overextended cognition
TRANSCRIPT
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Overextended cognitionShannon Spaulding
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To cite this article: Shannon Spaulding (2011): Overextended cognition, Philosophical Psychology,DOI:10.1080/09515089.2011.579421
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Philosophical Psychology2011, 1–22, iFirst
Overextended cognition
Shannon Spaulding
Extended cognition is the view that some cognitive processes extend beyond the brain.One prominent strategy of arguing against extended cognition is to offer necessary
conditions on cognition and argue that the proposed extended processes fail to satisfythese conditions. I argue that this strategy is misguided and fails to refute extended
cognition. I suggest a better way to evaluate the case for extended cognition that shouldbe acceptable to all parties, captures the intuitiveness of previous objections, and avoids
the problems with the strategy of offering necessary conditions on cognition. I concludethat extended cognition theorists have failed to establish the truth of extended cognition.
Keywords: Cognition; Cognitive Psychology; Extended Cognition; Extended Mind; Folk
Psychology
1. Introduction
Extended cognition is the view that some cognitive processes extend beyond the
brain. Several theorists argue against extended cognition by offering necessary
conditions on cognition and arguing that extended processes do not satisfy these
necessary conditions. Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa (2001, 2008) are the most
prominent defenders of this kind of strategy. Adams and Aizawa claim that in order
to determine whether cognition extends, we need some conditions for distinguishing
cognitive and non-cognitive processes, i.e., a mark of the cognitive. They give two
necessary elements of the mark of the cognitive: cognitive processes involve original
content and have a distinctive form of processing. Adams and Aizawa argue that the
processes extended cognition theorists deem extended cognition fail to
meet these conditions and so fail to be genuinely cognitive processes. Other
defenders of this sort of strategy include Robert Rupert (2004, 2009) and Daniel
Weiskopf (2008).Despite the prevalence of this strategy, I argue that it is misguided. Offering
necessary conditions on cognition often begs the question against extended
cognition, gets the wrong results, and fails to refute extended cognition. In section 2,
I review the case for extended cognition. In section 3, I evaluate and argue against the
Correspondence to: Shannon Spaulding. Email: [email protected]
Shannon Spaulding is a PhD candidate at University of Wisconsin – Madison.
ISSN 0951-5089 (print)/ISSN 1465-394X (online)/11/000001-22 � 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2011.579421
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strategy of offering necessary conditions on cognition. In section 4, I suggest a better
way to argue against extended cognition. I argue that, thus far, extended cognition
theorists have failed to establish the truth of extended cognition.
2. The Case for Extended Cognition
‘‘Extended cognition’’ is the view that cognitive processes span the brain, body and
external world, and that cognitive states sometimes comprise parts of the external
world (Clark, 1997; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Haugeland, 1998; Hutchins, 1995;
Menary, 2007; Port & van Gelder, 1995; Rowlands, 1999). There are a variety of
arguments for extended cognition. In this paper I shall discuss one prominent
argument offered by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998).1 This argument is
based on Clark and Chalmers’ (C&C) parity principle, which says:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, wereit done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of thecognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitiveprocess. (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8)
For clarity, let’s distinguish intra-cranial processes—processes that occur solely in
the brain, from trans-cranial processes—processes that span the brain, body and the
external world.2 C&C’s parity principle claims that if we come across a trans-cranial
process that, were it an intra-cranial process, we would count it as cognitive, then we
should count that trans-cranial process as cognitive. The skull and skin, they argue,
are arbitrary boundaries for cognition. The argument based on the parity principle is
that there are trans-cranial processes that we would count as cognitive if only they
occurred within the skull. Thus, there are cognitive processes that extend beyond the
brain (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 11).
C&C argue that some cognitive processes are trans-cranial processes, and some
cognitive states comprise parts of the external world. In defense of this claim, C&C
offer the memorable case of Inga and Otto the Alzheimer’s patient (1998, pp. 11–14).
Inga hears about an exhibit at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) and decides to
go see it. She thinks about where MoMA is, remembers that it is on 53rd Street, and
goes to the museum. Inga believes that MoMA is on 53rd Street, a belief she had non-
occurrently before she consulted her memory.
Contrast Inga with Otto. Otto has Alzheimer’s disease and so must rely on
information in the environment to structure his life. Otto has a notebook that he
carries around with him everywhere. Whenever he learns new, relevant information
he writes it down in the notebook, and when he needs old information he consults
the notebook. Otto, too, hears about the exhibit at MoMA and decides to go see it.
He opens his notebook, sees that the museum is on 53rd Street, and goes to the
museum.
Otto walks to 53rd Street because he desires to go to MoMA and because he
occurrently believes that MoMA is on 53rd Street, just like Inga. C&C argue that just
as Inga had a non-occurrent belief about the location of MoMA before she consulted
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her memory, Otto had a non-occurrent belief about the location of MoMA before he
consulted his notebook:
For in relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays forOtto the same role that memory plays for Inga. The information in the notebookfunctions just like the information constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief; itjust so happens that this information lies beyond the skin. (Clark & Chalmers,1998, p. 7)
But the location of the information is irrelevant:
The moral is that when it comes to belief, there is nothing sacred about the skulland skin. What makes some information count as a belief is the role it plays, andthere is no reason why the relevant role can be played only from inside the body.(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 14)
Thus, the trans-cranial process comprising Otto’s brain, body and notebook is a
cognitive process. And since Otto’s belief is constituted in part by the external
environment, Otto’s cognitive states extend into the world.3
C&C challenge the opponent of extended cognition to come up with a principled,
non-question-begging reason to count only intra-cranial processes as cognitive. Their
bet is that there is no such principled, non-question-begging reason and that there is
good reason, based on the parity principle, to count as cognitive some trans-cranial
processes.
3. Necessary Conditions on Cognition
There is much to say about this and the other arguments for extended cognition, but
the focus here will be on a certain kind of argument against extended cognition,
namely, arguments that offer necessary conditions on cognition. Extended cognition
opponents offer necessary conditions on mental states and processes, and they argue
that trans-cranial processes do not satisfy these conditions; therefore trans-cranial
processes are not cognitive. Adams and Aizawa (A&A) offer the most prominent such
argument. I shall examine A&A’s argument first and then consider other similar
arguments.
