www.poea.gov.ph/lmi/agreements.htm Date accessed: May 4, 2013. For social security arrangements: Global Forum on Migration and Development (n.d.)
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and more complex forms of cooperation were incorporated (Makulec 2013). All of these arrangements were concluded after 2000. However, three of these arrangements (entered into with Norway, Spain, and Bahrain) were never implemented. In 2006, the arrangement entered into with the UK expired and was never renewed. The agreement entered into with Germany is expected to take effect soon. Currently, only the MOU entered into with Japan remains in force. In my opinion, the fact that the MOU entered into with Japan was integrated into the wider framework of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement explains why Japan has maintained its part of the agreement until now, despite findings that demonstrate that the scheme lingered on the verge of failure in its early stages (Carlos 2013b).
Because the Philippine government has failed to convince host countries to engage in the effective implementation of policies and schemes that provide greater advantages for Filipino migrants (with respect to their recruitment, deployment, employment, integration, and the protection of their rights in host countries, and with respect to reintegration), and for the Philippines (with respect to international migration’s contributions to national development), the Philippine government has primarily resorted to unilateral management of emigration by the provision of the programs and schemes mentioned above. In the forefront, it appears that the Philippine government has been more successful than other sending countries in the management of migration. However, in reality, as Tigno emphasized in his presentation, even within the framework of national governance and management, these policies have been less effective because of the existence of coordination and consensus building problems among national and sub-national stakeholders. Furthermore, “turf battle” (i.e., conflicts of interest and overlapping roles) among government agencies also contributes to the development of more complicated bilateral and multilateral negotiations and arrangements that makes them less effective.
Sato and Uyar report on the discussions, that occurred during the Forum held at the University of the Philippines, on the governance of international migration in the Philippines. Khondker’s presentation examines different frameworks for the governance of international migration. It analyzes the experience of Bangladesh migrant workers and explores the possibility of forging bilateral or multilateral arrangements between a group of sending countries and the Middle Eastern receiving countries. Tigno’s presentation describes the problems of national governance of international migration in the Philippines. He argues that the Philippine situation, in which national governance is marred by conflicts among national stakeholders, can also contribute to that country’s failure to enter into and implement bilateral or multilateral arrangements.
Throughout the Workshop, we seek answers to the following questions based on the
perspectives of a sending country the Philippines:
(1) How can a sending country engage its nationals who reside overseas in national/local economic and social development?
(2) What kinds of effective interventions (with respect to policies, programs, and
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schemes) can the state implement to ease the integration of its nationals who reside overseas and subsequently facilitate their reintegration upon return?
(3) To what extent can the sending country, as either a single nation, or as a member of a larger group, participate in the governance of international migration? During that process, how can the sending country maximize its gains and mitigate losses caused by emigration?
Although our discussions and interactions with academics, government agencies,
NGOs, migrants and their families did not provide complete answers to these inquiries, our findings on the ground helped us better understand the sending country’s stakeholders’ interests and concerns. We consider this an essential step in the process of deepening the policy debate and motivating nations –both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries– to assume shared responsibility for a global issue whose impacts are as wide-ranging as international migration. References Acacio, Kristel. 2008. Managing Labor Migration: Philippine State Policy and International
Migration Flows, 1969-2000. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 17(2): 103-132.
Aquino, President Benigno III. “Social Contract with the Filipino People,” Platform of Government <http://www.gov.ph/about/gov/exec/bsaiii/platform-of-government/> (Accessed on May 3, 2013)
Asahi Shimbun. “International Marriage: Japanese-Filipino children pay for their fathers’ mistakes,” June 25, 2012. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/ AJ201206250001>
Asis, Maruja. 2008. The Social Dimensions of International Migration in the Philippines: Findings from Research. In Moving Out, Back and Up: International Migration and Development Prospects in the Philippines, eds. Maruja M. B. Asis and Fabio Baggio, 77-107. Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center. The Scalabrini Migration Center: <http://www.smc.org.ph/MAPID/MAPID%20CD/Philippines% 20pdf%20file/IX.%20Reference%20Material-Moving%20Out.pdf> (Accessed May 5, 2013).
Asis, Maruja. 2011. Keizaikiki wo Koete: Kawarukotono nai fillipin karano Kokusaiijyuroudou [Overcoming the Economic Crisis: The Unchanging International Labor Migration from the Philippines]. In Imin, Diasupora kenkyu: Idouroudou to Sekaiteki Keizaikiki [Study of Migration, Diaspora: Labor Migration
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and World Economic Crisis], eds. H. Komai and J. Akashi, 192-209. Tokyo: Akashi (in Japanese).
Asis, Maruja and Piper, N. 2008. Researching International Labor Migration in Asia, The Sociological Quarterly 49(3): 423-445.
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. 2003. Borders beyond Control, Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb. In The Council on Foreign Relations: <http://www.cfr.org/world/borders-beyond-control/ p5356> (Accessed May 3, 2013).
Carlos, Maria Reinaruth D. 2013a. The Impact of the 2008 Global Recession on Foreign Workers in Japan: Focus on Filipino Long-term and Permanent Residents of Shiga and Chiba Prefectures. Ryukoku daigaku Kokusaishakai bunka kenkyujo kiyo [Journal of the Socio-Cultural Research Institute, Ryukoku University] 15 (Forthcoming).
Carlos, Maria Reinaruth D. 2013b. The Multistep International Migration of Filipino Nurses and Its Policy Implications on the Retention of Foreign Nurses in Japan. Paper presented at the Conference on “Asian Nurses at the Global Labour Market: Post-Crisis Dynamics of Demand and Supply and Nurse Mobility Regulation” on April 14-16, 2013 at the University of Edinburgh (Unpublished draft).
Carlos, Maria Reinaruth D. 2012. Firipinjin roudousha no tadankaitekiidou no bunka kara mita kaigoshi no nihon he no teichaku no kadai [Examining the Retention Issue Concerning Foreign Careworkers in Japan from the Perspective of Filipino Workers’ Culture of Multistep Migration] Intercaruchuraru [Intercultural Annual Review of the Japan Society for Intercultural Studies], 10:127-135 (in Japanese).
Carlos, Maria Reinaruth D., and Chizuko Sato. 2008. Sending Society’s Responses to International Migration of Nurses and Its Policy Implications: The Case of the Philippines. Ritsumeikan International Affairs Journal Vol.6: 27-51.
CFO website: “Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos.” <http://www.cfo.gov.ph/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=1340:stock-estimate-of-overseas-filipinos&catid=134:statisticsstock-estimate&Itemid=814> (Accessed on January 28, 2013).
Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) n.d. Compendium of Good Practice Policy Elements in Bilateral Temporary Labour Arrangements. <http://www.gfmd.org/documents/manila/gfmd_manila08_contribution_to_rt1-2_compendium_on_good_practice_en.pdf> (Accessed April 10, 2013).
Go, Stella. 2005. Fighting for the Rights of Migrant Workers: The Case of the Philippines. In OECD and Federal Office of Immigration, Integration and Emigration, Migration
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for Employment: Bilateral Agreements at a Crossroads, 187-202. OECD Publishing.
Go, Stella. 2011. The Role of Bilateral Labor and Similar Agreements in Asian Labor Migration: The Post- Crisis Context. Presented at the ADBI-OECD Roundtable on Labor Migration in Asia: Recent Trends and Prospects in the Post-crisis Context Tokyo, Japan, January 18-20, 2011. In Asian Development Bank Institute: <http://www.adbi.org/files/2011.01.18.cpp.sess2.2.go.asian.labor.migration.pdf.> (Accessed May 3, 2013).
Hochschild, Arlie R. 2000. Global Care Chain and Emotional Surplus Value. In On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism, eds. Will Hutton and Antony Giddens. 130-146. London: Jonathan Cape.
International Organization for Migration (IOM) Global Migration Group. 2010. Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning: A Handbook for Policy-makers and Practitioners. IOM Denmark.
Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice (in Japanese). <http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri /kouhou/nyuukokukanri01_00013.html> (Accessed on March 2, 2013).
JFC Multisectoral Networking Project. n.d. Who are the Japanese Filipino Children? In JFC Multisectoral Working Project: <http://jfcmultisectoralnetworkingproject.org/index. php/en/home> (Accessed February 1, 2013).
Makulec, Agnieszka. 2013. Mobility of Health Professionals: Lessons Learned from the Philippines Bilateral Labour Arrangements. Paper presented at the Conference on Asian Nurses at the Global Labour Market: Post-Crisis Dynamics of Demand and Supply and Nurse Mobility Regulation, April 14-16, 2013 at the University of Edinburgh (Unpublished draft).
Newland, Kathlee. 2005. The Governance of International Migration: Mechanisms, Processes and Institutions. In Global Commission on International Migration. 18pp. International Organization for Migration: <http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/ myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/gcim/tp/TS8b.pdf> (Accessed May 10, 2013).
Parreñas, Rhacel. 2005. Children of Global Migration: Transnational Families and Gendered Woes. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Pittman, Patricia, L. H. Aiken and J. Buchan. 2007. International Migration of Nurses: Introduction. Health Services Research 2007 June, 42(3) Part 2: 1275-1280.
Shinnnikkeijin Network Association, Inc. n.d. Shin Imin zanjitsuroku 198, Shin Nikkei Nisei
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‘Yonjyuman nin’ [Diary of New Immigrant 198, New Nikkei Second Generation, ‘Forty million people’] In Shin Nikkei Net Association: <http://www.shinnikkei. net/column/column198.html> (Accessed March 10, 2013).
Veniles, Cherry Joy. 2011. Proposed Strategies and Initiatives in the Reintegration of Overseas Filipinos into Philippine Society. Powerpoint Presentation during the First Global Summit of Filipinos in Diaspora. In CFO: <http://rnr.cfo. gov.ph/files/global_summit/2011/VENILES_rANDr.pdf> (Accessed May 3, 2013).
Wickramasekara, Piyasiri. 2012. Something is Better than Nothing: Enhancing the protection of Indian migrant workers through Bilateral Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2032136> (Accessed April 11, 2013).
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Afrasian Research Centre - Third World Studies Center Joint Research Forum
Governance of International Migration: Perspectives of Sending Countries
FOR
UM
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33
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Habibul H. Khondker
Jorge V. Tigno
Chizuko Sato
Ma. Reinaruth D. Carlos
Aysun Uyar Jean Encinas-Franco
Pauline Kent Maria Ela L. Atienza
Akihiro Asakawa Viktoriya Kim
Maria Makabenta Ikeda
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PROGRAM
9:00 – 9:30 Registration 9:30 – 9:40 Opening Remarks
Michael L. Tan, Ph.D (Dean, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman)
9:40 -9:50 Introduction of Speakers
Ma. Reinaruth D. Carlos, Ph.D (Professor, Ryukoku University, Japan) 9:50-10:30 Presentations
Jorge V. Tigno, DPA (Associate Professor Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman)
“The Governance of International Migration” Habibul Khondker, Ph.D (Professor, Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.) “Migration Governance: Harmonizing the Interests of the Labor-Sending Countries with those of Labor-Receiving Countries”
10:30-11:00 Comments
Jean Encinas-Franco, Ph.D (Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman)
Chizuko Sato, Ph.D (Researcher, JETRO- Institute of Developing Economies, Japan)
11:00-11:35 Open Forum 11:35-11:45 Synthesis
Aysun Uyar, Ph.D (Assistant Professor, Research Institute for Humanity and Nature, Japan) Moderator: Maria Ela Atienza, Ph.D (Director, Third World Studies Center (TWSC), Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman)
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The Governance of International Migration in the Philippines
Jorge V. Tigno University of the Philippines Diliman
Abstract The (national) governance of international migration raises some serious concerns about the integrity and sovereignty of states. International migration poses a challenge to states primarily because of the numerous tensions that exist between the local/national, the international, and the global/transnational. This is one reason why there’s a high degree of uncertainty, ambiguity, or ad hoc-ness manifested in the migration policies of states whether they are in destination or in sending areas. State governance of international migration is such a daunting project that it requires strenuous efforts on the part of the national government to steer or direct the phenomenon towards the attainment of national development goals. At the global level migration governance requires serious consideration of commonalities and similarities (which are few) but also attempts to overcome the differences and the specificities within each country (which are many). Any attempt to craft a national migration governance framework much incorporate a coherent set of national goals through which the governance experience itself might be evaluated including consistencies with existing global norms and best practices. Introduction I wish to thank the Third World Studies Center and Ryukoku University for creating this forum and for inviting me to speak. This presentation focuses on the Philippines, and in particular on the prospects, issues, and challenges of governing international migration.
International migration presents sending countries with several challenges. We can see that national integration migration policies present a certain degree of ambiguity and an ad hoc quality in the way they are implemented in both the sending and receiving areas. Another challenge, I think, has to do with how migration can be tapped for national as well as local development purposes, and this is a relatively new perspective in how migration is looked upon by both sending and receiving areas. The Philippine situation is certainly no exception; like all sending countries, it has to face these challenges.
