ushahidi lessons learned

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Ushahidi 1100 North Glebe Rd. 22201 http://ushahidi.com Lessons Learned – March 2011 Author: Sarah George

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Lessons learned from Ushahidi deployments 2008 to 2011

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Page 1: Ushahidi Lessons Learned

Ushahidi 1100 North Glebe Rd. 22201 http://ushahidi.com

Lessons Learned – March 2011

Author: Sarah George

Page 2: Ushahidi Lessons Learned

Ushahidi Inc.

Lessons Learned, March 2011 2

Framing the Discussion

At the International Conference on Crisis Mapping (ICCM) last September Sabina Carlson, an Ushahidi Haiti

volunteer and liaison with Haitian diaspora, explained “People don’t speak in terms of data sets. They say

‘I’m Hungry’.” Her point is that the need for translation does not only refer to language but also applies to the

need to translate information into action. In the following discussion of crowdsourcing, it’s important to keep

this fundamental challenge in mind.

Crowdsourcing is a general concept – and various Ushahidi implementations apply the approach in critically

different ways. While crowdsourcing broadly implies information generated by many for the benefit many,

there are three distinct audiences or stakeholders for any individual campaign:

• Deployers (whether a group of citizen volunteers, an individual organization, or a multi-agency

partnership)

• Users (generating and/or actively using the content)

• Viewers (passive consumers of the shared information, similar to viewers of broadcast media)

While each audience is unique, they may also overlap. Many of the best crowdsourcing campaigns anticipate

the needs of all three audiences while others target a specific audience. Identifying stakeholders in advance

is important to the success of a campaign and will influence decisions during implementation. In addition, it is

important to consider a few key strategic distinctions:

• Local vs remote (virtual) deployment

• Permissive vs hostile environment

• Short term vs ongoing campaign

• Situational awareness vs direct / tactical response

• Direct reports and/or curation of (social & mainstream) media reports

• Trusted and/or anonymous public reporters

Again, recognizing these distinctions in advance will help determine what methodology to adopt during

implementation and will help establish clear and attainable goals.

Finally, when considering lessons learned it is also helpful to distinguish between different types of

deployments such as:

• Crisis Response

• Election observation

• Social / environmental advocacy campaigns

• Media / journalism

Page 3: Ushahidi Lessons Learned

Ushahidi Inc.

Lessons Learned, March 2011 3

Different types of deployments will incorporate different implementation strategies and target different

audiences.

Challenges

Quantity of information

Too much information can be problematic, especially in campaigns that tap into the flood of social

media (ie via Twitter or Facebook). Information overload is a serious concern.

Underreporting can lead to a dearth of reports in campaigns that rely on direct reporting from the

public. Barriers can include: lack of incentive, lack of awareness, lack of literacy, fear of intimidation or

reprisal, socio-cultural constraints such as reticence to share information / self-censorship, cost of

SMS if mobile is primary reporting mechanism, technical hurdles, the habit of public to passively

consume rather then produce information, etc

Qual i ty of information

Reports from public may not be relevant or detailed enough to be actionable.

Insufficient training of trusted reporters in the field can yield poor data.

Need to structure data for easy adoption and to mitigate rather than exacerbate information overload.

Need for information management (incident tracking) and data analysis.

Human capacity

Insufficient and/or inconsistent staff and/or volunteers to moderate (approve, geo-locate, verify).

Incoming reports can cause a critical delay as well as uneven quality of categorization / geo-location.

Lack of local language proficiency.

Lack of response capability.

Sustainability of large pools of volunteers needed to crowdsource translation, geo-location, report

moderation in large scale deployments.

Technical capacity

Page 4: Ushahidi Lessons Learned

Ushahidi Inc.

Lessons Learned, March 2011 4

Localization, customization and troubleshooting of software platform.

Low internet bandwidth on the ground.

When visualizing data, underlying map may lack detail.

Situat ional issues

Difficulty of navigating a field crowded with multiple agencies / responders (ie, Haiti and LABB).

Lack of reliable electricity / internet.

Cooperation of telecommunication companies if using mobile reporting.

F inancia l issues

While technology and raw data may be free, cost of hosting site, SMS, publicity, personnel, etc can be

prohibitive for small organizations / volunteer groups.

Security

Privacy protection is critical in repressive environments and in vulnerable populations such as children.

Page 5: Ushahidi Lessons Learned

Ushahidi Inc.

Lessons Learned, March 2011 5

Lessons Learned

Crowdsourcing platform must be easy to deploy, intuit ive, s imple to local ize / customize

Strong correlation between successful campaigns and technical capacity.

