unodc - crime & instability

8/8/2019 Unodc - Crime & Instability

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Main TOC threatsTypes of threat: Cocaine production and trafficking Areas mostly affected: Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, transit and destination countries Origin and destination of trafficking flows: Colombia to Central America, Mexico, Caribbean

and North America; Colombia to Venezuela, Caribbean, West Africa and Europe; Peru and Bolivia to Brazil, Argentina,and Europe

Annual volume of main goods trafficked: 590 tons in 2008 Estimated annual value: US$6.6 billion to Colombian groups

(US$88 billion global market value)

Criminal groups involved: Organized crime groups, FARC, successor organizations of AUC Location of traffickers: All along the trafficking route

Stability threat Type of threat: Insurgency Areas mostly affected: Coca cultivation areas Armed groups involved: FARC, ELN, and successor organizations of AUC in

Colombia; Shining Path in Peru

Links between TOC and stability threatsNature of the link: Financing of insurgency activities Impact of TOC on the stability threat: Perpetuation of insurgency Estimated trend: Declining in Colombia, re-emerging in Peru

th impa h A d a R gi1.1.

Cent ra l As ia

C e n t r a l A f r i c a

South-Eas tAs ia

Gul f a rea ,Midd le Eas t

H o r n o f A f r i c a

E a s t A f r i c a

South-Eas tEurope

Wes t Af r i ca

A n d e a nr e g i o n

Uni ted S ta tesof Amer ica

Car ibbean

Wes tCen t ra lEurope

Russ ianFedera t ion

Sources: UDCP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2009; ICC InternationalMaritime Bureau, Piracy and armed robbery against ships, Annual Report 2009;UN/UNODC

Trafficking from easternDemocratic Republic of the Congo

Gold

Cassiterite

Cocaine trafficking

High homicide rates linkedto cocaine trafficking

Heroin trafficking

Main source countries


Conflict resulting in 1,000 ormore battle deaths in 2008

Area of instability with presenceof UN peace missions

Piracy off the Horn of Africa

Conflict resulting in 25-999battle deaths in 2008

UN regional peace mission U N O D C / S C I E N C E S P O


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14/65CRimE And instAbility8

tRAFFIcKInG In cocAIne

Mai ra a i al rga iz d rimI.hr a

Most of the worlds illicit cocaine supply comesfrom the Andean region, primarily from or throughColombia. However, Colombia is also the country which has made most progress over the last few years in curbing the threats to national and interna-tional security emerging from drug production andtrafficking.

Colombian traffickers started out in the cannabistrade, flying locally produced marijuana to the USmarket. In the 1970s, they lost this market to can-nabis produced closer to the consumer, but weresufficiently well connected at that stage to capitalizeon the growing market for cocaine. Drawing their

raw materials from Bolivia and Peru, they processedthe drug and exported it on a massive scale, and by the late 1970s, Colombia was the worlds numberone source of cocaine.

The 1980s saw the emergence of the Medellin andthe Cali cartels: large, structured organizationsthat controlled most of the market. Prices forcocaine were high at the time, as was consumption,and very shortly a huge amount of wealth was con-centrated in a small number of hands. This allowedthe cartel members to wield tremendous corruptingpower and gain political influence. There were aseries of scandals where high ranking politicians andcivil servants were linked to the cartels. The destruc-tion of these cartels became an urgent national

security issue, and, with international cooperationand assistance, they were dismantled in the first half of the 1990s.

This did not stop the drug trade, but it did signifi-

cantly reduce its political influence. A large numberof smaller criminal organizations emerged, some-times also referred to as cartelitos . The emergenceof these groups, in combination with increasedefforts to curb the transport of raw materials fromPeru and Bolivia, led to increased coca cultivationin Colombia in the second half of the 1990s. By 1997, Colombia became the worlds largest sourceof coca leaf.

Around this time, the Colombian groups began toface some serious challenges. First, prompted inpart by evidence that insurgent groups were taxingthe trade, the Government intensified its eradica-tion efforts. The area under coca cultivation fellfrom 163,300 ha in 2000 to 81,800 ha in 2008,mainly due to eradication. During the same time,however, yields increased, due to the introductionof more efficient farming and processing techniques,before declining again in recent years. In sum,Colombian cocaine production declined by 38%between 2000 and 2008.

The second challenge faced by the Colombian traf-ficking organizations in the late 1990s was the lossof control over their primary destination market:the USA. Mexican traffickers, who had previously been little more than transportation agents for the

coca bUsh cUltivation in theFig. 5: andean region, 1990-2008

Source: UNODC, 2009 World Drug Report, June 2009.

81,000

163,300

101,800

40,100

43,400 56,10038,700

129,100121,300

30,50014,600

50,300

38,000

167,600

211,700

181,600

221,300

190,800

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

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2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

H e c

t a r e s

ColombiaPeru

BoliviaTotal



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Colombians, began to assume control of everythingfrom importation to street sales, seizing the mostlucrative segments of the trafficking chain. This loss was partly due to the reduced size of the Colombiangroups, and partly to new extradition rules, which

made Colombian traffickers reluctant to be associ-ated with direct shipments to the USA. The Mexi-can traffickers had been paid for their services inkind for some time, and they took advantage of their numeric superiority and long experience intrafficking to reduce their former bosses to meresuppliers.

This left the Colombian traffickers looking for new markets to explore, and they found a ready one inEurope. The size of the European cocaine marketdoubled between 1998 and 2008. While Colom-bian traffickers now cooperate with a wide range of groups in Europe, they still maintain a dominantrole in supplying the European market.

In parallel, traffickers in Peru and Bolivia began tomanufacture cocaine. By 2008, about half of the worlds finished cocaine products originated in thesetwo countries, and was shipped to the growingmarkets of South America and Europe. Powdercocaine destined for Europe is often shipped viaBrazil and various West African and Southern Afri-can countries. Criminal groups in Peru and Boliviaare, in general, only involved in shipping the cocaine within the region to neighboring countries, whereinternational syndicates take over the trafficking.

s uri y/g v r a i ua iII.

Colombia has long been the most developed andmost industrialized country in the Andean Com-munity. But Colombia also suffers from a highly unequal distribution of wealth and has had a longhistory of political violence. In the nineteenth cen-tury more than 50 armed conflicts emerged betweenand within the traditional political parties. Thetwentieth century started with the Guerra de losMil Das (One Thousand Day War) of 1899-1902,costing the lives of some 100,000 Colombians. Another wave of conflict was dubbedLa Violencia (the Violence), an undeclared civil war over the1946-58 period that claimed some 300,000 lives.Leftist guerilla groups emerged in the mid-1960s.Several of the left-wing rebel groups later joined thepolitical system, leaving the Fuerzas Armadas Rev-olucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejrcito

de Liberacin Nacional (ELN) as the two mainguerilla forces.6

Right-wing paramilitaries emerged in the 1980s,initially to protect the interests o the large armers

and other business owners. By 1997, the paramili-tary groups amalgamated under the umbrella o the

Autode ensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).7 heservices o the paramilitary groups were, however,also sought by various organized crime groups to

protect their smuggling activities. Eventually, the AUC itsel emerged as a key organizer o cocainetra icking.

The countrys overall security situation deterioratedaround 2000, as the FARC, the ELN and the AUCstarted to control ever larger parts of the Colombianterritory, partly financed through drug money. Withthe strong decline in coca cultivation over the 2000-2008 period, and the regaining of the territory by the Government, the security situation improvedagain. Starting in 2003, many members of the AUC were demobilized through an amnesty process, which included a promise not to be extradited tothe USA. But, as described below, the threat has notpassed, and the country continues the struggle tocontrol all of its sovereign territory.

he main security threats or Peru have been theactivities o the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path),a Maoist group which started its operations in the

Ayacucho region o Peru, close to the coca cultiva-tion centres o Apurimac-Ene. Its activities werelater concentrated in the Huallaga valley, Peruslargest coca producing area (Alto Huallaga). heleader o the Shining Path was arrested in 1992 andthe rebel group started to disintegrate. Links withdrug tra icking groups, however, enabled the Shin-ing Path to survive. In line with growing coca culti-vation in recent years, sporadic attacks against army patrols increased again a ter 2006.8

Li kag b w toc a d abili yIII.hr a

The progress made in Colombia over the last few years in reducing the threats emerging from thenarco-business has been impressive, as shown above.Nonetheless, the overall situation remains fragile. Without the continuation of efforts, Colombiacould fall back to where it was a few years ago.