3.1. Adams and Aizawa: The Cognitive Processes Condition
A&A take up C&C’s challenge to come up with a principled, non-question-begging
reason to regard only intra-cranial processes as cognitive. A&A argue that if we want
to know whether an object or process constitutes an agent’s cognitive apparatus or
processing, we need to first figure out how to distinguish the cognitive from the non-
cognitive. Analogously, if we want to know whether an entity is a person and is
thereby worthy of moral rights, we need to know what distinguishes a person from a
non-person, i.e., the mark of personhood. If we want to know whether a fetus is a
person, we need to first have a mark of personhood and then see if a fetus satisfies
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that mark. And so with extended cognition: in order to determine whether trans-
cranial processes are cognitive processes, we need to know the mark of the cognitive.A&A offer two necessary conditions of the mark of the cognitive and argue that as
a matter of contingent, empirical fact, trans-cranial processes do not satisfy theseconditions. Cognitive processes (1) involve original content and (2) have a distinctive
form of processing. A&A note that these elements are probably not the only elementsthat mark the cognitive, but, they argue, they are surely two necessary conditions of
being cognitive, and they provide principled, non-question-begging reason to locatecognition solely in the brain. My focus shall be on the cognitive processes condition.4
The cognitive processes condition states that cognitive phenomena differ from non-
cognitive phenomena in virtue of the nature of their underlying processes (Adams &Aizawa, 2001, pp. 58–61; 2008, p. 57). The processes underlying cognition are
distinctive and, the idea is, we can determine whether cognition extends byexamining trans-cranial processes to see if they have this distinctive character.
So, what is this distinctive character? A&A discuss examples in which cognitivepsychologists individuate cognitive processes by reference to underlying laws or
mechanisms (2008, pp. 63–70). With regard to memory, for example, there is the lawof effect, the primacy effect, the recency effect, the relationship between practice and thestrength of a memory trace, the generation effect, the spacing effect, etc. (Adams &
Aizawa, 2008, pp. 63–68). The primacy effect, for example, describes the tendencywhen presented with a list of items to recall the items presented first more easily than
items subsequently presented. A&A spend a fair amount of time describing the detailsof these laws and mechanisms of memory processing, but we need not delve into
those details. The important point for our purpose is that these laws and mechanismscharacterize normal human intra-cranial memory. These laws and mechanisms
constitute the distinctive character of memory.By pointing out the differences between the processes going on in Otto and in
Inga, A&A aim to establish that the relation between Otto and his notebook is non-cognitive because it lacks the distinctive character of normal human cognitiveprocessing. This is meant to be a principled, non-question-begging reason not to
count Otto’s trans-cranial processes as cognitive. But how exactly are we meant tounderstand this appeal to the laws and mechanisms of cognitive psychology? A&A do
not give us much guidance in how exactly to apply the cognitive processes condition.Based on the kinds of differences between Inga and Otto that A&A point to, there are
two plausible interpretations of the cognitive processes condition. I shall argue thatboth versions are misguided.
A&A do not intend to claim that for a process to be cognitive it must be subject toall of the laws and mechanisms of normal human cognition (2008, pp. 57 & 70–74).One charitable interpretation of the cognitive processes condition is that for a
phenomenon to count as cognitive the processes underlying it must be looselygoverned by at least some of the laws and mechanisms typical of normal human
cognitive processes. For a phenomenon to be human memory, for example, theunderlying processes must exhibit at least some of the following: the primacy effect,
the generation effect, the spacing effect, the recency effect, etc.
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First, absent any further guidelines, the cognitive processes condition is
uninformative. How many of the standard laws and mechanisms must govern theunderlying processes? It seems that putting a number on this would be arbitrary.
Second, and more problematically, this condition is unacceptable to the extendedcognition theorist. It is true, of course, that normal human cognitive processes are
subject to the laws and mechanisms of cognitive psychology. And as a matter ofcontingent, empirical fact, trans-cranial processes (as described by proponents of
extended cognition) typically are not subject to these laws and mechanisms. Extendedcognition theorists would happily accept these claims. What they would deny is thatthese claims imply that trans-cranial processes are non-cognitive. To see why,
consider the dialectic. Extended cognition theorists argue for an expansion ofcognitive psychology. Cognitive psychology has been relatively successful studying
intra-cranial cognition, but extending the domain of cognitive psychology to includetrans-cranial processes would yield an even more fecund cognitive science (Clark,
1997, 2007; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Port & van Gelder, 1995; Rowlands, 1999).Extended cognition theorists typically argue that trans-cranial processes satisfy
sufficient conditions for being cognitive.In search of a principled reason to regard all trans-cranial processes as non-
cognitive, A&A attempt to determine the distinctive character of cognitive processes.
Looking to cognitive psychology, they find that laws and mechanisms are thedistinctive character of cognitive processes. Cognitive psychology reveals various laws
and mechanisms of memory, perception, etc. Thus, for a process to be cognitive itmust be subject to some of the laws and mechanisms currently studied by cognitive
psychology. A crucial claim in the foregoing argument is that the laws andmechanisms of current cognitive psychology are definitive of (in the sense of a
necessary condition) cognitive processes.Now, there are two ways to understand this claim.5 First, the laws and mechanisms
that govern intra-cranial cognitive processes are definitive of cognition. That is,whatever laws and mechanisms govern intra-cranial cognitive processes, those lawsand mechanisms are definitive of cognition. Second, certain laws and mechanisms are
definitive of cognition, and as it turns out these laws and mechanisms govern onlyintra-cranial processes. To argue the first way begs the question against extended
cognition, and is therefore unacceptable. Extended cognition theorists are looking toexpand beyond the laws and mechanisms of intra-cranial cognition, so defining
cognition this way is question begging. The second interpretation, though strictlyspeaking not question-begging, is still unacceptable to the extended cognition
proponent. The laws and mechanisms that A&A discuss are those studied bycognitive psychology. But why think the laws and mechanisms of current cognitivepsychology apply to cognition in general rather than just intra-cranial cognition?
Cognitive psychology has not studied trans-cranial processes, after all. The laws andmechanisms cognitive psychology has discovered have all been based on intra-cranial
cognition. Extended cognition theorists argue for the expansion of cognitivepsychology on the grounds that trans-cranial processes satisfy certain sufficient
conditions for being cognitive. To appeal to intra-cranial-focused cognitive
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psychology to adjudicate the debate biases the debate in favor of intra-cranial
cognition.To be clear, extended cognition theorists need not deny that laws and mechanisms
in general are distinctive of cognitive processes. Nor would they deny that theparticular laws and mechanisms of current cognitive psychology typify normal intra-
cranial cognition. Nor would they deny that trans-cranial processes are typically notsubject those laws and mechanisms. What they would deny is that the particular laws
and mechanisms of current cognitive psychology are definitive of cognition ingeneral, not just intra-cranial cognition.