Crowdmap has reduced dependence on technical proficiency

Important to consider need for additional functionality and/or appropriate technology

When soliciting reports via SMS, procure a shortcode if possible

Use phone number recognition to auto-post reports from trusted sources

Start ear ly

Complete technical work prior to trainings and conduct testing prior to public deployment.

Establish protocols / clear workflows in advance. Haiti pointed to need and Libya demonstrates.

Also, need clear security protocols in repressive environments and when working with vulnerable

populations.

Invest in training of field reporters and site moderators / administrators to improve quality of data

Integrate into emergency preparedness strategy, ie too late to educate an impacted population during

crisis (Orciano 2010 civil protection exercise, BushFire Connect, OCHA Colombia earthquake

simulation)

Anticipate how a campaign will evolve, ie in Crisis from Response to Recovery to Rebuilding; in

elections from campaign / voter registration to Election Day to results announcement to post-election

Get the word out

Several deployments point to the importance of advance publicity / outreach via media coverage,

advertising, workshops & demonstrations.

Recognize that media may be reluctant to cover a campaign until after data is published and supports

a “story”, ie Stock Stopouts campaign received significant press coverage by adopting a publicity

strategy that included a post-implementation press conference to announce results.

Encourage media to use data as a source for their own reporting

Page 6: Ushahidi Lessons Learned

Ushahidi Inc.

Lessons Learned, March 2011 6

Uchaguzi and Plan International both suggest that real life demonstrations can to improve local “take

up.” Similar outreach efforts could be used with beneficiary populations and humanitarian orgs /

responders.

Consider the use of SMS Blasts. However, consider capacity issues. For example the Mission 4636

project decided not to send an SMS blast out of concern that systems were not in place to handle the

potential influx of information.

Radio can be an effective means for raising awareness and educating the public

Make Fr iends

Perception of independence (or lack of) may influence the public’s willingness to report.

Consider how to develop mutual trust.

Clearly define roles and responsibilities

In crisis response, “plug-in” to existing humanitarian response network. UN OCHA invitation to create

Libya Crisis Map suggests potential for “buy-in”

Partner with local NGOs who can create a feedback loops by both generating and applying data

Partner with local media (BBC Tubestrike, ABC Queensland Flood, Washington Post Snowmaggedon)

Local Matters

Utilize linguistic and geographic knowledge of local (and diasporan) population

Encourage capacity for local citizen response (Russian Wildfire HelpMap, Holoda.info HelpMap, New

Zealand earthquake)

Local populations can provide “eye-witness” accounts

Provide a channel for local population to articulate needs

Information Please

In addition to information aggregation and visualization, the need for data management tools

Provide “value added” information analysis

Page 7: Ushahidi Lessons Learned

Ushahidi Inc.

Lessons Learned, March 2011 7

Ask the right questions, ie PakReport asked public to report “What they See” rather than “What they

Need”

Humanitarian organizations and responders need structured information

Consider using trusted reporters in addition to crowd

Sufficient human capacity to process, manage and analyze data

Anonymous reporting is crucial in repressive environments / in vulnerable populations

Consider “low-tech” solutions such as paper and voice reporting

Conduct rigorous quality assurance

Motivat ion

Incentivize public participation by closing the feedback loop. London Tubestrike deployers noted that a

simple “Thank You!” in response to a public report would encourage subsequent reporting

Make sure that information returned to public is meaningful, useful and timely.

Utilize volunteer crisis mapping community to make social media actionable, ie crowdsourcing report

moderation, translation, geolocation, approval and verification in addition to reporting.

Universities for Ushahidi and the Standby Volunteer Task Force are confronting the need for a

sustainable, replicable, reliable and predictable pool of volunteers in large scale / ongoing deployments

Crowdsourcing is effective in exposing gaps in official response / monitoring.

Crowdsourced data can be used to evaluate veracity of official data (StopStockouts, Cuidemos el

Voto)

Crowdsourcing campaigns can serve as repository of eyewitness accounts / testimony (LABB)

Crowdsourcing can be used for long-term monitoring of environmental / health affects

Citizen reporting works when and where traditional media coverage cannot – ie inherent bias ofofficial

sources or inability to effectively cover thru traditional reporting, ie London Tubestrike

US Marines used UHP to identify “centers of gravity”

Page 8: Ushahidi Lessons Learned

Ushahidi Inc.

Lessons Learned, March 2011 8

NYC Medics were able to identify a hospital with capacity to utilize the resources they could mobilize

Geolocation services used in SAR operations

Be open to unexpected outcomes / application of data ie correlation between spatial distribution of

structural damage and report clustering in Ushahidi Haiti + direct communication between Mission

4636 volunteers and people on the ground may have had impact thru direct intervention