As the cocaine economy expanded, the number o homicides rose in Colombia rom around 5,000 peryear in the late 1970s to some 30,000 in the early 1990s.9 But when the large cartels were dismantledin the early 1990s, violence began to decline again.

he smaller groups assumed a lower pro ile andavoided open con rontations with the authorities.Large amounts o cocaine continued to low out o the country, but homicides declined rom around28,000 in 1993 to 23,000 in 1998.




This trend was briefly reversed in the late 1990s, asboth the insurgents and the paramilitaries increasedtheir role in the drug business. The left-wing groupshave primarily taxed coca cultivation in the areasunder their control, with the FARC engaging in

some manufacture and local trafficking to neigh-bouring Venezuela and Ecuador. The paramilitary groups, on the other hand, increasingly focused onproviding services to trafficking groups, and eventrafficking themselves. At the beginning of thetwenty-first century, the AUC reportedly made

some 70% of its total income from drug relatedactivities, mostly related to the cocaine business.The international reach of the AUC tended to bemuch larger than that of the FARC, extending toMexico and in some cases to the USA.

When the Colombian Government began to regainterritory lost to the militants, the homicide ratebegan to decline again. Important areas controlledby the FARC, including some of the countrys cocaproducing areas, were recovered. The number of persons enlisted in the insurgent groups in Colom-bia (excluding the AUC) declined from 33,800persons in 2002 to 13,200 in 2007. From 2003, theGovernment also began to dismantle the 32,000-strong AUC. As a result, the number of homicidesin Colombia fell by some 45% between 2002 and2008 to 16,000 persons, the lowest number overthe last two decades.Similar trends to those seen in Colombia over thelast few years can also be observed in Peru. In line with a massive decline of coca cultivation in the1990s, terrorist incidents, mostly related to theactivities of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)operating out of the main coca cultivation areas of the country, declined drastically.

While revenues rom the cocaine business declined,

overall economic development improved. In Peru,GDP grew by 4% per year over the 1990-2000period, that is, more than the overall economicgrowth in Latin America and the Caribbean overthe same period (3.3% per year). Similarly, theColombian economy grew, on average, by 4.4% per

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2 0 0 0

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2 0 0 4

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2 0 0 8

R a t e

homicide rate in colombia (Per 100,000Fig. 6:inhabitants), 1958-2008

coca cUltivation and size oF illegal armed groUPsFig. 7:(FARC And ELn)

Sources: UNODC, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey, June 2009 and previous years.

6 7

, 2 0 0

7 9

, 5 0 0

1 0 2

, 0 0 0 1

6 0

, 1 1 9

1 6 3

, 2 8 9

1 4 4

, 8 0 7

1 0 2

, 0 7 1

8 6

, 0 0 0

8 0

, 0 0 0

8 6

, 0 0 0

7 8

, 0 0 0

8 1

, 0 0 0

9 9

, 0 0 0

13,20015,10014,000

33,80028,100

-

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000140,000

160,000

1 9 9 6

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h e c t a r e s

-

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

n u m

b e r o f p e r s o n s

Coca surfaceSize of illegal armed groups (enrolment)

Sources: Multiple sources10



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year over the 2000-2008 period, which was abovethe average or the Latin America and Caribbeanregion (3.6%). In parallel, corruption declined inColombia. In 1999, ransparency Internationalrated Colombia the country most a ected by cor-ruption in South America. By 2009, it had thesecond best rating, second only to Chile.11

Despite these remarkable achievements, the dangerhas not passed, and the armed groups have not beeneliminated. he Shining Path in Peru is still activeand has been launching attacks, particularly a ter2006. In Colombia, there were illegal armed groupsin 79% o the municipalities where coca was culti-vated in 2008, while in non-coca growing areas theproportion was signi icantly lower (27%).12 hereare also indications that some o the ormer mem-bers o the dismantled AUC have re-organizedthemselves to become ull- ledged cocaine-tra ick-ing organizations. Out o the 31,700 persons that

were enlisted in the various AUC groups in 2003,around 4,800 persons may have become membersin the new paramilitary/tra icking organizations.13

here have even been claims that elements in theFARC and the AUC are collaborating in producingcocaine.

area Under coca cUltivation and terrorist incidentsFig. 8:in PerU, 1986-2005

Source: DEVIDA, Cocaine production Monitoring in the Andean region,Lima, July 2004; UNODC cultivation data

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

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t a r e s

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N u m

b e r o f a t

t a c k s

Area undercoca cultivation

Terroristincidents




illegal armed groUPs and coca cUltivation in colombia,Fig. 9: 2008

Source: UNODC, Colombia coca cultivation survey, June 20 09



1

As the situation in Colombia improves, the situa-tion in neighboring Venezuela appears to be indecline. he single largest cocaine seizure in 2008

was 4.1 tons o cocaine seized rom a commercialvessel coming rom Venezuela, and 2.5 tons were

also seized on a ishing boat coming rom thatcountry.14 According to the new Maritime AnalysisOperation Centre (MAOC-N), more than hal (51%) o all intercepted shipments in the Atlantic(67 maritime events over the 2006-08 period)started their journey in Venezuela. Direct ship-ments rom Colombia, in contrast, accounted or

just 5%.15 Venezuelas murder rate has risen in recentyears, and is now among the highest in the world.Its standing in the ransparency International rank-ings has also dropped. At the same time, all availablein ormation suggests that pro its made by Venezue-lan organized crime groups are still substantially lower than those made by Colombian organizedcrime groups.

ra icking to markets in both North America andEurope may have generated Colombian drug tra -

ickers some US$6.6 billion in sales (US$6 billionin gross pro its) in 2008.16 his is more than twiceas much as the US$2.7 billion o gross pro its gen-erated by A ghan opiate traders in 2008. he grosspro its made by the Colombian groups were, how-

ever, equivalent to only 2.5% o Colombias GDPin 2008, while the equivalent ratio in A ghanistan was 26%.17

Colombia has long struggled with this intractableblend of organized crime and insurgency, and whileit has received international assistance, much of thishas been aimed at drug interdiction within thecountry itself. Significant progress has been madeby Colombia in recent years, but much more couldbe done on addressing the entire trafficking chainthrough better coordinated international efforts.

The problems linked to Colombias cocaine produc-tion not only have implications for Colombia itself but also for a number of other countries, includingneighbouring Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, othercountries of Central America, most countries of theCaribbean, Mexico, the USA as well as countries in Western Africa and Europe. Colombias problemshave been aggravated by factors outside its control,and this instability has likewise had an impact onareas outside its jurisdiction. To address a problemthat affects South America, Central America, North America, Europe, Africa, and the rest of the world,a global strategic plan to combat the cocaine tradeis needed.

dePartUre locations oF identiFiedFig. 10:drUg traFFicking shiPments by seaFrom soUth america to eUroPe,2006-2008

Source: Maritime Analysis Operation Centre

Venezuela51%

Brazil10%

Caribbean11%

Colombia5%

West Africa11%

Other

12%


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1

Cent ra l As ia


South-Eas tAs ia



E a s t A f r i c a

South-Eas tEurope

Wes t Af r i ca



Car ibbean





Gold

Cassiterite

Cocaine trafficking


Heroin trafficking








Wes t Af r i ca

-

th impa W Afri a1.2.

