legaspi v csc

7/29/2019 Legaspi v Csc

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EN BANC[G.R. No. 72119. May 29, 1987.]

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION, respondent.

D E C I S I O NCORTES, J p:

The fundamental right of the people to information onmatters of public concern is invoked in this special civilaction for Mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L.

Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. Therespondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request forinformation on the civil service eligibilities of certainpersons employed as sanitarians in the Health Departmentof Cebu City. These government employees, JulianSibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly representedthemselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civilservice examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities ofJulian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas is guaranteed by theConstitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy andadequate remedy to acquire the information, petitionerprays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ ofMandamus to compel the respondent Commission to

disclose said information.

This is not the first time that the writ of Mandamus issought to enforce the fundamental right to information.

The same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanadaet. al. vs. Tuvera et. al., (G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985,136 SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informedunder the 1973 Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was

invoked in order to compel the publication in the OfficialGazette of various presidential decrees, letters ofinstructions and other presidential issuances. Prior to therecognition of the right in said Constitution, the statutoryright to information provided for in the Land RegistrationAct (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by anewspaper editor in another Mandamus proceeding, thistime to demand access to the records of the Register of


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Deeds for the purpose of gathering data on real estatetransactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil.383 [1948]).

The constitutional right to information on matters of publicconcern first gained recognition in the Bill of Rights, ArticleIV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:

Sec. 6. The right of the people toinformation on matters of public concern shallbe recognized. Access to official records, andto documents and papers pertaining to

official acts, transactions, or decisions, shallbe afforded the citizen subject to suchlimitations as may be provided by law.

The foregoing provision has been retained and the righttherein provided amplified in Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as togovernment research data used as basis for policy

development." The new provision reads:

The right of the people to information onmatters of public concern shall be recognized.Access to official records, and to documents,and papers pertaining to official acts,transactions, or decisions, as well as togovernment research data used as basis forpolicy development, shall be afforded thecitizen, subject to such limitations as may beprovided by law.

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. Theysupply the rules by means of which the right toinformation may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the

Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing theright and mandating the duty to afford access to sourcesof information. Hence, the fundamental right thereinrecognized may be asserted by the people upon theratification of the constitution without need for anyancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What maybe provided for by the Legislature are reason ableconditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded


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which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declaredState policy of full public disclosure of all transactionsinvolving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28).However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever

limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the rightand the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operativeand enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the NewCharter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in aMandamus proceeding such as this one.

The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections toOur giving due course to this Petition. He challenges the

petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latterdoes not possess any clear legal right to be informed ofthe civil service eligibilities of the government employeesconcerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of thepetitioner to show his actual interest in securing thisparticular information. He further argues that there is noministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnishthe petitioner with the information he seeks.

1. To be given due course, a Petition for Mandamusmust have been instituted by a party aggrievedby the alleged inaction of any tribunal,corporation, board or person which unlawfullyexcludes said party from the enjoyment of alegal right. (Anti-Chinese League of thePhilippines vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). Thepetitioner in every case must therefore be an"aggrieved party" in the sense that he possessesa clear legal right to be enforced and a directinterest in the duty or act to be performed.

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issueon the personality of the petitioner to bring this

suit. It is asserted that, the instant Petition isbereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actualinterest in the civil service eligibilities of JulianSibonghanoy and Mariano Agas. At most there isa vague reference to an unnamed client inwhose behalf he had allegedly acted when hemade inquiries on the subject (Petition, Rollo, p.3).


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But what is clear upon the face of the Petition isthat the petitioner has firmly anchored his caseupon the right of the people to information on

matters of public concern, which, by its verynature, is a public right. It has been held that:

. . . when the question is one of publicright and the object of the mandamusis to procure the enforcement of apublic duty, the people are regarded asthe real party in interest and the

relator at whose instigation theproceedings are instituted need notshow that he has any legal or specialinterest in the result, it being sufficientto show that he is a citizen and as suchinterested in the execution of thelaws . . . (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et.al., G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985,

136 SCRA 27, 36).

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent thatwhen a Mandamus proceeding involves theassertion of a public right, the requirement ofpersonal interest is satisfied by the mere factthat the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore,part of the general "public" which possesses theright.

The Court had opportunity to define the word"public" in the Subido case, supra, when it heldthat even those who have no direct or tangibleinterest in any real estate transaction are part ofthe "public" to whom "(a)ll records relating to

registered lands in the Office of the Register ofDeeds shall be open . . ." (Sec. 56, Act No. 496,as amended). In the words of the Court:

. . . "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, itembraces every person. To say thatonly those who have a present and


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existing interest of a pecuniarycharacter in the particular informationsought are given the right of inspectionis to make an unwarranted

distinction. . . . (Subido vs. Ozaeta,supra at p. 387).The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such isclothed with personality to seek redress for thealleged obstruction of the exercise of the publicright. We find no cogent reason to deny hisstanding to bring the present suit.

