jun 2011 godina 4, broj 14 godina 7, broj 25 februar 2018...

JUL 2008godina 1, broj 2

DECEMBAR 2009godina 2, broj 8

SEPTEMBAR 2010godina 3, broj 11

JUN 2011godina 4, broj 14

SEPTEMBAR 2011godina 4, broj 15

DECEMBAR 2012godina 5, broj 20

JUN 2013godina 6, broj 22

MART 2014godina 7, broj 25

februar 2018godina 11, broj 40

Udruženioko zajedničkog

ciljaAddiko Bank AD PodgoricaAtlas Banka AD PodgoricaCrnogorska komercijalna banka AD PodgoricaErste Bank AD PodgoricaHipotekarna Banka AD PodgoricaInvest Banka Montenegro AD PodgoricaKomercijalna Banka AD BudvaLovćen banka ADNLB BankaNova banka AD PodgoricaSociete Generale MontenegroPrva banka Crne Gore 1901.Universal Capital BankZapad Banka AD PodgoricaZiraat Bank

Udruženioko zajedničkog

cilja

10 godinaUdruženje banaka Crne Gore, sa ponosom ukazuje na jubilej od 10 godina časopisa „Bankar“ koji ne bi bio moguć bez kontribucije banaka i njihove posvećenosti, gdje je prisutnost podrške regulatora bila od samog početka. Časopis „Bankar“ je kroz autorske tekstove i intervjue predstavio 241 autora (170 domaćih i 71 inostranih plus 7 tekstova tima EBF ). Od tog broja, imali smo 52 doktora nauka i 44 magistra. U prosjeku, svaki broj Bankara je imao 6-7 novih autora koji su svojim iskustvom, znanjem i prezentovanom pozitivnom praksom pojašnjavali dešavanja i pojave, najavljivali potrebe inovativnosti i međunarodne trendove struke, a sve sa ciljem da se uvijek ide napred i dijele iskustva koja nisu dostupna većini. „Bankar“ služi da se kroz struku artikulišu stavovi, dopune iskustva, ali edukativno i efektivno djeluje kroz ukazivanje na operativne probleme, najavi i pojasni procese, kao i harmonizaciju sa EU propisima, implementaciju standarda i konsekvence istih u postojećim uslovima.

Zahvaljujemo se svim autorima, kao i bankarima Crnogorskim na podršci dosadašnjoj, gdje sloboda izražavanja stava je tekovina civilizacijskih dostignuća. Ne smijemo zaboraviti da je ovo jedini časopis koji tretira finansije u Crnoj Gori, a time je i lična karta strukovne misli kod nas. Konvencija praktikovanja moći pozicije trenutne i stereotipa kojim se želi ograničiti sloboda drugim nije opcija, jer kroz razmjenu mišljenja čistimo svoje viđenje, a prepreke se prepoznaju, definišu, šire prezentuju i prevazilaze. Časopis artikuliše stavove struke, čiji glas se mora čuti ukoliko želimo napredak. Slažemo se sa mišljenjem dobronamjernih prema struci, bankarstvu Crnogorskom, glasu akademaca i profesionalaca koji čitaju naš časopis da isti ima dugovječnost definisanu potrebom države u prezentaciji struke bankarske, finansijske, ekonomske i edukacije šire zainteresovanih. Takođe dobronamjerna kritika, sugestija, novi pogledi, svježe ideje su uvijek predmet seriozne evaluacije i usvajanja.

Uz još jedno veliko hvala, svim autorima, čitaocima kao i podršci bankara koji čine ovaj časopis kvalitetom koji je prepoznat i van granica Crne Gore, do novog broja i novih jubileja srdačan pozdrav tima koji pravi ovaj časopis prepoznatljivim...

S poštovanjem,mr Bratislav Pejaković

Uvodna riječGlavnog i odgovornog

urednika

The Association of Montenegrin Banks proudly announces a 10-year jubilee of the "Bankar" magazine that could not have been possible without the contribution of the banks and their dedication, and the support of the regulator from the very beginning. The magazine "Bankar" presented 241 authors (170 domestic authors and 71 foreign authors, and 7 articles written by the EBF team) through authors’ articles and interviews. This number of authors included 52 authors with PhD and 44 authors with M.Sc. On average, each issue of the Bankar had 6 to 7 new authors who, through their experience, knowledge and positive practice, clarified the developments and events, announced the need for innovativeness and international trends in the profession, which was aimed at advancing and sharing experiences that is not available to majority of people. The magazine "Bankar" serves to express different views of the authors through the profession, add to experiences, but also it serves as an education tool and to act effectively by pointing out operational problems, to announce and explain processes and alignment with EU regulations, implementation of standards and their consequences under the existing conditions.

We would like to thank all authors, as well as Montenegrin bankers for their support so far, where the freedom of expressing the views is the civilization attainment. We must not forget that this is the only magazine that deals with finances in Montenegro, and thus is a personal card of professional thoughts in our country. The convention of practicing the power of the current posi-tion and the stereotype that wants to limit the freedom of the others is not an option, because we clarify our views through the exchange of opinions, while the obstacles are recognised, defined, presented broadly and resolved. The magazine articulates the views of the profession, whose voice must be heard if we want the progress. We agree with the benevolent opinions regarding the profession i.e. the banking industry in Montenegro, the voice of academics and professionals who read our magazine that it should have longevity, which defined by the need of the country for presenting the banking and finance industries, and economics, and the education of the wider public. Also, a well-meaning criticism, suggestion, new views, fresh ideas are always subject to serious evaluation and adoption.

With sincere thanks to all authors and readers and to the support of the bankers who make this magazine recognised beyond the borders of Montenegro, to the new issue and new jubilees, best regards from the team that makes this magazine recognisable.

Bratislav Pejaković, M.Sc.

An Introductory Word from Editor10 years

februar 2018 | :Bankar

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Ministar finansija Darko Radunović, intervju za Bankar Cilj je da od 2019. imamo opadajući trend javnog duga A Downward Trend in Public Debt Targeted from 2019

Dr Nikola Fabris digitalne valute - veliki oprez Digital Currencies: Great Caution

Vesko Lekić potrebna stalna usavršavanja da bi otklonili rizik Permanent Improvements Needed to Eliminate Risk

Predrag Marković nova uloga u očuvanju finansijske stabilnosti New Role in Preserving Financial Stability

Dr Velimir Šonje nalazimo se na početku zanimljive faze u razvoju bankarstva Beginning of Interesting Phase in Development Of Banking Industry

Markus Becker-Melching, Volker Hofmann bliži se kraj politike negativnih kamatnih stopa Negative Interest Rate Policy is coming to an End

Prof.dr Dragoljub Janković, efikasnost Crnogorskog finansijskog sistema Montenegro Financial System Efficiency

Mr. Jovana Žugić, Aleksandar Đuričković tržište kapitala biće sigurnije i efikasnije Capital Market will be More Secure and Efficient

EBF promišljenim i efikasnim okvirima ka stabilnom bankarskom sektoru Prudential and Efficient Frameworks towards Stable Banking Sector

Đorđe Dimić msfi 9 je stigao – šta dalje? IFRS 9 Has Arrived – What Next?

Dr Dragan Momirović slepo verovanje i novi dizajn Blind Belief and New Design

Radmila Gaćeša pitanja i odgovori Questions and Answers

Miodrag Kirsanov londonska serija novčaniCa vlade kraljevine jugoslavije u izbjeglištvu 1946. i 1953. London Series of Banknotes of the Yugoslav Royal Government-in-Exile

BANKARBroj 40 / februar 2018.

IZDAVAČUdruženje banaka Crne Gore Novaka Miloševa bb/3 PodgoricaTel: +382 20 232-028 www.ubcg.info

TIRAŽ: 600 primjerakaČasopis izlazi kvartalno.

Rješenjem Ministarstva kulture, sporta i medija časopis Bankar je upisan u Evidenciju medija - štampani mediji 17. marta 2008, pod rednim brojem 641.

REDAKCIJSKI ODBORglavni i odgovorni urednikmr Bratislav Pejaković

Prof. dr Aleksandar Živković,dr Nikola Fabris,dr Saša Popović,mr Nebojša Đoković

tehnički urednik Goran Kapor

dizajn i prelomNikola Latkovićfotografijewww.photodune.net i fotodokumentacija UBCGprevodMilena Ljumovićštampa Grafotisak, Grude, BIH

Prilozi - tekstovi se dostavljaju u elektronskom obliku na e-mail adrese: [email protected], [email protected], na disketi ili cd-u; maksimalna dužina teksta do 25.000 karaktera.- reklame po normativima UBCG na e-mail: [email protected]

BANKARČasopis Udruženja banaka Crne GoreBroj 40 / februar 2018.

IMPRESUM

Dobri rezultati u 2017. godini samo su početak ukupnog

stabilizacionog puta koji je pre-cizno opisan u Fiskalnoj strate-giji. Trebaće puno upornosti i dosljednosti da, već u 2020. godini, kako smo planirali, dostignemo pozitivne trendove po svim ključnim pa-rametrima, kazao je u intervjuu za “Bankar” minister finansija Darko Radunović.

:B Prvo bismo željeli da Vam čestitamo na kvalitetnim rezultatima rada Ministarstva koje su pozitivno ocjenile međunarodne finansijske institucije WB i MMF. Finansije su same po sebi zahtjevne, ali različit je pristup sa aspekta bankara, što je Vaša osnovna vokacija, i ministra finansija. Koji su bili najveći izazovi u osvajanju novih zadataka, što nije vidljivo za javnost i da li ste realizovali planirano? Dužnost ministra finansija podrazumjeva zaista ve-liku odgovornost. Ta funkcija, posebno u složenim ekonomskim okolnostima, nije jednostavna. Naime, često ste u poziciji da kreirate i javnosti obrazlažete

mjere koje, ma kako nužne i dosljedne bile, nijesu popularne, pa ne mogu biti dočekane sa kooperativ-nim razumijevanjem. U politikantskom ambijentu kakav imamo, ta činjenica se koristi za demagoško manipulisanje javnošću.

Ipak, kao ozbiljni ljudi, dužni smo da takve opstruk-cije zanemarimo i da svoje znanje i iskustvo stavimo u funkciju progresa Crne Gore. To je i bio moj motiv da prihvatim ovu dužnost. Osim toga, mislim da će eventualni uspjeh na ovoj funkciji zaokružiti moj profesionalni profil.

Djelovalo bi neskromno kada bih rekao da sam u potpunosti zadovoljan ostvarenim, ali rezultati koje smo postigli zaista ohrabruju i pokazuju da smo,protekle godine, pravili dobre procjene i istrajali u naporima da ojačamo fiskalnu stabilnost, u funkciji daljeg rasta i razvoja naše ekonomije.

Vlada se opredijelila za mjere koje će, u najmanjoj mogućoj mjeri, negativno uticati na privredu i stanovništvo. Poseban fokus je na povećanju fiskalne discipline, čime nastojimo da direktno utičemo na smanjenje obima neformalne ekonomije.

Cilj je da od 2019. imamo opadajući trend javnog duga


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MINISTAR FINANSIJA DARKO RADUNOVIĆ, INTERVJU ZA BANKAR

Good results accomplished in 2017 are only the beginning of overall path towards stabilisation

that is described in detail in the Fiscal Strategy. It will take a lot of determination and consistency to reach positive trends in all key parameters in 2020 as planned, said Finance Minister, Darko Radunović, for the Bankar.

:B We would like to congratulate you at the beginning on the quality results of the work of the Ministry of Finance, which were positively assessed by the international financial institutions, the World Bank and the IMF. The finances are very demanding, but there is difference in approach from the banker’s position, which is your main profession, and form the finance minister’s position. What were the largest challenges in accomplishing new objectives, which are not visible in the public? Did you realise everything what has been planned? The mandate of the Finance Minister implies indeed high responsibility. This mandate, particularly in complex economic circumstances, is not an easy one. Namely, you find yourself often in a position to create and explain to the public measures, which,

regardless of how they are necessary and consistent, are not popular, and thus, they cannot be welcomed with

cooperative understanding. In political environment as it is in our country, this fact is used for demagogic manipulation of the public.

However, as serious people, it is our responsibility to neglect such obstructions and put our knowl-edge and experience in the function of progress of Montenegro. This was my motive for accepting this mandate. Besides, I believe that the potential success in this mandate will complete my professional profile.

It would seem immodest if I would say that I am fully satisfied with what has been achieved, but the results that we have accomplished are encouraging and show that last year we made good assessments and endured in our efforts to enhance fiscal stability in the function of further growth and development of our economy.

Challenges put before us were numerous, and there are going to be plenty of them in the forthcoming pe-riod. However, I am certain that we have established a good team that has competences to accomplish, with its energy, knowledge and dedication, what is imperative of our activity – creation of better living standard for all of our citizens.

a downward trend in public debt targeted from 2019The Government has opted for measures that will, to the lowest possible extent, influence negatively the economy and public. Special focus is placed on the increase in fiscal discipline, thereby striving to directly influence the decline in the volume of informal economy.

february 2018 | :Bankar5

FINANCE MINISTER, DARKO RADUNOVIĆ IN AN INTERVIEW FOR THE BANKAR

Izazovi su bili brojni, a biće ih i u narednom peri-odu. Ipak, siguran sam da smo oformili dobar tim koji ima kompetencije da, sa potrebnom energijom, znanjem i posvećenošću, ostvari ono što je imperativ našeg djelovanja – kreiranje boljih uslova života za sve naše građane.

:B Tokom godine je bila intenzivna saradnja sa međunarodnim institucijama, a imali ste i konstruktivnu razmjenu podataka i mišljenja na jesenjem zasijedanju MMF-a i Svjetske banke u SAD, a potom i u zemlji. Koje su ključne poruke i zadaci koji su definisani i očekuju nas u narednom periodu?Tačno, i inače visok nivo angažovanja naših kapaci-teta na internom nivou, intenziviran je saradnjom sa Svjetskom bankom i Međunarodnim monetarnim fondom. Efekat te saradnje je kreiranje i uspješno sprovođenje dobro izbalansiranih mjera fiskalne i makroekonomske politike i operativna odlučnost u dostizanju dugoročne fiskalne stabilnosti i održivosti. Takvu ocjenu potvrdile su i pomenute finansijske institucije, naglašavajući da je Crna Gora na pravom putu snaženja svoje pozicije u međunarodnim okvi-rima i da je, već u 2017. godini, ostvarila rekordni rast ekonomije. Takav trend registrovale su i renomirane rejting agencije, pozitivno procjenjujući makroeko-nomske izglede i perspektivu Crne Gore.

U tom kontekstu je Svjetska banka krajem protekle godine donijela odluku da, kreditnom garancijom u vrijednosti od 80 miliona eura, podrži naše reforme usmjerene ka jačanju javnih finansija i otpornosti finansijskog sektora. Podržana je i ideja dodatnog finansiranja veoma uspješnog projekta MIDAS. Naime, prenijeto nam je interesovanje ove institucije da podrži projekat u oblasti održivog turizma, kao i infrastrukture i agrobiznisa.

„Izazovi su bili brojni, a biće ih i u narednom periodu. Ipak, siguran sam da smo oformili dobar tim koji ima kompetencije da, sa potrebnom energijom, znanjem i posvećenošću, ostvari ono što je imperativ našeg djelovanja – kreiranje boljih uslova života za sve naše građane“

“bankar” je znak zrelosti i ozbiljnosti struke

:B Ovim brojem časopis „Bankar“ obilježava desetogodišnjicu izlaženja i predstavlja ličnu kartu bankarstva, gdje se tretiraju operativna bankarska, ali i ekonomska kretanja u Crnoj Gori, gdje objavljuju autorske tekstove kako uvaženi profesori i bankari, tako i predstavnici EBF-a i Savjeta Evrope itd. Da li ste pratili razvoj „Bankara“ i koliko je bitno da se čuje glas struke, odnosno ljudi koji rješavaju probleme u postojećim limitima?

Rekao bih da je to od izuzetnog značaja... Znate, da biste bili uspješni u bilo kojem poslu, morate stalno učiti, biti u toku onoga što se dešava u vašem poslovnom okruženju i praviti bazu dostupnih iskustava, kako biste znali da uočite i primijenite adekvatna rješenja.

Postojanje časopisa kao što je Vaš, znak je zrelosti i ozbiljnosti struke i sposobnosti da se, na profesionalan način, prikaže aktuelno stanje, ali i trendovi u svijetu bankarstva, te da se otvori forum za razmjenu relevantnih mišljenja. Na tome Vam zaista čestitam.

Želim Vam uspješan rad i u budućem periodu, uz očekivanja da ćete i dalje doprinositi napretku struke i boljoj javnoj percepciji svijeta finansija.


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:B The cooperation with the international institutions was intensive throughout the year, and you had a constructive share of data and information at the IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings in the USA and in the country. What were the key messages and tasks defined, and what are those that are expected from us in the following period?That is correct. High level of involvement of our resources internally was also intensified through the cooperation with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The effect of such a cooperation is the creation and successful implementation of well-balanced fiscal and macro-economic policy measures and operational decisiveness to reach long-term fiscal stability and sustainability. Such assessment was confirmed by these institutions, highlighting

that Montenegro is on the right path to strengthen its position in international framework, and that it experiences a record growth in 2017. Such a trend was registered also by renowned rating agencies, which positively assessed macro-economic outlook and perspective of Montenegro.

In this context, the World Bank passed a decision at the end of the previous year to support, by issuing credit guarantee of 80 million euros, our reforms di-rected towards strengthening of public finances and resilience of the financial sector. The idea of additional funding of very successful MIDAS project was also sup-ported. Namely, we were informed that this institution is interested in supporting the projects in the area of sustainable tourism, infrastructure, and agro business.

Surely, we have to bear in mind that good results achieved in 2017 are only the beginning of overall stabilisation path that is prescribed in detail in the Fiscal Strategy. It will take a lot of determination and consistence to accomplish positive trends in all key parameters in 2020 as planned. Furthermore, we must create better maturity of public debt and inter-est repayment in timely manner, particularly bearing in mind the possibility of potential growth in cost of borrowing in international capital market due to monetary policies changes in developed countries.

“Challenges put before us were numerous, and there are going to be plenty of them in the forthcoming period. However, I am certain that we have established a good team that has competences to accomplish, with its energy, knowledge and dedication, what is imperative of our activity – creation of better living standard for all of our citizens”.

:B “bankar” is a sign of maturity and seriousness of the profession

The "Bankar" magazine celebrates 10th anniversary, and represents personal identification card of the banking industry. It tackles operational banking and economic developments in Montenegro, where texts written by well-respected professors and bankers are published, as well as texts written by representatives of the EBF and the Council of Europe. Have you followed the development of "The Bankar", and how important is it to hear the voice of the profession or the people who solve the problems within the existing limits?I would say that is of utmost importance ... You know, to be successful in any business, you must always learn, you must be updated of what is hap-pening in your business environment, and make a database of available experiences so that you know how to spot and apply adequate solutions.

The existence of a magazine like yours is a sign of the maturity and seriousness of the profession and the ability to present professionally the current state of affairs, as well as trends in the banking world, and to open a forum for exchanging rel-evant opinions. I really congratulate you on that.

I wish you a successful work in the future, with the expectation that you will continue to contribute to the advancement of the profession and better public perception of the world of finances.



Naravno, moramo imati u vidu da su dobri rezultati u 2017. samo početak ukupnog stabilizacionog puta koji je precizno opisan u Fiskalnoj strategiji. Trebaće puno upornosti i dosljednosti da, već u 2020. godini, kako smo planirali, dostignemo pozitivne trendove po svim ključnim parametrima. Pored ostalog, moramo pravovremeno kreirati bolju ročnost javnog duga i otplata kamata, posebno imajući u vidu mogućnost da, zbog promjene monetarnih prilika u razvijenim zemljama, dođe do rasta cijene zaduživanja na me-đunarodnom tržištu kapitala.

:B Koji su to najveći izazovi sa kojima će se suočiti crnogorska ekonomija u ovoj godini?Naš ključni zadatak je stvaranje pretpostavki, zapravo, izgradnja održivog modela dinamizovanja ekonomije i privrednog rasta, na platformi makroekonomske, fiskalne i finansijske stabilnosti. Naše razvojne ambicije su nesporno opravdane i nužne. S druge strane, one su, prvenstveno izgradnja autoputa što je naš strateški projekat, prirodno dovele do neuravnoteženja javnih finansija. Zato je bilo neophodno da u toku 2017. godine utvrdimo model fiskalne konsolidacije, kako bismo, već 2018. godine, ušli u fazu budžetskog suficita, a od 2019. ostvarili opadajući trend javnog duga.

U tom kontekstu, Vlada se opredijelila za mjere koje će, u najmanjoj mogućoj mjeri, negativno uticati na privredu i stanovništvo. Poseban fokus je na povećanju

fiskalne discipline, čime nastojimo da direktno uti-čemo na smanjenje obima neformalne ekonomije.

Sprovođenje takvog koncepta nije jednostavno, niti bezbolno. No, u Vladi postoji odlučnost da se sve predviđene mjere sprovedu, u čemu nas ohra-bruju rezultati iz 2017. godine. Naravno, svjesni smo da izazovi nisu isključivo pod našom kontrolom, s obzirom da male ekonomije poput crnogorske trpe značajni uticaj od eksternih ekonomskih kretanja. Ipak, ne možemo se prepustiti letargiji zbog respekta te činjenice, već moramo maksimalno raditi ono što zavisi isključivo od nas, jačajući, koliko je god to moguće, našu otpornost prema spoljnim uticajima.

:B Planirani budžet za narednu fiskalnu godinu je definisan na nivo mogućeg, ali da li ga možemo karakterisati kao razvojni budžet?Na troškovnoj strani postoje prioriteti koje ne možete zaobići, bez obzira da li se opredjeljujete za razvojnu ili socijalnu atribuciju budžeta. Država prvenstveno mora da obezbijedi svoje osnovne funkcije – obra-zovanje, zdravstvo, bezbjednost, socijalna davanja, podršku penzionom fondu...Tek kada se ti prioriteti zadovolje, po usmjerenju preostalih sredstava možemo ocijeniti u kojoj je mjeri budžet razvojno orijentisan. Ja mislim da jeste, jer smo gotovo sva preostala sred-stva od oko 290,8 miliona eura usmjerili na kapitalne razvojne projekte.

Čak 208 miliona je namijenjeno za autoput Bar-Boljare, kao najznačajniji projekat u novijoj istoriji Crne Gore. Na ostale započete i nove projekte saobraćajne infrastrukture usmjerićemo još 37,2 miliona eura, a za projekte koje realizujemo premo Direkcije javnih radova – 45,6 miliona. Posredno, razvojnu svrhu imaju i sredstva namijenjena razvoju nauke i obrazovanja, kao i implementaciji znanja i novih tehnologija u poljoprivredi i drugim privrednim sektorima. „Naše razvojne ambicije su

nesporno opravdane i nužne. S druge strane, one su, prvenstveno izgradnja autoputa što je naš strateški projekat, prirodno dovele do neuravnoteženja javnih finansija.“


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:B What are the biggest challenges Montenegrin economy will face in this year?Our key task is creating assumptions, i.e. deve-lopment of sustainable model for more dynamic economy and economic growth on the platform of macro-economic, fis-cal and financial sustai-nability. Our development ambitions are justified and necessary without any doubts. On the other hand, they naturally led, primarily the highway construction as our strategic priority, to imbalance of the public finances. Therefore, it was necessary to determine fiscal consolidation model in 2017, so that we could enter the phase of budget surplus in 2018 and from 2019 reach declining trend in public debt.

In that regard, the Government has opted for meas-ures that will, to the lowest possible extent, influence negatively the economy and public. Special focus is placed on the increase in fiscal discipline, thereby striving to directly influence the decline in the volume of informal economy.

The implementation of such a concept is neither simple nor painless. However, the Government is determined to implement all measures envisaged, whereby the 2017 results are encouraging. Of course, we are aware that the challenges are not solely un-der our control, given that small economies such as Montenegrin suffer significant influence from external economic developments. Nevertheless, we cannot tolerate lethargy due to the respect of that fact, but we must put our maximum efforts in doing what depends solely on us, strengthening our resistance to external shocks as much as possible.

:B Budget planned for the following fiscal year is defined in the level of possible, but can it be characterised as development budget?There are priorities on the expenditure side of the budget that cannot be avoided, regardless of whether you opt for development or social

attribution to the budget. The Government must primarily ensure its basic functions – education, health, security, social benefits, and support to the pension funds. Once these priorities are met, based on direction of the remaining funds, it can be assessed to which extent the budget is development-oriented. I believe it is, since we directed almost all of the re-maining funds of about 290.8 million euros to capital development projects.

Even 208 million are intended for the highway Bar-Boljare, as the most important project in the recent history of Montenegro. We are going to invest another 37.2 million euros in the infrastructure projects that have already been initiated and in new projects, and 45.6 million euros in the projects that we accomplish through the Directorate of Public Works. Funds in-tended for the development of science and education have indirectly the developmental purpose, as well as the implementation of knowledge and new tech-nologies in agriculture and other economic sectors.

:B Are you satisfied with the results of tax debt rescheduling programme and repayment of the tax debt in general, but also in the instalments, as well as with the repayment of tax debt through the sale of immovable property (by the debtor) that represent forced moves but also well-known approach for resolving the issue in developed countries – something that is done also by banks when there is no other way of collecting debts?

“Our development ambitions are justified and necessary without any doubts. On the other hand, they naturally led, primarily the highway construction as our strategic priority, to imbalance of the public finances”.



:B Da li ste zadovoljni rezultatima reprograma i otplate poreskog duga generalno, ali i programski u ratama, kao i izmirivanjem poreskog duga prodajom nekretnina (od strane dužnika), koji jesu iznuđeni potezi, ali i poznati pristup rješenja u razvijenim zemljama, što rade i banke kada nema drugog načina naplate? Koji su naredni potezi u planu, kada je zaostali poreski dug u pitanju kao naslijeđen teret?Pri ocjenjivanju efekata primjene Zakona o reprogramu, treba imati na umu motive zbog kojih je on donesen. Naime, naš osnovni cilj je bio naplata poreskih potraživa-nja i disciplinovanje dužnika, ali tako da, koliko god je to moguće, ne ugrozimo njihov poslovni opstanak, odnosno da zaštitimo radna mjesta. Uz to, željeli smo da verifi-kujemo objektivnu vrijednost ukupnog poreskog duga, a ne da se zavaravamo teorijskim iznosom potraživanja.

Imajući u vidu da Zakon predviđa reprogramiranje obaveza na rok od 60 mjeseci, poslije prve godine primjene moguće je ocijeniti samo uspješnost njegove inicijacije, ne i ukupne efekte. Prije usva-janja Zakona, naša procjena je bila da je, od ukupnog pore-skog duga objektivno naplativo cca 236 miliona. Za korišćenje prava na reprogram prijavilo se oko 6,5 hiljada obveznika čiji je ukupni poreski dug na nivou 200 miliona. Približna podudarnost naše procjene naplativosti i materijalizo-vanog reprograma je, rekao bih, prvi faktor uspješnosti primjene novog Zakona. Na žalost, gotovo je izvjesno da ostali dužnici nemaju kapacitet da izmire fiskalne obaveze, ni da opstanu na tržištu, pa će se suočiti sa stečajem i likvidaci-jom, kao jedinim preostalim rješenjem.

vlada će kreirati set novih mehanizama finansijske podrške msp

:B Kako vidite strategiju razvoja crnogorske ekonomije, koji su prioriteti, odnosno da li je razvoj malih i srednjih preduzeća i dalje prioritet za Vladu?Mala i srednja preduzeća (MSP) treba da, u bliskoj budućnosti, budu os-novna razvojna poluga crnogorske ekonomije i ključni faktor podizanja njene konkurentnosti. MSP generišu radna mjesta, povećavaju fleksilnost privredne strukture, efikasno reaguju na tržišne promjene, doprinose regionalnom uravnoteženju razvoja... No, da bi se ovako deklarisano razu-mijevanje pragmatizovalo u praksi, treba puno uraditi. Nisu u pitanju samo mjere iz nadležnosti Ministarstva koje vodim, nego i kompleks segmenata u kojima Država može i mora pomoći MSP sektor.

U tom smislu, već smo razmatrali poboljšanje postojećih i kreiranje no-vih mehanizama finansijske podrške MSP, posebno njihovim programima projektnog tipa koji predviđaju optimizaciju produktivnosti i efikasnosti poslovanja, kao i osvajanja novih segmenata ponude. Finansijski ćemo favorizovati pokretanje novog biznisa, otvaranje novih radnih mjesta, izvozno orijentisane programe, projekte inovacije ...

Ozbiljno razmatramo i sistem nefinansijske podrške MSP sektora. Stimulisaćemo sektorsku klaster-organizaciju tržišnog nastupa i druge elemente poboljšanja preduzetničke infrastrukture. Država može dosta pomoći u podizanju preduzetničkih znanja, kroz organizovanje eduka-cije, prvenstveno u domenu menadžmenta, marketinga, organizacije i planiranja. Prostor za podršku vidimo i u organizovanom pribavljanju i stavljanju na raspolaganje informacija i usluga koje su od značaja za po-slovanje u inostranstvu. Imamo namjeru da participiramo u unapređenju inovativnosti MSP, zatim u podršci ženama u biznisu. Povećanjem naših administrativnih kapaciteta aktivno ćemo doprinositi većem obimu kori-šćenja COSME, H2020 i drugih programa podrške koje je EU namijenila malim i srednjim preduzećima.

Uz sve ovo, nastojaćemo da institucionalizujemo i koordinaciju sa MSP sektorom, kako bismo kroz stalnu interakciju imali dvosmjernost komunikacije.

290 mil €u ovogodišnjem

budžetu biće usmje- reno na kapitalne razvojne projekte.


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What are the next steps in the plan when the residual tax debt is the inherited burden?When assessing the effects of the application of the Law on Rescheduling Tax Debt, it is necessary to bear in mind the motives for its adoption. Namely, our main goal was the collection of tax receivables and debtors’ discipline, without jeopardising to the maximum extent their business survival, and to protect job positions. In addition, we wanted to verify the objective value of total tax debt, and not to be fooled by the theoretical number of receivables.

Bearing in mind that the law en-visages rescheduling of obligations within 60 months, after the first year of its implementation, it is possible to evaluate only the success of its initia-tion, not the total effect. Prior to the adoption of the Law, our estimate was that approximately 236 million euros of total tax debt could be collected. Some 6.5 thousand taxpayers with a total tax debt of 200 million euros applied to use the right for rescheduling of tax debt. I would say that the closest coincidence of our assessment of collectability

and implemented rescheduling programme would be the first factor of the successful implementation of the new Law. Unfortunately, it is almost certain that other debtors will not have the capacity to repay their fiscal obligations or to survive in the market, and they will face bankruptcy and liquidation as the only remaining solution.

Majority of taxpayers respect the rescheduled re-payment. Therefore, in 2017, about 22 million euros was collected. This group of debtors covers total tax debt of about 176 million euros. On the other hand, a

number of debtors failed to meet the initial requirement, i.e. to make 10% one-off payment of their total debt. Decisions on rescheduling of their debts were immediately abolished to these debtors, and standard measures for collecting the entire debt started. This speaks on our determination to implement the Law strongly and consistently.

Taxpayers also had the possibility to pay their tax debt by ceding the immovable property. This op-tion implies a debt of over 100.000 euros because,

290 mil €in the Budget for

this year will be directed to capital

development projects.

:B government will Create a new set of meChanisms to support finanCially smesHow do you see Montenegrin economy's development strategy, what are the priorities, or whether the development of small and medium-sized enterprises remains a priority for the Government?Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) should be the basic developmental leverage of the Montenegrin economy in the near future, and a key factor in raising its competitiveness. SMEs generate jobs, increase flexibility in the economic structure, respond ef-fectively to market changes, contribute to regional balance of development ... But to make this declaration of understanding achievable in practice, much work has to be done. These are not just measures within the competence of the Ministry I run, but also the complex of segments in which the Government can and must assist the SMEs sector.

In this regard, we have already considered the improvement of the

existing and the creation of new mechanisms of financial support for SMEs, in particular their project programmes, which foresee optimi-zation of productivity and business efficiency, as well as the conquest of new supply segments. We will financially encourage new start-ups, creation of new jobs, export-oriented programmes, innovation projects ...

We also seriously consider the sys-tem of non-financial support of the SMEs sector. We will stimulate sector‘s clusters in the market and other ele-ments of improving entrepreneurial infrastructure. The Government can help a lot in raising entrepreneurial knowledge by organising training, primarily in the field of management,

marketing, organisation and planning. We also see the space for support in the providing and making available information and services that are important for business abroad. We intend to participate in improving SMEs innovation, and supporting women in business. By increasing our administrative capacity, we will actively contribute to the greater scope of the use of COSME, H2020, and other support programmes that the EU earmarked for small and medium-sized enterprises.

In addition to this, we strive to institutionalize and co-ordinate with the SME sector, so that we have a two-way communication through constant interaction.



Većina obveznika poštuje reprogramiranu dinamiku plaćanja obaveza, tako da je, već u 2017, naplaćeno oko 22 miliona eura. Ova grupa dužnika „obuhvata“ ukupan poreski dug od cca 176 miliona eura. S druge strane, jedan broj dužnika nije uspio da ispuni po-četni uslov, odnosno da jednokratno uplati 10% svog ukupnog duga. Njima su odmah ukinuta rješenja o reprogramu, uz aktiviranje standardnih mjera za na-platu cjelokupnog duga. To govori o našoj odlučnosti da Zakon dosljedno i energično sprovedemo.

Poreski dužnici su imali i mogućnost da poreski dug izmire imovinom. Ova opcija podrazumijeva dug veći od 100 hiljada eura jer, za imovinu manje vrijednosti, država nema opravdanu kalkulaciju za preuzimanje. Izmirenje duga ustupanjem imovine je jedan od mehanizama koji ide u prilog našem nastojanju da dug naplatimo na način koji je duž-niku prihvatljiv, odnosno koji neće kritično ugroziti njegovo poslovanje.

Obim primjene ove mjere je relativno mali jer je imovina dužnika, uglavnom, opterećena zalogom. Ipak, iako je u dijelu javnosti bilo kritika ove mjere, smatram da je dobro da postoji više opcija plaćanja poreskih obaveza.

Dakle, imajući u vidu početne rezultate primjene, siguran sam da je Zakon o reprogramu postavio te-melje za efikasno upravljanje poreskim dugom. Na ovaj način, uz primjenu standardnih mehanizama naplate fiskalnih obaveza, minimizovaćemo nena-plativa potraživanja i onemogućiti kumulaciju novih dugova. Vjerujem da je Zakon o reprogramu dobra pretpostavka da poreski dužnici stabilizuju poslovanje i postignu redovnost u izmirivanju poreskih obaveza, čime se čuvaju kompanije i radna mjesta, uz veće budžetske prihode.

:B Da li pozicija ministra finansija daje novi ugao gledanja na poslovanje banaka, njihovu konstruktivnost u poslovanju sa privredom i potrebama države?Moram priznati da funkcija ministra finansija pred-stavlja novi ugao mog posmatranja ukupne poslovne stvarnosti, dakle i jasnije prepoznavanje svih faktora koji determinišu poziciju i odnose svih ekonomskih subjekata.Od sposobnosti da privreda, banke i država ostvare si-nergiju zavisi ukupna produktivnost jednog ekonomskog

sistema. Parcijalni interes svakog od njih je praktično neostvariv, ako se nema u vidu interes ostalih. Svakako, postoji značajna razlika između navedenih činilaca, prije svega u targetiranoj grupi kojoj je prilagođen model poslovanja. Država je prvenstveno u poziciji da mora podmiriti potrebe svih građana i obezbijediti redovnost svih javnih funkcija. To se ne može ostvariti bez privrede kao ekonomskog generatora. Privreda je, opet, i zavisna i usmjerena ka bankama kao izvorištu finansiranja poslovanja. U tom trouglu je, rekao bih, prostor razumijevajuće interakcije. U tom okviru sagledavam ulogu države koja će sve svoje javne politike korelirati sa drugim subjektima i vrednovati sa aspekta njihove stimulativne biznis-orijentacije.


12


the Government does not have a reasonable take-over calculation for immovable property of smaller value. The repayment of debt by ceding the immovable property is another mechanism that goes hand in hand with our ef-fort to collect debt in a manner that is acceptable to the debtor or that will not seriously jeopardize his business.

The volume of implementing this measure is relatively small because the debtor's property is, in general, bur-dened by a pledge. Nevertheless, although part of the public criticized this measure, I consider that it is good that there are more options for repayment of tax liabilities.

Therefore, given the initial results of implementation, I am sure that the Law on Rescheduling Tax Debt has laid the foundations for efficient tax debt administration. In

this way, by applying standard mechanisms for collecting tax liabilities, we will minimize uncol-lectable claims and disable the ac-cumulation of new debts. I believe that the Law on Rescheduling of Tax Debt is a good prerequisite for taxpayers to stabilise their business and to achieve regular-ity in repayment of tax liabilities, thereby maintaining companies and job positions, with higher budget revenues.

:B Does the Finance Minister's mandate provide a new view on banking operations, their constructiveness in business with the economy, and the needs of the Government?I must admit that the mandate of finance minister gives a new view to the overall business reality, and therefore a clearer recogni-tion of all factors that determine the position and relations of all economic entities.

The overall productivity of an economic system depends on the ability of the economy, banks and governments to achieve synergy. The partial interest of each of them

is practically non-existent, if the interest of the others is lacking. Of course, there is a significant difference between the mentioned factors, primarily in the target group which has a tailored business model. The Government is primarily in a position to meet the needs of all citizens and to ensure the regularity of all public functions. This cannot be achieved without the economy as an economic generator. The economy is, again, dependent and focused on banks as a source of business financing. In that tri-angle, I would say, there is a space for understanding the interaction. I see the role of the Government within this framework that will align all its public policies with other entities and evaluate them from the aspect of their stimulating business orientation.



Po pitanju ulaganja u digitalne valute i njihove upotrebe, cen-

tralne banke su se prilično različito postavile. Tako su neke zemlje, poput Indije, zabranile upotrebu privatnih kriptovaluta. Jedan broj nacionalnih banaka još uvijek „ispituje“ teren, dok druge razmišljaju o uvođenju sopstvenih digitalnih valuta. Ipak, najveći broj centralnih banaka upo-zorava na rizike koji nosi njihova upotreba. Istakao bih upozorenje koje je, u junu prošle godine, iznio guverner Banke Francuske Francois Villeroy de Galhau savjetujući "veliki oprez sa bitkoinom, zato što iza njega ne stoji nijedna javna institucija, koja bi obezbijedila kredibilitet. U prošlosti su se primjeri privatnog novca loše završili".

Ideja o privatnom novcu nije nova i ona datira još od Hajeka koji je, prije četrdesetak godina, napisao da isključivo pravo na emitovanje novca i regulisanje monetarnih tokova od strane države nije proizvelo ništa bolji novac od onoga koji bi inače postojao da država ne vrši pomenute funkcije. Nakon globalne finansijske krize, pojavile se se prve digitalne

valute, sa idejom da to bude novac nezavisan od vlada i koji ne bi bio podložan inflaciji. Najpoznatija digitalna valuta je bitkoin i iza nje ne stoji nijedna institucija. Emisiju

bitkoina odrađuje programerski kod, a za svakodnevna plaćanja nijesu potrebne finansijske institucije, jer za to postoji blokčein tehnologija.

S obzirom da su digitalne valute

Digitalne valute - veliki oprezDigitalne privatne valute su postale realnost i, prema procjenama, u ovom trenutku ih ima preko 1.000 vrsta. Stoga ne čudi što se veoma često postavlja pitanje da li ulagati u digitalne valute ili ne. U ovom trenutku, njihovo korišćenje u Crnoj Gori, kao ni u eurozoni, nije regulisano i to otvara mnogo dilema.

Dr Nikola Fabris viceguverner Centralne banke Crne Gore


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MJEHUR BEZ REGULACIJE

With regard to the investment in digital currencies and

their use, the central banks have quite different views. Thus, some countries, like India, prohibited the use of private cryptocurren-cies. A number of national banks still examines this area, while others consider the introduction of their own digital currencies. However, the largest number of central banks warns the risks of their use. I would like to point out the warning expressed in June last year by the Bank of France Governor, Francois Villeroy de Galhau, advising“great caution with respect to bitcoin because there is no public institution be-hind it to provide confidence. In history all examples of private currencies ended badly”.

The idea of private money is not new and it dates back to Hayek who, some forty years ago, wrote that the governments’ exclusive right to issue money and regulate monetary flows did not give us better money than that would have otherwise existedif the

governments did not perform the said functions. After the global financial crisis, the first digital currencies emerged with the idea of being independent from the governments and not subject to inflation. The most famous digital currency is bitcoin, and no institution stands behind it. A programmer’s code processes the bitcoin mining, and financial institutions are not needed for daily payments; instead it is done by blockchain technology.

Since digital currencies are very weakly accepted as means of payment, it cannot be said that they assumed the main func-tion of money. The Governor of the Bank of Japan, Haruhiko Kuroda, had once said that“bitcoin is being traded for investment or speculative purposes”. Similar opinion was also expressed by European Central Bank (ECB) Vice-President Vitor Constancio, who said that “bitcoin is not a currency but sort of a tulip”, al-luding to a price bubble of the Dutch tulip mania in 17th century.

Digital Currencies: great CautionPrivate digital currencies have become the reality and currently, according to estimates, there are over 1000 types of these currencies. Therefore, it is no surprise that frequently asked question is whether to invest in them or not. Currently, their use in Montenegro, as well as in euro area, is not regulated, and it opens many dilemmas.

Nikola Fabris, PhD Vice-Governor of the Central Bank of Montenegro


BUBBLE WITHOUT REGULATION

veoma slabo prihvaćene kao sred-stvo plaćanja, ne može se reći da su one preuzele ovu, osnovnu funkciju novca. Jednom prilikom, guverner Banke Japana Haruhiko Kurodaje rekao da se "bitkoinom trguje za investiranje ili iz spekulativnih ra-zloga". Slično mišljenje je iznio i potpredsjednik Evropske centralne banke Vitor Constancio rekavši da „bitkoin nije valuta, već lala“, čime je aludirao na cjenovni mjehur koje su napravile lale u Holandiji u XVII vi-jeku. Takođe, guverner Bundesbanke Jens Wiedman je istakao da kretanje bitkoina ima izrazito spekulativni karakter. Ipak, najjasnija je bila zamjenica guvernera Banke Kanade Carolyn Wilkins koja je istakla da "kripto valute nijesu pravi oblik novca, već aktiva ili vrsta hartija od vrijednosti i tako ih treba tretirati". U iznošenju negativnog stava prema bitkoinu, najoštriji je bio guverner Banke federalnih rezervi Australije Philip Lowe, kada je istakao da njih

mnogo više koriste kriminalci nego obični građani.

Na pitanje da li je moguće da se vrijednost nekog elektronskog zapisa ili neke druge aktive u rela-tivno kratkom vremenskom periodu drastično uveća, odgovor je potvr-dan. U istoriji je bilo puno takvih primjera. U pitanju su bili klasični cjenovni mjehurići koji su prije ili kasnije „pucali“, što je rezultiralo ostvarivanjem enormne zarade od strane malobrojnih pojedinaca,koji bi na vrijeme izašli. Sa druge strane, ogroman broj drugih je bilježio

masovne gubitke. Kada bismo svi "ru-darili" i trgovali di-gitalnim valutama, a zanemarili realnu proizvodnju, jasno je da bi takvo druš-tvo bilo osuđeno na propast. To je, uo-stalom, bila i jedna od lekcija globalne finansijke krize, da se ne možemo svi baviti finansijskim uslugama, a zapo-stavljati realnu proizvodnju.

Digitalne valute nemaju ni drugu

bitnu funkciju novca, tj. one nijesu mjerilo vrijednosti, jer danas gotovo da ne postoji nijedan proizvod čija se vrijednost isključivo iskazuje u digitalnim valutama.

Ove valute nemaju ni treću funk-ciju novca, tj. nijesu čuvar vrijednosti.Naime, kada posjedujete novac, vaše očekivanje je da će on imati približno istu vrijednost u budućnosti. Sa druge strane, vrijednost digitalnih valuta u budućnosti ne može niko ni približno da procjeni.

Iako iz navedenog proizilazi ja-san zaključak da digitalne valute ustvari i nijesu pravi novac, one su postale realnost i njih će biti sve teže ignorisati. Očekivanja su da će, u narednom periodu, sve više zemalja započeti proces njihovog regulisanja. Izvesno je da je blo-kchain tehnologija nešto što otvara prostor i za unapređenje postojećih finansijskih sistema.

Crna Gora, kao zemlja u procesu pristupanja EU, svakako treba da sli-jedi regulaciju koju donese Evropska centralna banka. Međutim, sve dok ove valute ne postanu široko prihva-ćeno sredstvo plaćanja, odnosno dok ne dobiju sva obilježja novca (sredstvo plaćanja, mjerilo vrednosti, čuvar vrijednosti), treba biti vrlo oprezan sa investiranjem u iste.

“Zaključak je da digitalne valute ustvari i nijesu pravi novac, ali postaju realnost i njih će biti sve teže ignorisati. Očekivanja su da će, u narednom periodu, sve više zemalja započeti proces njihovog regulisanja.

veliki rast je rezultat spekulaCijaImajući u vidu da činjenicu da je npr.vrijednost bitkoina, za vrlo kratak vremenski period, porasla sa 1.000 na 20.000 dolara, uz ve-like fluktuacije, jasno je da je ovakvo kretanje njegove vrijednosti rezultat spekulativnih faktora. Evidentno je da se iz ovakvog kretanja može ostvariti velika spekulativna dobit, ali i ogroman gubitak. Na veliki oprez upućuje i činjenica da iza bitkoina i ostalih digitalnih valuta ne stoji nijedan monetarni autoritet i nijedna država, da ne postoji nikakva zaštita u slučaju kvara tehnološke platforme, da su plaćanja ovom valutom minorna, te da ove valute nemaju nikakvo realno pokriće.


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MJEHUR BEZ REGULACIJE

Also, Bundesbank Governor Jens Weidmann highlighted that the development of bitcoin has no-ticeably speculative character.However,Senior Deputy Governor at the Bank of Canada, Carolyn Wilkins, clearly pointed out that “cryptocurrencies are not really the form of money, but assets or securities, so they should be treated in that way”. Australia’s RBA Governor, Philip Lowe, was the most severe in expressing nega-tive position on bitcoin when he pointed out that it is more used by criminals than by ordinary people.

There is a positive answer on whether it is possible to increase dramatically the value of an elec-tronic note or other assets in relatively short period. The his-tory shows a lot of examples in that respect. There were classical price bubbles that sooner or later burst, which resulted in mak-ing enormous income by small number of individuals that would withdraw on time. On the other hand, a large number of other type of individuals recorded huge losses. If all of us would mine and trade with digital currencies, and neglect real output, it is clear that

the society will be doomed. In fact, this was one of the lessons learned from the global financial crisis, that all of us cannot be engaged in financial services and neglect real output.