Main TOC threat Type of threat: Cocaine trafficking Areas mostly affected: Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Nigeria and destination countries Origin and destination of trafficking flows: South America to Europe Annual volume of main goods trafficked: 25 tons in 2008 Estimated value at the national/regional level: About US$1 billion (US$6.8 billion retail at destination

in West Europe)Criminal groups involved: South American, West AfricanLocation of traffickers: South America, West Africa, Europe

Stability threat Type of threat: Corruption, instability, violence Areas mostly affected: Guinea-Bissau, Guinea Armed groups involved: Rival military and non-military factions

Links between TOC and stability threatsNature of the link: Profits fund corruption, competition for access to profits

fuels violence Impact of TOC on the stability threat: Cocaine could drive violent changes of government and

associated conflict

Estimated trend: Stable to declining




Mai ra a i al rga iz dI.rim hr a

There are many transnational organized crime threatsaffecting West Africa, including the trafficking of cocaine, natural resources (including oil), cigarettes,counterfeit medication, women, small arms, toxic waste, and migrant workers. Of these, two forms of contraband currently pose a real threat to the stabil-ity of states in the region: cocaine and naturalresources. The other organized crime problems areserious for other reasons, but they do not concen-trate enough money into a small enough number of hands to pose a real challenge to the state.

Large-scale cocaine trafficking through the region was first detected in 2004, symptomatic of a shift inthe centre of gravity of the global market from theUSA to Europe. West African traffickers had longbeen active in small-scale import and marketing of cocaine in Europe, as they have been in many otherparts of the world. But around this time individualsbased in West Africa began to provide logistic assist-ance to Colombian traffickers in organizing theirmaritime shipments to Europe from at least twohubs: one centred on Guinea-Bissau and Guinea inthe north, and one centred on the Bight of Benin in

the south, both involving Nigerian nationals.Mother ships from South America could unloadcargoes to smaller craft from the coast, and thecocaine could be stored, repackaged, and redirectedto European buyers from this vantage. In exchange

for their services, it is believed that the West Afri-cans were paid in kind: they were allowed to retainup to one third of the shipment to traffic on theirown behalf, which they did mainly via commercialair couriers.

By 2008, the situation began to change. Height-ened international awareness of the threat madetrafficking via West Africa more difficult. In addi-tion, a series of events shifted the political terrain inthe northern hub. In August 2008, the head of thenavy of Guinea-Bissau fled the country under alle-gations that he was orchestrating a coup dtat. InDecember 2008, the man who had ruled Guineafor 24 years died, and a military cabal took control,later arresting two of the dictators sons and severalprominent officials for their involvement in drugtrafficking. In March 2009, the head of the army of Guinea-Bissau was murdered, and, shortly afterward, in an apparent reprisal attack, so was thepresident. Finally, a series of very large seizures of cocaine disappeared while in police custody. Theowners of these shipments, Colombian traffickers,

may have concluded that their West African part-ners had decided to keep 100%, rather than onethird, of the consignment, and terminated relationson this basis. Whatever the cause, both maritimeseizures and airport seizures on flights originating in West Africa virtually disappeared at the end of 2008(Figure 12). Some trans-Atlantic traffic may haveshifted to private aircraft, however, as the recentcrash of a Boeing 727 jet in central Mali suggests.Some may be trafficked by means as yet undiscov-ered. The cocaine trade through West Africa contin-ues, but apparently at a reduced rate of perhaps 25tons per year, with a retail market value of US$6.8billion at destination in 2008. However, there isanecdotal information from law enforcement circlesthat cocaine trafficking via West Africa may havestarted to increase again in late 2009 and in 2010 astraffickers are trying out new routes, including ship-ments via the Sahara for transit destinations innorthern Africa and final destinations in Europe.

West Africa has also been affected by trafficking of natural resources. One of the best documented casesinvolved the trafficking of diamonds from SierraLeone, often via Liberia, with the funds supportingthe rebel Revolutionary United Front and the crim-inal regime of Charles Taylor. While this trade haslargely been tamed due to the end of the war and the

Place oF cocaine seizUres (in kg),Fig. 11: 2005-2009

E

1,900

2,252

1,300 1,500

3,000

840

830

360

630

5003,100

588

120

1,250

674635

1,200

3,700

3,700

2,500

388

116

3,210

Countries that reportedseizures on land

*Only seizures above 100 kg are displayed

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009 Morocco

Algeria

Mali

Mauritania

BurkinaFaso

Togo

Niger

Benin

CtedIvoire

Ghana

Liberia

Sierra Leone

Guinea

Guinea-BissauThe GambiaSenegal

Cape Verde

Nigeria703

170274

160

1,884

500 km

Source: UNODC

U N O D C



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implementation of the Kimberley Process, an oldertrafficking flow endures: the illegal bunkering of oil from the Niger Delta in Nigeria.

Oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1956 and has

played an important role in domestic politics sincethat time. During the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), the rebel Igbo Biafrans devised simplified ways of refining the high quality crude of the Delta,allowing local marketing of stolen oil. Today, oilbunkering is inextricably entangled in the militantstruggle in the Niger Delta. A series of organizedarmed groups have demanded the Government andthe international oil companies give a larger share of the wealth of their land to the local people and tocompensate them for damage done to waterways

and farm land. These militants fund themselvesthrough a variety of criminal activities, includingkidnapping of oil company employees, but theirmainstay has long been the trade in stolen oil.

th abili y/g v r a i ua iII.

West Africa is one of the the poorest and least stableregions on earth. All but three of the 16 countriesin this region are on the United Nations list of theleast developed countries, including the five coun-tries with the very lowest levels of human develop-ment. Since independence, West Africa hasexperienced at least 58 coups and attempted coups,some very recent, such as the 18 February 2010coup in Niger. There remain many active rebelgroups in the region.

At present, o the 15 nations o the Economic Com-munity o West A rican States (ECOWAS), abouthal are experiencing some orm o instability. Long-standing insurgencies are ound in Cte dIvoire,Senegal, Mali, Niger and, arguably, Nigeria. BothSierra Leone and Liberia are continuing to recover

rom brutal civil wars. Mauritania and Guinearecently experienced coups dtat, and the presidento Guinea-Bissau was murdered by his own troops.

According to one recent rating o the 25 countries with the highest risks o instability globally, nine were in West A rica: Niger, Mali, Sierra Leone,Liberia, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Cte dIvoireand Benin.18

The United Nations maintains a number of politi-

cal and peace missions in the region, including theUnited Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA),the United Nations Peace-building Support Officein Guinea Bissau (UNOGBIS), the United NationsIntegrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone,United Nations Operation in Cte dIvoire(UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Libe-ria (UNMIL).


The greatest danger posed by cocaine is its extremevalue compared to that of local economies. Thisallows traffickers to penetrate to the very highestlevels of government and the military. Law enforce-ment officials can be offered more than they could

share oF cocaine coUriers detected at selected eUroPeanFig. 12: airPorts originating in west aFrica, 2006-2009

Source: IDEAS database

48%

35%30%

35%

59%

36%

15%

20%

28%

8%6%

1% 0%

5%

27%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr

2006 2007 2008 2009

s h a r e

W e s

t A f r i c a n




earn in a lifetime simply to look the other way. Thisextreme leverage has allowed traffickers to operate with very little resistance from the state, and there-fore little need to resort to violence. There appearsto have been some violence in elite circles as rivals

compete for access to these profits, however.For example, in Guinea-Bissau, several journalistsand activists have had to lee the country or go intohiding a ter they received death threats or reportingon military involvement in drug tra icking. Boththe then head o the army and the head o the navy appear to have been involved in making thesethreats.19 From 2007 onwards, high level o icialshave made similar accusations, including the Inte-rior Minister and the head o the Judicial Police, butnone has been able to challenge the military. Drugshave been detected arriving on military air strips,military o icers have been arrested in possession o hundreds o kilograms o cocaine, and there havebeen several armed stand-o s between police andmilitary orces concerning drug shipments. Drugsseized by the police are con iscated by the military and then disappear. Accused soldiers, as well as or-eign tra ickers, are simply released rom custody. In

July 2008, both the Attorney General and the Min-ister o Justice said they had received death threatsrelated to investigations into a cocaine seizure.20

he killing o the president and the army chie o sta in March 2009 appears to have been motivatedmore by personal rivalry between the two men thanby tra icking, although the latter was said to haveaccused the ormer o involvement prior to the2008 elections. he nature o the alleged coup plotby the head o the navy is even less clear. But giventhe evidence o corruption and the relative sizes o the contraband and the economy, virtually every political con lict has criminal undertones.