My concern at this point is not how plausible the argument for extended cognition
is, but rather whether or not the cognitive processes condition can serve as anargument against extended cognition. The gist of the cognitive processes condition is
that cognitive processes have a distinctive character, and we can determine whetherproposed processes are cognitive by determining whether they have this distinctive
character. A&A cannot, however, insist that the distinctive character be the laws andmechanisms governing intra-cranial cognitive processes or (what amounts to
the same thing) the laws and mechanisms cognitive psychology has discovered.One way of putting the extended cognition argument is that there are other processesthat are not governed by the laws and mechanisms of intra-cranial cognition but
which we should nevertheless count as cognitive because they satisfy the parityprinciple. The laws and mechanisms of cognitive psychology may be distinctive of
intra-cranial cognitive processes, but they may not be distinctive of cognitiveprocesses in general.6
In other places, A&A can be read as suggesting a slightly different way tounderstand the cognitive processes condition (2008, pp. 131–141). On this
interpretation, what matters is functional equivalence. For a proposed phenomenonto count as cognitive, the trans-cranial process that underlies it must be functionally
equivalent to an intra-cranial cognitive process.The functional equivalence condition seems to be an improvement, for it seems to
abstract from the particular details of intra-cranial cognitive processes. In fact,
functional equivalence is one criterion that extended cognition theorists use to arguefor extended cognition (albeit as a sufficient condition for cognitive status, not a
necessary condition). Recall the argument based on the parity principle: there aretrans-cranial processes that we would count as cognitive if only they occurred within
the skull, and so we should count those trans-cranial processes as cognitive. Theunderlying processes that lead Otto and Inga to walk to 53rd Street are certainly
different, but, it is argued, these differences are superficial. In all the importantrespects, the trans-cranial process underlying the relation between Otto and hisnotebook and the intra-cranial process in Inga are the same. For Otto, the notebook
entries play just the sort of role that dispositional beliefs play in guiding Inga’s life(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, pp. 14–17). The functional equivalence of intra-cranial and
trans-cranial processes could be said to form general categories of cognition. Forexample, though Otto and Inga differ in many ways, each of the processes that lead
up to their walking to 53rd Street fall under the category of general memory.
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If functional equivalence is what matters, then the question is whether any trans-
cranial processes and intra-cranial processes are functionally equivalent. A&A argue
that the kind of functional equivalence that we should care about is a cognitive
equivalence. There is a difference between saying the relation between Otto and his
notebook is functionally equivalent, in some sense, to Inga’s memory, and saying that
the relation between Otto and his notebook is cognitively equivalent to Inga’s
memory. A&A claim: ‘‘not just any functional equivalence is cognitive equivalence;
what we should care about in extended cognition is cognitive equivalence’’
(2008, p. 135).A&A go on to argue that trans-cranial processes are not cognitively equivalent to
intra-cranial processes. Taking the Inga-Otto example as a target, they draw attention
to the many psychological differences between Inga and Otto (2008, p. 136). They
claim that Otto’s performance in certain memory tests will differ from Inga’s: Inga’s
performance will display primacy and recency effects, whereas Otto’s will not (2008,
p. 137). Inga’s performance in memory tasks will improve with practice, whereas
practice will have no effect on Otto’s performance in memory tasks (2008, p. 138).
Inga’s performance in memory tasks will be enhanced by the depth of processing
required in the tasks, whereas Otto’s performance will be nearly perfect regardless of
the depth of processing required (2008, pp. 138–139). The same holds for spacing
effects and generation effects (2008, 10, 1.4, p. 139).From these numerous psychological differences, A&A argue that the kinds of
processes spanning Otto’s brain, body and notebook are not cognitively equivalent to
the processes going on in Inga. They claim:
If Inga and Otto differ in ways that cognitive psychologists have taken to beimportant, that provides principled reasons to think that there is somethinginteresting and answers at least very roughly to what has normally been taken to becognitive processing that is going on in Inga’s brain, which is not very much likewhat is going on with Otto and his notebook. The existence of what we might callnormal human cognition in Inga, but not in Otto, is enough to vindicate orthodoxcognitive psychology and adequately reply to charges of mere (Cartesian) prejudice.(Adams & Aizawa, 2008, pp. 140–141)
The above quote clearly illustrates that the dialectic is now back to where it started.
If cognitive equivalence means being subject to the same laws and mechanisms, then
we have the following dilemma again: either A&A are begging the question, or the
criterion based on intra-cranial-focused cognitive psychology unfairly biases the
debate. The extended cognition theorist would, and should, agree that the laws and
mechanisms that govern intra-cranial processes do not govern trans-cranial
processes, but he would disagree that this means that trans-cranial processes are
non-cognitive.7
3.2. Other Arguments
I shall briefly sketch a couple of similar arguments against extended cognition and
explain why I think all of these arguments are misguided. Rupert (2004, 2009, 2010)
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offers several arguments against extended cognition. Given extended cognition
theorists’ claim to radically revise cognitive science, Rupert takes it as necessary that the
new extended cognition program accommodate a wide range of results already well
established in cognitive science. The taxonomy of extended cognition must provide a
coherent and fruitful framework within which to place all, or at least a healthy majority
of, significant results in cognitive science (Rupert, 2004, p. 23).Rupert discusses memory as an object lesson for other cognitive processes. He
appeals to the retrieval structure of memory, the difference between short term and
working memory, and negative transfer. For brevity, I will focus on Rupert’s
discussion of negative transfer, a memory interference effect studied by cognitive
psychology. Negative transfer occurs when previously learned information interferes
with a subject’s ability to learn new information. Negative transfer is a normal feature
of human memory, but there is no reason to expect it with external stores of
information, like Otto’s notebook (Rupert, 2004, p. 31). In addition, there is no
reason to expect that there would be a learning curve for memorizing information
like there is in the normal case.Rupert argues:
The above described differences between external and internal memory areneither trivial nor irrelevant from a cognitive standpoint. It is not a matter ofsaying, for example, that externally stored memories are typically a greater distancefrom my nose than are internally stored ones. The sort of difference to which Ihave drawn attention involves those characteristics—e.g., learning-time andaccess-time—that are at the very heart of cognitive scientists’ investigations ofmemory. (2004, p. 32)
Thus, extended cognition’s failure to accommodate a wide range of results on
memory constitutes a genuine strike against extended cognition.The force of Rupert’s argument depends on what one takes to be the goal of
extended cognition. If the goal of extended cognition is to repeal and replace
standard cognitive science, then it is a legitimate requirement that it accommodate
the successes of standard cognitive science. For even if one agreed with the claim that
extending cognition would yield a more fruitful science of the mind, if it failed to
accommodate the successes of standard cognitive science, then we would surely be
trading one step forward for two steps back. If, however, the goal of extended
cognition is more modest, e.g., to expand the domain of cognitive science, then it is
not clear that Rupert’s argument will work. Why would extended cognition need to
accommodate all of the successes of cognitive science if it is only interested in addinga branch of research, or perhaps a new host of explanatory tools, to the repertoire of
standard cognitive science? That is not a requirement on any particular branch or
explanatory tool of current cognitive science. Rupert’s requirement would be
unreasonable if proponents of extended cognition had this more modest goal in
mind. Clark, one of the most prominent extended cognition proponents, is best
interpreted as arguing for the more modest conclusion. His goal is not to repeal
and replace cognitive science with an alternative science of the mind. Instead he
argues that we should adopt a pluralistic cognitive science, one that relies on
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computational-representational models, connectionist nets, dynamic systems, etc.