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The Philippines has had a long love affair with international migration. Since the 1970s, we have seen this phenomenon become highly institutionalized in terms of the number of agencies, rules, regulations, and government programs to manage or administer the migration flows. Also, migration used to be seen as a temporary stopgap measure, but over the last three to four decades, we can see that what used to be stopgap measures has turned into permanent policies implemented by the government. Another peculiar thing about the Philippines’ love affair with migration over the last two decades is that we have seen the government take an “uncompromising” stand on protecting the rights of migrants, especially in the open policy discourse. I use the word “uncompromising” in quotation marks because I think there is a need to qualify this kind of position based on this excerpt from the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,1 stated as follows:
“… the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and achieve national development. The existence of the overseas employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity and fundamental human rights and freedoms of the Filipino citizens shall not, at any time, be compromised or violated.”
Issues and Challenges in the Governance of International Migration Filipino emigration is characterized by the following. First, the demography in both the sending and host countries plays a significant role in outflow. Over the years, the Philippine population has become substantially younger relative to the countries that receive migrants, and which have larger numbers of older people and declining population sizes. Philippine outmigration flows mainly through the corridors between the Philippines and countries in Northeast Asia, the Middle East Asia, North America, Australia, New Zealand, and also Western Europe. Moreover, a substantial number of the Filipinos who go abroad are women, largely doing low-skilled work, such as household service workers (HSW) or domestic workers and servants. Statistics from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) indicate that an increasing number of women are leaving the country as household service workers compared to women who leave as skilled workers, managers, or technicians.
Another key feature of the Philippine outmigration phenomenon is the role played by the private sector, particularly labor brokers and recruitment agencies. Over 90% of overseas deployment from the Philippines is undertaken by the private sector. There is also growing recognition among Filipino policymakers of the need to tap the potential of international migration so that it can contribute to development and be seen not merely as a liability from the perspective of victimization. Moreover, recognition has grown in the Philippines over the last decade that the Filipinos living overseas also need certain political rights, especially
1 Republic Act No. 8042, also known as the “Philippine Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995” Section 2a.
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voting rights. The Philippine government allowed overseas absentee voting in the last three elections and in the coming election of May 2013, but its impact is nominal. Absentee voting by mail in the Philippine is declining, as is the case for other countries.
In addition to the institutional features mentioned above, another facet of international migration from the Philippines that should be emphasized is the serious problem of how institutions and agencies involved in international migration coordinate with each other. Figure 1 is a diagram of the different institutions that play roles in migration, what the role is, and how they are connected with other Philippine institutions as presented by the Commission on Audit. From this diagram, we can see the great number of agencies and institutions, such as the Congress and the different agencies like the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), the POEA, and the recruitment agencies involved in international migration from the Philippines. The diagram shows how hard it is to make sense of the responsibilities and roles of each institution; it is much harder to identify coordinating responsibilities among them. For example, the OWWA is under the Department of Labor (DOLE), but OWWA is in the far right of the diagram while DOLE is on the left so there seems to be no connection between them. The same can be seen in the case of POEA. Therefore, the diagram gives us a sense of the complicated relationships, and sometimes the “disrelations” among the different institutions and agencies of the government and the private sector. As a result, very little integration and coordination takes place. Such conditions exacerbate the intractability of international migration.
Indeed, there is certainly dissonance between the program as it is being implemented, which is largely market-determined, and the declared policy, which is to protect the rights of migrants. It is very hard to accomplish both at the same time, much like mixing oil and water. Leaving everything to the forces of the market would sacrifice the protection of migrants. On the other hand, protecting migrants’ rights could sacrifice the market interests. Hence, there is contradiction in the declared relationship: There should be a market-determined program that allows for protection for migrant workers at the same time.
Moreover, migration management infrastructure in the Philippines tends to be highly and primarily devoted to sending people out. Government agencies keep statistics on how many people have left the country at a given time, including their gender, occupation, destination, number and type of contracts, the provisions in the contracts, etc., but not on the number of migrants who have returned and what they do after their return. In my opinion, the Philippine government does not seem to monitor the return of migrant workers because of the notion that the job of a sensible government is to send workers out when they cannot find jobs in the domestic market. The reality, however, is that the overseas jobs that these workers find are contractual, and are therefore, time-limited. The lack of government action to support return migrants workers, even in terms of merely providing statistics, means the Philippines relies on non-government organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations for this, and also for their efforts to monitor return migrants at the local levels.
Another issue in the management of international migration in the Philippines is turf battles among different agencies within a department, for example, between the OWWA and
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the POEA, which are both under the Department of Labor. Turf issues also occur among the DFA, the Commission of Filipinos Overseas (CFO), and the DOLE. These administrative and bureaucratic problems within these organizations can hinder improvements to managing international migration. Trying to make sense, coordinate, and manage all of these different institutions and mechanisms that are incongruent and yet operating and working at the same time is a challenge for any national government.
Despite such provision in the Migrant Workers Act, government information on migration is not shared. Adopted in 1995, the Act provides for the establishment of an information system among government agencies. However, as of last year, 17 years after the law was passed, the Philippine government was still in the stage of envisioning what this migration information system would look like. Another peculiar fact about international migration in the Philippines is that the private sector is largely under-regulated, as required by the policy declaration of leaving everything to the market. There are also problems with sharing resources and information between policy makers, practitioners, and researchers. Most policies are singlehandedly drawn and implemented by government policy makers with minimal informed decision-making. The policy-making and implementation processes are bureaucratic and path-dependent, making it difficult to deviate from such a path in which the attitude of following and sticking to what has been done in practice so far prevails. There is little room for integration.
Figure 2: Annual Migrant Remittances (1977-2011)
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Note: The data for 2011 is only an estimate of the total remittances for the year.
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Another area of concern is the absence of any extensive or effective system to tap the remittances of migrants. While they are individual household remittances and therefore the migrants themselves have the right to spend as they wish, the government nonetheless has a responsibility to steer and channel those remittances towards economically and socially productive activities. The intractability of international migration leads to issues and questions about the gains that migration could yield at the macro level via remittances. The government mentions proudly that Filipinos have sent back huge remittances to their families in the Philippines over the years, contributing to the survival or the shoring up of the national economy. This amount has been generally increasing, and there were only a couple of times (in 1995 and 1998) when the flow experienced heat-ups during regional financial crises. However, the current global financial crisis hasn’t reduced the flow, indicating great resiliency.
In analyzing the management or governance of international migration, we have to take into account the international environment. Across different states and economies and between sending and receiving areas exist very few commonalities and many differences. Existing international conventions and norms put pressure on countries that do not yet abide by such norms, but they have not been successful because the norms could be seen as interfering with state sovereignty. Therefore, any international migration governance or national migration management infrastructure or framework for the Philippines must take into consideration such conditions in the international environment. It will be difficult to convince neighboring countries to conclude bilateral agreements with the Philippines. Neither can the Philippines put pressures on these countries precisely because sovereignty is supreme.
Whether to engage in bilateral agreements or cooperative arrangements in managing migration flows is still the prerogative of these states. Perhaps they are content with the way things are. Therefore, what the Philippines can do in terms of management and governance is limited, and the policies it implements will sometimes be ad hoc or arbitrary.
The Way Forward Indeed, the issues discussed in the presentation deserve more attention and need to be resolved. There is a need to rethink migration policies and perspectives to resolve the dissonance and intractability of the current system. There is also a need to reorient the existing protective mechanisms towards a more proactive system. In the case of protecting workers’ rights, instead of having a reactive system in which solutions are created in response to an issue only when it arises, there should be a mechanism or system in place to prevent that issue from coming up in the first place. There is a need also to formulate a stronger set of well-written policies that integrate migration with development. In the current national development plan, international migration and remittances are mentioned merely in words and phrases, but such mere mention is not enough. It is important to have a chapter in the national development plan that actually describes the role of migration in national development.
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Moreover, there is a need to redesign our migration management scheme to encourage greater coordination between government institutions and the private sector. The private sector should be regulated rather than left on its own. The pertinent Philippine government agencies should exert more effort to improve the collection of more relevant and accurate data, and should allow the sharing of data among stakeholders and the academia. Stronger links between migrant remittances and migrant organizations and local development should be established. Local governments can also play a role in how migrants make use of their remittances, which have a multiplier effect on the local economy. There is a need to provide venues for more meaningful exchange between scholars and practitioners, for example, when incorporating inputs from members of the academia in the decisions drawn by the POEA and OWWA. There is a need to expand the representation of the overseas worker population in the affairs of the country beyond nominal representation through absentee voting. Lastly, strengthening the pathways towards greater regional cooperation among national authorities is important, and this is where perhaps ASEAN can play a significant role. ASEAN has already created the charter on overseas migration, and that is a good start.
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45
Migration Governance to Migration Diplomacy: Bangladeshi Migrant Workers in the UAE
Habibul Haque Khondker
Zayed University, Abu Dhabi Abstract In this paper, I explore migration governance by considering whether the interests of labor-sending countries can be harmonized with those of labor-receiving countries. I consider the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a labor-receiving country, and Bangladesh, a labor-sending country. Rapid infrastructural and socio-economic developments in the UAE combined with its demographic realities led to reliance on temporary contract workers from various labor-surplus Asian countries. While temporary migrant workers play an important role in the UAE’s economy, and through their remittances, also play a major role in their respective national economies, their condition often remains precarious.
Improvement in the governance of temporary labor migration can be of great benefit both for the stakeholders involved, namely, the labor-receiving country and the labor-sending countries and also the contract laborers. The UAE government has assumed leadership in this regard by initiating the Abu Dhabi Dialogue in January 2008 in partnership with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This initiative included all the major stakeholders: representatives of the labor-sending countries and labor-receiving countries, international nongovernmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch, and intergovernmental organizations such as the IOM and International Labour Organization.
Since the late 1970s, Bangladesh has been a labor-sending country vis-à-vis the UAE. As many as 700,000 Bangladeshis now work in the UAE, dominating the construction and other labor-intensive sectors. The Bangladeshi government has shown keen interest in promoting labor migration as a strategy for national development. Income from remittance has continued to soar in recent years, reaching US$12 billion in 2012.
To improve governance, a clearer understanding of the best practices in each of the labor-sending countries and learning from each other’s experiences is of utmost importance. Introduction As many as 240 million people live outside the country of their birth. By 2050, it is estimated that 450 million people will live outside their home countries. Migration is the next big thing.
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Over the past three decades, Bangladesh has emerged as a major labor-exporting country alongside India and the Philippines. It is estimated that around 8 million Bangladeshis (about 5% of the total population of Bangladesh) live and work outside Bangladesh. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) attracted a large expatriate work force in the wake of oil price hikes in the mid-1970s. A steady emigration of labor from Bangladesh began in the late 1970s, reaching millions by 2013. For the most part, labor migration took place without much direct governmental support. The near laissez-faire quality of migration had advantages as well as disadvantages. Many migrants who left Bangladesh arranged for work overseas with the help of their relatives and friends. The trickle of migrants in the mid-1970s, directed to a handful of countries, became a flood of millions by the end of the 1990’s. As of 2013, Bangladeshi workers are working in 143 countries worldwide. In 2012, Bangladesh received remittances of over US$14 billion, which is 13% of the country’s GDP (Table 1).
For a country with limited exportable goods other than ready-made garments, this is not a small amount. The increasing trend in remittance income is a global phenomenon. As migration of labor becomes a lucrative source of foreign currency for the country and as the government gets involved in the process both as a promoter and regulator, the subject of migration governance becomes salient. Although migration as a new dimension of political economy has gained in importance, migration governance as a subject on its own deserves a great deal of attention. Meanwhile, in many of the labor-migrant receiving countries, migrant population outnumbers the number of citizens. As the number of migrant workers, or temporary contract workers as they are called in the UAE, has touched record levels, the host country’s government has voiced some concerns. UAE’s migrant–citizen ratio is one of the most skewed in the world. The paper seeks to examine the challenges of migration governance by arguing that the next phase of governance involves migration diplomacy. More intergovernmental initiatives are needed in harmonizing the interests of labor-sending countries with those of labor-receiving countries. There are challenges to such harmonization in an asymmetrical world. The real test is to overcome those challenges through good
Table 1: Amount of International Remittances to Selected Countries in 2012 Rank Country Amount (US$)
1 India 70 billion 2 China 66 billion 3 The Philippines 24 billion 4 Mexico 24 billion 5 Nigeria 21 billion 6 Egypt 18 billion 7 Bangladesh 14 billion 8 Pakistan 14 billion 9 Vietnam 9 billion
Source: World Bank
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governance and development diplomacy. I outline some of these issues in the present paper. Most of the current theoretical insights derive from the experience of permanent
migration usually occurring from the South to the North. Assimilation, pluralism, cultural integration, and identity were issues that occupied researchers’ interests in the advanced North. In the South, the concerns were brain drain and its cost and impacts. Temporary or fixed-term labor migration is a relatively new phenomenon—occurring since the 1960s and 1970s. Hence, to analyze this phenomenon, I use politico-economic theories of world-system analyses and globalization theories and add to the notion of good practices of global governance. In that sense, this paper is an inter-disciplinary project, drawing insights from public administration, international relations (IR), and sociology.