Guinea-Bissau is not unique in this respect. InGuinea, the presidential guard, commanded by oneof the presidents sons, appears to have been involvedin drug trafficking, alongside a number of highranking public security officials. Another of his sonshas also been accused of involvement. In SierraLeone, the Minister of Transportation resigned afterhis brother was implicated in the countrys largestcocaine seizure. Given their close ties to nationalofficials, it is perhaps not surprising that there islittle evidence of insurgents dealing in the drug.There have been allegations that rebels in the north

of Mali and Niger have been involved in trans-Sa-haran trafficking, but little evidence is currently available on this flow.

In contrast, oil bunkering in Nigeria has been very much a rebel activity rom the start, although thepolitical objectives o the thieves have always beenvague. he Niger Delta rebels argue that their por-tion o the country has been le t undeveloped and

subjected to environmental abuses, even as Nigeriasmost valuable resource is extracted rom the Delta.But as time has passed, it has become di icult todistinguish those with political motivations romthose with inancial ones. he integrity o the oiltrade is particularly important to regional stability because Nigeria accounts or over hal the popula-tion o the region and over 60% o the regionalGDP. Oil comprises 95% o Nigerias oreignexchange earnings and up to 80% o budgetary revenues.21 In turn, Nigeria is a key trading partner

or the other countries o the region, so a large shareo the regions population is dependent on the oilsector. housands have died in the armed struggle,

which itsel has absorbed a large amount o nationalsecurity resources.

From August to October 2009, Nigerian PresidentUmaru YarAdua o ered a pardon and cash pay-ments to rebels who laid down their arms, andmany o the most prominent leaders took him upon this o er. he major militant umbrella group,the Movement or the Emancipation o the Niger

Delta (MEND) declared a cease ire at the sametime. But in February 2010, MEND retracted thiscease ire, calling the amnesty process a sham and

warning the oil companies to prepare or all-outonslaught.22 he con lict and the smuggling con-tinue.

The countries of West Africa need help in strength-ening their capacity to resist transnational organ-ized crime. Recent efforts against the cocaine trade, with the support of the international community,have shown promising results. But, rich or poor,there isnt a region in the world that can be entirely shielded against transnational organized crime. West Africa remains particularly exposed, and theregion will continue to face serious potential threatsto governance and stability so long as transnationalcontraband markets are not addressed.



1

Cent ra l As ia


South-Eas tAs ia



E a s t A f r i c a

South-Eas tEurope

Wes t Af r i ca



Car ibbean





Gold

Cassiterite

Cocaine trafficking


Heroin trafficking








Ca

-

th impa M am ri a*1.3.

Main TOC threat Type of threat: Cocaine trafficking Areas mostly affected: Ports and border crossing areas in Mexico and

Central America and destination countries Main origin & destination of trafficking flows:Colombia to the USA Annual volume of main goods trafficked: About 200 tons Estimated value: About US$6 billion to Mexican groups (US$38 billion at destination)Criminal groups involved: Colombian & Mexican cartels and

Central American affiliates Location of traffickers: Colombia, Central America, Mexico, USA

Stability threat Type of threat: Violence, corruption, intimidation Areas mostly affected: Central America, Mexico Armed groups involved: Cartels

Links between TOC and stability threatsNature of the link: Cartels fight for control of territory Impact of TOC on the stability threat: Violence among criminals and toward state officials and

public; corruption, loss of territorial control Estimated trend: Increasing

* Mexico and Central America





A great deal of international attention has beenplaced on the drug-related violence in Mexico, withsome even arguing that the country is in danger of being severely destabilized. Less attention has beenplaced on Central America, where the murder ratesare four to five times higher than in Mexico, and where both the economy and the state are far lessrobust and resilient. While the drug violence hasbeen intense in places like Ciudad Juarez, Mexicosoverall murder rate remains moderate compared tomany other countries afflicted by the drug trade.On the other hand, the Mexican cocaine traffickersappear to be evolving into multi-crime groups, withthe ability to shift investment to other areas if thecocaine trade declines.

Unlike Mexico, the Central American countrieshave high levels of violence unrelated to the drug

trade a legacy of longstanding social divisions anddecades of civil war. The highest murder rates inthese countries are seen not in the largest cities, butin provinces with a special role in the drug trade,often ports or border crossing points. For example,the rural Petn province in Guatemala, particularly affected by the drug trade, has the highest murderrate in the country. The death count has risen overtime, as a growing share of cocaine trafficking isconducted through this region.

The territory of Mexico has long been used by traf-fickers as a conduit for cocaine destined for theUSA, but as noted above, the groups in Mexicohave progressively wrested control of this flow fromtheir Colombian suppliers over time. Today, some

180 tons of cocaine, bringing about US$6 billion tothe regional cartels, transits Central America andMexico annually. A sudden drop in consumption inthe United States after 2006 (Figure 14), almost

mUrder rates in mexico andFig. 13:central america, 2009

N I C A R A G U A

M E X I C O

U N I T E D S T A T E S

O F A M E R I C A

G U A T E M A L A

E L S A L VA D O R

H O N D U R A S

B E L I Z E

F O C U S

C U B A

G u l f

o f M e x i c o

P a c i f i c

O c e a n

Chihuahua

BajaCalifornia

Guerrero

Sinaloa

Durango

Hermosillo

Oaxaca

Michoacn

Nayarit

Morelos

QuintanaRooDistrito Federal

Colima

Jalisco

Tijuana

La Paz

Mazatln

Juarez

Manzanillo

LzaroCardenas

Mxico

500 km

200 km

Nogales

Mexicali

San Salvador

Guatemala

Tegucigalpa

Atlantida 108,4

Petn98

Corts 92,1

Izabal 91

N i c a r a g u a

B e l i z e

G u a t e m a l a

E l S a l v a d o r

H o n d u r a s

Sources: Official sources

Murder rate(per 100 000 inhabitants)

20 503 10 70 90 109

U N O D C / S C I E N C E S P O



1

certainly related to loss of supply, has renderedcompetition for the remaining market even moreintense. It may also be prompting trafficking organ-izations to diversify their operations.

The wealth associated with cocaine trafficking hascreated large and powerful organized crime groups.These groups command manpower and weaponry sufficient to challenge the state when threatened,including access to military arms and explosives.They also have the funds to sow widespread andhigh-level corruption.

In Mexico, the cocaine trade is now dominated by a number of cartels who compete to controlborder crossings and transportation routes. Theleadership, turf, and structure of these groups has

shifted over time as conflict both within andbetween the cartels, as well as enforcement efforts,force realignments. As of early 2010, the dominantcartels were the following:

Te Sinaloa Federation , led by billionaire,and Mexicos most wanted man, Joaquin ElChapo Guzman;

Te Gulf Cartel , once the most power ulcriminal organization in Mexico, now greatly weakened by the de ection o Los Zetas;

Los Zetas , ounded when a group o specialorces soldiers de ected to the Gul Cartel and

now operating as a tra cking organization inits own right;

Te Juarez Cartel , also known as the CarrilloFuentes Organization, which is struggling tomaintain control over its plaza (smuggling tur )in Ciudad Juarez, the city most a ected by car-tel violence;

Te ijuana Cartel , also known as the ArellanoFelix Organization, which is similarly strugglingto maintain control over the ijuana plaza.

Te Beltran Leyva Organization , a breakaway rom the Sinaloa cartel, now weakened by the

police killing o its leader, Arturo Beltran Leyva,on 19 December 2009.

La Familia Michoacana , a Zetas breakaway based in Michoacan but expanding, renowned

or its penchant or beheadings, quasi-religiousideology, and domination o methamphetamineproduction.

Perhaps due to the recent slump in the cocainetrade, these groups are progressively engaging in anumber of other organized crime activities, includ-ing migrant smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion(including taxing businesses) all crimes that were prevalent in Mexico before cartel involvement.

