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Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc

Reasonably Traditional: Self-Contradiction and Self-Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre's Accountof Tradition-Based RationalityAuthor(s): Micah LottReviewed work(s):

Source: The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Fall, 2002), pp. 315-339Published by: on behalf of Journal of Religious Ethics, IncStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40018087 .

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REASONABLY RADITIONALSelf-Contradiction nd Self-Referencein AlasdairMaclntyre'sAccountofTradition-BasedRationalityMicahLott

ABSTRACTAlasdair Maclntyre'saccount of tradition-basedrationality has been thesubjectof much discussion, as well as the objectof some recent charges ofinconsistency.The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, PeterMehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that Maclntyre'saccountof rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the variouscharges of inconsistency brought against Maclntyre by these critics canbe understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) thatMaclntyre's account of tradition-based rationality presents a picture ofrationality with inconsistent internal elements, and (2) that Maclntyre,in the act of presenting his picture of rationality, makes the sort ofclaims to which his own account of rationality denies legitimacy,and thusMaclntyre's account is self-referentially incoherent. In response to criti-cisms of the first sort, it is argued that Maclntyre can further clarify ordevelophis positionto take the current criticisms into account without al-tering the fundamental aspects of his pictureof rationality.In responsetothe chargeof self-referential ncoherence, t is arguedthat the chargerestson a mistaken understandingof Maclntyre's position and of the nature ofjustification. In dealingwith these arguments,the authorhopesto not onlyvindicateMaclntyre'saccountof rationality against the chargesof some ofits recent critics, but also to shed some light on the nature of argumentsboth for and against relativism and historicism.KEY WORDS:radition-based rationality, Maclntyre, relativism, self-reference, ustification

this paper examines alasdair macintyre's account of tradition-basedrationality in light of several claims that his account is inconsistent.One of the primary goals of this paper is to clarify both Maclntyre'spositionand the claims of his critics.An additionalgoal is to consider howI would ike to thankNancey Murphyand Keith Coxforhelpfulcommentson earlier draftsof this paper.

JRE 30.3:315-339. 2002 JournalofReligiousEthics,Inc.

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316 Journal of Religious EthicsMaclntyremight respondto these criticisms and how, n someinstances,he might clarify or further develop his own position in order to takethese criticisms into account. In the process of doing this, I also hope toshed some light on the general nature of arguments both forand againsthistoricism and relativism.

Although the chief focus of Maclntyre's work has been the area ofethics and practical rationality and his concerns with rationality in gen-eral seem to have arisen from his morespecificinterests in moralenquiry,the focusof this paperis on Maclntyre'saccount ofrationality in generaland not as limited to practical rationality.Throughoutthis paper I con-sider a number of Maclntyre'sworks, with the central text being WhoseJustice? WhichRationality? (WJWR).At the risk of downplayingshiftsin Maclntyre'sviews over the last two decades, I attempt to present assympathetically as possible Maclntyre'sviews on reason and traditionas forminga consistent whole.The order of the paper is as follows: I begin by briefly surveyingMaclntyre's view of reason and tradition. I then outline a criticism ofthis view recently made by Jennifer Herdt. I begin with Herdt becauseI take her conclusion regarding Maclntyre that his position is self-contradictoryat its core to be the most extreme of the charges of in-consistency brought against him. Upon examination, however, I findthat the precise nature of Herdt's criticism is not clear, and that herargument to the effect that Maclntyre's position contradicts itself canbe characterized in two different ways, which make for two distincttypes of criticism of Maclntyre'sposition. With this distinction in hand,I next examine arguments against Maclntyre made by Peter Mehl andJohn Haldane and conclude that their arguments can be best under-stood as criticisms of the first type. After considering how Maclntyremight respondto these criticisms, I return to Herdt'sargument and sug-gest it can in fact best be characterized as a criticism of the secondtype.I then show how Herdt'sargumentrests on confusion between the ratio-naljustification oftradition-based claims on the one hand, and the truthof those claims on the other.

1. Maclntyreon ReasonandTradition1.1 Rational enquiryas tradition-dependent

The central contention of Maclntyre's account of rationality is thatrational enquirytakes place only within a tradition of enquiry.Thus, allrational enquiry is tradition-dependent.As Maclntyre says in WJWR,"There s no standing ground,no place for enquiry,no way to engage inthe practicesof advancing,evaluating, accepting,and rejectingreasonedargument apart from that which is provided by some particular tradi-tion or other" Maclntyre 1988, 350). InAfterVirtue,Maclntyreexplains


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Self-Contradictionand Self-Reference 317

what he meansby tradition:"A ivingtradition hen is an historicallyextended,sociallyembodiedargument,and an argumentprecisely npartabout he goodswhichconstitute hat tradition"Maclntyre1984,222).Sucha traditionofrationalenquiryprovidests adherentswith aset ofbackground eliefs about he world,as well as with a set ofprob-lemsorquestions hat membersofthe traditionattempt o resolveandthestandards f rationalustificationhatare tobe used nsolving hoseproblems.Thus,onMaclntyre'siew, he natureof rationalustificationis internal o traditions.Thisdoesnotmean,ofcourse, hat various ra-ditionswillnot shareany backgroundeliefs,problems, rstandardsofrationalustification.Onthecontrary, hat s sharedbetween raditionswillvary,andanytwo traditionsmayshare a greatdeal orvery ittle atall. For nstance,Maclntyre cknowledgesn WJWRhat,"Allhe tradi-tionswith whichwe have been concernedreferringo theAristotelian,Augustinian,ScottishEnlightenment, nd Liberal raditionsexaminedin thatbook]agree n according certainauthorityologicboth n theirtheoryand in their practice" Maclntyre1988,351).WhatMaclntyrestresses,however, s that what is shared between rival traditions, n-cluding aws of logic, s not substantialenough o serve as a means ofproviding rational esolution or hesignificantdisagreementsetweentraditions.Maclntyre asts his viewof reasonastradition-dependents an alter-native to the Enlightenment iew ofrationality.Accordingo the latter,reason standsindependent f andin contrast o tradition,ratherthanas something hat operatesonlyfromwithin a giventradition.On theEnlightenmentiewreason s externalotradition, nd t provides ll ra-tionalpersonswith universal tandards f reasonwhich,nprinciple,n-able themto settledisagreements etweenvarious raditionsn a ratio-nalfashion.Maclntyredoesnotargue hat suchatradition-independentview of reason s inherentlycontradictory,ut he contends hat it is anotion that shouldbe abandoned n historicalgrounds: he repeatedfailure intheperiod ncompassingndfollowingheEnlightenment)fanyone o find standardsof rational ustification hat secureuniversalassentfromall rationalpeopleprovides verwhelmingvidence hat theproject fdoingso is essentially lawed.1.2 Troubleurking:Relativismandperspectivism

Maclntyrerecognizes,however,that his rejection of tradition-independentnormsof rational ustificationand his insistencethat allrationality s tradition-dependentaises the possibilityof otherprob-lems,including elativismandperspectivism.f rationalstandardsaretradition-dependentas well as background eliefs andproblemso besolved),hen it mightseemthat it is impossibleoranytradition o ratio-nallyevaluateor criticizea rival radition.This s so because he rational


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318 Journalof ReligiousEthicsstandardsusedbyone traditionmightnot beaccepted s rationalbyan-othertradition.Thus,we couldsay that certainclaims of a traditiondifferent romour own wereirrational,butonlyin the sense that theywere irrationalaccordingo the standardsof our tradition.They mightverywell be perfectlyrationalaccordingo the standardsof their tra-dition. Since there is no tradition-independenttandardof reason toappealto, we wouldbe left sayingthat ourdisagreementwith a rivaltraditionwas not resolvablebyrationalmeans:whatemerges s eithera sort ofrelativismor non-rationalideism.Maclntyreputstheproblemthis way:

It may therefore seem to be the case that we are confrontedwith the ri-val and competing claims of a number of traditions to our allegiance inrespect of our understanding of practical rationality and justice, amongwhichwe can have no goodreason to decidein favorof any one rather thanof the others. Each has its own standards of reasoning;each providesitsownbackgroundbeliefs. To offer one kind of reason, to appeal to one set ofbackgroundbeliefs, will alreadybe to have assumed the standpointof oneparticulartradition. But if we make no such assumption,then we can haveno good reason to give more weight to the contentions advanced by oneparticulartradition than to those advancedby its rivals. Argument alongthese lines has been adduced in support of a conclusion that if the onlyavailable standards of rationality are those made available by and withintraditions,then no issue between contendingtraditions is rationallydecid-able. Toassert or to concludethis rather than that can be rationalrelativeto the standards of some particular tradition, but not rational as such.There can be no rationality as such (Maclntyre 1988, 351-352).