2. For every right of the people recognized asfundamental, there lies a corresponding duty onthe part of those who govern, to respect andprotect that right. That is the very essence of theBill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Onlygovernments operating under fundamental rulesdefining the limits of their power so as to shieldindividual rights against its arbitrary exercise can

properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley,supra. at p. 5). Without a government'sacceptance of the limitations imposed upon it bythe Constitution in order to uphold individualliberties, without an acknowledgment on its partof those duties exacted by the rights pertainingto the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes asophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.

In recognizing the people's right to be informed,both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charterexpressly mandate the duty of the State and itsagents to afford access to official records,documents, papers and in addition, governmentresearch data used as basis for policy

development, subject to such limitations as maybe provided by law. The guarantee has beenfurther enhanced in the New Constitution withthe adoption of a policy of full public disclosure,this time "subject to reasonable conditionsprescribed by law," in Article II, Section 28thereof, to wit:


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Subject to reasonable conditionsprescribed by law, the State adoptsand implements a policy of full publicdisclosure of all its transactions

involving public interest. (Art. II, Sec.28).

In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutionalguarantee was bolstered by what this Courtdeclared as an imperative duty of thegovernment officials concerned to publish allimportant legislative acts and resolutions of a

public nature as well as all executive orders andproclamations of general applicability. Wegranted Mandamus in said case, and in theprocess, We found occasion to expound brieflyon the nature of said duty:

. . . That duty must be enforced if theConstitutional right of the people to be

informed on matters of public concernis to be given substance and reality.

The law itself makes a list of whatshould be published in the OfficialGazette. Such listing, to our mind,leaves respondents with no discretionwhatsoever as to what must beincluded or excluded from suchpublication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra,at 39), (Emphasis supplied).

The absence of discretion on the part ofgovernment agencies in allowing theexamination of public records, specifically, therecords in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is

emphasized in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra:

Except, perhaps when it is clear thatthe purpose of the examination isunlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we donot believe it is the duty under the lawof registration officers to concernthemselves with the motives, reasons,


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and objects of the person seekingaccess to the records. It is not theirprerogative to see that the informationwhich the records contain is not

flaunted before public gaze, or thatscandal is not made of it. If it be wrongto publish the contents of the records,it is the legislature and not the officialshaving custody thereof which is calledupon to devise a remedy. . . . (Subidov. Ozaeta, supra at 388). (Emphasissupplied).

It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements ofthis Court that government agencies are withoutdiscretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to,information of public concern. This is not to losesight of the reasonable regulations which may beimposed by said agencies in custody of publicrecords on the manner in which the right to

information may be exercised by the public. Inthe Subido case, We recognized the authority ofthe Register of Deeds to regulate the manner inwhich persons desiring to do so, may inspect,examine or copy records relating to registeredlands. However, the regulations which theRegister of Deeds may promulgate are confinedto:

. . . prescribing the manner and hoursof examination to the end that damageto or loss of, the records may beavoided, that undue interference withthe duties of the custodian of thebooks and documents and other

employees may be prevented, that theright of other persons entitled to makeinspection may be insured . . . (Subidovs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387).

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, Werecognized a similar authority in a municipal

judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by


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the public of criminal docket records in the caseof Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Saidadministrative case was filed against the

respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allowexamination of the criminal docket records in hissala. Upon a finding by the Investigating Judgethat the respondent had allowed thecomplainant to open and view the subjectrecords, We absolved the respondent. In effect,We have also held that the rules and conditionsimposed by him upon the manner of examining

the public records were reasonable.

In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, Wewere emphatic in Our statement that theauthority to regulate the manner of examiningpublic records does not carry with it the power toprohibit. A distinction has to be made betweenthe discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of

or access to a particular information and theauthority to regulate the manner in which theaccess is to be afforded. The first is a limitationupon the availability of access to the informationsought, which only the Legislature may impose(Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The secondpertains to the government agency charged withthe custody of public records. Its authority toregulate access is to be exercised solely to theend that damage to, or loss of, public recordsmay be avoided, undue interference with theduties of said agencies may be prevented, andmore importantly, that the exercise of the sameconstitutional right by other persons shall beassured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra).