Digital currencies do not have second important function of money, i.e. they are not units of account, since nowadays there is virtually no product which value is exclusively expressed by digital currencies.

These currencies do not possess third function of money, i.e. they do not store value. Namely, when a person owns money, he expects that it will have ap-proximately the same value in the future. On the other hand, the value of digital currencies in the future cannot be estimated not even close.

Although it can be drawn clear conclusion from the above-mentioned that digital currencies in fact are not real money; they have become real-ity, and it will be more difficult to ignore them. It is expected that increasing number of countries will start regulating them in the future. It is certain that blokchain technology is

something that opens a room also for improvement of financial systems.

As a country in the process of the EU accession, Montenegro surely should follow the regula-tion adopted by the European Central Bank. However, until these currencies become widely accepted means of payment, i.e. until they obtain all characteristics of money (medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value), one should be very cautious in investing in these currencies.

high growth is the result of speCulationsBearing in mind the fact that the value of bitcoin has increased for very short period from 1,000 USD to 20,000 USD with high fluctua-tions, it is clear that such a trend in its value is the result of speculative factors. It is obvious that high speculative income can be earned from such a trend, but also an enormous loss can be incurred. Another fact that points to the great caution is that no monetary authority or state stands behind bitcoin and other digital currencies. There is no protection in case of failure of technological platform, the pay-ments in this currency are small, and these currencies do not have any real coverage.

“It can be concluded that digital currencies in fact are not real money; they have become reality, and it will be more difficult to ignore them. It is expected that increasing number of countries will start regulating them in the future”.


BUBBLE WITHOUT REGULATION

USPNFT je, shodno međunarodnim standardima, u svom radu samostalan i nezavistan, a to se ogleda u sljedećem: ■ analitičkim alatima se vrši obrada i analiza poda-taka, nakon čega se, na osnovu procjene službenika Uprave, informacije prosleđuju nadležnim organima i institucijama;

■ analizira se stepen rizika transakcija (sumnja u vezi sa transakcijama i licima) i na osnovu procjene istog službenici Uprave predlažu eventualno otvaranje predmeta;

■ USPNFT vrši nezavisnu provjeru lica i transakcija na osnovu pisane i obrazložene inicijativedrugih nadležnih organa (tužilaštva, policije, i dr.)

■ USPNFT je nepristrasna u svom radu, a to se ogleda u tome što procesuira i obrađuje sve transakcije i lica kada postoji sumnja da se radi o pranju novca i/ili finansiranju terorizma, kao i u tome što postupa po svim prijavama o sumnjivim transakcijama.

zakonska regulativa usklađena sa međunarodnim propisimaZakonska regulativa u Crnoj Gori iz oblasti sprječavanja pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma u velikom dijelu je harmonizovana sa relevantnim propisima iz ove oblasti i prati preporuke međunarodnih institucija.

Tokom 2017. godine USPNFT je u saradnji sa nad-ležnim državnim organima pristupila izradi Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o sprječavanju pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma, sa kojim će se izvršiti dodatno usaglašavanje sa IV Direktivom EU o sprječavanju upotrebe finansijskog sistema u svrhe pranja novca ili finansiranja terorizma, kao i sa novim Preporukama FATF-a (Radne grupe za finansijske mjere u borbi protiv pranja novca) iz 2012. godine i sa preporukama Komiteta Savjeta Evrope za evalua-ciju mjera u borbi protiv pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma (MONEYVAL). Inovirani standardi i obaveze koje proističu iz IV

Potrebna stalna usavršavanja da bi otklonili rizik

Vesko Lekić, direktor Uprave za sprječavanje pranja novca i

finansiranja terorizma

Uprava za sprječavanje pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma (USPNFT), je centralni organ u borbi protiv pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma u Crnoj Gori, a prema međunarodnim standardima organizovana je kao finansijsko obavještajna služba administrativnog tipa, koja se bavi prikupljanjem, analizom i dostavljanjem podataka, informacija i dokumentacije o sumnjivim transakcijama nadležnim državnim organima na dalje postupanje u cilju sprječavanja i otkrivanja pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma.


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UPRAVA ZA SPRJEČAVANJE PRANJA NOVCA I FINANSIRANJA TERORIZMA

The APML/TF is, according to international standards, independent and autonomous in its work, and this is reflected in the following: ■ analytical tools used for data processing and analysing, after which, on the basis of the evaluation of the Administration staff, the information is forwarded to the competent authorities and institutions;

■ level of transaction risk is analysed (suspicion regarding transactions and persons) and based on its assessment, Administration staff proposes possible opening of the case;

■ the APML/TF conducts independent verification of persons and transactions based on written and explained initiatives of the competent authorities (prosecutors, police);

■ the APML/TF is impartial in its work, which is reflected in processing all transactions and persons when there is a suspicion of money laundering and / or terrorist financing as well as dealing with all reports on suspi-cious transactions.

legal regulation aligned with international regulationsThe legal regulations in Montenegro in the area of money laundering and terrorist financing have been largely aligned with relevant regulations in this area and it follows the recommendations of international institutions.

In 2017, the APML/TF, in cooperation with the competent government authorities, has begun drafting the Law amending the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, which will be further aligned with the IV EU Directive on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing, as well as with the new FATF Recommendations of 2012 and with the recommendations of the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL).

Permanent improvements needed to eliminate risk The Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (APML/TF) is a central authority in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in Montenegro, and according to the international standards, it has been organised as a financial intelligence unit of the administrative type, which deals with the collection, analysis and submission of data, information and documentation on suspicious transactions to the competent government authorities for further action in order to prevent and detect money laundering and terrorist financing.

Vesko Lekić, Director of the Administration for the Prevention of Money Launderingand Terrorist Financing


ADMINISTRATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERINGAND TERRORIST FINANCING

Direktive i 40 novih preporuka FATF-a, postavljaju složenije zahtjeve prema sistemima sprječavanja pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma zemalja članica Savjeta Evrope, te je neophodno kontinuirano sprovođenje mjera i aktivnosti u cilju primjene tih standarda, kao i praćenje same implemenatcije u cilju procjene efikasnosti.

preventivne mjere i obukaUSPNFT pored svoje primarne djelatnosti - sprječavanja pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma, akcenat stavlja i na preventivno djelovanje u oblasti sprječavanja pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma, uključujući indirektni (administrativni) nadzor i obuku obveznika (banaka, finansijskih institucija, investicionih fondova, društava za životno osiguranje i dr.).

Zakonom o sprječavanju pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma (Zakon o SPNFT) je propisana obaveza dostavljanja podataka USPNFT od strane obveznika, kad ovlašćeno lice istog utvrdi postojanje osnova sumnje u krivično djelo pranja novca ili finansiranja terorizma. Dakle, ovlašćeno lice dostavlja izvještaj o sumnjivim transakcijama (STR) ukoliko ocjeni da postoji dovoljan osnov sumnje da su sredstva, određene transakcije, lica ili poslovanje klijenta po-vezani sa pranjem novca, finansiranjem terorizma i sa njima povezanim krivičnim djelima. Kao sredstvo za utvrđivanje osnova sumnje su liste indikatora koje je donijela Uprava ili koje su obveznici utvrdili inter-nim procedurama i pravilnicima.Kontrolu primjene ovih pravila, procedura i indikatora, prilikom ocjene osnova sumnje od strane ovlašćenih lica banaka, te dostavljanja izvještaja USPNFT, vrši Centralna banka Crne Gore (CBCG) kao nadzorni organ. Banke su najveći obveznici USPNFT i najčešći subjekti preko kojih postoji mogućnost da se novac pokušava oprati.

Takođe, banka-obveznik je dužna da, pri prepozna-vanju transakcija za koje postoji osnov sumnje da su povezane sa pranjem novca i finansiranjem terorizma koristi, osim liste indikatora za prepoznavanje sum-njivih klijenata i transakcija i neposredna saznanja, iskustva i bankarske procedure, kao i da na osnovu internog akta o analizi rizika izvrši procjenu rizičnosti klijenta i transakcije u vezi mogućnosti zloupotrebe u svrhu pranja novca ili finansiranja terorizma.

u 2017. povećan broj prijavaTokom 2017. godine USPNFT je značajno povećala broj svojih inicijativa, tj. obavještenja upućenih prema drugim nadležnim organima koja ukazuju na sumnju u pranje novca ili finansiranje terorizma, odnosno na druga kri-vična djela koja se gone po službenoj dužnosti.

Možemo konstatovati da je u prilogu tome doprinijela i činjenica povećanja kako broja, tako i kvaliteta,inicijativa USPNFT nastalih kao rezultat svakodnevne obrade sop-stvene baze podataka, kao i prijava sumnjivih transak-cija/sumnjivih poslovanja koje su dostavljane od strane obveznika.

Rezultat navedenih napora, koji se ogleda u broju inicijal-nih obavještenja praćenih analizom finansijskih podataka, koje USPNFT kao nezavisni finansijsko obavještajni organ upućuje drugim organima i svojom inicijativom uzrokuje pokretanje finansijskih i drugih istraga, jeste duplo veći broj obavještenja upućenih nadležnim državnim organima tokom 2017. godine, u odnosu na 2016. godinu.

U prilog ovoj tvrdnji pokazuju preliminarni statistički podaci za 2017.godinu, po kojima je Upravi dostavljeno 210 prijava o sumnjivim transakcija/sumnjivim poslova-njima od strane obveznika.

Na osnovu navedenih prijava, kao i na osnovu procjene Uprave, gdje su određene redovne tranksacije prijavljene od obveznika prepoznate kao sumnjive, ukupno je otvo-reno 306 predmeta, i izvršeno 110 neposrednih kontola kod obveznika. Od navedenih otvorenih predmeta i izvršenih kontrola, od strane USPNFT tokom 2017. godine, proslijeđeno je na sopstvenu inicijativu ukupno 115 obavještenja, i to: ■ Upravi policije: 17 obavještenja; ■ nadležnim državnim tužilaštvima: 63 obavještenja; ■ Poreskoj upravi: 12 obavještenja; ■ ANB-u: 22 obavještenja; ■ Upravi za inspekcijski nadzor: 1 obavještenje.


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važno je znati prepoznati potenCijalni rizikZakonom o sprječavanju pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma su propisane kaznene mjere ukoliko banka ne obavijesti Upravu o postojanju sumnjive transakcije.

U saradnji sa CBCG pokušavamo da pojačamo kon-trolu banaka i ovlašćenih lica kod banaka, s obzirom na to da su identifikovane pojave kada ovlašćeno lice ne prijavljuje evidentnu sumnjivu transakciju.Takođe, zbog uloge koju banke imaju u finansijskom sistemu i njihove izloženosti riziku od pranja novca neophodno je stalno usavršavanje kadrova kako bi se što kvali-tetnije prepoznali potencijalni rizici, a posebno rizici koje nose novi trendovi u savremenom bankarstvu.

USPNFT kroz seminare, radionice i savjetovanja aktivno učestvuje u edukaciji ovlašćenih lica obveznika i zaposlenih koji imaju direktan kontakt sa klijentom. Takođe, redovno održava radne sastanke sa ovlašćenim licima banaka, na kojima se između ostalog poseban akcenat stavlja na kvalitet rada ovlašćenih lica, kao i unapređenju kvaliteta prijavljivanja sumnjivih tran-sakcija pored aktuelnih pitanja koja se javljaju tokom rada.Takođe, pored edukacije obveznika, Uprava aktivno radi i na pospješivanju međuinstitucijalne saradnje. Naime, pomenuto podrazumijeva, između ostalog, organizovanje obuka i radionica za predstav-nike organa uključenih u borbu protiv pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma, gdje službenici USPNFT, zajedno sa predstavnicima drugih organa, razmjenjuju iskustva iz prakse. Pored toga, poslovne banke preko svojih ovlašćenih lica za SPNFT dužne su da sprovode kontinuirane obuke zaposlenih i o tome kroz svoje redovne godišnje izvještaje obavještavaju USPNFT.

Međutim, za dio obveznika koji pripadaju nefi-nansijskom sektoru, može se reći da ima prostora za poboljšanje u oblasti primjene Zakona o SPNFT.

porast zloupotreba novih tehnologija i internetaPrema analizama urađenim u 2017.godini od strane USPNFT, primjetno je da su pojedina pravna lica uključena u izvršenje krivičnih djela utaje poreza putem zaključivanja fiktivnih pravnih poslova, gdje preko drugih pravnih lica izvlače novac podizanjem gotovine. Po osnovu toga, od strane Uprave pro-slijeđen je veći broj obavještenja prema nadležnim državnim organima, a koji se odnose na ovakav vid protivzakonitog poslovanja.

Dalje, što se tiče USPNFT, naše analize ukazuju na sumnju da glavni izvor nelegalno stečenih sredstava koja se pokušavaju ubaciti u legalne tokove potiče od trgovine narkoticima, internet prevara, trgovina finansijskim instrumentima (razne platforme za tr-govanje, binarnim opcijama, valutama itd.), prometa nekretninama.

Takođe, analize prijavljenih sumnjivih transakcija, koje je USPNFT obrađivala tokom 2017. godine uka-zuju na to, da najveći dio sredstava koja se plasiraju kroz različite forme, potiču sa off shore destina-cija: Britanska Djevičanska Ostrva, Sejšeli, Panama, Maršalska ostrva i dr.

Prilikom razmjene podataka sa stranim finansijsko obavještajnim službama (FOS) uočena je promjena u trendovima pranja novca, odnosno, primjetan je porast slučajeva zloupotrebe novih tehnologija i interneta u svrhe pranja novca, gdje se uglavnom radi o neovla-šćenim instrukcijama za plaćanje putem interneta.

Pojava ovih novih trendova u velikoj mjeri uslo-žnjava i pristup i način bavljenja ovom problematikom na međunarodnom planu, zahtijeva kontinuirano usavršavanje i unapređenje sistema za borbu protiv pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma, kao i nepre-kidnu i efikasnu saradnju svih aktera sistema SPN/FT, kako na nacionalnom, tako i na regionalnom i međunarodnom nivou.

sve značajnija međunarodna i regionalna saradnjaTokom 2017. godine Uprava je ostvarila značajnu sa-radnju sa stranim finansijsko obavještajnim službama, relevantnim međunarodnim organizacijama i tijelima.

Osim toga, Uprava kontinuirano radi na ispunja-vanju međunarodnih kriterijuma i standarda, koji su znatno pooštreni, shodno potrebi da se nacionalni državni sistemi za sprječavanje pranja novca i finan-siranja terorizma u najvećoj mogućoj mjeri ojačaju u cilju efikasne i uspješne borbe protiv navedenih krivičnih djela.

Članstvom u Egmont grupi (međunarodna mreža finansijsko obavještajnih službi), USPNFT je omo-gućeno da, posredstvom „Egmont secureweb” sajta, razmjenjuje podatke sa 154 države članice, kao i da redovno učestvuje na plenarnim zasijedanjima i na sastancima radnih grupa Egmont grupe. Jačanje saradnje sa finansijsko obavještajnim službama odvija se i kroz


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The new standards and obligations deriving from the IV Directive and new 40 FATF recommendations pose more complex demands on money laundering and terrorist financing systems of member states of the Council of Europe, and it is necessary to continuously implement measures and activities for the purpose of applying these standards, as well as monitoring their implementation in order to evaluate efficiency.

Preventive Measures and TrainingIn addition to its primary activity - prevention of

money laundering and terrorist financing, the APML/TF also focuses on preventive action in the area of money laundering and terrorist financing, including indirect (administrative) supervision and training of obligors (banks, financial institutions, investment funds, life assurance companies, etc.).

The Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Law on PML/TF) stipulates the obligation of submitting data to the APML/TF by the obligors when the compliance officer establishes the existence of grounds for suspicion in the criminal offense of money laundering or terrorist financing. Therefore, the compliance officer submits suspicious transactions report (STR) if it considers that there are sufficient grounds for suspicion that funds, certain transactions, persons or client business are associated with money laundering, terrorist financing and related criminal offenses. The list of indicators issued by the Administration or those established by the obligors in their internal procedures and rulebooks are used for determining the grounds for suspicion. The Central Bank of Montenegro (CBCG), as supervisory authority, controls the application of these rules, procedures and indicators when assessing the grounds of suspicion by compliance officers of banks, and submission of the report to the APML/TF. Banks are the largest obligors of the APML/TF and the most common entities over which there is a possibility that money is laundered.

Also, a bank-obligor is obliged to use, other than the list of indicators for identifying suspicious clients and transactions, in recognition of transactions for which there is a suspicion that they are related to money laundering and terrorist financing, direct knowledge, experience and banking procedures. It is also obliged to assess, based on the internal docu-ment on risk analysis, the client's risk and transactions

number of reports inCreased in 2017During 2017, the APML/TF significantly increased its number of initiatives, i.e. notifications sent to other competent authorities indicating suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, or other offenses that have been carried out ex officio.

This was supported by the fact that the number and quality of the initiatives of the APML/TF increased as a result of the daily processing of its own database, as well as the reports of suspicious transactions / suspicious activities that were submitted by the obligors.

The result of these efforts, which was reflected in the number of initial reports followed by the analysis of finan-cial data that the APML/TF, as an independent financial intelligence unit, sends to other bodies, and initiates the financial and other investigations, was twice higher number of reports sent to the relevant state authorities in 2017 compared to 2016.

This statement is supported by preliminary statistics for 2017 that 210 reports of suspicious transactions / suspi-cious activities were submitted to the Administration by the obligors.

Based on the above mentioned reports, as well as on the basis of the Administration estimates, where certain regular transactions reported by obligors were identified as suspicious, 306 cases were opened, and 110 on-site controls were carried out with obligors. Out of these open cases and the controls carried out by the APML/TF during 2017, a total of 115 reports were forwarded to its own initiative, namely to the following institutions: ■ Police Administration: 17 reports; ■ competent state prosecutors offices: 63 reports; ■ Tax Administration: 12 reports; ■ Agency for National Security: 22 reports; ■ Inspection Directorate: 1 report.



regarding the possibilities of misuse for the purpose of money laundering or terrorist financing.

it is important to reCognise potential risk The Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing of Terrorism prescribes sanctions if the bank does not notify the Administration of the existence of suspicious transactions.

In cooperation with the CBCG, we are trying to strengthen the supervision of banks and compliance officers in banks, given that cases when a compliance officer did not report an obvious suspicious transaction were identified. Moreover, due to the role the banks have in the financial system and their exposure to money laundering risk, an ongoing of staff is needed in order to recognise potential risks, and especially the risks posed by new trends in modern banking.

The APML/TF actively participates through seminars, workshops and consultations in the education of compli-ance officers of obligors and employees who have direct contact with the client. Also, it regularly maintains work-ing meetings with compliance officers of banks, where it particularly emphasizes, inter alia, quality of work of compliance officers, as well as the improvement of the quality of reporting of suspicious transactions in addition to current issues occurring during work. In addition to the education of obligors, the Administration actively works on the improvement of inter-institutional co-operation. Namely, this includes, among other things, the organisation of trainings and workshops for representatives of bodies involved in the fight against money laundering and ter-rorist financing, where the APML/TF staff, together with representatives of other bodies, exchange experience from practice. In addition, commercial banks are obliged to carry out through their compliance officers for PML/TF continuous training of employees and notify the APML/TF through their regular annual reports.

However, there is a room for improvement in the area of application of the Law on PML/TF for a portion of obligors from the non-financial sector.

Increase of Misuses of New Technologies and InternetAccording to the analysis conducted by the APML/TF

in 2017, it is noted that some legal persons were involved in the execution of the criminal offenses of tax evasion by concluding fictitious legal transactions and withdrawing cash through other legal entities. In that respect, a number of notices issued by Administration was forwarded to

competent government authorities regarding this type of illegal business.

Furthermore, as far as the APML/TF is concerned, our analysis indicates the suspicion that the main source of illegally acquired assets, intended for insertion legal flows, originate from trafficking in narcotics, internet fraud, financial instrument trading (various trading platforms, binary options, currencies, etc.), and real estate transactions.

Also, the analysis of reported suspicious transactions, which were processed by the APML/TF during 2017, suggests that the largest portion of funds placed through various forms, originate from by offshore destinations: the British Virgin Islands, Seychelles, Panama, Marshall Islands and the like.

When exchanging information with During the exchange of information with the Foreign Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), a change in money laundering trends was noticed, i.e., there has been an increase in cases of misuse of new technologies and the Internet for money launder-ing, mainly involving unauthorised payment instructions via the internet.

The emergence of these new trends largely complicates the approach and the method of dealing with this issue at the international level; it requires continuous training and improvement of the system of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as the continuous and efficient cooperation of all participants of the PML / FT system, both at the national and regional and international level.

growing importanCe of international and regional CooperationDuring 2017, the Administration achieved significant cooperation with foreign financial intelligence units, relevant international organisations and bodies.

In addition, the Administration is constantly work-ing on meeting international criteria and standards, which are considerably intensified, due to the need to strengthen national state systems for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing to the fullest extent possible in order to effectively and successfully combat these crimes.

By joining the Egmont Group (the International Financial Intelligence Unit Network), the APML/TF has been able to exchange data with 154 member states via the Egmont secureweb site and regularly participate in plenary sessions and meetings of the Egmont working groups. Strengthening of the cooperation with financial intelligence units also



potpisivanje sporazuma o saradnji i razmjeni finan-sijsko obavještajnih po-dataka. U skladu sa tim u 2017. Godini potpisan je Sporazum sa Finansijsko obavještajnim centrom Južnoafričke Republike, što predstavlja trideset i peti sporazum koji je Uprava do sada potpi-sala. Tokom 2017. go-dine Uprava je stranim finansijsko obavještajnim službama (FOS) uputila 209 zahtjeva, dok je od stranih FOS primila 46 zahtjeva za informacijama.

Ulažući napore na unapređenju saradnje na me-đunarodnom nivou, predstavnici Uprave redovno prisustvuju plenarnim zasijedanjima i sarađuju sa Evroazijskom grupom za borbu protiv pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma. U ovoj grupi evro-azijskih zemalja, koja je osnovana 2004. godine, Crna Gora ima status posmatrača od juna 2010. godine.

Osim navedenog, značajni napori se ulažu i u unapređenje regionalne saradnje. Redovna godišnja regionalna konferencija šefova finansijsko obavještajnih službi održana je u Sloveniji,u novembru 2017.godine. Neke od tema konferencije bile su: pranje novca kroz zloupotrebu virtuelnih valuta, nove tipologije pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma, unapređenje zakono-davstva u odnosu na efikasniju razmjenu podataka.

međunarodne instituCije prepoznale napredak Crne goreUSPNFT je u saradnji sa Svjetskom bankom i mi-sijom OEBS u Crnoj Gori, a uz značajnu podršku Evropske komisije, krajem 2015. godine zaokružila projekat Nacionalne procjene rizika (NPR), u skladu sa

obavezom predviđenom u preporuci broj 1 FATF (jedna od 40 preporuka kojima se uspostavljaju međunarodni standardi - obaveza zemlje da izvrši samoprocjenu rizika od PN i FT). Nacionalna procjena rizika (NPR) predstavlja sveobuhva-tan proces prikupljanja i analize relevantnih poda-taka, sa ciljem da se pro-cijeni stepen izloženosti pojedinačnih sektora

pranju novca i finansiranju terorizma. Njena svrha je sagledavanje mogućnosti za efikasno angažovanje raspoloživih finansijskih, tehničkih i ljudskih resursa u borbi protiv finansijskog kriminala.

Završni dokument se sastojao iz procjene rizičnosti svih sektora u oblasti pranja novca na nacionalnom nivou, tj. procjene njihove ranjivosti, kao i Akcionog plana koji predviđa mjere koje je potrebno preduzeti kako bi se smanjio uticaj identifikovanih rizika.

Pored navedenog bitno je istaći da su najznačajnije međunarodne institucije i organizacije u proteklom periodu prepoznale napredak Crne Gore u borbi pro-tiv pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma i pozitivno ocijenili zakonodovnu aktivnost koja se ogleda u dodatnom usaglašavanju Zakona o SPNFT sa me-đunarodnim standardima i preporukama. Takođe, pozitivni komentari sa međunarodnih adresa stigli su i na račun saradnje sa tužilaštvom i policijom i procesuiranja predmeta vezanih za pranje novca i finansiranje terorizma.

Dakle, ovakvi komentari su signal da imamo dobar preventivni sistem koji Crnu Goru sve više udaljava od zemalja koje imaju problema sa pranjem novca i finansiranjem terorizma.

unaprijeđen informaCioni sistemVažno je napomenuti da je USPNFT kroz IPA projekat "Podrška EU vladavini prava u Crnoj Gori" izradila novi softver za svoje potrebe, te time izvršila zamjenu i unapređenje informacionog sistema u Upravi.

Ovaj dio sistema ima značajno veće mogućnosti u odnosu na stari, a posebno u smislu validacije podataka, povećanog stepena bezbjednosti i brzine razmjene podataka sa obveznicima. Svi obveznici su sada u mogućnosti da uz minimalna ulaganja koriste elektronski sistem za izvještavanje i razmjenu podataka i dokumenata.

Ovim sistemom su unaprijeđene i aktivnosti vezane za analizu, otvaranje i vođenje predmeta, razmjenu dokumenata i podataka unutar USPNFT. Takođe je uvedena mogućnost prenosa papirne dokumentacije u elektronski format i njeno korišćenje u daljim poslovnim procesima.

U narednom periodu, kroz finansijsku podršku fondova Evropske unije, planirano je dalje unapre-đenje informacionog sistema USPNFT, a naročito softverskih rešenja za efikasniju razmjenu podataka sa nadležnim državnim organima.


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takes place through the signing of memoranda of un-derstanding and exchange of financial intelligence data. Accordingly, in 2017, the Agreement with the Financial Intelligence Centre of South Africa was signed, which represents the thirty-fifth MoU the Administration has signed so far. During 2017, the Administration filed 209 requests with the Foreign Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), while 46 foreign requests for information were received from FIUs.

By making efforts to improve international coopera-tion, representatives of the Administration regularly at-tend plenary sessions and cooperate with the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. Since June 2010, Montenegro has a status of an observer in this group of Euro-Asian countries, which was founded in 2004.

In addition, significant efforts are also being made to improve regional co-operation. Regular annual regional conference of heads of financial intelligence units was held in Slovenia in November 2017. Some of the topics of the conference were: money laundering through the misuse of virtual currencies, new types of money laundering and terrorist financing, improvement of legislation in relation to more efficient data exchange.

international institutions reCognised montenegro progressAt the end of 2015, the APML/TF, in co-operation with the World Bank and the OECD Mission to Montenegro, along with significant support from the European Commission, completed the National Risk Assessment (NRA) project, in accordance with the commitment provided for in FATF Recommendation No. 1 (one of 40 recommendations establishing international standards - the country's obligation to carry out a self-assessment of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing). The National Risk Assessment (NRA) is a comprehensive process of gathering and analysing relevant data, with a view to assessing the level of exposure of individual sectors to money laundering and terrorist financing. Its purpose is to look at the opportunities for efficient engagement of available financial, technical and human resources in the fight against financial crime.

The final document consisted of the risk assessment of all sectors of money laundering at the national level, i.e. their vulnerability assessment, as well as the Action Plan that foresees measures to be taken to reduce the impact of the identified risks.

In addition, it is important to point out that the most important international institutions and organizations have recognised the progress of Montenegro in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financ-ing in the past period and have positively assessed the legislative activity reflected in the further alignment of the Law on PML/FT with international standards and recommendations. Also, positive comments from international institutions have also arrived with regard to the co-operation with the prosecution and police and the processing of money laundering and terrorist financing.

Thus, these comments are a signal that we have a good preventive system that is increasingly separating Montenegro from the countries that have problems with money laundering and terrorist financing.

information system improvedIt is worth mentioning that the APML/TF has devel-oped a new software for its needs through the IPA project "EU Support for the Rule of Law Reforms in Montenegro", thereby replacing and upgrading the information system of the Administration.

This part of the system has significantly greater opportunities compared to the old one, especially in terms of data validation, increased level of security and speed of data exchange with obligors. All obligors are now able to use the electronic reporting and document and data exchange system with minimal investment.

This system has also enhanced activities related to analysis, opening and managing of cases, exchange of documents and data within the APML/TF. The possibil-ity of transferring paper documentation to electronic format and its use in further business processes has also been introduced.

In the forthcoming period, further improvement of the APML/TF information system is planned through the financial support of European Union funds, and in particular software solutions for more efficient exchange of data with relevant government authorities.



U prethodne tri godine došlo je do velikih promjena i inovacija u regulatornom okviru finansijskog

sistema i sistema zaštite depozita EU. U Evropskoj regulativi usvojeni su novi standardi za zaštitu de-pozita, koje su zemlje članice bile u obavezi da im-plementiraju u nacionalno zakonodavstvo do kraja 2016. godine. Fondovi za zaštitu depozita su dobili posebne odgovornosti u upravljanju bankarskim krizama i doprinosu očuvanja finansijske stabilnosti.

FSAP misija iz 2015. godine je ukazala na moguće probleme u bankarskom i finansijskom sistemu Crne Gore i dala preporuke za njihovo ublažavanje i eliminisanje.

S obzirom na to da su u toku pristupni pregovori Crne Gore, koja svoje zakonodavstvo treba da uskladi sa pravnom tekovinom EU, Fond kontinuirano prati izmjene zakonodavstva EU iz oblasti zaštite depozita i priprema uvođenje novih zakonskih rješenja.

Novim direktivama EU o osiguranju depozita i sa-naciji banaka, postavljena je drugačija uloga i pozicija Fondova za zaštitu depozita, kao odgovor na izazove moguće finansijske krize.

EU je 2014. godine usvojila direktivu 2014/49 EC o osiguranju depozita, a odmah nakon toga i Direktivu 2014/59 EC o sanaciji banaka. Ova dva dokumenta, na nov način tretiraju zaštitu depozita i sanaciju banaka. Sve zemlje EU su bile u obavezi da pređu na ex-ante naplatu premije. Naime, dotadašnji model organizacije fondova za zaštitu depozita podrazumijevao je i ex-post model naplate premije, što se u uslovima krize pokazalo kao loš model, jer je u momentu propasti neke od banaka, trebalo je u veoma kratkom roku prikupiti sredstva i isplatiti deponente, što je moglo da dovede do ozbiljnih problema u čitavom bankarskom sistemu. Često je zbog ovakvog načina prikupljanja premije bila neophodna i intervencija države u većem obimu od onog koji je bio neophodan da je premija naplaćivana po sistemu ex-ante, t.j unaprijed.

Directiva 2014/49 EC je, pored uvođenja ex-ante modela obavezala države članice da pređu na obračun premije na bazi stepena rizika pojedinih banaka, tako da bi banke sa većim rizikom plaćale veće dopirinose i samim tim učestvovale sa većim iznosima u sredstvima Fonda, čime bi bila zastupljena pravednost u naplati

“S obzirom na to da su u toku pristupni pregovori Crne Gore, koja svoje zakonodavstvo treba da uskladi sa pravnom tekovinom EU, Fond kontinuirano prati izmjene zakonodavstva EU iz oblasti zaštite depozita i priprema uvođenje novih zakonskih rješenja.

Predrag Marković, direktor Fonda za zaštitu depozita

nova uloga u očuvanju finansijske stabilnosti


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FOND ZA ZAŠTITU DEPOZITA

Major changes and innovations occurred in the regulatory framework of the financial system and

the EU deposit guarantee scheme in the past three years. New standards for deposit protection were adopted in the European regulations, which the Member States were obliged to implement onto national legislation by the end of 2016. Deposit guarantee schemes were provided with special responsibilities in managing banking crisis and contributing to preservation of financial stability.

The 2015 FSAP Mission indicated possible problems in the banking and financial system of Montenegro and gave recommendations to mitigate and eliminate them.

Given the ongoing negotiations of Montenegro accession, which should align its legislation with the EU Acquis, the Fund continuously monitors changes in the EU legislation in the area of deposit protection and prepares the introduction of new legal solutions.

The new EU Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive have placed a different role and position on the deposit guarantee schemes in response to the challenges of a possible financial crisis.

The European Union adopted Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive 2014/49 EC in 2014, and immediately after that the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 2014/59 EC. These two documents treat the deposit protection and bank recovery in a new way. All EU Member States were obliged to shift to ex-ante col-lection of premiums. Namely, the former model of

deposit guarantee schemes also implied an ex-post model of collection of premiums, which proved to

be a bad model in crisis, because, in the moment of failure of some of the banks, funds should be collected in short period and pay out the deposi-tors, which could lead to serious problems in the entire banking system. Due to this manner of collecting premiums, bail out was often necessary to a greater extent than the one that would be

needed to pay the premium if ex-ante system was applied i.e. payment in advance.

In addition to the introduction of ex-ante model, the directive 2014/49 EC obligated member states to shift to the calculation of premiums based on the level of risk of individual banks. It means that banks with higher risk would pay higher contributions, thereby participating with higher amount in the Fund's resources. This would ensure righteousness in the collection of premium. The obligation of intro-ducing risk-based premium concluded in 2016, and all EU Member States adopted the ex-ante system for collecting premiums, depending on the risk of individual banks.

The directive 2014/59 EC has also changed the prac-tice of bank resolution and bankruptcy. The central banks, or in some countries independent resolution

new role in Preserving financial stability

Predrag Marković Director of the Deposit Protection Fund

“Given the ongoing negotiations of Montenegro accession, which should align its legislation with the EU Acquis, the Fund continuously monitors changes in the EU legislation in the area of deposit protection and prepares the introduction of new legal solutions.


DEPOSIT PROTECTION FUND

premije. Obaveza uvođenja premije na bazi rizika oročena je sa 2016. godinom i sve države članice EU su prešle na ex-ante sistem naplate premije, zavisno od stepena rizika pojedinih banaka.

Directiva 2014/59 EC je takođe promijenila praksu sanacije i stečaja banaka. Centralne banke, ili u nekim od država nezavisna sanaciona tijela, dobila su ovlašćenja da u situacijama kada procijene da je manja šteta po bankarski sistem ako se banka sanira, u odnosu na to kada bi banka pošla u stečaj, izvrše saniranje banke. Za potrebe intervencije osniva se sanacioni Fond, u koji banke uplaćuju određeni iznos doprinosa. U slučaju da sredstva Sanacionog fonda nijesu dovoljna za sanaciju banke, mogu se koristiti i sredstva fondova za zaštitu depozita. Ovaj iznos određuju zajedno sa-naciono tijelo i Fond za zaštitu depozita, na način da sredstva sa kojima interveniše Fond za zaštitu depozita ne mogu biti veća od gubitka koji bi za Fond nastao u slučaju da je banka otišla u stečaj, odnosno od visine garantovanih depozita koje bi u tom slučaju morao da isplati Fond za zaštitu depozita.

Usvojen je ZAKON O TRŽIŠTU KAPITALA, kojim je pored ostalog regulisana zaštita investitora i formi-ran Fond za zaštitu investitora. Na ovaj način će biti regulisano pitanje obezbjeđenja sredstava za isplatu garantovanog iznosa investitorima, slično kao i kod zaštite depozita.

U parlamentarnoj proceduri je ZAKON O SANACIJI BANAKA i očekuje se njegovo usvajanje u prvom kvartalu ove godine. Ovim zakonom je predviđeno učešće Fonda u sanaciji banaka, ali najviše do iznosa garantovanih depozita banke nad kojom se sprovodi postupak sanacije.

Predlog ZAKONA O ZAŠTITI DEPOZITA je pripre-mljen i bit će dat na javnu raspravu tokom februara ove godine.

Ovim predlogom se garantovani depozit povećava na 100.000 € (sa dosadašnjih 50.000 €), ali se primjena povećanja garantovanog depozita odlaže do pristupa-nja Crne Gore EU. Takođe, rokovi za početak isplate se u skladu sa Directivom 2014/49 EC skraćuju na 7 radnih dana od dana uvođenja stečaja. Pored toga ostavlja se mogućnost za isplatu garantovanog depozita u većem iznosu od 100.000 €, ako sredstva na računu deponenta potiču iz transakcija vezanih za sledeće događaje: prodaje nekretnina, odštetnih zahtjeva prema državnim organima, kao i sistuacija vezanih za odlazak u penziju, razvod, sklapanje braka i sl.

Ono što je posebno bitno za brzu isplatu garantovanih depozita je i obaveza banaka da sve deponente, depozite i dospjele obaveze deponenata prema banci, označe po posebnoj nomenklaturi, koju propisuje Fond, kako bi u svakom momentu Fond mogao, preuzimanjem baze podataka iz banke, utvrditi iznos garantovanog depozita za svakog pojedinačnog deponenta.

Tokom 2017 godine, jedan broj banaka je dobrovoljno prihvatio da se izvrši simulacija isplate garantovanog depozita na realnim podacima banaka. Preuzimanjem podataka, koji su u dijelu ličnih podataka depone-nata (ime, prezime i matični broj deponenta) bili kriptovani tako da se nije moglo utvrditi identitet deponenta. Testirana banka je bila u ulozi „banke u stečaju“. Nakon obrade podataka i utvrđivanja garantovanog depozita za svakog deponenta, Fond je bankama ustupio softversku aplikaciju za isplatu garatnovanih depozita. Nakon obuke osoblja banke, banka se našla u ulozi „banke isplatioca“ i „izvršila“ isplatu garantovanog depozita.

Iako je simulacija isplate garantovanog depozita, koju smo tokom 2016 i 2017 godine sproveli u 7 banaka, pokazala visok stepen kompatibilnosti informacionih sistema banaka i njihove mogućnosti da u kratkom roku dostave podatke radi utvrđivanja visine garan-tovanog depozita za svakog pojedinačnog deponenta, novim načinom evidencije omogućiće se lakši i brži prenos podataka neophodnih Fondu.

Testiranje sistema za obračun garantovanog depozita biće obavezno jednom u tri godine, a odabrane banke će, na osnovu softverske aplikacije koju obezbjeđuje Fond, moći da simuliraju i ulogu „banke isplatioca“. Ovo je veoma bitno kako bi, u slučaju stečaja neke banke, stečajni upravnik mogao da dostavi Fondu podatke u veoma kratkom roku (tri radna dana) a takođe ne manje važno i da u svakom momentu

“Novim direktivama EU o osiguranju depozita i sanaciji banaka, postavljena je drugačija uloga i pozicija Fondova za zaštitu depozita, kao odgovor na izazove moguće finansijske krize.


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authorities, are authorised to resolve banks in situa-tions when they estimate that there is lesser damage to the banking system if the bank is resolved compared to its bankruptcy. For the purpose of intervention, a Resolution Fund is established, where the banks pay certain amount of contributions. In case the funds of the Resolution Fund are not sufficient for the bank to be resolved, funds from deposit insurance schemes may be used. This amount is determined jointly by the Resolution Authority and the Deposit Insurance Scheme, in such a way that the funds which the Deposit Insurance Scheme uses for intervention may not exceed the loss that the Deposit Insurance Scheme would incur in case the bank went bankrupt or the amount of guaranteed deposits that would have to pay Deposit Insurance Scheme in that case.

The CAPITAL MARKET LAW was adopted, which, inter alia, regulates the investor protection and the Investor Protection Fund was established. This will regulate the issue of insuring funds for the payment of guaranteed amount to investors, similar to the deposits insurance.

THE RESOLUTION LAW is in the parliamentary procedure and is expected to be adopted in the first quarter of this year. This Law envisages the partici-pation of the Fund in the bank resolution, but up to the amount of guaranteed deposits of the bank in resolution.

The Proposal of the DEPOSIT INSURANCE LAW was drafted, and it will be forwarded to a public hear-ing during February this year.

Based on the draft law, guaranteed deposit is in-creased to 100,000 euros (from current amount of 50,000 euros). However, the application of the in-crease in the guaranteed deposit is postponed until Montenegro accession to the EU. Also, deadlines for the beginning of pay-outs in accordance with Directives 2014/49 EC are shortened to 7 working days from the date of introduction of the bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, there is a possibility to pay guaranteed deposit in the amount of 100,000 euros if the funds in the account of the depositor originate from transactions related to the following events: sale of real estate, claims against government bodies, as well as situations in respect of retirement, divorce, and marriage.

What is particularly important for quick payment of guaranteed deposits is also the obligation of banks

to identify, using special nomenclature prescribed by the Fund, all depositors, deposits and matured obligations of depositors with the bank, so that the Fund may determine at any moment, downloading database from the bank, the amount of the guaranteed deposit for each individual depositor.

In 2017, a number of banks voluntarily agreed to make simulation of the payment of guaranteed deposits using real data of banks. Downloading of data included also the encrypted part related to the personal data of the depositor (name, last name and personal identification number of the depositor) so that the identity of the depositor could not be estab-lished. The tested bank was in the role of "bankrupt bank". After data processing and determining the guaranteed deposit for each depositor, the Fund has transferred to the banks a software application for the payment of guaranteed deposits. After the train-ing of bank staff, the bank became the “bank-payer" and "made" the payment of the guaranteed deposit.

Although the simulation of guaranteed deposit payments, which was conducted in 7 banks in 2016 and 2017, showed high level of compatibility of in-formation bank systems and their ability to provide in short term data for determining the amount of guaranteed deposit for each individual depositor, the new recording method will allow easier and faster transfer of data necessary for the Fund.

Testing of the system for the calculation of guaran-teed deposit will be mandatory once in three years, and selected banks will be able to simulate the role of the "bank-payer" based on the software applica-tion provided by the Fund. This is very important because bankruptcy administrator could, in case of bankruptcy of a bank, to provide the Fund data within a very short period of time (three business

“The new EU Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive have placed a different role and position on the deposit guarantee schemes in response to the challenges of a possible financial crisis.



imamo spremne banke koje bi mogle preuzeti ulogu „banke isplatioca“. U skladu sa Odlukom o načinu i postupku izbora banke isplatioca, Fond je dostavio pozivno pismo za iskazivanje interesa banaka da u postupku isplate garantovanog depozita budu „banka isplatioc“. U prvoj fazi ovog postupka interes je iskazalo 5 banaka. Fond će u veoma kratkom roku (nakon dobijanja neophodnih podataka iz Centralne banke) pripremiti listu banaka, koje bi kod nastanka „zaštićenog slučaja“ bile banke isplatioci.

Ono što će u narednom periodu biti posebno in-teresantno za sve banke je „Obračun premije na bazi rizika“. Direktivom 2014/49 EC je propisano da se kod utvrđivanja visine premije vodi računa o rizičnosti pojedinih banaka, tako da banke sa manjim rizikom plaćaju manji iznos premije, odnosno banke koje su više rizične, plaćaju veći iznos premije. Do sada se premija plaćala po jedinstvenoj stopi od 0,50% na iznos ukupnih depozita. Predlogom, koji sadrži radna verzija Zakona o zaštiti depozita, se utvrđuje iznos premije za 5-to godišnji period, pa se godišnji iznos premije raspodjeljuje na banke shodno njihovom stepenu rizika. Stepen rizika utvrđuje se na bazi Metodologije za obračun premije na bazi rizika, koju Fond priprema u saradnji sa Svjetskom bankom (WB). EBA je izdala uputstva za izradu ove Metodologije i većina zemalja u EU je primjenjuje od kraja 2016 godine.

Način na koji se obračunava i naplaćuje premija će biti predmet rasprave sa zainteresovanim subjek-tima, a tu prije svega mislim na sve banke u sistemu i Centralnu banku. Svaka banka će unaprijed znati kolika će biti visina premije koju treba da plati, a sve na bazi podataka koje sama banka dostavlja Fondu u okviru odgovarajućih informacija i izvještaja. Dio podataka se obezbjeđuje od strane Centralne banke (podaci o adekvatnosti kapitala, stepenu likvidnosti i solventnosti i sl), kako banke ne bi dodatno op-terećivali da dva puta dostavljaju podatke. Ciljani nivo sredstava sa kojima Fond može da interveniše treba da iznosi 10% garantovanih depozita. Ovaj nivo Fond mora dostići do kraja 2024. godine. Ukoliko se u međuvremenu dogodi „zaštićeni slučaj“ i sredstva Fonda padnu ispod 2/3 ciljanog nivoa, ovaj rok će se produžiti za narednih 6 godina.

Na kraju 2017. godine ukupni depoziti iznose 3,27 milijardi €, zaštićeni depoziti iznose cca 2,99 mili-jardi €, a garantovani depoziti iznose 1,34 milijarde €. Ciljani nivo sredstava Fonda je 10% garantova-nih depozita ili cca 134 miliona €. Fond trenutno raspolaže sa 96 miliona €, te bi u statičkoj analizi bilo neophodno obezbijediti dodatnih 48 miliona € za period od narednih 6 godina. Ovo uz uslov da garantovani depoziti budu na istom nivou kao na kraju 2017. godine. Obzirom da garantovani depoziti rastu po godišnjoj stopi od cca 6% godišnje, to bi u dinamičkoj analizi garantovani depoziti u 2024. godini iznosili cca 2,02 milijardi €. U tom slučaju, sredstva Fonda bi u 2024. godini trebala da iznose cca 202 miliona €. Stopa premije će se primjenjivati na osnovicu koju čine garantovani depoziti (umjesto dosadašnje, koja se primjenjivala na ukupne depozite) i koriguje stepenom rizika pojedine banke.

Imajući u vidu da je preporuka WB da se nivo premije zadrži na sadašnjem nivou, a da se isti ras-poredi na banke shodno njihovom rizičnom profilu (u skladu sa Metodologijom) to bi navedeni ciljani nivo mogao biti dostignut u 2024. godini.

Do promjene Metodologije, primjenjivaće se dosa-dašnja stopa premije, a Metodologija će takođe biti predmet rasprave na Udruženju banaka. Očekujemo da novi Zakon o zaštiti depozita, nakon predviđene procedure davanja saglasnosti od strane Evropske komisije, bude usvojen u parlamentu do kraja ove godine, a da se premija na bazi rizika primijeni do kraja 2019. godine.

“Ono što će u narednom periodu biti posebno interesantno za sve banke je „Obračun premije na bazi rizika“. Direktivom 2014/49 EC je propisano da se kod utvrđivanja visine premije vodi računa o rizičnosti pojedinih banaka, tako da banke sa manjim rizikom plaćaju manji iznos premije, odnosno banke koje su više rizične, plaćaju veći iznos premije


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days). It is also important that we have prepared banks that could take over the role of "bank-payer" at any moment. Pursuant to the Decision on the Method and Procedure for Electing Paying Bank, the Fund submitted letter of invitation to express the interest of banks in the process of payment of guaranteed deposit as a "bank-payer". In the first phase of this procedure, 5 banks showed interest. In a very short time (after obtaining necessary information from the Central Bank), the Fund will prepare a list of banks that would be bank-payers in the case of insured event.