1. Conceptual Framework For a long time, sociology has been a source of theoretical frameworks for IR theorists. In fact, once Raymond Aron wrote of the vacuousness of IR theories. Now it is the turn of the sociologists to borrow from IR theory. Borrowing from the simple-minded “theories” of “idealist theory” and “realist theory,” I suggest a hybrid of “realism” and “idealism” should be employed in migration governance theory. As we speak of harmonization of interests of two sets of countries, we need to find complementarity of interests between two states pursuing their respective national interests. A win–win situation is possible for both provided the negotiations are successfully conducted and the resulting policies implemented.
We have been hearing talk of “globalization of migration” for some time. Yet, it has not been explicated clearly what “globalization of migration” means. Stephen Castles and Mark Miller (2003) suggested tendencies of population mobility that entail globalization of migration. For example, they suggested that international population mobility would involve an increasingly large number of countries in the process of migration and that there would be an increase in the number of people involved in migration. Migration—both permanent and temporary—has been a feature of globalization, if we conceive globalization as a long-drawn historical process (Turner and Khondker, 2010). Those who—I might add, mistakenly—equate globalization with neo-liberal economic dogma miss the historical processes of migration spanning forced migration, that is, slave trade, and voluntary movement of people. More than 240 million people live outside their countries of birth or nationality, up from 191 million in 2005. In 2050, it could rise to 405 million (IOM, 2010). In a world characterized by uneven economic, social, and political development and increased global interconnectedness, migration affects most countries.
Migration is defined as the movement of a person or persons from one geographical unit to another across an administrative or political border, with the intention of settling permanently or temporarily in a place other than their place of birth. There are different categories of migrants: refugees, displaced persons, irregular migrants, as well as economic migrants. The main difference between refugees and migrants is individual autonomy or choice. When people are forced to migrate against their free will, we can define the situation
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as forced migration. Human trafficking is the most coercive and forced form of migration. However, in the present paper, I focus on temporary labor migration wherein migrants go to their destinations for a limited period with the intention of returning to their countries of origin. Labor migration is commonly defined as a cross-border movement for the purpose of employment in a foreign country (IOM, 2009). Through legal or irregular means, facilitated or otherwise, labor migrants contribute to the economies of both the origin and the destination countries.
In the recent discussions on globalization and migration, one of the major concerns has been the role of migration in the socio-economic development of the source country. Foreigners account for more than 88.5% of UAE residents, many of them poor migrant workers (Table2). Immigration sponsorship laws allowed employers to recruit large numbers of workers. In recent years, the Middle East as a region has seen a spike in youth unemployment with it reaching as high as 25%. Even in the UAE, although the figures are not nearly as high as in the region, there has been a rise in unemployment levels among the local population. Whereas allowing temporary contractual work in the UAE has been profitable for businesses, the growing unemployment among citizens has created a certain amount of unease. In fact, a dilemma between economic interests and political consequences has arisen over the question of temporary contract workers.
In the globalization discourse, one can look at several ways of conceptualizing the processes of globalization. One of the conceptualizations views globalization as flows: flows of capital, technology, ideas, and population. International and intra-national demographic imbalance plays an important part in encouraging flows of work and workers. Flows of information via word-of-mouth to the new media are connected with the flow of workers.
Writers such as John Urry (2000) have proposed a theory of mobile society, emphasizing the mobility of people. Yet one need not overplay the role of mobility since the world has become increasingly bordered and fenced with the advancing march of globalization (Turner and Khondker, 2010). The forces of globalization have brought the state back. The relationship between globalization and the state has taken a new turn, making the state stronger insofar as border control is concerned.
Table 2: Number of Migrant Workers in UAE by Nationality
India 1,100,000 Pakistan 750,000
Bangladesh 700,000 Jordan 200,000
Philippines 200,000 Sri Lanka 150,000
Nepal 70,000 Source: Khondker, 2013
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A state is the sovereign authority in a specified territory, with the right to use force in order to maintain internal order and to defend its territory against external aggression. Max Weber defined the state as an organization with monopoly over the legitimate means of violence. The main functions of the state are providing national security, maintaining peace and order in society, and providing welfare. Of the various institutions, the state is the ultimate source of authority; it is the sole authority, which is to say that the state has sovereignty. The state has become the accepted and legitimate mode of organizing societies within given geographical boundaries. Although all states share certain common features, not all states are equally effective. Some states are able to make use of the opportunities presented by global capitalism. Others fail to deal with the global environment effectively.
Strong states are those that are able to impose internal order and are able to deal with external threats effectively. Weak states are ineffective or dysfunctional both internally and externally. While effectiveness separates a hard from a soft state, soft states are characterized by weak institutional capacities to the extent that the state becomes malleable. Under certain circumstances, a state’s effectiveness becomes a variable, that is “stateness” may vary. While some states are more successful than others, certain states decline and become “failed states.” Corruption, especially official corruption, makes some states vulnerable. “Kleptocracy” is a term reserved for extremely corrupt regimes.
Globalization processes are intrinsically uneven in both their form and their effect. The state is a key actor in governing globalization. Proponents of globalization overstate the extent and novelty of transnational movements and the power of transnational corporations. The variety and adaptability of state capacities is also seriously underrated. Surely, the state is not losing control. Contrary to the myth of a borderless world with states becoming impotent in the face of globalization, the state remains the most vital institution at the service of globalization. The state decides who comes in and who goes out. The state has ultimate control over citizenship and migration, permanent or temporary. Since there is a hierarchy of states, states have unequal bargaining power. 2. Bangladeshi Migrant Workers The Bangladeshi government has been able to display selective effectiveness. In a coordinated effort, the Bangladeshi government successfully repatriated 38,000 stranded Bangladeshi workers in Libya during the social turmoil that overthrew the old regime. The Bangladeshi government, it appears, is better at crisis management than routine work.
The 200 or so countries of the world can be divided as (a) labor-sending countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Philippines, and Indonesia, (b) labor-receiving countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Brunei, and Japan, and (c) both labor-sending and labor-receiving countries such as Malaysia and India. Bangladesh is clearly a labor-sending country. Table 3 shows the movement of Bangladeshi workers worldwide.
In recent decades, although there has been a significant growth in the migrant
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population, earlier centuries saw more mobility of people in terms of percentage of total population and in terms of degree of freedom—if not ease—of movement. The last decade of the twentieth century was declared the “age of globalization” by Stephen Castles (2000), but the nineteenth century allowed easier migration flows. In the euphoria of discussions on globalization, writers like Ohmae, a business guru announced the coming of a “borderless world.” It is ironic that when celebratory remarks on the so-called borderless world were being made, walls were being erected in many parts of the world to restrict the movement of people. Contrary to popular perception, in the twentieth century the world has become more bordered than at any other time in the past. We live in a state-centered world. The contradiction of globalization is best revealed in the free-flow of capital and restricted movement of labor. This has clearly led to rethink of migration governance.
Some of the recent trends in migration include a growing trend in South–South migration (migration between developing countries). South–South migration is larger than migration from the South to high-income countries in the North. Many countries in the South are both labor-receiving as well as labor-sending countries. Economic forces continue to dominate international migration. Both the working classes as well as the professional classes are driven by the same economic motive. While for the professional class there are more choices, the working class is constrained by a raft of factors. Sometimes, the line that separates migrants from refuges or asylum seekers becomes blurred, especially when it comes to working class migrants. According to a recent report, refugees and asylum seekers made up 16.3 million, or 8%, of international migrants in 2010.
Some of the top labor-receiving countries of Bangladeshi labor, such as Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, along with Kuwait and Qatar, are now seriously considering reducing their dependence on foreign labor. In some countries such as the UAE, foreigners constitute nearly 80% of the labor force. For Kuwait, this figure is nearly 70% and for Qatar, it is 86.5%. This demographic imbalance is increasingly dominating public discourses in the Arabian Gulf countries. Programs such as “Saudization” and “Qatarization” are in place. Yet, the global need for a skilled workforce is likely to last.
The key problem is to harmonize the interests of the labor-sending countries with those of labor-receiving countries. Their interests are different but complementary. I focus on complementarity of interests rather than disharmony. As the world is asymmetrical and unequal, not all the nations have the same level of bargaining power.
It would be useful for one to understand the perspectives of others. From the point of view of a UAE citizen, when she goes to a local shopping mall and sees only foreigners, she is likely to wonder whether she is in another country. Further, is she a local or foreigner in her own country? Such visual representation of society may be quite unnerving for some. From the larger societal point of view, there is often a conflict between economic interests and political interests.
It is now widely recognized that when properly managed, temporary contractual labor mobility may benefit both the countries of origin and destination as well as improve the well-being of temporary contractual workers. Labor mobility can be an important means of
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facilitating the development of economies as well as of individual human beings. The main concepts used here are temporary labor migration and governance. By
governance, we do not mean government and its functions; governance has a wider meaning that focuses on the process as well as the institutional matrix. In addition to the government, the private sector, civic society, and International Non-governmental Organizations (INGO), among others, come to play a role. Thus, governance brings several stakeholders into play. According to UNESCAP, Governance is “the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented).” (UNESCAP, n.d) A time-line of Bangladesh’s Migration Related Events:
• 1971 Independence of Bangladesh • 1976 Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training • 1982 Emigration Ordinance passed • 1984 Bangladesh Overseas Employment Services Ltd (BOESL) • 2001 Ministry of Expatriate Welfare • 2006 Overseas Employment Policy formulated • 2010 Expatriate Welfare Bank Act • 2011 Expatriate Welfare Bank launched • 2012 Overseas Migrant Workers Act awaiting ratification
Since 2003, the Colombo Process has been an important initiative to coordinate the policies of labor-sending countries. Labor-sending countries began to talk about what they could do collectively, which led to the start of the Colombo process in 2003. Initially, the ten participating states were Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. In the first meeting, the representatives of these countries made recommendations for the effective management of overseas-employment programs and agreed to regular follow-up meetings. Then, in 2004, the representatives of the labor-sending countries met in Manila. They met in Bali in 2005, where
Table 3: Number of Migration of Bangladeshi Workers in Selected Destinations (January-September, 2012) UAE 214,328 Oman 132,350 Qatar 19,341
Bahrain 16,310 Libya 14,555
Lebanon 11,390 Singapore 43,707
Source: Khondker, 2013
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for the first time, they also invited officials from labor-receiving countries. In 2011, the fourth meeting of the Colombo process took place in Dhaka. The theme of the Fourth Colombo Process meeting was “Migration with Dignity.” Apart from the Asian migrant-sending countries, representatives of the migrant-receiving countries took part in the Dhaka meeting.
In January 2008, at the Abu Dhabi Dialogue in partnership with International Organization for Migration (IOM), all the major stakeholders were present: representatives of the labor-sending countries and labor-receiving countries, international nongovernmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch, and intergovernmental organizations such as IOM and International Labour Organization. However, to harmonize the policies of the labor-sending countries with those of labor-receiving countries, this process should be continued. In fact, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue provides an excellent model for creating a multilateral platform involving all the stakeholders.
Although overall migration of labor did not drop in 2012 (240,000 Bangladeshis migrated from August to September 2012), migration to the UAE dropped by 85%. The temporary disruption in granting new work-visas to Bangladeshis has resulted in a huge drop in the number of foreign contract workers in the UAE. Apparently there is a large number of irregular workers in Abu Dhabi which may have prompted the need to clamp down visa restrictions on the Bangladeshis. In the interest of Bangladeshi workers, the Bangladesh government has to negotiate with their counterparts in the UAE to resume the temporary contract laborers scheme with Bangladesh.
We are living in a highly asymmetrical world. Consider the relative wealth of nations as manifested in the differences in per capita income. In 2012, according to the World Bank’s Annual Development Report, the UAE had a per capita gross national income (GNI) of US$40,000 compared to Bangladesh’s per capita GNI of US$700. The two countries are in an asymmetric economic position. Exportable labor as a “commodity” does not offer much bargaining power. There are other countries waiting to export labor. In South Asia, Nepal and Burma are both keen to export labor. In fact, the number of migrant workers from Nepal is rising. In 2012, Bangladesh signed an agreement with Malaysia, a G-to-G, or government-to-government agreement. While this initiative was able to cut out the highly exploiting “manpower agencies” in Bangladesh and their counterparts in Malaysia who acted as middlemen, the number of laborers dropped. Until the first quarter of 2013, a meager 200 workers were sent to Malaysia. While in principle, it seems to be a sound idea, at this stage, the government of Bangladesh lacks the institutional capacity to undertake large-scale labor mobility. The government can serve the interests of the migrant workers by initiating a public–private partnership and assuming the role of a regulator, given its lack of experience in exploring the job market. 3. Future Research Future research should focus on governance reforms in labor-sending as well as labor-receiving countries. Governance reforms, according to Dani Rodrik include, “reducing
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corruption, improving the rule of law, increasing the accountability and effectiveness of public institutions, and enhancing access and voice of the citizenry.” (Rodrik, 2008). By reducing corruption, the quality of governance in Bangladesh can be vastly improved.