La Familia, which espouses a bizarre ideology com-bining aspects of evangelical Christianity with revo-lutionary populism, provides the most extremeexample, taxing businesses in the areas they con-trol and engaging in very public displays of violenceto soften resistance.

Though the total flow has declined, the share of northbound cocaine passing through Central Amer-ica (particularly Guatemala and Honduras) appearsto have increased. The groups involved in this regionare less well defined. For most forms of crime in theregion, the blame often falls on two street gangconfederations founded by deportees from the USA:Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and Calle 18 (M18).

But there is little evidence that these groups, com-prised of street youths intensely focused on neigh-borhood issues, are widely engaged in large-scale

transnational drug trafficking. Most are based ininland cities, far from the maritime routes along which most cocaine flows before arriving in Mexico.They are certainly culpable in street sales in theareas they control, but their capacity to engage inbulk transnational smuggling is questionable. Somemay be recruited as hit men by the Mexican organ-izations, but as they frequently tattoo their faces asa sign of their commitment to the gang, they areill-suited for any operation involving possible con-tact with the public or the authorities. The marashave engaged in demonstrative violence in the past,including the random killing of civilians, but thereis little to indicate they have any kind of politicalagenda, aside from avoiding police interference withtheir affairs.

Positive tests For cocaine UseFig. 14: among the Us workForce, 2004-2009

0.72 0.7 0.72

0.58

0.41

0.3

0.570.6 0.58

0.44

0.32

0.24

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*

%

General USworkforce

Federallymandated,safety-sensitiveworkforce

* January-JuneSource: Quest Diagnostics




The repeated arrests of high level officials in thepolice and the military, in contrast, suggest that themain traffickers in Central America are far moresophisticated than street gangsters, and are tied tosome members of the ruling elites, rather than the

underclass. There is also growing evidence of Mexi-can cartel penetration into Central America, par-ticularly regarding Los Zetas in Guatemala and theSinaloa Federation in Honduras.


The Northern Triangle of Central America is stillreeling from the brutal civil wars in Guatemala(1960-1996) and El Salvador (1980-1992). Theregion suffers from having one of the most unequaldistributions of income in the world, comparable

only to southern Africa or the Andean region. Smallelites working with strong militaries have longdominated countries in this region, exporting agri-cultural commodities, as well as engaging in otherlabor-intensive enterprises. All countries in thisregion score poorly in governance indicators, par-ticularly with regard to the rule of law (Figure 15),and the threat of renewed instability and conflictremains. Guatemala has long had a problem withvigilante justice, a response to a lack of police pres-ence in much of the country. Honduras experienceda coup dtat in 2009, when the serving presidentattempted to attain public support for an extendedterm of office.

As a result of this legacy of violence, instability, andinequality, the Northern Triangle of Central Amer-ica has the highest murder rate of any region in the

world, and very high rates of other forms of violentcrime (Figure 16). It has also experienced politicalviolence, and at times the distinction between crim-inal and political violence can be difficult to dis-cern. Street gangs appear to be a symptom, rather

than a driving cause, of this underlying violence.

Mexico is very different from her southern neigh-bors, having a much larger and diversified economy,a stronger government, and milder social divisions.Nonetheless, insecurity in some parts of the country has become intense, and drug-related corruptionhas had an impact on national institutions.


Organized crime threatens stability, to varyingdegrees, in both Mexico and the northern triangleof Central America. In some areas, the civilianpolice have been both corrupted and outgunned,and the military has been brought in to recaptureterritory lost to criminal groups. These groups havegone on the offensive, murdering a number of prominent law enforcement officials who dared tooppose them. For example, in December 2009, thehead of the Honduran anti-drug agency was mur-dered, as was Mexicos federal police chief in 2008.

Organized criminals also target rank-and-file policeofficers for retaliatory killings. In June 2009, 12federal police agents were tortured, killed, and theirbodies dumped when the Mexican police arrested ahigh ranking member of La Familia Michoacana.Civilians have also been targeted for demonstrative

Percentile rank oF coUntries andFig. 15:regions based on world bank rUleoF law indicator 23 , 2008

Source: World Bank 23

0 20 40 60 80 100

Guatemala

Honduras

Subsaharan Africa average

Mexico

El Salvador

Latin America average

OECD average

percentile rank

comParative regionalFig. 16:mUrder rates (Per100,000 inhabitants), 2008

Source: UNODC International Homicide Statistics

60.9

51.849.0

11.6

5. 21. 7

0. 0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

H o n

d u r a s

E l S a l v a d o r

G u a t e m a l a

M e x i c o

U S A

C a n a d a



1

attacks, such as 2008 Independence Day grenadeattacks in Morelia.

In all of these countries, corruption at the highestlevels, on occasion including the national heads of

police and drug enforcement agencies, has beendetected. For example, in Guatemala in August2009, President Colom fired the director general of the national police, his deputy, his operations head,and his investigations head after a large amount of cocaine and cash went missing. This was far fromthe first such purging in Guatemala in recent years.In 2005, the head of the drug enforcement agency,his deputy, and another top drugs official werearrested for drug trafficking after being lured to theUSA on pretence of training. The drug enforce-ment branch they commanded was itself a rework-ing of a previous agency, which had been disbandedfollowing arrests of members for similar diversions.The agency has been reworked yet again in 2009.

Similarly, in August 2008, the Mexican Govern-ment launched Operation Cleanup, aimed atpurging the top ranks of the police of drug cartelcorruption. The operation resulted in the jailing of both the interim commissioner of the Federal Policeand the acting head of the counternarcotics divi-sion, among others. The same month, El Salvadors

chief of police resigned when two top aides wereaccused of drug links. The corruption extends out-side the police, and has implicated other criminal justice officials, legislators, and members of stateand local government.

But this situation is complicated: accusations of drug complicity can be used to take out opponents,and some of those assassinated by the traffickersmay have been erstwhile collaborators. The fact thathigh level corruption continues to be detected andthe officials removed shows the struggle is very

much alive and that progress is being made.The complexity of the situation is perhaps bestillustrated by a drug scandal that began on 19 Feb-ruary 2007, when three Salvadoran representativesto the Central American parliament (Parlacen) inGuatemala were killed after inexplicably departingfrom their motorcade. Their murderers were quickly identified as the head of Guatemalas criminal inves-tigations division and three of his men. One of these arrestees claimed they had been hired to hijack the car, which was allegedly carrying cocaine worthUS$5 million. The arrestees were never able toelaborate, however, as they were all shot dead whilein custody in a high-security prison on 25 February.This incident led the serving Interior Minister to

tender his resignation. Since then, two key investi-gators have been murdered, and the United NationsInternational Commission against Impunity inGuatemala (CICIG) has accused the Attorney Gen-eral of interfering in the investigation of one of

these cases. Aside from its corrosive effect on law enforcementintegrity, the cocaine trade has also propelled themurder rate in the northern triangle of Central America to the highest in the world. Figure 13demonstrates the clear linkages between drug traf-ficking and violence. Contrary to what would beexpected, in none of these countries is the highestmurder rate found in the largest cities: rather, it isfound in provinces that have strategic value to drugtraffickers. For example, Guatemalas Petn prov-ince is rural and largely indigenous, two variablesthat negatively correlate with violence elsewhere inthe country. But it is also a major drug traffickingzone, where jungle landing strips provide easy accessto the Mexican border. Consequently, it has thehighest murder rates in the country. Other prov-inces have the misfortune of containing key traf-ficking ports, such as the provinces of Atlntida inHonduras, Sonsonate in El Salvador, Escuintla inGuatemala and Michoacn in Mexico.

Honduras has the un ortunate distinction o havingthe astest growing murder rate in the region, whichmay be associated with its increased use o thecountry as landing site or cocaine-laden aircra t

rom Colombia and Venezuela. It also hosts theprovince with the single highest murder rate in theregion: Atlntida, where one out o every 1000people was murdered last year. he capital o Atln-tida is La Ceiba, a well-known cocaine tra ickingport, and the site o clandestine landing strips.24 Asmentioned above, in December 2009, General Aris-itides Gonzales, director general o the nationalo ice or combating drug tra icking, was mur-dered. he General had gone on a campaign againstthe unauthorised airports ound across the country,some o which are said to be linked to the Sinaloacartel. Just be ore his murder, he had seized a majorstrip and threatened to take action against all prop-erty owners on whose land the strips were ound.