What will be particularly interesting for all banks in the forthcoming period is "Risk-based premium calculation". Directive 2014/49 EC stipulates that when determining the amount of premium, it takes into account the risks of some banks, so that banks with a lower risk pay lower amount of premium, i.e. banks that are riskier pay higher premiums. Until now, the premium was paid at a uniform rate of 0.50% on the total deposits amount. The proposal, which contains the draft Deposit Insurance Law, de-termines the premium amount for a five-year period, so that the amount of annual premium is distributed to banks according to their level of risk. The level of risk is determined on the basis of the Methodology for calculating risk-based premium, which the Fund prepares in co-operation with the World Bank (WB). The EBA has issued guidelines for developing this Methodology and most countries in the EU have been applying it since the end of 2016.

The method of calculating and charging the premium will be the subject of discussions with stakeholders - all banks in the system and the Central Bank. Each bank will know in advance what is the amount of premium it is supposed to pay, based on data provided by the bank itself to the Fund within the appropriate information and reports. Part of the data is provided by the Central Bank (capital adequacy, liquidity and solvency ratios), sin order not to burden banks to deliver data twice. The targeted level of funds with which the Fund may intervene should amount to 10% of guaranteed deposits. This level must be reached by the end of 2024. If an insured event occurs in the meantime, and Fund assets fall below 2/3 of the target level, this deadline will be extended for the next 6 years.

At the end of 2017, total deposits amounted to 3.27 billion euros, eligible deposits amounted to 2.99 billion euros, and guaranteed deposits amounted to

1.34 billion euros. The targeted level of funds of the Fund is 10% of guaranteed deposits or approximately 134 million euros. The Fund currently has 96 million euros, and in the static analysis it would be neces-sary to provide an additional 48 million euros over the next 6 years, provided that guaranteed deposits remain at the same level as at the end of 2017. Given that guaranteed deposits grow at an annual rate of approximately 6% per annum, this would provide in a dynamic analysis guaranteed deposits of about 2.02 billion euros in 2024. In that case, the funds of the Fund in 2024 would have to amount to about 202 million euros. The premium rate will be applied to the base of guaranteed deposits (instead of the cur-rent, applied to the total deposits) and adjusted by the level of risk of a particular bank.

Bearing in mind that the recommendation of the World Bank to maintain the level of premium at the current level and to allocate it to banks according to their risk profile (in accordance with the Methodology), this target level could be reached in 2024.

Until the change in Methodology, current premium rate will apply, and the Methodology will also be the subject to discussion in the Banking Association. We expect that the new Deposit Insurance Law will be adopted by Parliament by the end of this year following the envisaged procedures of approval by the European Commission, and that the risk-based premium will be applied by the end of 2019.

“What will be particularly interesting for all banks in the forthcoming period is "Risk-based premium calculation". The directive 2014/49 EC stipulates that when determining the amount of premium, it takes into account the risks of some banks, so that banks with a lower risk pay lower amount of premium, i.e. banks that are riskier pay higher premiums



Stoga, pitanje visine kamatne marže, njenih determinanti i očekivanih kretanja, predstavlja jedno od ključnih pitanja bankarstva i njegova utjecaja na ekonomska kretanja. U ovom se tekstu prvo definira kamatna marža, prikazuju usporedbe za veći broj dr-žava, analiziraju trendovi i zaključuje o determinantama čije promjene u većoj ili manjoj mjeri mogu utjecati na visinu kamatnih marži.

usporedba marži među državamaStatistika Evropske središnje banke omogućava usporedbu kamatne marže među državama članicama EU. Kamatna marža se definira kao realizirana neto kamatna razlika, što znači da predstavlja omjer između neto prihoda od kamata i aktive koja nosi kamatni prihod, u postotku na godišnjoj razini. Slika 1 pokazuje da se tako definirana neto kamatna marža kreće od oko dvije trećine postotnog boda u Finskoj do iznad 3 postotna boda u Bugarskoj i Mađarskoj.

nalazimo se na početku zanimljive faze u razvoju bankarstva

Kamatne marže su kontroverzna tema. Dužnici i političari ih u pravilu smatraju previsokima bez obzira na trendove i usporedbe među državama. Često ne razumiju njihove determinante pa očekuju smanjenja i kada okolnosti ne upućuju na takvu mogućnost. Bankari s druge strane imaju ambivalentan odnos prema kamatnoj marži. Na kratak rok, veća marža ostavlja veći prostor za ostvarivanje višeg povrata na kapital. Na srednji i dulji rok veća marža poziva na tržišno natjecanje. Ona otvara prostor da se nuđenjem nižih kamatnih stopa i povoljnijih kreditnih uvjeta pretekne konkurencija i preuzmu klijenti kojima će biti odobreni novi krediti.

Dr Velimir Šonje Arhivanalitika i Ekonomski lab

Slika 1. Neto kamatna marža u EU početkom 2017.

Izvor: Evropska središnja banka, Data Warehouse


34

DETERMINANTE KAMATNE MARŽE

Therefore, the issue of the level of the interest rate margin, its deter-minants and expected trends is one of the key issues of the bank-ing industry and its impact on economic trends. This paper will define the interest rate margin, show comparisons between a number of countries, analyse trends and make conclusion on determinants whose changes may, to a greater or lesser extent, affect the level of interest rate margins.

Comparison of margins between CountriesThe European Central Bank sta-tistics allows for a comparison of interest rate margins between the EU Member States. Interest rate margin is defined as realised net

interest rate difference, which means that it represents the ratio between net interest income and interest-bearing assets, in percentage per annum. Figure 1 shows that net

interest margin defined in this man-ner ranges from about two thirds of the percentage point in Finland to above 3 percentage points in Bulgaria and Hungary.

beginning of interesting Phase in Development f banking industry

Interest rate margins are a controversial topic. Debtors and politicians consider them, as a rule, to be too high regardless of trends and comparisons among the states. They often do not understand their determinants expecting their decline even when circumstances do not indicate to such a possibility. Bankers, on the other hand, have an ambivalent relationship to the interest rate margin. Larger interest rate margin leaves greater room for higher returns on equity in short period. In the medium and longer term, a larger margin calls for competition. It opens up the space to surpass the competition, by attracting lower interest rates and providing more favourable loan conditions, and take over clients to whom new loans will be approved.

Velimir Šonje, PhD Arhivanalitika and Ekonomski lab

Picture 1. Net interest margin in the EU at beginning of 2017

Source: European Central

Bank, Data Warehouse


DETERMINANTS OF INTEREST MARGIN

Lako je uočiti da se starije i bogatije članice EU nalaze u desnom dijelu slike, dok se nove države članice, koje nisu toliko razvijene, nalaze u lijevome dijelu. U tom kontekstu ne čudi da bi se podaci za Crnu Goru, Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Srbiju, da su uvršteni na sliku 1, nalazili lijevo od podatka za Mađarsku i Bugarsku. Na primjer, prema Izvještaju o stabilnosti finansijskog sistema Centralne banke Crne Gore za 2016., kamatni spred je procijenjen na 4,7 postotnih bo-dova. Prema Izvješću o financijskoj stabilnosti Centralne banke BiH za isto razdoblje neto kamatna marža se kreće oko 3,5 postotna boda, dok kvartalni Pregled indikatora finan-sijske stabilnosti Narodne banke Srbije pokazuje recentno smanjenje neto kamatne marže blago ispod 4 postotna boda.

Dok takvi odnosi generalno imaju smisla jer je očito da stupanj razvoja znači i veću efikasnost financijskog posredovanja i veće volumene posla, ipak je potreban dublji uvid u deter-minante kamatne marže kako bi se detaljnije pojasnile razlike u visini kamatnih marži među pojedinim zemljama.

determinante kamatne maržeNajčešća laička pogreška u pronica-nju u tajne kamatnih marži sastoji se u pretpostavci da je marža jednaka zaradi. Međutim, slika 2 pokazuje da se marža, ilustrirana kao razlika između konačne kamatne stope na kredit i kamatne stope koju kreditna institucija plaća na depozite i druge izvore sredstava, sastoji od četiri elementa. Među njima je dobit, točnije očekivana dobit, tek jedan od elemenata. U marži također uče-stvuju troškovi regulacije, operativni troškovi i troškovi rizika.

U lijevome dijelu slike 2 prikazana je ilustracija marže iz perspektive banke. S druge (desne) strane postoji potražnja odnosno tržište. Tržišna potražnja zavisi o tome koliko su klijenti spremni uzeti kredita po prevladavajućoj kamatnoj stopi. Nisu rijetke niti situacije u kojima regulatori reguliraju kamatne stope (slučaj crvene linije s desne strane). U takvim situacijama treba paziti da se pretjeranim administriranjem ne uđe u situacije kada su kamatne stope određene prenisko u odnosu na potrebu za pokrićem pojedinih komponenti marže. Tada ponuda kredita može nestati pa dio kli-jenata može nestati sa službenog ka nereguliranom, sivom tržištu lihvarskih kredita.

Dakle, koji elementi kamatne marže u stvarnosti imaju najvažniji utjecaj na njenu visinu?

U ekonometrijskim ispitivanjima koja sam proveo u sklopu izrade se-rije radova HUB Analiza za Hrvatsku udrugu banaka (HUB Analize, bro-jevi 58 i 62 , oba iz 2017.) pokušao sam objasniti razlike u visini neto

kamatne marže među državama članicama EU. Dobiveni su sljedeći rezultati:1. Troškovna efikasnost ima domi-

nantan učinak na visinu marži. Povećana efikasnost smanjuje marže.

2. Kako troškovna efikasnost zavisi o volumenima kreditnog posre-dovanja (ekonomije obujma) i primjeni novih tehnologija, iznos kredita po zaposlenom u bankama i raširenost internet tehnologija također utječu na visinu marži. Veći volumeni i tehnološki na-predak smanjuju marže.

3. Troškovi regulacije utječu na visinu marži. Članice euro po-dručja, uz ostale utjecaje nepro-mijenjene, imaju niže marže, a u euro području troškovi regulacije su znatno niži.

4. Rizici mjereni rizikom likvidnosti i kreditnim rizikom (omjer nepri-hodujućih kredita NPL) utječu na visinu marži. Manji rizik znači manje marže.

5. Utjecaj profitabilnosti na maržu je dvojben.

Slika 2. Ilustracija strukture neto kamatne marže


36


Iz ovako tehnički pobrojanih re-zultata treba izvući dvije ključne poruke.

Prvo, dvojben utjecaj profitabil-nosti je očekivan. Kako je istaknuto na početku, veća očekivana dobit banaka s jedne strane znači veće marže, ali s druge strane poziva na cjenovno takmičenje koje vodi obaranju kamatnih stopa i na kraju ka smanjenju marži.

Drugo, na neto kamatnu maržu utječu strukturne, što znači teško promjenjive veličine, kao što su stu-panj ekonomskog razvoja, troškovi regulacije (koji sami često zavise o rizicima), rizici (koji su opet veli-kim dijelom strukturno zadani i korelirani sa stupnjem ekonomskog razvitka) i sl.

promjene u vremenuStrukturna uvjetovanost neto kamat-nih marži utječe na njihova slaba kolebanja u vremenu. Naprosto, njihove ključne determinante, koje, pokazalo se, zavise o dugoročnom razvoju, teško se mijenjaju u krat-kom roku.

To se vidi na kretanju neto ka-matne marže u Hrvatskoj u ovom stoljeću (slika 3). Nakon relativno brzog smanjenja marže početkom XXI stoljeća, što je bilo određeno konsolidacijom i privatizacijom bankarskog sistema, dakle, jedno-kratnim i neponovljivim mjerama, marža se od 2005. do 2017. kretala u okviru vrlo uskog raspona između 2,16 i 2,83 postotna boda.

Marža je do početka krize 2008./09. padala jer, ili su aktivne kamatne stope padale brže od pa-sivnih, ili aktivne kamatne stope nisu rasle brzo kao pasivne stope. Nakon parabole marži u vrijeme

najveće krize 2010.-2012. kamatna marža od 2013. počinje novi ciklus rasta koji se po svojem karakteru razlikuje od većeg dijela prethodnog perioda. Naime, od 2013. do 2017. vidimo brže smanjenje pasivnih nego aktivnih kamatnih stopa (koje također padaju, ali sporije).

Taj način rasta marže iscrpljen je u toku prošle godine. Od polovice 2017. u Hrvatskoj primjećujemo dva važna trenda. Prvo, kamatne stope na depozite i druge izvore toliko su niske da više nema značajnijeg prostora za daljnje smanjenje. Drugo, konku-rencija i potražnja pritišću kamatne stope na kredite prema dolje. Iz toga se može zaključiti da je ciklus rasta kamatnih marži više-manje završen i da se Hrvatska vjerojatno nalazi pred dugim ciklusom stagnacije i/ili smanjenja marže.

Najvažnije je uočiti da se pri tome ne radi ni o kakvim spektakularnim promjenama. Povežemo li raniju analizu razlika u kamatnim mar-žama među članicama EU s ovim tumačenjem promjena kamatne marže u vremenu, uočit ćemo da su spore i male promjene kamatne marže u vremenu posve u skladu s nalazom o strukturnim odnosno

razvojnim karakteristikama eko-nomskog sistema koje određuju visinu kamatne marže. Te veličine se ne mogu puno mijenjati u kratkom i srednjem roku.

očekivano kretanje kamatnih stopa i kretanje kamatne maržeDa li to znači da kreatori financijske politike ne mogu ništa učiniti radi utjecanja na neto kamatne marže? Nije posve tako. Slika 4 povezuje naše poznate elemente neto kamatne marže s mjerama koje se mogu koristiti radi poticanja smanjenja kamatne marže. Te mjere se odnose na sva četiri elementa marže: troš-kove regulacije, operativne troškove, troškove rizika i dobit.

Smanjenje troškova regulacije može imati izravni učinak na sma-njenje marže, ali ne treba zaboraviti i neizravni učinak koji se javlja u mjeri u kojoj se uspije potaknuti rast tržišta (to vrijedi za sve mjere). Kada su kamatne stope niske, ili kada je zemlja poput Crne Gore uvela euro, standardni regulacij-ski troškovi više nisu toliko bitni. Međutim, ostaje jedan jako važan regulatorni trošak – trošak premije

Slika 3. Neto kamatna marža (NIM=A-P) u Hrvatskoj 2001.-2017.


38


It is easy to see that older and wealthier EU member states are on the right-hand side of the graph, while the new member states, which are not so developed, are on the left-hand side of the graph. In this context, it is no surprise that if data for Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia are in-cluded in Figure 1, they would be left from the data for Hungary and Bulgaria. For example, according to the Financial Stability Report of the Central Bank of Montenegro for 2016, interest rate spread was estimated at 4.7 percentage points. Based on the Financial Stability Report of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the same pe-riod, net interest margin was about 3.5 percentage points, while quar-terly Financial Stability Indicators Overview of the National Bank of Serbia indicates to recent decline in net interest margin slightly below 4 percentage points.

While such relationships gener-ally make sense because it is obvi-ous that the level of development means greater efficiency of financial mediation and higher volume of work, however, it requires deeper insight into the determinants of interest margins in order to better explain the differences in interest rate margins between individual countries.

determinants of interest marginThe most common material error in analysing interest rate margins is the assumption that the margin is equal to earnings. However, Figure 2 shows that the margin, illustrated as the difference between the final interest rate on loan and the interest

rate that the credit institution pays on deposits and other sources of funds, consists of four elements. Among them, the gain, the more precisely the expected profit, is just one of the elements. In addition, regulatory costs, operating costs, and risk costs are also included in the margin.

Left part of Figure 2 shows margins from the perspective of a bank. The other (right) side of the Figure 2 shows demand or market. Market demand depends on how many loans the clients are willing to take at the prevailing interest rate. The situations in which regulators regulate interest rates (the case of the red line on the right-hand side) are not rare. In such situations, care should be taken to ensure that excessive administration does not occur when interest rates are set too low in relation to the need for cover-ing certain marginal components. Then loan offer may disappear, and some clients may disappear from the official to the unregulated, informal market of usury loans.

Therefore, what are the elements that can have most important influence on the level of interest rate margin?

In the econometric surveys I have conducted within the development of a series of studies of HUB Analyses for the Croatian Banking Association (HUB Analize, issues 58 and 62 , both published in 2017), I tried to

explain the differences in the level of the net interest margin between the EU Member States). The following results were obtained:1. Cost efficiency has a dominant

effect on the level of the mar-gin. Increased efficiency reduces margins.

2. As cost efficiency depends on the volume of credit intermedia-tion (economies of scale) and the application of new technologies, the amount of loans per employee in banks and the outspread of internet technology also affect the level of margins. Higher volumes and technological progress reduce the margins.

3. Costs of regulation affect the level

Picture 2 Structure of net interest margin



of the margin. Euro area Member States, with other unchanged impacts, have lower margins, the regulatory costs are considerably lower in the euro area.

4. Risks measured by liquidity risk and credit risk (the ratio of non-performing loans, NPLs) affect the level of margins. Less risk means less margins.

5. The impact of profitability on margin is ambiguous.

two key messages should be drawn from these teChniCal results. First, ambiguous impact of profit-ability is expected. As pointed out at the beginning, higher expected profit of banks means higher mar-gins on one hand, but on the other hand, it calls for price competition that leads to lowering of interest rates and ultimately reduction of margins.

Secondly, net interest margin is affected by the structural measures, which means measures that are difficult to change, such as level of economic development, costs of regulation (which often depend on risks), and risks (which are again largely structurally set and cor-related by the level of economic development).

Changes in timeStructural conditionality of net interest margins affects their weak fluctuations in time. Indeed, their key determinants, which have proven to depend on long-term development, are difficult to change in short term.

This is seen in the development of the net interest margin in Croatia in this century (Figure 3). After

a relatively rapid decline in the margins at the beginning of 21st century, which was determined by the consolidation and privatisation of the banking system, i.e. by one-off and unique measures, the margin was within a very narrow range of 2.16 and 2.83 percentage points in period between 2005 and 2017.

The margin declined until the outset of the 2008/09 crisis, be-cause either lending interest rates fell faster than the deposit interest rates, or lending interest rates did not rise quickly as deposit interest rates. After the parabola of margin at the time of the biggest crisis in 2010-2012, interest rate margin be-gins a new growth cycle from 2013 that is different in character from major part of the previous period. Namely, from 2013 to 2017, a faster decline in deposit interest rate is noted than lending interest rates (which also fall, but slower).

This method of growth has been exhausted during the last year. Since the middle of 2017, two important trends occurred in Croatia. Firstly, interest rates on deposits and other sources were so low that there is no longer significant room for further

reduction. Secondly, the competition and demand push interest rates on loans down. It can be concluded that the growth cycle of interest rate margins is more or less completed and Croatia is likely to be in the long cycle of stagnation and / or the reduction of margin.

It is most important to note that these are not spectacular changes. If we link previous analysis of dif-ferences in interest rate margins among the EU Member States with this interpretation of the change in interest rate margin over time, we will notice that slow and small changes in the interest rate margin over time are fully in line with the findings on the structural or development characteristics of the economic system that determine the level of interest rate. These measures can-not change much in the short and medium term.

expeCted development in interest rates and interest margin trendDoes this mean that financial policy makers cannot do anything to influ-ence the net interest margin? Not so. Figure 4 links our known elements

Picture 3. Net interest margin (NIM=A-P) in Croatia 2001-2017



osiguranja depozita. Zbog toga je kvaliteta supervizije banaka i finan-cijska stabilnost jako važna; otvara vrata smanjenju premije osiguranja i smanjenju regulacijskog troška po toj osnovi.

Operativne troškove u postotku aktive ili dohotka nije jednostavno smanjiti. Ipak, država i tu nije posve nemoćna. Poticanje tehnološkog razvoja (npr. širokopojasni Internet) i zadržavanje razumno niske razine oporezivanja kanali su kako se može utjecati na operativnu troškovnu efikasnost. Naravno, ne treba smet-nuti s uma da ona na kraju zavisi o volumenima, odnosno o dostignu-tom stupnju razvoja i integraciji u kreditne organizacije optimalne veličine koje omogućuju korištenje ekonomija obujma.

Rizici u velikoj mjeri zavise o institucijama. Kvaliteta kreditnih informacija, efikasna naplata i pra-vosuđe, predvidivi i razumni propisi koji uređuju poslovanje, sve to utječe na lakoću poslovanja i rizike. Interesi banaka i klijenata ovdje idu ruku

pod ruku, jer je svima u interesu niži rizik.

Na kraju,konkurencija je važna kako se ne bi pojavili monopolski ili oligopolski profiti i kako bi se održao zdrav pritisak na kamatne stope. Međutim, na vlastima je također da paze kako konkurencija ne bi postala destruktivna, jer to može umanjiti kapitalnu snagu i financijsku stabilnost kreditnih posrednika.

umjesto zaključka: kraj ere pada kamatnih stopa i kamatne maržePrikazana razmatranja posebno su važna u kontekstu postepenog nestanka prostora za daljnje sma-njenje kamatnih stopa. Ljudi se često zabune, pa misle da je ključno predvidjeti kada će kamatne stope ponovo početi rasti na svjetskom tržištu. Ako do toga ne dođe, stvari će, navodno, ostati iste kao i do sada. Međutim, to je pogrešno gledanje na stvari. Dovoljno je da se pad kamatnih stopa zaustavi,

što je već nastupilo u zemljama u kojima su se kamatne stope na depozite približile nuli, a one na tržištu novca potonule u negativne zone. Zaustavljanje pada kamatnih stopa na strani izvora sredstava i buđenje te zaoštravanje cjenovnog takmičenja na strani plasmana stvara pritisak na znatniji pad neto kamatnih marži.

Tamo gdje kombinacija veličine tržišta, stupnja razvoja, tehno-loškog napretka i perspektiva za daljnji rast duga to dozvoli, kre-ditni posrednici će se prilagoditi kroz rast volumena poslovanja. Međutim, u zemljama u kojima su odnosi među ključnim determi-nantama marži takvi, da povećani volumeni ne mogu kompenzirati pritisak na pad neto kamatne marže, prilagodbe će se odvijati kroz spajanja, pripajanja, inte-gracije, troškovne uštede i druge modalitete traženja povećane troš-kovne efikasnosti. Kao i uvijek, nalazimo se na početku zanimljive faze u razvoju bankarstva.

Slika 4. Kako utjecati na smanjenje neto kamatne marže


42


of net interest margin to measures that can be used to encourage inter-est rate cuts. These measures relate to all four elements of the margin: regulatory costs, operating costs, costs of risk and profit.

Reducing regulatory costs may have a direct impact on the mar-gins cut, but indirect impact that will likely stimulate market growth should not be forgotten (this applies to all measures). When interest rates are low, or when a country like Montenegro has introduced the euro, standard regulation costs are no longer so important. However, one very important regulatory cost remains - the cost of deposit in-surance premiums. Therefore, the quality of bank supervision and financial stability is very impor-tant; it opens the doors to reducing insurance premiums and reducing the regulatory cost on that basis.

It is not easy to reduce operating costs in the percentage of assets or income. However, the government is not quite helpless in this area. Encouraging technological devel-opment (e.g. widespread Internet) and maintaining a reasonably low level of taxation channels are how it can affect operating cost efficiency. Surely, one should not be fooled by the fact that it ultimately depends on

the volumes, i.e. it depends on the level of development and integration in optimal size credit institutions that allow the use of economies of scale.

Risks largely depend on institu-tions. The quality of credit infor-mation, efficient collection and justice, predictable and reasonable regulations governing the business, all affect the ease of doing business and risks. The interests of banks and clients go hand in hand because everyone’s interest is lower risk.

Finally, the competition is impor-tant in order to have no monopoly or oligopoly profits and to maintain sound pressure on interest rates. However, the authorities should pay attention to ensure that competi-tion does not become destructive because it can reduce the capital strength and financial stability of credit intermediaries.

instead of ConClusion: end of an era of deCline in interest rates and interest marginsThe considerations presented are particularly important in the context of gradual disappearance of space for further reduction in interest rates. People are often confused, so they think it is crucial to pre-dict when interest rates will start growing again in the global market.

If that does not happen, things will, apparently, stay the same as it has been so far. However, this is a misinterpretation of things. It is enough to stop the fall in interest rates, which has already occurred in countries where interest rates on deposits were close to zero and those on money markets shifted into negative zones. Stopping the fall in interest rates on the side of sources of funds and awakening and the sharpening of the price competition on the side of the placement creates pressure on more significant fall in e net interest margins.

Where a combination of market size, level of development, tech-nological progress, and prospects for further debt growth allows it, credit intermediaries will adapt their operations through increased business volume. However, in coun-tries where relationships among key determinants of margin are such that increased volumes can-not compensate for the pressure on the decline in net interest margin, adjustments will be made through mergers, acquisitions, integration, cost savings and other methods of looking for increased cost efficien-cies. As always, we are at the begin-ning of an interesting phase in the development of banking industry.

Picture 4 How to influence the reduction of net interest margin



povjerenje i pouzdanost – eCb započinje u tradiCiji bundesbankePokretanje Evropske monetarne unije početkom 1999-tih i početak rada Evropske centralne banke (ECB) bili su izuzetno uspješni, naročito u pogledu stabilnosti cijena. Godišnja stopa inflacije u eurozoni u cjelini iznosila je u prosjeku 2,2% tokom prvih deset godina monetarne unije: stopa orjentisana ka stabilnosti, za koju su mnogi kritičari mislili da nije moguća, naročito tokom tako dugog vremenskog perioda, prije uvođenja jedinstvene valute.

Ovaj uspjeh desio se, između ostalog, zbog institucionalnih pri-prema za monetarnu uniju: ECB je u osnovi bila kreirana po ugledu

na Bundesbanku.Stabilost cijena je objavljena kao njen primarni cilj, koji je sadržan u Ugovorima Evropske unije zajedno sa političkom nezavisnošću ECB-a i nacionalnih centralnih banaka država učesnica. Ali prenos reputacije sa Bundesbanke na ECB je bio moguć i zbog toga što je Bundesbanka uspjela da snažno doprinese radu ECB od samog osni-vanja kao njena „savjest za politiku stabilnosti“. Uspješan početak bio je, šta više, olakšan globalnim deflator-nim okruženjem krajem 1990-tih i u prvoj dekadi 21. vijeka.

pragmatična „čvrsta ruka“ monetarne politikeKljuč uspješne politike stabilnosti Bundesbanke u decenijama prije

pokretanja monetarne unije bila je, sporedno, njena komunikaciona politika. Tržišnim učesnicima su date snažne, dugoročne referentne tačke kroz, na primjer, ekspanziju novčane mase orijentisanu ka stabilnosti, koja utiče na tražnju. Stopa ekspanzije za novčanu masu je stoga određivana na godišnjem nivou kao prelazni cilj za stabilnost cijena.

Ipak, iako čuvari njemačke va-lute nijesu uspjeli da postignu ovaj prelazni cilj gotovo u polovini svih slučajeva, ipak su uspjeli da tokom ovog perioda dalje ojačaju visok nivo povjerenja politike stabilnosti. Ovo se uglavnom desilo zbog toga što su detaljno analizirali odstupanja od cilja i pažljivo objasnili relevantne posebne faktore. Ali važno je istaći da

bliži se kraj politike

negativnih kamatnih stopa

Markus Becker-Melching je član Upravnog odbora Udruženja njemačkih banaka u Berlinu i odgovoran je za ekonomsku politiku i evropske poslove. Volker Hofmann je direktor u Udruženju koji se bavi ekonomskom politikom i međunarodnim poslovima.

ECB treba da prekine svoju prekomjerno fiksaciju na stopu inflacije od 1,9% i saopšti raspored izlaska

iz krizne situacije u monetarnoj politici što je prije moguće. Prema našem mišljenju, ECB će zahtijevati

u sljedećoj godini kraj kupovine neto obveznica i brzi izlazak iz politike negativnih kamatnih stopa


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MONETARNA POLITIKA U EUROZONI

trust and reliability – eCb starts off in the tradition of the bundesbankThe launch of European monetary union at the beginning of 1999 and the start of the work of the European Central Bank (ECB) were highly successful,particularly in terms of price stability. The annual rate of inflation for the eurozone as a whole was 2.2% on average dur-ing the first ten years of monetary union: a stability-oriented rate that many critics would not have thought possible, especially over such a long period, before the introduction of the single currency.

This success was due, among other things, to the institutional preparations for monetary union:

the ECB was basically modelled on the Bundesbank.Price stability was declared its primary objectiveand enshrined in the EU Treaties along with the political independence of the ECB and the participating na-tional central banks. But a transfer of reputation from the Bundesbank to the ECB was also possible be-cause the Bundesbank managed to contribute heavily to the work of the ECB as its “stability policy conscience” right from the outset. The successful start was, moreover, eased by the global disinflationary environment of the late 1990s and the noughties.

pragmatiC “steady hand”

monetary poliCyA key to the Bundesbank’s successful stability policy in the decades before the launch of monetary union was, incidentally, its communication policy. Market players were given rough, long-term reference points, e.g. through a stability-oriented expansion of the money supply af-fecting demand. A rate of expansion for the money supply was thus set annually as an interim target for price stability.

Yet while the guardians of the German currency failed to reach this interim target in almost half of all cases, they still managed during this period to further strengthen the high level of trust in their stability

negative interest rate policy is coming to an EndMarkus Becker-Melching is a

member of the Management Board of the Association of German Banks, Berlin, in charge of economic policy and European affairs.Volker Hofmann is a director at the Association, dealing with economic policy and international affairs.

The ECB should therefore drop its over-fixation on the 1.9% inflation rate figure and communicate a timetable for exiting the monetary policy crisis mode as soon as possible. In our view, both an end to the net bond purchases and a swift exit from the negative-interest-rate policy are called for in the coming year.


MONETARY POLICY IN THE EUROZONE

su uvijek jasno stavljali do znanja da ne podvrgavaju monetarnu politiku bilo kojoj vrsti automatizma, već detaljno ispituju složeno opšte okru-ženje. Ovaj sveobuhvatan dugoročni pristup je omogućio Bundesbanci da koristi svoju često citiranu po-litiku „čvrste ruke“da „pregleda“ kratkoročne fluktuacije u ključnim ekonomskim indikatorima. To je naročito omogućilo veću postojanost i pouzdanost monetarne politike.

strukturni problemi postaju očigledniEvropska centralna banka (ECB) suočila se sa naročito ozbiljnim izazovima tokom finansijske krize (2008.-2010.),a kasnije i tokom evropske krize državnog duga. Naročito su tokom krize držav-nog duga bili bolno ranjivi tokovi u stvaranju monetarne unije, ali i prethodna pogrešna kretanja naci-onalnih ekonomskih politika.

Neadekvatan nivo ekonomije i konvergencije ekonomske poli-tike među pojedinim državama eurozone objelodanjen je prilično jasno. Uprkos monetarnoj uniji i jedinstvenoj monetarnoj politici, nije se pratila zajednička smjer-nica u pogleduodređivanja toka nacionalne ekonomske politike u državama eurozone. Povrh svega toga, cilj zajedničke međunarodne konkurentnosti, što jeizuzetno važno u monetarnoj uniji i što se može ogledati, na primjer,u trendu je-dinice cijena zarada, pokazao je oštre nacionalne divergencije. S obzirom na odsustvo bilo kojeg opsega za devalvaciju u eurozoni, ovo je zahtijevalo odgovarajuće mjere nacionalnih vlada kako bi se riješila odstupanja u međunarodnoj konkurenciji. Ali u stvarnosti, teški disbalansi kretanja jedinice cijene zarada i stope nacionalne inflacije su manje-više bili pasivno prihvaćeni.

Ovaj trend može se objasniti prilično jasno „klasičnim“ obrascima ponašanja ekonomske politike. Dok neke države eurozone integrišu svoje ekonomije vrlo proak-tivno u međunarodnu trgovinu i odgovaraju na pogoršanje konkuren-tnosti implementiranjem strukturnih reformi u svom poslovnom sektoru i ekonomskom poslovnom okruženju, druge države članicei su se navikle to-kom decenija na to da se opadajuća međunarodna konkurentnost fiksira jedino devalvacijom. Ovi različiti nacionalni obrasci ponašanja postoje

još uvijek, čak i nakon pokretanja monetarne unije, i na kraju sprje-čavaju ekonomsku konvergenciju.

Finansijska kriza i kriza državnog duga: Uspješna politika ECB…

ECB je odgovorila na finansijsku krizu i krizu državnog duga veoma vješto kroz svoju monetarnu poli-tiku. Na primjer, da bi stabilizo-vala ekonomiju, ECB je preduzela sveobuhvatne „netradicionalne“ mjere. Ona je uvela, između ostalog, negativnu kamatnu stopu na depo-zite i pokrenula masivni program otkupa obveznica. Ove mjere bile su kreirane da još više snize kamatne stope na dugoročne kredite.

Ova politika je bila – makar djeli-mično– opravdana u tom periodu. Uostalom, ekonomska situacija nekih država eurozone bila je izu-zetno neizvjesna dugo vremena zbog evropske krize državnog duga. Ipak, od samog početka bile su očigledne dvije kritike: ■ Prvo, ECB je uspijevala i jedva uspijeva da kupi vrijeme ekstre-mno ekspanzivnom monetarnom politikom. Kreatori nacionalnih ekonomskih politika treba da riješe i eliminišu osnovne strukturne probleme.

■ Drugo, bilo je jasno da bi se rizici i nuspojave ove monetarne poli-tike povećali u trajanju i intenzi-tetu usvojenih mjera. Ovi rizici uključuju, između ostalog, oštre fluktuacije određivanja cijena rizika, prijetnju pucanja mjehurića cijene aktive na nekim tržišnim segmentima, izuzetno snažan pritisak na sve u potpunosti fi-nansiranje oblike rezervacija za penzije i rizik kamatne stope koji nastavlja da se nagomilava – ne samo u bilansima banaka veći i u javnim finansijama.

“Evropska centralna banka suočila se sa naročito ozbiljnim izazovima tokom finansijske krize (2008.-2010.),a kasnije i tokom evropske krize državnog duga. Naročito su tokom krize državnog duga bili bolno ranjivi tokovi u stvaranju monetarne unije, ali i prethodna pogrešna kretanja nacionalnih ekonomskih politika“


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policy. This was mainly because they closely analysed target de-viations and carefully explained the relevant special factors. But an important point was also that they always made clear that they do not submittheir monetary policy to any kind of automatism, but thoroughly examine the complex overall en-vironment. This comprehensive, long-term approach enabled the Bundesbank to use its oft-quoted “steady hand” policy to also “look through” short-term fluctuations in key economic indicators. This, in particular, allowed greater steadiness and reliability in monetary policy.

struCtural problems beCome evidentThe ECB faced particularly serious challenges during the financial crisis (2008-2010) and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. Especially during the sovereign debt crisis, the flaws in the architecture of monetary union, but also the preceding misguided developments in national economic policies, were painfully exposed.

The inadequate level of economic and economic policyconvergence between the individual eurozone countries was revealed particularly clearly. Despite monetary union and a single monetary policy, no common direction was pursued when it came to setting the na-tional economic policy course in the eurozone countries. Above all, the target of common international competitiveness, which is a highly important one in a monetary union and may be reflected in, for example, the trend in unit wage costs, dis-played sharp national divergences. Given the absence of any scope for

devaluation in the eurozone, this would have called for appropriate measures by national governments to address the divergence in inter-national competitiveness. But in actual fact thehardening imbal-ances in the development of unit wage costs and national inflation rates were more or less passively accepted.

This development can, inciden-tally, be explained quite clearly by “classical” patterns of behaviour in economic policy. Whilst some eurozone countries integrate their economy very pro-actively into international trade and respond to deteriorating competitiveness par-ticularly by implementing structural reforms in their business sector and theireconomic operating environ-ment, others were accustomed over decades to declining international competiveness being fixed solely by devaluation. These differing national patterns of behaviour are unfortunately still in place even after the launch of monetary union and ultimately hamper economic convergence.

finanCial and sovereign debt Crises: eCb poliCy suCCessful …The ECB responded to the finan-cial and sovereign debt crises very skilfully through its monetary policy. For example, to stabilise the economy, the ECB also under-took comprehensive “unorthodox” measures. Among other things, it introduced a negative interest rate on deposits and launched a massive bond-buying programme. Both measures were also designed to bring down interest rates on long-term loans further.

This policy was – partly, at least – justifiedat the time.After all, the economic situation of some eurozone countries was extremely precarious for a long time as a result of the European sovereign debt crisis. Yet, from the very start, two points of criticism were obvious: ■ Firstly, the ECB was and is merely managing to buy time with its extremely expansive monetary policy. The underlying structural problems need to be tackled and eliminated by national economic policymakers.

■ Secondly, it was clear that the risks and side effects of this monetary policy would increase in step with the duration and intensity of the measures adopted. These risks include, among other things,

“The ECB faced particularly serious challenges during the financial crisis (2008-2010) and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. Especially during the sovereign debt crisis, the flaws in the architecture of monetary union, but also the preceding misguided developments in national economic policies, were painfully exposed”.



… ali raste pritisak fiskalne politike na eCb Monetarna politika ECB prijeti da pređe u dilemu zbog veoma neodlučnih ekonomskih reformi u državama eurozone: ograničenja fiskalne politike se povećavaju i smanjuje se prostor za manevar u monetarnoj politici nakon skoka kamatnih stopa koje će prije ili kasnije postati neophodan. Što je još važnije, da bi opravdala svoje opsežno snabdijevanje likvidnošću, ECB je usvojila tokom prethodne tri godine trend da prihvati prilično mehaničku monetarnu politiku, koja je na kraju tačno suprotna „čvrstoj ruci“ monetarne politike usmjerenoj na dugi rok.

Faktor koji doprinosi tome je da se cilj dugoročne inflacije, koja se namjerno tumačila relativno nejasno prilikom pokretanja monetarne unije, ponovo tumači u praksi mo-netarne politike kao istaknuti cilj od 1,9% koji bi trebao, ako je moguće, da se dostigne u dvogodišnjem prognoziranom periodu. Poremećaji ove skraćene i vrlo mehaničke jed-načine doveli su i još uvijek dovode do nastavka širenja ultra-labavih mjera monetarne politike.

okvir monetarne politike je značajno poboljšanOkruženje za monetarnu politiku ECB-a se, ipak, znatno poboljšalo u po-sljednjih dvanaest do osamnaest mjeseci. To je, prije svega, posljedica cikličnog ekonomskog oporavka i kontinuira-nog ekonomskog rasta u

većini industrijalizovanih zemalja. Eurozona, takođe, sada ima snažan ekonomski rast, koji je stekao ši-rinu i stabilnost. Makroekonomski učinak u eurozoni ove godine će biti znatno jači nego potencijalna proizvodnja treću godinu zaredom. Nezaposlenost u cijeloj eurozoni smanjuje se, iako je i dalje relativno visoka. Stopa inflacije pomaknula se dobro od nulte linije. U 2017. godini se očekuje godišnji prosjek od 1,5%. Ozbiljni deflatorni rizici odavno su nadvladani.

Kreditna aktivnost banaka prema kompanijama i privatnom sektoru opet raste. Međutim mjerno opsež-nim snabdijevanjem likvidnošću i istorijski niskim ključnim kamatnim stopama, ovaj oporavak je još uvi-jek slab. To ukazuje da ekonomski uzlazni trend u eurozoni nije bio – ili makar ne primarno – vođen monetarnom politikom. Suprotno tome, u nekim državama eurozone postoje znaci da je očekivanje da će kamatne stope ostati na niskom nivou neko vrijeme u budućnosti u stvari ohrabrilo kompanije da usvoje stav „čekaj da vidimo“ prema ulaganjima, jer ovaj izgled mone-tarne politike važi uglavnom više za ekonomski pesimizam.

Uprkos ovoj bitnoj promjeni monetarnog okruženja eurozone, monetarna politika ECB ostaje du-boko u kriznom režimu. Kamatna stopa na aranžmane depozita ECB je i dalje negativna (-0,4%) i, zbog programa otkupa obveznica, bilans stanja ECB stalno raste. Produženje programa otkupa obveznica makar do kraja septembra 2018, o čemu je odlučio Upravljački savjet ECB krajem oktobra 2017, predstavlja dodatni stimulans monetarne po-litike od 270 milijardi eura.

Cilj inflaCije ne smije se tumačiti kao „istaknuti Cilj“Predstavnici ECB uvijek ističu u tom smislu da ECB ima jasan mandat da održava stabilnost cijena i da cilj nivoa inflacije ispod, ali blizu, 2% nije do sada bio podriven u njihovim prognozama.

Uprkos pozivitnom ekonomskom okruženju, jedino veoma umjereni trend inflacije se može trenutno naći u gotovo svim industrijalizovanim državama. Postoji mnogo razloga za to, koji se kreću od veoma sporog povećanja radne produktivnosti koja ograničava opseg povećanja zarada do veće transparentnosti cijena, oštrijoj konkurenciji zbog digitalne informacione tehnolo-gije i integraciji Kine u globalnu ekonomiju koja je dugi niz godina djelovala kao ublaživač cijena.

Očekivanja niže inflacije posljed-njih godina takođe su kočile stope rasta cijena.

Osim toga, vjerovatno su tu odi-grali ulogu i smanjeni fiksni troškovi kompanija zahvaljujući reformama tržišta rada, kao i fleksibilnijim proizvodnim procesima u cjelini i

“Sadašnje tumačenje cilja inflacije ECB-a kao istaknutog cilja od 1,9% je previše mehaničko i ne uzima u obzir brojne različite faktore koji utiču na to, kao i odloženi uticaj monetarne politike“


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sharp fluctuations in risk pricing, the threat of asset price bubbles in some market segments, an extremely heavy strain on all fully funded forms of provision for retirement and an interest rate risk that continues to pile up – not only on banks’ balance sheets but also in public finances.

… but fisCal poliCy pressure on eCb is growingThe ECB’s monetary policy threatens to slip into a dilemma due to the only very hesitant economic reforms in the eurozone countries: the fis-cal policy constraints are increas-ing and the room for manoeuvre in monetary policy following an interest rate hike that will sooner or later become necessary again is dwindling. What is more, to justify its ample supply of liquidity, the ECB has over the past three years adopted a tendency to embrace a quite mechanistic monetary policy, which is ultimately the exact opposite of a “steady hand” monetary policy geared to the long term.

A contributing factor is that the

long-term inflation target, which was deliberately worded relatively vaguely at the launch of monetary union, has been reinterpreted in monetary policy practice virtu-ally as a pinpoint target of 1.9% that should, if possible, be reached within a two-year forecast period.Disruptions of this shortened and highly mechanistic equation have led and are still leading to a con-tinued expansion of the ultra-loose monetary policy measures.

monetary poliCy framework fundamentally improvedOver the past twelve to eighteen months, the setting for the ECB’s monetary policy has, however, no-ticeably improved. This is due, above all, to a cyclical economic recovery and a sustained economic upturn in most industrialised countries. The eurozone, too, is now experiencing a robust economic upturn, which has gained in breadth and stability. Macroeconomic performance inthe eurozone will expandmuch more strongly this year than potential out-put for the third year in succession.

Unemployment in the eurozone as a whole is dropping, though it is still relatively high. The inflation rate has moved well clear of the zero line. For 2017, an annual aver-age rate of 1.5% is expected. Serious deflation risks have long since been overcome.

Bank lending to businesses and private households is also starting to pick up again. Yet measured against the ample supply of liquidity and historically low key interest rates, this recovery is still weak. It proves that the economic upturn in the eurozone was not – or at least not primarily – driven by monetary policy. On the contrary, in some eurozone countries there are signs that the prospect of interest rates remaining low for some time to come has actually encouraged businesses to adopt a wait-and-see attitude towards investment, particularly as this monetary policy outlook stands, in principle,more for economic pessimism.

Despite this fundamental change in the eurozone monetary environ-ment, the ECB’s monetary policy remains deep in crisis mode. The interest rate on the ECB’s deposit facility remains negative (-0.4%) and, because of the bond-buying programme, the ECB’s balance sheet is steadily growing. The extension of the bond-buying programme until at least September 2018 that was decided by the ECB Governing Council at the end of October 2017 means an additional monetary policy stimulus of €270 billion.

inflation target not to be interpreted as a “pinpoint target”ECB representatives always point out in this respect that the ECB has a clear mandate to maintain price stability and that the target inflation level of below, but close to, 2% has not been undercut in their forecasts so far.

“The present interpretation of the ECB’s inflation target as a pinpoint target of 1.9% is much too mechanistic and fails to take account of the many different influencing factors and the delayed impact of monetary policy”.



strukturnom pomaku prema usluž-noj ekonomiji.

Ipak, generalno donekle obuz-dan trend cijena u industrijskim zemljama ne treba da se smatra kao mogućnost da se promijeni cilj inflacije. ECB bi trebala da se pridržava srednjoročnog cilja od samo iznad 2%. Međutim, ono što se treba promijeniti jeste prekomjerno mehaničko usmjerenje ECB-a na taj cilj inflacije koji se u monetarnoj politici tumači kao istaknuti cilj od 1,9%. U tom smislu bilo bi korisno podsjetiti se na komunikacionu poli-

tiku Bundesbanke, prema kojoj su se odstupanja od cilja uvijek analizirala, a zatim otvoreno, jasno i uvjerljivo objasnila. Sadašnje tumačenje cilja inflacije ECB-a kao istaknutog cilja od 1,9% je previše mehaničko i ne uzima u obzir brojne različite fak-tore koji utiču na to, kao i odloženi uticaj monetarne politike.

neophodan izlazak iz kriznog režima u monetarnoj politiCi …Udruženje njemačkih banaka stoga vjeruje da bi ECB mogla sada sasvim uvjerljivo da tvrdi da je stabili-zovala trend inflacije u eurozoni i da u svakom slučaju ne postoji ništa što bi je spriječilo da izađe iz kriznog režima u monetarnoj politici - naročito ako se imaju na umu rastući rizici i nuspojave ultra labave monetarne politike.

Stoga bi ECB trebala da prekine svoju prekomjerno fiksaciju na

stopu inflacije od 1,9% i saopšti raspored izla-ska iz krizne situacije u monetarnoj politici što je prije moguće. Prema našem mišljenju, ECB će zahtijevati u sljedećoj godini kraj kupovine neto obveznica i brzi izlazak iz politike negativnih kamatnih stopa.

… ali će promjena ključnih kamatnih stopa biti dugoročnaMeđutim, ECB se u svojoj naprednoj instrukciji po-svetila tome da dugoročno zadrži nepromijenjene ključne kamatne stope nakon završetka otkupa neto obveznica. To znači da će, čak i ako se neto

kupovina u okviru programa otkupa obveznica u sljedećoj godini smanji na nulu, iz današnje perspektive imaćemo kamatnu stopu negativnog depozita sve do 2019. godine.