Thus, heproblems that whereasMaclntyre's oalwas toprovide viewofrationalityas tradition-dependent,is viewappears o collapse ntowhat is notrationalityat all,butrelativismor fideism.Maclntyre allsthisview the viewthat"Everyet ofstandards,very raditionncorpo-ratinga setofstandardshas asmuchandas little claim oourallegianceas anyother"-the "relativist hallenge"Maclntyre 988,352).Maclntyrealso cites a relatedchallengeto his view of tradition-dependent ationality, challengeherefers o as the"perspectivisthal-lenge."Whereas he relativistarguesthat rationalchoicebetween ra-ditions s impossible ccordingo Maclntyre'sccount,heperspectivistarguesthat becauseno singletraditioncan showitself to be rationallysuperior o its rivals,no traditioncan claimuniquelegitimacyor ex-altedstatusovera rivaltradition.Thus,notraditioncanclaimthat itstheoriesare "true"n contrast o the incompatibleheoriesof its rivals."The olution, o the perspectivist rgues, s towithdraw he ascriptionoftruthandfalsity,at least in the sensein which true'and'false'havebeenunderstood o farwithinthe practiceof suchtraditions,bothfromindividualheses andfrom hebodiesofsystematicbeliefofwhichsuch


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theses are constitutive parts" (Maclntyre 1988, 352). Accordingto thisview, then, the implicationof Maclntyre'snotion of rationality is that notradition should be seen as offeringus an account of what is "true"; achtradition is only offeringits own perspective in contrast to the perspec-tives of the others.1.3 Whytradition-dependent rationality does not lead to relativismorperspectivism

Tocounter the contentionthat tradition-dependentrationalityleads toeither relativism or perspectivism, Maclntyre offers an account of howtraditions of rational enquiry develop and how they can enter into ra-tional competitionwith each other, even though this competitionis notbased on an Enlightenment-style appeal to tradition-independentstan-dards of rationality. Accordingto Maclntyre, traditions of enquiry passthroughseveral well-defined stages. Beginning froma stage in which re-ceived authorities are accepted unquestionably,a tradition next movesinto a stage in which inadequacies in the acceptedbeliefs are identifiedbut not resolved, and from there into a third stage in which "response othose inadequacieshas resulted in a set ofreformulations,reevaluations,andnew formulationsand evaluations, designedto remedyinadequaciesand overcomelimitations"(Maclntyre 1988, 355). Once this third stagehas been reached,participants in the tradition are in the positionto rec-ognize a discrepancybetween the world as they now understand it andtheir previouslyheld beliefs about the world.This lack ofcorrespondenceis what participants refer to when they call those previouslyheld beliefs"false" Maclntyre 1988, 356). As a tradition advances, its members for-mulate beliefs andtheories and test them througha processofdialecticalquestioning. The goal of this process is to arrive at true beliefs beliefsthat do not suffer the same inadequaciesthat are now apparentin previ-ous beliefs now seen to be false. "To laim truth for one'spresent mindsetand the judgments which are its expression is to claim that this kind ofinadequacy,this kind of discrepancy,will never appear in any possiblefuture situation, no matter how searching the enquiry,no matter howmuchevidence is provided,no matter what developmentsin rational en-quirymayoccur"Maclntyre1988, 358). The ability to survive dialecticalquestioning is the criterion accordingto which the claims of a traditionmay bejudged to be true.As a tradition of enquirymoves forwardhistorically,it is always char-acterized by a certain set of unsolved problems, and rational progresswithin a tradition is judged by the ability of the adherents of the tradi-tion to deal with their set of problems, solving problems that were leftunsolved by their predecessors and explaining why those problemshadso far been left unsolved, as well as expandingthe scopeand explanatory


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320 JournalofReligiousEthicspowerofthetradition.Aparticularheorywill be ustifiedwithina tradi-tionaccordingo its ability o contribute o this sort ofprogress.That s,it willbejustifiedon the basisofits ability o bothexplainandovercomethe inadequacies f its predecessorsn the traditionup to the presenttime.An importantcorollary f this is that justificationwithin a tra-dition will alwaysbe tied to the historyof that tradition,because t isin relation to its predecessorsn the tradition(andnot in relation togeneric, imelessrational tandards)hat a theory sjustified.Thus, hejustificationof a theory s always inseparable rom the writingof thehistoryof the traditionup to that point.Thisis whatMaclntyre eferstowhen he says:"Toustifyis to narratehow the argumenthas gonesofar" Maclntyre 988,8).Suchrationalprogresswithina tradition,however,s not inevitable,andthis is a keyfact in Maclntyre'srgumenthattradition-dependentrationalitydoes not entail relativism or perspectivism.At any giventime,a traditionmayconfrontwhatMaclntyre efers o as an"epistemo-logicalcrisis" Maclntyre1988,361-362).1This is a situation n whicha tradition's"hitherto rusted methodsofenquiryhave become terile"(Maclntyre1988, 362). The tradition is no longerable to solve theproblems hat it has set foritself;newinadequacies ndincoherenciesare recognizedwithin the tradition for which its practitionershaveinsufficientconceptual esources o resolvewhilemaintaininghe corebeliefsand rationalstandardsof the tradition.Such a crisismightberesolvedand a tradition aved if newconceptual esources an be usedto solvethe irresolvable roblemsn such a waythat alsoexplainswhythey had beenunsolvablebefore,as well as maintainsa fundamentalcontinuitybetweenthe new conceptual esourcesand the beliefs andstandardsofthetradition o far.However,t is also possiblethat such a crisismaynot be solvedbyits adherents. n this situation, he adherentsof the tradition n crisismightturnto a rivaltradition orhelp.In order o dothis, the adher-ents ofthe tradition n crisis must first learnthe second raditionas a"secondirst language" theymustcome o understand t conceptuallyon its ownterms,ratherthan simply rom he perspective ftheirorig-inal tradition.Havingcometo "speak"he languageof twotraditions,adherentsof a traditionn crisismightdiscover hat the rival traditionprovidesheconceptual esourcesackingntheirowntradition osolve,bytheirownstandards frationality,heproblems ftheirown raditionwhichhad ledto anepistemologicalrisis,and also toexplainwhythoseproblemswereunsolvablerom he perspective ftheoriginal radition.Recognizinghe superiority f the rivaltradition n this way,membersofthe tradition n crisismaychoose o abandonheirtraditionn favorofone of its rivals.Thisprocessofabandoning netraditionn favorof

1See also Maclntyre 1977.


