re- subpoena duces tetum

8/12/2019 RE- Subpoena Duces Tetum

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RE:SUBPOENADUCES

TECUMDATED JANUARY 11,

2010 OF ACTING DIRECTOR

ALEU A. AMANTE, PIAB-C,

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 2, 2010


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x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

Before us for consideration are the interrelated matters listed below.

a. The subpoena duces tecum (dated January 11, 2010 and received by

this Court on January 18, 2010),issued by the Office of the Ombudsman on the

Chief, Office of the Administrative Services or AUTHORIZED

REPRESENTATIVE, Supreme Court, Manila, for the submission to the

Office of the Ombudsman of the latest Personal Data Sheets and last known

forwarding address of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and former

Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez. Thesubpoenaducestecumwas

issued in relation to a criminal complaint under (b) below, pursuant to Section 13,

Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770. The Office

of the Administrative Services (OAS) referred the matter to us on January 21,

2010 with a request for clearance to release the specified documents andinformation.

b. Copy of the criminal complaint entitled Oliver O. Lozano

and Evangeline Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al.,OMB-C-C-09-

0527-J, cited by the Ombudsman as basis for the the subpoena duces tecumit

issued. We secured a copy of this criminal complaint from the Ombudsman to

determine the legality and propriety of thesubpoena duces tecumsought.

c. Order dated February 4, 2010 (which the Court received on February

9, 2010), signed by Acting Director Maribeth Taytaon-Padios of the Office of

the Ombudsman (with the approval of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-

Gutierrez), dismissing the Lozano complaint and referring it to the Supreme

Court for appropriate action. The order was premised on the


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Memorandum[1]

issued on July 31, 2003 by Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo who

directed that all complaints against judges and other members of the Judiciary be

immediately dismissed and referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.

OUR RULING

I. TheSubpoena Duces Tecum

In light of the Ombudsmans dismissal order of February 4, 2010, any

question relating to the legality and propriety of thesubpoena duces tecum the

Ombudsman issued has been rendered moot and academic. Thesubpoena duces

tecummerely drew its life and continued viability from the underlying criminalcomplaint, and the complaints dismissal belated though it may be cannot but

have the effect of rendering the need for thesubpoena duces tecumacademic.

As guide in the issuance of compulsory processes to Members of this Court,

past and present, in relation to complaints touching on the exercise of our judicial

functions, we deem it appropriate to discuss for the record the extent of the

Ombudsmans authority in these types of complaints.

In the appropriate case, the Office of the Ombudsman has full authority to

issue subpoenas, includingsubpoena duces tecum, for compulsory attendance of

witnesses and the production of documents and information relating to matters

under its investigation.[2] The grant of this authority, however, is not unlimited, as

the Ombudsman must necessarily observe and abide by the terms of the

Constitution and our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable jurisprudence on

the issuance, service, validity and efficacy of subpoenas. Under the Rules of

Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including asubpoena duces tecum, operates

under the requirements of reasonableness and relevance.[3] For the production of

documents to be reasonable and for the documents themselves to be relevant, the

matter under inquiry should, in the first place, be one that the Ombudsman can

legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon.


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In the present case, the matter that gave rise to the issuance of asubpoena

duces tecum was a criminal complaint filed by the complainants Lozano for the

alleged violation by retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and

retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019,

as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

A first step in considering whether a criminal complaint (and its attendant

compulsory processes) is within the authority of the Ombudsman to entertain (and

to issue), is to consider the nature of the powers of the Supreme Court. This Court,

by constitutional design, is supreme in its task of adjudication; judicial power is

vested solely in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established

by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts, not only to settle actual

controversies, but also to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction has been committed in any branch or

instrumentality of government.[4]

As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the

exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose

judgment is final. This constitutional scheme cannot be thwarted or subverted

through a criminal complaint that, under the guise of imputing a misdeed to the

Court and its Members, seeks to revive and re-litigate matters that have long

been laid to rest by the Court. Effectively, such criminal complaint is a collateral

attack on a judgment of this Court that, by constitutional mandate, is final andalready beyond question.

A simple jurisprudential research would easily reveal that this Court has had

the occasion to rule on the liability of Justices of the Supreme Court for violation

of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019the very same provision that the complainants

Lozano invoke in this case.