Uporne negativne stopem među-tim imaju naročito nepovoljan uticaj na poslovne banke u eurozoni. One jedva mogu prenijeti takve stope na

klijente, jer bi većina klijenata vrlo osjetljivo reagovala i povukla svoje depozite sa računa. Za poslovne banke u eurozoni, negativna kamatna stopa ECB-a stoga radi kao „poseban porez“ koji ih trenutno košta više od 500 miliona eura mjesečno - novac koji bankama nedostaje za njihove prioritetne zadatke: restrukturiranje, podsticanje digitalizacije i jačanje osnovice kapitala.

prag izuzetaka za negativnu kamatnu stopu na višak likvidnosti kao posredni korakKako bi se smanjili rizici i nuspojave negativne kamatne stope, Udruženje njemačkih banaka predložilo je nedavno da se višak likvidnosti poslovnih banaka koji se čuva kod ECB u određenoj mjeri izuzme od negativne kamatne stope – mjeru koju je već preduzela Centralna banka Švajcarske i Banka Japana kod uvođenja negativnih kamatnih stopa. Na primjer, Centralna banka Švajcarske naplaćuje negativnu ka-matnu stopu samo na depozite koji prelaze prag od 20 puta minimalne obavezne rezerve, ali najmanje 10 miliona švajcarskih franaka po vla-sniku tekućeg računa.

moguć nastavak niskih dugoročnih kamatnih stopaUkoliko se izlazak iz kriznog re-žima u monetarnoj politici saopšti na uvjerljiv način, postoji dobra šansa da će se tržišne kamatne stope samo malo povećati i da to neće nepovoljno uticati na privredu. Ovo je podržano jedino još veoma umjerenim izgledom inflacije, ali i iskustvom iz promjene kursa mo-netarne politike u SAD. Prinos na desetogodišnje državne obveznice

“Priča o euru je uspješna priča.Dugoročno gledano, sve države članice EU treba da se stoga pridruže monetarnoj uniji. Postoji jasan set pravila koji je uspostavljen za to - i za potreban nivo ekonomske konvergencije. Ova pravila se moraju strogo poštovati i ne treba da budu izložena bilo kojim taktički motivisanim političkim pokušajima da se na njih utiče


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Despite thepositive economic development, an only very moder-ate inflation trend is currently to be found in virtually all industrialised countries. There are many reasons for this, ranging from the only very slowly rising labour productivity limiting the scope for pay rises, to more price transparency, keener competition due to digital infor-mation technologies and China’s integration into the global economy, which acted as a dampener on prices for many years.

The lower inflation expectations in recent years are also now braking price increase rates.

In addition, businesses’ reduced fixed costs thanks to labour market reforms, as well asmore flexible production processes as a whole and the structural shift towards a service economy,probably play a role.

Yet the generally somewhat sub-dued price trend in the indus-trialised countries should not be takenas an opportunity to change the inflation target. The ECB should stick to its medium-term target of just under 2%. What should be changed, however, is the ECB’s overly mechanistic focuson this inflation target that is interpreted in monetary policy practice as a pinpoint target of 1.9%. It would be helpful in this respect to recall the Bundesbank’s communication policy, under which target devia-tions have always been analysed and then openly explained clearly and convincingly. The present in-terpretation of the ECB’s inflation target as a pinpoint target of 1.9% is much too mechanistic and fails to take account of the many different influencing factors and the delayed impact of monetary policy.

exit from monetary poliCy Crisis mode neCessary …The Association of German Banks therefore believes that the ECB could now arguequite plausibly that it has stabilised the inflation trend in the eurozone and that there is at any rate nothing to prevent it from exiting the crisis mode in monetary policy – particularly when the growing risks and side effects of the ultra-loose monetary policy are borne in mind.

The ECB should therefore drop its over-fixation on the 1.9% infla-tion rate figure and communicate a timetable for exiting the monetary policy crisis mode as soon as pos-sible. In our view, both an end to the net bond purchases and a swift exit from the negative-interest-rate policy are called for in the coming year.

… but a Change in key interest rates will be a long time ComingIn its forward guidance, the ECB has, however, committed itself to leaving the key interest rates un-changed for a long time even after ending its net bond purchases. This means that, even if net purchases

under the bond-buying programme are cut to zero in the course of the coming year, we will, from today’s perspective, still have a negative deposit interest rate until well into 2019.

The persistent negative interest rates are, however, having a par-ticularly adverse effect on com-mercial banks in the eurozone. They can scarcely pass on such rates to customers, as most customers would react highly sensitively and withdraw their deposits from their accounts. For commercial banks in the eurozone, the ECB’s negative interest rate therefore works like a “special tax” that currently costs them more than €500 million a month – money that banks lack for their priority tasks: restructuring, driving forward digitisation and strengthening their capital base.

exemption threshold fornegative interest rate on exCess liquidity as intermediate stepTo curb the risks and side effects of the negative deposit rate some-what, the Association of German Banks suggested some time ago

“The euro is a success story. In the long term, all EU member states should therefore join monetary union. There is a clear set of rules in place for this – also for the required level of economic convergence. These rules must be strictly respected and should not be exposed to any tactically-motivated political attempts to influence them”.



SAD od 2,30% trenutno iznosi manje od 60 baznih poena iznad prosjeka za nisku godišnju kamatnu stopu iz 2012. U međuvremenu, program otkupa obveznica je ukinut, ključna kamatna stopa je povećana za če-tiri stepena i nedavno je započelo sužavanje bilansa stanja FED-a. Pored toga, izgled blagog preokreta kamatne stope bi mogao da ubrza planirana ulaganja.

potrebno produbljavanje ekonomske i monetarne unijeIstovremeno, kreatori politike na evropskom nivou i države članice treba da se upozore da ne prepuštaju monetarnu uniju samoj sebi. U svim državama eurozone, potrebne se dalje strukturne reforme koje jačaju slab potencijal rasta i vode ka snažnijoj ekonomskoj konvergenciji.

Potrebne su nam dalje mjere za uspostavljanje dugoročne stabilne arhitekture na nivou monetarne unije. Ovo uključuje eksplicitno razu-mijevanje među državama eurozone o jačanju trenda ekonomskog rasta kao najvećeg prioriteta u ekonom-skoj politici kao i kreiranje struk-tura podsticaja za veću ekonomsku

konvergenciju i jaču međuna-rodnu konku-rentnost u drža-vama eurozone u cilju eliminisanja nedostatka regu-latorne usaglaše-nosti i institucio-nalnih slabosti. U tom procesu, od-govornost i oba-veza bi, po našem mišljenju, trebalo da zajedno budu

na istom nivou koliko je to moguće. Kao konkretne mjere, mi pred-

lažemo razvijanje Mehanizma za evropsku stabilnost (ESM) u Evropski monetarni fond (EMF) i osnažujemo ga sa prihvaćenim ovlašćenjima za kontinuirani nadzor budžeta eurozone. Pored toga, trebalo bi uspostaviti budžet eurozone čineći dostupnim dva aranžmana za hitne slučajeve za posebne namjene euro-zone (kao što su prirodne nepogode)

i za podržavanje neophodnih struk-turnih reformi u državama člani-cama zajedno sa sadašnjim ESM (u budućnosti EMF) aranžmanom za hitne slučajeve za države eurozone koje imaju finansijskih problema. Ministar finansija eurozone bi tre-bao da preuzme predsjedavanje Eurogrupom, da predstavlja članice države eurozone eksterno u mo-netarnim pitanjima, i da upravlja aranžmanima za hitne slučajeve i podršku strukturnim reformama.

Priča o euru je uspješna priča.Dugoročno gledano, sve države članice EU treba da se stoga pridruže monetarnoj uniji. Postoji jasan set pravila koji je uspostavljen za to - i za potreban nivo ekonomske kon-vergencije. Ova pravila se moraju strogo poštovati i ne treba da budu izložena bilo kojim taktički moti-visanim političkim pokušajima da se na njih utiče. Istovremeno, ne treba napominjati da se članstvo u monetarnoj uniji bez volje države članice politički ne dovodi u pitanje.

“Ukoliko se izlazak iz kriznog režima u monetarnoj politici saopšti na uvjerljiv način, postoji dobra šansa da će se tržišne kamatne stope samo malo povećati i da to neće nepovoljno uticati na privredu.


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that commercial banks’ excess liquidity deposited with the ECB should be exempted from the nega-tive interest rate to a certain extent – a measure already taken by the Swiss central bank and the Bank of Japan when introducing negative interest rates. The Swiss central bank, for example, only charges a negative interest rate on deposits exceeding a threshold of 20 times the minimum reserve requirement, but at least 10 million Swiss francs per current account holder.

Continued low long-term interest rates possibleIf an exit from the crisis mode in monetary policy is communicated in a convincing manner, there is a good chance that capital market interest rates will only rise slightly and that the economy will not be adversely affected. This is backed up not only by the still very moderate inflation outlook but also by the experience made with the change of course in monetary policy in the US. At 2.30%, the yield on 10-year US government bonds is currently less than 60 basis points above the average for the low-interest-rate year 2012. In the meantime, the bond-buying programme has been terminated, the key interest rate has been raised in four steps and, most recently, a start has been made on shrinking the Fed’s balance sheet. In addition, the prospect of a soft interest rate turnaround could ac-celerate planned investments.

deepening of eConomiC and monetary union neededAt the same time, policymakers at European level and member states

should be warned against leaving monetary policy to itself. In all eu-rozone countries, further structural reforms that boost weak growth potential and lead to stronger eco-nomic convergence are required.

And at monetary union level, we need further measures to establish a stable architecture in the long term. This includes an explicit un-derstanding among the eurozone countries on strengthening the economic growth trend as the top priority in economic policy as well as creating incentive structures for greater economic convergence and strongerinternational competitive-ness in the eurozone countries in order to eliminate the lack of regula-tory compliance and institutional weaknesses. In the process, liability and responsibility should, in our view, go hand in hand at the same level as far as possible.

As concrete measures, we pro-pose developing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) and investing it with accepted au-thority for continuous eurozone budgetary surveillance. In addition,

a eurozone budget should be es-tablished by making available two special-purpose eurozone facilities for emergencies (such as natu-ral disasters) and for supporting necessary structural reforms in the member countries alongside today’s ESM (in the future, EMF) emergency facility for eurozone countries experiencing financing problems.Aeurozonefinance minis-tershould take over the chair of the Eurogroup, represent the eurozone countries externally on monetary issues and manage the facilities for emergencies and for supporting structural reforms.

The euro is a success story. In the long term, all EU member states should therefore join monetary union. There is a clear set of rules in place for this – also for the required level of economic convergence. These rules must be strictly respected and should not be exposed to any tactically-motivated political at-tempts to influence them. At the same time, it goes without saying that membership of monetary union against the will of a member state is out of the question politically.

“If an exit from the crisis mode in monetary policy is communicated in a convincing manner, there is a good chance that capital market interest rates will only rise slightly and that the economy will not be adversely affected”.



Vremenom se iz bankarstva razvio finansijski sistem kao

širi koncept. Savremeni finansij-ski sistem omogućava zaduživanje kompanija ne samo na bankarskom, već i finansijskom tržištu. Definicija finansijskog tržišta je jednostavna jer se odnosi na pozajmljivanje finansijskih sredstava zajmoprim-cima koja su potrebna na određeno vrijeme, uz plaćanje kamate, od zajmodavaca koji imaju slobodna sredstva. Drugim riječima, finan-sijsko tržište vrši transfer resursa kroz vrijeme, udružujući ih i, na taj način, generišući sredstva radi realizacije investicionih ideja ili povećanja potrošnje. S druge strane, finansijski sistem je kompleksan jer ga čine finansijska tržišta uključu-jući bankarsko tržište, finansijski

instrumenti, finansijske institucije, razni učesnici i regulativa. Ujedno to je na specifičan način osjetljiv sistem jer se radi o pozajmljivanju novca uz razne rizike koji prate finansijske odnose. Dakle, širenjem mogućnosti zaduživanja sa komercijalnog ban-karstva na finansijsko tržište razvio se i sam finansijski sistem.

Za razliku od ugovora o ban-karskom kreditu, na finansijskom tržištu ti ugovori nazivaju se har-tije od vrijednosti kao dokaz da su sredstva pozajmljena, danas u vidu elektronskog zapisa. Ugovori su standardizovani zato se kreiraju različiti finansijski instrumenti ali pojedini od njih mogu imati dodatne, tzv. ugrađene opcije. Finansijski sistem koji dobro funkcioniše je onaj koji (Mertonu 1993, Crane

1995) obezbjeđuje nekoliko osnov-nih funkcija, a to su: obračun i saldiranje plaćanja, ukrupnjavanje i mobilizaciju sredstava, transfer ekonomskih resursta u vremenu i geografski, upravljanje rizicima, informisanje o cijenama finansijske aktive i suočavanje sa informacionim i podsticajnim problemima.

Eksluzivitet bankarskog sistema prikupljanja i plasiranja slobodnih sredstava razvojem finansijskim tržištem je ukinut time što se za-jmoprimci i zajmodavci nalaze i na finansijskom tržištu, najčešće uz posredovanje brokera i dilera. Međutim, finansijska tržišta ne pred-stavljaju zamjenu za bankarstvo, niti otežavaju poslovanje bankarskom sektoru, već su njegova dopuna u izboru štednje i plasiranju slobodnih sredstava. Banke su našle interes da se uključe u finansijska tržišta, tako je savremeni finansijski sistem postao jedna integrisana cjelina ne samo na nacionalnom nivou, nego i globalno. Finansijski sistem kao druga strana materijalne ekonomije postao je dominantno razvijeni sektor važniji od proizvodnje, tako da se kraj 20. i početak 21. vijeka naziva doba finansijskog kapitalizma. Nove tehnologije i inovativnosti

efikasnost crnogorskog finansijskog sistema

Prof.dr Dragoljub Janković, profesor finansija na Univerzitetu Mediteran

“Realna opasnost javlja se pri zapostavljanju efikasnosti finansijskog sistema jer destabilizovani finansijski sistem pri vraćanju u ravnotežu zahtijeva vrijeme i resurse. Stabilan i efikasan finansijski sistem je osnova za održivi ekonomski rast i povećanje životnog standarda


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Financial system, as a wider con-cept, has been developed from

banking system over time. Modern financial system enables borrowing of companies in both the banking and financial markets. The definition of financial market is a simple one: it relates to lending to borrowers in need of funds for a certain period of time, with payment of interest. In other words, financial market transfers the funds through time by pooling them, thus generating them for investing or increasing spend-ing. On the other hand, financial system is a complex system, and it is comprised of financial markets including banking market, financial instruments, financial institutions, various participants and regulation. Simultaneously, it is in a specific way, a sensitive system as it bor-rows money with various risks that follow financial relationships. Thus, the financial system developed by expanding the possibility of bor-rowing from commercial banking to financial market.

Unlike banking loan agreements, the agreements in the financial market are called securities that represent an evidence that funds were borrowed. Nowadays, this

evidence is in the form of electronic record. Agreements are standard-ised for creating financial instru-ments, but some of them may have additional embedded options. A well-functioning financial system must provide several core func-tions (Mertonu 1993, Crane 1995): clearing and settling payments, pooling or mobilizing resources, transferring economic resources, inter-temporally or geographically, managing risk, pricing information, and dealing with information and incentive.

The exclusiveness of the banking system in collecting and distribut-ing available funds through the development of the financial market has been abolished, since borrowers and lenders, most often through

mediation of brokers and dealers, are also located in the financial market. However, financial markets do not represent a substitute for banking system or make banking business more difficult, but are complemen-tary to the choice of savings and the allocation of available funds. Banks have found an interest in joining the financial markets, so modern financial system has become fully integrated not only at the national level but also at international level. The financial system, as the other side of the material economy, be-came a dominantly developed sector that is more important than the manufacture, so the late 20th and early 21st century is called the era of financial capitalism. New tech-nologies and innovations did not

montenegro financial system efficiencyDragoljub Janković, PhD., professor of finance at the Mediterranean University

“Real danger appears when financial system efficiency is neglected, since destabilised financial system requires time and resources to return into balance. A stable and efficient financial system is fundamental for sustainable economic growth and the growth of the living standard”.


CHALLENGES

nijesu zaobišli finansijski sistem i uticali su da se bankarski sistem ali i finansijska tržišta znatno promijene.

efikasnost i stabilnost finansijskog sistemaPrimarni cilj centralnih monetarnih institucija danas predstavlja stabil-nost finansijskog sistema, koji se može analizirati sa više stanovišta: nivoa inflacije, sistema kreditiranja, funkcionisanje bankarskog sektora i finansijskih tržišta itd. U ovom kontekstu pitanje efikasnosti fi-nansijskog sistema je vrlo bitno jer direktno utiče na razvoj, a time i na stabilnost samog finansijskog sistema. Finansijski sistem pokriva finansijske transakcije i razmjenu novca između investitora, zajmo-davaca i zajmoprimaca, tako da stabilnost finansijskog sistema igra ulogu monetarne zaštite potrošača. Smatra se da je finansijski sistem efikasan kada funkcioniše na način da slobodno prikuplja sredstva i plasira ih, pri čemu, tržišni meha-nizam besprekorno funkcioniše u dijelu vrednovanja finansijske aktive uzimajući u obzir relevantne rizike. Ako je finansijski sistem efikasan u smislu kontinuiranog unapre-đenja, to znači da ima perspektivu stabilnosti na sve većem nivou. Regulativa u mnogim zemljama stavlja naglasak na finansijsku sta-bilnost (Finansijska stabilnost – Institucionalna briga, Bankar br.38, jun 2017), dok se njegova efikasnost

ostavlja unutrašnjem djelovanju tržišnih snaga i reagovanju finan-sijskih institucija. Međutim, realna opasnost javlja se pri zapostavljanju efikasnosti finansijskog sistema jer destabilizovani finansijski sistem pri vraćanju u ravnotežu zahtijeva vrijeme i resurse. Stabilan i efikasan finansijski sistem je osnova za održivi ekonomski rast i povećanje životnog standarda. Otud razne regulatorne institucije (komisija za hartije od vrijednosti, centralna banka, agen-cije itd.) imaju ulogu da omoguće što efikasniji finansijski sistem, a to se odnosi na finansijska tržišta, bankarski sistem, klirinški sistem obračuna i poravnanja (kliring i setlment sistem), brokere i dilere, kvalitetne propise itd.

Ključni element finansijskog si-stema su finansijski instrumenti – hartije od vrijednosti, koje mogu biti dužničke (obveznice, zapisi) i vlasničke (akcije) sa mnogobrojnim varijacima i karakteristikama. Prema Međunarodnim računovodstvenim standardima (IAS) finansijski instru-ment je ugovor koji daje pravo na finansijsku imovinu jednom entitetu i finansijske obaveze ili instrument kapitala drugom entitetu. Finansijska imovina jednog entiteta izvodi vri-jednost iz ugovorne obaveze na koji se odnosi (npr. akcija, obveznica, bankarski depozit i slično). Zato, zemljište, roba, nekretnine ili druga opipljiva fizička imovina imaju svoju vrijednost dok finansijska imovina

ne mora uvijek da ima fizičku vri-jednost. Pojavom derivata, za koje se smatra da u suštini nijesu hartije od vrijednosti, čija vrijednost zavisi od budućih gotovinskih tokova na koje glase, znatno je povećalo neizvjesnost i rizik u trgovini ovim finansijskim instrumentima.

razvijenost finansijskog sistemaKljučna komponenta finansijskog sistema je finansijsko tržište na kojem se trguje hartijama od vri-jednosti prema opštem principu ponude i tražnje. Finansijsko tržište uključuje kratkoročne i dugoročne hartije od vrijednosti zavisno da li kreditno zaduženje dospijeva u periodu do jedne (tržište novca) ili preko jedne godine (tržište ka-pitala). Primarno finansijsko tržište je zaduživanje emitenata hartija od vrijednosti na tržištu, a sekundarno svaka dalja prodaja emitovanih hartija od vrijednosti po tržišnim uslovima, tako da kupci finansijskih instrumenata, tj. tržišni zajmodavci ne moraju da čekaju rok dospijeća hartije od vrijednosti ukoliko žele ponovnu likvidnost svoje investicije. Hartija je likvidna ako ima kupca na tržištu, kada novi vlasnik preuzima ulogu zajmodavca i snosi sve rizike ostvarivanja prava koja mu daje hartija od vrijednosti. Međutim, konkurencija finansijskog tržišta i bankarskog sektora dovela je do toga da se bankarski krediti prodaju na tržištu na razne načine, uklju-čujući sekjuritizaciju komercijalnih kredita i oročenih depozita preko finansijskih instrumenata derivata (CD, fjučersi, swapovi, mehani-zam bankarske unakrsne prodaje i kupovine kredita itd.). Mnoge evidencije i analize ukazuju da je

“Mnoge evidencije i analize ukazuju da je nivo razvijenosti jedne ekonomije u direktnoj zavisnosti od razvijenosti finansijskog sistema.


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Vi znate da Erste znači prvi. Zna i Euromoney. Nagrada za izvrsnost 2017.

Važno je koja je Vaša banka.

“Euromoney Awards for Excellence 2017“ u kategoriji Najbolja banka u Crnoj Gori. Nagradu dodjeljuje renomirani časopis specijalizovan za bankarstvo i tržište kapitala, londonski Euromoney.

nivo razvijenosti jedne ekonomije u direktnoj zavisnosti od razvijeno-sti finansijskog sistema. U daljem tekstu slijedi trendovska analiza bankarstva i finansijskih tržišta u Crnoj Gori na osnovu podataka finansijskih zvaničnih institucija iz ugla efikasnosti izabranog seta važnijih parametara.

depoziti i krediti u Crnogorskom bankarstvuOsnovni koncept bankarskog po-slovanja nije se mijenjao od pojave bankarstva, a to je prikupljanje depozita klijenata koji se plasiraju putem kredita istim i drugim kli-jentima. Bankarski sektor posluje sa tuđim sredstvima jer se kapital banke u prosjeku kreće između 8 i 10% u ukupnim izvorima sred-stava. Kada bi akcijski kapital za-mijenio depozite akcionari ne bi mogli ostvariti očekivane tržišne prinose jer bankarstvo u izvorima sredstava, osim onih na koje plaća kamatu, ima i udio sredstava koja su nekamatonosna. Upravo takva struktura omogućava bankama da funkcionišu, dok je akcijski kapital samo u obimu kao garant eventu-alnih bankarskih gubitaka i radi upravljanja bankom od strane ak-cionara. Zato komercijalni krediti najčešće nadmašuju depozite iz više razloga. Naime, depoziti „koštaju“ banke kroz pasivne kamate koje banka plaća na račune štediša ali i na druge račune koje depozitari drže kod banke. Iako svi depoziti nijesu kamatonosni, značajan broj jeste, što zahitjeva od banke aktiv-nost na plasiranju komercijalnih kredita uz aktivne kamatne stope koje su veće od pasivnih. I drugi su razlozi zašto aktivne kamatne stope moraju biti veće od pasivnih, poput

troškova poslovanja same banke, pokrivanje rizika loših kredita, te zaradu koju očekuju akcionari banke. Kada bankarski sektor odobrava kredite njihovi depoziti rastu jer se ta sredstva i dalje nalaze na ban-karskim računima i predstavljaju novi kreditni izvor kroz kreditni multiplikator koji zavisi od propisane obavezne stope rezerve. Međutim, dejstvo multiplikatora je suprotno kada kreditna aktivnost opada, tako da se u tom slučaju radi o stvarnom povećanju depozita prilivom novca na depozitne račune.

U izvorima sredstava sve se više javljaju kreditna zaduženja samih banaka. U crnogorskom bankarskom sistem plasirani krediti su u aprilu mjesecu 2009. god. dostigli najveći nivo u odnosu na visinu depozita u bankarskom sistemu za 1,6 milijardi € ili 67%. To je period ekonomskog post-booma jer od 2008. god. poči-nje hlađenje pregrijane ekonomije. Grafikon pokazuje da se ova razlika iz godine u godinu kontinuirano smanjuje da bi se odobreni krediti izjednačili sa visinom depozita u junu mjesecu 2014. god. Nakon toga, depoziti su do kraja 2017. god. nadmašivali kredite sa tendencijom uvećanja ovog gepa dostižući 15%, tako da je apsolutna razlika između kredita i depozita iz aprila 2009. i kraja 2017. god. dostigla čak 82%.

Bankarski sistem u postkriznom periodu pokazuje stabilnost rasta depozita i opadanje kreditnoj pla-smana do 2014. god. nakon čega rastu uz nevelike oscilacije. Finansijski sistem efikasno prikuplja bankarske depozite znatnim dijelom i zbog toga što je njegov drugi segment - finansij-sko tržište slabo razvijen. Međutim, nagomilavanje depozita dovodi do teškoća u poslovanju bankarskog sistema. Da bi se zaključilo koliko je nesklad u kretanju depozita i kredita uticao na pad profita u bankarstu, a možda i pojavu gubitaka u pojedi-nim bankama, neophodno je dalje istraživanje.

Banke su suzdržane u kreditiranju privrede dok istovremeno rastu de-poziti i zato su manje zainteresovane da primaju nove, posebno velike depozite, neke pokušavajući da za-računaju negativne kamatne stope prema klijentima. Negativne kamatne stope na međubankarskom tržištu je fenomen u Everopskoj uniji poslednjih godina, ali bi bilo vrlo opasno njegovo prelivanje na depozite klijenata u ko-mercijalnom bankarstvu. Negativne kamatne stope, koje se odnose na referentne kamatne stope između finansijskih institucija, imaju za cilj smanjenje „parkiranja“ slobodnih bankarskih sredstava radi njihovog preusmjeravanja, prije svega u pri-vredu. Zato, uspostavljanje negativ-

nih kamatnih stopa prema klijentima moglo bi da vodi ka dezintegraciji bankarskog sistema.

Analiza strukture depozita pokazuje na značajne pro-mjene poslednjih godina u pravcu porasta a vista


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bypass the financial system, and have influenced the banking system as well as the financial markets to change significantly.

finanCial system effiCienCy and stabilityNowadays, primary objective of central monetary institutions is financial system stability that can be analysed from several aspects: inflation level, lending system, functioning of banking sector and financial markets, and the like. In this context, the issue of financial system efficiency is very important as it influences directly the devel-opment, and thus the stability of financial system. Financial system covers financial transaction and exchange of money between the investors, lenders and borrowers. Therefore, financial system stability plays a role of monetary protection of consumers. Financial system is considered to be efficient when it functions in the manner that it freely gathers funds and places them, whereby market mechanism func-tions smoothly in valuing financial assets, taking into consideration relevant risks. If financial system is efficient with regard to an ongo-ing improvement, it means that its stability perspective is increasing. Regulation in many countries high-lights financial stability (Financial Stability as Institutional Concern, The Bankar, issue 38, June), while

its efficiency is left to internal activi-ties of market forces and reaction of financial institutions. However, real danger appears when financial system efficiency is neglected, since destabilised financial system re-quires time and resources to return into balance. A stable and efficient financial system is fundamental for sustainable economic growth and the growth of the living standard. Thus, the role of different regulatory institutions (securities and exchange commission, central bank, agencies) is to enable more efficient finan-cial system. This refers to financial markets, banking system, clearing and settlement system, brokers and dealers, and qualitative regulations.

Key element of financial system are financial instruments - securi-ties, which can be debt securities (bonds, notes) and equity securities with numerous variations and fea-tures. According to the International Accounting Standards (IAS), finan-cial instrument is any contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity. Financial asset of an entity derives value from underlying contractual obligation (e.g. share, bond, banking deposit). Therefore, land, commod-ity, real estates or any other tangible physical asset have their value, while financial assets does not always have to have physical value. When derivatives appeared, which are

not considered to be in fact securities, and which value depends on future cash flows that are made out to, signifi-cantly increased uncertainty and risk in trading with these financial instruments.

finanCial system development Key component of financial system is financial market, where securities are traded based on general principle of demand and supply. Financial market involves short-term and long-term securities depending whether loan matures in period of one (money market) or over one year (capital market). Primary financial market represents indebtedness of security issuers in the market, and secondary market represents any further sale of issued securities by market conditions, where buyers of financial instruments, i.e. market lenders do not need to wait for maturity of securities if they want their investment to be liquid again. A security is liquid if it has a buyer in the market, then new owner becomes lender and bears all risks of exercising rights against security. However, competition of financial market and banking sector resulted in sale of banking loans in the market in various ways, including secu-ritization of commercial loans and deposited funds through derivative financial instruments (CDs, futures, swaps, cross-selling and repurchase of loans). Many records and analyses indicate that the level of development of an economy directly depends on development of financial market. The following text shows trend analysis of banking and financial markets in Montenegro based on data of financial official institutions with

“Many records and analyses indicate that the level of development of an economy directly depends on development of financial market”.


CHALLENGES

depozita, s jedne strane, i smanje-nje dugoročno oročenih depozita do 3 godine, oročenih depozita do 3 mjeseca ali i onih od 3 mjeseca do 1 godine, s druge strane, kako to pokazuje sljedeći grafikon.

Deponenti žele da im sredstva budu na raspolaganju u svakom trenutku i manje su spremni da ih dugoročne oroče, što je na neki način odraz povećane neizvjesnosti u privrednom poslovanju.

Obavezne rezerve su poslije eko-nomskog vrha u 2007. god. splasnule u 2009. god., što je korespondiralo sa kretanjem depozita. Depoziti su dostigli najviši nivo u 2007. god. da bi u naredne četiri godine opadali, te da bi opet porasli od 2011. god. do 2017. god. za skoro 10% prosječno godišnje. Ovo komplikuje činjenica da je privreda nespremna za ekspanziju, tj. nova kreditiranja. Povezanost nivoa depozita sa obaveznim rezervama u strukturi depozita na koje se one izdvajaju pokazuje korelacija od viso-kih 0,9 izračunata na stanje ukupnih depozita što znači da je politike obave-zne rezerve koegzistentna. Obavezne rezerve rastu sa povećanjem depozita ali su u 2016. god. nadmašili nivo iz perioda "booma", iako se privreda nalazi u fazi vrlo usporenog oporavka. Na depozite po viđenju i oročene depozite do godinu dana, kojih ima 60,7% u ukupnim kreditima, stopa obavezne rezerve iznosi 7,5%, a na depozite oročene na preko godinu dana ili preostalih 39,3% ukupnih

depozita, stopa obavezne rezerve iznosi 6,5%. Dakle, ponderisana obavezna stopa rezervi na depozite iznosi 7,11% koja se u masi kreće oko 225 miliona € pri kraju 2017. god. Polovina ove obavezne rezerve na nivou crnogorskog bankarstva otežano se plasira u inostranstvo zbog negativnih kamatnih stopa na međubankarskom tržištu. Na drugu polovinu obavezne rezerve Centralna banka plaća kamatu po stopi EONIA, koja je negativna u poslednje dvije godine, umanjeno za 10 baznih po-ena, što znači da banke ne ostvaruju prihod po ovom osnovu ali zauzvrat imaju sigurnu podršku Centralne banke Crne Gore u slučaju kratkoročnih nelikvidnosti, čak i beskamatnu na jedan dan.

bankarski krediti privredi i stanovništvuU 2017. god. prvi put dolazi do većeg kreditnog plasmana banaka u sektor stanovništva u odnosu na privredni sektor što samo po sebi govori da ovaj trend nije povoljan jer se jača potroš-nja, a ne stvaranje novih vrijednosti za domaće i strano tržište. Jačanje potrošnje od strane stanovništva, koja se umnogome odnosi na trajna dobra, negativno se odražava na spolj-notrgovinski bilans koji je hronično nepovoljan zbog velikog deficita.

u 2018. doći će do velike promjene u komerCijalnom bankarstvu euU 2018. god. doći će do velike promjene u komercijalnom bankarstvu Evropske unije implementacijom tzv. PSD2 direktive (Direktiva o izmjenama usluge plaćanja) snažno podržana inovativnim tehnologi-jama i promjenom potrošačkih preferencija. Naime, ovom dirketivom nestaće monopol komercijalnih banaka nad informacijama i uslugama računa njihovih klijenata jer će fizička i pravna lica moći koristiti treće lice provajdere da upravljaju njihovim finansijama (pr. Facebook, Google ili neko drugi moći će da plaća račune klijenata putem P2P transfera i da analiziraju potrošnju na način mnogo efikasniji koji uključuje bržu i raznovrsniju primjenu analitike podržane vještačkom inteligencijom klijentovog ponašanja prilikom kupovine i drugih finansijskih transakcija, a sve to istovremeno dok je novac siguran na bankarskom računu. Banke neće više međusobno konkurisati u plaćanjima za svoje klijente već sa bilo kime ko je registrovan za ovu uslugu. Na ovaj način banke prestaju da budu glavni provajderi jer će nebankarske institucije lakše ulaziti na tržište sa novim finansijskih rješenjima, tako da se vjeruje da će nebankarske finansijsko-tehnološke kompanije (FinTech) igrati značajnu ulogu u budućem finansijskom pejzažu, kako to već najavljuju investicione banke. Za sada se različito gleda na to da li će ovo pomjeranje sa banaka na bankarstvo uključu-jući treća lica dovesti do veće konkurencije i promjenu u potrošačkoj tražnji. Ali šta se zasigurno očekuje od ove direktive jeste snažan uticaj na dalju integraciju finansijskog tržišta u Evropskoj uniji.


60

IZAZOVI

regard to the efficiency of selected set of important indicators.

deposits and loans in montenegrin banking seCtor The main concept of banking op-erations has not changed since the emergence of banking, i.e. attracting deposits of clients that are placed through loans granted to the same and other clients. Banking sector operates with someone else’s money, because capital of a bank ranges on average between 8% and 10% in total sources of funds. If share capi-tal replaces deposits, shareholders would not be able make expected market returns, because in addition to funds that pay interest banking industry has share of non-interest bearing funds in sources of funds. This structure allows banks to func-tion, while share capital is used only as a guarantor for potential bank losses and for managing bank by shareholders. Therefore, commercial loans usually exceed deposits due to several reasons. Namely, deposits are an expense for banks because banks pay deposit interest rates on deposits of their clients but also on other accounts deposited with the bank. Regardless of the fact that all deposits are not interest-bearing, sig-nificant number of them is interest-bearing, which requires banks to grant loans at lending interest rates that are larger than deposit interest rates. There are also other reasons why lending interest rates must be higher than deposit interest rates, like operating costs, the coverage of risk of non-performing loans, and the earnings expected by the bank's shareholders. When the banking sector grants loans, their deposits increase because these funds are

still in the bank accounts and rep-resent a new credit source through a credit multiplier that depends on the required reserves. However, the effect of the multiplier is the opposite when the credit activity decreases, and in that case, it is real increase in deposits through deposit accounts inflow.

Banks' credit lines are becoming increasingly apparent in sources of funds. In April 2009, in bank-ing system of Montenegro, loans reached the highest level in relation to deposits in the by 1.6 billion euros or 67%. This was the period of eco-nomic post-boom. However, since 2008, the cooling of the overheated economy begins. Graph below shows that this difference is continuously decreasing year over year, and in June 2014 they were in the same amount as deposits. In period after June 2014 until end-2017, deposits exceeded loans with a tendency to increase this gap reaching 15%, so the absolute difference between loans and deposits from April 2009 to the end of 2017 has reached 82%.

The banking system in post-crisis period showed stability of deposit growth and a decrease in loans until 2014. After this period, loans increased with the slight oscilla-tions. Financial system efficiently gathers bank deposits substantially

also because financial market is poorly developed. However, accumulation of deposits leads to difficulties in banking system operations. Further research is needed in order to make a con-clusion on how the disparity in deposits and loans has affected decline in bank's profit, and per-haps the occurrence of losses in some banks.

Banks are reluctant to lend to the economy while simultaneously deposits grow, and are therefore less interested in accepting new, particularly large deposits. In doing so, some of the banks are trying charge negative interest rates to their clients. Negative interest rates in the interbank market have been a phenomenon in the European Union over the last few years, but their spill over to clients’ deposits in commercial banks would be dangerous. Negative interest rates that refer to reference interest rates between financial institutions are aimed at reducing depositing of available fund for the purpose

of their redirec-tion, primarily in the economy. Therefore, impos-ing negative inter-est rates on clients could lead to dis-integration of the banking system.

Analysis of de-posit structure

shows significant changes in re-cent years in favour of increase in deposit on one hand, and decrease in long-term deposits up to 3 years, term deposits up to 3 months, but also those from 3 months to 1 year. This is shown in the graph below.


CHALLENGES

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Deposits want their funds at their disposal at any time and are less in-clined to make long-term deposits, which in some way reflects increased uncertainty in business.

Statutory reserves dwindled in 2009 after reaching economic peak in 2007, which corresponded with the deposits trend. Deposits reached the highest level in 2007, to fall in the next four years and to rise again in

period from 2011 to 2017 by almost 10% on average per year. This is complicated by the fact that the economy is unprepared for expansion, i.e. new lending. The correlation of the level of deposits with statutory reserves in the struc-

ture of the deposits is high at 0.9. It is calculated on the balance of total deposits, which means that the reserve requirement policy is co-existent. Reserve requirement increases with the increase in deposits. However, they exceeded the levels reached in the period of boom, although the economy is in a very slow recovery phase. Reserve requirement amounts to 7.5% on demand deposits and time

deposits up to one year, which account for 60.7% in total loans, while reserve requirement is 6.5%, on deposits over one year, which make up the remaining 39.3% of total deposits. Thus, weighted reserve requirement on deposits is 7.11%, which amounted to about 225 million euros at the end of 2017. Due to negative interest rates in the interbank market, it is diffi-cult for half of reserve requirement of Montenegro banks to be placed internationally. The Central Bank pay interest rate at EONIA for the second half of the reserve requirement, this being negative in the last two years, reduced by 10 basis points, meaning that banks do not generate revenue on this basis but in turn they have the secure support of the Central Bank of Montenegro in the case of short-term lack of liquidity, even interest free overnight.

retail and Corporate banking loans In 2017, banks’ lending to retail sector compared to corporate sector have increased for the first time, which means that this trend is not favourable because spending grows stronger than development of new values for domestic and foreign markets. Growing level of spending in retail sector, which is largely related to durable consumer goods, is negatively reflected on foreign trade balance, which is chronically disadvantageous due to the large deficit.

big Changes to oCCur in eu CommerCial banking in 2018In 2018, a big change in the commercial banking of the European Union will occur by implementing the PSD2 Directive (Payment System Directive), which is strongly supported by innovative tech-nologies and changing consumer preferences. Namely, this directive will influence the vanishing of the monopoly of commercial banks over the information and services of their clients' accounts, since natural and legal persons will be able to use third-party providers to manage their finances. This implies that Facebook, Google or some-body else will be able to pay customer accounts via P2P transfers and analyse spending in a much more efficient way that involves faster and more diversified analysis supported by artificial intelligence of client behaviour when purchasing and executing other financial transactions, while securing money at the bank account. Banks will not compete in payments for their clients anymore; instead, they will compete with anyone who is registered for this service. In this way, banks will not be the main providers, because it will be easier for non-banking institutions to enter the market with new financial solu-tions. Thus, it is believed that non-banking financial and technology companies (FinTech) will play a significant role in the future financial architecture, as already announced by the investment banks. There are different views currently as to whether this shift from banking sector to third parties will lead to greater competition and a change in consumer demand. However, it is certainly expected that this directive will strongly influence further integration of the financial market in the European Union.





CHALLENGES

Bankarski sistem je sve više u funk-ciji stanovništva (potrošnje), a manje privrede. Kreditiranje privrednog sektora od ekonomskog booma 2007. god. ima silaznu putanju u naredne četiri godine od kada nivo kredita ovom sektoru stagnira uz manja variranja kako to grafikon pokazuje.

Sa porastom depozita uvećava se teorijski kreditni multiplika-tor koji iznosi 14,1 puta inicijalne kreditne mase tj. potencijala rasta depozita, koji se inače kreće preko 3 milijarde € krajem 2017. god. S druge strane, obim kredita kreće poslednjih 5-6 godina na nivou nešto ispod 1 milijarde € što bez direktnih stranih investicija ne bio dovoljan zamajac rasta.

Sljedeća tabela sadrži proračune agregatnog bilansa banaka u Crnoj Gori sa stanjem na kraju svake go-dine, osim u 2017. koji se odnosi na kraju novembra mjeseca.

TABELA

Pad efikasnosti osnovne bankarske aktivnosti može se trendovski uočiti jer novčana sredstva u ukupnim sredstvima rastu što znači da banke sve manje upošljavaju svoj kreditni potencijal. Stanje gotovine banaka u odnosu na plasirane kredite se pove-ćava, tako da je skoro trostruko veće u odnosu na period velikog uspona (2007-2008. god.). S druge strane, depoziti rastu u ukupnim izvorima sredstava na rekordnih 77% pri kraju 2017. god. uz smanjenje zaduživanja bankarskog sektora na ¼ danas u odnosu na 2008. god. Dakle, s jedne strane raste kreditni potencijal, a s druge strane odobreni krediti sta-gniraju, što na dužem roku može destabilizovati bankarski sektor.

loši dugovi – uzrok ili posljediCaNa kraju 2015. godine 63 firme iz Crne Gore imale su profit preko milion eura ili ukupno 232 miliona € dobiti koji je prijavljen Poreskoj upravi za opo-rezivanje. Međutim, oporeziva dobit u 2016. god. od 7.532 firmi znatno je snižena na ukupno 44 miliona € (prema portalu Bankar). Crnogorska privreda posluje sa profitom koji nije veliki. S druge strane, problem loših dugova je donekle ublažen raznim mjerama u okviru bankarskog sektora. Iako su loši krediti u ranijem periodu bili preko 20% ukupno datih kredita,

mjere poput ročnog restrukturiranja, refinansiranje i izmještanje loših kredita na faktoring kompanije, ovaj procenat je danas znatno snižen. Osim u odnosu na Srbiju (17%) od zemalja iz okruženja Crna Gora sa 11,1% (ili realnih 20-tak%) loših dugova u nepovoljnom je položaju u odnosu na pr. Kosovo (4,9%), prosjek EU 5% itd. Rješenje ovog problema, prema najnovijem Izvještaju MMF-a, za ekonomije regiona bi moglo biti u razvoju lokalnih tržišta kapitala gdje bi banke emitovale korporativne obveznice, dok bi jačanje privatnih investicionih i penzionih fondova i osiguravajućih kompanija pomoglo kreiranju tražnje za bankarskim obveznicama i podsticanju domaće štednje.

Loši krediti nijesu ništa veći pro-blem realne ekonomije nego što je to problem finansijskog sektora. Može se konstatovati da je nerazvijenost svih segmenata finansijskog sistema u savremenim uslovima poslovanja jedan od glavnih uzroka ove pojave. Jer, nove forme i novi biznisi, ali i oni koji duže traju, u današnjim uslovima otvorenosti, vrlo su ne-izvjesni u pogledu opstanka što zahtijeva i prilagođavanje izvora finansiranja koji su sremni na tako visoke rizike. A to može da pruži samo razvijeni finansijski sistem i finansijska tražišta.

“Loši krediti nijesu ništa veći problem realne ekonomije nego što je to problem finansijskog sektora. Može se konstatovati da je nerazvijenost svih segmenata finansijskog sistema u savremenim uslovima poslovanja jedan od glavnih uzroka ove pojave.

God. novac/aktiva

novac/kredit

depozit/ pasiva

pozajmice/pasiv

2006 19% 26% 75% 12%

2007 14% 17% 70% 18%

2008 9% 11% 60% 27%

2009 10% 12% 60% 24%

2010 11% 14% 61% 24%

2011 10% 12% 65% 19%

2012 11% 14% 71% 13%

2013 13% 18% 71% 11%

2014 16% 23% 74% 8%

2015 18% 29% 76% 7%

2016 21% 35% 76% 8%

XI 2017 19% 31% 77% 7%


64

IZAZOVI

The banking system is increasingly in the function of population (spending) and less in the function of economy. Corporate lending in period from eco-nomic boom in 2007 had been trending down in the next four years since the level of loans granted to this sector stagnated slightly oscillating as the graph below shows.

When deposits increase, the theoretical credit multiplier increases by 14.1 times of the initial credit supply, i.e. the growth potential of the deposit, which exceeded 3 billion euros at the end of 2017. On the other hand, the loan portfolio was somewhat below 1 billion euros in the last 5-6 years, which would not be, without direct foreign investments, sufficient driver for growth.

The following table contains calcula-tions of the aggregate balance sheet of banks in Montenegro as at the end of each year, except in 2017, which refers to the end of November.

The decline in efficiency of core banking activity can be trendy because monetary assets grow in total assets,

which means that banks are less and less employing their credit potential. The cash position of banks in relation to loans increased, so that it is almost three times higher in relation to the period of boom (2007-2008). On the other hand, deposits growth was 77% of total sources of funds at the end of 2017. Simultaneously, banking sectors’ debts reduced to ¼ compared to 2008. Thus, credit potential is growing, while granted loans stagnated, which in the longer term can destabilize the bank-ing sector.

bad debts – Cause or ConsequenCeAt the end of 2015, 63 Montenegrin companies had a profit of over 1 million euros or total of 232 million euros of profit was reported to the Tax Administration for taxation. However, taxable profit in 2016 of the 7,532 companies was significantly reduced to a total of 44 million euros (according to the Bankar portal). Montenegrin economy oper-ates with profit that is not big. On the other hand, the problem of bad debts has somewhat mitigated by various measures within the banking sector. Although non-performing loans ac-counted for more than 20% of total loans in the previous period, measures such as maturity restructuring, refinancing and transferring of non-performing loans to factoring companies resulted nowadays in substantial fall of this

percentage. Except compared to Serbia (17%), Montenegro is, of all neighbouring countries, with non-performing loans of 11.1% (or real 20%), in disadvantageous position compared to Kosovo (4.9%), whereby EU average is 5%. According to the latest IMF report, the solution to this problem for the economies in the region could be in the development of local capital markets where banks would issue corporate bonds, while strengthen-ing of private investment and pension funds and insurance companies could help creating demand for bank bonds and boost domestic savings.

Non-performing loans are no a bigger problem for a real economy than it is a financial sector problem. It can be stated that underdevelopment of all segments of the financial system in modern operat-ing conditions is one of the main causes of this phenomenon. In the situation of open markets nowadays, new forms and new businesses, and those that last longer, are very uncertain with regard to their existence, which requires also adjusting the sources of funds that are ready to take such high risks. This can only be provided by developed financial system and financial market.

bank return on interest rateBanks yield curves are inverse, since interest rates on short-term loans are higher than interest rates on long-term loans, as the following chart shows.

“Non-performing loans are not bigger problem for a real economy than it is a financial sector problem. It can be stated that underdevelopment of all segments of the financial system in modern operating conditions is one of the main causes of this phenomenon.