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another constitutes the way in which there may be rationality across(and not only within) traditions, even though there can be no appeal toEnlightenment standards of tradition-independent rationality.Rationalcompetitionbetween traditions takes place on the basis of the ability ofone tradition to solve both its own problems and the problems of rivaltraditions by the rivals' own standards.How does this account of rationality between traditions via episte-mological crisis and problem-solvingshow that Maclntyre's tradition-dependent rationality does not lead to relativism? The claim thattradition-dependentrationality leads to relativism depends on the claimthat, given tradition-dependent rationality, we can have no way of de-ciding rationally between competingtraditions, and each tradition willalways judge its own claims to be rationally acceptableby its own stan-dards of reason. Maclntyre's account of crisis and competition shows,however, how a tradition may fail by its own standards of rationalityand how a traditionmay rationally competewith another on the basis ofits ability to solve its rival'sproblemsbetter than the rival tradition cansolve them itself. Thus, we have a criterion accordingto which we maymake a rational choice of one tradition over another: "It is in respect oftheir adequacyorinadequacyin responses to epistemologicalcrises thattraditions are vindicated or fail to be vindicated" Maclntyre 1988, 366).Similarly,this accountof rational competitionbetween traditions is arejoinderto perspectivism. Like the relativist, the perspectivist claimsthat we cannot decide rationally between traditions. The perspectivistthen takes this claim, which is about the relativism of the justifica-tions for ourbeliefs, and goes on to argue that in view of this relativismwe should abstain from referring to our beliefs as "true" or "false."Thus, the perspectivist argumentregardingtruth claims depends on thepremise that "noclaim to truth made in the name of any one competingtradition coulddefeat the claims to truth made in the name of its rivals"(Maclntyre 1988, 367). But Maclntyre's account shows how, from theperspective of tradition-dependent rationality, the claims of one tradi-tion can defeat, in a rational way, the truth claims of a rival tradition,and thus perspectivismis undermined.

2. Is Maclntyre'sAccount of Reason and TraditionSelf-Contradictory?A number of thinkers have questioned the coherence of Maclntyre's

theory of tradition-based rationality and the rationality of competingtraditions.Perhapsthe most severe criticism ofMaclntyre'sunderstand-ing of rationality has been made by Jennifer A. Herdt, who argues thatMaclntyre'saccount is self-contradictory.Herdt argues that Maclntyre,in his accountof rationalcompetitionbetween traditions,has offered ustthe sort of tradition-independentmeans of rationaljustification that he


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322 Journal of Religious Ethics

earlier claimed could not be attained: "It seems, then, that by offeringwhat he claimed on empirical grounds could not be provided,that is,a tradition-independent mode of rational justification, Maclntyre hascontradictedhimself; he has provedhimself a liberal at just that pointwhere he is most specific in his indictments of liberalism"(Herdt 1998,537).Herdt seems to acceptthe line ofreasoningthat Maclntyre presents inWJWRwhichsuggests that in the absence of somewaytojudge rationallybetween conflictingtraditions, we are in a position of relativism with re-spectto rival traditions. Thequestion,then, is whether ornotMaclntyre'sclaims about the tradition-dependent nature of reason mean that wehave nowaytojudge rationallybetween conflictingtraditions.Ofcourse,Maclntyre'saccount of traditions in epistemologicalcrisis and the abilityof some to better deal with those crises was meant to be a descriptionofjust such a waythat a tradition can be rationallyvindicatedagainst rivaltraditions,andof how members of one traditionmaymake a rationaldeci-sion to abandon their originaltraditionin favor of a rival traditionjudgedto be superior.The problemwith this account,according o Herdt, is thatin offeringit Maclntyre has provideda tradition-independentstandardof rationaljustification, which is preciselywhat he earlier claimedcouldnot be done. Thus, Maclntyre is caught in a dilemma: "It would seemeither that his theory of rational conflict-resolution is correct,thus dis-proving his empirical claim about tradition-dependence,or this theoryfails, in which case he has not succeededin showing a way to escape theroadfromhistoricism to relativism"(Herdt 1998, 527).Herdtpoints out that Maclntyre'saccount ofrational conflict betweencompetingtraditions can be formulatedas a universal standard orprin-ciple of rationality,which she formulates thus: "Whena tradition B canprovidea cogent and illuminating explanation of an epistemologicalcri-sis faced by rival tradition A accordingto tradition A's own standards,and B does not face a similar crisis, then rationality requires membersof A to acknowledgethe superiorrationality of B. I will call this principleRt"(Herdt 1998, 535). It is this principle, Herdt argues, that makes aswitchbetween traditionsrational,andwithout it such a switch wouldbeirrational. She acknowledges that this principle is tradition-dependentin several ways: it employs concepts that were developed within spe-cific traditions,2its applicationrequires evaluating particular issues intheir context, and the person who evaluates particular issues in con-junction with Rt must begin with his or her own context (Herdt 1998,537). However,she insists that Rt is tradition-independent insofar as:

2Herdt'schiefexamplehere is that Rt makesuse ofempathetic imagination,which sheargues is, ironically,a virtue that grew out of the liberal traditionthat Maclntyreintendsto criticize.


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Self ContradictionndSelf-Reference 323"(1)hetheorys notrestricted o validuse within hetraditionnwhich tarose; 2) t transcends ndabstracts romconcrete ssues withinagiventradition; nd(3)it can be articulated part romany particularssues"(Herdt1998,537).Noting hatMaclntyre'sccountsthustradition-independentnsomewaysand radition-dependentnothers,Herdtasks:"Is his asimplecon-tradictionwithinMaclntyre'shought,or s itpossibleo movebeyondheimpasse?"Herdt1998,538).Thesolution hesuggests s thatMaclntyreprovidean argument o show that Rt is a theoryofrationalitypresup-posedbyall rational raditions s such.Sucha transcendentalrgumentwoulddefeatrelativismby showing hat Rtis available o all traditionsbecauset is an essentialpartof the developmental rocessof traditionsas such,a process hat is the result not merelyof the contingent actsof humannature,butoflogicalnecessity.At the sametime,however, naccountofRt that showed t to be a tradition-transcendentaltandardofjustificationwouldsatisfythe demand hat our standardsof ratio-nalitybe understood s tradition-dependent,ecause Rt is somethingthatemerges ullyfromwithinthe historicaldevelopmentftraditions.Thus,Maclntyrecould"continue o insist that all our conceptual e-sources ome romwithinthe historicaland culturalmatrix n whichweare embedded" hilestill maintaininghat "rational ebateand choiceamongrivaltraditions s possible,becauseof thegeneralstandardspre-supposedbytraditionsofenquiry"Herdt1998,541).

3. Two Sorts of Criticism, Two Kinds of ContradictionWhatare we to make of Herdt'sassessmentof the contradiction e-tween Maclntyre's ccountof tradition-dependentationalityand hisformulation f a tradition-independentayofrationallyevaluatingri-val traditions?Wecanbeginbypinpointinghe exactplacewhereHerdtlocatesthe contradictionn Maclntyre's hought.As we haveseen,sheseems to suggest in several places that the problem s simplythatMaclntyre's ccountof competition etweentraditions whichshe for-mulates intothe rationalprincipleRt)is tradition-independent,hichcontradictshis claim that standards of rationality are tradition-dependent.Butthen Herdtherselfgoeson to note thatMaclntyre'sRtistradition-independentn somewaysandtradition-dependentn others.Thismoveallowsus to see howMaclntyre's ccountmaybe understoodas fullyconsistentwithoutan appeal o transcendental tandardsof ra-

tionalitynecessarilypresentwithin all traditionsof enquiry.WemaysimplysaythatMaclntyre'sccount f Rtis tradition-dependentnall ofthe essentialsensesinwhichone s to understand he standards f ratio-nalityto betradition-dependent. ost mportantly, thas arisenoutofaparticularAristotelian-Thomisticradition n whichMaclntyreocates