Thus, while the manner of examining publicrecords may be subject to reasonable regulationby the government agency in custody thereof,the duty to disclose the information of publicconcern, and to afford access to public recordscannot be discretionary on the part of saidagencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be


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made contingent upon the discretion of suchagencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of theconstitutional right may be rendered nugatory byany whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The

constitutional duty, not being discretionary, itsperformance may be compelled by a writ ofMandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus toissue? In the case before Us, the public right tobe enforced and the concomitant duty of theState are unequivocably set forth in the

Constitution. The decisive question on thepropriety of the issuance of the writ ofMandamus in this case is, whether theinformation sought by the petitioner is within theambit of the constitutional guarantee.

3. The incorporation in the Constitution of aguarantee of access to information of public

concern is a recognition of the essentiality of thefree flow of ideas and information in ademocracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. MatterNo. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In thesame way that free discussion enables membersof society to cope with the exigencies of theirtime (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102[1939]), access to information of general interestaids the people in democratic decision-making(87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974] by givingthem a better perspective of the vital issuesconfronting the nation.

But the constitutional guarantee to informationon matters of public concern is not absolute. It

does not open every door to any and allinformation. Under the Constitution, access toofficial records, papers, etc., are "subject tolimitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III,Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may thereforeexempt certain types of information from publicscrutiny, such as those affecting nationalsecurity (Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p.


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10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p.32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It followsthat, in every case, the availability of access to aparticular public record must be circumscribed

by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a)being of public concern or one that involvespublic interest, and, (b) not being exempted bylaw from the operation of the constitutionalguarantee. The threshold question is, therefore,whether or not the information sought is ofpublic interest or public concern.

a. This question is first addressed to thegovernment agency having custody of thedesired information. However, as alreadydiscussed, this does not give the agencyconcerned any discretion to grant or denyaccess. In case of denial of access, thegovernment agency has the burden ofshowing that the information requested is not

of public concern, or, if it is of public concern,that the same has been exempted by lawfrom the operation of the guarantee. To holdotherwise will serve to dilute theconstitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . .the government is in an advantageousposition to marshall and interpret argumentsagainst release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutionalright, every denial of access by thegovernment agency concerned is subject toreview by the courts, and in the proper case,access may be compelled by a writ ofMandamus.

In determining whether or not a particularinformation is of public concern there is norigid test which can be applied. "Publicconcern" like "public interest" is a term thateludes exact definition. Both terms embracea broad spectrum of subjects which the publicmay want to know, either because thesedirectly affect their lives, or simply because


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such matters naturally arouse the interest ofan ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it isfor the courts to determine in a case by casebasis whether the matter at issue is of

interest or importance, as it relates to oraffects the public.

The public concern invoked in the case ofTaada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need foradequate notice to the public of the variouslaws which are to regulate the actions andconduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta,

supra, the public concern deemed covered bythe statutory right was the knowledge ofthose real estate transactions which somebelieved to have been registered in violationof the Constitution.

The information sought by the petitioner inthis case is the truth of the claim of certain

government employees that they are civilservice eligibles for the positions to whichthey were appointed. The Constitutionexpressly declares as a State policy that:

Appointments in the civil serviceshall be made only according tomerit and fitness to be determined,as far as practicable, and except asto positions which are policydetermining, primarily confidentialor highly technical, by competitiveexamination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2. [2]).

Public office being a public trust, [Const., Art.

XI, Sec: 1] it is the legitimate concern ofcitizens to ensure that government positionsrequiring civil service eligibility are occupiedonly by persons who are eligibles. Publicofficers are at all times accountable to thepeople even as to their eligibilities for theirrespective positions.


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b. But then, it is not enough that the informationsought is of public interest. For Mandamus tolie in a given case, the information must notbe among the species exempted by law from

the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirmor deny the claims of eligibility, therespondent has failed to cite any provision inthe Civil Service Law which would limit thepetitioner's right to know who are, and whoare not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial

notice of the fact that the names of thosewho pass the civil service examinations, as inbar examinations and licensure examinationsfor various professions, are released to thepublic. Hence, there is nothing secret aboutone's civil service eligibility, if actuallypossessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore,neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when,

as in this case, the government employeesconcerned claim to be civil service eligibles,the public, through any citizen, has a right toverify their professed eligibilities from theCivil Service Commission.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarianbeing of public concern, and in the absence ofexpress limitations under the law uponaccess to the register of civil service eligiblesfor said position, the duty of the respondentCommission to confirm or deny the civilservice eligibility of any person occupying theposition becomes imperative. Mandamus,therefore lies.

WHEREFORE:, the Civil Service Commission is ordered toopen its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian,and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of JulianSibonghanoy and Mariano Agas for said position in theHealth Department of Cebu City, as requested by thepetitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.


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Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin andSarmiento, JJ., concur.Feliciano, J., is on leave.

legaspi v csc

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