Year Money/ assets

Money/Loan

Deposits/iabilities

Borrowings/liabilities

2006 19% 26% 75% 12%

2007 14% 17% 70% 18%

2008 9% 11% 60% 27%

2009 10% 12% 60% 24%

2010 11% 14% 61% 24%

2011 10% 12% 65% 19%

2012 11% 14% 71% 13%

2013 13% 18% 71% 11%

2014 16% 23% 74% 8%

2015 18% 29% 76% 7%

2016 21% 35% 76% 8%

XI 2017 19% 31% 77% 7%


CHALLENGES

bankarski kamatni prinosKrive bankarskih prinosa su inverzne jer su kamatne stope na kratkoročne kredite veće od kamatnih stopa na dugoročne kredite, kako to pokazuje sljedeći grafikon. Teorija očekivanja i Teorija preferencijalne likvidnosti, s jedne strane i praksa iz koje se ana-lizira vremenska struktura kamatnih stopa s druge strane, upućuju na to da inverznost signalizira krizu jer se bankarski sektor ali i privreda uzdrža-vaju od dugoročnog kreditiranja zbog povećanog rizika vraćanja tih kreditnih obaveza. U takvim okolnostima veća tražnja za kratkoročnim kreditima teži da nadomjesti uzdržavanje od dugoročnog zaduživanja što utiče da su kamatne stope na kratkoročne kredite veće od kamata na dugoročne kredite.

Investiciono razvojni fond je državna finansijska institucija koja kreditira-njem podstiče ostvarivanje ciljeva ekonomske politike, prije svega po-većanje zaposlenosti, novi biznis, po-državanje regionalnog aspekta razvoja i dr. Politika ovog fonda je davanje kredita po nižim kamatnim stopama, što pokazuje grafikon. Njegov uticaj na visinu tržišnih kamatnih stopa nije bio značajan pa su aktivne bankarske kamatne stope ostale relativno visoke, čak povećavajući ovu razliku, iako im je trend opadajući. Ekspanzija ovog fonda mogla bi da se poveća na 1 milijardu € godišnjih stanja kredita za period od osnivanja zaključno sa narednom godinom, što je jedna desetina kreditnog potencijala ban-karskog sektora samo u jednoj godini.

Fond nema uticaj na sniženje tržišnih kamatnih stopa jer je njegov kreditni potencijal znatno manji i fokusiran na projekte koji su u funkciji ekonomske politike i regionalnog razvoja.

Savjet stranih investitora u Crnoj Gori u svojim preporukama navodi: „Čitava ekonomija bi imala velike koristi od nižih kamatnih stopa i jednostavnijeg i lakšeg pristupa finansiranju. Ali, ovo zahtijeva stabilnije poslovanje okruženja, te u tom smislu ohrabru-jemo Vladu da ovo pitanje sagleda kao širu kategoriju, s obzirom da su

kamatne stope odraz rizika u jednoj ekonomiji – one su posledica, a ne uzrok“. Postavlja se pitanje koji su to rizični faktori, na koje ukazuju strani investitori, i koliko oni uvećavaju kamatne stope na kredite u Crnoj Gori. Nije poznatao da li ima analiza i istraživanja u ovom pravcu, koje bi pomogle u formulisanju politika u bankarstvu i finansijskom sistemu, niti su na raspolaganju u javnosti re-dovno objavljivanje i praćenje kretanja premije rizika na različite plasmane u crnogorskom finansijskom sistemu.

Opšti nivo kamatnih stopa konstan-tno je visok bez obzira koji je tekući ekonomski ciklus, tj. da li privreda u usponu ili padu. Ako kompanija koristi kredit i nakon pada prihoda i smanjenja varijabilnih troškova u periodu krize, visoke kamate kao fiksni troškovi postaju uzrok gubitka kako to pokazuje sljedeći primjer.

bilans uspjeha prijerefinansiranja

iznos 000 €Bruto prodaja 100.000Povraćaji, diskont 100NETO PRODAJA 100.000Troškovi prodaje 35.000

Bruto marža 65.100Ostali troškovi

Prodaja 13.000Opšt i administratvni 25.000Amortzacija 10.000Ostalo 500Ukupni operatvni troškovi 48.500

OPERATIVNI PRIHOD 16.600

Prihod od kamata -Troškovi kamata -25.000Prihod od dividende -Dobitak (gubitak) od prodaje osnovnih sredstava -

Bruto prihod (prije oporezivanja) -8.400

Porezi na prihod -756

Neto prihod -9.156


66

IZAZOVI

Theory of Expectations and Theory of Preferential Liquidity, on one hand, and the practice of analysing t time structure of interest rates on the other hand, indicate that the inversion signals a crisis because the banking sector and the economy refrain from long-term lending because of the increased risk of repayment of these credit obliga-tions. In such circumstances, higher demand for short-term loans tends to compensate for long-term borrow-ing, which implies that interest rates on short-term loans are higher than interest on long-term loans.

The Investment and Development Fund is government financial institu-tion that stimulates the realisation of the goals of economic policy through lending, employment growth, new business, support the regional aspect of development. The Fund grants loans at lower interest rates (see Graph below). It did not affect significantly the level of market interest rates, so bank lend-ing interest rates remained relatively high, even increasing this difference, although their trend was declining. The Fund could increase lending to 1 billion euros on annual level for the period from its establishment to the next year, which is one-tenth of the banking sector's loan potential in only one year. The Fund has no impact on the reduction of market interest rates because its loan potential is considerably smaller and it is focussed on projects in the function of economic policy and regional development.

Montenegrin Foreign Investors Council states in its recommenda-tions: "The entire economy would benefit greatly from lower interest rates and simpler and easier access to finance. However, this requires more stable business environment, and in this regard we encourage the Government to consider this issue as a broader category, given that interest rates reflect the risks in an economy - they are the con-sequence, not the cause”. There is a question of what are the risky factors

that foreign investors point to, and how much they increase interest rates on loans in Montenegro. It is unclear whether there is an analysis and research in this direction that would assist in formulating policies in banking and financial system, or whether they are publicly available for regular disclosure and monitoring of risk premium trends for differ-ent placements in the Montenegrin financial system.

The general level of interest rates is consistently high regardless of the current economic cycle, i.e. whether the economy is rising or falling. If the company uses a loan even after decline in revenues and reducing variable costs during the crisis, high interest rates as fixed costs become the cause of the loss as shown in the following example.

bilans uspjeha prijerefinansiranja

iznos 000 €Bruto prodaja 100.000Povraćaji, diskont 100NETO PRODAJA 100.000Troškovi prodaje 35.000

Bruto marža 65.100Ostali troškovi

Prodaja 13.000Opšt i administratvni 25.000Amortzacija 10.000Ostalo 500Ukupni operatvni troškovi 48.500

OPERATIVNI PRIHOD 16.600

Prihod od kamata -Troškovi kamata -25.000Prihod od dividende -Dobitak (gubitak) od prodaje osnovnih sredstava -

Bruto prihod (prije oporezivanja) -8.400

Porezi na prihod -756

Neto prihod -9.156

profit and loss statement before refinancing

amount 000 €Gross sales i000 € Returns, discounts 100NET SALES 100.000Sales expenses 35.000

Gross margin 65.100Other expenses

Sales 13.000General and administrative 25.000Depreciation 10.000Other 500Total operating expenses 48.500

OPERATING INCOME 16.600

Interest income -Interest expenses -25.000Dividend income -Profit (loss) from sale of fixed assets -

Gross income (pre-tax) -8.400

Income tax -756

Net income -9.156


CHALLENGES

TRADICIJA DUGAPREKO 150 GODINA

The company now has lower operating costs due to refinancing, as a result of decline in market interest rates (both lending and deposit rates, while their spread remains the same), which allows it to operate positively. However, it is obvi-ous that the market does not adequately regulate the level of the market interest rate because they are not resistant to eco-nomic cycles. The question is why does the financial market lack self-regulation in this case? The answer is partly that the mechanism of decline in market interest rates is complex because deposit interest rates have to fall first and then lending interest rates. In practice, it is difficult that such a situation will hap-pen in practice as the banks that begin to implement such a policy are afraid of losing their customers. Reduction in deposit and lending interest rates at the same interest rate spread would be appropriate for banks and the economy, but this does not happen on the market. In practice, regulator will intervene in such cyclical developments obliging the banks to implement measures that will lead to the reduction or increase in interest rates, depending on the current economic cycle. Thus, market inefficiency is successfully replaced by regulation,

which is in the function of economic recovery. In any case, if interest rates do not adjust to economic cycles in long run, realistically, the recovery of the economy should not be expected in longer period, which is negatively transferred to the banking sector.

interest rate spreadInterest rate spread between the aver-age annual lending and deposit interest rate is high, although it declined from a maximum of 7.47% in 2015 to 6.29% in 2017. High interest rate spread indicates the risk of lending, which is why com-mercial banks want to achieve higher interest margin that could offset losses from unrecovered loans. interest rate spread at the banking system level was variable in the last 7 years with a slight declining trend recorded in the last three years as shown in the following graph.

In the scenario of system regulation, the interest rate spread of 6.56% in 2011 would be the same if deposit interest rate was 0.5% instead of 3.13% and lending interest rate was 7.06% instead of 9.69%, which would be a major relief for the economy. Even in situation of a stable operations, risks would be lower and the spread could be lower, which would be acceptable for the bank. Thus, general high level of interest rates does not contribute to the recovery of the economy as it would be in the case of systemically defined regulation through reference interest rates.

Despite the downward trend, interest margins remain high and far from desir-able average of 4% of lending interest rates in the period of crisis and recovery, which only points to uncertainty of bank placements.

The market turned out to be inefficient, and the concept of a free financial market without adequate regulation through interest rate policy and other policies has long been abandoned. Interest rate management by central monetary authori-ties is implied. This is one of the main leverages of monetary policy implemented by the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem. In a market game, each individual bank, in period of the need to reduce interest rates, is tempted when and how much to reduce deposit interest rate before lending interest rates due to the risk of migration of the depositors.

fdi inflows and outflowsWith regard to infrastructure, the financial system is important for the inflow of foreign investments, which is one of the main development factors in Montenegro.

“Interest rate spread between the average annual lending and deposit interest rate is high, although it declined from a maximum of 7.47% in 2015 to 6.29% in 2017. High interest rate spread indicates the risk of lending, which is why commercial banks want to achieve higher interest margin that could offset losses from unrecovered loans”.


CHALLENGES

Refinansiranjem, kao rezultatom pada tržišnih kamatnih stopa (aktivnih i pa-sivnih pri čemu njihov raspon ostaje isti), kompanija sada ima niže troškove poslovanja što joj omogućava da posluje pozitivno. Međutim, očigledno da tržište ne reguliše na odgovarajući način nivo tržišne kamatne stope jer su one nerezi-stentne na ekonomske privredne cikluse. Postavlja se pitanje zašto finansijsko tržište nema samoregulaciju u ovom slučaju? Odgovor je, dijelom u tome, što mehanizam pada tržišnih kamatnih stopa je složen jer prvo moraju da padaju depozitne kamatne stope a zatim kamatne stope kreditiranja klijenata. To je u praksi teško očekivati da se desi jer se banke koje počnu da sprovode takvu politiku plaše da bi mogle da izgube klijente. Smanjenje pasivne i aktivne kamatne stope pri istom kamatnom rasponu bi odgovaralo i bankama i privredi, ali se to na tržištu ne dešava. Praksa je nametnula potrebu da u ovakvim cikličnim kretanjima regulator mora da intervenište jer se na taj način sve banke obavezuju na sprovođenje mjera koje vode u smanjenju ili povećanju kamatnih stopa, zavisno od tekućeg privrednog ciklusa. Tako se neefikasnost tržišta uspješno supstituiše regulacijom

koja je u funkciji oporavka privrede. U svakom slučaju, ako se kamatne stope dugoročno ne prilagođavaju privrednim ciklusima, realno ne treba očekivati ni oporavak ekonomije u dugom roku, što se negativno prenosi na bankarski sektor.

kamatni rasponKamatni spred između prosječne godiš-nje aktivne i pasivne kamatne stope je velik, iako je sa maksimuma od 7,47% u 2015. god. smanjen na 6,29% u 2017. god. Široki kamatni raspon ukazuje na rizičnost plasiranja kredita zato poslovne banke žele da ostvare što veću kamatnu maržu kojom bi mogla da nadoknadi gubitke od nevraćenih kredita. Kretanje kamatnog spreda na nivou bankarskog sistema u poslednjih 7 godina poka-zuje varijabiltet sa tendencijom blagog smanjenja u poslednje tri godine kako to pokazuje sljedeći grafikon.

U scenariju sistemske regulacije kamatni raspon npr. u 2011. god. od 6,56% bio bi isti da je pasivna kamatna stopa 0,5% umjesto 3,13% a aktivna kamatna stopa 7,06% umjesto 9,69%, što bi za privredu bilo veliko olakšanje, čak u takvim okol-nostima stabilnog uslova poslovanja rizici bi bili niži pa bi i raspon mogao biti manji što bi bilo prihvatljivo za banku. Dakle, opšti visoki nivo kamatnih stopa ne do-prinosi oporavku privrede na način kako bi to bilo u slučaju sistemski definisane regulacije preko repernih kamatnih stopa.

Uprkos tendenciji smanjenja, kamatne marže ostaju visoke i daleko od poželjnih prosječnih 4% aktivnih kamatnih stopa u periodu krize i oporavka što samo ukazuje na nesigurnost bankarskih plasmana.

Tržište se pokazalo neefikasnim i kon-cept slobodnog finansijskog tržišta bez odgovarajuće regulative preko politike kamatnih stopa i drugih politika davno je napušten. Upravljanje kamatnim sto-pama od strane centralnih monetarnih vlasti se podrazumijeva. To je jedna od glavnih poluga monetarne politike koju sprovodi Evropska centralna banka sa sistemom centralnih banaka Eurozone. Jer, u tržišnoj utakmici u periodu potrebe snižavanja kamatne stope stavlja svaku pojedinačnu banku na iskušenje kada i koliko smanjiti pasivne kamatne stope prije aktivnih kamatnih stopa zbog rizika migracije deponenata.

priliv i odliv sdiFinansijski sistem je infrastrukturno bitan za priliv stranih investicija koje su jedan od glavnih razvojnih faktora u Crnoj Gori.

“Kamatni spred između prosječne godišnje aktivne i pasivne kamatne stope je velik, iako je sa maksimuma od 7,47% u 2015. god. smanjen na 6,29% u 2017. god. Široki kamatni raspon ukazuje na rizičnost plasiranja kredita zato poslovne banke žele da ostvare što veću kamatnu maržu kojom bi mogla da nadoknadi gubitke od nevraćenih kredita.


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Generally, the FDI have shown a declining trend in Montenegro over the last few years. in order to maintain net inflow at a desirable level, it is essential to further develop a financial system that would provide more opportunities for investing in securities.

Foreign direct investments may become a significant leverage of de-velopment in the forthcoming period as well. In the structure of foreign investments, intercompany invest-ment is relatively large that requires a developed financial market with a variety of financial instruments. Domestic real estate market is at-tracting fewer direct investments, but investment in companies could be also important. Less developed and unrelated financial system in Montenegro affects slower and lower inflow of foreign direct investments, especially when they come from developed countries.

The annual diaspora inflow through the banking sector was about 400 million euros in 2017. However, it is estimated that it reaches 500 million euros including inflow out of financial channels. Financial system with more advanced mechanisms of channelling and security can be significant in the future for inflows from the diaspora if various mar-ket material is enabled. Obviously, Montenegro has large foreign inflows in the form of loans, remittances, donations, and in that respect, more

developed financial system could increase benefits from savings, available funds disbursement, and cheaper borrowing.

money marketMoney market is the least developed component of the financial market in Montenegro. Namely, there is no activity of issuing and trading of company short-term securities in the are very limited in trad-ing. This means that this market is not only sufficiently developed in terms of market choice, but it almost lacks liquidity. However, the short-term securities market has had substantially higher demand than supply for three-month and 6-month securities. Banks have reduced their lending to corporate sector due to increased risk, but are likely to be more willing to buy short-term T-bills. Excess of demand to the borrowing price ratio is negative -0.29, which means that the excess of demand is not a significant factor for possible reduc-tion of short-term interest rate. The correlation between the volume of securities traded and interest rates is also negative -0.55, which means that 55% of interest rate on these securities are explained by the volume of securities traded, which is an important information for

the application of a future model of recovery of this market. The demand and supply do not have a major impact on the discount price of short-term securities, which is a kind of growth potential of this market.

The market is the best mecha-nism for establishing interest rates. The mechanisms of issue and sale of T-Bills performed by the Central Bank of Montenegro for the re-quirements of the Government if further improved, would further lower the borrowing costs, and wider circle of potential inves-tors could be interested. For this purpose, establishing a special platform for the purchase of short-term T-Bills would simplify the procedure, and it could stimulate the development of the money market in Montenegro with the wider choice of financial instru-ments. Also, Montenegro Stock Exchange mechanism should be better utilized in the function of money market development.

“The mechanisms of the issue and sale of T-Bills performed by the Central Bank of Montenegro for the requirements of the Government if further improved, would further lower the borrowing costs, and wider circle of potential investors could be interested”.


CHALLENGES

Generalno, SDI pokazuje opadajući trend u Crnoj Gori poslednjih neko-liko godina i da bi se zadržao neto priliv na poželjnom nivou bitan je dalji razvoj finansijskog sistema koji bi pružio više mogućnosti ulaganja u hartije od vrijednost.

Strane direktne investicije imaju potencijal i u narednom periodu da budu značajna poluga razvoja. U strukturi stranih inesticija, interkom-panijsko ulaganje je relativno veliko što zahtijeva i razvijeno finansijsko tržište sa raznovrsnim finansijskim instrumentima. Domaće tržište ne-kretnina privlači manje direktnih investicija ali bi ulaganje u firme moglo da bude i dalje perspektivno. Manje razvijeni i nepovezani finan-sijski sistem u Crnoj Gori utiče na sporiji i niži priliv stranih direktnih investicija, posebno kada one dolaze iz razvijenih zemalja.

Godišnji priliv iz dijaspore kroz bankarski sektor kreće se na nivou od oko 400 miliona € za 2017. god. ali se procjenjuje da dostiže 500 miliona

€ računajući i priliv van finansijskih kanala. Finansijski sistem sa još ra-zvijenijim mehanizmima kanalisanja i sigurnosti može u budućnosti da bude značajan za priliv iz dijaspore tim prije ako omogući raznovrsni tržišni materijal. Očigledno, Crna Gora ima velike prilive finansijskih sredstava iz inostranstva bilo u formi kredita, doznaka, donacija i dr. i u tom smislu razvijeniji finansijski sistem bi mogao da uveća koristi iz štednje, plasmana slobodnih sredstava i jef-tinijeg zaduživanja.

tržište novCaTržište novca je najslabije razvijena komponenta finansijskog tržišta u Crnoj Gori. Naime, na tržištu novca nema aktivnosti emisija i prometovanja kompanijskih kratkoročnih hartija od vrijednosti. Jedini emitent je Država čije kratkoročne hartije od vrijednosti, državne zapise (T-bills), se vrlo ogra-ničeno prometuju. To znači da ovo tržište nije samo dovoljno razvijeno u smislu izbora tržišnog materijala, nego je i gotovo nelikvidno. Međutim, tržište kratkoročnih hartija od vrijednosti ima već duže vrijeme tražnju znatno veću od ponude za državnim zapisima ročnosti 3 i 6 mjeseci. Banke su sma-njile plasiranje kredita privredi zbog povećane rizičnosti ali bi vjerovatno više bile spremne da kupuju kratko-ročne državne hartije od vrijednosti.

Korelacija viška tražnje prema cijeni zaduživanja je -0,29 što znači da višak tražnje nije značajan faktor eventual-nog obaranja kratkoročne kamatne stope. Korelacije količine prodatih hartija od vrijednosti i kamatne stope je takođe negativna -0,55, što znači da se 55% kretanje kamatnih stopa na ove hartije od vrijednosti objaš-njava količinom prodatih hartija od vrijednosti, što je važan podatak za primjenu nekog budućeg modela oživljavanja ovog tržišta. Ponuda i tražnja ne pokazuju veliki uticaj na diskontnu cijenu kratkoročnih har-tija do vrijednosti što je svojevrsni potencijal rasta ovog tržišta.

Tržište je najbolji mehanizam za uspostavljanje kamatnih stopa. Mehanizam emitovanja i prodaje državnih zapisa koji obavlja Centralna banka Crne Gore za potrebe Države sa daljim unapređenjem dodatno bi se snizili troškovi zaduživanja i animirala širi krug potencijalnih investitora. Za tu svrhu uspostavljanje posebne platforme za kupovinu kratkoročnih državnih hartija od vrijednosti pojed-

nostavile bi proceduru i uz širi izbor finan-sijskih instrumenata mogla da podstakne razvoj novčanog tr-žišta u Crnoj Gori. Takođe, mehanizam Montenegroberze bi se treba bolje iskori-stiti u funkciji razvoja novčanog tržišta.

“Mehanizam emitovanja i prodaje državnih zapisa koji obavlja Centralna banka Crne Gore za potrebe Države sa daljim unapređenjem dodatno bi se snizili troškovi zaduživanja i animirala širi krug potencijalnih investitora.


72

IZAZOVI

Graph above shows development of market interest rate on short-term T-bills that are favourable to the Government as issuer, especially in recent years, but this opportunity is not sufficiently exploited.

Capital marketIn respect of volume of transac-tions, Montenegrin capital market has become small after the boom, shallow and inefficient to be in the function of economic development.

The graph above shows a small volume of transactions in the Montenegrin Stock Exchange Market, especially the company's debt securities.

Stock exchange index, Monex, after reaching maximum in 2007, has stagnated at a level of 1/5 for a number of years. Transactions re-late to the secondary market, while there is almost no transactions in the primary market.

Capital market is not sufficiently integrated through the financial system with other segments, money market and banking market, and it is significantly bypassed by inflow of foreign investments. In addition, there is a small number in foreign investors while, due to insufficient market capitalization, investment funds do not have the ability to invest at a level that would sustain them, and thus their financial position has already collapsed. Investment funds, private pension funds and private insurance companies, as important

institutional investors, op-erate under conditions of underdeveloped financial market infrastructure which is already jeopardizing their future business.

referenCe interest rateReference interest rate of the European Central Bank and the US Fed shows how to

effectively manage the interest rate policy in crisis periods. Namely, the supreme monetary institutions acted in a way that they lowered reference interest rates over a very short pe-riod of time and thus regulated the market interest rates significantly in the period of crisis, thereby re-ducing the costs of financing of the economy and other borrowers on the banking market and money and capital markets. The following graph

shows very efficiently, in a relatively short period of time, lowering of the FED's interest rate and keeping it low until the economy emerged from the crisis.

Interest rates are thus adjusted to the demand for the current business cycle. Namely, reference interest rates have been lowered to a minimum level, close to zero, so interest rates on clients with such low bases have been increased only by the risk factor to be more favourable for clients in difficult times of business. In this way, interest rate operating costs have been significantly reduced for both corporate and retail sectors, which has helped these countries to recover faster and more successful through lower operating costs and lower household borrowing costs, thus boosting demand that doubly positively affected the economy.

The European Central Bank has been delaying about half a year to lower its reference interest rate as shown in the graph below, which may have been the reason why the financial crisis in one segment felt stronger in the EU, and therefore had to enter the negative interest rate zone in order to discourage with-holding available funds of banks and waiting for more favourable time for lending and making them turn more to lending to the economy and the population. Negative interest rates were not recorded in the US financial


CHALLENGES

Grafikon pokazuje kretanje tr-žišne kamatne stope na kratkoročne trezorske zapise koji su povoljni za emitenta Državu naročito po-slednjih godina ali ta šansa nije dovoljno iskorišćena.

tržište kapitalaPoslije boom-a crnogorsko tržite kapitala akcija je postalo malo po obimu transakcija, plitko i nedovoljno efikasno da bi bilo u funkciji privrednog razvoja.

Grafikon pokazuje mali obim na crnogorskom berzanskom tr-žištu, posebno se to odnosi na kompanijske dugovne hartije od vrijednosti.

Berzanski indeks Monex nakon maksimuma 2007. god. stagnirao je na nivou od 1/5 već duži niz godina. Transakcije se odnose na sekundarno tržište, dok primarno tržište gotovo da je zamrlo.

Tržište kapitala nije dovoljno integrisano kroz finansijski sistem sa ostalim segmentima, novčanim tržištem i bankarskim tržištem, a zaobilazi ga značajno i priliv stranih investicija. Osim toga, stranih investitora je vrlo malo dok zbog nedovoljnog tržišnog materijala investicioni fondovi nemaju mogućnost investiranja na nivou koji bi ih održao tako da se njihov finansijski položaj već dosta urušio. Investicioni fondovi, privatni penzioni fondovi i privatna osiguravajuća društva, kao značajni institucionalni investitori posluju u uslovima nedovoljno razvijene finansijske tržišne infrastrukture što već ugrožava njihovo buduće poslovanje.

reperna kamatna stopaReperna ili referentna kamatna stopa Evropske centralne banke i američkog FED-a pokazuje kako se efikasno upravlja politikom kamatnih stopa u kriznim perio-dima. Naime, vrhovne monetarne institucije djelovale su na način što su u vrlo kratkom vremen-skom periodu spustile referentne kamatne stope i time regulatorno uticale da se tržišne kamatne stope značajno smanje u periodu krize i time umanje troškovi finansiranja privrede i drugih zajmoprimaca

na bankarskom tržištu i tržištima novca i kapitala. Na sljedećem gra-fikonu prikazano je vrlo efikasno, u relativno kratkom vremenskom pe-riodu, snižavanje FED-ove kamatne stope i držanje na

niskom nivou dok privreda nije izašla iz krize.

Kamate se na taj način prilagođa-vaju zahtjevu tekućeg privrednog ciklusa. Naime, referentne kamatne stope spuštene su na minimalni nivo, nešto iznad nule tako da su kamatne stope prema klijentima sa ovako niske osnove bile samo uvećane za faktor rizika kako bi za klijente bile povoljnije u teš-kim vremenima poslovanja. Na ovaj način troškovi poslovanja po osnovu kamata značajno su sniženi za privredu i stanovništvo što je pomoglo da se ove zemlje prije i uspješnije privredno oporave kroz niže troškove poslovanja i niže troškove zaduživanja stanovniš-tva čime se pojačala tražnja što se dvostruko pozitivno odrazilo na privredu.

Evropska centralna banka je ka-snila oko pola godine u spuštanju reperne kamatne stope, kako to pokazuje naredni grafikon, što je možda bio razlog da se finansijska kriza u jednom segmentu jače


74

IZAZOVI

osjetila u EU, te zbog čega je mo-rala ući u zonu negativne kamatne stope kako bi se destimulisalo „parkiranje“ slobodnih sredstava banaka čekajući povoljnija vre-mena za kreditiranje i natjerala ih da se više okrenu kreditiranju privrede i stanovništva. Negativne kamatne stope nijesu zabilježene na finansijskom tržištu SAD-a jer adekvatna monterna politika bila brža u reagovanju i efikasnija u svakom pogledu.

Ključan faktor u finansijskom sistemu čini aktivno vođenje po-litike kamatnih stopa od strane vrhovne monetarne vlasti u ze-mlji. U protivnom, neizbježni su poremećaji na finansijskom i bankarskom tržištu na dugi rok.

zaduživanje države i finansijski sistemCrnogorski bankarski sektor za-računava visoke premije rizike na kamatne stope bankarskih kredita koja se kreće između 7,17% i 11,5% poslednjih nekoliko godina kako to pokazuje sljedeći grafikon.

Iako stope prinosa na državne bezrizične kratkoročne hartije od vrijednosti su na relativno niskom nivou, premije su izuzetno visoke što je izazvano visokim rizikom od loših kredita u bankarskom sektoru. A loši krediti se dobrim dijelom javljaju zbog nefleksibilnosti fi-nansijskog tržišta i nedjelovanja samoregularnog mehanizma pri-lagođavanja kamatnih stopa na niži nivo u periodu recesije. Ovaj začarani krug se tako održava jer ne postoji adekvatna sistemska regula-cija bankarskog sektora u ovom vrlo bitnom segmentu. Korelacija, koja je jednaka nuli (ρ=0), pokazuje da ne postoje nikakve međuzavisnosti između kretanja prinosa na kratko-ročne državne hartije od vrijednosti i prosječne kratkoročne bankarske kamatne stope.

Država ne koristi mogućnost da se više zadužuje na kratkoročno

tržište hartija od vrijednosti po nižim kamatnim stopama u kon-tinuitetu umjesto što to radi po mnogo višim kamatnim stopama, posebno na inostranim tržištima. Odsustvo programa redovnih emi-sija kratkoročnih državnih hartija od vrijednosti u 2017. god. prema procjeni uvećava budžetske rashode za nekoliko miliona eura samo u jednoj godini.

Kamate na euroobveznice su od 2010. god do 2014. god. imale silazni trend sa 7,875% na znatno nižih 3,875% ali je u 2016. god. došlo do povećanja na 5,75% možda kao odgovor na političku nestabilnost koja je karakterisala tu godinu sa tzv. prelaznom Vladom. Međutim, domaće tržište obveznica reagovalo je sa nižom kamatnom stopom na obveznice od 4% što se prenijelo na bankarsko kreditiranje Države u 2017. god. po istoj stopi.

Crna gora može primjeniti pilot projekat bezgotovinskog plaćanjaCrna Gora bi mogla primijeniti pilot projekat bezgotovinskog plaćanja koji postaje sve više aktuelan u zemljama EU. To znači da gotovina više ne bi bila u upotrebi jer bi sav novac bio u elektronskoj formi. Sva plaćanja bi se mogla izvoditi putem kartica, e-bankingom i mo-bilnim bankingom. Kompletni novčani tokovi bili bi u bankarskom sistemu, nelegalna ekonomija više ne bi postojala. Bankarski sistem bi raspolagao sa više sredstava i na stabilnijem nivou. Kontrola neza-konitih transakcija bi gotovo eliminisala mogućnost pranja novca i druge nezakonite finansijske transakcije. Svi novačni tokovi bili bi u legalnom finansijskom sistemu i siva ekonomija bi bila eliminisana. Obračun poreza i naplata bila bi dovedena na najviši nivo. Izostali bi razni sumnjivi investitori, posebno velika gotovinska ulaganja. Finansijski sistem bi bio u funkciji privrede, građana i samih banaka, na kvalitetniji način više nego ikada do sada. Stanovništvo i mala pri-vreda bi podigli nivo edukovanosti i korišćenja savremenih finansija i svi bi ostvarili veći prihod na svoja sredstva koja bi stalno bila u bankarskom sistemu zemlje.


76

IZAZOVI

market because adequate monetary policy was faster in response and more efficient in every aspect.

A key factor in the financial sys-tem is the active management of interest rates policy by the supreme monetary authorities in the country. Otherwise, inevitable disturbances on the financial and banking markets are in the long run.

borrowing of the state and finanCial systemMontenegrin banking sector is charg-ing high premiums on interest rates on bank loans ranging between 7.17% and 11.5% in the last few years as shown in the following graph.

Although rates of return on gov-ernment riskless short-term securi-ties are at a relatively low level, the premiums are extremely high due to the high risk of non-performing loans in the banking sector. Non-performing loans largely appear due to the financial market's inflexibility and the lack of self-regulation mecha-nism of adjusting interest rates to a lower level during the recession. This vicious circle is maintained because there is no adequate system regulation of the banking sector

in this very important segment. The correlation, which is equal to zero (ρ = 0), shows that there is no interdependence between the movement of return on short-term government securities and the average short-term bank in-terest rate.

The state does not use the ability to borrow more on the short-term securities market at lower interest rates in the future instead of doing it at much higher interest rates, especially in foreign markets. The absence of programme of regular issuance of short-term govern-ment T-bills in 2017 according to estimates increases budget spending by several million euros in just one year.

In period 2010-2014, interest rates on Eurobonds were trending

down from 7.875% to a significantly lower 3.75%. However, in 2016, there was an increase of 5.75%, perhaps as a response to the political instability that characterized the year with the so-called Transitional Government. However, the domestic bonds market re-acted with a lower interest rate on bonds of 4%, which was transferred to the bank

lending to the Government at the same rate in 2017

montenegro Can implement Cashless payment pilot projeCtMontenegro could apply a non-cash payment pilot project that is becoming increasingly current in the EU countries. This means that cash would no longer be in use because all the money would be in electronic form. All payments could be made through payment cards, e-banking and mobile banking. Cash flows would be in the banking system, illegal economy would no longer exist. The banking system would have more resources at its disposal in more stable level. The supervision of illegal transactions would almost eliminate the possibility of money laundering and other illegal financial transactions. Cash flows would be in the legal financial system and the informal economy would have been eliminated. The cal-culation of taxes and payments would be brought to the highest level. No suspicious investors would occur, especially large cash investments. The financial system would be in the function of economy, citizens and banks themselves, in a better way than ever before. The population and small economy would raise the level of education and use of modern finances and everyone would make greater revenue on their funds that would be constantly present in the banking system of the country.


CHALLENGES

Uočava se da se zaduživanje države dugovnim hartijama od vrijednosti radi sporadično kada je finansijsko na-prezanje vezano uglavnom za vraćanje prethodnih zaduženja. Ta sporadičnost sa velikim iznosima zaduživanja bez vremenske neusklađenosti i konti-nuiteta nepovoljno se odražava na uslove zaduživanja povećavajući cijenu pozajmljenih sredstava.

Primjeri Srbije i Hrvatske su vrlo indikativni jer su uspjeli da stabilizuju finansijska tržišta većim uključivanjem državnih hartija od vrijednosti na re-dovnoj osnovi. Srbija prema kalendaru emisija za 2017. god. je imala ukupno 24 aukcije koje su raspoređene po mjesecima u ukupnoj vrijednosti od 1,5 milijardi € kao i 23 aukcije emisija obveznica u vrijednosti od 207 milijardi dinara (1,7 milijardi €). Hrvatska je samo u jednoj od 20 aukcija emitovala zapise u vrijednosti od 100 miliona €. Kako slika pokazuje, internet portal je idealno sredstvo za organizovanje emitivnog tržišta državnih hartija od vrijednosti.

Uređenost finansijskog tržišta je jedan od faktora zašto se Država Srbija povoljnije zadužuje sa 1,9% u odnosu na Crnu Goru sa 4%.

sCenario razvojaCrnogorski bankarski sistem karak-teriše djelovanje tržišta bez vođenja politike kamatnih stopa od bilo koje institucije ili regulatora. Zato se može reći da je crnogorski bankarski sistem okrenut ka kratkoročnom cilju profitabilnosti. Ovakav bankarski sistem se u turbulentnim finansijskim dešavanjima manje okreće privredi zbog povećane rizičnosti na uštrb du-goročnom stabilnom i profitabilnom poslovanju, jer korektivni regulatorni mehanizmi nijesu sistemski postav-ljeni na efikasan način. Postavlja se pitanje da li je crnogorski finansijski sistem suviše malo odmakao od onog predtranzicionog, osim što je došlo do povećanje broja banaka i papirna usklađivanja poslovanja sa EU direktivama? Da li je finansijski sistem dovoljno efikasan? Efikasnost finansijskog sistema u osnovi se sagledava na način koliko su ele-menti koji ga čine funkcionalni i razvijeni, ali i koliko je u saglasju sa realnom ekonomijom i kako se bankarski sistem razvija u skladu sa najnovijim trendovima.

Scenario razvoja finansijskog si-stema iz sadašnjeg predtranzicionog oblika u savremeni mogao bi se od-vijati na način da se prvo uspostavi politika kamatnih stopa koja bi pratila privredne cikluse, zatim uspostavi reperna bezrizična kamatna stopa kako bi se mogli transparentnije identifikovati rizici i nadograđivati na kamatnu stopu u finansijskom sistemu. Država bi uvođenjem pro-grama redovnih emisija raznovrsnih hartija od vrijednosti sa više različitih rokova dospijeća snizila troškove zaduživanja i doprinjela izgradnji efikasnijeg sistema kamatnih stopa. Uvođenjem šire lepeze finansijskih instrumenata omogućio bi lakše planiranje slobodnih sredstava i pristupačnije finansiranje privrede, a osim privrede i banke bi proširile svoje poslovanje na tržišta novca i kapitala. Finansijski sistem bi na taj način počeo efikasnije da vrednuje finansijsku imovinu zavisno od njene vrste i izloženosti rizicima. Efikasniji finansijski sistem smanjuje pritisak na tržište nekretnina kao oblik plasiranja slobodnih sredstava u stanove i poslovne prostore i ta sredstva kanališe u finansijski sistem uz veću korist vlasnika tih slobodnih sredstava. Finansijski sistem bi postao transparentniji i efikasniji, sa većim

izborom finansijskih instru-menata, većom konkurenci-jom u finansijama, te većim i efikasnijim podsticajima razvoju realnog sektora. Do tada, nije za očekivati da ćemo imati stope rasta BDP više od blagog rasta od 2,5% do 3,5% bez značajnijeg uticaja na po-boljšanje životnog standarda. Jer, paradigma da je finansijski sektor samo odraz privrede u finansijskom kapitalizmu očigledno ne važi.


78

IZAZOVI

It is noticed that government bor-rowing is periodic when the financial constraint is mainly related to the repayment of previous debts. This periodic high borrowings without time constraints and continuity adversely reflects on borrowing conditions by increasing the price of borrowed funds.

The examples of Serbia and Croatia are very indicative because they have managed to stabilize financial markets by regular engagement of government securities. According to the 2017 calendar of issues, Serbia held 24 auctions that were distributed by months in total amount of 1.5 billion euros and 23 bond auctions in the amount of 207 billion euros (1.7 billion euros). Croatia issued T-Bills of 100 million euros in one of 20 auctions. As the picture below shows, the internet portal is an ideal tool for organizing the issuing market of government securities.

The financial market struc-ture is one of the reasons why Government borrows under more favourable terms (1.9%) compared to Montenegro (4%).

Development Scenario

The Montenegrin banking system is characterized by the functioning of the market without pursuing inter-est rate policy by any institution or regulator. Therefore, it can be said that Montenegrin banking system is facing a short-term profitability objective. Such a banking system is turning less to economy in tur-bulent financial developments due to increased risk to the detriment of long-term stable and profitable business, since corrective regulatory mechanisms are not systematically set up in an efficient manner. The

question is whether Montenegrin financial system has gone too far from the pre-transition, apart from the increase in the number of banks and document alignment with EU directives? Is the financial system efficient enough? Efficiency of the financial system is basically seen in terms of the elements that make it functional and developed, and how much it is in accordance with the real economy and how the banking system develops in line with the latest trends.

The scenario of the development of the financial system from the current pre-transition form to the modern one could take place by establish-ing first an interest rate policy that would follow the economic cycles, and then establish riskless reference interest rate in order to identify risks more transparently and upgrade the interest rate in the financial system. By introducing regular programme of issuing various securities with multiple maturities, the Government would reduce borrowing costs and contribute to building a more ef-ficient interest rate system. The introduction of a wider range of financial instruments would enable

easier planning of available funds and more affordable finance for the economy, and in addition to the economy, banks would expand their business to the money and capital markets. The financial system would thus have become more efficient in assessing financial assets depend-ing on its type and risk exposure. A more efficient financial system reduces the pressure on the real estate market as a form of investing available funds in apartments and business premises, and these funds are channelled into the financial system with the greater benefit to the owners of these available funds. The financial system would become more transparent and more efficient, with greater choice of financial in-struments, greater competition in finances, and more and more effec-tive incentives for the development of the real sector. Until then, it is unlikely that GDP growth rates will be more than mild growth of 2.5% to 3.5% without significant impact on improving the living standards. For, the paradigm that the financial sector is only a reflection of the economy in financial capitalism obviously does not apply.


CHALLENGES

novine zakona Zakonom o tržištu kapitala uvode se brojne novine u odnosu na postojeće uređe-nje ovog tržišta kao i načina poslovanja učesnika na istom. Novi zakon predstavlja ključni pravni akt kojim se uređuje supervizija i poslovanje na tržištu kapitala.

Zakon propisuje sveobuhvatniju definiciju finan-sijskog instrumenta i kreiranje novih platformi za trgovanje (multilateralne platforme za trgovanje i vanberzansko trgovanje).

Takođe, brojne odredbe Zakona služe boljoj zaštiti klijenata investicionih društava i očuvanju integriteta tržišta, putem usklađivanja zahtjeva koje investiciona društva i regulisana tržišta moraju da ispunjavaju, i to prilikom dobijanja dozvole za rad, kao i kroz pravila poslovnog ponašanja.

Zakon propisuje, i detaljno uređuje, obavezu izrade prospekta kod javne ponude hartija od vrijednosti ili kod uključivanja hartija od vrijednosti u trgovanje na

regulisanom tržištu. Na ovaj način se ostvaruje princip zaštite investitora. Naime, investitor donosi odluku o ulaganju na osnovu tačnih i potpunih informacija o emitentu, odnosno finansijskim instrumentima u koje ulaže novčana sredstva.

Zakon propisuje veću transparentnost emitenata čije su hartije od vrijednosti uključene u trgovanje na regulisanom tržištu. Zakonom se propisuje godišnje, polugodišnje i tromjesečno izvještavanje emitenata hartija od vrijednosti, rokovi i način izvještavanja kao i dodatne obaveze emitenta u pogledu objavlji-vanja svih promjena u pravima iz emitovanih hartija od vrijednosti. Takođe, uvode se dodatni pragovi

tržište kapitala biće sigurnije i efikasnije

Mr. Jovana Žugić i Aleksandar Đuričković, savjetnici u Komisiji za hartije od vrijednosti

Novi Zakon o tržištu kapitala će u potpunosti zamijeniti postojeći Zakon o hartijama od vrijednosti i dodatno urediti: vrste finansijskih instrumenata, emisiju hartija od vrijednosti, organizaciju i poslovanje investicionih društava, regulisano tržište kapitala, sekundarno trgovanje hartijama od vrijednosti, registraciju finansijskih instrumenata, kliring, saldiranje i registraciju transakcija finansijskih instrumenata, objavljivanje finansijskih i drugih podataka i izvještavanje emitenata i drugih učesnika na tržištu kapitala, zabranu zloupotrebe na tržištu kapitala, zaštitu investitora i nosioca prava iz hartija od vrijednosti i druga pitanja od značaja za rad tržišta kapitala. Ciljna grupa novog Zakona o tržištu kapitala jesu, kako akcionarska društva, tako i pravna i fizička lica, investiciona društva i ovlašćene kreditne institucije, organizatora tržišta i centralno klirinško depozitarno društvo.


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NOVI ZAKON O TRŽIŠTU KAPITALA

innovations in the law The Capital Market Law introduces numerous innova-tions in relation to the current regulation of this market, and the manner in which market participants operate. The new law represents the key legal act governing the supervision and operation of the capital market.

The law prescribes more comprehensive defini-tion of financial instrument, and the creation of new trading platforms (multilateral trading platforms and over-the-counter trading).

In addition, numerous provisions of the Law are aimed at better protection of clients of investment companies and preserving market integrity, by

aligning the requirements that investment companies and regulated markets must meet when obtaining licenses, as well as through business conduct rules.

The Law prescribes and defines in detail the obliga-tion to make a prospectus for a public offering of securities

or for including securities in trading in a regulated market. In this way the principle of investor protection is achieved. Namely, the investor makes a decision on the investment based on accurate and complete information on the issuer, i.e. financial instruments in which the funds are invested.

The law prescribes higher transparency of issuers whose securities are included in trading in a regulated market. Furthermore, the Law prescribes annual, semi-annual and quarterly reporting of issuers of securities, timeframes and reporting methods, as well as additional obligations of the issuers with respect to the disclosure of all changes in rights from issued

Capital market will be more secure and efficient

Jovana Žugić, M.Sc. and Aleksandar Đuričković, advisors to the Securities and Exchange Commission

New Capital Market Law will fully replace the current Law on Securities, and additionally regulate: types of financial instruments, issue of securities, organisation and operation of investment companies, regulated capital market, secondary securities trading, registration of financial instrument transactions, clearing, settlement and registration of financial instrument, disclosure of financial and other data, and reporting of issuers and other capital market participants, prohibition of capital market abuse, protection of investors and holders of rights from securities, and other issues relevant for the operation of capital market. Target group of the new Capital Market Law is both joint stock companies companies and legal and natural persons, investment companies, licensed credit institutions, market organisers, and central depository and clearing company.


NEW CAPITAL MARKET LAW

izvještavanja o promjenama vlasničke strukture i propisuje se postupak i sadržaj obavještenja o pro-mjenama vlasničke strukture.

Komisija će uspostaviti Centralni registar propisa-nih informacija, kao centralnu bazu svih izvještaja, obavještenja i drugih informacija o emitentima har-tija od vrijednosti koje su uključene u trgovanje na regulisanom tržištu.

Zakonom je propisano ispunjavanje evropskih standarda u pogledu zloupotrebe tržišta, pa je ova oblast sveobuhvatno i sistematski regulisana. Uvode se nove definicije, insajderskih informacija i zlou-potrebe tržišta.

Zakon o tržištu kapitala uvodi sistem zaštite inve-stitora čija je osnovna funkcija, uspostavljanje Fonda za zaštitu investitora kako bi se osigurala zaštita određenih potraživanja klijenata.