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324 JournalofReligiousEthicshimself,and to understandRt we mustunderstandt in termsofits his-torical ontextwithin hatparticularradition.Moreover, twillberatio-nally ustifiedwithin ts traditionbyreferenceo thehistoryofthat tradi-tion,andthesupporthat someoneoutsideof that traditionwill haveforbelievingRtwilldependonthestatus of the broaderradition fwhichRtis a part.Thought mightbepossible oformulateRtin sucha waythat"transcends ndabstractsromconcretessues withinagiventradition,"it neverthelessremains he case that Rt,even as formulated yHerdt,is related o specificquestionsabout he natureof rational ustificationacross raditions,questions hat have arisen nparticular istorical on-texts and must be understoodn relation o the historical raditionsnwhich heyarepresent.Given he fact hat Herdtherselfrecognizeshese differentwaysofun-derstandingradition-dependencendtradition-independenceut stillsees a contradictionn Maclntyre'shought,we maywell ask furtherabout whereexactlyHerdtfinds self-contradictionn Maclntyre's c-countofrationality.Whatabouther claim that partofthe problematictradition-independencef Rt is that Rt is "notrestricted o valid usewithin he traditionnwhich t arose"? hetrans-traditionalpplicationof Rt in contrast o claims abouttheory-dependenceappears o be akeypartofwhat Herdtfindscontradictoryn Maclntyre's ccount.Wemightrestate the problemhat Herdtseemsto be raising n this way:"You,Mr.Maclntyre, ay that reasononlyworkswithintraditions,butthenyouoffera theoryof reasonthat worksnotonlyin yourtraditionbutacross raditionsas well."Now, t is possible o understandhis crit-icismin twoways:either as (1) a criticismregardinghe coherenceofthetheoryofrationalityincluding is account frationalitybothwithinandbetweentraditions) hat is presented n Maclntyre's laims,or as(2) a criticismregarding he coherenceof Maclntyre's bilityto makethese claims. The first sort of criticismarguesthat in layingout histheoryofrationalityMaclntyremakes certainclaims andemployscer-tainconcepts hat areinconsistentwith oneanother.The second ort ofcriticismarguesthat in the act of makinghis claims aboutrationality,Maclntyrecontradicts implicitlyor explicitly) he contentof his ownclaims.3 t seems to me that Herdt'sargumentcan be best construedas an argumentof the secondsort. Butbeforeconsidering ow Herdt'spositionmightbe characterizedn this way, et us consider wo otherarguments fthe first sortagainstMaclntyre's osition.

3This second sort of criticism is a charge of self-referentialincoherence, such as isexhibitedif I say to you, "Ihave neveruttered a word ofEnglish."The first sort of criticismis the chargeof plain-old ncoherence,such as is exhibitedif I say to you, "That igurehasfoursides and it has onlythree sides."


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3.1 Rational standards across traditions: Weakand strongThe first sortof criticism can be stated as follows:Ifpeoplearereallytogo through the process of evaluating rival traditions in the manner thatMaclntyre suggests, they must have a degree of tradition-independentrationality, but Maclntyre denies that they have access to this andthereby contradicts himself. Peter Mehl and John Haldane each offera criticism of this type. In comparing Maclntyre to Basil Mitchell,Mehlargues that "Maclntyre acitly assumes, as Mitchell explicitly does, thatwe have a degree of rationality independent of tradition"(Mehl 1991,23). Mehl points out that on Maclntyre's account of progress withina given tradition, all traditions seem to possess some common ratio-nal standards, even if those are very general: "achieving consistencyand comprehensiveness seem general marks of rationality, things to beachievedby all inquirers in any tradition"(Mehl 1991, 35). Likewise, indescribingwhat would count as a solution to an epistemological crisis,Maclntyre offers general standards of rationality to judge the degreeto which an epistemological crisis has been resolved (Mehl 1991, 35-36). Moreover,Maclntyre's description of an adherent of one traditionswitching to another suggests that there are some standards of rational-ity that are shared. If not, then it would be impossible for an individualto see another tradition as resolving the difficulties in her own. As Mehlexplains: "His claim that one tradition can see the new resources fromanother,resolving incoherencies,means that there are commoncharac-teristics at some level, even if very general. How else couldthey see theincoherence fade with the new explanation; how else could they speakaboutadequateorinadequate solutions?" Mehl1991, 36). Mehlsuggeststhat Maclntyreis not clear about the existence of such general standardsof rationality across traditions, and that the lack of clarity is related toMaclntyre'sclaim that substantive continuity with the old tradition isnot retained when one switches traditions (unlike when the resolutionof a crisis comes fromwithin a tradition). The word"substantive,"Mehlnotes, is ambiguous.Ifwe take it in a strongway so as to implythat thereare no standardsofrationalitythat are retained acrosstraditions,then itseems that the decisionto switch traditionswas essentially non-rational,a leap offaith. This is so becauseif there were no standards ofrationalityacross traditions, then the second tradition could in no way show itselfsuperior to the first tradition except on its own terms as isolated fromother traditions, and the first tradition could then do the same as well,in which case there would be no rational reason for choosing one overthe other.But this is just the sort of relativism that Maclntyre'saccountwas meant to avoid, of course. Thus, Mehl concludes, and I agree withhim, that we should not understand Maclntyre's statements about thesubstantive break from one tradition to the next as denying that there


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are certain very general standards of rationality such as consistencyand comprehensiveness that hold across traditions. If this were not so,rationality across traditions truly would be impossible.WereMaclntyre to concede this point, would that not lead to a con-tradiction with other aspects of his picture of rationality,especially hisinsistence that rationality is tradition-dependent? I do not think so.Maclntyre already suggests that such general, trans-traditional stan-dards of rationality exist4 and his insistence on the tradition-dependentnature ofrationality does not mean that there can be no placeforgeneralstandards of reason shared by all traditions. Rather,Maclntyre distin-guishes between the most general, "weak" tandardsofrationality suchas consistency and comprehensiveness which all rational traditionsshare, and the "stronger" ational standards, which vary fromtraditionto tradition. The more general standards are "weak" nsofar as they areinsufficient for deciding between incompatible views on issues of sub-stance. The "strong" tandards, on the other hand, do provide reasonsfor choosing between incompatible views. An example of the strongertype of rational standard that is not in the realm of practicalrationalitymight be a principle stating that only ideas which are clear and distinctshould be accepted as true. In WJWR,Maclntyre does not discuss thisdistinction at length. In that book much of Maclntyre's historical dis-cussion centers on divergent standards of rationality drawn from thearea ofpracticalrationality,and most of those examples of rational stan-dards seem to involve more than the "weak"standards of consistencyand comprehensiveness.5However, n ThreeRival VersionsofMoralEn-quiry Maclntyre states more explicitly this distinction between weakand strong standards of rationality,as when he says that, "Theacceptedstandards of rationality, insofar as they are generally shared, providecontemporaryacademicpracticewith only a weakly conceived rational-ity,onecompatiblewith the coexistence ofwidelydivergent pointsofview,each unable, at least by those generally accepted standards, to provideconclusiverefutations of its rivals"(Maclntyre 1990, 172).With this distinction, we can see how Maclntyre is able to saythat standards of rationality vary across traditions these are thestrong standards while also assuming a minimum of general (trans-traditional6)rationality the weak standards which allows forrational

4See the previouslynotedquotefromMaclntyre1988, 351, as well as a related treat-ment of the Thomistic notion of first principlesin Maclntyre1990a, 9-11.5See, forexample,the accountof Hume'sstandards ofpracticalrationalityversus thoseofAristotle,Maclntyre1988, 300-310.61 think that the phase "trans-traditional"s perhapsa betterwayofcharacterizinghegeneralor"weak"tandards ofrationality,because it doesnot lose sight of the wayin whicheventhese standards arealwaysputto workwithinthe contextofaparticular radition,andit avoidsthe Enlightenmentconnotationsof the phrase"tradition-independent"tandardsof rationality.