(Clark, 1997, pp. 170–173, 2008, pp. 135–139). For versions of extended cognition
that aim to extend rather than replace cognitive science, Rupert’s requirement is
unreasonable. Thus his argument fails to refute extended cognition.8
Weiskopf (2008) argues that informational integration is a necessary feature of
certain mental states, beliefs in particular. Beliefs are sensitive to changes in a person’s
overall system of beliefs. For example, if I learn that two people are divorced, I will
believe that they no longer live in the same house. Or if I learn that Joe is in Kona
until Tuesday, I will no longer believe that on Monday I will meet him in Madison
for a run. When new information is learned, a host of related beliefs are
automatically, subconsciously updated to be consistent with the new information.
The entries in Otto’s notebook, however, do not meet this requirement.
New entries in the notebook do not effect changes in previous entries in the
notebook.
Like A&A, Weiskopf argues against extended cognition by arguing for a necessary
condition that trans-cranial processes (at least as described) do not meet. Unlike
A&A, Weiskopf does not hinge his necessary condition on the way in which beliefs
are normally informationally integrated. Although in the normal case, beliefs are
updated automatically and subconsciously via some algorithm, none of these features
are necessary to satisfy the informational integration condition. We can imagine a
radically different way of updating our system of beliefs in response to new
information. These beliefs will be implementationally different from standard beliefs,
but they fulfill the functional role—informational integration—of beliefs (Weiskopf,
2008, p. 272). Thus, Weiskopf avoids A&A’s problematic reasoning and rules out the
Otto’s notebook entries as genuine beliefs.
Weiskopf considers the following objection: informational integration is not a
necessary feature of beliefs because some of our beliefs are stubbornly immune to
revision. The fanatic who steadfastly believes that 9/11 was an inside job holds this
belief in the face of overwhelming counterevidence. The fanatic’s belief is immune to
revision, but it is nevertheless a genuine belief. In response Weiskopf claims:
These cases are not counterexamples to my claim, for the claim is that a subject’sbeliefs are, in the typical case, open to automatic, largely effortless revision andamendment in the face of acquisition of novel information that the subject herselftakes to be relevant to those prior beliefs. If a subject stubbornly, perhaps evenirrationally, thinks that there is no evidence that would disconfirm one or anotherbelief of hers, she nevertheless has that belief. (2008, p. 273)
Weiskopf (personal communication, October 15, 2009) further clarifies this
argument by claiming that although the fanatic’s beliefs are de facto unrevised, they
actually are revisable because they are part of a system that has belief updating
mechanisms. Otto’s notebook entries fail to be beliefs because they are not part of a
system with belief updating mechanisms. One could redescribe the Otto case so that
there is an updating mechanism (manual consistency checking or some fancy
technology). But the larger the information source, the harder it is to imagine
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manually carrying out this updating process. Moreover, changing the example so that
some (as yet undescribed) artificial mechanism makes consistent his notebook entries
and intra-cranial beliefs makes it less plausible that extended cognition is presently
ubiquitous, as extended cognition theorists argue.The following response is available to the extended cognition proponent: with
regard to being part of a system with belief updating mechanisms, the fanatic’s beliefs
and Otto’s notebook entries are on a par. Otto’s beliefs and notebook entries are part
of a system with belief updating mechanisms. The updating mechanisms are precisely
the same mechanisms that update beliefs in the normal case. It is just that in Otto’s
case the mechanism operates more slowly and is implemented differently sometimes.
The first difference should not matter. We allow that people with brain damage have
beliefs even though the mechanisms that make consistent their beliefs operate slowly
at best. The second difference should not matter either because, as I discussed,
Weiskopf does not want to tie his argument to implementational details. So, Otto’s
notebook entries satisfy Weiskopf’s necessary condition.Weiskopf is correct that informational integration is a necessary condition on
beliefs, but the fanatic and Otto are on a par with regard to informational integration.
Construing informational integration as a necessary condition is not an adequate
argument against extended cognition. This is one more instance in which necessary
conditions fail to yield the result opponents of extended cognition desire. I have
considered the prominent arguments against extended cognition which rely on
necessary conditions, and for all of them either the conditions are strict enough to
rule out Otto’s case but end up begging the question, or they are not strict enough to
rule out Otto’s case. In the next section I shall suggest an alternative way of arguing
against extended cognition.
4. A Better Way to Argue Against Extended Cognition
In this section, I shall suggest a different way of arguing against extended cognition
that involves appealing to the parity principle. There has been a fair bit of controversy
about the interpretation of the parity principle (Clark, 2007, 2008; Wilson & Clark,
2009). Critics of extended cognition sometimes argue that because intra-cranial
cognitive processes and the proposed trans-cranial processes are very dissimilar, there
is no parity between the two and so the trans-cranial processes are not cognitive
processes (Adams & Aizawa, 2008; Rupert, 2004). Rowlands (2009) calls this the
‘‘difference argument.’’ In response, extended cognition theorists argue that the
parity principle has been persistently misinterpreted. The principle, they maintain, is
only meant to serve as a ‘‘veil of metabolic ignorance’’ that ensures that we will not
regard a trans-cranial process as non-cognitive simply because it is trans-cranial
(Clark, 2007; Wilson & Clark, 2009).
Despite these claims, the parity principle plays a bigger role in the arguments for
extended cognition than a mere veil of metabolic ignorance. We can see this by
looking at the structure of the debate between extended cognition theorists and their
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critics. Extended cognition critics have argued that the cognitive routines involving
biological memory and those involving external stores of information are impor-
tantly different. A&A (2001, 2008) and Rupert (2004) point to features like the
primacy effect and negative transfer as features distinctive of the cognitive routines of
biological memory and point out that these are not features of cognitive routines
involving external stores of memory. In defense of the Otto/Inga case, Clark insists:
The claim was not that the processes in Otto and Inga are identical, or even similar,in terms of their detailed implementation. It is simply that, with respect to the rolethat the long-term encodings play in guiding current response, both modes ofstorage can be seen as supporting dispositional beliefs. It is the way the informationis poised to guide reasoning. . . and behavior that counts. (2008, p. 96)
Clark frequently argues that the argument for extended cognition does not hinge
on fine-grained distinctions (2008, pp. 88, 96–97, & 99). Arguing against the
necessity of sameness of fine-grained functional role, Clark asks us to imagine
creatures with very different fine-grained implementation of cognitive mechanisms.
Just as we would not regard as non-cognitive the mechanisms in these creatures
simply because the fine-grained implementation details differ from our own, we
should not hinge the case for cognitive extension on sameness of fine-grained
functional roles. Sameness of fine-grained functional role is not a necessary condition
on being a cognitive process. Though it may be a sufficient condition, it is patently
not what the argument for extended cognition rests on.