Još jedna od novina Zakona jeste izmijena naziva regulatora tržišta kapitala iz „Komisija za hartije od vrijednosti Crne Gore“ u „Komisija za tržište kapitala Crne Gore“. Ova izmjena na precizniji način definiše oblast nadzora i nadležnosti ove institucije.

ključne poruke novog zakona Zakonom i podzakonskim aktima, pravno uređenje tržišta kapitala će se u velikoj mjeri uskladiti sa prav-nom tekovinom Evropske Unije, a posebno u dijelu koji se odnosi na:

1. Pružanje investicionih usluga i obavljanje investi-cionih aktivnosti:a) Sveobuhvatnija definicija finansijskog instrumenta;b) Uvođenje novih platformi za trgovanje; c) Izmjene u statusu investicionih društava;d) Uslovi poslovanja i zaštita klijenata investicionih

društava;e) Pružanje investicionih usluga i obavljanje investi-

cionih aktivnosti i pomoćnih usluga;f) Prekogranično pružanje investicionih usluga i

obavljanje investicionih aktivnosti i pomoćnih usluga;

g) Adekvatnost kapitala investicionih društava;h) Sistem zaštite investitora;i) Nadzor Komisije nad pružanjem investicionih

usluga i obavljanjem investicionih aktivnosti i pomoćnih usluga.

novine zakona – širi spektar investiCionih i pomoćnih uslugaZakon o tržištu kapitala uvodi sljedeće najznačajnije iz-mjene na tržištu kapitala:Zakon uvodi pojam „investiciono društvo“ (dosadašnja brokersko-dilerska društva i ovlašćene kreditne institucije) u čije redovno poslovanje spada pružanje jedne ili više investicionih usluga, odnosno profesionalno obavljanje jedne ili više investicionih aktivnosti.Zakon propisuje znatno širi spektar investicionih i po-moćnih usluga koje Investiciona društva mogu da pružaju klijentima, kao što su:

▷ Prijem i prenos naloga i izvršenje naloga za račun klijenta; ▷ Trgovanje za svoj račun; ▷ Upravljanje portfeljem; ▷ Investiciono savjetovanje; ▷ Usluge sprovođenja ponude, odnosno prodaje finansij-skih instrumenata sa ili bez obaveze otkupa; ▷ Usluge sprovođenja ponude, odnosno prodaje finan-sijskih instrumenata bez obaveze otkupa; ▷ Upravljanje multilateralnim i ostalim platformama za trgovanje; ▷ Čuvanje i administriranje finansijskih instrumenata za račun klijenata, uključujući kastodi usluge; ▷ Odobravanje kredita i zajmova investitoru radi omo-gućavanja zaključenja transakcije sa jednim ili više finansijskih instrumenata; ▷ Davanje opštih preporuka u vezi sa strukturom kapitala, poslovnom strategijom i srodnim pitanjima i uslugama koji su u vezi sa spajanjem i sticanjem udjela u društvima; ▷ Usluge poslovanja stranom valutom u vezi sa pružanjem investicionih usluga; ▷ Istraživanje i finansijska analiza ili opšte preporuke u vezi sa transakcijama finansijskim instrumentima; ▷ Usluge u vezi sprovođenja ponude odnosno prodaje finansijskih instrumenata sa obavezom otkupa; ▷ Investicione usluge i aktivnosti, kao i pomoćne usluge koje se odnose na osnovnu imovinu sadržanu u derivatu, ako su povezane sa investicionim i pomoćnim uslugama.


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securities. Also, additional reporting thresholds on changes in the ownership structure are introduced, and the procedure and content of notification on changes in the ownership structure.

The Commission shall establish Central Register of Regulatory Information as the central database of all reports, notifications, and other information on securities issuers involved in trading in a regulated market.

The law prescribes the fulfillment of European standards in terms of market abuse, so this area is comprehensively and systematically regulated. New definitions, insider information and market abuse are introduced in the Law.

The Capital Market Law introduces a system of investors’ protection whose basic function is the establishment of the Investor Protection Fund to ensure the protection of certain receivables of clients.

Another novelty of the Law is the change of the name of the capital market regulator from the “Securities and Exchange Commission of Montenegro" to the "Capital Market Commission of Montenegro". This amendment defines the area of supervision and au-thority of this institution in a more precise manner.

key messages of the new law The Law and implementing regulation will align, to a large extent, legal organisation of capital market with EU Acquis, particularly in the area that refers to the following:

1. Provision of investment services and performance of investment activities:a) More comprehensive definition of financial

instrument;b) Introduction of new trading platforms; c) Changes in the status of investment companies;d) Business conditions and protection of clients of

investment companies:e) Provision of investment services and conducting

investment activities and ancillary services;f) Cross-border provision of investment services and

performance of investment activities and ancillary services;

g) Capital adequacy of investment companies;h) Investor protection system;

innovations in the law – broader sCope of investment and anCillary serviCes Capital Market Law introduces the following most im-portant changes in the capital market:The Law introduces the term “investment company” (current broker and dealer companies and authorised credit institutions), which regular operation covers the provision of one or more investment services, i.e. profes-sional provision of one or more investment activities.The Law prescribes a considerably broader scope of invest-ment and ancillary services that investment companies can provide to clients, such as:

▷ Reception and transfer of orders and execution of orders for the account of clients; ▷ Trading for its account; ▷ Portfolio management; ▷ Investment advice; ▷ Services related to the execution of bid or sale of finan-cial instruments with or without obligation to redeem; ▷ Services related to the execution of bid or sale of financial instruments without obligation to redeem; ▷ Management of multilateral and other trading platforms; ▷ Custody and administration of financial instruments for client accounts, including custody services; ▷ Granting credits or loans to the investor to facilitate the conclusion of transactions with one or more financial instruments; ▷ Provision of general recommendations regarding the structure of capital, business strategy and related issues and services connected to mergers and acquisitions; ▷ Foreign exchange services related to providing inves-tment services; ▷ Research and financial analysis or general recommen-dations related to financial instrument transactions; ▷ Services related to the execution of the bid or sale of financial instruments with the obligation to redeem; ▷ Investment services and activities as well as ancillary services related to the underlying of the derivatives if they are connected to the provision of investment and ancillary services.



2. Regulisano tržište:a) Izdavanje i oduzimanje dozvole

za rad tržišnom operateru regu-lisanog tržišta;

b) Pristup i trgovanje na regulisa-nom tržištu;

c) Finansijski instrumenti kojima se trguje na regulisanom tržištu;

d) Objavljivanje podataka o trgovanju;

e) Nadzor nad tržišnim operaterom regulisanog tržišta i trgovanja na regulisanom tržištu;

3. Emisija hartija od vrijednosti i objavljivanje propisanih informacija:a) Prospekt;b) Izvještaji emitenata;c) Informacije o promjeni u pro-

centu glasačkih prava;d) Obaveze emitenata;e) Objavljivanje propisanih informacija;f) Nadzor Komisije nad emitentima.

4. Zloupoteba tržišta:a) Insajderska informacija;b) Manipulacija tržištem;c) Preporuke za investiranje;d) Nadzorne mjere.

5. Kliring i saldiranje finansijskih instrumenata i odredbe u vezi sa Centralnim klirinško depozitarnim društvom;

6. Postupak nadzora koji sprovodi Komisija;

7. Saradnja sa nadležnim tijelima i razmjena informacija;

8. Kaznene odredbe.

efekti novog zakona Imаjući u vidu osnovne ciljeve ovog zаkonа koji se odnose nа razvoj tržišta kapitala, usklаđivаnje sа regulаtivom EU, veću zаštitu investitorа, obezbjeđivanje prаvednog, efikаsnog i trаnspаrentnog tržištа kаpitаlа, kаo i smаnjenje sistem-skog rizikа nа tržištu, ovаj Zаkon ima nаmjeru dа nа sveobuhvаtаn i konzistentаn nаčin, а u sklаdu sа odgovаrаjućom domаćom i međunаrodnom regulаtivom iz ove oblаsti, uredi trgovаnje finan-sijskim instrumentima, osnivаnje i poslovаnje svih učesnikа nа tržištu, obezbijedi trаnspаrentnije, sigurnije i efikаsnije funkcionisаnje sаmog tržištа kаpitаlа, bolju zaštitu klijenata kаo i dа omogući аdekvаtniji i efikаsniji nаdzor u postupku primjene Zаkonа.

novi minimalni iznosi potrebnog kapitala

Zakon propisuje minimalne iznose kapitala koji investiciona društva moraju posjedovati kako bi obavljala određene investicione usluge:

▷ 50.000 eura za pružanje usluga za obavljanje brokerskih poslova ukoliko investiciono društvo nema odobrenje za držanje novčanih sredstava i finansijskih instrumenata klijenata;

▷ 125.000 eura za pružanje usluga za obavljanje brokerskih poslova, upravljane portfeljem, investiciono savjetovanje i usluge u vezi sa ponudom i prodajom finansijskih instrumenata bez obaveze otkupa;

▷ 730.000 eura za pružanje usluga trgovanja za sopstveni račun (dilerski poslovi i poslovi market mejkera), za pružanje usluga po-krovitelja emisije i za pružanje usluga upravljanja multilateralnom trgovačkom platformom.


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i) Commission supervision of the provision of investment services and performance of investment activities and ancillary services

2. Regulated market:a) Issuing and revoking a license to

a market operator in a regulated market;

b) Access to and trading in a re-gulated market;

c) Financial instruments traded in a regulated market;

d) Disclosure of trading data;e) Supervision of market operator

of regulated market and trading in regulated market;

3. Issue of securities and disclosure of prescribed information:

a) Prospectus;b) Reports of issuers;c) Information on change in voting

rights percentage;d) Liabilities of issuers;e) Disclosure of prescribed

information;f) Commission supervision of

issuers.

4. Market abuse:a) Insider information;b) Market manipulation;c) Recommendations for investing;d) Supervisory measures.

5. Clearing and settlement of finan-

cial instruments and provisions in respect of Central Depository and Clearing Company;

6. Supervisory procedure carried out by the Commission;

7. Cooperation with supervisory authorities and exchange of information;

8. Penalty provisions.

effeCts of new law Bearing in mind the main objectives of this Law relating to the develop-ment of capital markets, alignment with the EU regulations, greater protection of investors, provision of a fair, efficient and transparent capital market, and the reduction of systemic risk in the market, this Law is aimed at regulating financial instruments trading, establish-ment and operation of all market participants, as well as providing more transparent, safer and more efficient functioning of the capital market, better protection of clients, and enabling more adequate and efficient supervision in the process of Law implementation in a com-prehensive and consistent manner and in accordance with the relevant domestic and international regula-tions in this area.

new minimum amount of required CapitalThe Law prescribes minimum amounts of capital that investment companies must maintain to perform certain investment services:

▷ 50,000 euros for the provision of broker activities if investment companies do not have approval for keeping cash and financial instruments of clients; ▷ 125,000 euros for the provision of broker services, portfolio ma-nagement, investment advisory and services related to the bid and sale of financial instruments without obligation to redeem; ▷ 730,000 euros for the provision of trading services for its own account (dealer activities and market maker activities), for underwriting services and management of multilateral trading platform.



Bankarski sistem Evropske unije suočava se sa zna-čajnom transformacijom deceniju nakon naglog

širenja finansijske krize, naročito u pogledu povećane otpornosti, na putu ka izuzetno konkurentnom fi-nansijskom tržištu sa novim konkurentima koji do sada posluju ispod ili po nepostojećim regulatornim režimima. Prema tome, RRP treba da bude uravnotežen okvir s obzirom na širi kontekst trenutnog i budućeg tržišta finansijskih usluga. Zakonodavci ne treba da izgube iz vida ogromne regulatorne troškove koji su naslijeđeni iz bankarskog poslovanja, jer će se te aktivnosti pomjeriti kao što su to već uradile prema blažim regulatornim prostorima ostavljajući banke sa manje poslova i više regulative.

Važno je započeti analizu RRP-a procjenjujući ono što je urađeno tokom poslednje decenije, što je to što se moglo uraditi bolje i što još ostaje da se uradi. U posljednjoj deceniji se dosta postiglo. Prije svega, bankarski sistem Evropske unije je postepeno i dosljedno povećavao svoju otpornost jačajući kvan-titet i kvalitet kapitala kao i amortizere likvidnosti. Poslednji podaci EBA pokazuju koeficijent osnovnog kapitala od 13,6% na kraju 2016. godine na osnovu sprovođenja svih propisa o kapitalnim zahtjevima, što predstavlja povećanje od samo 5% prije krize. Koeficijent pokrića kratkoročne likvidnosti koji je 2011. godine bio ispod 70%, dostigao je sada nivo od 141%. Koeficijent neto stabilnog finansiranja je iznad minimalnog nivoa usklađenosti. Koeficijent zaduženosti se povećao sa jedva 3% na više od 5%. Ali sva postignuća koštaju. Banke u EU su žrtvovale profitabilnost kako bi povećale rezerve amortizera kapitala i iznose likvidnih sredstava u monetarnom okruženju ultra niskih kamatnih stopa.

promišljenim i efikasnim okvirima ka stabilnom bankarskom sektoruPaket za smanjenje rizika (RRP) predstavlja ispunjenje ambiciozne regulatorne reforme nakon krize u bankarskom sektoru. Ovaj paket treba da osnaži promišljene i efikasne okvire, kao i okvire Evropske unije za sanaciju zaokružujući time brojne zakonodavne inicijative u okviru Jedinstvenog pravilnika EU za finansijske usluge. Kreiranje RRP treba da otvori put prema stabilnom bankarskom sektoru koji može finansirati evropsku privredu i ponovo zadobiti konkurentan profil na globalnim finansijskim tržištima.


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STAVOVI EBF O PAKET ZA SMANJENJE RIZIKA

One decade after the upsurge of the financial crisis the EU banking system is experienc-

ing a significant transformation, notably in terms of increased resilience, on the way to an extremely competitive financial market with new competi-tors which operate so far under light or inexistent regulatory regimes. Therefore, the RRP should be a balanced framework considering the wider context of the current and future financial services market. Legislators should not lose sight of the tremendous regulatory cost inherent to the banking business as these activities will shift, as they have already done, to more lenient regulatory spaces, leaving banks with less business and more regulation.

It is imperative to start the analysis of the RRP by appraising what has been done in the last de-cade, what could have been done better and what furthermore remains to be done. There have been important accomplishments in the last decade. To begin with, the EU banking system has gradually and consistently increased its resilience by enhan-cing the quantity and quality of its capital as well as its liquidity buffers. The latest EBA figures show a core equity tier 1 capital ratio of 13.6% on a fully loaded basis at the end of 2016, up from a mere 5% before the crisis. The short-term Liquidity Coverage Ratio, which was below 70% in 2011, has reached now a level of 141%. The Net Stable Funding Ratio is also above the compliance bar. Leverage ratio has increased from barely 3% to more than 5%. But all achievements come at a cost. EU banks have sacrificed profitability to increase their capital buffer reserves and their holdings of liquid assets amid a monetary environment of ultra-low interest rates.

prudential and efficient frameworks towards stable banking sectorThe Risk Reduction Package (RRP) represents the fulfilment of the ambitious post-crisis regulatory reform in the banking sector. It is intended to strengthen the EU prudential and resolution frameworks, and thereby wrapping up the numerous legislative initiatives within the EU Single Rulebook for financial services. The design of the RRP should pave the way towards a stable banking sector that can finance the European economy and regain a competitive profile in the global financial markets.


SUMMARY OF EBF VIEWS ON RISK REDUCTION PACKAGE

The EU regulatory environment has coupled the transposition of the international standards with the development of the Banking Union including the implementation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). These achievements were virtually inconceivable before the crisis. In the meantime, the European Banking Authority has enhanced the Single Rulebook with strong determination.

Against this background, European policy makers have a unique opportunity to complete a robust RRP that puts the crisis behind and promotes the support-ive role of EU banks in financing the EU domestic economy and international trade.

In this context, the EBF is making recommenda-tions to secure the following goals:

1. Competitiveness, consistency and level playing field for European banks

2. Support to market liquidity and market making3. Translating the EU Single Market and the Banking

Union into prudential realities4. Limit burdensome regulation and supervision5. The growth and innovation dimension of RRP6. The importance of fast-tracking some key reforms

With that aim, the EBF is proposing a series of amend-ments divided over 22 themes which exact wording and rationale are elaborated in a comprehensive posi-tion document (annex ref. EBF_027201C). All these amendments contribute to meet one or several of the 6 abovementioned general purposes. A summary of the most significant ones follows:

1. What can be done to secure competitiveness, consistency and level playing field for European banks?

a. Put on hold the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB)

Many key components of the FRTB are still being discussed at international level. The Basel Committee has recognised the flaws in the calibration and is currently looking at adjusting them on an updated version expected by the end of 2017. As the FRTB terms have a direct impact on banks and corporates

the current uncertainty about the commitment of a relevant jurisdiction like the US is a major issue of level playing field that should also be monitored.

In view of these circumstances, we propose to put the Commission’s FRTB package on hold until technical discussions are finalised at Basel level and an updated text is available. Europe should not incur/create/suffer from uneven playing field situations by frontloading international standards that are not yet finalised nor committed to by other relevant jurisdictions.

b. Safeguard consistency on MREL requirements

The Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) standards formulated at international level were meant to be applied only to global systemically important insti-tutions (G-SII). Europe took the decision to extend the scope far above and beyond the international minima and devised a European scheme of minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). As a result, the European banking system will be subject to a wider and more complex require-ment to determine the loss absorbing capacity of its capital and liabilities.

Given this situation, the RRP should at least ensure the implementation of the TLAC and MREL standards do not lead to stricter requirements (resulting from already stricter provisions in the European capital standards) than what was intended in the interna-tional standards, e.g.:

(i) Systemic and counter-cyclical buffers should not be part of the MREL Guidance for the sake of consistency with the FSB term sheet;(ii) The recapitalisation part of the MREL leverage ratio should be limited to 3% following the EBA recommendation.

c. Draw clear delimitation of the scope of Pillar 2

The complexity of the post-crisis regulatory prudential toolbox in combination with the numerous authorities involved is giving way to problems of inconsistency and overlapping, especially within the scope of Pillar 2. It is important that the scope of risks covered by Pillar 2 is carefully considered and clearly articulated and that duplication and overlaps with Pillar 1 risks and macro-prudential instruments such as buffers are avoided.



Regulatorni okvir EU je povezao transponovanje međunarodnih standarda sa razvojem Bankarske unije kao i implementacijom Jedinstvenog mehanizma za superviziju (SSM) i Jedinstvenog mehanizma za sanaciju i likvidaciju banaka (SRM). Ovi rezultati su bili praktično nezamislivi prije perioda krize. U međuvremenu, Evropski bankarski regulator (EBA) osnažio je Jedinstveni pravilnih uz jasne odrednice.

S tim u vezi, kreatori evropske politike imaju jedin-stvenu priliku da završe snažan RRP koji ostavlja krizu u prošlosti i promoviše ulogu podrške EU banaka u finansiranju domaće ekonomije EU i međunarodne trgovine.

U tom smislu, Evropska bankarska federacija (EBF) daje preporuke kako bi se postigli sljedeći ciljevi:

1. Konkurentnost, konzistentnost i jednaka pravila za sve evropske banke,

2. Podrška tržištu likvidnosti i nivelaciji tržišta,3. Prenošenje Jedinstvenog tržišta EU i Bankarske

unije u prudencijalne realnosti,4. Ograničavanje teške regulative i supervizije,5. Rast i inovativna dimenzija RRP,6. Značaj ubrzanja nekih ključnih reformi

S tim ciljem, EBF predlaže seriju izmjena i dopuna podijeljenih u 22 teme čije se tačne formulacije i obrazloženja opisani u sveobuhvatnom dokumentu o zajedničkom mišljenju (Aneks EBF_027201C). Te izmjene i dopune doprinose ispunjavanju jednog ili nekoliko gorenavedenih opštih ciljeva. Kratak pregled naznačajnijih izmjena i dopuna slijede:

1.Štasemožeuraditikakobiseobezbijelilakonkurentnost,dosljednostijednakapravilazasveevropskebanke?

a. Odložiti Temeljnu reviziju knjige trgovanja (FRTB)

O mnogim glavnim komponentama FRTB se još uvijek razgovara na međunarodnom nivou. Bazelski komitet je priznao greške u podešavanju i trenutno pokušava da ih koriguje u ažuriranoj verziji koja se očekuje do kraja 2017.

Pošto uslovi FRTB imaju direktan uticaj na banke i privredna društva, postojeća neizvjesnost u vezi

obaveza određene jurisdikcije, kao što je SAD, pred-stavlja glavni problem jednakih pravila koja takođe treba pratiti.

S obzirom na ove okolnosti, predlažemo da se Komisijin paket u vezi sa FRTB odloži dok se ne završe tehnički razgovori u Bazelu i dok ažurirani dokument ne bude dostupan. Evropa ne treba da napravi/stvori/pati od nejednakih pravila unaprijed izdajući međunarodne standarde koji još uvijek nijesu završeni niti su na to obavezane druge jurisdikcije.

b. Čuvati konzistentnost u vezi zahtjeva MREL

Standardi ukupne sposobnosti pokrivanja gubitaka (TLAC) koji su formulisani na međunarodnom nivou treba da se primjenjuju jedino na globalno sistemski važne institucije (G-SVI). Evropa je donijela odluku da proširi obuhvat mnogo iznad i ispod međuna-rodnog nivoa i smislila Evropsku šemu minimalnih zahtjeva za regulatornim kapitalom i kvalifkovanim obavezama (MREL). Zbog toga će evropski bankarski sistem biti predmet šireg i složenijeg zahtjeva da se utvrdi sposobnost pokrivanja gubitaka po osnovu kapitala i obaveza.

S obzirom na ovu situaciju, RRP treba da obezbijedi, kao minimum, da implementacija TLAC i MREL standarda ne vodi ka strožijim zahtjevima (koji pro-izilaze iz već strožijih odredbi evropskih standarda kapitala) nego što je to bila namjera u međunarodnim standardima, na primjer:

(i) Sistemski i kontraciklični amortizeri ne treba da budu dio Smjernica o MREL-u zbog konzistenstosti sa listom uslova Odbora za finansijsku stabilnost (FSB);(ii) Dio dokapitalizacije koeficijenta zaduženosti MREL treba da bude ograničen na 3% nakon pre-poruka EBA.

c. Izvući jasno razgraničavanje opsega Stuba 2

Složenost regulatornog prudencijalnog okvira u pe-riodu nakon krize zajedno sa brojnim angažovanim nadležnim organima stvara probleme nekonzisten-tnosti i preklapanja naročito u okviru opsega Stuba 2. Važno je da se opseg rizika obuhvaćenih Stubom 2 pažljivo razmotri i jasno formuliše, kao i da se izbjegavaju dupliranja i preklapanja sa rizicima iz


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d. Exclude extraordinary events from risk estimates

The RRP should leave space for interpretation of ex-traordinary facts that could distort the value and sense of risk parameters, notably the loss given default. For instance, non-conventional recovery processes that might be triggered in the context of the ECB plans for fast disposal of non-performing loans.

e. Let banks hire digital talent

Professionals who are not material risk takers, especially digitally skilled employees, should be excluded from remuneration policies for the sake of level playing field.

f. Respect the regulatory level playing field in third countries

The Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments, as well as minority interests, issued in third countries by a financial holding company of an EU banking group should be eligible if they are subject to similar or comparable rules as credit institutions of that third country according to local prudential regulations.

2. What can be done to support market liquidity and market making?

a. Review the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) calibration

The NSFR should be calibrated in a way that does not squeeze market liquidity. Two elements stand out in the current proposal that should be carefully considered:

(i) The asymmetric treatment of repos and reverse repos. The former receive a 0% available stable fund-ing (ASF) factor while the latter are required a 50/0 to 10% required stable funding (RSF) factor.

(ii) The application of the NSFR derivative rules would be detrimental for the functioning of the European de-rivatives markets, and ultimately, for the European end users such as SMEs, larger corporates, pension funds and other client serving entities who hedge away financial risk such as foreign exchange - and interest rate risk.

b. Prevent an unintended combined impact on market making

The requirements of the FRTB, combined with NSFR and leverage ratio, will have negative implications on banks' market making activities. If regulation pushed banks to withdraw from this business market liquidity will dry up as a result.

c. Avoid automatic MDA restrictions for MREL breaches

We strongly disagree with the introduction of MDA restrictions in the case of a breach of the combined buffer for MREL related reasons only (i.e. where a bank continues to respect capital requirements and combined buffers). We do not believe that the in-troduction of a grace period (which may need to be publicly disclosed) is an adequate response to limit the negative impacts of automatic MDA restrictions.

d. Apply consistency to high-quality liquid assets across policy tools

HQLA level 1 securities should be excluded from the leverage ratio calculation for the sake of consistency with LCR and NSFR.

3. What can be done to further strengthen the internal market for financial services?

a. Make waivers at solo level automatic and not discretionary

For NSFR purposes, liquidity subgroup status be automatically granted for subsidiaries within the same Member State or different Member States. The double requirement both at solo and consolidated level, does not reflect the way liquidity is managed in a banking group. All the more within the Eurozone as there are no restrictions on the movement of capital and payments.

b. Remove internal MREL

Internal MREL should not need to exist within the EU, and absolutely not within the Banking Union.



Stuba 1, i makroprudencijalnim instrumentima kao što su amortizeri.

d. Isključiti vanredne događaje iz procjena rizika

RRP treba da ostavi prostora za tumačenja vanrednih činjenica koje bi mogle iskriviti vrijednost i smisao parametara rizika, naročito gubitak usljed neurednog izmirenja obaveza. Na primjer, nekonvencijalni procesi oporavka koji bi se mogli pokrenuti u kontekstu pla-nova ECB za brzo oslobađanje nekvalitetnih kredita.

e. Dozvoliti bankama da angažuju digitalni talent

Stručnjaci koji nijesu preuzimaoci materijalnog rizika, naročito zaposleni koji imaju informacione vještine, trebalo bi da budu isključeni iz politika nadoknada zbog jednakih pravila za sve.

f. Poštovati jednaka pravila igre u trećim državama

Dodatni instrumenti osnovnog i dopunskog kapitala, kao i manjinska učešća koja finansijska holding druš-tva bankarske grupe Evropske unije izdaju u trećim državama treba da se kvalifikuju, ako su predmet sličnih ili uporedivih pravila, kao i kreditne institucije te treće države u skladu sa lokalnim prudencijalnim regulativama.

2.Štasemožeuraditikakobisepodržalotržištelikvidnostiinivelacijatržišta?

a. Revidirati podešavanje koeficijenta neto stabilnog finansiranja (NSFR)

NSFR treba da se podešava na način koji ne pritiska tržište likvidnosti. Dva elementa se ističu u trenutnom predlogu koja treba pažljivo razmotriti:

(i) Asimetričan tretman repo ugovora i obrnutih repo ugovora. Prvoj vrsti ugovora se dodjeljuje 0% faktora raspoloživog stabilnog finansiranja (ASF), dok druga vrsta ugovora zahtijeva 5% do 10% faktora potrebnog stabilnog finansiranja (RSF).

(ii) Primjena derivatnih pravila NSFR bi bila štetna za funkcionisanje evropskog tržišta derivata i na kraju

za evropske krajnje korisnike kao što su MSP, velike korporacije, penzioni fondovi i drugi subjekti koji pru-žaju usluge klijentima koji omeđuju (štite) finansijski rizik kao što je devizni rizik i rizik kamatne stope.

b. Spriječiti nenamjeran kombinovan uticaj na nivelaciju tržišta

Zahtjevi FRTB, u kombinaciji sa NSFR i koeficijentom zaduženja će imati negativne implikacije na aktivnosti banaka kod nivelacije tržišta. Ako regulativa natjera banke da se povuku sa ovog poslovnog tržišta, likvid-nost će se iscrpiti.

c. Izbjegavati automatska MDA ograničenja za kršenja MREL

Mi se snažno protivimo uvođenju ograničenja naj-većeg raspodjeljivog iznosa (MDA) u slučaju kršenja kombinovanog amortizera jedino zbog razloga koji su povezani sa MREL (odnosno kada banka nastavlja da poštuje zahtjeve za izdvajanjem potrebnog kapi-tala i kombinovane amortizere). Mi ne vjerujemo da uvođenje grejs perioda (koje će možda trebati da se javno objelodani) predstavlja adekvatan odgovor na odraničavanje negativnih uticaja automatskih MDA ograničenja.

d. Primjenjivati dosljednost na viskokokvalitetna likvidna sredstva (HQLA) u instrumentima politike

HQLA hartije od vrijednosti nivoa 1 treba da se is-ključe iz izračunavanja koeficijenta zaduženja zbog konsistentnosti sa koeficijentom pokrića likvidnosti (LCR)i NSFR.

3.Štasemožeuraditikakobisedaljeojačalounutrašnjetržištesafinansijskeusluge?

a. Napraviti automatska a ne diskreciona osloba-đanja od obaveze

U svrhe NSFR, status podgrupe likvidnosti treba da se automatski dodijeli subsidijarnim licima u okviru države članice ili različitih država članica. Dupli zahtjev na individualnom i konsolidovanom nivou ne odražava način na koji se upravlja likvidnošću u


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c. Grant preferential treatment for intragroup transactions

The preferential treatment for intragroup transactions should be granted automatically and not subject to supervisory discretion. The European Union is a single market, in which the financial sector benefits from a common prudential regulatory framework in all EU Member States. Furthermore, within the European Union, the majority of Member States (Euro Area and other Member States opting to participate) are also part of the Banking Union which provides a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Due to these significant advances of the single market and single rulebook, banking groups with an EU parent institution should be treated equally in the European Union, especially in the Banking Union.

d. Recognise the reduced systemic risk

The lack of recognition of the EU Single Market and of the Banking Union as prudential realities for systemic risk purposes would neglect their objectives and the importance of the significant accomplishments made in terms of Single Market, Single Rulebook, Single Supervision and Single Resolution.

4. What can be done to limit burdensome regulation and supervision?

a. Reduce disclosure requirements in scope and granularity

The EBF proposes to streamline certain elements of the disclosure provisions in RRP as explained in chapter 11 of the annex.

The RRP should require the disclosures envisaged in the Basel III framework but not more than those. In particular, it should let banks restrain from dis-closing confidential information without waiting for ex-ante supervisory authorisation and avoid increasing the scope of disclosure by requiring in-tragroup transactions.

The new disclosure requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities should be limited or otherwise it will be substantially greater than for regulatory capital instruments. It would be very useful to introduce a materiality threshold below which only aggregated information would be required.

Disclosures should reflect facts. Disclosures of hypothetical metrics, like risk weights under stand-ardised approach for banks that use internal models, not only are burdensome but can also be misleading.

Another area where disclosures should be stream-lined is counterparty credit risk as the RRP proposal imposes way too detailed breakdowns with little or no value for investors.

Too many details and outdated information is re-quested in the area of operational risk. It would be wise to wait for the findings that the Basel Committee is due to publish following its consultation on Standardised Measurement Approach (SMA) for Operational Risk.

The granularity and frequency of short-term liquid-ity ratio disclosure should be rationalised. Disclosure at the end of the month should be sufficient knowing that the supervisor monitors the position on a daily basis. The amounts of inflows and outflows should be given as total figures.

One more example of unnecessary disclosure burden is the requirement of six net interest income scenarios in the scope of interest rate risk in non- trading book activities. The BCBS only required two scenarios.

b. Keep current simplified methods for counterparty credit risk

In our view the proposed simplified approaches to measure counterparty credit risk are not necessary for smaller banks with small derivative business because they will cause important implementation and calcula-tion costs without delivering significant added value for banks and supervisors. We therefore recommend maintaining the simplified methods (Mark-to-Market and current Original Exposure Method - OEM -) in-stead of the new simplified standardised approaches. We also recommend to increase the thresholds, which would benefit smaller banks and reduce complexity and regulatory burden for them.



bankarskoj grupi. Štaviše, to treba uraditi i u okviru eurozone, jer ne postoje ograničenja na kretanja kapitala i plaćanja.

b. Ukloniti interni MREL

Interni MREL ne treba da postoji u okviru EU i ap-solutno ne treba da postoji u okviru Bankarske unije.

c. Dodijeliti preferencijalni tretman transakcijama u okviru grupe

Preferencijalni tretman za transakcije u okviru grupe treba da se automatski dodijeli i ne treba da bude predmet diskrecione odluke supervizora. Evropska unija je jedinstveno tržište na kojem finansijski sektor ima koristi od zajedničkog promišljenog i efikasnog (prudencijalnog) regulatornog okvira u svim državama članicama EU. Pored toga, u okviru Evropske unije, većina država članica (eurozona i ostale države članice koje odluče da učestvuju) su takođe dio Bankarske unije koja pruža Jedinstveni supervizorski mehanizam (SSM) i Jedinstveni mehanizam za sanaciju i likvidaciju banaka (SRM). Zbog ovih značajnih prednosti jedinstvenog tržišta i jedinstvenog pravilnika, bankarske grupe sa matičnom institucijom iz EU treba da se jednako tre-tiraju u Evropskoj uniji, naročito u Bankarskoj uniji.

d. Priznati smanjeni sistemski rizik

Nedostatak priznavanja Jedinstvenog tržišta EU i Bankarske unije kao prudencijalnih realnosti u svrhe sistemskog rizika bi zapostavilo njihove ciljeve i značaj važnih postignuća urađenih u smislu Jedinstvenog tržišta, Jedinstvenog pravilnika, Jedinstvene super-vizije i Jedinstvene sanacije i likvidacije.

4.Štosemožeuraditikakobiseograničilateškaregulativaisupervizija?

a. Smanjiti zahtjeve za objelodanjivanjem u opsegu i granularnosti

EBF predlaže da se konsoliduju određeni elementi odredbi o objelodanjivanju u RRP kao što je to objaš-njeno u poglavlju 11 aneksa.

RRP treba da zahtijeva objelodanjivanja kako su predviđena u Bazelu III, ali ne više od toga. Naročito, RRP treba da dozvoli bankama da se uzdrže od objelodanjivanja povjerljivih informacija ne čekajući naknadnu dozvolu supervizora, kao i da izbjegavaju povećanje opsega objelodanjivanja od zahtijevajućih transakcija unutar grupe.

Novi zahtjevi za objelodanjivanjem sopstvenih sred-stava i kvalifikovanih obaveza treba da se ograniče, jer će biti znatno veće od zahtjeva za objelodanjivanjem instrumenata regulatornog kapitala. Bilo bi veoma korisno da se uvede bitan prag ispod kojeg bi se zahtijevale samo informacije na agregatnoj osnovi.

Objelodanjivanja bi trebalo da odražavaju činje-nice. Objelodanjivanje hipotetičkih matrica, kao što su ponderi rizika po standardizovanom pristupu za banke koje koriste interne modele, nijesu samo teret, već mogu da budu i varljive.

Još jedna oblast u koji se objelodanjivanja moraju konsolidovati je rizik druge ugovorne strane jer pri-jedlog RRP nameće previše detaljnu analitiku uz malo ili bez bilo kakve vrijednosti za investitore.

Previše detalja i zastarjele informacije se zahtijevaju u području operativnog rizika. Bilo bi mudro sačekati nalaze koji Bazelski komitet treba da objavi nakon konsultacija o standardizovanom pristupu mjerenja (SMA) za operativni rizik.

Granularnost i učestalost objelodanjivanja koefici-jenta kratkoročne likvidnosti treba da se racionalizuje. Objelodanjivanje na kraju mjeseca treba da bude dovoljno znajući da supervizor prati poziciju na dnevnoj osnovi. Iznosi priliva i odliva treba takođe da se prikažu kao ukupni iznosi.

Još jedan primjer nepotrebnog tereta objelodanji-vanja je zahtjev šest neto scenarija u opsegu rizika kamatne stope u knjizi finansijskih instrumenata kojima se aktivno ne trguje. BCBS je zahtijevao samo dva scenarija.

b. Zadržati postojeće jednostavne metode za kreditni rizik druge ugovorne strane

Po našem mišljenju, predloženi jednostavni pristupi za mjerenje kreditnog rizika druge ugovorne strane nijesu neophodni za manje banke sa malim derivat-nim poslovanjem jer će oni uzrokovati veče troškove


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implementacije i izračunavanja bez nuđenja značajne dodate vrijednosti za banke i supervizore. Stoga, mi preporučujemo da se zadrže jednostavne metode (metod iskazivanja vrijednosti aktive po tržišnoj vrijednosti i postojeći metod originalne izloženosti - OEM -)umjesto novih jednostavnih standardizovanih pristupa. Mi takođe preporučujemo povećanje limita, od kojih bi imale koristi male banke i smanjivanje složenosti i regulatornog tereta za njih.

c. Ukloniti odobrenje supervizora za otkupljivanje MREL

Ovaj zahtjev nije dio liste uslova FSB i stoga bi bio vanredni teret za evropske banke.

Prethodni proces dobijanja odobrenja za sopstvena sredstva pokazao se kao mučan i dugotrajan kako na nivou nadležnih organa tako i na nivou institucija. Davanje prethodnog odobrenja za kvalifikovane obaveze bi umnožilo zajedničke napore i time pove-zane troškove jer sami broj instrumenata koji bi se mogli kvalifikovati kao kvalifikovane obaveze daleko premašuje broj instrumenata sopstvenih sredstava u mnogim institucijama.

Prema tome, mi preporučujemo da se uzdrži od nametanja bilo kojeg prethodnog odobrenja kada smanjenje ne vodi ka kršenju minimalnih TLAC/MREL zahtjeva za kvalifikovane instrumente TLAC/MREL osim za sopstvena sredstva.

5.ŠtasemožeuraditikakobiseunaprijediorastiinovativnadimenzijaRRP?a. Revidirati regulatorna ograničenja na finansiranje trgovine

(i) RSF faktori koji su predloženi u NSFR nijesu srazmjerni i mogli bi ograničiti finansiranje trgo-vine jer je to po prirodi kratkoročna aktivnost. Mi predlažemo umjesto toga RSF u iznosu od 65% za izvozne kredite koje pokrivaju izvozne kreditne agen-cije (ECA) država članica EU; 20% RSF za kredite za finansiranje trgovine sa preostalim dospijećem između 6 mjeseci i 1 godine; i 85% za ostalo. Zauzvrat, nepredviđenim obavezama po osnovu finansiranja trgovine bi trebalo da se dodijeli 5% bez obzira na njihovo dospijeće zbog toga što nose nizak rizik.

(ii) Faktoring transakcije, glavni instrument za finan-siranje evropskih kompanija, treba da se tretiraju na isti način kao aktivnosti finansiranja trgovine nakon preporuka EBA o NSFR.

(iii) Uvođenje klauzula interne sanacije u doku-mente u vezi trgovanja vanbilansnim instrumentima kao što su akreditivi i tehničke garancije stavlja evropske kompanije u značajan nepovoljan po-ložaj. Mi predlažemo da se stoga u BRRD (član 55.2) odustane od obaveze klauzule o internoj sanaciji za sve nepredviđene vanbilansne finan-sijske instrumente.

(iv) Sve izloženosti ECA koje proizilaze iz ECA ugra-đene u okviru EU treba da budu izuzete iz primjene koeficijenta zaduženja bez obzira na valutu odobrenja kredita. Proširenje ovog izuzetka na ECA država OECD se takođe preporučuje.

b. Revizija pondera rizika za kompanije za zajednička ulaganja (CIU)

CIU predstavlja subjekat koji dopušta brojnim poje-dinim i nepovezanim investitorima da zajedno inve-stiraju grupišući kapital, dijeleći troškove i postižući širu diversifikaciju rizika.

Predloženi ponderi rizika su nesrazmjerni, naročito metod povlačenja koji vodi do pondera rizika od 1,250% koji je štetan za investiranje u privatni kapital. Faktor multiplikacije gdje je izračunavanje dodijeljeno trećoj strani nije opravdan i treba ga ukloniti.

c. Revizija kalibracije kreditnog rizika druge ugo-vorne strane (CCR) kako bi se izbjeglo povećanje troškova omeđivanja rizika (hedžinga)

Određeni metodološki nedostaci u standardizovanom pristupu (SA-CCR) vode ka značajnom precjenjivanju derivatnih izloženosti i posljedično povećavaju potreban kapital u poređenju sa pristupom internog modela. Glavni problemi koje treba riješiti su nedovoljno priznavanje kolaterala, nepriznavanje diversifikacije deviza u valutnim parovima i zastarjeli alfa faktor čija je vrijednost previše konzervativna.


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c. Remove supervisory approval for redemption of MREL

This requirement is not part of the FSB term sheet and it would therefore be an extraordinary burden for European banks.

The prior permission process for own funds has proven laborious and time- consuming, both at the level of competent authorities and institutions. The extension of prior permission to eligible liabilities would multiply the connected efforts and hence costs associated since the sheer number of instruments that could qualify as eligible liabilities far exceeds the number of own funds instruments in most institutions.

Therefore, we recommend to refrain from imposing any prior permission in cases where the reduction does not lead to a breach of the minimum TLAC/MREL requirement for TLAC/MREL-eligible instruments other than on own funds.

5. What can be done to foster the growth andinnovationdimensionofRRP?

a. Review the regulatory restrictions to Trade Finance

(i) The RSF factors proposed in NSFR are dispro-portionate and could curtail trade finance as it is in nature a short-term activity. We propose instead a RSF of 65% for export credits covered by Export Credit Agencies (ECA) of the EU Member States; a 20% RSF for trade finance loans with residual maturity between 6 months and 1 year; and 85% otherwise. In turn, contingent trade finance liabilities should receive a 5%regardless of its maturity due to being a low risk activity.

(ii) Factoring transactions, a major instrument for the financing of European enterprises, should be treated the same as trade finance activities following the EBA recommendation on NSFR.

(iii) The introduction of bail-in clauses on documents of trade-related off- balance instruments such as letters of credit and technical guarantees put European companies at a significant disadvantage. We therefore suggest to waive in BRRD (article 55.2) the obligation

of a bail-in clause for all off-balance sheet contingent finance instruments.

(iv) All ECA exposures originated by ECAs incor-porated within the EU should be exempted from the application of the leverage ratio irrespective of the currency of the loan. Extending this exemption to ECAs of OECD countries is also recommended.

b. Review the risk weight of Collective Investment Undertakings (CIU)

A CIU is a vehicle that allows a number of separate and unrelated investors to make investments together pooling their capital, sharing costs and achieving broader diversification of risks.

The risk weights proposed are disproportionate, in particular the fall-back approach leading to a risk weight of 1,250% which is detrimental to investment in private equity. The multiplying factor where the calculation is delegated to a third party is not justified and should be removed.

d. Review the calibration of Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) to avoid increasing the cost of hedging

Certain methodological shortcomings in the Standardised Approach (SA-CCR) lead to a sig-nificant overestimation of derivative exposures and consequently raise the capital requirements in com-parison with the internal model approach. This would impact significantly the cost of hedging for corporate clients. The main issues to review are the insufficient recognition of collateral, the lack of recognition of foreign exchange diversification across currency pairs and the outdated alpha factor which value is overly conservative.

e. Remove the deduction of software from banks' regulatory capital

Banks contribute to the digitalisation of the EU economy. They need to invest in software develop-ment to remain competitive and to strengthen their cybersecurity. However, software investments remain penalised in Europe compared to the US where



d. Ukloniti umanjenje softvera iz regulatornog kapitala banaka

Banke doprinose digitaliziaciji ekonomije Evropske unije. One treba da ulažu u razvoj softvera kako bi ostale konkurentne i ojačale bezbjednost od sajber napada.Međutim, ulaganja u softver se i dalje sankcioniše u Evropi u odnosu na SAD gdje se softver ponderiše rizikom kao fiksno sredstvo, kao prostorije i oprema. Isti tretman bi trebalo primijeniti i u Evropi.

e. Održati i proširiti faktor podrške (SF) za mala i srednja preduzeća (MSP)

SF MSP se pokazao korisnim od uvođenja 2014. Postojeće smanjenje kapitala od 24% za izloženosti MSP do 1,5 miliona eura se održava. Dodatno, smanjenje kapitala od 15% se predlaže za preostali dio izloženo-sti iznad praga od 1,5 miliona eura.Ovaj prijedlog je odobren i koristan za široku mrežu evropskih MSP.

f. Ponoviti faktor podrške za infrastrukturne projekte

Banke finansiraju većinu investicionih projekata u transportu, obnovljivoj energiji i bolnicama u Evropi.

Prijedlog Evropske komisije da uskladi potreban kapital za kreditni rizik za izloženosti prema subjek-tima koji posluju ili finansiraju fizičke strukture ili prostorije, sisteme i mreže koje pružaju ili podržavaju osnovne javne servise (novi član501a) bi mogao da olakša regulatorni uticaj na dugoročna ulaganja i stoga promoviše rast.

6.Kojereformetrebadaseubrzaju?

RRP sadrži brojne i raznovrsne komponente kojima se može baviti u različitim fazama u zavisnosti od međunarodnih rokova i hitnosti reformi. Sljedeće od njih zaslužuju usvajanje ubrzanih procedura prije kraja 2017.

a. Rangiranje neobezbijeđenih dužničkih instru-menta u hijerarhiji nesolventnosti

EBF pozdravlja prijedlog za harmonizovanim ran-giranjem nesolventnosti dozvoljavajući EU G-SIB

da izdaju subordinisane instrumente kao i da sepo zahtjevima TLAC i EU globalne banke koje nijesu sistemski važne usaglase sa potencijalnim diskrecionim zahtjevom nadležnih organa Unije za sanaciju da ispune MREL i sa subordinisanim instrumentima u skladu sa jedinstvenim zajedničkim okvirom. Ubrzanje ovog prijedloga će mnogo olakšati izdavanje neprioritetnih instrumenata sa pravom prvenstva koji drugačije možda ne bi ispunili međunarodno usaglašeni rok za listu uslova TLAC FSB do 2019 i2022.

b. Prelazni pristup za ublažavanje uticaja MSFI 9 na kapital

Postoji hitna potreba za prelaznim periodom koji je usaglašen sa 1. januarom 2018. kao datumom usvajanja MSFI 9. Neophodno je ubrzati promjene u članu 473a.

Bankama je potrebna jasnoća u vezi sa prelaznim pristupom što je moguće prije, jer drugačije će morati da razmotre koje će privredne aktivnosti i smanjenje kreditiranja određenih sektora ekonomije morati da se dese kako bi se osiguralo da su u mogućnosti da prođu stresno testiranje 2018. u skaldu sa novim računovodstvenim okvirom MSFI 9.

c. Faktori podrške za MSP i infrastrukturu

Faktor podrške za MSP i faktor podrške za infrastruk-turu treba da se prate jer koristi po ekonomski rast ne treba da čekaju do usvajanja složene i dugotrajne regulative kao što je CRR2.

d. Prelazni aranžmani za limite velikih lzloženosti koji se primjenjuju na izloženosti prema državama članicama iskazanim u stanoj valuti.

Od 1. Januara 2018, izloženosti prema državama člani-cama iskazanim u stranoj valuti ne bi se više smatrali bezrizičnim i neće biti automatski izuzete iz limita velikih izloženosti. Prelazni aranžmani treba da se prate i primjenjuju prije 1. januara 2018. kako bi bili efikasni i spriječili efekt sunovrata koji proizilazi iz naglog ukidanja izuzetaka. To ukidanje izuzetaka bi moglo da izazove poremećaje na tržištu za državne obveznice država koje nijesu članice eurozone čiji je državni dug izražen u eurima.


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software is risk weighted as an ordinary asset, like premises and equipment. The same treatment should be applied in Europe.

e. Maintain and extend the SME Supporting Factor (SF)

The SME SF has proven useful since its introduction in 2014. The current capital reduction of 24% for SME exposures up to euro 1.5 million, is maintained. Additionally, a capital reduction of 15% is proposed for the remaining part of the exposure above the threshold of euro 1.5 million. This proposal is warranted and beneficial for the vast grid of European SME.

f. Replicate the supporting factor to Infrastructure projects

The majority of investment projects in transporta-tion, renewable energies and hospitals, in Europe are financed by banks.

The proposal from the European Commission to adjust capital requirements for credit risk for exposures to entities that operate or finance physical structures or facilities, systems and networks that provide or support essential public services (new article SOla) could alleviate the regulatory impact on long-term investment and thus promote growth.