Studies are needed to examine both the short-term and the long-term consequences of such high rates of migration for both the labor-sending and labor-receiving countries. One of the challenges is the ability of the labor-sending countries to develop human resources appropriate for national development, as they remain dependent on only exportable skills. A re-examination of the development planning and future trends of labor migration in view of sustainable national development is urgently needed. As the number of women migrant professionals and workers is increasing, comparative research is needed on migrant women from Southeast and South Asia and the various social, economic, and cultural ramifications. Here too, a bilateral—even multilateral—approach involving labor-receiving and labor-sending countries would be more effective to ensure the security and dignity of temporary contractual workers.
We need to mix realism with idealism. The world we aspire to is an idealist world. However, the world we live is a realist world. References Castles, Stephen. 2000. Ethnicity and Globalization. London: Sage.
Castles, Stephen and Mark Miller. 2003. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. (Third edition) New York: Guilford Publications.
International Organization for Migration. n.d. www.iom.int/ (various data) (Accessed April 3, 2013).
Khondker, Habibul. 2013. Research Paper: Migration Governance. (unpublished paper).
Rodrik, Dani. 2008. Is “good governance” an end or a mean? http://rodrik.typepad.com/ dani_rodriks_weblog/2008/04/is-good-gover na.html (Accessed May 3, 2013).
Turner, Bryan, and Habibul Khondker. 2010. Globalization: East and West. London: Sage.
UNESCAP. n.d. What is good governance? http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities /Ongoing/gg/governance.asp (Accessed May 4, 2013).
Urry, John. 2000. Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-first Century. London: Routledge.
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Governance of International Migration: Perspectives of Sending Countries
Summary, Comments, and Synthesis
Chizuko Sato Institute of Developing Economies
Aysun Uyar Doshisha University
The Forum discussed the governance of migration from the perspective of major sending countries. Presentations were made by Dr. Jorge Tigno of the University of the Philippines and Dr. Habib Khondker of Zayed University. Dr. Tigno’s Presentation Dr. Tigno’s presentation focused on the issues and challenges of governing international migration, from the perspective of the Philippines as a sending country. Giving an overview of how migration is managed in the Philippines, he argued that although migration has been highly institutionalized in the Philippines since the 1970s, there is very little coordination among the different state institutions involved in the migration process. He presented a flow chart of different stakeholders (state institutions as well as private actors) that are involved in migration in the Philippines. Among the many stakeholders, including the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), and so forth, the problem lies in understanding how each actor fits into the overall picture. Dr. Tigno mentioned a lack of coordination, a lack of sufficient and reliable data on migrants, and a lack of academic involvement in the policy-making process as factors that hinder development of effective structures for managing migration in the Philippines.
In spite of these highly institutionalized structures in the Philippines, according to Dr. Tigno, over 90% of deployment is undertaken by recruiters, brokers, and others in the private sector. In this context, weak or nonexistent government regulation of migration creates huge disadvantages to migrants, who can be easily exploited. For instance, the Migration Workers Act of 1995 aims to protect the human rights of migrant workers, but the Philippine government has not enforced the act strictly. Moreover, the political rights of Filipinos overseas are nominal and as a consequence, overseas migrants themselves neglect their own rights. This is reflected in the fact that very few participated in the last three elections via
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absentee voting. Migrants can contribute to development in the home (sending) country through
remittances, and the annual remittances the Philippines receives are not negligible. However, as a considerable portion of remittances seems to be used by migrant households on non-productive spending, the challenge for the Philippine government is how to tap remittances into local and national development.
Finally, he also pointed out that the Philippine government has so far concentrated on sending people out, and has not addressed the issue of return migration, which occurs when older migrants go back to their home countries for retirement. According to Dr. Tigno, the first generation of migrants who went out in the 1970s are now retiring and returning to the Philippines. However, information on returnees is very limited. He suggested that at the moment, returnees must rely on NGOs and civil society organizations for their social welfare. Dr. Khondker’s Presentation Dr. Khondker discussed the challenge of how to harmonize the interests of labor sending and receiving countries, by describing the situation of Bangladeshi workers in the UAE. Dr. Khondker introduced the term “migration diplomacy” and gave an example of the Colombo Process, which started in 2003 in Sri Lanka as a conference of several sending countries to discuss about their common concerns on the management of overseas employment and contractual labor. The conference was subsequently held in Manila, the Philippines, in 2004, and in Bali, Indonesia, in 2005. The Bali Conference was important in that several receiving countries began to participate in the Process. The Colombo Process was replaced by the Abu Dhabi Process, when the conference was held in Abu Dhabi in 2008. Not only government representatives but also NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and academics participated. Thus, the process was initiated by the governments of sending countries, but it evolved into a multi-stakeholder negotiation. However, there was a need for more, and Prof. Khondker argued for the inclusion of a representative of labor groups as the fourth component in the negotiation.
In spite of the ongoing negotiation through the Abu Dhabi Process, Bangladeshi workers are still vulnerable. Dr. Khondker described an incident in August 2012 when the UAE government reduced visas issued to Bangladeshis by 85% due to a high number of irregular workers in the UAE. Prior to this incident, a rumor had circulated that the UAE might stop issuing visas to Bangladeshi workers. The UAE government denied the rumor, but the 85% drop in working visas issued to Bangladeshis nonetheless ensued. This incident raises suspicion about government policies and also highlights the importance of government-to-government communication between sending and receiving countries.
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Comments and Responses Two commentators, Dr. Jean Encinas-Franco of the University of the Philippines and Dr. Chizuko Sato of the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), brought up issues, such as the gender aspect of migration and the different levels of migration governance—national, regional, and global—in the Philippines and other sending countries. Dr. Encinas-Franco emphasized the importance and difficulty of selective migration processes. The complexity of the institutional structures of migration policy in the Philippines further hinders the transparency of the whole migration process. As a response, migration-oriented groups and communities create their own private circles and networks, which might, in many cases, defy or circumvent governmental procedures. Since women are always in the center of migration processes, whether as migrants going away, family members left behind, or senior migrant workers greeting incoming migrants in the host country, gender issues are critical in domestic and international governance of migration, according to Dr. Encinas-Franco. Changing realities in host countries and how they affect positions as well as attitudes of workers and government authorities in the host countries was another issue raised by Dr. Encinas-Franco.
Dr. Sato also posed a few questions to each presenter. She first asked Dr. Tigno how best to harmonize interests between the governments of sending countries and migrants themselves. When the governments of sending countries tighten control over migrants, she said, it might just be seen as a tax from the migrants’ perspective, or a violation of their right to migrate and move. Migrants wish to move freely. Her second question addressed the issue of how effective regional coordination at the ASEAN level could be. Dr. Tigno discussed three levels of migration management: national, bilateral, and regional (or multilateral). In a book published in 2009, he argued strongly that regional cooperation or region-level governance is important within the framework of ASEAN. However, his presentation highlighted the problem of coordination at the national level in the Philippines. When various stakeholders cannot coordinate at the national level, is it reasonable to expect different countries to coordinate on migration issues at the regional level within the framework of ASEAN?
In her comments on Dr. Khondker’s presentation, Dr. Sato raised two points for further clarification. On the necessity of involving a labor representative in the Colombo or Abu Dhabi processes, Dr. Sato asked what it would mean to have a representative of labor (trade unions) in the receiving country for migrant workers. This seems to be important as workers (and trade unions) in the receiving country tend to oppose foreign workers because they worry about competition for limited jobs and possible wage decline due to the influx of foreign workers. Dr. Sato also asked about the reason behind the sudden drop in Bangladeshi worker visas in the UAE. She further asked, “Did the Bangladeshi government know about it? Was it taken by a surprise? Was there any government-to-government agreement between the UAE and Bangladesh in order to prevent this kind of tragic incident?”
Dr. Tigno responded that migrants are calculating agents. He understands that the interests of migrants cannot be disregarded, but also feels it important to stress that they
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operate based on the calculation of their interests. As for ASEAN, he mentioned that there is a chapter on migration, which serves as a basic framework for future arrangements between sending countries. However, he also admitted that the progress is very slow in ASEAN. To sum up, he stressed the importance of coordination among different institutions in the Philippines to accelerate the ASEAN process.
Dr. Khondker clarified that in the context of the UAE, where more than 85% of workers are foreigners, a representative of migrant workers should be included in the negotiation process, rather than a representative of Emirati workers. The domestic workforce in the UAE is very small, but the situation in countries such as the United States might be different. At the moment, there is no bilateral agreement between the UAE and Bangladesh. Thus, he asserted the necessity of bilateral agreements within the framework of multilateral governance structures. General Discussion The following points were raised during the general discussion:
1. There is a question about whether migration in the Philippines is well regulated. On the surface, it seems highly regulated with many state institutions involved in different aspects of the migration process, but today’s presentations revealed a lack of coordination among different institutions and a lack of legal enforcement. In this context, we need to reconsider regulation and coordination in the migration circle in the Philippines.
2. The role of sub-national actors within migration governance is important in terms of both the promotion and regulation of migration. Hokkaido, a northern prefecture in Japan, is an example of a region that is more willing to accept migrants than the central (national) government in Japan. We can observe another similar policy initiated by the State of California, where the government is more migrant-friendly than other American states, such as Arizona. Three levels of migration governance—micro, meso, and macro—are described further to understand the stance of local authorities within national borders.
3. The effectiveness of the international codes of conduct on migration was briefly discussed. There are already several international agreements on the ethical recruitment of migrant workers, in particular, in the field of health workers. How effective are these agreements, and what is their relevance to the governance of migration at the global level were two more relevant questions raised during general discussion.
4. The relationship between migration and development was also examined, since returnees to the Philippines directly affect the economic as well as social transformation of their local regions and the whole country in the medium term. Considering how to accommodate the returnees in their own villages, towns, and
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big cities brings up issues of urbanization as well as internal migration in recent years.
Synthesis As part of the Philippines Workshop of the Afrasian Centre Group 1, this Forum played an important role in restating three major issues of the migration cycle and policy implementation, not only in the Philippines but in any other sending country: (1) governance of migration, (2) migrant integration, and (3) consequential migration-related development issues. In spite of the workshop’s short duration, two paper presenters, two commentators, and the following lively discussion of the audience proved our stance that there are still various dimensions of migration to be observed, discussed, analyzed, and improved.
As summarized earlier, migration challenges (in terms of state sovereignty, lack of institutional communication, limited inter-state coordination, ambiguity of data and information sharing among relevant actors, and the impacts of ad hoc policy) are still prevalent in society and may be worsening with the increasing rate of return back to hometowns. Development-related problems are confronting both policy makers and researchers. The following issues were added to the evolving agenda of migration governance:
1. There is growing dissonance between market-determined programs and the
declared policies of the sending countries to “protect.” 2. Migration management infrastructure is devoted primarily to sending people
overseas and collects very limited information on returnees. 3. Due to escalating and migration-induced development problems in local and
urban areas, the already complicated problems of policy integration and coordination lead to organizational intractability and mismanagement of information on migration.
4. A lack of reliable data and statistics provided by the government limits implementation of sound research and analysis.
5. Despite constant macroeconomic gains, there is still no clear way to tap and manage migrant remittances.
6. Despite recent developments in migration policies within the ASEAN framework, there are few commonalities and many differences. Country-level adjustment to the regional regimes and further improvement of international and regional (ASEAN) conventions and norms appear to be necessary.
The way forward from the present also lies within these mentioned issues. Recent
social transformation and how receiving countries (both state organs and people) perceive migrants, as well as how sending countries (both state organs and people) welcome back the returnees in the digital age, with social networking and modern transportation, force both
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local and national governments to redefine their positions and their social contracts with individuals. Statehood is also on the table, being discussed and criticized with recent challenges to sovereignty, among bottom-up, community-level movements. Soon we will need to redefine the concepts of “governance of migration,” “migration diplomacy,” and the “movement of people” while redesigning governance regimes of migration at regional and international levels. While migration governance becomes more disposed to the national and international (also regional like ASEAN) norms, further analysis should be done on how we can utilize our similar and different experiences as well as policy practices during this global social transformation. Reference Tigno, Jorge. V. 2009. Introduction: State, Politics and Nationalism Beyond Borders:
Changing Dynamics in Filipino Overseas Migration. In State, Politics and Nationalism Beyond Borders: Changing Dynamics in Filipino Overseas Migration, ed. Jorge V. Tigno, 1-16. Quezon City: Philippine Social Science Council.