Some have argued that the violence in Mexico istied to the Governments efforts to stop the drugtrade, not the drug trade itself. While it is true thatenforcement can create instability in drug marketsthat can lead to violence, enforcement in countrieslike Guatemala is much weaker, and the murderrate is at least four times higher. In addition, mostof the deaths in the cartel wars are of cartel mem-




bers themselves, fighting over trafficking routes.These groups have shown their willingness to diver-sify into other areas of crime, and recent losses incocaine revenues seems only to have intensified theviolence. A policy of appeasement is impractical:

these people, and corrupt officials who supportthem, cannot be allowed to remain in place. Thetreatment is painful, but the alternative is to lose thepatient itself.

his may sound like an exaggeration, but many who have worked closely with law en orcement inthe region concur. In December 2008, the head o UN CICIG said, I the Guatemalan authorities areunable to stop the in iltration o Mexican drugcartels, in two years they could take over GuatemalaCity.25 President Colom has issued a series o stateo prevention orders in response to the violence in

which constitutional liberties are restricted or aperiod o time in certain parts o the country, andthere have been a series o attacks against laborunion leaders, environmentalists, and human rightsde enders.26 While Guatemala appears to be themost a ected, its problems are not unique, and thestability o all countries in this region requires thattransnational organized crime be controlled.

To do this, the states need support in strengtheninglocal law enforcement and governance. But evenmore important, they need the assistance of theinternational community in addressing the transna-tional flows affecting their countries. The drug warsthey face are fuelled by a cocaine trade that runs the

length of the region. Mexicos killers are armedlargely by weapons trafficked from the north, butalso from the south. Dealing with these threats willrequire both national institution building and aglobal strategy to address the relevant trafficking

flows.

51

5962

64

57

52

3135

4245 45

49

34

26

35

43

50

61

12 11 11 11 10 12

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

m u r

d e r s p e r

1 0 0 , 0 0 0

El Salvador

GuatemalaHonduras

Mexico

mUrder rate trends in mexico and central america (Per 100,000Fig. 17:inhabitants), 2003-2008

Source: UNODC International Homicide Statistics



2

Cent ra l As ia


South-Eas tAs ia



E a s t A f r i c a

South-Eas tEurope

Wes t Af r i ca



Car ibbean





Gold

Cassiterite

Cocaine trafficking


Heroin trafficking








Cent ra l As ia

Sou th-Eas tAs ia



South-Eas tEurope

s t Af r i ca

Wes t

Cen t ra lEurope


-

tRAFFIcKInG In HeRoIncHAPteR 2.

There are some 11 million heroin users in the worldtoday (a market worth some US$65 billion peryear). Heroin is arguably the worlds most problem-atic drug. More users die each year from problemsrelated to heroin use, and more are forced to seek treatment for addiction, than for any other illicitdrug. In addition, heroin is the drug most associ-ated with injection, which brings about a host of acute and chronic heath problems (including HIV).Heroin is also the illicit drug most highly associated

with a single source: upwards of 90% of the worldsheroin now comes from opium grown in Afghani-stan. Most of the profits of this transnational illicittrade in Afghan heroin (some US$55 billion a year)go to the drug traffickers plying two main routes:

Te so-called Balkan route, which traversesthe Islamic Republic o Iran, subsequently re erred to as Iran (o ten by way o Pakistan),

urkey and South East Europe to West Europe.

Te northern route, which mainly runs throughajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (or Uzbekistan or

urkmenistan) to Kazakhstan and the RussianFederation.

330 tons of opium are produced annually in South-East Asia, which generate around US$100 million

in gross income for the farmers. Profits for traffick-ers from Myanmar are roughly estimated at someUS$360 million. The total value of this flow in theconsumer markets is close to US$3 billion.

This chapter consists of three parts. The first willexamine the impact on South-West and Central Asia, the second, how South-East Europe, a key transit region, is affected, and the third will look atthe consequences of opium production and traffick-

ing for South-East Asia.


32/65



2

Main transnational organized crime threat Type of threat: Heroin trafficking Areas mostly affected: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia and

consumer countries Origin and destination of trafficking flows: From Afghanistan to Central Asia (25%), Pakistan (40%)

and Iran (30%) towards the Russian Federation and Europe and other destinations

Annual volume of main goods trafficked: 375 tons of heroinEstimated value: US$ 2.5 billion in Afghanistan/US$ 55 billion global market

for Afghan heroin

Criminal groups involved: Organized crime groups and individuals Location of traffickers: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia

Stability threat Type of threat: Insurgency, terrorism Areas mostly affected: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan Armed groups involved: Afghan Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Al-Qaida,

Haqqani network, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

Links between TOC and stability threatsNature of the link: Symbiosis of drug trade and insurgency Impact of TOC on the stability threat: Perpetuation of conflict Estimated trend: Stable

th impa s u h-W a d c ral A ia2.1.

Cent ra l As ia


South-Eas tAs ia



E a s t A f r i c a

South-Eas tEurope

Wes t Af r i ca



Car ibbean





Gold

Cassiterite

Cocaine trafficking


Heroin trafficking








Cent ra l As ia

l f a rea ,dd le Eas t

-



tRAFFIcKInG In HeRoIn


Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, having suffered decades of war and instabil-ity. Opium production in the country began roughly at the time of the Soviet invasion, and has grown tobecome a centerpiece of the economy. As in otherareas suffering from both drug cultivation andinsurgency, drug funds are used to buy weapons,

and thus perpetuate the conflict. But in Afghani-stan, where heroin production represents such alarge share of total output, the threat posed by thedrug trade is far more profound. UNODC esti-mates that Afghan traffickers earned US$1.9 billionfrom the trade in opiates in 2009, the equivalent of one fifth of licit GDP. The ratio was even higher inprevious years. The country, quite literally, is tryingto recover from a drug dependency.

Sources: UNDSS, Government of Afghanistan -National monitoring system implemented by UNODC

Security risk:

Opium cultivation(in hectares)

High Medium LowExtreme

20,000

70,000

500

5,000

* Federally Administrated Tribal Areas

Tra cking ow(in %)

30

20

10

2.5


200 km

Kandahar

Zabul

Hilmand

Nimroz

Farah

Badghis

Hirat

Badakhshan

Kunar

Nangarhar

LaghmanKabul

Day Kundi

B a l o c h i s t a n

Uruzgan

F A T A *

P u n j a b

B al o

ch

is t

a n N

o

r

t

h

-

W e

s t

Fr

o n

t ie

r

P

r

o

v

i

n

c e

P A K I S T A NI S L A M I CR E P U B L I CO F I R A N

T U R K M E N I S T A NU Z B E K I S T A N T A J I K I S T A N

P A K I S T A N

A F G H A N I S T A N

I S L A M I CR E P U B L I CO F I R A N

T U R K M E N I S T A NU Z B E K I S TA N TA J I K I S TA N

B a l o c h i s t a n

FATA *

oPiUm PoPPy cUltivation and insecUrity in aFghanistan,Fig. 18: 2009



2

Afghanistan has dominated the worldwide opiummarket for more than a decade and 2009 was noexception as overall opium production in the coun-try now stands at 6,900 metric tons, or 95% of global supply. The impact extends beyond Afghani-

stan itself, affecting neighbors with stability issuesof their own. An estimated 375 tons of Afghanheroin are trafficked worldwide via routes flowinginto and through the neighboring countries of Paki-stan (150 tons), Iran (105 tons), and the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turk-menistan (95 tons).27 Most of the drugs are boundfor the lucrative markets in Europe and the RussianFederation, but drug use in the region is rising.