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Self-Contradictionand Self -Reference 327

progress between competing traditions. Maclntyre'schief point is that,removed from the context of a tradition and its history (especially itshistory of epistemological crises and resolutions), the weak standardsof rationality that are shared across traditions are insufficient to re-solve serious disputes between rival traditions. Thus, an Enlightenmentview of tradition-independent reason as the arbiter between the dis-putes of traditions is false. However, when considered in light of thehistory of the tradition and its previous epistemological crises, whatis shared does provide enough common ground to allow the possibil-ity that one tradition (including its strong standards of rationality)may rationally vindicate itself against its rivals. Thus, relativism too isfalse.3.2 Rebel withouta tradition: Theproblemof the outsider

Mehl briefly mentions a criticism regarding the internal coherenceof Maclntyre's picture of rationality (another criticism of the first sort).This criticism has been elaborated more thoroughly by John Haldane(Haldane 1994, 96-97) and may be called the "problemof the outsider."In WJWRMaclntyre says that he is writing primarilyto "someonewho,not as yet having given their allegiance to some coherent tradition ofenquiry, s besieged by disputes over what is just and abouthow it is rea-sonableto act, both at the level of the particularimmediate issues. . .andat the level at whichrival systematic tradition-informedconceptionscon-tend"(Maclntyre1988, 393). Mostcontemporaries,Maclntyrenotes, live"betwixtand between"a variety of traditions (Maclntyre 1988, 397). Theproblemarises, however,when we consider Maclntyre'sclaim that rea-son only operates within a tradition of enquiry:how is the outsider,theperson not clearly committed to a particular rational or moral tradi-tion of enquiry, to decide rationally between the options presented toher? It would seem that, as an outsider to a particulartradition, reasonis not available to such an individual, because reason always operateswithin a given tradition.In fact, in criticizingthe perspectivist challenge,Maclntyre says explicitly that:The person outside all traditions lacks sufficient rational resources forenquiry and a fortiori for enquiry into what tradition is to be rationallypreferred.He or she has no adequate relevant means of rational evalu-ation and hence can come to no well-groundedconclusion,including theconclusionthat no tradition can vindicate itself against any other.To beoutside all traditions is to be a stranger to enquiry; t is to be in a state ofintellectual and moral destitution (Maclntyre 1988, 367).

The outsider to traditions, Haldane concludes, appears to be in a posi-tion of either non-rationalismorrelativism, having no rational reason toadoptone tradition over the other (Haldane 1994, 97).


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328 JournalofReligiousEthicsItwouldbehighly ronic,ofcourse,f it turnedout that the sortofper-sonto whomMaclntyrehas addressedhis workon decidingrationallybetweentraditions s just the sortof personthat cannotbenefit fromMaclntyre'swork for the purposeof decidingrationallybetween tra-ditions(presumably,ot evenforthe purposeof rationallydeciding oacceptMaclntyre'sradition).ButMaclntyrehimselfsuggestshow theoutsidermay beginthe processof rationallyevaluating he traditionswhich confronther: "What uch an individualhas to learn is how totest dialecticallyhe theses proposedo him orherby eachcompetingtradition,whichalsodrawingupon hese samethesesin order o test di-

alecticallyhose convictions ndresponseswhichhe or she has broughtto the encounter"Maclntyre 988,398).Mehlpointsout,however,hatfortheoutsider obeginthisprocessofdialecticalestingshemust havesomestandardsofrationality,venif very roughandgeneralstandards(Mehl1991,36). Thus,the "problem f the outsider"makesa similarpointas the previous riticism egardingwhatis retainedacrossa the-oryswitch:ust as there are somegeneralstandardsofrationalityhatoperateacross raditionswhichmake a switchof traditions ational, othere aregeneralstandardsof rationalityavailable o all people,eventhoseoutsideofany particularradition.As in the case ofthe previouscriticism,t seems that Maclntyre anrecognizeheexistenceofgeneralstandardswithoutretreatingromhissignificantclaimsaboutthe tradition-dependentature of reason.Wecan againinvokethe distinctionbetweenweak and strongstandards,and say that the standardsof reasonthat aid the outsiderat the be-ginningof her processof dialectical esting are onlyweak standards.However, houghweak standardsmaybe important o get dialecticalquestioningoffthe ground,we shouldnot think of the outsideras pos-sessing generalrationalstandardsandnothingelse.Rather,Maclntyreexplainsthat as the outsider o traditionsgoesthrough he processofdialecticallyestingthe theses ofthe rivaltraditionsbeforeher,she willalsouse thosetheses totest"those onvictions ndresponseswhichhe orshehasbroughto theencounter."hus, t is clear hat such anoutsideris not a "generic easoner,"evoidofbackgroundeliefsor free fromanyinfluencewhatsoever ftraditions.Rather, uchan individualhas a va-rietyofbeliefsdrawn roma varietyofdifferentraditions,hough hesebeliefsare not likelyto forma coherentwhole(Maclntyre1988,397-398).Nonetheless, hosebeliefsform he startingpointforthe outsideras shebeginsto evaluaterationallyhe traditionsbeforeher.Moreover,houghgeneralstandardsof rationalityplaya partin al-lowing he dialecticalestingtoproceed,heyarenotin themselves uf-ficient forthe outsider o rationallydecidewhichtradition s superior.Rather, o makesuch a choice he outsidermustgo through he processof "steppingnside" he varioustraditions.She must"becomenvolved


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Self-ContradictionndSelf-Reference 329in theconversation etween raditions,earning o use the idiomofeachin orderto describeand evaluate the otheror othersby means of it"(Maclntyre 988,398).It is onlyin this waythat the outsidercan cometo understandhe substantivecontentof each traditionandappreciatethe relativesuccesses andfailure of each traditionwith respectto itshistory.Thus,ratherthanjudgeall traditions rom he outsideusingatradition-independentationalstandard, he outsider(who,we noted,was notreallyasthorough oingan outsider o traditionas wesupposedat first)comes o evaluate he rival traditions rom he variousperspec-tives offered rom within eachtraditionand so compareseach to theotheraccordingo the strongstandardsofrationality heyoffer. ndeal-ingwith theproblem f theoutsider, hen,Maclntyre anacknowledgelimitedrole forgeneralstandardsofrationality,while still maintainingthat these standardsare notadequate,n themselves, o settle debatesbetweenrival traditions,and that the strongstandardsof rationalitymaydifferbetweenrival traditions.Havingsaidthis, what are we to make ofMaclntyre's escription fthe personoutsideall traditions n the abovequotation rompage367of WJWR?Wecandistinguishbetween he outsider o whomWJWR swritten,who s "betwixt ndbetween"raditionsand hasa mixof beliefsfromvarious raditions, ndthethoroughgoingutsiderdescribed here.Thedescription fthe thoroughgoingutsiderappliesnot to the person"betwixt ndbetween"raditions,but to the person n the position hattheperspectivist ttempts oadopt or hepurposes fmakinga perspec-tivistargument.That hispositionofabsoluteradition-free-nessannotbe heldwithoutreducingoneto a state of "intellectual nd moraldesti-tution,"Maclntyreakesto be a strongargumentagainstthepossibilityofa rational ormulationfperspectivism.3.3 Stout'sronic wist andthehintofa second ypeofcriticismIn a relatedversionof the "problem f the outsider,"effreyStoutarguesthat Maclntyre's wnphilosophicalourneyprovides trongevi-denceagainstsomeofMaclntyre'slaimsabout hetradition-dependentnatureofrationality. tout'spoint s thatMaclntyrehas himselfprovento be just such an outsiderto traditions,movingin and between avarietyof positionsover the years,yet he has been no less rationalbecauseof it, and thus his own careeris evidenceagainsthis claimthat reasonoperatesbest onlywithintraditionsas he describes hem."Maclntyrewas not a less rationalman at midcareerhan he is today.He couldbynowwritethemodernanalogueofAugustine'sConfessions.Thestoryof his reasonedmovementbetwixtand betweenthe varioustraditionswithwhichhe has affiliatedhimself s itself strongevidenceagainstatheoryaccordingo whichrationality anbe exercised tits best