InIn re Wenceslao Laureta,[5]

the client of Atty. Laureta filed a complaint

with the Tanodbayancharging Members of the Supreme Court with violation of

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for having knowingly, deliberately and with

bad faith rendered an unjust resolution in a land dispute. The Court unequivocally

ruled that insofar as this Court and its Divisions are concerned, a charge of

violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such

collective decision is unjust should notprosper; the parties cannot relitigate in


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another forum the final judgment of the Court, as to do so is to subordinate the

Court, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to another body.[6]

In re Joaquin T. Borromeo"#$

reiterates theLaureta ruling, particularly that

(1) judgments of the Supreme Court are not reviewable; (2)

administrative, civil and criminal complaints against a judge should not be turned

into substitutes for appeal; (3) only courts may declare a judgment unjust; and (4) a

situation where the Ombudsman is made to determine whether or not a judgment

of the Court is unjust is an absurdity. The Court further discussed the requisites for

the prosecution of judges, as follows:

That is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this

impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, takingaccount of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are that

there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding

of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there

be also evidence of malice and bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence on

the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order.

Thus, consistent with the nature of the power of this Court under our

constitutional scheme, only this Court not the Ombudsman can declare a

Supreme Court judgment to be unjust.

InAlzua v. Arnalot,[8]

the Court ruled that judges of superior and general

jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages, and provided this

rationale for this ruling: Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself

aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of

this freedom and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can

be either respectable or useful. The same rationale applies to the indiscriminate

attribution of criminal liability to judicial officials.

Plainly, under these rulings, a criminal complaint for violation of Section

3(e) of RA 3019,based on the legal correctness of the official acts of Justices of

the Supreme Court, cannot prosper and should not be entertained. This is not to say

that Members of the Court are absolutely immune from suit during their term, for


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they are not. The Constitution provides that the appropriate recourse against them

is to seek their removal from office if they are guilty of culpable violation of the

Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal

of public trust.[9]

Only after removal can they be criminally proceeded against for

their transgressions. While in office and thereafter, and for their official acts thatdo not constitute impeachable offenses, recourses against them and their liabilities

therefor are as defined in the above rulings.

Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, in fact, specifically grants the

Ombudsman the authority to investigate impeachable officers, but only when such

investigation is warranted:

Section 22.Investigatory Power. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have thepower to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by

officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint

for impeachment, if warranted.

Conversely, if a complaint against an impeachable officer is unwarranted for lack of

legal basis and for clear misapplication of law and jurisprudence, the Ombudsman

should spare these officers from the harassment of an unjustified investigation. The

present criminal complaint against the retired Justices is one such case where an

investigation is not warranted, based as it is on the legal correctness of their officialacts, and the Ombudsman should have immediately recognized the criminal

complaint for what it is, instead of initially proceeding with its investigation and

issuing asubpoena duces tecum.

II. The Ombudsmans Dismissal

of the Criminal Complant

As the Ombudsmans dismissal of the criminalcomplaint (Oliver O. Lozanoand Evangeline Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-

0527-J) clearly implied, no complete dismissal took place as the matter was

simply referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.


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Although it was belatedly made, we cannot fault this Ombudsman action for

the reasons we have already discussed above. While both accused are now retired

from the service, the complaint against them still qualifies for exclusive

consideration by this Court as the acts complained of spring from their judicial

actions while they were with the Court. From this perspective, we therefore passupon theprima faciemerits of the complainants Lozanos criminal complaint.

a. Grounds for the Dismissal of the Complaint

By its express terms, the criminal complaint stemmed from the participation

of the accused in the Resolution the First Division of this Court issued inHeirs of

Antonio Pael v. Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843. The

retired Chief Justice and retired Associate Justice allegedly committed thefollowing unlawful acts:

1) Overturning the findings of fact of the CA;

2) Stating in the Resolution that the Chin-Mallari property overlaps the UP property,

when the DENR Survey Report stated that the UP title/property overlaps the Chin-

Mallari property;

3)

Issuing a Resolution, for which three Justices voted, to set aside a Decision for whichfive Justices voted.

By these acts, the retired Members of this Court are being held criminally

accountable on the theory that they violated the Constitution and the law in their

ruling in the cited cases, thereby causing undue injury to the parties to these

cases.

After due consideration, we dismiss the criminal complaint against retiredChief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia

Austria-Martinez under Section 3(e) of RA 3019. We fully expound on the reasons

for this conclusion in the discussions below.

a. Contrary to the complainants position,


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the Supreme Court has the power to review

the lower courts findings of fact.

The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land with the power to review,

revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules ofCourt may provide, final judgments and orders of the lower courts.

[10] It has the

authority to promulgate rules on practice, pleadings and admission to the bar, and

suspend the operation of these rules in the interest of justice.[11]

Jurisprudence

holds, too, that the Supreme Court may exercise these powers over the factual

findings of the lower courts, among other prerogatives, in the following instances:

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or

conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd of

impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment isbased on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both

appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial

court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific

evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as

well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;

and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of

evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

[12]

Thus, contrary to thecomplainants Lozano assertions in their complaint, the Supreme Court, in the

proper cases, can and does rule on factual submissions before it,and even

reverses the lower courts factual findings when the circumstances call for this

action.

b. Constitutional Provisions were misused.