The heroin trade is controlled by well-establishedtrafficking networks of various sizes in cooperation with corrupt officials with a range of internationalconnections.28 Some of the larger traffickers andcorrupt officials may launder their money interna-tionally, particularly in the nearby financial hub of Dubai. Despite robust efforts by Dubai authorities,29

the Emirates proximity to Afghanistan, the pres-ence of an important South Asian diaspora andlarge informal financial systems leave Dubai par-ticularly vulnerable to exploitation by criminalgangs and, possibly, terrorist groups.

In Afghanistan, where 80 to 90% of the economy is still informal, the hawala system of money trans-fer remains prevalent: money is paid to a networksrepresentatives in one country, and this brokerauthorizes the same amount to be paid out inanother. All this occurs outside the formal bankingsystem, and this allows criminal funds to be trans-ferred without risk of encountering official con-trols.30 Narcotics make up a significant portion of this informal economy.31 Research by UNODC in2006 suggested that 60% of fund transfers in Afghanistan were drug related, while an estimated80 to 90% of the hawala dealers in Kandahar andHilmand provinces were involved in drug money transfers.32 An estimated US$5 to US$6 billion were transferred to and from Afghanistan in 2004and 2005, through hundreds of hawala marketsaround the country.33

The smuggling of the chemical precursors neededto make heroin from opium is also a big business. Around 13,000 tons of chemical precursors, includ-ing the crucial acetic anhydride, are needed eachyear to produce heroin from Afghan opium. Thereis no licit use for these chemicals in Afghanistan, sothey have to be diverted from legal shipments froma wide range of sources around the world. In thespan of a decade, the price of acetic anhydride in

Afghanistan has shot up from US$24 per litre in1998 to US$300-350 per litre in 2008, either dueto more effective interdiction or increased demand.The concentration of processing in Afghanistanshould make it easier to interdict chemicals likeacetic anhydride, but current seizures comprise lessthan 1% of what is believed to be imported into thecountry.34

Although opium is Afghanistans most notoriouscrop, the hashish trade has also grown in recentyears, and total production today may rival that of Europes traditional supplier, Morocco. All of Afghanistans neighbors are reporting increases incannabis seizures,35 and cannabis production hasbeen reported in 20 of Afghanistans 33 provinces.36

With entrenched smuggling networks, widespreadinsecurity and a drug-based economy, Afghanistanis ideally placed to become a major player in theglobal hashish market. In 2008, a single seizure inKandahar province netted an astonishing 236.8tons of hashish with a regional wholesale value of

US$400 million.37

In terms of sheer volume, this was the largest drug seizure in history.

s abili y/g v r a i ua iII.

Afghanistan has suffered from more than thirty years of conflict beginning with the Soviet invasionof Afghanistan (1979), a war which would last tenyears, cost more than a million Afghan lives, anddestroy most of the countrys economy and infra-structure. Civil strife and warlordism followed theSoviet withdrawal (1988), so that many welcomedthe arrival of the Taliban in 1996. They ruled overmost of the country until the events of September11 2001 and the international coalitions interven-tion in Afghanistan. Eight years afterward, conflictremains a central part of life in the country.

oPiUm ProdUction in major ProdUcingFig. 19:coUntries (mt), 1994-2009

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

70008000

9000

10000

1 9 9 4

1 9 9 5

1 9 9 6

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

2 0 0 9

m e t r i c

t o n s

Myanmar

Afghanistan


36/65



2

lions of dollars worth of poppy, precursor chemicals, weapons, and ammunition.43 Although opiumpoppy is the highest-value drug on regional mar-kets, cannabis also likely contributes to insurgentfunding.44

Borders, particularly with Pakistan, still requiresubstantial strengthening, and the rise in volumes of goods traded across these borders provides opportu-nities for both traffickers and insurgents. The Afghan Trade Transit Agreement (ATTA), designedto promote free trade between Pakistan and Afghan-istan, is being abused by groups illicitly traffickingall kinds of goods, including precursor chemicals.The total estimated value of opiate trafficking inPakistan is around US$1 billion per year. Drugstrafficked into Pakistan that pass through its Feder-ally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), travelthrough territory that is under the influence of theTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and other Al-Qaidalinked groups. Taliban-style taxation systems havebeen reported in these regions as well.45 In southernTajikistan, the porous border with Afghanistan iscrossed by traffickers but also militants linked to theIslamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other Al-Qaida linked groups.46 The estimated value of opi-ates trafficked through Central Asia is aroundUS$350-400 million and increases as opiates travel

northward towards the Russian Federation.On Afghanistans western front, the Islamic Repub-lic of Iran has suffered greatly from the influx of Afghan opium. It has the highest level of opiumconsumption in the world. Drug trafficking is con-sidered such a major security threat that the Gov-ernment has spent over US$600 million to digditches, build barriers and install barbed wire tostop well-armed drug convoys from entering thecountry. More than 3,500 Iranian border guardshave been killed in the past three decades by drugtraffickers.

In addition to funding insurgency, the drug trade isfueling corruption. Afghanistan seized less thanthree tons of heroin in 2008 while about 375 tons were estimated to be trafficked out of the country,a seizure rate of less than 1%. This appears to reflecthigh levels of corruption among border guards andpolice, as well as collusion with transportation com-panies. In addition, few drug traffickers are everbrought to justice, and some of those that have beenconvicted have been pardoned, suggesting higherlevel corruption as well. At the same time, being amember of the judiciary has become a dangerousprofession. For example, Chief Judge Sher Gul wasmurdered by insurgents in Khost province in August

2008 while Judge Alim Hanif, who headed theCentral Narcotics Tribunal Appeals Court in Kabul, was murdered in September 2008.

Widespread corruption, violence, and impunity

have undermined the confidence of the Afghanpeople in their government, further strengtheningthe hand of the insurgents. Indeed, a portion of the Afghan Taliban are non-ideological, more oppor-tunistic fighters motivated by a mixture of politicaldiscontent and financial need. As the insurgentsand criminals grow stronger, they are better able tosow more violence and corruption, and recruitamong the disenfranchised.

There was little indication that this vicious circle would be broken soon, but there is hope that recentpolitical developments will alter the course of events. At present, various insurgent groups now controllarge swathes of the Afghan countryside, preventingaid from reaching some of the most vulnerablecommunities. At the same time, insurgents are ableto carry out brazen terror attacks in major popula-tion centers, such as recent operations in Kabul.Instead of focusing on the development needs of the Afghans, international aid is tied up in theeighth year of fighting the insurgency. Given thetranscontinental dimensions of the Afghan herointrade and the difficulties in combating drug traf-ficking in the context of an active conflict, interna-tionally coordinated action against the global heroinmarket is vital.


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39/65Case studies of transnational threats 33

Cent ra l As ia


South-Eas tAs ia



E a s t A f r i c a

South-Eas tEurope

Wes t Af r i ca



Car ibbean





Gold

Cassiterite

Cocaine trafficking


Heroin trafficking








2

Sou th -Eas tEurope

-

Main TOC threat Type of threat: Heroin trafficking

Areas mostly affected: Most Stability Pact countries and consumer countries

Origin and destination of trafficking flows: Afghanistan to Western Europe

Annual volume of main goods trafficked: 80 tons

Estimated value at regional level: Unknown (value at destination US$20 billion)

Criminal groups involved: Mostly Albanian and Serbian groups

Location of traffickers: Turkey, South-East Europe, Western Europe

Stability threat Type of threat: Fragmentation, ethnic violence

Areas mostly affected: Disputed areas of the Western Balkans

Armed groups: None active, but former combatants could be mobilized

Links between TOC and stability threatsNature of the link: Drug proceeds fund corruption and arm criminal groups

Impact of TOC on the stability threat: Strongmen may promote conflict to protect rackets

Estimated trend: Stable to declining

The impact on South-East Europe2.2.