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Orientation at the CFO
A house of an overseas Filipino worker in “Little Italy”
Visit to the village of Santa Rosa in Laguna
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Meeting with Ms. Dizon-Anonuevo at Atikha
Ecolife Homestay Eco-tour at Lake Pandin
Meeting with Ms. Kono at Maligaya House
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The Philippine Government’s Roles in Emigration: Programs and Activities of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO)
Summary, Comments, and Synthesis
Viktoriya Kim
Osaka University Introduction Presidential Decree 442, also known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, promulgated by President Ferdinand Marcos in 1974, formally introduced the Philippine state’s institutionalization of labor export. From there the state’s agencies, such as “the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), the Bureau of Employment Services (BES), and the National Seaman’s Board (NSB), were responsible for the development, promotion, regulation and implementation of the labor export program” (Rodriguez 2010, 12). Initially aimed at migration to the United States, this program later on shifted its locus to 200 destination countries around the world. Such a neoliberal strategy 1 raised criticisms, especially from scholars, calling the Philippine state as “a labor brokerage state” (Rodriguez 2010, X). However, despite this, a close scrutiny of governmental agencies’ activities is necessary. In particular, how they improve migrants’ knowledge of the country of destination, their rights, working conditions and further settlement in the country, as well as their reintegration to the Philippines’ society in case they return. Moreover, it is also important to analyze the institutional organization of the migration process and its regulation.
This report aims to discuss the programs and activities of the CFO that it provides for Filipino migrants before actual migration, during, and after their return to the Philippines. It will also examine the recent initiatives and new directions of the CFO activities, as well as the activism of its officers. Most information was provided by Ms. Ivy D. Miravalles, Officer-in-Charge of Migrant Integration and Education Division of CFO, in a roundtable discussion with Afrasian Group 1 on February 4, 2013.
1 According to Rodriguez, neoliberal strategy “is comprised of institutional and discursive practices through which the Philippine state mobilizes its citizens and sends them abroad to work for employers throughout the world while generating a ‘profit’ from the remittances that migrants send back to their families and loved ones remaining in the Philippines” (Rodriguez 2010, X).
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1. Overview of CFO Activities The OEDB was initially created “to set up a systematic program for overseas employment of Filipino workers, as well as to register and monitor emigrants leaving for various countries abroad” (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2013b). However, the growing number of emigrants led to the creation of the Office of Emigrant Affairs (OEA) in June 1978, targeting Filipino emigrants as “the local support network.” Later on, the OEA was replaced by the CFO in order “to strengthen the policy on the promotion of migrant welfare and interest” (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2013c).
The CFO was established on June 16, 1980 as “an agency of the Philippine Government tasked to promote and uphold the interests of Filipino emigrants and permanent residents abroad, and to preserve and strengthen ties with Filipino communities overseas” (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2013c). Its main functions are:
1. Provision of assistance to the President and the Congress of the Philippines in the
formulation of policies and measures concerning or affecting Filipinos overseas; 2. Development and implementation of programs to promote the interest and
well-being of Filipinos overseas; 3. Service as a forum for preserving and enhancing the social, economic and cultural
ties of Filipinos overseas with the motherland; and 4. Liaison on behalf of Filipinos overseas with appropriate government and private
agencies in the transaction of business and similar ventures in the Philippines” (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2013c).
As shown in Figure 1, the CFO currently serves about 47% of the 10,455,778 Filipinos overseas (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2013f).2 The main beneficiaries of CFO programs are the following: Filipino emigrants and immigrants or legal permanent residents abroad (in Japan, these are the long-term and permanent residency holders); Filipinos overseas who have become citizens of other countries or dual citizens; Filipino spouses and other partners of foreign nationals leaving the country; descendants of Filipinos overseas as defined in Batas Pambansa (Republic Act) 79; Filipino youth overseas; and Exchange Visitor Program participants. 2 Temporary Filipinos overseas are served by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). The main purpose usually of these temporary overseas Filipinos is to work so most of them are employment-related or as we call them Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). Some leave as trainees, entrepreneurs, businessmen, not staying on a permanent basis abroad. The third category which makes up 10% of the 10.5 million Filipinos abroad are the undocumented ones, those Filipinos who probably left as tourists or students; but when their legal status expired they did not extend it in the host country. As a result, they are considered “irregular migrants.”
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2. CFO Programs and Initiatives As previously mentioned, the CFO provides various programs to support migrants before and after actual migration. The framework of its activities consists of four program areas: migrant social and economic integration, Filipino education and heritage, Filipino unity and national development, policy development and data banking. The following introduces the programs conducted under this framework. 2.1. Country-specific Pre-Departure Orientation Seminars (PDOS) The CFO has been conducting these seminars since the 1990s, and its aim is not only cultural immersion of emigrants, but also required registration in the CFO provides accurate reference for policy formulation and program development. Since the seminars are country-specific, various pamphlets and information booklets are available on the major countries of destination. One of these booklets, “A Guide for Filipinos Migrating to Japan, 2011,” first provides travel information, such as how and what to prepare for travel (travel documents, settlement documents, itinerary, reservations, ticketing, baggage, etc.), what to do on the departure day (time allowance, check-in, in-flight tips), and procedures upon arrival (immigration clearance and baggage claim). It then proceeds to the general information about the country (such as climate, language, education, employment, medical services, etc.). Much attention is paid to immigration concerns, particularly the following: re-entry permit, permission to extend period of stay, permission for permanent residency and requirements to apply for those; acquisition of Japanese nationality, dual nationality and naturalization; and also, regulations affecting the foreign spouse of a Japanese national (family registry, children of foreign spouse from previous marriage, divorce and so on).
Figure 1: Estimate of Overseas Filipinos by Residence Status Overseas
Source: Created based on “Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos”
(as of December, 2011) by the Commission of Filipinos Overseas
4,867,645 47%
4,513,171 43%
1,074,972 10%
Permanent
Temporary
Irregular
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This is a mandatory program, and all migrants aged 20-59 are required to take these seminars. “Every day we have an average of 138-200 Filipinos attending the program” (Ms. Ivy Miravalles, February 4, 2013), and there were 33,579 attendees in 2010. There are five main steps (as shown in Figure 2): (1) registration; (2) verification of registration forms; (3) payment of authorized fee; (4) PDOS and peer counseling session; (5) release of the passport with PDOS sticker.
PDOS provides various types of sessions; main sessions include seminars (country-specific discussions) and counseling sessions (peer counseling program, counseling program for Filipino spouses). It is important to note that all the information provided is up-to-date and gathered by the CFO staff through various channels. Migrants who leave to work overseas have to attend PDOS, where they get information on the country of destination, their rights and obligations. Those who leave as spouses of foreign nationals, also have to attend counseling sessions. During these sessions, small groups of women (around 8-10 women per session) discuss with the counselor their future life with their husband-to-be/husband. Since all the sessions are country-based, during the session for those bound for Japan, the counselor provides information about intermarriages in Japan and main concerns of Filipino women marrying Japanese men. During various counseling sessions, “aside from travel documents, we teach them coping mechanisms. (...) The counseling is composed of lectures and situational analysis. This runs for 3 hours or more. And then you have the guidance and counseling program in two stages: 1) common clientele with common shared concerns; 2) individual counseling. After the individual counseling, we may not issue certificates yet because sometimes we see some problems like fraudulent documents, marriage for convenience, etc. So the counseling program is also a tool for preventing human trafficking and to spot mail-order bride cases, and to assist victims who think they are not victims at all” (Ms. Ivy Miravalles, February 4, 2013).
Figure 2: 5-Step Process for Emigrant Registration
Photo by Viktoriya Kim
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Those who successfully underwent the seminar/counseling sessions are provided with
special stickers in their passports, which will be checked at the Bureau of Immigration or at the port of exit. If there is no the sticker in the passport, he or she will not be allowed to leave the country.
2.2. Other Programs and Initiatives The CFO currently conducts many various programs and initiatives. The following sections will discuss some of the most important ones.
1343 Actionline Against Human Trafficking According to the CFO website, “In the US State Department’s Trafficking Report of 2010, the Philippines was classified as a Tier 2 Watch list country in terms of efforts to combat human trafficking. The country is identified as a source and, to a much lesser extent, a destination and transit country for men, women who are subjected to trafficking in persons, specifically forced prostitution and forced labor” (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2013a). Therefore, in 2011, in order to improve the situation, the CFO, along with other organizations 3 in cooperation with Inter-Agency Council against Human Trafficking (IACAT), organized Hotline 1343 to combat human trafficking. The work is organized in
3 Stakeholders and partners for the 1343 Actionline include, but not limited to the following: Bureau of Immigration; Commission on Filipinos Overseas; Commission on Higher Education; Commission on Human Rights; Department of Education; Department of Foreign Affairs; Department of Health; Department of Interior and Local Government; Department of Justice; Department of Labor and Employment; Department of Social Welfare and Development; Department of Tourism; Department of Transportation and Communication; Department of Trade and Industry; National Bureau of Investigation; Overseas Workers Welfare Administration; Philippine Information Agency; Philippine Overseas Employment Administration; Philippine Center for Transnational Crime; Philippine National Police; Philippine Commission on Women; Council for Welfare of Children; Local government units (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2013a).
Figure 3: Commission on Filipinos Overseas
Photo by Viktoriya Kim
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such a way that all crisis calls or inquiries received are forwarded to the appropriate agency, which then has to take an action or solve the case within 24 hours.
Educational Programs (1) Community Education Program Apart from the education of actual migrants, the CFO also conducts annual campaigns called Community Education Program (CEP), whose objective is to educate prospective migrants about migration relevant issues. Moreover, it aims “to raise public awareness on various issues concerning migration, intermarriages and existing government policies and programs directed against illegal recruitment, documentation fraud and trafficking in persons, among others” (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2013d). This program has conducted 30 education programs in 30 provinces in the Philippines. (2) Financial Literacy Program CFO programs target not only leaving and returning migrants, but also the families they leave behind, since the latter are mostly the recipients of remittances and, thus, their education is necessary as well. Therefore, financial literacy programs were recently implemented. One of these programs, KapitKa (“Hold On!”) (Kaalamang Pinansyal Tungo sa Kaunlaran: Financial Literacy for Development), was established in 2011. It provides financial literacy education to migrants, and ways to teach family members they leave behind on the proper use of remittances. Migrants Reintegration Programs As Ms. Miravalles mentioned, “The direction of CFO is to ensure that we help migrants’ integration into the host country. But nowadays, a lot of migrant-serving agencies like the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), and us are also talking about how to help them out when they come back to the Philippines. So the discussion on the trends of migration in the Philippines is about the reintegration program. (...) It is only now that the sending countries like the Philippines are talking about reintegration programs because maybe in the past 20 years, our concentration was to give information to Filipinos as they leave” (Ms. Ivy Miravalles, February 4, 2013). These recent changes in the perception of Filipinos’ migration led to changes in activities of various government agencies. Thus, the CFO revived some of the programs it promulgated at the end of 1980s, while at the same time introducing new programs that will not only help immigrants to settle down in their destination countries, but also would help those who return to the Philippines to reintegrate into society. So far there are several programs aimed at the reintegration of migrants. (1) YouthLead This program, introduced in 2010, targets Youth Leaders in the diaspora, whose number constitutes about 31% (574,673 Filipinos below 19 years of age, 2011) of all registered
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Filipino emigrants (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2013e). The main purpose of the program is to assist the youth in their search for young leaders in the diaspora, and, with their help, to reach out to youth-migrants who experience discrimination or emotional traumatic experiences. Moreover, the program assists in migrant youths’ integration into society, and helps those who succeed in their field to use their resources and skills for the development of the Philippines. (2) OFs-RED Project The CFO is engaged in programs aimed at promoting Filipinos’ welfare abroad. One of such programs is the Overseas Filipinos Remittances for Development (OFs-RED). This is carried out in coordination with the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). “The strategy now is to be more proactive: how can we let them stay here or how we can sustain their coming back in the Philippines. So now we are talking about the nexus between migration and development; and what's the good connection between the two” (Ms. Ivy Miravalles, February 4, 2013). Therefore, the main purpose is to teach overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) and their families back home the wise use of remittances.
Overall, as discussed earlier, through these past two to three decades, the programs provided by the CFO have become more diversified, and since 2000s more migrant-oriented, since more attention is paid to migrants’ education and well-being. However, there are still many challenges facing the CFO staff. Thus, in the following, the issues specific to Japan, other challenges and measures taken by the CFO will be discussed. 3. Japan-Specific Concerns There are 220,882 overseas Filipinos currently residing in Japan, 154,219 of whom stay on a permanent basis. 113,265 of them are Filipino spouses and other partners of Japanese nationals. Japan is number eight in the top ten destination countries of Filipino migrants, and it is ranked fifth on the number of permanent residents according to the CFO (Commission on Filipinos Overseas 2013e).