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onlywithin highly coherent andVeil-integrated' traditions" Stout 1989,232).Although Stout's argument is similar to those of Mehl and Haldane,there are important differences between Stout's line of reasoning andthose we have considered so far. Stout's disagreement with Maclntyre isnotover the questionof whether or not rationalityis tradition-dependent,but over what type of tradition is necessary to sustain rational en-quiry. His argument is not designed to show that reason is tradition-independent, but that the traditions in which reason works effectivelydo not have to be as well-defined, tightly structured, and formalizedas Maclntyre suggests. This is a point that Stout raises in his Ethicsafter Babel, where he suggests that in the absence of a tradition witha well-defined canon and unified cultural inheritance, we nevertheless"muddlethrough much of the time, quite reasonably"by relying on ar-eas of agreement, immanent criticism, creative powers, and numerousother resources (Stout 2001, 217). Stout also develops his case againstMaclntyre'sunderstandingoftraditionin his 1998 article "CommitmentsandTraditions" Stout 1998,23-56). There Stout arguesthat Maclntyre'saccount of liberal modernity relies on a misleading selection of exam-ples which hides the presence of a particular democratic tradition inmodernethical discourse(Stout 1998, 43-48). This democratic radition,with which Stout is highly sympathetic, is neither a highly-coherenttradition of the sort Maclntyre describes as essential to rational en-quiry,nor is it the anti-traditional Cartesian tradition that Maclntyreequates with liberal modernity (Stout 1998, 49-51). Unfortunately,thequestions surrounding the definition of "tradition"and the descrip-tion of the modern ethical landscape are well beyond the scope of thispaper.Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider Stout's argument aboutMaclntyre'scareerprogressbecause it sheds light on the nature of argu-ments regarding the coherence of Maclntyre'snotion of tradition-basedrationality.The form of Stout'sargumentis different from those of eitherMehl or Haldane. The latter two arguments attempt to locate a contra-diction in Maclntyre's thought on the basis of an examination of thecoherence of the concepts within Maclntyre's theory,and thus they arewhat we called the first type of criticism. In contrast, Stout's argumentis based on an appealto evidenceoutside of the theoryitself (Maclntyre'sown career)in orderto show that the theory cannot accountforhow ra-tionality actually operates. In making a criticism that moves beyondan examination of the internal coherence of Maclntyre's theory andalso makes reference to Maclntyre himself, Stout comes close to mak-ing a criticism of the second sort: a criticism regardingthe coherence ofMaclntyre'sabilityto make the claimsthat he does.However,Stout stopsshort of making a criticism of the second sort, which would argue that


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Maclntyre contradictshimself in the process of making his claims. Thatis, Stout does not argue as follows: If Maclntyre's theory is true, thenhis own journey has been irrational, thus his own views are irrationaland we have no reason to believe that his theory is true. Rather,Stout'sargument takes Maclntyre'scareer more as a sort of third person pieceof evidence against Maclntyre's theory. Thus, Stout's argument wouldwork as a criticism of Maclntyre'saccount of rationality even if it werenot Maclntyre's own career that Stout was appealing to as evidence.Stout might just as well have chosen some other philosopheras an ex-ample of someonewho made a reasoned movement betwixt and betweenvarious traditions throughout his lifetime but was no less rational forit at any point in his career,and the argument would have retained itsforce. The fact that it is Maclntyre himself that Stout uses as his ex-ample gives his argument an ironic twist, but it is not essential to itsform.At times, however, Stout approaches a criticism about Maclntyre'sability to make the claims that he does in a consistent manner. Such acriticisminvolves reference to the self-referential nature of Maclntyre'sclaims. Criticisms of this second sort are often tied to arguments aboutthe "ground"r"perspective"romwhichMacintyre s speaking,and howhis claims relate self-referentially to that ground.In Ethics afterBabel,Stout raises just such a criticismwhen speaking aboutMaclntyre's earlywork,A Short History of Ethics. Stout suggests Maclntyre'sbook is "Ahistorical deconstruction of unhistorical thought [which] concludes byleaving its own point of view unsituated in the history it describes,thusraising doubts about its own right to speak. . .Maclntyre seems to havebeen looking downon his age fromabove,while also telling us that thiscannotbe done" Stout 2001, 206, 207). However,Stout goes onto explainthat in AfterVirtueMaclntyre resolves this problemby identifying him-self with Aristotle and the tradition of the virtues. ForStout, this seemsto mean that Maclntyre'sposition"no onger self-destructs" Stout 1988,207). In his review article of WJWR,Stout makes similar commentsabout "theproblemof the point of view"in regard to Maclntyre'searlyworkin the history of ethics:

A narrative that explains in moral terms how morality has disintegratedand pronouncesthis outcomedisastrous, leaves one wonderingfrom whatpointofview the verdictcouldhave been reachedand how that pointof viewis itself to escape the implied condemnation.If Maclntyre did not alreadyoccupyan identifiable and defensible normative point of view, the tragictone of his historical narrative and the various evaluations expressedin itwould be groundless.Yet in this periodhe was preparedto take his standonly against the self images of the age. The groundon which he had takenthat stand the vantage point of the narrative remained invisible (Stout1989, 221).


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However,Stout goes on to note that Maclntyre, later in his career,ex-plicitly adoptedthe vantage point of Thomism,and Stout seems to sug-gest this resolves the "problemof the point of view"forMaclntyre:"Thisconfession does indeed clarify the position Maclntyre intends to occupywhile criticizing liberal society and reworking his account of Westernculture's downward slide" (Stout 1989, 224). After commenting thus,Stout's review articlenever returns to the problemof the pointofview forMaclntyre. Likewise, in his more recent writings on Maclntyre'sworkStout does not raise this problem (Stout 2001, 341-355). He appearsto believe that Maclntyre is no longer susceptible to the charges of self-referential incoherence and that he no longerundercuts his ownpositionin the process of making his claims.It is just this sort of criticism, however,that Herdt appears to be lev-eling against Maclntyre:notjust that there are internal inadequaciesorinconsistencies in Maclntyre's picture of rationality,but that the pictureof rationality as a whole is such that in claiming it to be true Maclntyrecommits self-contradiction and removes the ground on which his ownclaim is being made. With this in mind, we can now return to Herdt'sarguments to see how they might be best formulated as criticismsof thissecond sort. Having done this, we can then consider possible responsesin defense of Maclntyre.4. Self-Contradiction, Self-Reference,and Rational Justification

Herdt concludes her article by re-stating her claims about the self-contradictorynature of Maclntyre's position, and she here providestheclearest indication that her real criticism of Maclntyre is of the secondsort we have described:the significanceof the moment oftraditiontransendentalityin Maclntyre'sthought should not be underestimated. Even to articulate a general claimof tradition dependenceor historical dependenceis to make what is, logi-cally,a tradition-transcendentalmove.Similarly, he logicof the rationalityof traditions is presupposed by traditions of enquiry.That even as histori-cist a thinker as Maclntyre makes a transcendental move in articulatingthe rationality of traditions is compelling testimony to the inevitability oftranscendental considerations. We are already standing on not tradition-independentbut tradition-transcendentalground,and the impossibilityofconsistently articulating a tradition-dependentposition bears witness tothis (Herdt 1998, 546).