South-East Europe has long been a transit zone foreast-west commerce, both licit and illicit. Theimpact of organized trafficking became particularly profound after the Cold War ended and Yugoslaviadissolved. During this time, organized criminalsforged connections with some commercial andpolitical elites that continue to have ramifications tothis day. As a result, organized crime in this regionis generally exceedingly well organized, and contra-band moves through the region with very littleresistance from law enforcement. This arrangementlacks the kind of confrontational violence currently seen in other countries, but it has had long-termimplications for the integrity and stability of the

state.In modern times, the key illicit commodity traf-ficked has been heroin. The end of the Cold Waralso saw an increase in trafficking in women for thepurposes of sexual exploitation from Eastern Europeto Western Europe, as well as a good deal of assistedillegal migration. During the Yugoslav wars, allmanner of materiel was trafficked, and cigarettes were a particularly important source of funds forthe conflict. After the wars ended, much of thisactivity declined, but trafficking, especially of heroin, remains an issue.

About 80 tons of heroin, worth some US$20 billionat retail level, is smuggled through South-EastEurope on its way to Western Europe each year.47

Very little of this flow is seized in South-EastEurope, and, while the precise routes have varied abit over time, this general flow has remainedunchanged over the years. Aside from ferryingheroin through the region, Balkan criminals have

played a strong role in heroin markets in WestEurope, especially during the war. This role appearsto be declining since that time, however.

For example, in 2000, ethnic Albanians were said tocontrol 70% of the heroin market in Germany,among other countries.48 Between 2000 and 2006,the number of Albanian heroin trafficking suspectsidentified in Germany declined by a factor of five.The German 2009 Organized Crime SituationReport discusses organized crime groups of ninedifferent foreign nationalities.49 Albanians, andBalkan groups in general, are pointedly not amongthem, and they are no longer singled out in officialreports on the heroin situation.50 Italy remains onekey heroin consumer market where Albanians play an important role, but, in 2008, only 6% of herointraffickers arrested in Italy were Albanian.

This decline in Balkan participation can be seen inother criminal markets as well. At one stage, womenfrom South-East Europe and Eastern Europe (oftentrafficked via South-East Europe) were clearly pre-

dominant among human trafficking victims in WestEurope, but this appears to have changed. Forexample, in the late 1990s, Albania was a predomi-nant source of victims. In 1996, about 40% of thevictims of trafficking for sexual exploitation detected


Sources: UNODC and World Customs Organization

Belarus

Ukraine

Germany

Czech Republic

Slovakia

AustriaHungary

Romania

Serbia

Bulgaria

The FYRMacedonia

Albania

Greece

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Montenegro

Netherlands

Belgium

France

Italy

Switzerland SloveniaCroatia

Turkey

SyrianArab RepublicAlgeria Tunisia 750 km

Poland

Spain

United Kingdom

> 1000 kg400 - 999 kg1 - 399 kg

Non-reportingcountries

heroin seizUre locations and volUmes (kg) rePorted, by city,Fig. 20: 2004-2006



2

in Italy were Albanians. This percentage dropped to22% in 2000-2003 and 13% after 2003. And Italy is the one country where Albanian victims are mostprevalent: of some 10,000 human trafficking vic-tims detected in Europe and reported to UNODCover the period 2005 to 2006, only 56 (about half a percent) were Albanian.52 A similar situation canbe seen with victims from the Russian Federation,

Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. Todayshuman trafficking victims come from a much widervariety of locations, many of them much furtherafield.

The trade in counterfeit cigarettes was once a main-stay of the belligerent parties, even a key source of funding to certain national governments, and itremains an important issue. But as far as stability inthe region is concerned, the biggest crime problemfacing South-East Europe is domestic: fraud andcorruption involving some government officials andtheir network of private sector partners. This cor-

ruption is fuelled by complicity in the heroin tradeand other trafficking activities. The region hasmoved on from the chaos of wartime to a period of transition, where opportunities in a rapidly growing

87

21

31

4351

89

103

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

nUmber oF albanianFig. 21:heroin traFFickingsUsPects identiFied ingermany 51, 2000-2006

40

22

13

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1996-1999 2000-2003 2004-2007

p e r c e n t

Source: Bundeskriminalamt

share oF hUman traF-Fig. 22:Ficking victims detectedin italy who were

albanian, 1996-2007

Source: Anti-ma ia Bureau and Project WES

economic growth in the balkans,Fig. 23: 2007-2009

Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF, April 200953

-6

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2

4

6

8

10

12

A l b a n

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B o s n

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B u

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t i a

F Y R O M

M o

l d o v a

M o n

t e n e g r o

R o m a n

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2007

2008

2009

E c o n o m

i c g r o w

t h ( % )




economy and the possibility of European integra-tion may prove more attractive than criminal rack-ets. Of course, renewed political conflict couldchange all this, as could the sudden downturn inthe economy.


Many of the states in South-East Europe are recentcreations, and new institutions are still consolidat-ing. The simultaneous stresses of the transition fromcommunism to free markets and the conflicts asso-ciated with the dissolution of the former Yugoslaviaplaced tremendous pressure on the region. It is stillrecovering from this difficult period.

Unrest between rival ethnic groups in the SocialistFederal Republic of Yugoslavia began in 1990, justas communism was collapsing across EasternEurope. Slovenia was able to secede in a relatively short 10-Day War, and the former Yugoslav Repub-lic of Macedonia was allowed independence with-out challenge. But the struggles in Bosnia andCroatia were much more protracted, extendinguntil 1995 and involving serious war crimes. These wars were followed by a conflict in Kosovo until1999, and within the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001.

These conflicts have yet to be entirely resolved.Bosnia and Herzegovina remains under interna-tional supervision, and tensions between the Fed-eration and the Republika Srpska have run high.Kosovo (Serbia) still hosts a large internationalpeacekeeping force and states are divided on thequestion of its final status. The global financialcrisis, which has had an especially negative impacton institutions investing in the Balkans, threatensthe progress that has been made.

Li kag b w toc a d abili yIII.

hr aOrganized crime has played a direct role in enablingconflict in the region and continues to play a role inperpetuating the residual instability. Under com-munism, organized criminal figures linked to thevarious national secret services smuggled consumergoods and performed other needed services that thestate could not directly perform. These skills wouldprove invaluable during the conflict period, whenevading sanctions was essential for all the antago-nists. They were also useful in navigating the priva-

tization process, where entrepreneurial instinct andinformal pressure played a key role.

During the Yugoslav wars, all sides depended onsmugglers. For the rump Yugoslavia, oil was essen-

tial; for other parties, weapons and other materiel.Many traffickers sold to both sides in the conflict.Some factions relied on trafficking as a source of funding. Smuggling cigarettes to the region andinto Western Europe was one important money

spinner, and heroin was another. Criminal activitiesextended beyond the region into the extensiveBalkan diaspora in Western Europe and throughoutthe world.

Even more directly, organized criminals were oftenamong the antagonists, deployed in volunteer bri-gades or paramilitaries or even as commissionedofficers of the warring factions. These groups wereresponsible for some of the worst atrocities of the war. One of the key objectives was to cleanse dis-puted areas of rival ethnicities, and for this, author-ized criminals were often more effective than amilitary approach. Rape camps were organized,making use of female prisoners of war,54 and traf-ficking in women for the purposes of sexual exploi-tation continued to be an issue even after thepeacekeepers arrived.55 In these ways, organizedcrime became an instrument of war. War and priva-tization took place simultaneously, and organizedcriminals were well placed to take advantage of thisprocess.56

Once the war in Yugoslavia began to cool, anotherfront opened up. In 1997, the economy and gov-ernment of Albania collapsed when a series of nationwide pyramid schemes ran insolvent. Aroundthis time, fighting began between ethnic AlbanianKosovars and the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and this continued through to 1999.The Kosovo Liberation Army received weaponslooted from the armories of Albania and supportfrom the Albanian diaspora community. It alsodrew funds from heroin trafficking, making use of diaspora networks in Italy, Switzerland, and elsewhere in Europe. In 2001, ethnic Albanians in theFormer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia rebelled, amove that some have said was motivated more by criminal interests than political ones.

During the conflict, Albanian traffickers enjoyed agreat advantage in the heroin market, due to chaosin their home areas and large diaspora populationsin several key destinations, in

unodc - crime & instability

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