There is, however, a lacuna here. Clark argues against the claim that sameness of
fine-grained functional role is a necessary condition on regarding a trans-cranial
process as cognitive, but that does not establish that sameness of coarse-grained
functional role is sufficient. The skeptic may wonder why we should think coarse-
grained similarity is sufficient for cognitive status. In comes the parity principle. The
parity principle is the implicit defense of the sufficiency claim. It says that if we come
across a trans-cranial process that would count as cognitive were it an intra-cranial
process, then we should count that trans-cranial process as cognitive. But what would
our reason be for regarding the trans-cranial process as cognitive if it were in the
brain? Surely not simply the fact that it occurs in the brain. Presumably the reason
would be because the trans-cranial process functions like an intra-cranial process, i.e.,
it has the same functional role as an intra-cranial process. And it is the functional role
of the process, not the location that matters for cognition. Notice that the parity
principle does not specifically target sameness of coarse-grained functional role over
fine-grained functional role. The principle is neutral among different grains of
individuation. The parity principle supports the crucial claim that if a process plays
the same (fine- or coarse-grained) functional role as an uncontroversially cognitive
process, then it is also cognitive (Shapiro & Spaulding, 2009). Thus, contrary to some
claims, the parity principle is not merely a veil of metabolic ignorance.There are a number of ways the extended cognition critic can proceed at this point.
One strategy is to reject the parity principle itself. This strategy, however, is too
broad, for most parties in this debate accept some version of the parity principle.
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A second strategy is to deny the sufficiency of coarse-grained sameness. This is to
specifically reject the coarse-grained interpretation of the parity principle. In doingthis, one is denying that parity between coarse-grained functional roles of intra-
cranial and trans-cranial processes guarantees the cognitive status of the trans-cranialprocess. I am skeptical about the prospects for this maneuver. It seems that the way
to argue for this claim is to deny that psychology is interested in coarse-grainedfunctional roles. But there is a plurality of explananda in psychology. Sometimes
psychology may be interested in explaining the coarse-grained functional poise ofinformation, as the extended cognition theorists emphasize (Clark, 2008, pp. 87–89),and other times psychology may be interested in fine-grained functional roles. I think
it would be a mistake to claim that psychology is only interested in fine-grainedfunctional roles, just as it would be a mistake to claim that psychology is only
interested in coarse-grained functional roles.A third way for the critic to proceed is to offer necessary conditions and argue that
trans-cranial processes do not satisfy these conditions. This strategy largely bypassesthe questions about the parity principle. A&A and others pursue this strategy,
arguing that fine-grained functional similarities are necessary for trans-cranialprocesses to be cognitive processes. But as I argued in the previous section, thesearguments fail. One could amend A&A’s necessary condition so that it does not beg
the question or bias the debate, but this strategy still faces a further difficulty that Idiscussed in section 3. First, we are probably not in a position to confidently offer
strict necessary conditions on the causal mechanisms underlying cognitive processes.There is no telling what a complete cognitive science will look like. This is a problem
for A&A’s arguments. Second, the necessary conditions we offer may not get theresults we intuitively want. It may be the case that, according to our necessary
conditions, some processes that we thought were cognitive actually turn out to benon-cognitive, whereas some extended processes may satisfy the necessary condi-
tions. I discussed this worry in my discussion of Weiskopf’s arguments. Third, thisstrategy fails to address the extended cognition theorists’ positive arguments forextended cognition. Given that the necessary conditions discussed fail to refute
extended cognition, this last problem is particularly worrying.A fourth strategy is to accept the parity principle, i.e., accept that satisfying the
parity principle, both the coarse and fine-grained interpretations, is sufficient forcognitive status, but deny that trans-cranial processes satisfy it. I think this is the
most promising strategy for the critic, and I will pursue it below. There are twoclaims to defend: trans-cranial processes do not satisfy the fine-grained interpretation
of the parity principle, and they do not satisfy the coarse-grained interpretation. Withregard to fine-grained functional role, I shall focus on similarities and differences ofcognitive psychology. Although one could go to a ‘‘lower’’ level than this, in which
case the differences between intra-cranial and trans-cranial processes would be evenstarker, I shall not. With regard to coarse-grained functional role, I shall focus on
similarities and differences of folk psychology.9
Although I will not do this, one could construe the following discussion in terms of
natural kinds: do trans-cranial and intra-cranial processes form a natural kind of
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cognitive psychology or of folk psychology? As far as accounts of natural kinds go, the
most promising account for the extended cognition proponent is the Homeostatic
Property Cluster (HPC) kinds, according to which natural kinds are groups of
entities that share stable similarities (Boyd, 1999; Millikan, 1999; Wilson, Barker, &
Brigandt, 2007). HPC accounts contrast with essentialist accounts of natural kinds,
which hold that essential properties are definitive of natural kinds. Thus construed,
the questions would be whether or not trans-cranial and intra-cranial processes share
stable similarities with regard to cognitive psychology and whether or not they share
stable folk psychological similarities. The answer to both of these questions is, I think,
no. However, the jury is still very much out on exactly how to understand natural
kinds, and I do not want to hinge my argument against extended cognition on
potentially controversial claims about natural kinds. Thus, I shall leave it to the
reader to interpret the discussion in terms of natural kinds if she so prefers.For the analysis of fine-grained functional role, the relevant similarities and
differences are at the level of cognitive psychology. We could use A&A’s and Rupert’s
appeal to the laws and mechanisms of cognitive psychology as the criterion for
sameness of fine-grained functional role. And given that it is a sufficient condition
that is at stake, the appeal to laws and mechanisms would not beg the question.
Nonetheless, I contend that it is wrongheaded. A&A clearly intend the appeal to laws
and mechanisms to be a necessary condition and not a sufficient condition. But
regardless of their intentions, the more important point is that being subject to the
recency effect or negative transfer does not guarantee cognitive status. We could
construct a clever non-cognitive machine so that it is subject to the recency effect or
negative transfer. What we need is a more fundamental criterion, one that focuses on
competence rather than performance.I suggest that the fine-grained similarities and differences that matter to whether
the underlying trans-cranial and intra-cranial processes are functionally equivalent
have to do with their functional organization, i.e., their integration in the cognitive
system. The processes underlying cognition are functionally integrated in particular
ways in cognitive systems. If a trans-cranial process is integrated in the same way as
the corresponding intra-cranial process, then according to the fine-grained
interpretation of the parity principle, we should regard it as a cognitive process.