While Japan is one of the most popular destinations of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), they still face many challenges upon arrival, many of which are linked with cultural differences between the countries. Thus, the number one concern is the language barrier, leading to misunderstandings and homesickness of migrants. Another issue mostly mentioned regarding Filipinas marrying Japanese men is cultural differences in lifestyle that lead to domestic violence and divorce. Many Filipinos also express frustration since the amendment of Japanese immigration law, because of the lack of information on the requirements and obligations. Moreover, a large portion of remittances sent to the Philippines comes from Japan (USD 882.9 million). However, these remittances are mostly consumption-driven and spent on household expenses, children’s education, building and improvement of houses,
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among others. Therefore, the CFO is concerned with the education of migrants on the more productive ways of using remittances.
Thus, there is a need for constant dialogue between the Philippines as sending country and Japan as receiving country on “taking a more pro-active role towards harnessing the development potential of international migration while at the same time reducing migration’s significant costs to the overseas Filipinos themselves” (Ms. Ivy Miravalles, February 4, 2013).
4. Challenges With the growing number of programs and activities the CFO is engaged in, CFO officers face many challenges and tasks. One of the most important tasks is data gathering and information campaign. Whenever possible, the CFO sends its PDOS officers to different countries and hires officers from those countries. However, in order to constantly update the information provided to migrants, CFO members have to rely on the public (Philippine embassies) and private overseas networks (local communities). Therefore, whenever CFO officers visit various countries, they organize meetings with their counterparts. Moreover, with the growing information technologies sector, many of the migrants have access to Internet resources. This led the CFO to provide an online Migrant Advisory Information System, through which all migrants can learn about their host country. According to Ms. Miravalles, in the case of Filipinos in Japan, there are still many who are unaware of the changes in the immigration law. Therefore, the CFO plans to produce an online video introducing the new immigration law, as well as to produce a video on financial literacy for OFWs. This way, CFO messages can reach a wider population of migrants abroad.
Another way to keep information up-to-date and to find out about the conditions of CFO clients abroad is through getting feedback from migrants themselves. Since the CFO pays particular attention to the development of networks with migrants, PDOS officers provide their e-mail addresses and phone numbers to their clients, so anybody can contact them at any time. This type of counseling was revived in 2010, though it was first introduced in 1989. In addition, PDOS officers provide their Facebook account details to anybody who wishes to contact them. This service is very helpful for CFO clients, though officers themselves have to keep in touch 24/7 with thousands of people abroad.
Since these types of network support and activities are initiated and voluntarily developed by CFO officers, it is clear that there is a need for constant dialogue between the Philippines as a sending country and receiving countries in order to ease the process of information acquisition and to identify the needs of both sides. Though various organizations in the Philippines work together in order to improve migrants’ situation and lifestyle, nowadays, there are still many challenges and tasks to be solved. There are both macro level and micro level tasks for the CFO to work on.
Macro level tasks include intergovernmental discussion of the migrants’ problems, and how each receiving country deals with migrants. Firstly, in case of Japan, one of the tasks is
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to have an agreement on mutual recognition of skills, due to the inability of many highly skilled Filipinos to find work in a profession in Japan similar to what he/she had in the Philippines. Secondly, another task is to have not only pre-departure seminars, but also post-arrival services to integrate migrants in the destination countries. “There should be some organizations that will help the migrants get integrated. I think Japan is very supportive in trying to help migrants including those from the churches or in the social welfare profession. But because the volunteers are mostly Japanese, we have to work out bringing in translators. They need to also study the Filipino culture” (Ms. Ivy Miravalles, February 4, 2013). And, thirdly, while the CFO collaborates with governmental agencies of some of the receiving countries, in Japan all the operations are still conducted through the local communities. “The main issue here is that: is the PDOS a duty of the host country, the receiving country, or other agencies? I say that this should be all. It should be a multi-stakeholder, multifaceted thing” (Ms. Ivy Miravalles, February 4, 2013).
On the other hand, on the micro level, CFO counselors need to constantly study various laws, including immigration laws, domestic violence laws or marriage-related laws in the host country, in addition to its cultural, cross-cultural and social realities. This task will be easier, if there is some exchange of information on the government level. Also, it is clear that many of the new programs implemented lately depend on the human resources of the CFO and its networks, as well as the activism of each individual working for the agency or supporting them from abroad. Therefore, in order to support further development of its activity, the CFO has to develop and institutionalize such networks in the Philippines and abroad. References Commission on Filipinos Overseas. 2013a. 1343 Actionline Against Human Trafficking.
http://cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1366%3A1343-actionline-against-human-trafficking&catid=147%3Ainstitutional-devtorganizational-strengthening&Itemid=833 (Accessed April 14, 2013).
Commission on Filipinos Overseas. 2013b. About Commission of Filipinos Overseas. http://cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1300:commission-on-filipinos-overseas&catid=110:frequently-asked-questions&Itemid=858 (Accessed April 5, 2013).
Commission on Filipinos Overseas. 2013c. About Us. http://cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option =com_content&view=section&id=12&Itemid=789 (Accessed April 5, 2013).
Commission on Filipinos Overseas. 2013d. Public Education and Information Program. http://cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1363%3Apubli
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c-information-and-education-program&catid=146%3Aculture-and-education&Itemid=833 (Accessed April 14, 2013).
Commission on Filipinos Overseas. 2013e. Statistical Profile of Registered Filipino Emigrants. http://cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13 41:statistical-profile-of-registered-filipino-emigrants&catid=134:statisticsstock-estimate&Itemid=814 (Accessed April 20, 2013).
Commission on Filipinos Overseas. 2013f. Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos. http://cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1340:stock-estimate-of-overseas-filipinos&catid=134:statisticsstock-estimate&Itemid=814 (Accessed April 20, 2013).
Rodriguez, Robyn Magalit. 2010. Migrants for Export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor to the World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
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Bridging the Gaps: The Atikha Experience in Migration and
Development in the Philippines
Summary, Comments, and Synthesis
Maria Makabenta Ikeda University of Hyogo
Introduction This whole-day activity aims to provide firsthand information on the impacts of international migration in the economic development of a local community. It also highlights the pivotal role of grassroots NGOs in initiating and enhancing migration-related development programs and in providing the vital link among the various stakeholders in international migration, such as the national government, the local government, the business sector, the agricultural sector, the migrants themselves and those left behind. With a sharp decrease in labor supply and agricultural production due to international migration, the main economic activity of the town suffered, causing a slowdown of the town’s economic productivity. Various interventions to stimulate town regeneration and economic revitalization are targeting the micro (family of the migrant) and macro (town/region) levels.
The program started with a visit to a local community (village) to see how international migration of many of its members to Italy has influenced the way of life of the villagers, from the way the houses are built and maintained to the manner in which village festivals are held. In the dialogue with the village council, the leaders explained the council’s plans and achievements in terms of coping with the exodus of its members.
In order to understand the role of NGOs, particularly in enhancing the positive impacts and mitigating the negative effects on the micro level, the delegation also participated in an orientation lecture and round-table discussion with the executive director and staff of Atikha Overseas Workers and Communities Initiative Inc., the local-based non-government organization. This NGO not only provides economic and social services to overseas Filipinos and their families but also strives to mobilize migrant resources towards the revitalized development of the communities affected by the diaspora of Filipino workers. Some of these activities are as follows: (1) implementation of financial literacy programs for both the migrant (Pinoy Wise) and migrant family members left behind (Batang Atikha Savers Club); (2) harnessing an agri-based cooperative (SIDC) as an investment option for migrants; and (3) linking the communities with national government agencies, local government units, other
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NGOs and the business and banking sectors to be able to develop livelihood programs and implement technical support and assistance schemes for agri-business development initiatives. Finally, the delegates also participated in an eco-tour of Lake Pandin, which is a livelihood program spearheaded by Atikha and run by the local women’s organization 1. The Situation in Laguna’s “Little Italy”: A Community with Migrant Workers Working in Italy 1.1. Migration Challenges for “Little Italy” The first stop was a dialogue with the Santa Rosa barangay council. The barangay captain (community head), Mr. Ernesto Sahagun welcomed the delegation at the barangay hall and gave an overview of the situation in the village, a part of which is now popularly known as “Little Italy,” due to the fact that a large number of members of their community are working in Italy. Many of the large Italian-inspired houses built by these migrants are left under the care of a relative, with the owners occasionally coming back only for a holiday especially during the village festival month.
The barangay council cited agriculture as the industry most adversely affected by migration. While the family members who are left behind are mostly engaged in agriculture or have experiences in agricultural work, most of the remittances being sent home by the migrant to their families are not being invested in agricultural activities. The council members think there is a need to channel the migrant remittances towards improving the
Photo 1: “Little Italy”
Photo by Shincha Park
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agricultural industry of their locality and at the same time increasing the income potential of the migrant’s family members.
In connection with this, the council is seeking the assistance of the local representative of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to develop livelihood programs and to get the active involvement of family members of the migrant workers. Some examples of areas that need collaboration with the DTI are as follows: (1) development of market feasibility studies and incentives to stimulate agri-business and (2) exploring innovative ways to utilize the large supply of coconut trees and other cash crops which grow in abundance in this region of Laguna, etc.
According to the community leaders, to stop the vicious cycle of “rags-to-riches-to-rags” which is common among migrant families, there is a need for a financial literacy program not only for the family members left behind but also for the migrant worker. In particular, such a program should have the following elements: 1) strong value formation for education 2) details of investment options for the migrant and his family left behind, and 3) savings for reintegration upon return to the town. 1.2. The Path Forward for “Little Italy” In its efforts to make the village an ideal place for residents, the council has designed a comprehensive village improvement initiative package targeting employment creation and environmental consciousness for the fiscal year 2013-2014. This village is trying to make the migrant situation work to its advantage by channeling resources towards developing economically sustainable and environmentally friendly projects such as:
a) Managing a sustainable water supply for the town by effectively utilizing the local natural mountain springs and by setting up water refilling stations. One of the main reasons that pushed the community to implement this project is the high cost of electricity needed to operate the current water tank system.
b) Increasing investments to the agri-based community cooperative called Soro-soro
Ibaba Development Cooperative (SIDC).1 The village, with the help of Atikha, has started a campaign to strengthen the involvement of migrant family members in SIDC by making them active member investors.
c) Distribution of coin banks for use by underprivileged families d) Implementation of a parking fee ordinance
1 SIDC is a leading agri-based cooperative in the Philippines with total membership of 14, 634 members (regular and associate). In 2009, it had total assets amounting to 1.16 billion pesos and total revenues of 2.7 billion pesos. It employs 252 regular employees nationwide. Although risk in any investment could not be avoided, partnership with a successful enterprise minimizes the exposure to the risk of investment (Atikha website (a)).
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e) Establishment of a waste segregation program and imposition of penalties to those who do not follow the segregation rules.
f) Coordination with the Department of Trade and Industry on technical assistance
concerning livelihood programs.
g) Rehabilitation of the drainage system and improving the flood ways to prepare for heavy rains and prevent floods.
h) Implementation of projects that support education, like for example, buying school
supplies for 900 elementary students and finding major sponsors or donors for education improvement projects. ABS-CBN, a major broadcasting station in the Philippines, allowed free use of the Knowledge Channel in the barangay’s elementary school.
i) Implementation of the Garbage-for-Medicine Swap Program.
j) Establishment of a microfinance program that provides seed capital for small
entrepreneurs at minimal (2%) interest rate. k) Increasing both the family members and migrant workers’ awareness on financial
literacy and value formation
Photo 2: Need for Replication across the Country: Town Cooperative Store Utilizing Migrant Worker’s Investments
Photo by Shincha Park
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School-based program addressing the social costs
of migration
Migration for development by mobilizing resources in
migrant source communities
Financial literacy and Interventions addressing
barriers to reintegration of migrants
Psychosocial and Economic services for
migrants and their families
2. The Role of NGOs in Minimizing the Social Cost and Maximizing the Gains of Migration Atikha Overseas Workers and Communities Initiative Inc. is a non-government organization established in in 1996 in San Pablo, Laguna to provide support for families of migrant Filipino workers. Atikha’s founding members are migrant returnees themselves who knew all too well the economic, emotional and social issues involved in migration. According to the executive director, Ms. Estrella “Mai” Dizon-Anonuevo, Atikha’s programs are based on four initiatives: 1) school-based program addressing the social costs of migration; 2) migration-for-development initiative focused on mobilizing migrant resources towards agri-based cooperatives serving source communities of the migrants; 3) financial literacy program for migrants and migrant family members; and, 4) interventions addressing barriers to reintegration of migrants. Atikha implements its various projects and activities in collaboration with various NGOs such as the Filipino Women’s Council and local community groups in the Philippines and community groups of migrants abroad.