The contradiction in Maclntyre, according to Herdt, is not primarilythat aspects of Maclntyre'spicture of the rationality of traditions seemto require more tradition-independentrationality than he suggests areavailable at other places when giving that picture. Rather, there is


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Self ContradictionndSelf Reference 333the deeperproblemof the "impossibilityf consistentlyarticulatingatradition-dependentosition." orHerdt, heinevitablenconsistency farticulating tradition-dependentosition eemsto come rom he wayin whichanyarticulation f even a generalclaimabout raditiondepen-dence is to "makewhat is, logically,a tradition-transcendentalove."Herdtappearsto think that such a "tradition-transcendentalove"is madeas a result of the fact that even generalclaimsabout tradi-tiondependence laimvaliditynotonlywithintheir owntraditionsbutacross raditions.Thisaspectof trans-traditionalalidity s the firstwayin whichHerdtcharacterizedMaclntyre'sRt as tradition ndependent:"(1)hetheory s notrestricted o validuse withinthe traditionnwhichit arose"Herdt1998,537).And t is thekeyfeatureof Herdt'sproposedtradition-transcendentaltandardofrationalityhat it is not restrictedin validity o a particularradition:"Sucha theoryofrationalitywouldbe 'traditionranscendental.'t wouldnot be linked n its validity o anyoneparticularraditioneven f particular lements, uchas empatheticimagination, avebeenconceptualizedy particularraditions)"Herdt1998,538).Howexactlydoesthis issue of the scopeof validityof standardsofrationality elatetothechargeofself-contradiction?t seemsthatHerdtintends t to relatein this way:Maclntyre laimsthat standardsof ra-tionalityaretradition-dependentndinternal o traditions.This meansthat theorieswill have rationalvalidityonlywithin a particular ra-dition.However,Maclntyre'sheoryof Rt has validityoutside of thetradition n whichit arose,and thus is a violationof Maclntyre's wnclaimsabouttradition-dependence.oreoverandthis is the criticismofthesecond ort,aboutMaclntyre's bility o makesuch a claim),evenMaclntyre's laimsabouttradition-dependentationalityare meant tobe validfor all traditions,describingall traditionsas they reallyare.Thus,Maclntyre'slaimsabout radition-dependencereself-defeatingbecauseheythemselvesarenottradition-dependentntheway hattheysay that all substantiveclaimsmust be. How then woulda "tradition-transcendental"estatementofMaclntyre's osition olvethisproblem?It wouldshowthat Maclntyre'slaims about raditiondependence ndaboutRt are not self-defeatingbecausethey are themselvestraditiondependent.At the sametime,this dependences not a problemortheirclaims o trans-traditionalaliditybecause heseclaimsarejustifiedbyargumentswhichshowthatthe rationalityof traditionss applicableoall traditionsofnecessity.4.1 Truth,ustification,anddifferences etweenhe two

ThecentralproblemwithHerdt's rguments that it confuses wo dif-ferentsenses nwhicha claimmaybesaidto be "valid."When peaking f


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334 JournalofReligiousEthicsthe tradition-dependentatureof certainclaims,we cansaythat thoseclaims are valid onlywithin a giventradition, n the sense that theyare supportedby the particularbackground eliefs andrationalstan-dardsof thattradition,whiletheyare notrationally upported ya rivaltraditionwith contrastingbackground eliefs and rational standards.In this sense,validityhas do with the conditions orrational ustifica-tion of a claim.Thisappears o be the sense ofvalidity hat HerdthasinmindwhendealingwithMaclntyre'slaimsabout radition-dependence.However,we canalso think ofvaliditynot as a matterofrational usti-ficationbut as a matter of the appropriate angeof application f par-ticularclaims.Inthis second ense,to saythat somethings universallyvalid is to say that its truthis not restricted o a particular phere.Itis this secondsense ofvalidityas rangeof applicationhat is relevantwhendiscussing he wayin whichMaclntyre'sheoryof Rt as well ashis statementsabouttradition-dependencere not meant to be state-mentswhoseappropriateangeofapplications onlywithinMaclntyre'stradition.It is importanto notethat,forMaclntyre,t is possiblehat the claimsofa traditionmaybe validin the first senseonlywithin that tradition,while at the same time those claimsmightbe validin the secondsenseacrossall traditions.Thatis, a theorymightberationally ustifiedonlygivencertainassumptions ndstandards freasonparticularo a certaintradition,yet that theorymightbe a theoryabout howthings are forall people,regardlessof theirtradition.This is the casebecauseof thedifference etweenrationalustificationand warranted ssertability ntheonehand,andtruthonthe other.Whether rnot a claim s rationallyjustifiedandsomeones warrantedn asserting hat claimwill dependontheparticular istoricalocationof thepersonmaking he claim.Yet,truth s somethinghat isnotdependent nhistorical ocation.Maclntyrestresses this distinction n a numberof places,as when he says that"The onceptofwarrantedassertabilityalwayshas application nlyatsomeparticularimeandplace nrespectof standardshenprevailing tsomeparticulartage nthedevelopmentf a tradition fenquiry. .Theconcept ftruth,however,s timeless.Toclaim hat some hesis is true snotonly oclaim orallpossible imes andplaces hat it cannotbe shownto fail to correspondo realityin the sense of 'correspond'lucidatedearlierbutalsothat themindwhichexpresses ts thought n that thesisis in factadequate o its object"Maclntyre1988,363).7Whenwe usethe term"validity"n the first sense,we are referring o the degree owhicha claim s rationallyustifiedorwarranted s an assertion.Whenwe us the term"validity"n the second ense, however,we arereferring

7See also Maclntyre 1998,205-210.


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to the scopeof the truth claims that are being made from within a giventradition.Despite these differences Herdt seems to conflate these two senses ofvalidity when she developsher argument regarding"theimpossibilityofconsistently articulating a tradition-dependent position."Her argumentdependson the premisethat the sort of universal validity that Maclntyreclaims for his own position regarding tradition-dependenceis preciselythe sort of universal validity that that very position denies to any po-sition. But in fact, although Maclntyre's position does claim for itselfuniversal validity in the second sense (that is, Maclntyre asserts that

his accountof rationality and tradition is the true one), Maclntyre doesnot claim that his position has universal validity in the first sense. Onthe contrary,Maclntyrerepeatedly points out that, if his claims are true,they will likely not appear to adherents of the rival tradition of liberal-ism as being rationally justified. He insists that "ifthe central thesesin favor of which I have been arguing for nearly twenty years are true,then we should expect them to be rejected by the most articulate andable representatives of the dominant culture of modernity" Maclntyre1994, 283).Herdt,then, conflates a claimaboutthe truth (universallyvalid appli-cation)ofMaclntyre'stheoryoftradition-dependentrationality a claimthat Maclntyre does in fact make with a separate claim about the jus-tification of that first claim a claim about a claim (namely, that thefirst claim is rationally justifiable in a universal sense) that Maclntyredoes not actually make. This leads Herdt to think that Maclntyre is con-tradicting himself, because the second claim (the claim about the claim)would indeed be in conflict with the first claim. WereMaclntyre in factto be making a claim of the second sort, he would be committingjustthe sort of "pointof view" error that Stout describes earlier. Why?Be-cause such a claim about the universal rationaljustifiability of the firstclaim (that is, the claim about tradition-dependence)would involve anappeal to standards of rationality that the initial claim itself said werenot present, and in so doingwouldbe assuming a tradition-independentpoint of view about the claim that the claim itself insists cannot beassumed.

Recognizingthat Herdt fails to distinguish between these two episte-mological evels8 the claims aboutrationality and traditionon one leveland the claims about those claims on another we can see why she seesa need for transcendental standards of rationality which can be shownto exist necessarily as a feature of any tradition of enquiry.The secondsortof claim(claimon the secondlevel) is a claimto knowledgeabout our

8I first came acrossthe language of"epistemologicalevels" n Alston 1989.