This criterion abstracts away from the relatively unimportant details about
composition and performance limitations, and it is prima facie possible for trans-
cranial processes to satisfy this condition.Moreover, extended cognition theorists have recently used functional integration
as the basis of arguments for extended cognition. For example, Wilson and Clark
discuss various extended cognition arguments that hinge on functional integration:
We can imagine a hippocampus-in-a-distant-vat whose activity is so wellintegrated as to unproblematically count as part of my cognitive apparatus. . . .Coupling, we conclude, does not in and of itself render a tool or resource part ofthe agent’s cognitive apparatus. But the right kind of coupling (one resulting indeep functional integration) is a major part of what determines the scope andbounds of an agent’s cognitive apparatus. (2009, pp. 20–21)
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Thus, judging parity based on functional integration with other cognitive processes
seems to be a perfectly legitimate criterion, one that even extended cognitiontheorists endorse.
I shall use the Otto/Inga example to demonstrate that, at the level of cognitivepsychology, the functional integration of trans-cranial processes is relevantly different
from intra-cranial processes’ functional integration.10 Inga’s biological memory isfunctionally integrated with the rest of her cognitive processes in a way that Otto’s
notebook is not. If the entries in Otto’s notebook are any kind of memory, then theyare semantic memories.11 Semantic memory in Inga’s brain is stored in the neocortex,which contains the primary sensory, motor and association cortices. The cognitive
processes involved with the primary motor cortex are the control of voluntaryactions, general motor control, maintenance of a prominent somatotopic represen-
tation of the body, and a mapping of the body surface in the nervous system thatrepresents information about touch, pain, temperature, and limb proprioception.
These are just a few of the cognitive processes involved with the primary motorcortex, which is part of the neocortex, which stores semantic memories. Semantic
memory is formed by consolidation of short-term (i.e., sensory or working)memories. Consolidation is the process of strengthening the connections betweenstimulus inputs and previously stored information. Consolidation occurs in the
hippocampus, which is involved in learning, spatial memory, and episodic memory.Consolidation of short-term memories involves visual, auditory and somatosensory
information. Short-term memory is often formed from sensory input, especiallyacoustic and visuospatial information. Thus, the consolidation of short term memory
(the process that forms semantic memories) is integrated with various sensorysystems, learning, spatial memory, and episodic memory, among other cognitive
processes. The retrieval of semantic memory involves the left prefrontal cortex, whichincludes Broca’s area and the ventral lateral region, which are involved in speech
production and comprehension. Thus, the process of calling up (so to speak) asemantic memory is integrated with various speech production and comprehensionfunctions.12
The point of all this is not to give a lesson in cognitive psychology. The point is toillustrate how just one function of the brain, semantic memory, is intricately
integrated with other cognitive functions of the brain. Otto’s notebook is just notintegrated with other functions of Otto’s brain like Inga’s biological memory is.
Otto’s notebook is not related in the same way to the cognitive processes involvedwith the neocortex. It is not integrated with the cognitive processes involved with the
primary sensory, primary motor and association cortices like Inga’s memory is. Theentries in the notebook are not consolidated from short-term memories, and so they
are not integrated with the various cognitive processes implicated in the hippocam-pus like Inga’s memory is. Otto’s notebook fails the fine-grained version of the parityprinciple, for even if we shrunk Otto’s notebook and stuck it in his brain there would
still be many fine-grained functional differences between Inga and Otto. The relationbetween Otto and his notebook, the paradigmatic example of extended cognition,
does not exhibit fine-grained functional integration even similar to the functional
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integration of Inga’s memory. This is not to say, of course, that the relation
between Otto and his notebook is not functionally integrated in the brain at all. Of
course it is. (In fact, as far as cognitive psychology is concerned, the relation
between Otto and his notebook would seem to be just like Inga reading Otto’s
notebook.) But it is not integrated with other cognitive processes in the way
that Inga’s semantic memories are integrated, and so the information in the
notebook is not fine-grained functionally equivalent (or even similar) to Inga’s
biological memory. Thus, we can see that, at least in the case of the Otto/Inga
example, there is not sufficient fine-grained parity to regard the processes as
functionally equivalent. That is, trans-cranial processes do not satisfy the fine-grained
interpretation of the parity principle.
The second claim to defend is that trans-cranial processes do not satisfy the coarse-
grained interpretation of the parity principle. The kinds of similarities and differences
that matter for coarse-grained similarity have to do with folk psychological
functional roles. The original extended cognition argument focused on dispositional
beliefs, arguing that dispositional beliefs can be constituted partly by features of the
environment, when those features play the right sort of role in driving cognitive
processes (Clark, 2008, p. 226; Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 13). Clark claims:
With respect to the role that the long-term encodings play in guiding currentresponse, both modes of storage [Otto’s notebook and Inga’s biological memory]can be seen as supporting dispositional beliefs. It is the way the information ispoised to guide reasoning. . .and behavior that counts. (2008, p. 96)
Criticisms of the coarse-grained interpretation of the parity principle are legitimate
insofar as they point to coarse-grained, folk psychological differences between trans-
cranial and intra-cranial processes.
There are important coarse-grained differences between Otto and Inga. Otto’s
‘‘remembering’’ involves perception—reading the entries in his notebook—whereas
Inga’s memory does not. Chalmers makes much of this point in his introduction to
Clark’s Supersizing the mind (2008). I do not want to insist that not involving
perception is a necessary condition on memory, but the fact that Otto’s process
involves perception and Inga’s does not counts against the parity claim.
In addition, there are standard folk psychological belief distinctions that apply to
Inga’s beliefs and not Otto’s notebook. For example, the standard folk psychological
conception of belief holds that we can have degrees of belief. It is hard to see how the
entries in Otto’s notebook, as the case is described, can admit of degrees of belief. The
standard folk psychological conception of belief also distinguishes explicit disposi-
tional beliefs (e.g., ‘‘today is Tuesday’’) from implicit dispositional beliefs (e.g., ‘‘I do
not currently have any giraffes in my pockets’’). It is not clear how we can make this
distinction with the entries in Otto’s notebook. Again, these differences count against
the parity claim.Moreover, according to the standard folk psychological conception of disposi-
tional beliefs, dispositional beliefs can affect our behavior without ever becoming
occurrent. Suppose you dispositionally believe that walking under ladders is bad luck.
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You consistently avoid walking under ladders. If someone were to ask you whether
you avoided walking under the ladder because you believed that walking under
ladders is bad luck, you would (if you were being honest) answer affirmatively.
Nevertheless, when you avoid walking under the ladder you are not occurrently
thinking that walking under ladders is bad luck. In fact, you rarely explicitly entertain
this belief. This example is not at all fantastical. This sort of thing is very common.
Prejudices, stereotypes, and superstitions shape our behavior all the time without our
ever explicitly entertaining them. In the same way, dispositional beliefs can shape our
behavior without ever becoming occurrent. And importantly, this seems impossible
for the entries in Otto’s notebook. How could the external store of information
causally affect his behavior in the way that standard dispositional beliefs do? This
difference counts against the parity claim.