The complainants Lozano appear to us to have brazenly misquoted and

misused applicable constitutional provisions to justify their case against the retired

Justices. We refer particularly to their use (or strictly, misuse) of Article X,

Section 2(3) of the 1973Constitutionwhich they claim to be the governing rule

that the retired Justices should have followed in acting onPael. This constitutional

provision states:


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Cases heard by a division shall be decided with the concurrence of at least

five Members, but if such required number is not obtained the case shall be

decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the

Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed

except by the Court sitting en banc.[13]

For failure of the retired Justices to act according to these terms, the complainants

claim that the former subverted the Constitution by reversing, by a vote of a

majority of only three members, the decision of the First Division unanimously

approved by its full membership of five members.

Had the complainants bothered to carefully consider the facts and

developments inPaeland accordingly related these to the applicable

constitutional provision, they would have discovered thatPaelwas decided in

2003 when the 1987 Constitution, not the 1973 Constitution,was the prevailing

Charter. They then would have easily learned of the manner cases are heard and

decided by Division before the Supreme Court under the 1987

Constitution. Section 4(3), Article VIII of this Constitution provides:

Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with

the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took partin the

deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without

the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number

is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or

principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en bancor in

division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

(Emphasis supplied.)

This was the provision that governed in 2003 and still governs to this day. Thus,

the complainants argument and basis for their criminal complaint that in ruling

on a motion for reconsideration, all five members of the Division should concur

is totally wrong.

c. The elements of the offense charged are

not sufficiently alleged in the complaint


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A public official can violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019[14]

in two

ways: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by

giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference;[15]

in

either case, these acts must be committed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith,

or gross and inexcusable negligence.

Partiality is defined as a bias or disposition to see and report matters as

wished for, rather than as they are. Bad faith connotes not only bad judgment or

negligence, but also a dishonest purpose, a conscious wrongdoing, or a breach of

duty amounting to fraud. Gross negligence, on the other hand, is characterized by

the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a

duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious

indifference to consequences as far as other persons are concerned.[16]

The criminal complaint in this case failed to allege the facts and

circumstances showing that the retired Justices acted with partiality, bad faith or

negligence. A judicial officers act in reviewing the findings of fact in a decision

and voting for its reversal cannot by itself constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of

Republic Act No. 3019 in the absence of facts, alleged and proven, demonstrating

a dishonest purpose, conscious partiality, extrinsic fraud, or any wrongdoing on his

or her part. A complainants mere disagreement with the magistrates ownconclusions, to be sure, does not justify a criminal charge under Section 3(e)

against the latter. In the absence of alleged and proven particular acts of manifest

partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good faith and

regularity are generally presumed in the performance of official duties by public

officers.[17]

For the criminal complaints fatal omissions and resultant failure to allege

aprima faciecase, it rightfully deserves immediate dismissal.

III. The Complainants Potential Liability

for Filing the Ombudsman Complaint

In light of the above conclusions and under the attendant circumstances of

the criminal complaints, we cannot avoid considering whether the complainants


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Lozanoacted properly as members of the Bar, as officers of this Court, and as

professionals governed by norms of ethical behavior, in filing their complaint.

In their criminal complaint, the complainants gave a slanted view of the

powers of this Court to suit their purposes; for these same purposes, they wronglycited and misapplied the provisions of the Constitution, not just any ordinary

statute. As lawyers, the complainants must be familiar and well acquainted with

the fundamental law of the land, and are charged with the duty to apply the

constitutional provisions in light of their prevailing jurisprudential interpretation.

As law practitioners active in the legal and political circles, the complainants can

hardly be characterized as unknowing in their misuse and misapplication of

constitutional provisions. They should, at the very least, know that the 1973

Constitution and its provisions have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, andthat they cannot assail invoking the 1973 Constitution the judicial acts of

members of the Supreme Court carried out in 2003 when the 1987 Constitution

was in effect. Their misuse of the Constitution is made more reprehensible when

the overriding thrust of their criminal complaint is considered; they used the 1973

provisions to falsely attribute malice and injustice to the Supreme Court and its

Members.

In our view, the complainants errors do not belong to the genre of plain andsimple errors that lawyers commit in the practice of their profession. Their plain

disregard, misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions constitute

serious misconduct that reflects on their fitness for continued membership in the

Philippine Bar. At the very least, their transgressions are blatant violations of Rule

10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents

of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a

decision or authority, orknowingly cite as a law a provision already renderedinoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been

proved. (Emphasis provided.)