2.1. Psychosocial and Economic Services A growing feminization of migration due to increased employment opportunities for women overseas has led to some psychosocial/emotional costs of migration. According to Ms. Anonuevo, most children found it difficult to cope with the migration of the mother, who normally takes up the “nurturing role” in the Filipino family. Atikha provides counseling as well as, livelihood and skills training (entrepreneurship training, coop formation training, computer literacy, arts and crafts training, tourism-service training, etc.) for the family members left behind.
Figure 1: Atikha’s Program Initiatives Supporting Migrant Workers and Their Families
Source: Atikha website
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2.2. School Based Program in Addressing the Social Costs of Migration Their programs include the following: 1) training school teachers in setting up programs for children of migrants; 2) value formation regarding migration realities; 3) capacity building for the children of migrant workers; 3) skills training for the migrant worker’s children; 4) organizing Batang Atikha Savers Club in elementary schools to build consciousness among the children about the hardships of the migrant parents by encouraging them to save the money their parents send them; and 5) integrating migration issues in the elementary and secondary levels of education. 2.3. Financial Literacy and Interventions addressing Barriers to Reintegration One of the main pillars of Atikha support program for migrants is its financial literacy campaign called Pinoy Wise (Worldwide Initiative for Savings Investment and Entrepreneurship) that was launched in 2011 at the Philippine Embassy in Abu Dhabi. Pinoy Wise is initiated by a network of NGOs, cooperatives, microfinance institutions in partnership with government and private sector to encourage the OFWs and their families to save and invest their hard-earned money. According to Ms. Dizon-Anonuevo, “OFWs need to be wise in managing their funds and also to be wise in caring for their families. We have seen in our work with OFWs and their families that despite their high income, 70% are not able to save and achieve their long-term goals for migration. This is the reason why they are unable to return and reintegrate and be with their family for good.” (Atikha website (b)).
As part of the financial literacy program, Atikha conducts 1) trainers’ training on financial literacy; 2) formation of a pool of financial and psychosocial counselors; and 3) financial literacy seminars for family members left behind. 2.4. Migration-for-Development Intervention This aspect of Atikha’s program goes beyond troubleshooting for migrants and their families. It focuses on preparing for the migrant reintegration into their home/source communities by creating an enabling environment that can effectively absorb the savings/investments of the migrants and channeling the resources of migrants towards local economic development particularly in their source communities. Its activities include the following: 2.4.1. Collaboration with Local Government Units (LGUs) and Other Stakeholders in Setting up OFW Migration Resource Centers Some examples of its activities are 1) organizing multi-level multi-stakeholder OFW Coordinating Council composed of national government agencies, local government, NGOs, migrant and family organizations, cooperatives, banks, etc.; 2) training and other preparatory activities for programs and services for OFW Migration resource centers; 3) technical assistance-mentoring and monitoring of the OFW migration center operations and management; 4) conducting seminars focusing on migration and development with local government units and stakeholders; and 5) integrating migration in provincial, municipal, city development plans.
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2.4.2. Mobilization of Migrant Philanthropy towards Development of Their Hometowns (Creating Jobs and Economic Opportunities) Some of Atikha’s initiatives have led to setting up social enterprises that produce organic products utilizing local raw materials such as Coco Natur, Organic Market by the Lake and Organic Farming. Other successful projects explore the tourism front such as the Ecolife Homestay Eco-tour which fosters the development of local human resources as homestay operators and tour guides. 2.4.3. Linking Remittances towards Local Economic Development (Linking Remittances with Existing Cooperatives and Microfinance Institutions) Some of the main partners of Atikha that are also “enablers” of local economic development are: Soro-soro Ibaba Development Cooperative (Egg Layer); Farm Cavite Farmers Feedmilling and Marketing Cooperative (Baylen Farm); Banko Kabayan (Bayani ng Bayanihan Program that provides housing loans). These partners play an important role in creating investment projects utilizing migrant remittances. 3. Some Concluding Remarks This activity emphasizes the need for coordination and collaboration among various government agencies in the national, regional and municipal levels as well financial institutions to effectively implement the “migration for development” programs particularly in boosting agriculture in the migrant source communities. Public-private partnership initiatives may help rationalize business incentives needed to stimulate employment, investments and entrepreneurship in those communities affected by the diaspora of its members. The role of the third sector (NGOs and NPOs) as well as community-based
Photo 3: Social Enterprise Projects (Eco-tour and Coco Natur Handmade Soap)
Photo by Shincha Park
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organizations, cooperatives and migrant organizations abroad as intermediating and implementing agents helps ensure strong impacts on the grassroots level. Apart from creating an enabling environment in the source communities, transforming migrants from mere milking cows to economic stakeholders equipped with adequate financial acumen to actively steer the development of their own communities out of stagnation and towards renewed prosperity may well be the lynchpin for the migration-local economic development nexus. References Atikha Website (a). “Soro-soro Ibaba Development Cooperative Launches Investment
Program in Agriculture for Overseas Filipinos.” http://www.atikha.org/news/sidc- launches-investment-program-in-agriculture-for-ofw.html (Accessed March 3, 2013).
Atikha Website (b). “PINOY WISE Financial Literacy for OFWs launched in Abu Dhabi”. http://www.atikha.org/news/pinoy-wise-financial-literacy-for-ofws-launched -in-abu-dhabi.html (Accessed March 22, 2013).
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Issues and Concerns of Filipino-Japanese Children and Their (Re)Acquisition of Japanese Nationality
Summary, Comments and Synthesis
Akihiro Asakawa Nagoya University
Introduction Before the amendment of Japan’s Nationality Law of Japan in December, 2008, children who were born out of wedlock could inherit Japanese nationality only when their father recognized them before birth. However, as the result of the amendment, children recognized after the birth can now inherit Japanese nationality. This amendment was the result of court action by Filipino mothers, supported by Japanese human right lawyers on the basis that the previous arrangement was discrimination against children born out of wedlock. Their argument was accepted by the Supreme Court, leading to this amendment.1
It is estimated that about 100,000 to 400,000 children of Japanese-Filipino children (JFC) can potentially benefit from the revision of the law. They are those who were not given parental recognition by the Japanese father before birth and their parents were unmarried at the time of birth. Therefore, they were unable to secure Japanese nationality. There are also a number of them whose parents were married at the time of birth but the birth was not reported to the Japanese authority (Embassy, Consulate or local government office) within three months from the date of birth, and thus the children lost their Japanese nationality. With the amendment of the law, many JFCs now desire to gain or reacquire their Japanese nationality but are unable to do so because of their lack of knowledge of the legal process, the difficulty in finding their Japanese father and the high cost that the process entails. The Maligaya House is one of the NGOs that assist the JFCs in looking for the Japanese father and undertaking the legal process on the children’s behalf. During the visit, the delegation was met by the staff headed by Ms. Naoko Kono and several JFCs and their guardians (mothers and relatives). After Ms. Kono gave an orientation about the activities of the Maligaya House, the Workshop members engaged in an active discussion about the issues and concerns of Maligaya House and the JFCs. It was followed by an interaction in
1 For details about the Revised Nationality Law of Japan (as amended in 2008), please refer to Japan Ministry of Justice website http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tnl-01.html
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which the JFCs and their guardians shared their experiences and aspirations with the Workshop participants.
1. The Maligaya House “Maligaya House,” translated into English, means “Happy House”. The Citizen’s Network for JFC Inc. Tokyo Office established this local office in 1998. It is dedicated to helping those Japanese-Filipino Children (JFC), who are abandoned by their Japanese fathers, find happiness. Maligaya House fights to protect the human rights of the JFC and gives support as they grow to adulthood” (Maligaya House website). For its part, the Citizen’s Network for JFC requests volunteer staff, particularly lawyers, to file for the case in Japanese court. The source of the organization’s funds is donations from members. The House is run by a Japanese staff, Ms. Naoko Kono, together with a Filipino social worker.
The main mission and program of the Maligaya House is to provide legal assistance to JFCs. This means aid in winning recognition from fathers and obtaining financial support for children. Many of their clients are mothers or immediate relatives of JFCs who are abandoned by their Japanese fathers. It is usually when the children enter elementary school that they ask for the House’s assistance. This is because that is the time that they long for their fathers, and also because they need financial assistance as single mother families. Many of the clients obtain the House’s contact details from the Japanese Embassy in Manila, where they initially consult and seek assistance. The Embassy staff does not give any assistance because the Japanese government considers these cases as purely a personal issue.
Photo 1: Maligaya House
Photo by Shincha Park
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2. Support for JFCs towards Gaining/Reacquiring Japanese Nationality Ms. Kono explained the procedure in lending the support, which usually begins when the clients make telephone inquiries. After that, the House staff meets them and asks them to participate in orientation/registration meeting held once a month. For registration, the clients are asked to submit documents as evidence that can be helpful in finding the father in Japan, such as letters from the father, photographs, and certificates of remittances from the father. After these procedures, the clients make a contract with the House to formalize the official assistance. Every month, the House receives six to seven telephone inquiries, but only three to four of those cases are able to make the contract with the House. However, after the East Japan Earthquake, there have been fewer inquires. This is probably because the Filipino mothers are expecting less financial assistance from Japanese fathers because of the effects of the earthquake.
Before the start of the legal assistance, the House makes a mandatory home visit in order to understand the real situation of the families. In some cases, there are families who have enough financial assets, despite their report. The documents provided as evidence are then forwarded to the Tokyo Office, which in turn locates the father and sends at most three letters informing him of the child’s conditions in the Philippines. Usually the Office does not get any responses from the father. In some cases, the father criticizes the Office. It is not the Office’s policy to criticize the fathers, therefore, its staff does not directly meet with them or makes calls. In this process, if it is unable to establish the whereabouts of the father, the case will be terminated.
If there is no response to any of the three letters, a fourth letter will be sent to the father by registered mail to let him know that a legal process will be carried out. A case of recognition and child-raising support to the Family Court with jurisdiction over his address is then filed. First, the case is referred to a mediation committee before going into actual court process. At this stage, lawyers cooperating with Maligaya House deals with the cases. These lawyers are interested in human right issues and are relatively young and wish to gain legal experience. Lawyers’ fees are paid by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations.
Direct negotiation between the father and mother is prohibited during the process. This is because sometimes the father asks the mother to withdraw the case. At that time, some father promises to send 100,000 yen per month, however, many fathers usually stop sending it in several months’ time. If the mother withdraws from the case, the House’s relationship with the lawyers and mediation committee members will be badly affected.
When the case is not solved by mediation, the case is brought to the court in which recognition is usually obtained in most cases. The child-raising support is determined on the basis of the financial situation of the father, according to the Japanese law. The mother
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usually wishes to receive 100,000 yen per month, however, the actual amount will be 15,000 to 20,000 yen per month. In some cases, where the father is a pensioner or receiving welfare assistance (Seikatsuhogo), then the amount would be just 5,000 yen a month. Some fathers were highly prosperous owners of small- and medium-sized companies in the “economic bubble” period, but some of them went into bankruptcy and owe substantial amounts of debt.
During the court process, DNA evaluation might be required. Evaluation itself is conducted in Japan, therefore, the staff of Maligaya House (Ms. Kono) collects blood samples from children and sends them to Japan. It normally costs about 50,000 yen, but it is reduced to 20,000 yen because the cases are handled by a NGO.
Since the House was established in 1997, around 900 cases have been handled. Though there are no specific statistics, it is estimated that around 30% or 40% of cases won recognition. It takes half a year to locate the father, and it takes half or one year before the court is able to reach its decision. 3. Result and Effect of Recognition The purpose of winning recognition is to obtain the child-raising support, however, the amount is not so large, as mentioned. Though the full details are not known, a certain number of mothers and children thus decide to go to Japan to work, as mothers can also go with their children as guardian because the children are Japanese nationals. In other words, the purpose of winning recognition itself might be “to go back to Japan to work.”
Figure 1: Flow Chart of Legal Assistance at Maligaya House
Inquiry
Orientation
Acceptance Meeting
Forward Documents to Tokyo Office
First Letter to the Japanese Father
Second Letter to the Japanese Father
Third Letter to the Japanese Father
Reply
Yes
Negotiation
Negotiation Failed
Client Decided to File a Case
Apply for a Funding
Look for a Lawyer to Handle the Case
Client Shoulders the Court Case Expenses
Sign SPA
Filing a Lawsuit
Hearing with the Mediation Committee
Reach Agreement
Sign Second SPA
Bring the Suit up to the Judge
Court Decision
Come up with an Agreement
Father Missing
No
Yes
Cancel Case
No
Not ApprovedApproved
No Yes
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The background to this situation is that most of the mothers are former entertainers in Japan and they are not financially well off. There is virtually no social welfare assistance for single mother families in the Philippines. Therefore, it is financially difficult for JFCs to go to school. In addition, mothers have experience of working in Japan during the “bubble” period, so they have good memories of good times in Japan. On the other hand, while it is true that the children are Japanese nationals, it is quite difficult for them to acquire Japanese language especially if they go to Japan after they reach ten years of age. As the result, many of them drop out of school and some even join gang groups.