Another difference that counts against the parity claim is that normally our beliefs
are updated automatically and this updating immediately results in a host of other
beliefs being updated, but this is not the case for Otto and his notebook
(Weiskopf, 2008). And if introspection is necessarily first-person, as our folk
conception seems to suggest, then Otto’s beliefs are not introspectable
(Gertler, 2007). Thus, even in the paradigm case, it looks as if there are manyimportant coarse-grained functional differences between Otto and Inga (Shapiro &
Spaulding, 2009). In fact, the only similarity is the so-called functional poise of the
information in Otto’s notebook and Inga’s biological memory. Below I will call into
question even this alleged similarity.
One could take issue with one or more of these differences. One might disagree
with, for example, the claim about introspection. That is fine. The point is to
illuminate a host of folk psychological differences between Otto and Inga that count
against the claim that there is a strong parity between Otto and Inga. Even through
coarse-grained lenses, there are many differences.Some of these differences I highlight are original to this paper, and some are
not new. What is distinctive about my argument is that, contrary to all of the
theorists cited, I do not take any of these individual differences to be the
crucial difference. As I have argued throughout, the fact that trans-cranial processes
fail to demonstrate one of these features does not mean much. First, surely the
extended cognition theorist could change the example so that it did demonstrate the
feature in question. Second, there may be processes we intuitively judge to be
cognitive that fail to demonstrate the feature. Third, I doubt we are in a position to
confidently assert necessary conditions on the causal mechanisms underlying all
cognitive processes. My argument advances the dialectic by avoiding these problems
and focusing on the parity principle, a crucial premise in arguments for extended
cognition. Any one of these individual differences may not be enough to dismiss the
parity claim, but the collection of all of them presents a pretty compelling case
against it.I have argued that trans-cranial processes are sufficiently different from
intra-cranial cognitive processes that we should not regard them as having the
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same fine-grained or coarse-grained functional role, i.e., that there is not sufficient
parity between intra-cranial cognitive processes and trans-cranial to regard to former
as cognitive. There are, however, positive arguments for the claim that trans-cranial
processes are sufficiently similar to intra-cranial processes to count as cognitive.
These arguments do not deny that there are differences between trans-cranial and
intra-cranial processes. Instead they hold that trans-cranial processes satisfy a
sufficient condition for being cognitive. Rowlands (2009) and Clark (2008) have
offered such arguments. In order make the case against extended cognition
convincing, we must address these arguments.
Rowlands argues that all objections to extended cognition can be resolved by
providing a mark of the cognitive, and he goes on to offer a mark of the cognitive,one comprised of four conditions that are jointly sufficient for a process, P, to count
as cognitive: (1) P involves information processing; (2) the information processing
has the proper function of making information available to the agent; (3) the
information is made available by the production of a representational state with non-
derived content;13 (4) P is a process that belongs to the subject of the representational
state. There is not space here to fully discuss Rowland’s arguments, but I would like
to note a couple of my misgivings. First, opponents of extended cognition would not
dispute the truth of these four claims, but they would deny that these conditions are
really sufficient for extended cognition. For one could accept his conditions and still
claim that external things are merely props. Second, his project rests on the
possibility of articulating an ownership criterion (in order to avoid the cognitive
bloat objection14), but instead of arguing for such a criterion he argues that
ownership is as much a problem for opponents of extended cognition as it is for
proponents. However, the extended cognition skeptic could argue that we track
ownership by the representations with non-derived content, which are always
internal to the agent.Clark also argues that despite the differences between trans-cranial and
intra-cranial processes, trans-cranial processes can be cognitive. In defense of the
claim that Otto’s notebook is a contributor to Otto’s long-term store of dispositional
beliefs, Clark focuses on the role the retrieved information will play in guiding
current behavior. It is at this point, he claims, that the commonsense functional
similarity becomes apparent (Clark, 2008, p. 98). It is true that there are
some differences between stored biological memory and the notebook, he
admits, ‘‘but when called upon, its immediate contributions to Otto’s behavior
still fit the profile of a stored belief. Information retrieved from the notebook will
guide Otto’s reasoning and behavior in the same way as information retrieved from
biological memory’’ (Clark, 2008, p. 98). Otto’s notebook is sufficiently like Inga’s
memory with regard to the role that the information will play in guiding
current behavior.This line of reasoning will not convince the skeptic, though. Of course the
retrieved information from the notebook will guide Otto’s behavior in the same way
as information retrieved from biological memory, but the reason is not that the
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entries in Otto’s notebook fit the profile of dispositional beliefs. The reason is that,
once the information is retrieved, Otto has an occurrent belief guiding his behavior.
The explanation of Otto’s current behavior is not that the dispositional beliefs in his
notebook were guiding his behavior. As I pointed out above, it is not clear how the
entries in the notebook could guide Otto’s behavior like dispositional beliefs can. The
explanation is that Otto now has an occurrent belief, which is fully in the head that is
guiding his current behavior.One may object at this point that we could say the same thing about Inga’s
dispositional belief, namely, that her dispositional belief does not guide her
behavior either, that it is only once her dispositional belief is made occurrent that
it can affect her behavior. One could justify this with the general claim that
dispositional beliefs are made occurrent precisely so that they can affect behavior.
Thus, one might argue that Otto and Inga are the same in this regard.15 I find
this objection unpersuasive. One reason is that I reject the general claim that only
occurrent beliefs can affect behavior. In the normal case, dispositional beliefs can
shape behavior without becoming occurrent. I argued for this in evaluating the
coarse-grained parity claim. So we need not accept the claim that Inga’s behavior
is only guided by occurrent beliefs. All sorts of non-occurrent beliefs shape Inga’s
behavior, and there seems to be no good reason to deny that in this case.
Secondly, it seems impossible for the entries in Otto’s notebook to guide his
behavior. For Otto, the entries in the notebook can have an effect on his behavior
only once he occurrently believes them. Thus, contrary to what Clark claims,
Otto and Inga are not the same in this regard. The role retrieved information
plays in guiding current behavior does not mitigate the differences between
Inga and Otto.
The defender of extended cognition could dismiss these differences as irrelevant
details, preferring instead to emphasize the similarities between the cases. But the
main similarity, functional poise of information, turns out to be pretty feeble. And in
any case, it is not clear what principled reason could motivate a dismissal of all the
differences. Instead of denying that these differences are relevant, it seems wiser to say
that there are interesting similarities between Otto and Inga, that the entries in Otto’s
notebook are interestingly belief-like, but not literally beliefs. When we are interested
in explaining some phenomena, e.g., Otto’s walking to 53rd Street, the similarities
between Otto and Inga come to the forefront, but when we are interested in
explaining other phenomena, e.g., why Otto reaches for his notebook, the similarities
fade away. We do not lose any explanatory advantage by calling the entries
interestingly belief-like in certain circumstances, and we avoid having to bite bullets
with regard to the differences between the two cases. Thus, given that there are
several important dissimilarities between the notebook and biological memory, and
given that appealing to the role retrieved information will play in guiding current
behavior will not establish any similarity between the intra-cranial and trans-cranial
processes, the Otto/Inga case fails the coarse-grained interpretation of the parity
principle, as well.