6. Which reforms should be fast-tracked?

The RRP contains numerous and diverse components which can be dealt with at different paces depending on the international timelines and the urgency of the reforms. The following deserve a fast-track procedure to be enacted before the end of 2017.

a. Ranking of unsecured debt instruments in in-solvency hierarchy

The EBF welcomes the proposal for a harmonised insolvency ranking allowing EU G-SIBs to issue subordinated instruments as per TLAC requirement and EU non-G-SIBs to comply with a potential dis-cretionary request by Union resolution authorities to meet the MREL also with subordinated instruments

under a single common framework. Ensuring the fast track of this proposal will greatly facilitate the issuance by banks of senior unpreferred instruments which might not otherwise meet the internationally agreed timetable for the FSB’s TLAC term sheet by 2019 and 2022.

b. The transitional approach to mitigate IFRS 9 impact on capital

There is an urgent need for a transitional period aligned with the 1 January 2018 adoption date of IFRS 9. It is necessary to fast track changes in article 473a.

Banks need clarity on the transitional approach as soon as possible, otherwise they will have to consider what commercial actions and reduction in lending to certain sectors of economy will have to take place now to ensure that they are in a position to pass stress testing in 2018 under the new IFRS 9 accounting framework.

c. SME and infrastructure supporting factors

The SME supporting factor and the infrastructure supporting factor both should be fast tracked as their benefits to economic growth should not wait until the articulation of such a complex and lengthy regulation as CRRZ.

d. The transitional arrangements for the large exposure limits applied to sovereign exposures of Member States denominated in non-domestic currencies.

From 1 January 2018, sovereign exposures of Member States denominated in non-domestic currencies would no longer be considered as risk free and will not automatically be exempted from the large exposure limits. The transitional arrangements should be fast tracked and in force prior to 1 January 2018 in order to be effective and prevent a cliff-edge effect resulting from an abrupt termination of the exemption which could potentially cause distortions in the market for government bonds in non-Eurozone Member States with Euro-denominated sovereign debt.



Očekivanja menadžmenta su u najvećoj meri vezana za pro-

fitabilnost poslovanja, kako i za upravljanje profitabilnošću (poseban izazov će biti planiranje troškova kreditnog rizika) pa se u tom smi-slu očekuju što manji finansijski efekti pre svega misleći na nivoe ispravki. Dakle, sve što će dovesti do smanjenja očekivanih kreditnih gubitaka, kao i do što manjeg iznosa u Stage 2 delu portfolija za koje se računaju kreditni gubici za ceo vek trajanja finansijskog instrumenta za koje se smatra da će imati značajno veći nivo ispravki od portfolija u Stage-u 1.

Pretpostavka je onda da će banke i finansijske insti-tucije ulagati pre svega u razvoj si-stema ranog upozo-renja (koji je samim uvođenjem Stage-a 2 na mala vrata de-limično uveden), u razvoj modela koji

bi trebalo da stabilizuju vrednosti PD parametra (rating modeli) kao i u naprednije modele za računanje LGD (LossGivenDefult) parametra jer su pretpostavke da bi napredniji modeli trebalo da donesu pobolj-šanja (smanjenje) LGD parametra jer bi jednostavniji modeli koji su najčešće u upotrebi prilikom prve primene uglavnom trebalo da sadrže određene bafere konzervativnosti.

Takođe, banke i finansijske in-stitucije će imati sve manje mane-varskog prostora pri određivanju cene kreditnih proizvoda jer su procene menadžmenta banaka da kamatne stope ne mogu da

apsorbuju sve efekte dodatnih troš-kova rizika koje će doneti primena MSFI 9 standarda. Ovo praktično znači da će se prilikom odrađi-vanja aktivnih kamatnih stopa više voditi računa o komponenti troška kreditnog rizika posebno kroz eventualno uvođenje FTP (Fund Transfer Pricing) modela ili RiskBasedPricing metodologija.

Imajući u vidu zahtev za preciznim (ili bar što preciznijim) planiranjem troškova rizika i nivoa ispravki, banke će sa jedne strane donekle izmeniti, odnosno unaprediti si-steme za interno izveštavanje, ali što je možda još važnije, trebalo bi da dođe do izmena u Collection strategijama (strategijama naplate) kako u delu strategije za naplatu od Retail klijenata (fizičkih lica, preduzetnika i malih preduzeća) tako i u delu strategije napate u Corporate segmentu poslovanja. Naime, pretpostavlja se da će uslovi za ranu naplatu biti direktno pove-zani sa kriterijumima za transfer u Stage 2 (na primer, tolerancija za

msfi 9 je stigao – šta dalje?Sa početkom godine na snagu je stupio MSFI 9 – Finansijski instrumenti, standard za koji su se banke i finansijske institucije pripremale duži vremenski period. Pored računovodstvenih efekata koje sama primena standarda donosi, uloženi su i značajni resursi u izmene postojeći procesa, modela i IT infrastrukture kako bi se zahtevi standarda zadovoljili. Tu, međutim, nije kraj rada na implementaciji ovog standarda. Dalji rad će u najvećoj meri zavisiti od nivo ispunjenja očekivanja koja se formiraju na 3 različite strane – očekivanja menadžmenta, očekivanja revizora kao i očekivanja regulatora.

Đorđe Dimić partner u društvu za reviziju Crowe Horwath


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NOVI FINANSIJSKI INSTRUMENTI

Expectations of managementare largely related to the profitability

of operations and the profitability management (special challenge with be planning of expenses for credit risk). In that respect, lower financial effects are expected, primarily regarding levels of adjustment. It refers toevery-thing that will lead to the reduction of expected credit losses, as well as everything that will lead to lower amount in Stage 2 of the portion of portfolio for which credit losses are calculated for entire life of financial instrument. It is believed that they will have substantially higher level of adjustments than portfolio in Stage 1.

The assumption is that the banks and financial institutions will primarily invest in the development of early warning systems (which is partially introduced by introducing the Stage 2), in the development of models that should stabilise the values of the PD indicators (rating models), and into advanced models for cal-culating loss given default (LGD). The assumptions are that advanced models should contribute to the improvement (reduction) of the LGD,since simplified models that are most frequently used during the first implementation should contain certain conservation buffers.

Also, banks and financial institutions will have less room for manoeuvre when pricing loan products. The assessments of the management of banks is that interest rates cannot absorb all effects of additional costs of risks brought by the implementa-tion of IFRS 9. This practically means that when determining lending in-terest rate, cost component of credit risk will be particularly considered through potential introduction of fund transfer pricing (FTF) model or risk-based pricing methodologies.

Bearing in mind the require-ment for precise planning (or as much as precise) of costs of risk and value adjustments levels, banks will somehow alter or improve internal reporting systems, and, which could be even more important, the collec-tion strategies should be changed with regard to the collection from retail clients (natural persons, entre-preneurs, and small companies) as well as from corporate clients. It is assumed that the conditions of early collection will be directly connected

ifrs 9 has arrived – what next?International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 – Financial Instruments entered into force at the beginning of this year. Banks and financial institutions have been preparing for the implementation of this standard for long period. In addition to the accounting effects of the implementation of the Standard, significant resources have been invested in the changes of the current processes, models and IT infrastructure to meet the requirements of the Standard. However, this is not the end of the work on the implementation of the Standard. Further work will largely depend on the level of meeting of the expectations of three different sides – expectations of the management, expectations of auditors, and expectations of regulators.

Đorđe Dimić Partner Audit Firm Crowe Horwath


NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

kašnjenja od preko 30 dana će biti minimalna jer je kriterijum od 30 dana kašnjenja jedan od prvih za transfer u Stage 2, što je u skladu sa trenutnom praksom prilična izmena).

Očekivanja revizora predstavljaju potencijalno najveću nepoznanicu iz prostog razloga jer se praksa tek kreira. Revizorske kuće su i do sada bile angažovane zajedno sa bankama i finansijskim instituci-jama na implementaciji standarda kao konsultanti. Međutim, između teorijskih modela i metodologija i konačnih (praktičnih) rešenja često postoje manje ili veće razlike. U prvom trenutku se, posebno iz prethodno navedene činjenice da su bili angažovani kao konsultanti, ne očekuje da revizori imaju posebno visoka očekivanja odnosno primedbe na prvu primenu standarda. Ono što je realnije je pretpostavka da će se ta očekivanja menjati vremenom, odnosno očekivaće se od banaka i fi-nansijskih institucija da sva trenutna

rešenja koja odstupaju od zahteva standarda budu izmenjena u smeru što višeg nivoa ispunjavanja zahteva MSFI 9. To na primer znači da će revizori od institucija koje nemaju LGD model (iz trenutno objektiv-nog razloga kao što je nepostojanje kvalitetnih podataka za analizu) očekivati da neki takav model počnu da razvijaju, ili makar počnu da prikupljaju i sistematizuju podatke kako bi u budućnosti model mogao da bude razvijen.

Još jedna pretpostavka je da će postojati određeno razumevanje za nedostatke u modelima ili po-dacima i njihovom kvalitetu, ali isto tako se očekuje da sve podatke i sisteme kojima banka ili finansijska institucija raspolaže ona i koristi u procesu obračuna očekivanih kreditnih gubitaka. To na primer znači da institucije koje imaju rejting sisteme moraju da uključe podatke o rejtinzima u ocenu „značajnog povećanja kreditnog rizika“ odnosno da će morati da se uzmu u obzir kao

kriterijum za transfer potraživanja u Stage 2. Ukoliko tako ne postupi, institucija će imati težak posao da argumentovano objasni revizoru zašto te informacije nisu uzete u obzir.

Svakako, može se očekivati da revizori, svesni okruženja i veličine i kompleksnosti lokalnog tržišta, imaju određenu dozu razumevanja za praktična rešenja koja će biti sprovedena u bankama i finansijskim institucijama.

Imajući u vidu sve navedeno, prilično je izvesno da će se rad na primeni MSFI 9 standarda nastaviti u budućnosti na direktan ili neki indirektan način. Banke i finansij-ske institucije to mogu doživeti i kao priliku da neke sisteme i pro-cese koji trenutno ne funkcionišu na optimalan način u budućnosti izmene, osavremene i poboljšaju i na taj način ostvare i dodatne pozitivne efekte, a ne samo efekte radi postizanja pune implementacije MSFI 9 standarda.

očekivanja regulatora da bude jasno definisana

Očekivanja regulatora bi u krajnjem trebalo da budu najjasnije defini-sana. Uveden je novi standard kao odgovor na globalnu ekonomsku krizu i njegov glavni cilj je da finansijska aktiva bude procenjena što realnije (odnosno što konzervativnije i prudentnije – tj. da se ispravke formiraju na većem nivou nego prilikom važenja MRS 39, kao i da se one formiraju ranije). Ostaje nejasno da li će regulatori i centralne banke ići dalje od neformalnih očekivanja, odnosno da li će ta očekivanja pretočiti u neku regulativu (smernice, odluke…).Očigledan zaključak je da će regulator biti zadovoljniji većim efek-tima (koji neće ugroziti stabilnost banaka i finansijskih institucija u smislu adekvatnosti kapitala ili dugoročne profitabilnosti). Dakle, očekivanja regulatora će biti da što veći deo portfolija bude u Stage 2 delu obračuna, kao i da ispravke, posebno u Stage 2 i Stage 3 delu obračuna budu veće nego dosadašnje.


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NOVI FINANSIJSKI INSTRUMENTI

with the transfer criteria in Stage 2 (e.g. tolerance for default over 30 days will be at minimum,since the 30 days default is one of the first criterion for transfer into Stage 2, which is a big changeaccording to the current practice).

Expectation of auditors are po-tentially the largest unknown, be-cause the practice has been just created. Auditing firms have been involved until now as consultants together with banks and financial institutions in the implementation of the Standard. However, there are often lower or higher differences between theoretical models and methodologies and final (practical) solutions. it is not expected that the auditors will have particularly high expectations or observations at the beginning of application of the Standard, especially from the above-mentioned fact that they were engaged as consultants. It is more realistic assumption that these expectations will change over time,

i.e. banks and financial institutions will be expected to change all cur-rent solutions that deviate from the requirements of the Standardtowards higher implementation of the IFRS 9. This means that the auditors of institutions that do not have the LGD model (due to currently objective reasons, such as lack of quality data for analysis) will expect that such a model will begin to develop or even begin to collect and systematise data in order to develop the model in the future.

Another assumption is that there will be some understanding for shortcomings of models or data and their quality, but it is also expected that the bank or financial institu-tion uses all data and systems it has in the process of calculating expected credit losses. This means, for example, that institutions that have rating systems must include data on ratings in the assessment of "significant credit risk", i.e. they will have to take them into account as a

criterion for transfer of receivables in Stage 2. If the institutions do not comply, it may find itself in a difficult position to explain to the auditor arguably why this information was not taken into account.

Certainly, it can be expected that the auditors, being aware of the environment, and the size and complexity of the local market have a certain amount of understanding for practical solutions to be im-plemented in banks and financial institutions.

Bearing in mind all the above, it is fairly certain that the work on IFRS 9 implementation will continue in the future in a direct or indirect way. Banks and financial institu-tions can also experience this as an opportunity to modernise and improve some systems and processes that do not function optimally in the prospective changes, and thus achieve additional positive effects, not just the effects for the full im-plementation of IFRS 9.

expeCtations of regulators to be Clearly defined

Expectations of regulators should ultimately be clearly defined. A new standard has been introduced in response to the global economic crisis and its main objective is to assess the financial assets as real-istically as possible (i.e., more conservative and prudent – to make adjustments at a higher level than under IAS 39 and that they are made earlier). It remains unclear whether regulators and central banks will go beyond informal expectations, or whether these expectations will be transposed into some regulation (guidelines, decisions ...).Obvious conclusion is that the regulator will be more satisfied with larger effects (which will not jeopardize the stability of banks and financial institutions in terms of capital adequacy or long-term prof-itability). Therefore, the regulators will expect larger portion of the portfolio to be in Stage 2, as well as that the adjustments, especially in Stage 2 and Stage 3, are higher than the previous ones.


NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

Trgovina finansijskim derivatima počela je 1972 godine na Čikaškoj berzi fjučers ugovorima o va-

luti. Odbor čikaške berze opcija (CBOE-The Chicago Board Options Exchange) je osnovan 1973 godine, čime ja počela trgovina opcijama. Tržište svopova je krajem 1970-ih i ranih 1980-tih je jednostavno poletelo, a nekoliko godina kasnije eksplodiralo je i tržište egzotičnih derivata.

Prekomerna ekspanzija tržišta OTC (over-the-co-unter) finansijskih derivata, evoluirala je u periodu od 1980. do 2008 godine, prevashodno pod uticajem privatne kontrole dizajnirane od strane samih učesnika na finansijskom tržištu pri čemu je Međunarodna asocijacija za svopove i derivate (ISDA-International Swaps and Derivatives Association) imala vodeću ulogu.

privatno naspram javnogZato, nije nikakvo iznenađenje a ni čudo, što se u navedenom vremenskom razdoblju, OTC tržište fi-nansijskih derivata razvilo u kritičan finansijski sektor. Kontrola i nadzor nad ovim tržištima, uglavnom je bila prepuštena privatnim agencijama i tržištu (hi-poteza efikasnosti tržišta). Vlade i njihova nadležna tela su neformalno dali prednost privatnoj kontroli finansijskog tržišta OTC derivata smatrajući da će privatna kontrola ovih tržišta biti bolja i efikasnija. Ponekad, kada su vlade ocenile, da su privatne kon-trole i nadzor zatajile, ili nisu na vreme otkrile neke ozbiljne finansijske ekscese ili probleme, onda su one intervenisale ispostavljanjem određenih i obaveznih izvršnih radnji. Intervencije, vlade su bile kratkog dometa i obično su bile preduzete ad hok kako bi se ublažile ili otklonile potencijalne opasnosti koje su mogle da ugroze zdravlje finansijskog sistema. Povremene reakcije vlada, su bile plitke i po dubini i po širini, i prevashodno su bile usmerene na tržišne učesnike da trenutno otklone ili poprave nastale ekscesne epizode i probleme.

Privatna agencija ISDA, i druga privatna nadzorna i regulatorna tela, su pozitivno reagovali na povremene intervencije vlada, isključivo sa ciljem da jednostavno sačuvaju svoj dosadašnji legitimitet kao kontrolori i nadzorni organi finansijskog tržišta OTC derivata.

U svojoj studiji „Privatna i javna kontrola u OTC tržištu derivata 1984-2015“ David MCcafferi navodi da „tri izveštaja od strane Grupe za upravljanje

slepo verovanje i novi dizajn

Dr Dragan Momirović, Visoka poslovna škola

za poslovnu ekonomiju i preduzetništvo Beograd

Slika 1. Globalni OTC tržište derivata (u trilionima US dolar)Izvor: Banka za međunarodno poravnanje


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TRGOVINA FINANSIJSKIM DERIVATIMA

Financial derivatives trading started in 1972 in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange with foreign

exchange contracts. The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) was founded in 1973, and in that year trading in options started. Swap trading simply rocketed in the end of 1970 and early 1980, and several years later, trading in exotic derivatives experienced its boom.

Excessive expansion of OTC derivatives market evolved in period from 1980 to 2008, primarily under the influence of the private control designed by the financial market participants, whereby the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) had a leading role.

private versus publiCTherefore, it is no surprise or a miracle that the OTC derivatives market developed during that period into a critical financial sector. The control and supervision of the market was largely left to private agencies and the market (efficient market hypothesis). The govern-ments and their competent bodies have given informal preference to private control of the OTC derivatives market, believing that private control of these markets will be better and more efficient. Sometimes, when governments estimated that private controls and su-pervision of the market failed, or did not reveal some serious financial excesses or problems, they intervened establishing of certain mandatory executive actions. These were short-term interventions that were taken ad hoc to mitigate or remove potential dangers that could threaten the soundness of the financial system. The occasional reactions of governments were shallow both in depth and in width, and above all, they were aimed at market participants to immediately eliminate or repair excess episodes and problems.

Private agency ISDA and other private supervisory and regulatory bodies positively reacted on occasional bail-outs solely with the aim at simply preserving their legitimacy as controllers and supervisory bodies of the OTC derivatives market.

David McCaffrey mentioned in his paper Private and Public Controls of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market, 1984-2015 that “three reports by the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (CRMPG) in 1999,

blind belief and new design

Dragan Momirović, PhD. Faculty of Business Economics and Entrepreneurship, Belgrade

Picture 1 – Global OTC derivatives market (USD trillions)Source: Bank for International Settlements


FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES TRADING

rizikom suprotne strane (CRMPG-Counterparty Risk Managment Policy Group) iz 1999, 2005. i 2008, koja su se odnosila na smanjenje nerešenih predmeta u procesiranju transakcija derivata od 2003. do 2006. godine bili primeri ovog odnosa između javnih i privatnih kontrola“.

U tom kontekstu ne treba, izbeći istinu, da je jedino Komisija za trgovinu robnim fjučersima (CFTC-Commodity Futures Trading Commmission) u svakom pogledu osporavala privatnu regulaciju OTC tržište finansijskih derivata. Predsedavajući CFTC, 1998. Godine, Born, je skoro rekao „da je OTC tržište počelo da funkcioniše kao organizovano tržište finansijskih fjučersa verovatno ne bi došlo do finansijske krize“, te je on u tom smislu, tvrdio da je više nego potrebno, da ono, bude stavljeno pod kontrolom i nadzorom saveznih vladinih organa.

Glavni zagovornik, regulacije i nadzora finansijskih OTC tržišta, CEFTA je pokušala da svojim argumen-tima, skrene pažnju na nužnost preuzimanje kontrole i nadzora od privatnih agencija. Njena argumenta-cija, od strane tadašnjeg predsednika FED-a Alena Greenspan i njegovih saradnika je glatko, a čini se i brzopleto odbijena, što će kasnije i sam Greenspan priznati kao grešku.

U tom vremenskom intervalu, regulacija i nadzor OTC tržišta finansijskih derivata je bila u suprotnosti sa ideologijom vlade SAD koja je svojom politikom odražavala stavove i interese industrije bankarstva i finansijskih usluga. Uprkos ranim upozorenjima, poput bankrota Orange Counti, Kalifornije, Proctor&Gamble protiv Bankers Trusta i dugoročnog neuspeha uprav-ljanja kapitalom, grupa za finansijska tržišta je opisala derivate OTC tržišta 1999. godine, kao važnu inovaciju, koja je „transformisala svet finansija, povećala raspon finansijskih proizvoda koji stoje na raspolaganju korporacijama i investitorima i podstakla preciznije načine razumevanje, kvantifikovanje i upravljanje rizicima“.

Svi učesnici na tržištu OTC derivata i neki od re-gulatornih organa su smatrali, a većina tvrdila, da bi zakonska i formalna regulacija, ovih finansijskih tržišta, bila kontraproduktivna. Uz to, zakonska regulacija bi dodatno opterećivala učesnike na tržištu OTC derivata i gušila privatnu inicijativu, što bi naknadno ometalo institucionalizaciju ovog tržišta pa zbog toga, uopšte nije poželjna a ni potrebna. Njihova argumentacija bila je suviše olaka i nije zasnovana na realne tržišne prilike. Oni su tvrdili, da trgovina OTC derivatima nije dostupna široj javnosti, kao što su dostupni finansijski derivati kojima se trguje na deviznim tržištima, pa zbog toga, njihov ishod trgovanja ne može uopšte da utiče na privredu kao celinu.

Ovakvo poimanje trgovine OTC derivatima od vlade i finansijskih autoriteta, u tom vremenskom periodu, je bio glavni razlog da se učesnici na ovom tržištu odupru vladinoj kontroli a privatni regulatori ostanu dominantni.

Razlog izostanka vladine regulacije je jednostavan, mnogi su smatrali da bi vladina regulativa bila manje informisana od privatnih kontrola i da ona ne bi do-vela do institucionalizacije tržišta. Uz to, jako je bio prisutan snažan lobi trgovaca OTC derivatima, koji se oštro suprotstavljao zakonskoj i formalnoj kontroli koja bi im svakako uticala na pad dobiti. Kongres je 2000. godine usvojio Zakon o modernizaciji robnih berzi, kojim je definitivno pravno i formalno spro-veo deregulaciju OTC finansijskog tržišta derivata, bez obzira što su se mnogi zalagali za regulisanje derivata OTC upozoravajući na opasnost izazivanja sistemskog rizika.

„Razlog izostanka vladine regulacije je jednostavan, mnogi su smatrali da bi vladina regulativa bila manje informisana od privatnih kontrola i da ona ne bi dovela do institucionalizacije tržišta. Uz to, jako je bio prisutan snažan lobi trgovaca OTC derivatima, koji se oštro suprotstavljao zakonskoj i formalnoj kontroli koja bi im svakako uticala na pad dobiti


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2005, and 2008; and firms’ reduction of backlogs in the processing of derivatives transactions from 2003 to 2006 were examples of this relationship between public and private controls”.

In that context, the truth should not be avoided mean-ing that the Commodity Futures trading Commission (CFTC) challenged in any sense the private regulation of the OTC derivatives market. Chairperson of the CFTC in 1998, Brooksley Born, argued that “if the OTC market was beginning to function like the regu-lated futures market, financial crisis might have been avoided”. He asserted that it is more than needed that this market should be controlled and supervised by the federal authorities.

CFTC, as the main advocate of the regulation and supervision of the OTC markets, tried with its argu-ments to indicate to the necessity of taking over the control and the supervision from the private agencies. Its arguments made by the then president of the FED, Alan Greenspan and its team, were smoothly and seemingly roughly rejected, which was acknowledged by Greenspan later as an error.

The regulation and the supervision of the OTC derivatives market in that period was opposite to the ideology of the USA Government which maintained, through its policy, the positions and interests of the banking and financial services industry. Despite early warnings, like the bankruptcy of Orange County, California, Proctor&Gamble vs. Bankers Trust and long-term failure of capital management, the group for financial markets described OTC derivatives market in 1999 as an important innovation that “transformed the world of finances, increased the range of financial products available to corporations and investors, and encouraged more precise methods of risk understand-ing, quantifying and management”.

All participants in the OTC derivatives market and some of the regulatory authorities considered, and most of them claimed, that legal and formal regulation of these financial markets would be counter-productive. Moreover, legal regulation would additionally burden the OTC market participants and suffocate private initiative, which would subsequently disrupt institutionalisation of the market and, therefore, it was neither desirable nor needed. Their arguments were too easy and were not based on real market conditions. They claimed that trading in OTC derivatives was not available to public

as it is the case with derivatives traded in the foreign exchange market, since their outcome cannot influence the economy as a whole.

Such a notion of OTC derivatives trading by the gov-ernment and financial authorities in that period was the main reason why the participants resisted government control and private regulators remained dominant.

The reason for absence of government regulation was simple: many believed that the government regulation was less informed than the private controls, and that it would lead to the institutionalisation of the market. Moreover, dealers lobby in the OTC derivatives trad-ing was strong, and it strongly opposed to legal and formal control which would certainly influenced the decline in income. In 2000, the Congress adopted the Commodities Futures Modernisation Act, which im-plemented legally and formally deregulation of OTC derivatives market, regardless of many that advocated the regulation of OTC derivatives warning the danger of escalating systemic risk.

finanCial Crisis and otC derivatives The devastating effect of OTC derivatives on the eco-nomy, according to many, is attributed to the general financial deregulation that influenced, to a large extent,

“The reason for absence of government regulation was simple: many believed that the government regulation was less informed than the private controls, and that it would lead to the institutionalisation of the market. Moreover, dealers lobby in the OTC derivatives trading was strong, and it strongly opposed to legal and formal control which would certainly influenced the decline in income”.



finansijska kriza i otC derivatiRazarajući efekat derivata OTC tržišta, na ekonomiju, prema mnogima, je pripisana opštoj finansijskoj de-regulaciji koja je u najvećoj meri uticala na pojavu velike ekonomske-finansijske krize 2008. godine. Oni smatraju da su dve karakteristike derivata OTC do-prineli finansijskoj krizi. Prva, nedostatak otkrivanja cena i nedostatak CCP (CCP-Central Counterparty Clearing). Nedostatak otkrivanja cena, uticalo je, kao što je u slučaju AVG ali i drugih investicionih banaka, da neprecizno i netačno, vrednuju pozicije derivata u svom portfelju. Pogrešna procena pozicije derivata, je ohrabrivala halapljive investitore u trci za zaradom, da preuzmu fatalno rizične pozicije u određenim vrstama derivata, naročito kod kreditne svopove (credit-default swaps) na hipotekarne hartije od vrednosti (mortage-backed securities). Kada su se rizici ovih derivata nagomilali, balon je pukao na finansijskim tržištima, a halapljivi investitori nisu mogli da servisiraju nastale svoje obaveze što ih je direktno dovelo do bankrota.

Nedostatak CCP je doprineo krizi tako što je insol-ventnost ovih OTC trgovaca postala sistemski problem. Kao što je poznato, CCP se postavlja između strana u transakciji sa derivatima i postaje kupac svakom prodavcu i prodavac svakom kupcu.

U nedostatku CCP stranke, učesnice u transakciji na OTC tržištu derivata postaju previše osetljive na rizike suprotne strane. U trgovanju OTC derivatima najviše nagomilanih problema je proisteklo iz profi-lisanog bilateralnog kliringa. Nedaće su se ispoljile u obliku širenja prekomernog preklapanja ugovora, što je ionako pothranjivalo pogoršanje, već postojećih rizika druge ugovorne strane izazivajući komplikacije, neprozirnost i interkonekciju u finansijskom sistemu. Preklapani ugovori su se, po nekom nepisanom pravilu, neprirodno „razmnožavali“ jer ugovorne strane umesto da ih zatvore, one su obično pribegavale kreaciji novih neusklađenih ugovora.

Sve ove inovativne „akrobacije“ finansijskih reinži-njera su bacile u senci, donekle i u mraku, regulatore i druge nadležne institucije i vlasti koje nisu bile svesne potencijalnih udara od efekata neuspeha suprotne strane. Slučaj inovativne finansijske OTC „akrobacije“ nastaje kada ugovorna strana, u transakciji derivatima, ne može da obezbediti zaštitu derivata od rizika koga je prodala, odnosno ne uspe da ispuni svoje obaveze, onda stranka koja je pokušala da prenese rizik podnosi troškove njegove realizacije. Nastanak ovih neočekivanih troškova, usled nemogućnosti ispunjenja ugovora, može da ugrozi likvidnost druge stranke koja onda spiralno može da ugrozi poverioce kojima duguje. U stvarnosti, to se dogodilo mnogim kompanijama (poveriocima ) koje su kupile kreditne svopove, emitovane od strane kompanije AVG, i najverovatnije veliki broj nezaštićenih a važnih po-verilaca (kupci svopova) je bio razlog, zbog čega je vlada SAD intervenisala, parama poreskih obveznika, u spasavanju AIG i drugih nelikvidnih kompanija i investitora. Konačno, to je bio neuspeh neregulisanih finansijskih tržišta OTC derivata i privatne regulacije kao i hipoteze efikasnog tržišta.

kasno saznanjeNepoštovanje upozorenja o potencijalnim opasnostima koje nadolaze od nabujalih neregulisanih finansijskih tržišta OTC derivata, dovelo je do kolapsa finansi-jskih tržišta i do najveće ekonomsko finansijske krize zabeležene u istoriji ljudskog društva.

Finansijska kriza je pokazala nedostatke u identifi-kaciji i ranog otkrivanja kao i upravljanje rizikom na finansijskom tržištu OTC derivata. Takođe, primećen je nedostatak transparentnosti u pogledu veličine

„Finansijska kriza je pokazala nedostatke u identifikaciji i ranog otkrivanja kao i upravljanje rizikom na finansijskom tržištu OTC derivata. Takođe, primećen je nedostatak transparentnosti u pogledu veličine bilateralnih pozicija u ugovorima finansijskih derivata. Različite kombinovane „akrobacije“ finansijskih reinžinjera, stvorile su dosta nejasnoća i konfuziju na ovom tržištu


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bilateralnih pozicija u ugovorima finansijskih derivata. Različite kombinovane „akrobacije“ finansijskih reinžinjera, stvorile su dosta ne-jasnoća i konfuziju na ovom tržištu. Mnogi su izrazili veliku zabrinutost, posebno u vezi adekvatnosti kolaterala i aranžmana za upravljanje rizicima. Opšte gledano, ove zabrinutosti, kod mnogih učesnika stvara ambijent i kreira okruženje u kome se lako i brzo gubi poverenje. Nakon kolapsa Lehman Brothers i spasavanja AIG, u septembru 2008. godine, koji su bili glavni učesnici na tržištu derivata, došlo je do značajnog poremećaja finansijskih tržišta i uvod u veliku krizu. Talas krize se, zbog velike prekogranične saradnje i povezanosti finansijskih tržišta i tržišnih učesnika, domino efektima prelila iz SAD u ostale delove sveta, nanoseći štetu finansijskim sistemima država analogno udaru cunamija.

Finansijska kriza, koja je započela 2008. godine, prema mišljenjima dela akademske i druge javnosti, mogla se izbeći. Oni ukazuju na inertnost i ignorisanje upozorenja upućena guverneru FED-a, Grinspeen Alana, sekretaru za finansije Rubina Roberta, ministru finansija Samers Lawrencea i Chairmena SEC Arthura Levita. Međutim, treba naglasiti, bez obzira na rana upozorenja od potencijalnih opasnosti neregulisanih OTC tržišta finansijskih deri-vata, da većina tadašnje akademske javnosti i gotovo svi učesnici na tržištu i regulatorne agencije izvan CFTC, osim Generalnog ureda za računovodstvo (General Accounting Office), su podržavali isključivanje OTC derivata iz savezne, zakonske regulative. Oni su skupa smatrali da je privatna kontrola i hipoteza o efikasnosti tržišta (tržišna kontrola) u toj oblasti razumna i da su privatna kontrola i povremene intervencije vlade dovoljne za efikasno upravljanje.

odgovor na krizuRazvoj događaja i identifikovani neuspesi OTC tržišta finansijskih derivata su snažno uticali na koordinirani pristup rešavanja nagomilanih problema, inicijativom lidera G 20, na samitu u Pitsburgu, septembra 2009. Ustanovljeno

otC reforma azijsko-paCifističkog tržišta

Reforme OTC tržišta derivata, na globalnom nivou, gura ri-zike štetnih veza između regionalnih satelitskih tržišta Azijsko-pacifističkog tržište i razvijenih zapadnih tržišta. Zbog toga, mnogi bankari i finansijske institucije strahuju od novih propisa kliringa i izveštavanja, smatrajući da će te promene imati loš uticaj na rast Azijskog-pacifističkog tržišta. Razlog za strah i zabrinutost je opravdan jer različite zemlje ovog regiona, ne pridržavaju se jedinstvenog regulatornog pristupa. Dok se ne izaberu globalne regulacije, široko se primenjuju regionalni trend regulacija koji ide u pravcu fragmentacije i stvaranja veće konfuzije, što neposredno dovodi do lokalizacije regulacije.Ng Nam Sing, pomoćnik generalnog direktora monetarnih vlasti Singapura navodi da će „način na koji se primenjuju nova pravila, za svaku zemlju pojedinačno - učiniti prekogranične derivate teškim problemom“. On ukazuje „ na mogućnost preklapanja, nekonzisten-tnosti i a ne može se isključiti i gore pogoršanje“. Pri tom, treba naglasiti da je Azija, kontinent sa najbržim rastom u svetu, te da će tražnja za efikasnijem upravljanju rizikom među preduzećima i finansijskim institucijama sigurno porasti. U 2013. godini trgovina OTC derivatima je porasla sa 25% na 47% u Aziji, izuzev u Japanu, u odnosu na rast u svetu za isti period od 8%, predstavlja snažan rast kada su se transakcije OTC derivata u drugim delovima sveta smanjivale. Većina azijskih tržišta OTC derivata, ako izuzmemo Japan, locirano je u gradu državi Singapur. Čak, 40% svih angažmana prolazi kroz ovu državu, pri čemu 43% zauzimaju devizne transak-cije. Dakle tri četvrtine OTC derivata u Aziji prolazi kroz Singapur.Od 2014. godine četiri države Azijsko-pacifističkog regionu, Singapur, Hong Kong, Japan i Australija počele su da implementiraju regula-tivu u skladu sa smernicama G20 usvojene na Pitsburg samitu 2009. godine. Opšti ciljevi regulatornih promena OTC tržišta derivata su uglavnom isti kao kod Dood-Frana i EMIR. Međutim, svaka zemlja regiona, u skladu sa svojim specifičnostima, sprovodi regulaciju prema sopstvenim prioritetima i sopstvenoj dinamici. Primetan je fazni pristup implementacije regulatornog okvira, sa različitim rokovima za različite učesnike na tržištu. Većina zemalja, čini se, oslanja se na model izveštavanja EMIRa, po kome obe strane su obavezne da izveštavaju, a većina je započela sa stvaranjem re-pozitorija trgovine i zahteva za prijavljivanje pre nego što pristupe centralnom kliringu.Vremenski rok za sprovođenja pravila u četiri naveden države je isti. Za varijacije margina koje predstavljaju vruću temu za sve četiri države, predviđen je tranzicioni period od marta do septembra 2017. godine kako bi se olakšala primena pravila. Pored toga, inicijalna margina, koja je poprilično nova za sve učesnike na tržištu će se sprovoditi progresivno u zavisnosti od obima derivata koji nisu centralno oslobođeni.


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the appearance of the major economic and financial crisis in 2008. They believed that two characteristics of OTC derivatives contributed to the financial crisis. These were lack of revealing prices and lack of central counterparty clearing (CCP). Lack of revealing prices influenced, as it was the case of AVG and other inves-tment banks, the unprecise and incorrect valuation of derivatives in the portfolio. Incorrect assessment of derivatives encouraged greedy investors to rush for in-come, to take over portentously risky positions in certain types of derivatives, particularly in credit-default swaps on mortgage-backed securities. When risks in these derivatives piled up, the bubble burst in the financial markets and greedy investors were not able to service their liabilities, which led directly to their bankruptcy.

Lack of CCPs contributed to the crisis, whereby insol-vency of these OTC traders became systemic problem. As it is known, CCP is set between the parties in the derivatives transaction, and it becomes a buyer to every seller and a seller to every buyer.

In the absence of CCPs, the participants in the OTC derivatives market became too vulnerable to counter-party risks. In the trading with OTC derivatives, the most accumulated problems came from the profiled bilateral clearing. Weaknesses emerged in the form of excessive overlapping of the contracts, which in turn exacerbated the deterioration of existing counterparty risks, causing complications, opacity and interconnec-tion in the financial system. Controversial contracts unnaturally multiplied by some unwritten rule, as the counterparties usually resorted to the creation of new non-harmonised contracts rather than closing them.

All of these innovative gymnastics of financial reen-gineering kept in the shadow, somewhat also in the dark, regulators and other competent institutions and authorities who were unaware of the potential impact of the failure of the counterparty. The case of innovative financial OTC gymnastics arises when counterparty, in a derivative transaction, cannot provide derivative protection against the risk it has sold or fails to fulfil its obligations, the party trying to assume the risk bears the costs of its realisation. The emergence of these un-expected costs, due to the inability to comply with the contract, can endanger the liquidity of the other party, which then spirally may endanger the debtors owed to it. In reality, this has happened to many companies (creditors) which have bought credit-default swaps

issued by AVG, and most likely a large number of un-protected and important creditors (swap buyers) was the reason why the U.S. government intervened with the taxpayer's money, by bailing out AIG and other illiquid companies and investors. Finally, this was a failure of the unregulated OTC derivative markets and private regulation, as well as the efficient market hypothesis.

knowledge Came too late Non-compliance with the warnings on potential threats coming from unstable non-regulated OTC derivative markets led to the financial markets collapse and larg-est economic and financial crisis ever recorded in the history of human society.

Financial crisis showed deficiencies in the identification and early warning, as well as in risk management in the OTC derivatives market. In addition, lack of transparency was noted with regard to the size of bilateral positions in the derivatives contracts. Different combinations of gymnastics of financial reengineering created a vast number of vagueness and confusion in these markets. A lot of concerns were raised, particularly regarding ad-equacy of collateral and risk management arrangements. In general, these concerns created an environment with many participants, where confidence was easily lost. After the crash of the Lehman Brothers and bail-out of

“Financial crisis showed deficiencies in the identification and early warning, as well as in risk management in the OTC derivatives market. In addition, lack of transparency was noted with regard to the size of bilateral positions in the derivatives contracts. Different combinations of gymnastics of financial reengineering created a vast number of vagueness and confusion in these markets”.



Bulevar Sv Petra Cetinjskog 115, 81 000 PodgoricaTel: +382 (0)20 407 900

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the AIG in September 2008, which were the main participants of derivative market, a significant disruption in financial markets occurred and introduced the crisis. Crisis wave, due to large cross-border cooperation and connectivity of financial markets and market participants, spilled over, by domino effects from the USA to other parts of the world harming financial systems of the countries as tsunami.

According to opinions of the academics and other public, financial crisis, which started in 2008, might have been avoided. They indicated to inactivity and ignorance of warnings forwarded to the Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Assistant Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, and SEC Chair Arthur Levitt. However, it should be pointed out that, regardless to early warn-ings on potential danger of non-regulated OTC derivative markets, majority of aca-demics and almost all market participants and regulatory agencies outside CFTC, except for General Accounting Office, supported the exclusion of OTC deriva-tives from federal legislation. All of them believed that private control and efficient market hypothesis o (market control) in this area is reasonable and private control and occasional bail-outs are sufficient for effective management.

Crisis responseThe development of events and identified failures of OTC derivative markets influ-enced strongly the coordinated approach to resolving piled up problems through the G20 initiative at the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009. It was established that all standardised OTC derivatives should be traded in markets or e-trade platforms that are adequate and cleared through CCPs, and derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Contracts that do not have central clearing should be subject to higher capital requirements.

asia-paCifiC otC market reform

The OTC derivatives market reforms, globally, push the risks of harm-ful links between the regional satellite markets of the Asia-Pacific market and the developed Western markets. Because of this, many bankers and financial institutions fear new clearing and reporting rules, considering that these changes will have a bad impact on the Asia-Pacific market growth. The reason for fear and concern is jus-tified because different countries of this region do not adhere to a single regulatory approach. Until global regulation is adopted, trend of regional regulation is widely applied. It goes towards the fragmen-tation and creation of greater confusion, which directly leads to the localisation of regulation.Ng Nam Sing, Assistant Managing Director to the Singapore Monetary Authorities, states that “the way in which the new rules apply to each country individually, make cross-border derivatives difficult”. He points out to the “the possibility of overlapping, inconsistency, and even higher deterioration”. It should be emphasised that Asia is the fastest growing continent in the world, where the demand for more effective risk management between companies and financial institutions will certainly grow. In 2013, OTC derivatives trading grew from 25% to 47% in Asia, except for Japan, compared to global growth of 8% for the same period, which is a strong growth taking into consideration that OTC derivatives transactions in other parts of the world declined. Most of the OTC derivatives markets in Asia, except Japan, are located in Singapore. Even 40% of all arrangements go through this country, whereas 43% refers to foreign exchange transactions. Therefore, three quarters of OTC derivatives in Asia refer to Singapore transactions.Since 2014, four Asian-Pacific countries, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan and Australia started implementing the legislation in line with the G20 guidelines that were adopted at the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009. General objectives of regulatory changes in the OTC derivatives market are mainly the same as in Dodd-Frank Act and EMIR. However, each country in the region, in accordance with its specificities, implements regulation according to its own priorities and its own dynamics. A phase-in approach to the implementation of the regulatory framework is noted, with different deadlines for different market participants. Most countries seem to rely on the EMIR reporting model, which requires reporting by parties. Many of them started creating a trade repository and reporting requirements before they begin with central clearing.The timeframe for implementing the rules in these four countries is the same. For marginal variations that represent a hot topic for all four countries, a transitional period from March to September 2017 is envisaged in order to facilitate the application of the rules. In addition, the initial margin, which is fairly new for all market participants, will be progressively implemented depending on the volume of derivatives that are not centrally cleared.Bulevar Sv Petra Cetinjskog 115, 81 000 Podgorica

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je da se svim standardizovanim OTC derivatnim ugovorima trguje na berzama ili platformama za elektronsku trgovinu, koji su odgovarajući i očišćeni kroz CCP, kao i da se ugovori o derivatima trebaju prijaviti trgovinskom reprozitorijumu. Ugovori koji nemaju centralni kliring treba da budu podvrgnuti višim zahtevima za kapital.

regulaCija otC u sadEksplozija nagomilanih mehurića, na finansijskom tržištu SAD, je konačno otklonila sve sumnje zagovor-nika o uspostavljanju kontrole i nadzora OTC tržišta finansijskih derivata pod saveznom kontrolom. Privatna kontrola je delimično uvažena dok je hipoteza efikasnog tržišta (tržišna kontrola) otišla u ekonomsku istoriju. Nastala je nova era, ozbiljne kontrole OTC finansijskih tržišta, na tlu SAD usvajanjem Frank-Dood zakon 2010. godine, bez obzira što je inicijativa za javne regulacije došla globalno. U novom regulatornom sistemu, regu-latorni organi, koriste pravila i podsticaje, uključujući zahteve trgovine, stroži kapital i zahteva za margine za OTC transakcije, kao i prenos OTC aktivnosti na regularnu berzu i novi neobavezujući uređeni trgo-vački objekt, SEF (SEF- Swap Execution Facilities). Takođe, uredba zahteva da mnoge standardizovane swap transakcije budu centralne za situacije gde je to izvodljivo i nakon trgovanja obavezu izveštavanja o količini i ceni transakcija.

U kontekstu novih regulatornih promena, pristalice navode primer očišćenih deviznih fjučersa koji su decenijama uspešno funkcionisali, bez obzira na ra-zličite tržišne okolnosti. Istovremeno, oni su tvrdili da su se swap transakcije odvijale u okviru regulatornog

sistema fjučersa, verovatno ne bi došlo do njihovog neuspeha i finansijskog kolapsa 2008. godine. Nasuprot njima, kritičari regulatornih promena su tvrdili da su problemi swopa samo deo neuspeha visoke ekspanzije finansijskih tržišta te da su i uvedena formalna pra-vila savezne regulacije ne bi sprečilo nastanak krize. Obe stane su iznele razumne argumente za i protiv, ali posledice finansijske krize su ipak preovladale o potrebi izgradnje novog regulatornog okvira. Čak i ortodoksni zagovornik izuzimanja finansijskih OTC derivata iz formalne kontrole, A. Gripssen priznao da je pogrešio u vezi ovog tržišta. On je 23. oktobra 2008. godine pred Komisijom za nadgledanje kuća, kazao: „Pretpostavljao sam da su interesi organizacija, posebno banka i drugih takvih da su najbolje sposobni da zaštite svoje akcionare i njihovu pravičnost firme“. Advokat Milbanke, Viliams, na formu regulacije iz 2012. godine kaže: „Verodostojnost glavnih aktera na finansijskim tržištima pomalo je oštećena kroz ovaj proces i jedan od razloga zašto neki ljudi stvarno osećaju da moramo preuzeti kontrolu nad tržištem od trgovaca, ne jedino zbog transparentnosti, već je u stvari potrebno otići i otkinuti poslovanje od glavnih trgovaca i staviti ih u ruke potpunog drugačijeg seta ekonomskih igrača“.

Agencija CFTC je, na osnovu, smernica Dodd-Franak, pod vodstvom Genslera Garija, u periodu od 2009. do 2013. godine sprovodila kontrolu i nadzor agresivnije nego što se očekivalo. Masad, njegov naslednik, nije dramatično promenio opštu politiku CFTC ali ostali regulatori i učesnici na finansijskom tržištu priznaju da je kontrola od 2014. godine manje agresivna i flek-sibilnija. Regulatorne promene OTC tržišta odvijaju se neravnomernije i sporije od predviđenog. Centralno čišćenje OTC derivatnih transakcija i stroži kapitalni i zahtevi margina su najbrže oblikovani iako su ostali ozbiljni problemi kao što su razlike između zahteva zemalja na globalnom tržištu. Izgrađeni su uslovi za izveštavanje ali nedoslednost u izveštavanju unutar i između država umanjuju korisnost podataka. Novi trgovinski sistem, kao što je SEF, ima oblik više prila-gođenog sistema, koji je funkcionisao pre donošenje Dood-Franak zakona, nego OTC trgovinske tran-sformacije koju zagovaraju pristalice reforme tržišta derivata sadržane u navedenom zakonu.