While mothers and children often wish to go to Japan after winning recognition, many of them cannot afford the cost of travel. Therefore, some brokers target JFCs and offer money to fund the cost and a job in Japan. These brokers operated to attract entertainers in the past. In fact, the care-giving industry in Japan has a demand for these Filipino mothers and they seem to be sent to this industry by brokers. In addition, in some cases mothers make their female children work as entertainers. 4. Comment: Social Cost of Emigration and “Generic Capital” These cases of abandoned JFCs are directly related to emigration to Japan of Filipino women as entertainers, mainly during the 1990’s. It is common knowledge that they actually worked as “hostesses” catering to Japanese men. This situation itself resulted in high possibility to form relationships between Japanese men and Filipino women out of marriage, and became the background to the existence of JFCs. It is true that many Filipino women could earn a certain amount of money in Japan. However, this resulted in obvious social cost of migration in terms of social and economic welfare of children and Filipino mothers as well. This example of JFCs shows one of the downsides of emigration and there might be other similar cases for Filipino nationals who migrated to other destinations, as women are dominant among migrants.
On the other side, the case of JFCs relates to what is called “generic capital.” This particular NGO’s activity is directly related to the amendment of the Nationality Law in Japan in 2008, which enabled Japanese fathers to recognize their children who were born by foreign mothers out of wedlock, after the birth. The direct purpose of winning recognition from Japanese fathers is related to children’s psychological well-being, however, an economic reason is obviously involved. Directly, financial support for raising children could be obtained from fathers and indirectly, the “right” to go to Japan.
The right to go to Japan arises from the children’s “generic capital” as Japanese nationals who inherited “blood” of Japanese fathers. The court action did not directly intend to grant such right. However, being a Japanese national automatically gives these children the right to go to Japan together with their Filipino mothers as “guardians of minors who are Japanese nationals.” Currently, the entertainer visa for Filipinos is almost suspended, so the existence of JFCs gives an important opportunity for the mothers to go to Japan and to work.
However, whether this “right” arising from “generic capital” of JFCs could turn into
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real economic and social capital seems to be not so easy to determine. As children have mostly been educated in the Filipino school system, lack of Japanese language fluency in both the mother and the child becomes a great obstacle to working and studying in Japan. Mothers might get jobs in the care-giving sector, which requires less Japanese language ability, however, children who cannot gain any formal educational qualifications in Japan must experience life-long disadvantage if they continue to live in Japan.
It is quite ironic that the recognition by fathers, which is meant to contribute to the well-being of children, does not automatically turn into social and economic well-being. In other words, it can be said that “generic capital” itself does not necessarily turn into “social and economic capital.” In this sense, the legal right from the viewpoint of “human rights” must be considered in the context of social and economic situation. More directly, it is true that the 2008 amendment of the Nationality Law is the result of court action led by some human right lawyers in Japan. However, the notion of “human rights” itself must be placed and considered in the wider context, especially in relation to the reality of migration. References
Maligaya House. http://jfcmultisectoralnetworkingproject.org/index.php/en/maligaya-house
Ministry of Justice, Japan. “Revised Nationality Law of Japan (as amended in 2008)” http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tnl-01.html
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APPENDIX
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PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES
Feb. 3 (SUN)
AM ACTIVITY A Visit to Maligaya House (Citizen’s Network for Japanese-Filipino Children) Issues and Concerns of Filipino-Japanese Children and their (Re)Acquisition of
Japanese Nationality VENUE: Maligaya House
18-A Cabezas St., Project 4, Quezon City, Metro Manila 1. Meeting with Ms. Naoko Kono (Executive Director, Maligaya House) 2. Interaction with Maligaya House Clients
Moderator: Akihiro Asakawa PM AFRASIA GROUP 1 Meeting
VENUE: Malayan Plaza Meeting Room 1. Workshop Introduction and Orientation (Ma. Reinaruth D. Carlos) 2. Research Update and Brainstorming for Book Publication (Pauline Kent)
Feb. 4 (MON)
AM ACTIVITY B Afrasian Research Center - Third World Studies Center Joint Forum Governance of International Migration: Perspectives of Sending Countries VENUE: Third World Studies Center (TWSC) Conference Room, Palma Hall, University of the Philippines Diliman Moderators: Aysun Uyar & Chizuko Sato
PM ACTIVITY C Visit to the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) The Philippine Government’s Programs for Emigrants: Focus on the Predeparture Orientation Program and Integration of Emigrants Bound for Japan VENUE: Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) Office
Citigold Center, 1345 Pres. Quirino Avenue Corner Osmeña Highway, Manila
Discussion with Ms. Ivy Miravalles, Officer-in-Charge, Migrant Integration and Education Division (MIED) Moderator: Viktoriya Kim
Feb. 5 (TUE)
AM/ PM
ACTIVITY D Migration and Development Study Tour Migration and Development: The Grassroot Community and NGO Perspectives VENUES: Alaminos (“Little Italy”) and San Pablo City, Laguna Province Atikha Overseas Workers and Communities Initiative Office Address: Green Valley Subdivision, San Francisco, San Pablo City Laguna Moderator: Maria Makabenta Ikeda
PM Integration Session: Workshop Output and Publication Venue: Kalamunda Farms, Tagaytay City
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LIST OF SUGGESTED READINGS Nationality and Citizenship (JFC/ JAPINO Issue)
A-1. Japan’s Revised Nationality Law (English version) http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tnl-01.html
A-2. Suzuki, Nobue. 2010. “Outlawed Children: Japanese Filipino Children, Legal Defiance and Ambivalent Citizenships” Pacific Affairs 83(1): 31- 50
A-3. Brief Introduction of Maligaya House (JFC Multisectoral Networking Project) http://jfcmultisectoralnetworkingproject.org/index.php/en/maligaya-house
A-4. Who are the Japanese-Filipino children? http://jfcmultisectoralnetworkingproject.org/index.php/en/home
A-5. Asahi Shimbun (Newspaper) Article “International Marriage: Japanese-Filipino children pay for their fathers’ mistakes” June 25, 2012
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201206250001
Governance of Migration
B-1. Betts, Alexander. ed. 2011. Global Migration Governance. Oxford:Oxford University Press.
B-2. Ghosh, Bimal. ed. 2000. Managing Migration: Time for a New International Regime? Oxford:Oxford University Press.
B-3. Gachter, August. ed. 2010. Strengthening Migration Governance. Geneva: International Labor Office.
B-4. Kunz, Rahel, Sandra Lavenex, and Marion Panizzon. eds. 2012. Multilayered Migration Governance: The Promise of Partnership. London:Routledge.
B-5. Gabriel, Christina, and Helene Pellerin. eds. 2008. Governing International Labour Migration: Current Issues, Challenges and Dilemmas. London:Routledge.
B-6. Hansen, Randall, Jobst Koehler, and Jeannette Money. eds. 2011. Migration, Nation States, and International Cooperation. London:Routledge.
B-7. Grugel, Jean, and Nicola Piper. 2007. Critical Perspectives on Global Governance: Rights and Regulation in Governing Regimes, (New edition). London:Routledge.
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International Migration in the Philippines
C-1. Tigno, J. 2009. “International Migration for Local Development and the Role of Subnational Institutions: The Importance of Governance and Institutions,” Scalabrini Migration Center Migrants’ Associations and Philippine Institution for Development – Capacity Building Programs in the Philippines Reference Materials http://www.smc.org.ph/MAPID/MAPID%20CD/Philippines%20pdf%20file/VII.2%20International%20Migration%20for%20Development-Jorge%20Tigno.pdf
C-2. Tigno, J. ed. 2009. “State, Politics and Nationalism beyond Borders: Changing Dynamics in Filipino Overseas Migration,” Philippine Social Science Council, Quezon City, Philippines 169pp.
C-3. Galias, Maria Regina Angela. 2012. “Pre-departure Programs for Migrant Filipinos: Enforcing Protective Mechanisms at Home” Paper presented at the Third Regional Migration and Remittances Peer-Assisted Learning Network (MIRPAL) Conference, 21-23 May 2012, Dushanbe, Tajikistan. http://www.cfo.gov.ph/~comfil/images/stories/pdf/mirpal_presentation_rgalias.pdf
C-4. Galias, Maria Regina Angela. 2012. “Integration of Overseas Filipinos: Policies and Challenges in Receiving Countries” Paper presented at the Third Regional Migration and Remittances Peer-Assisted Learning Network (MIRPAL) Conference, 21-23 May 2012, Dushanbe, Tajikistan. http://cfo.gov.ph/~comfil/images/stories/pdf/integration_of_ofs.pdf
C-5. Asis, Maruja M. B. and D. Rannveig Agunias. 2012. “Strengthening Predeparture Orientation Programmes in Indonesia, Nepal and the Philippines” Issue in Brief (A Joint Series of the IOM Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific and the Migration Policy Institute), September 2012 (Issue No. 5), 12pp. www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/predepartureorientation.pdf
C-6. Nicolas, Imelda. 2012. “Philippine Perspective on Migration: The Various Impacts of International Migration and the Role of the Philippine Diaspora in the Country’s Development” A paper presented at the Second International Forum on Migration and Development 26 November 2012, Guadalajara, Mexico. http://www.cfo.gov.ph/~comfil/images/stories/pdf/guadalajaranov262012.pdf
Others
O-1. de Haas, Hein. 2012. “The Migration and Development Pendulum: A Critical View on Research and Policy” in International Migration 50(3): 8-25. Blackwell Publishing.
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O-2. Agunias, Dovelyn Rannveig and K. Newland. 2012. “Engaging the Asian Diaspora” Issue in Brief (A Joint Series of the IOM Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific and the Migration Policy Institute), November 2012 (Issue No. 7), 12pp. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/engagingdiasporas.pdf
O-3. Nicolas, Imelda. 2012. “Updates on the Philippine Migration, Management, Structure and Programs” A paper delivered at the Norwegian European Migration Network National Contact Point Conference on Migration and Development, Oslo, Norway, June 18, 2012. www.cfo.gov.ph/~comfil/images/stories/pdf/oslospeech.pdf
O-4. World Bank – What is Governance? http://go.worldbank.org/G2CHLXX0Q0
O-5. UNESCAP – What is Good Governance? http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.pdf
O-6. Asian Development Bank, Governance: Sound Development Management http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/1995/govpolicy.pdf
Websites
Maligaya House Manila Office http://www.jca.apc.org/jfcnet/ Third World Studies Centre, University of the Philippines Diliman http://twsc.upd.edu.ph/ Commission on Filipino Overseas (CFO) http://www.cfo.gov.ph/ Atikha Overseas Workers and Communities Initiative, Inc http://www.atikha.org/
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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Akihiro ASAKAWA Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University Maria Ela L. ATIENZA Director, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines Diliman Maria Reinaruth D. CARLOS Professor, Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Ryukoku University Jean ENCINAS-FRANCO Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman Emerald O. FLAVIANO Research Associate, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines Diliman Maria Makabenta IKEDA Associate Professor, Institute for Policy Analysis and Social Innovation, University of Hyogo Pauline KENT Professor and Dean, Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Ryukoku University Habibul H. KHONDKER Professor, Humanities and Social Sciences, College of Arts and Sciences, Zayed University, UAE
Viktoriya KIM Assistant Professor, Department of Human Sciences, Osaka University Naoko KONO Executive Director, Maligaya House (Citizen’s Network for Japanese-Filipino Children) Shincha PARK Research Assistant, Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University Phoebe Grace SACULSAN Research Assistant, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines Diliman Chizuko SATO Research Fellow, Institute of Developing Economies Jorge V. TIGNO Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman Aysun UYAR Assistant Professor, Research Institute for Humanity and Nature (Assistant Professor, Department of Global and Regional Studies, Doshisha University from April 2013) Patcharapoom YOOKASEM Intern, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines Diliman
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3
Research Series, Studies on Multicultural Societies No.3
Ryukoku University Afrasian Research Centre Second International Workshop
International Migration and (Re)Integration Issues
in the Philippines
February 3 - 5, 2013 Metro Manila and Laguna, the Philippines
Edited by Pauline Kent, Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos,
Masako Otaki and Shincha Park
Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University (Phase 2)
2013 6 20
520-2194
TEL / FAX: 077-544-7173 http://afrasia.ryukoku.ac.jp/
600-8047 677-2
TEL: 075-343-0006 ISBN 978-4-904945-38-4
ISBN 978-4-904945-38-4
Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University
1-5 Yokotani, Seta Oe-cho, Ostu, ShigaJapan 520-2194