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5. Conclusion
I have argued that the strategy of arguing against extended cognition by offering
necessary conditions fails in a number of cases. Adams and Aizawa’s prominent
argument against extended cognition fails because the necessary condition they offer
unfairly biases the debate. Rupert’s argument puts on an unreasonable requirement
on moderate versions of extended cognition, and Weiskopf’s arguments fail to rule
out the standard example of extended cognition. I argued that it is best to argue
against extended cognition by challenging the claim that there is sufficient parity
between intra-cranial and trans-cranial processes. I argued that there are numerous,
important differences in the fine-grained functional integration of the intra-cranial
and trans-cranial processes in the Otto/Inga case, so the case fails one interpretation
of the parity principle. I also argued that there are several relevant differences
between coarse-grained functional roles of intra-cranial and trans-cranial processes
supporting dispositional beliefs, and that the maneuver to gloss over these differences
fails. Thus, the Otto/Inga case fails both the fine-grained and coarse-grained versions
of the parity principle, a crucial part of the case for extended cognition.
Extended cognition theorists could respond by offering a different set of sufficient
conditions for regarding a process as cognitive. I considered and argued against such
arguments by Rowlands and Clark. The defenders of extended cognition could also
respond to my challenges by changing the Otto/Inga example so that it satisfies the
parity principle, or dropping it all together and emphasizing a different sort of case.
Regardless, this is still a victory for the critic of extended cognition, for the Otto/Inga
example is the poster child of the extended cognition movement. And in any case,
making such changes is easier said than done. It will require showing a case where a
trans-cranial process satisfies either the fine-grained interpretation of the parity
principle (this is unlikely) or the coarse-grained interpretation (somehow avoiding
the difficulties with dispositional beliefs). Moreover, if the case for extended
cognition is to be interesting and true to the bold claims its proponents make, it
ought to show that cognition actually extends. The examples on offer ought to be
actual trans-cranial processes that satisfy the parity principle, not merely possible
examples. Still, one might be discouraged by this back-and-forth quibbling over
examples. That, however, is the nature of this debate. If we accept the parity principle
and thereby agree to tread in sufficient conditions, as I argue we should, then we
must proceed on a case-by-case basis.
Notes
[1] Other arguments for extended cognition include coupling arguments, complementarity
arguments, evolutionary arguments, and abductive arguments. For a critical analysis of these
arguments, see Adams and Aizawa (2008). For a defense of these arguments, see Wilson and
Clark (2009).[2] There is a third distinction one could make: processes that span the brain and body but not
the external world. This sort of process will not be relevant for this project.
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[3] In what follows, I shall rely heavily on the Otto/Inga example. This is partly because it is a
standard example offered in favor of extended cognition, and also because it is convenient to
refer back to a vivid example. Reliance on this example, however, is inessential for my
argument. If another example seems to better represent a paradigm case of extended
cognition, one may substitute that example for the Otto/Inga case.[4] I shall not discuss the original content condition here because there is not enough
space to thoroughly discuss it, but it should be noted that there has been a lot of
controversy over the original content condition (Adams & Aizawa, 2008; Clark, 2005, 2008;
Rowlands, 2009; Shapiro, 2008; Wilson & Clark, 2009). For what it’s worth, I think the
original content condition suffers some of the same problems other necessary conditions
face, in particular, it does not exclude all trans-cranial processes or include all intra-cranial
cognitive processes.[5] I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this insight.[6] Another anonymous referee suggests that a helpful way of viewing this discussion
is in terms of two kinds of cognition: Cognition 1, which consists in standard intra-cranial
cognitive process, and Cognition 2, which consists in trans-cranial processes. On this
view, A&A are really defending the idea that Cognition 1 does not extend, whereas
C&C are reallly arguing that Cognition 2 extends. And in that sense, A&A succeed and
C&C succeed. Though I find this an interesting possibility, I do not think it
furthers the discussion. For the same debate arises again when we ask the inevitable question:
are both Cognition 1 and Cognition 2 equally legitimate accounts of cognition? A&A
would argue that only Cognition 1 is real cognition, whereas C&C would argue that
both Cognition 1 and Cognition 2 are real cognition. And again, A&A need to come up
with a fair, principled, non-question-begging reason to think only Cognition 1 is real
cognition.[7] Aizawa has suggested (personal communication) that although this may indeed be the line
that extended cognition theorists now take, this is not what they used to argue and that this
appeal to ‘‘general cognition,’’ as he puts it, is a change in tack.[8] I should note that Rupert’s (2009) case against extended cognition is broader than this
argument. I hope I do no disservice to Rupert’s work by singling out this particular
argument. My interest is in the strategy of arguing against extended cognition by offering
necessary conditions because it such a common, yet misguided strategy.[9] I choose cognitive psychology for evaluating fine-grained parity and folk psychology for
evaluating coarse-grained parity because extended cognition theorists argue for parity
between intra-cranial and trans-cranial processes in these domains. I shall argue that even
when we allow extended cognition theorists to set the parameters for evaluating parity, the
extended cognition case fails.[10] One could tell the same kind of story about the Tetris example or other alleged examples of
extended cognition (Clark, 2008, pp. 70–75).[11] Long-term memory divides into declarative memory (explicit) and nondeclarative memory
(implicit), and declarative memory further subdivides into episodic memory (first-person
memory of events) and semantic memory (memory of worldly facts; Gazzaniga, Ivry, &
Magnun, 2002, pp. 309–315). The entries in the notebook are allegedly memories of worldly
facts, e.g., the location of MoMA.[12] This information can be found in any cognitive psychology textbook (e.g., Gazzaniga et al.,
2002).[13] Non-derived (or ‘‘original’’) content is best explained in contrast with derived content.
A representational state has derived content when the content or meaning of that state is
derived from other representations or conventions. Stop signs, words, gas gauges, etc., have
derived content because what they represent, their content, is derived from our
interpretation of them. A representational state has non-derived content when it has
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meaning independent of other representations or conventions. Our beliefs and desires are
the typical examples of representational states with non-derived content.[14] The cognitive bloat objection holds that extending cognition is a slippery slope.
If we allow that Otto’s cognitive processes extend into the notebook, then on that
same basis we would have to allow that Otto’s cognitive processes extend into the
phonebook or the internet because he uses those in the same way. But it is absurd to think
that Otto has a beliefs corresponding to everything in the phonebook or everything on the
internet.[15] Thanks to an anonymous referee for this point.
References
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kinds and the special sciences’’. Philosophical Studies, 95, 67–98.Clark, A. (1997). Being there. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Clark, A. (2005). Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind. Analysis, 65, 1–11.Clark, A. (2007). Curing cognitive hiccups: A defense of the extended mind. Journal of Philosophy,
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