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knowledge: t is a claim to know that one knows.In contrast,the first sortofclaim can be seen simply as a claim to knowledge: t is a claim that oneknows. Confusingthese two levels, Herdt fails to adequately distinguishbetween claims to know and claims to know that one knows,9and thusshe sees a need for arguments which would prove the latter to supportMaclntyre'sclaims,when in fact his claims are only claims to the former.Thus, she argues that what is necessary to support Maclntyre'sclaimsare arguments which show that Rt is a standard of reason of necessity:"Asa necessary condition, it cannot be denied without falling into self-contradiction" Herdt 1998, 545). Assuming the laws of logic, it is noteven a possibility that it is false. Hence, we would be in a position tosay not only that we know that such a standard is true, but also that weknowthat we know. Because this is actually the sort of claim that Herdtis lookingto support,it is not surprisingthat she seeks argumentswhichestablish their conclusions with the forceof necessity.4.2 Justifying ourjustifying: Theself-referentialelementin Maclntyre

If Maclntyre does assert the truth of his claims aboutrationality andtradition, but does not assert that those claims are rationally justifiableaccording o universal standards of reason, then it seems he has avoidedthe contradiction which Herdt charged him with, because he is not ap-pealing to standards of reason or a rational perspective that he denies.However,at this point, Herdt (or someone sympathetic with her line ofreasoning) might protest: Then what rational reason do we have for ac-cepting Maclntyre'saccount as rationally justified? Maclntyre'sanswerto this questionis that his theoryof tradition-basedrationality, ncludinghis account of how traditions vindicate themselves with respect to rivaltraditions, is itself justified in the same way that the account describes.This means that within its tradition Maclntyre'saccount, like all otheraccounts, will be justified by its ability to account for and overcome thelimitations of its predecessors.Likewise,Maclntyre'saccountwill be vin-dicated against standpoints of rival traditions insofar as the tradition inwhich Maclntyre'saccount is situated is able to vindicate itself againstrival traditions by its ability to overcome its own epistemologicalcrisesand account for the crises of its competitortraditions better than theythemselves can account for those crises. In both cases, a key aspect ofthe rationaljustification ofMaclntyre'stheorywill be his ability to writea history that accounts for the problems and solutions of Maclntyre's9Herdtdoes, in fact, note this distinction. It is my contention, however, hat in formu-lating her argumentsagainst Maclntyreshe does not adequatelytake this distinctionintoaccount.


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Self-ContradictionndSelf-Reference 337own tradition as well as rival traditions.This is so because,as wenotedearlier, ationalustification orMaclntyres alwaysgiven n ref-erenceto one'spredecessors, nd thus rational ustification s insepa-rable fromthe writingof the historyof those predecessors.Therefore,Maclntyreexplains,"It is indeedpreciselybecause and in so far asThomistAristotelianism nablesus to achieveanadequateunderstand-ing both of our ownhistoryand of that of othersin this way that itvindicatests claimto have identified he standardsofappeal o whichall practicesand traditionsare to be evaluated"Maclntyre 994,300).It is clear, hen, that thereis a self-referential spectto Maclntyre'saccountof how his theoryof rationality s to be justified.This self-referential spectresultspreciselyromMaclntyre'sefusal o make hesort of claimsabouthis claimsthat Herdtseemsto accusehimofmak-ing,andfromhis refusal o assume a tradition-independenttandpointthat would"allow"im to make such claimsfor his claims.As he says:"But amirremediably nti-Hegeliann rejecting he notionofan abso-lutestandpoint,ndependent f theparticularityf all traditions. havetherefore o assertthat the conceptof a tradition, ogetherwith the cri-teriaforits use andapplication,s itself onedevelopedromwithin oneparticularradition-basedtandpoint.This does not precludets appli-cationto the verytraditionwithin which t was developed"Maclntyre1994,295).Thus,Maclntyre'sositions notsusceptibleoinconsistencyinvolvedn the "point f viewproblem." nd what HerdtcallsRt, then,is atheoryabout he rationalvindication f a traditionagainst ts rivalsthat is itselfvindicatedagainstits rivalsaccordinghe processspelledoutin the theory tself.In additionto saving Maclntyre's heory from self-contradiction,this self-referential ort of justificationhas at least one importantadditionalconsequenceorMaclntyre's heoryof rationality. t meansthat we are not in a positionto speak definitively,once and for all,regardingthe rationaljustificationof the theory itself. We cannotclaim that we know with the certaintyof logical necessitythat Rt orany otheraspectof Maclntyre's iews on rationalityand tradition strue.This provisionallyregardinghe justifiabilityof truth claims ofMaclntyre'sheorycontrastswith the sort of knowledge hat Herdtwantedto provideregarding he truth of Maclntyre's laims:certainknowledge hat our claimsabout tradition-basedationalityare truebecause heyare truenecessarily.But a measureof provisionality nduncertainty egarding hejustificationofhis owntheoryofrationalitymustremain orMaclntyre,because hejustificationof his owntheoryaboutthejustificationof theories s itselfjustifiedas the theory says,in terms ofthe historyof tradition hus far,and therefore t is possiblethat at some future point Maclntyre's heories will be shown to beinadequate,or the tradition n whichthey are imbeddedwill suffer


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irremediableepistemological crisis, in which case Maclntyre's theorieswould cease to be rationally justifiable. There is a dual provisionality,then, in Maclntyre's account of rationality: (1) the justification of anytheory within a tradition and the vindication of that tradition will beprovisional,because of the necessarily historical nature ofjustification,and (2) that claim itself (claim 1) is provisional, because it is itselfjustified in a necessarily historical way, as it says that all claims are.However,for all this provisionality and self-referentiality there is not,so far as I can tell, a self-contradiction n Maclntyre'saccount.

REFERENCESAlston, William1989 EpistemicJustification. Ithaca, N.Y.:CornellUniversity Press.Haldane,John1994 "Maclntyre'sThomist Revival: What Next?" In After Maclntyre:CriticalPerspectiveson the WorkofAlasdair Maclntyre,edited byJohn Horton and Susan Mendus,91-107. Notre Dame, Ind.: NotreDame University Press.Herdt,Jennifer1998 "AlasdairMaclntyre's Rationality of Traditions' and Tradition-Transcendental Standards of Justification."Journal of Religion78.4 (October):524-546.Maclntyre,Alasdair1977 "EpistemologicalCrises,Dramatic Narrative and the PhilosophyofScience."Monist 60: 453-472.

1984 After Virtue. 2nd ed., Notre Dame, Ind.:University of Notre DamePress.1988 WhoseJustice? WhichRationality?Notre Dame, Ind.:University of

Notre Dame Press.1990a First Principles, Final Ends, and Contemporary Philosophy.Milwaukee,Wis.:Marquette University Press.1990b ThreeRival Versionsof MoralEnquiry.Notre Dame, Ind.: Univer-sity of Notre Dame Press.1994 "APartialResponseto MyCritics." nAfter Maclntyre:Critical Per-spectiveson the Work fAlasdair Maclntyre,editedby John Hortonand Susan Mendus, 283-304. Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre DameUniversity Press.1998 "MoralRelativism, Truth and Justification." In The MaclntyreReader, edited by Kevin Knight, 202-220. Previously publishedin1994 Moral Truth and Moral Tradition:Essays in Honourof PeterGeach and Elizabeth Anscombe.Blackrock,County Dublin: FourCourts Press.


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Self-Contradictionand Self-Reference 339Mehl,Peter1991 "In the Twilight of Modernity: Maclntyre and Mitchell on MoralTraditions and Their Assessment."Journal ofReligiousEthics 19.1(Spring):21-54.Stout, Jeffrey1989 "HomewardBound:Maclntyre on LiberalSociety and the Historyof Ethics."Journal ofReligion 69.2 (April):220-232.1998 "Commitmentsand Traditions."Journal of Religious Ethics 25.3(Supplement):22-56.2001 Ethics afterBabel. Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press.

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