Kao glavni razlog, nejednakog napretka reformi OTC tržišta, mnogi navode dominaciju glavnih trgo-vaca derivatima koji pružaju veliki otpor promenama

„U 2012. godini Evropska unija (EU) je shodno preporukama samita u Pitsburgu usvojila Regulativu evropske tržišne infrastrukture (EMIR9) sa ciljevima da poveća transparentnost na tržištu OTC derivata, ublaži kreditni rizik i smanji operativni rizik


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otC regulation in the usaThe burst of piled up bubbles in the USA financial market removed finally all doubts of the advocates of establishing control and supervision of OTC derivative markets under the federal control. Private control was partially taken into consideration, while the effective market hypothesis (market control) has gone in eco-nomic history. A new era of serious control of OTC financial markets in the USA emerged by adopting the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, regardless of the fact that the initiative for public regulation occurred globally. In this new regulatory system, regulatory authorities use rules and incentives, including trade requirements, stricter capital and margin requirements for OTC transactions, to shift OTC activities to regulated exchanges, and new non-exchange regulated trading facilities, called swap execution facilities (SEFs). Regulation also required that many standardised swap transactions be centrally cleared where feasible, and requires post-trade reporting of transactions’ volume and pricing.

In the context of new regulatory changes, the supporters cited the example in which cleared, exchange-executed futures markets have functioned effectively for decades under diverse economic conditions. They maintained that conducting swap transactions in a futures-like regulatory system would prevent the types of failures that had occurred leading up to 2008. In turn, critics of these changes argued that swap-related problems were only part of broader expansion of financial markets and the introduced formal rules of federal regulation would not have prevented the crisis. Reasonable arguments support both sides, but the trauma of the financial crisis tipped legislation in favour of a new regulatory system. Even the orthodox advocate of excluding OTC derivatives from formal control, Alan Greenspan, admitted that he was wrong about this market. On 23 October 2008, before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee he said “I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organisations, specifically banks and others, was such that they were best capable of protect-ing their own shareholders.“ As preeminent derivatives attorney John Williams, now of Milbank, observed in a forum in 2012: “The credibility of the major players in the financial markets to actually work with the regulators and explain what was going on was somewhat damaged through this process and so that’s one of the reasons why some people really felt that they needed to get

control of the market away from the dealers—not just transparency, but actually needed to go in and tear the business away from the major dealers and put it in the hands of a completely different set of economic actors.”

In period 2009-2013, the CFTC conducted control and supervision more aggressively than expected, based on the Dodd-Frank guidelines under the leadership of Gary Gensler. Timothy Massad, Gensler’s successor, has not changed the CFTC’s overall policies dramatically, but other regulators and market participants acknowledge that the agency’s leadership since 2014 is less aggressive and more flexible. Regulatory changes in the OTC derivatives markets have occurred unevenly and more slowly than expected. Central clearing of OTC derivatives transac-tions and stricter capital and margin requirements are forming most quickly, although serious problems, such as differences among nations’ requirements in a global market, remain. Reporting requirements are in place, but inconsistencies in reporting systems within and across nations diminish the usefulness of the data. New systems of trading, like SEFs, are more like regulation-induced adaptations of the systems used prior to Dodd-Frank than the transformations of OTC trading advocated by Dodd-Frank supporters.

The dominance of the major derivative dealers was pointed out as the main reason for the uneven progress of the OTC market reforms, since they provided great resistance to changes explaining that the OTC deriva-tive market has operated for them. Market participants beyond the major derivatives dealers have supported aspects of new rules wand measures. Major derivative dealers indicated that the regulation did not allow for more discretionary rights for executing transactions and

“In 2012, the European Union (EU) adopted, pursuant to the Pittsburgh Summit recommendations, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). This regulation is aimed at increasing the transparency in the OTC derivatives market, mitigate credit risk and reduce operational risk”.



objašnjavajući da je tržište OTC derivata radilo za njih. Ostali manji učesnici, izvan glavnih trgovaca derivatima, su podržali nove regulatorne mere i pravila. Glavni trgovci derivatima, ukazuju da regulatorni propisi ne dozvoljavaju više diskrecije u obavljanju transakcija i da ih prisiljavaju na rešavanje ugovornih obaveza u uslovima koji ugrožavaju njihovo poslovanje. Od ne-finansijskih kompanija, penzionih fondova i krajnjih korisnika se zahteva, zbog pružanja otpora novim pravilima, da dodatno kreiraju margine i troškove.

uspostavljanje regulative euU 2012. godini Evropska unija (EU) je shodno pre-porukama samita u Pitsburgu usvojila Regulativu evropske tržišne infrastrukture (EMIR9) sa ciljevima da poveća transparentnost na tržištu OTC derivata, ublaži kreditni rizik i smanji operativni rizik. Analogno proklamovanim ciljevima svi standardizovani ugo-vori o derivatima moraju da se obračunavaju preko centralnih ugovornih strana (CCP) koji je stupio na snagu 2015. godine i da se svi ugovori OTC derivata prijavljuju trgovinskom repozitorijumu.

Prema rečima potpredsednika Dombrovskog, u Briselu, 2017. godine , dve godine nakon uspostavljanja, „EMIR dobro radi“ ali radi efikasnijeg funkcionisanja „postoje

mogućnosti prilagođavanja kako bi ona bila proporci-onalnija i efikasnija“. Prilagođavanja se odnose, prema Komisiji za reviziju, na brojne probleme koji ometaju ostvarenje postavljenih ciljeva na efikasniji način. Problemi koji opterećuju efikasniju implementaciju EMIRa uključuju nesrazmerne troškove usaglašavanja a u nekim slučajevima prevazilaze prudencijalne koristi, nedovoljnu transparentnost pozicije, izloženosti OTC derivata i nedovoljan pristup kliringu za ugovorne strane. Iz tih razloga, Dombrovski naglašava da je „naš cilj da postignemo iste prudencijalne rezultate ali sa manjim troškovima za evropske kompanije i našu ekonomiju“.

Promene daljeg prilagođavanja odnose se na dosadašnje olakšanje pravila za ublažavanje zahteva za izveštavanje, a da se pri tom, ne ugrozi kvalitet prikupljenih informacija. Većina smatra da bi ova promena uticala na smanjenje operativnih troškova preduzeća za 1, 1 milijardu evra i skoro 5,3 milijardi evra u jednokratnim troškovima. Takođe prema navodima, Dombrovskog „za tri godine treba da razvijemo tehnička rešenja za penzione fon-dove kako bi i oni učestvovali u centralnom kliringu, istovremeno štiteći dohodak budućih penzionera“.

Uspeh EMIRAa se ogleda u tome, što je sve više derivata centralno očišćeno, tako da je u periodu 2009-2015. udeo centralno odobrenih derivata u vanrednim transakcijama porastao sa 36% na 60%. Istovremeno klirinški poslovi se koncentrišu u mali broj CCP, čime se povećava njihov značaj za ukupni finansijsku stabilnost EU. Zbog toga je logično da EU ima određenu odgo-vornost za njihovu nadzor. Takođe, treba ukazati da na osnovu uspostavljenih međunarodnih standarda OTC tržište EU ima dobar uspostavljeni sistem ekvivalencije, gde su 15 zemalja i 28 CCP priznati van granica EU. Zatim, ne treba izgubiti iz vida da neke CCP iz trećih zemalja imaju veoma važnu ulogu za finansijska tržišta EU kao i određeni uticaj na institucije EU, pa iz tih specifičnih razloga moraju biti stavljeni pod nadzor regulativnih organa EU.

Međutim, neplanirani problem predstavlja izlazak Velike Britanije iz EU a sam tim i napuštanje EMIR okvira regulacije. U ovom trenutku Velika Britanija ima ključnu ulogu u pružanju klirinških usluga. Čak 75% derivata kamatnih stopa denominirane u evrima se čiste u Veliku Britaniju. Ove aktivnosti, u buduće verovatno će biti van okvira EMIRa što predstavlja važno pitanje daljeg prilagođavanja i unapređenja regulatorne i nadzorne arhitekture OTC finansijskih derivata EU.

„Neplanirani problem predstavlja izlazak Velike Britanije iz EU a sam tim i napuštanje EMIR okvira regulacije. U ovom trenutku Velika Britanija ima ključnu ulogu u pružanju klirinških usluga. Čak 75% derivata kamatnih stopa denominirane u evrima se čiste u Veliku Britaniju. Ove aktivnosti, u buduće verovatno će biti van okvira EMIRa što predstavlja važno pitanje daljeg prilagođavanja i unapređenja regulatorne i nadzorne arhitekture OTC finansijskih derivata EU


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they were forced to resolve contractual obligations in the conditions that jeopardised their operations. Non-financial businesses, pension funds, and end-users of derivatives, are required to incur additional margin and clearing costs for their derivatives business due to the resistance to new rules.

establishing new eu regulationIn 2012, the European Union (EU) adopted, pursu-ant to the Pittsburgh Summit recommendations, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). This regulation is aimed at increasing the transparency in the OTC derivatives market, mitigate credit risk and reduce operational risk. According to the prescribed objectives, which entered into force in 2015, all stan-dardised derivative contracts must be cleared centrally through CCPs, and all OTC derivative contracts must be reported to trade repository.

Two years after the adoption of the regulation, Vice-President Dombrovskis in Brussels in 2017 said that “the EMIR is doing well overall”; however, for its efficient functioning “there is room for targeted adjustments to make it more proportionate and efficient”. According to the Audit Committee, these adjustments refer to numerous problems that disrupt the accomplishment of the objectives in more efficient manner. Problems that burden more efficient implementation of the EMIR include disproportionate harmonisation costs, and in some cases they exceed prudential benefits, insufficient transparency of position, exposures of OTC derivatives, and insufficient access to clearing for counterparties. Therefore, Dombrovskis highlighted that “our aim is to achieve the same prudential results but with less cost to Europe's companies and our economy”.

Changes of further adjustment relate to the current relaxation of the rules for mitigating the reporting requirements, without jeopardizing the quality of the information collected. It is believed that this change would have led to a reduction in operating costs of 1.1 billion euros and nearly 5.3 billion euros in one-off costs. Also, according to the Dombrovskis, “we are providing three years to develop technical solutions for pension funds to take part in central clearing while protecting the revenue of future pensioners”.

The success of the EMIR is reflected in the fact that the increasing volume of derivatives is centrally cleared. For example, between 2009 and 2015, the share of centrally

cleared interest rate over-the-counter derivatives went up from 36% to 60%. At the same time, the EU clearing business tends to strongly concentrate in a small number of CCPs. This concentration increases the importance of the most significant CCPs for the financial stability of the EU as a whole. It therefore makes sense that the EU has a certain responsibility for their supervision. Based on strong international standards, the EU has now a well-established system of equivalence. 15 countries and 28 CCPs outside the EU have been recognised. Then, it should be also pointed out that some third country CCPs play a key systemic role for EU financial markets, and have a particular impact on the responsibilities of EU and Member States institutions. Therefore, EU supervisory framework also needs to deal with these specific situations.

However, the unplanned issue is the UK exit from the EU and the abandoning of the EMIR regulatory framework. At this point, the UK plays a key role in providing clearing services. Even 75% of the interest rate derivatives denominated in euros is cleared in the UK. These activities are likely to be beyond the frame-work of the EMIR in the future, which is an important issue for further alignment and enhancement of the OTC financial derivative regulatory and supervisory architecture of the EU.

“The unplanned issue is the UK exit from the EU and the abandoning of the EMIR regulatory framework. At this point, the UK plays a key role in providing clearing services. Even 75% of the interest rate derivatives denominated in euros is cleared in the UK. These activities are likely to be beyond the framework of the EMIR in the future, which is an important issue for further alignment and enhancement of the OTC financial derivative regulatory and supervisory architecture of the EU”.



Koje promene donosi revidirana Direktiva o platnim uslugama PSD2?

EU je 2007.godine odobrila uvođenje Direktive o platnim uslugama PSD (eng. Payment Services Directive skraćeno PSD 2007/64/EZ) u cilju usklađivanja glavnih instrumenata bezgotovinskog plaćanja širom Evro-zone, povećanja učešća ne-bankarskih institucija u industriji plaćanja, kao i usklađivanja zaštite potrošača. Predmetna Direktiva se primenjuje samo na platne usluge u okviru Evro-zone, što znači samo na transakcije kod kojih su i nalogodavac i korisnik plaćanja u zemlji koja je članica Evro-zone.

U nastojanju da značajno unapredi domete predmetne Direktive Evropski parlament je dana 08.10.2015.godine usvojio Predlog Evropske komisije za stvaranje sigurnijih i inovativnijih pravila za plaćanja. Dana 16.11.2015.godine Savet EU je odobrio Revidiranu Direktivu PSD2, ostavljajući zemljama članicama rok od dve godine za uklju-čenje pomenute Direktive u nacionalne zakone i propise. Primena PSD2 je obavezujuća na teritoriji Evro-zone.U fokusu PSD2 su:

▷ Standardizacija, integracija i unap-ređenje efikasnosti plaćanja ▷ Bolja zaštita potrošača odnosno korisnika platnih usluga ▷ Dalja promocija inovacija i smanjenje troškova transakcija ▷ Povećanje transparentnosti u novim metodama plaćanja, a pre svega kod mobilnih i on-line plaćanja ▷ Ujednačavanje naknada- troškova izvršenja naloga, kao i unapređenje bezbednosti procesuiranja plaćanja.

Generalno posmatrano PSD2 obuhvata 4 segmenta:

1. Uključuje mogućnost da se jedan od učesnika u izvršenju platne usluge nalazi izvan EU, kao i proširenje li-ste učesnika unutar pojma “platna institucija”;

2. Uvode se:a) AISP (eng. Account Information

Service Providers) - provajder sa ovla-šćenjem za povezivanje sa nalogom korisnika u banci. Ovaj termin u predmetnoj Direktivi se odnosi na banku nalogodavca ili banku korisnika plaćanja, a sve u kontekstu platnih transakcija koje se obavljaju putem on-line bankinga; kao i

b) PISP (eng. Payment Initiation Service Providers) – provajder koji omogućava transakcije plaćanja, a što znači pristup za nove učesnike na tržištu platnih usluga, koji pružaju softverski “most” između nalogodavca/platioca i provajdera platne usluge samog na-logodavca, radi omogućavanja on-line plaćanja iniciranjem naloga na zahtev nalogodavca.

3. Reguliše se segment “card surchar-ges”, koji označava dodatnu naknadu koja se naplaćuje za određenu transak-ciju, na primer za podizanje novca na bankomatu. Naime, pored postojeće naknade, koju naplaćuje banka, korisnik plaća i naknadu pružaocu usluge podi-zanja novca, u slučaju kada je vlasnik mreže bankomata treće lice, a ne banka izdavalac ili banka primalac kartice;

4. Dodatno se uređuje oblast bez-bednosti plaćanja i pristupa računima.

PSD2 omogućava proširenje primene Direktive i to najpre u geografskom smislu, utoliko što se ne ograničava na zemlje članice EU odnosno Evro-zone, što je bio slučaj sa PSD. Direktiva PSD2 istovremeno omogućava značajno proširenje u pogledu valuta, utoliko što se ne ograničava na primenu valuta zemalja članica EU odnosno Evro-zone,

kakav je bio sistem shodno PSD, već omogućava primenu svih oficijelnih valuta, što će zahtevati prilagođavanje sistema u vezi sa konverzijom valuta, datumima valute, izvršenja naloga za plaćanje i neka druga.

Počev od januara 2018. godine, sve banke u EU će biti u obavezi da uvedu dvofaktorsku autentifikaciju u smislu provere/identifikacije nalogodavca.Trenutno, pojedine banke u EU koriste samo lozinku za zaštitu naloga svojih klijenata. Pored lozinke, klijentima će morati biti obezbeđen i drugi faktor au-tentifikacije.Trenutno se kao drugi faktor najčešće koristi tzv. TAN - transakcioni broj (eng. Transaction Number) ili SMS OTP - jednokratna lozinka koju banka šalje korisniku putem SMS-a (eng. SMS one time password). PSD2 ne priznaje ove vrste autentifikacije kao drugi faktor, već iste tretira samo kao drugi korak što od 2018. godine neće biti prihvatljivo, budući da se insistira na mnogo značajnijem sistemu bezbednosti učesnika u tran-sakcijama.Naime, PSD2 uvodi obavezu korišćenja najmanje 2 od 3 preporučena sistema identifikacije a to su:

▷ znanje: nešto što je poznato samo korisniku (na primer: šifra- password ili PIN) ▷ posedovanje: nešto što je u posedu samo korisnika (na primer: kartica i uređaj za elektronsku komunikaciju između kompjutera korisnika i kom-pjutera banke ili platne institucije tzv.“token”) ▷ nerazdvojivost: nešto što je samo izdavalac (na primer: otisak prsta ili glas).

PSD2 istovremeno nalaže promene u poslovanju banaka. Naime, do sada je pristup korisničkim nalozima bio u isključivom vlasništvu banaka, među-tim uvođenjem PSD2 banke će morati da o svom trošku omoguće pristup računima klijenata specijalizovanim provajderima.

PITANJE

ODGOVOR

Radmila Gaćeša, Konsultant


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PITANJA I ODGOVORI

What Changes Are Introduced by the Revised Payment Services Directive (PSD 2)?

In 2007, the European Union approved the introduction of the Payment Services Directive 2007/64/EC (PSD) with a view to harmonising main instruments of cashless payment throughout the euro area, increasing the participation of non-banking institutions in the payment sector, and harmonising the consumers protection. This Directive is applied only to the payment services within the euro area, i.e. it is applied only to the transactions where both the provider and the user of payment services are in the euro area Member State.

In order to significantly improve the scope of the implementation of the Directive, on 8 October 2015, the European Parliament adopted the Proposal of the European Commission to create sound and more innovative payment rules. On 16 November 2015, the EU Council approved the Revised Directive PSD2, leaving Member States the deadline of 2 years for transposing the PSD2 into the national laws and regulations. The implementation of the PSD2 is binding at the territory of the euro area. The PSD2 is focused on:

▷ standardisation, integration, and im-provement of the payment efficiency; ▷ better protection of consumers, i.e. payment services users; ▷ further promotion of innovations and the reduction of transaction costs; ▷ increase in transparency in new methods of payment, primarily in mobile and on-line payments; ▷ harmonisation of fees – expenses for the execution of payment orders,

and the improvement of security of payment processing;

In general, the PSD2 covers four segments:

1. it includes the possibility that one of the payment service participants is in non-EU country, as well as it enlarges the list of participants within the term “payment institution”;

2. It introduces the following:a) Account Information Service

Providers (AISP) – a provider authorised to link with the user’s payment order in the bank. This term in the Directive refers to the bank provider of services or bank user of payment, in the context of payment transactions executed via on-line banking; and

b) Payment Initiation Service Providers (PISP) – a provider that enables payment transactions. This means access for new participants in the payment services market, which provide software bridge between a party giving a payment order/payer and payment service provider of such a party to enable on-line payments by initiating the order at the request of the party giving payment order.

3. It regulates segment of “card sur-charges”, which means additionally fee charged for a certain transaction, for example for cash withdrawal from ATM. Namely, in addition to the exist-ing fee charged by the bank, the user pays also fee to the provider of services for withdrawing cash in case when the owner of ATM network is third party rather than payment card issuing bank or receiving bank;

4. It additionally regulates the security of payments and access to accounts.

PSD2 enables enlargement of the Directive implementation as it is not limited to the EU Member States, i.e. euro area Member States as it was the case with the PSD. The PSD2 simultaneously enables significant enlargement with regard to the currencies, since it is not

limited only to the application of curren-cies of the EU Member States, i.e. euro area Member States. Instead, it enables the application of all official currencies, which will require adjustment of systems regarding the currency translation, value dates of the payment orders’ execution, and some other adjustments.

Starting from January 2018, all banks in the EU will be required to introduce two-factor authentication for check/identification of a party giving the order for payment. Currently, individual banks in the EU use only password for protect-ing payment orders of their clients. In addition to the password, clients will be provided with the second authentication factor. Currently, Transaction Number (TAN) or SMS one-time password (SMS OTP) are most frequently used as the second factor. PSD2 does not recognise these types of authentications as the second factor, but it treats them only as the second step. This will not be ac-ceptable from 2018, since it is insisted on more important security system of the participants in the transactions. The PSD2 introduces the obligation of using at least 2 of 3 recommended identification systems being:

▷ knowledge: something that is known only to the user (e.g. password or PIN)

▷ ownership: something owned only by the user (e.g. payment card and electronic communication device between the computer of the user and the computer of the bank or payment institution, so called token)

▷ inseparability: something that is only the issuer (e.g. fingerprint or voice).

At the same time, the PSD2 requires some changes in banking operations. The access to user accounts until now has been exclusively owned by the banks. However, with the introduction of PSD2, banks will have to enable at their expense the specialised providers the access to the accounts of the clients.

QUESTION

ANSWER

Radmila Gaćeša, Consultant


QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

rad u emigraCijiNakon vojnog poraza i okupacije u aprilu 1941. Narodna banka je preko Nikšića, zajedno sa Vladom, prvo emigrirala u Jerusalim, a nakon toga u London. Tu je, u izmijenjenim uslovima nastavila svoj rad. Kraljevina Jugoslavija za-držala je svoj međunarodni subjektivitet jer su je Velika Britanija i Sjedinjene američke države tretirale kao savezničku zemlju, uprkos činjenici da nije kontrolisala političku i vojnu situaciju na okupiranoj i rasparčanoj zemlji.

Zbog ratnih uslova i poslovanja u emigraciji Banka je cijelo vrijeme rata poslovala bez organa upravljanja predviđenih pozitivnim zakonskim propisima. Jedino je uspjela da imenuje kvalifikovanog guvernera i vicegu-vernera što je doprinijelo njenom opstanku. Njen posao je bio sveden na davanje neogra-ničenih pozajmica emigrantskoj vladi, bez fiksiranog roka vraćanja, i brigu za očuvanje zlatnih i deviznih depozita.

Tokom cijelog rata Narodna banka je uspješno čuvala svoju imovinu i legitimne interese u čemu joj je najviše pomogla blo-kada sredstava, po propisima koje su donijele savezničke i neutralne zemlje o blokiranju potraživanja zemalja koje su bile pod nepri-jateljskom okupacijom.

izrada novih jugoslovenskih novčaniCaNa osnovu iskustva sa upotrebom i zamje-nom austrougarskog novca iz 1919. znalo se za probleme koji mogu nastati prilikom zamjene okupacijskog novca. Samo po sebi se nametnulo pitanje izrade novih jugoslo-venskih novčanica. Ovaj posao je pokrenut sredinom 1941 u punoj saradnji sa nadležnim engleskim institucijama. Nakon zajedničke konferencije Komiteta ministara za obnovu zemlje i Odbora za pripremu obnove zemlje, koja je održana 12. oktobra 1942. predsjednik

londonska serija novčaniCa vlade kraljevine jugoslavije u izbjeglištvu

Miodrag KirsanovCentralna banka Crne Gore

Podučena pozitivnim iskustvom iz Prvog svjetskog rata Akcionarsko društvo Narodna banka Jugoslavije, usljed ratne psihoze, u inostranstvo je 1939. iznijela svoje zlatne rezerve (Bank of Enkland, London, 11.203 kg i Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 41.666 kg čistog zlata). U nekoliko svjetskih centara formirala je konvertibilne devizne depozite u iznosu od 38.772.329,33 $ (Njujork, Moskva, Rio de Žaneiro i Ankara). Osim ovih, postojali su manji devizni depoziti u Kanadi, Engleskoj, Švajcarskoj i Švedskoj, kod tamošnjih centralnih banaka. Jedan dio zlata koji je ostao u zemlji, odnijela je emigrantska vlada, drugi oficiri, treći je razgrabljen od okupatora, a četvrti je ostao sakriven u Manastiru Ostrogu i pronađen poslije rata.


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VREMENA PROŠLA

Powered by positive experiences from the First World War, a Joint Stock Company The National Bank of Yugoslavia, due to war psychosis, moved its gold reserves to abroad in 1939 (11,203 kg to the Bank of England, London, and 41,666 kg of pure gold to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York). It established convertible foreign currency deposits in several world centres, in the amount of 38,772,329.33 USD (New York, Moscow, Rio de Janeiro and Ankara). In addition to these deposits, there were foreign currency deposits held with central banks in smaller amounts in Canada, England, Switzerland and Sweden. One part of the gold that remained in the country was taken by an emigrant government, other part was taken by the officers, the third part was seized by the occupiers, and the fourth part remained hidden in Ostrog Monastery and found after the war.

work in exileAfter the military defeat and occupation in April 1941, the National Bank through Nikšić, together with the Government, first immigrated to Jerusalem, and then to London. There, under the changed conditions, it continued its work. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia maintained its international subjectivity because the United Kingdom and the United States treated it as an allied country, despite the fact that it did not control the political and military situation in an occupied and fragmented country.

Due to war conditions and operations in emigration, the Bank has operated through-out the war without the management bodies envisioned by positive legal regulations. It only succeeded in appointing a qualified governor and vice governor, which contributed to its survival. Its job was reduced to giving unlimited loans to the emigrant government, without fixed repayment schedule, and taking care of

the preservation of gold and foreign currency deposits.

Throughout the war, the National Bank successfully secured its assets and legitimate interests in which it was best helped by the blockade of funds, in accordance with the regulations passed by the Allied and neutral countries on blocking the claims of countries that were under hostile occupation.

Creation of new yugoslav banknotesBased on the experience of using and re-placing Austro-Hungarian money from 1919, the Bank was aware of problems that may arise in the exchange of occupational money. The question of creating new Yugoslav bank-notes was imposed. This work was launched in middle of 1941 in full co-operation with competent English institutions. After a joint conference of the Committee of Ministers for the Reconstruction of the Country and the

london series of banknotes of the yugoslav royal government-in-exile

Miodrag KirsanovCentral bank of Montenegro


PAST TIMES

vlade u izbjeglištvu Slobodan Jovanović naredio je ministru trgovine i industrije Juraju Šuteju i guver-neru Narodne banke Dobrivoju Lazareviću da za sjednicu Ministarskog savjeta pripreme referat po pitanju pripreme novih novčanica.

Nakon prepiske i podnošenja više referata tokom 1942. i 1943. konačnu odluku o izradi novih novčanica donio je Ministarski savjet na sjednici od 9. aprila 1943. Kasnije je donio više izmjena i dopuna ove odluke.

Izvršenje odluke bilo je povjereno delegatu Ministarstva finansija Nebojši Dimoviću i guverneru Narodne banke Dobrivoju Lazareviću.

Nove jugoslovenske novčanice štampane su u Engleskoj, tokom 1944., u apoenima od 5, 10, 25, 100, 500 i 1.000, dinara, u tiražu od 177 000 000 komada i ukupnom nominalnom iznosu od 10.350.000.000 dinara.

pregled nominalaApoen komada iznos

5 dinara 40 000 000 200 000 000

10 dinara 55 000 000 550 000 000

25 dinara 40 000 000 1 000 000 000

100 dinara 36 000 000 3 600 000 000

500 dinara 2 000 000 1 000 000 000

1000 dinara 4 000 000 4 000 000 000

ukupno 177 000 000 10 350 000 000

Kao što je započet, ovaj posao je završen uz stručnu pomoć engleskog Glavnog trezora Ministarstva fi-nansija i Engleske banke u pogledu načina štampanja, količine, iznosa nominala, dimenzija novčanica, vrsta papira, fabrika koje su ga izradile, štamparija koje bi štampale novčanice i cijena izrade.

Papir je nabavljen kod svjetski poznate fabrike LaverstokeMills, Whitchurch, Hants. Ltd u količini nešto većoj od 102 tone. Novac su štampale dvije pri-znate engleske firme. Apoene od 5, 10 i 25 dinara firma Thomas De La Rue&Co., Ltd. iz HaywardeHeath, Sussex za 94562 funti i 100, 500 i 1.000 dinara firme Bradbury, Wilkinson&Co., Ltd., NewMaiden za 59450 funti.

Za ovu svrhu bilo je utrošeno nešto preko 155.213 engleskih funti.

Za lagerovanje i pakovanje gotovih novčanica bilo je upotrebljeno 2.106 sanduka.

apoeniApoen 5 dinara, dimenzije115x55 mm, tamno zelene boje, izrađen u dolarskom stilu, bez godine izdanja, štampan u ofset tehnici na papiru bez zaštitne niti i vodenog žiga. Autori i graveri nijesu poznati.

Na aversu, centralno je portret monarha u ovalnom okviru, i uniformi. Uokviren tradicionalnom narodnom šarom. U uglovima okvira su numeričke oznake apoena smještene u ovalna polja. Od vrha prema dnu je ćirilični tekst NARODNA BANKA/KRALJEVINE JUGOSLAVIJE. Lijevo i desno od portreta su serijski brojevi. Slijede, lijevo od portreta numerička oznaka apoene, ispod koje je tekst ZA NADZORNU VLAST/MINISTAR FINANSIJA i latinični potpis ministra finansija Dr Juraj Šutej. Desno od por-treta, ispod serijskog broja je grb Kraljevine Jugoslavije, ispod kojeg slijedi natpis GUVERNER/NARODNE BANKE i ćirilicom potpis Dobrivoje Lazarević. Na donjoj liniji okvira, ispod portreta je tekst PLAĆA DONOSIOCU/5 DINARA. Mašinski tekst SPECIMEN otisnut je crnom bojom preko gornje linije rama.

Na reversu je crtež planinskog pašnjaka sa stadom ovaca, uokviren bogatom tradicionalnom šarom. U uglovima okvira nalaze se numeričke oznake apoena smještene u ovalna polja. Na donjoj liniji okvira je latinični tekst PET DINARA.

Mašinski tekst SPECIMEN otisnut je crnom bojom preko gornje linije rama.

Tiraž: 40.000.000 komada, 200.000.000 dinara

Apoen 10 dinara, 120x55 mm, svijetlo crvene boje. Istih tehničkih karakteristika i dizajna kao prethodni apoen.


122

VREMENA PROŠLA

Country Reconstruction Committee that was held on 12 October 1942, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia, Slobodan Jovanović, ordered the Minister of Trade and Industry, Juraj Šutej, and Governor of the National Bank, Dobrivoje Lazarević, to prepare a report for the session of the Council of Ministers regarding the preparation of new banknotes.

After the correspondence and the submission of several papers during 1942 and 1943, the final deci-sion on creation of new banknotes was made by the Council of Ministers at its session held on 9 April 1943. Several amendments to this decision were made later.

Representative of the Ministry of Finance, Nebojša Dimović and the Governor of the National Bank, Dobrivoje Lazarević, executed the decision.

New Yugoslav banknotes were printed in England in 1944, in denominations of 5, 10, 25, 100, 500 and 1,000 dinars, in circulation of 177.000,000 pieces, and in total nominal amount of 10,350,000,000 dinars.

overview of nominal amountsDenomination of Pieces Amount

5 dinars 40 000 000 200 000 000

10 dinars 55 000 000 550 000 000

25 dinars 40 000 000 1 000 000 000

100 dinars 36 000 000 3 600 000 000

500 dinars 2 000 000 1 000 000 000

1000 dinars 4 000 000 4 000 000 000

total 177 000 000 10 350 000 000

As it began, this work was completed with expert assistance from the English Treasury of the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of England in terms of print-ing, quantity, nominal amount, banknote size, paper type, factories that produced it, printing presses that would print banknotes, and pricing.

the paper was acquired at the renowned factory Laverstoke Mills, Whitchurch, Hants. Ltd. in an amount somewhat greater than 102 tons. The money was printed by two recognised English firms. Denomination of 5, 10 and 25 dinars were printed by Thomas De La Rue & Co., Ltd. from Haywards Heath, Sussex for 94,562 GBP, and denominations of 100, 500 and 1,000 dinars were printed by Bradbury, Wilkinson & Co., Ltd., New Maiden for 59,450 GBP.

For this purpose, over 155,213 GBP was spent in English pounds.

For stockpiling and packing of finished banknotes 2,106 boxes were used.

denominations Denomination of 5 dinars, 15x55 mm, dark green, made in dollar style, without a year of issue, printed in offset technique on paper without a protective thread and watermark. Authors and engravers are not known.

The obverse shows portrait of a monarch in an oval frame and uniform is in the centre. It is framed by traditional folk tapestry. In the corners of the frame are numerical signs of denominations placed in oval fields. From the top to the bottom is the text written in Cyrillic: NATIONAL BANK / KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA. On the left-hand and right-hand sides of the portrait are serial numbers. On the left-hand side of the por-trait are numeric denominations, below which is the text FOR THE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY / MINISTER OF FINANCE, and the Latin signature of the Minister of Finance Dr Juraj Šutej. To the right of the portrait, below the serial number is the coat of arms of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, followed by the inscription of the GUVERNER / NATIONAL BANK and the Cyrillic signature of Dobrivoje Lazarević. At the bottom line of the frame below the portrait is the text PAID BY DELIVERER / 5 DINARS. The machine text SPECIMEN is imprinted in black over the upper line of the frame.

On the reverse is a drawing of a mountain pasture with flock of sheep, framed by a rich traditional design. In the corners of the frame are numeric denominations located in oval fields. The bottom line of the frame is the Latin text of FIVE DINARS.

The machine text SPECIMEN is printed in black over the upper line of the frame.

Printing: 40,000,000 pieces, 200,000,000 dinars


PAST TIMES

Jedina razlika aversa, u odnosu na prethodni apoen, su pravougaonici u koje su smještene numeričke oznake apoena.

Na reversu je polje žita u okviru. U uglovima okvira nalaze se numeričke oznake apoena smještene u okrugla polja.

Tiraž: 55.000.000 komada, 550.000.000 dinara.Gospodin Željko Stojanović u monografiji Novčanice

narodne banke 1884-2004. navodi da je u saradnji sa Međunarodnim udruženjem za istraživanje banknota 1997. ustanovio postojanje najmanje jednog sačuvanog apoena od 10 dinara i navodi njegov serijski broj.

Apoen 25 dinara, 125x55 mm, svijetlo plave boje. Istih tehničkih karakteristika i dizajna kao prethodni dva apoena.

Osim u vrijednosti apoena aversa, u odnosu na prethodni,različiti su pravougaonici u koje su smje-štene numeričke oznake apoena.

Na reversu crtež spomenika Neznanom junaku na Avali. Pravougaonici u koje su smještene numeričke oznake apoena isti su kao na aversu.

Tiraž: 40.000.000 komada, 1.000.000.000 dinara

Apoen 100 dinara, 155x65 mm, svijetlo zelena, lik monarha, duboka štampa na papiru bez zaštitne niti i vodenog žiga. Autori i graveri nijesu poznati.

Na aversu, centralno je portret monarha u ovalnom okviru, i civilnom odijelu. Uokviren tradicionalnom narodnom šarom i stilizovanom gravurom. U uglo-vima okvira su numeričke oznake apoena smještene

u umetnuta pravougaona polja. Od vrha prema dnu je ćirilični tekst NARODNA BANKA/KRALJEVINE JUGOSLAVIJE. Bez serijskih brojeva. Slijede, lijevo od portreta numerička oznaka apoene na stilizovanoj ovalnoj gravuri, ispod koje je tekst ZA NADZORNU VLAST/MINISTAR FINANSIJA i latinični potpis ministra finansija Dr Juraj Šutej. Desno od portreta, ispod serij-skog broja je grb Kraljevine Jugoslavije na stilizovanoj ovalnoj gravuri, ispod kojeg slijedi natpis GUVERNER/NARODNE BANKE i ćirilicom potpis Dobrivoje Lazarević. Na donjoj liniji okvira, ispod portreta je tekst PLAĆA DONOSIOCU/100 DINARA. Mašinski tekst SPECIMEN otisnut je dva puta crvenom bojom, ukoso, preko brojčane oznake apoena u polju i grba.

Iznad donje ivice okvira, novčanica je poništena sa dvije simetrične rupe prečnika 4,5 mm. U desnom uglu stoji SERIJA 1943.

Na reversu je crtež velike strugare, iza koje su šuma, rijeka i most, uokviren bogatom tradicionalnom šarom i stilizovanom grafikom. U donjim uglovima okvira nalaze se numeričke oznake apoena smještene u sti-lizovana pravougaona polja. Ispod gornje linije rama, centralno je latinični natpis KRALJEVINA JUGOSLAVIJA. Na donjoj liniji okvira je latinični tekst STO DINARA.

Tiraž: 36.000.000 komada, 3.600.000.000

londonski dinari danasAutori svih numizmatičkih kataloga i istorija (novčanica) Narodne banke Jugoslavije slažu se u jednom. Ovo je izuzetno rijetka serija novčanica i koliko je njima poznato od uništenja je sačuvano 20 kompletnih serija specimena, koje su prilikom završetka štampanja, podijeljene kraljevskoj po-rodici i članovima vlade u izbjeglištvu.

Muzej novca Centralne banke Crne Gore je imao čast i privilegiju da prilikom otvaranja 2012., od Narodne banke Srbije,pored ostalih eksponata, na poklon dobije jednu seriju ovih neizdatih novča-nica. Ovu priliku koristimo da im se zahvalimo na ovom izuzetno kolegijalnom gestu.

Kataloška vrijednost specimena ovih novčanica je oko 900 € po komadu, a redovnih serija je ljubiteljska, mada smo naveli da je ustanovljeno postojanje samo jednog apoena od 10 dinara.


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Denomination of 10 dinars, 120x55 mm, light red. The same technical characteristics and design as the previous denomination.

The only difference of the obverse compared to the previous denomination, is rectangles in which the numeric denominations are located.

On the reverse is the field of grain in the frame. In the corners of the frame are numeric markings of denominations located in rounded fields.

Printing: 55,000,000 pieces, 550,000,000 dinars.Mr. Željko Stojanović stated in his monograph

Banknotes of the National Bank, that he established in co-operation with the International Banking Association in 1997 that there was at least one preserved denomination of 10 dinars and states its serial number.

Denomination of 25 dinars, 125x55 mm, light blue. It contains the same technical features and designs as the previous two denominations.

In addition to the value of the obverse, this banknote differs in relation to the previous one, in rectangles where numerical denominations are located.

The reverse shows drawing of a monument to the Unknown Hero on Avala. The rectangles where the numbers of denominations are located are the same as those of the obverse.

Printing: 40,000,000 pieces, 1,000,000,000 dinars

Denomination of 100 dinars, 155x65 mm, light green, contains an image monarch, deep print on paper without a protective band and watermark. Authors and engravers are unknown.

london dinars nowadaysThe authors of all numismatic catalogues and history (banknotes) of the National Bank of Yugoslavia agree in one. This is an extremely rare series of banknotes, and as far as they know 20 complete sets of specimens have been preserved from the destruction, which were distributed to the royal family and members of the refugee govern-ment after their printing.The Central Bank of Montenegro Money Museum has had the honour and privilege to receive from the National Bank of Serbia at the opening in 2012, besides other ex-hibits, a gift from a series of these unissued banknotes. We use this opportunity to thank them for this extremely collegial gesture.The catalogue value of these banknotes is about 900 euros per piece, although we stated that there was only one denomination of 10 dinars.

The obverse shows the central portrait of a monarch in an oval frame, and in a civilian suit. It is framed with traditional folk design and stylized engraving. Numbers of the denomination are placed in the inserted rectangular fields. From the top to the bottom is the Cyrillic text NATIONAL BANK / KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA. Without serial numbers. To the left of the portrait is the number of denomination on a stylized oval engraving under which is the text FOR THE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY / MINISTER OF FINANCE and the Latin signature of the Minister of Finance Dr. Juraj Šutej. To the right of the portrait, below the serial number is the coat of arms of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on a stylized oval engraving, followed by the inscription "GOVERNOR / NATIONAL BANK" and the Cyrillic signature of Dobrivoje Lazarević. At the bottom line of the frame, below the portrait is the text PAID BY DELIVERER / 100 DINARS. The machine text SPECIMEN is printed twice in red with a number of denomination in the field and the coat of arms.

Above the lower edges of the frame, the banknote is can-celled with two symmetrical diameter holes of 4.5 mm. In the right corner stands SERIES 1943.

The reverse shows a large sawmill drawing, behind which are forests, rivers and the bridge, framed by a rich traditional


PAST TIMES

Apoen 500 dinara, 165x65 mm, braon boje. Istih je tehničkih karakteristika i dizajna kao prethodni apoen.Tekst SERIJA 1943. nalazi se u gornjem desnom uglu.

Na reversu je crtež velike fabrika sa visokim dim-njacima, a u pozadini je šuma i visoke planine pod snijegom. Ostalo je isto kao kod prethodnog apoena, osim numeričke vrijednosti.

Tiraž: 2.000.000 komada, 1.000.000.000 dinara

Apoen 1000 dinara, 175x65 mm, zelena, tamno plava i žuta. lik monarha, Istih tehničkih karakteristika i dizajna kao dva prethodna apoena.

Na reversu je Boka Kotorska, crtež, panorama. Tekst KRALJEVINA JUGOSLAVIJA smješten je u gornju li-niju okvira. Široj javnosti gotovo nepoznat primjer

korišćenja crnogorskog motiva na novcu Jugoslavije.Tiraž: 4.000.000 komada, 4.000.000.000 dinara.

sudbina londonskih dinaraPromjenom političke situacije u svijetu došlo je i do preraspodjele finansijske moći. Otkazana je vojna podrška saveznika četnicima Draže Mihailovića, do-jučerašnjim zvaničnim vojnim snagama u zemlji jugo-slovenske vlade u izbjeglištvu. Prihvatanjem partizana, predvođenih Komunističkom partijom Jugoslavije, kao novog ravnopravnog, državotvornog faktora, stvoreni su preduslovi za stvaranje nove Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije, definisane u Jajcu 29. novembra 1943. na Drugom zasjedanju Antifašističkog vijeća narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije. Dok su u Engleskoj štampani novi dinari u Topčideru su nove vlasti nastavile da štampaju novčanice Srpske narodne banke. U skladu sa Zakonom o povlačenju i zameni okupacijskih novčanica, od 5. aprila 1945. Ministarstvo finansija je na osnovu Rešenja o novčanicama Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije, od 13. aprila 1945., sarađujući sa svojim sovjetskim ideološkim partnerima, u Moskvi štampalo novi „partizanski“, jugoslovenski dinar, koji je likovno odgovarao novonastalom, komunističkom društvenom uređenju. Nakon toga počela je zamjena neprijateljskog novca na području cijele DFJ.

Velike sile, saveznici u Drugom svjetskom ratu, nijesu dozvolile da dinari pripremani u Londonu od 1941. i štampani 1944., budu pušteni u promet kao zakonsko sredstvo plaćanja. Oni su trebali zamijeniti okupacijski novac na području Jugoslavije ali su natpis Narodna banka Kraljevine Jugoslavije i portret monarha bili u suprotnosti sa novim ustavnim uređenjem.

Narodna banka u emigraciji prestala je sa radom Ukazom kraljevskih namjesnika od 27. novembra 1945., a njena uprava je razriješena dužnosti. Isti delegat Ministarstva finansija DFJ, koji je nadgledao razrešenje dužnosti uprave Banke, nadgledao je uništenje kompletne emisije novih dinara. Oni su samljeveni od 5. oktobra 1945. do 11. marta 1946. i ovom prilikom pomoć predstavnika Banke engleske bila je dragocjena, kada se uzme u obzir obim posla i njegova efikasnost.

Klišea za 5, 10 i 25 dinara firma Thomas De La Rue&Co., Ltd predala je Narodnoj banci, dok je firma Bradbury, Wilkinson&Co., Ltd., u skladu sa ugovorom, kod sebe zadržala kliše apoena od 100, 500 i 1000 dinara.

„Velike sile, saveznici u Drugom svjetskom ratu nijesu dozvolile da dinari pripremani u Londonu od 1941. i štampani 1944., budu pušteni u promet kao zakonsko sredstvo plaćanja. Oni su trebali zamijeniti okupacijski novac na području Jugoslavije ali su natpis Narodna banka Kraljevine Jugoslavije i portret monarha bili u suprotnosti sa novim ustavnim uređenjem.


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design and stylized graphics. In the lower corners of the frame there are numbers denominations located in stylized rectangular fields. Below the upper line, the central Latin inscription is YUGOSLAVIA'S KINGDOM. The bottom line of the frame is the Latin text ONE HUNDERD DINARS.

Printing: 36,000,000 pieces, 3,600,000,000

Denomination of 500 dinars, 165x65 mm, brown colour. It has the same technical features and designs as the previous denomination. The text SERIES 1943 is located in the upper right corner.

The reverse shows a big factory drawing with high chimneys, and in the background is the forest and high mountain under the snow. The rest is the same as the previous denomination, except the numerical value.

Printing: 2,000,000 pieces, 1,000,000,000 dinars

Denomination of 1000 dinars, 175x65 mm, green, dark blue and yellow. The image of a monarch, with the same technical characteristics and design as the two previous denominations.

The reverse shows Boka Kotorska, a drawing, a panorama. The text of THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA is located in the upper frame line. A widespread public is an almost unknown example of using the Montenegrin motif on Yugoslavia's money.

Printing: 4.000.000 pieces, 4.000.000.000 dinars.

destiny of london dinarsThe change in political situation in the world also re-sulted in the redistribution of financial power. Military support of allies was cancelled to Chetniks of Draža Mihailović, former official military forces in Yugoslavia's refugee country. By accepting the partisans, led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as a new, equal, government factor, the preconditions for creating a new Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, defined in Jajce on 29 November 1943, were created in the Second Session of the Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia. While the new dinars were

“Great powers, allies in the World War II, did not allow the dinar prepared in London in 1941 and printed in 1944, to be put into circulation as a legal tender. They were supposed to replace the occupation money in Yugoslavia but the inscription of the National Bank of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the portrait of the monarch were in contravention of the new constitutional arrangement”.

printed in England, new authorities continued in Topčider to print banknotes from the Serbian National Bank. Pursuant to the Law on the Withdrawal and Replacement of Occupational Banknotes of 5 April 1945, the Ministry of Finance, based on the Decision on Banknotes of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia of 13 April 1945 issued a new "Partisan" Yugoslav money in cooperation with its Soviet ideological partners in Moscow. This dinar corresponded to the new communist social organi-sation. After that, it began to replace the hostile money in the throughout Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFY).

Great powers, allies in the World War II, did not allow the dinar prepared in London in 1941 and printed in 1944, to be put into circulation as a legal tender. They were supposed to replace the occupation money in Yugoslavia but the inscrip-tion of the National Bank of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the portrait of the monarch were in contravention of the new constitutional arrangement.

The National Bank in emigration ceased working by the adoption of the Decree of Royal Trustees on 27 November 1945, and its administration was relieved of office. The same delegate of the DFY Finance Ministry, which oversaw the relieving of office of the Bank's management, also oversaw the destruction of the complete new dinar issue. They were destroyed in period from 5 October 1945 to 11 March 1946, and on this occasion, the assistance of the Bank of England's representatives was valu-able when the scope of work and its efficiency is considered.

Cliché for the 5, 10 and 25 dinars of Thomas De La Rue & Co., Ltd was handed over to National Bank, while Bradbury, Wilkinson & Co., Ltd., in accordance with the contract, re-tained 100, 500 and 1000 dinars.


PAST TIMES

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