To emphasize the importance of requiring lawyers to act candidly and in good

faith, an identical provision is found in Cannon 22 of the Canons of Professional


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Ethics. Moreover, lawyers are sworn to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing

of any in court before they are even admitted to the

Bar. All these the complainants appear to have seriously violated.

In the interest of due process and fair play, the complainants Lozano shouldbe heard, in relation to their criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against

retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia

Austria-Martinez, on why they should not be held accountable and accordingly

penalized for violations of their duties as members of the Bar and officers of this

Court, and of the ethics of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISSthe criminal complaint

entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al.,OMB-C-C-09-0527-J for utter lack of merit, and DECLAREas MOOTand ACADEMICthe

question of compliance with thesubpoena duces tecumdated January 11, 2010 that

the Ombudsman issued against this Court.

We hereby ORDERthe complainants Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty.

Evangeline Lozano-Endriano toEXPLAIN IN WRITING to this Court, within a

non-extendible period of 15 days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should

not be penalized as members of the Bar and as officers of this Court, for their opendisregard of the plain terms of the Constitution and the applicable laws and

jurisprudence, and their misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions in

their criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman, entitled Oliver O.

Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al.,OMB-C-C-09-0527-J.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice


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ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CAS

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

%&&'()*+, -.&+)(,

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR

Associate Justice


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[1] The pertinent part of the Memorandum reads:

Henceforth, on the basis of the foregoing, and in keeping with the spirit of the stated doctrine, all criminal

complaints against judged and other members of the Supreme Court shall be

immediately DISMISSEDand REFERREDto the Supreme Court for appropriate action. The dismissal shall not

in any manner touch on the merits of the complaint, and shall be made for the sole purpose of referring the same

to the Supreme Court. (emphasis found in the original.)

[2]Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770 reads:Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the

following powers functions and duties:x x x x

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such

limitations as it may provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of

documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office

involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any

irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary inthe discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent

records and documents.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section 13, Rule XI of the Constitution are similarly phrased:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following functions

and duties:

x x x x

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such

limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents

relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the

disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity tothe Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information in the

discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records

and information.[3]

See: Sections 3 and 4, Rule 21, Rules of Court.[4]

CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.[5]

232 Phil 353 (1987).

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice


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[6]To quote the pertinent portions ofLaureta, pp. 384-388:

As aptly declared in the Chief Justices Statement of December 24, 1986, which the

Court hereby adopts in toto, It is elementary that the Supreme Court is supremethe third great

department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality

all justiciable disputes public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its

judgments or declare them unjust. It is elementary that (A)s has ever been stressed since theearly case ofArnedo v. Llorente(18 Phil 257, 263[1911]) controlling and irresistible reasons of

public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error,

judgment of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some

definite time fixed by law or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond

the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of

law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen.

Respondents should have known that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal

Code as to rendering knowingly unjust judgment refer to an individual judge who does so in

any case submitted to him for decision and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass

judgment on the unjustness of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with

jurisdiction to review the same, either of the Court of Appeals and/or the SupremeCourt. Respondents should likewise know thatsaid penal article has no application to the

members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisionswho reach their conclusions in

consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also

follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on

the ground that such a collective decision is unjust cannot prosper. (emphasis supplied)

xxxx

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a

member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in regular exercise of

official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine the very independence of the

judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. xxxx

To allow litigants to go beyond the Courts resolution and claim that the members acted

with deliberate bad faith and rendered an unjust resolution in disregard or violation of the duty

of their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at

hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and

resolution and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty. To

allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the

Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.

Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannotwithout violating the separation of

powers mandated by the Constitutionrelitigate in another forum the final judgment of this

Courton legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries for final determination to and by

the Supreme Court and which fall within judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively

vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established

by law.[7] 311 Phil 441, 509 (1995).[8]

21 Phil 308, 326 (1912).[9]

CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 2.[10] CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5(2).[11]Id., Section 5(5).


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[12]Reyes v. Montemayor, G.R. No. 166516, September 3, 2009; Uy v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 157851, June 29, 2007,

526 SCRA 73, 83-84;Malison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147776, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 109. 117;

andBuenaventura v. Republic , G.R. No. 166865, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 271, 282.[13]

Part of the Criminal Complaint-Affidavit for Corrupt Practices, signed by Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty.

Evangeline Lozano-Endriano, received by the Ombudsman on September 8, 2009, Ombudsman Records, pp.

1089-1189,1090.[14]Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already

penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby

declared to be unlawful:x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party

any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or

judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable

negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of the offices or government

corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.x x x x

[15] Velasco v. Sandiganbayan, 492 Phil 669, 677 (2005).

[16]

Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil 712, 721 (2003); andMendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman, 430Phil 101, 115 (2002).

[17]Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil 712, 722 (2003).

re- subpoena duces tetum

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