The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 41 | Number 5 | Article ID 3427 | Oct 11, 2010

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Charter 08 Framer Liu Xiaobo Awarded Nobel Peace Prize.The Troubled History and Future of Chinese Liberalism　零八憲章起草者劉暁波氏ノーベル平和賞受賞、中国リベラリズムの悩みある歴史と将来

Feng Chongyi

Charter 08 Framer Liu XiaoboAwarded Nobel Peace Prize. TheTroubled History and Future ofChinese Liberalism

Feng Chongyi

Introduction

Liu Xiaobo, the primary drafter of Charter 08,has just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prizefor 2010 for “his long and non-violent strugglefor fundamental human rights in China.” Theaward signals international recognition of theChinese people's quest for justice, universalhuman rights and democracy through peacefulmeans.

China is a rare example of a Leninist party-state that wields power in the wake of thecollapse of communism and the Soviet Union inthe late twentieth century. Its remarkableeconomic growth for three decades hastriggered enthusiasm home and abroad for the“Beijing Consensus” or the “Chinese Model”, aloose conceptualization of the Chineseexperience in achieving economic growth,capitalist development, rapid urbanization andsocial change at the expense of human rights.Contrary to the view that human rights andsocial justice are dispensable in order toachieve economic efficiency and create wealth,contemporary Chinese society shows signs ofdeep striving for human rights, constitutional

democracy, social justice and equitabledistribution. These values are clearlyarticulated in the monumental documentCharter 08 and powerfully exemplified inrecent waves of social protest.

The publication of Charter 08 in China at theend of 2008 was a major event generatingheadlines all over the world. It was widelyrecognized as the Chinese human rightsmanifesto and a landmark document in China’squest for democracy. However, if Charter 08was a clarion call for the new march todemocracy in China, its political impact hasbeen disappointing. Its primary drafter LiuXiaobo, after being kept in police custody overone year, was sentenced on Christmas Day of2009 to 11 years in prison for the “the crime ofinciting subversion of state power”, nor has theChinese communist party-state taken a singlestep toward democratisation or improvinghuman rights during the year.1 This articleoffers a preliminary assessment of Charter 08,with special attention to its connection withliberal forces in China.

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Liu Xiaobo

The Origins of Charter 08 and theCrystallisation of Liberal and DemocraticIdeas in China

Charter 08 was not a bolt from the blue but theresult of careful deliberation and theoreticaldebate, especially the discourse on liberalismsince the late 1990s. In its timing, Charter 08anticipated that major political change wouldtake place in China in 2009 in light of a numberof important anniversaries. These included the20th anniversary of the June 4th crackdown,the 50th anniversary of the exile of the DalaiLama, the 60th anniversary of the founding ofthe People's Republic of China, and the 90thanniversary of the May 4th Movement. ActuallyChinese liberal intellectuals had earlier begunto advocate and discuss a road map andtimetable for the march to constitutionaldemocracy.2 Charter 08 was discussed from thesecond half of 2008. Its three primary initiatorsand drafters were leading dissidents LiuXiaobo, Zhang Zuhua and Jiang Qisheng.

The front cover of edited volume Charter08. Liu Xiaobo (left) and Zhang Zuhua, two

primary drafters of the Charter.

Liu Xiaobo, born in 1955, joined the faculty atBeijing Normal University in 1984 and receiveda PhD in literature there in 1988. He was oneof the four celebrated intellectuals who tookpart in the student hunger strike at TiananmenSquare in 1989 and played a key role inmediating between the students and the troopsfor the peaceful withdrawal of students fromthe square. Nevertheless, he was jailed afterthe June 4th Tiananmen Massacre andsubsequently lost his job. Liu became afreelance writer, political commentator andhuman rights activist, and served as Presidentof the Independent Chinese Pen Center3 for theperiod of 2003-2007. Liu was repeatedlyarrested and detained by Chinese authoritiesfor criticizing the ruling Chinese CommunistParty and promoting democracy and human

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rights. Zhang Zuhua, born 1955, received a BAin political science from Nanchong NormalUniversity in 1982 and was a member of theCommunist Youth League Standing Committeein charge of Youth League affairs of the CCPCentral Committee and the State Council in1989 when the Tiananmen Massacre tookplace. He lost his position for supporting thedemocracy movement and became a self-employed researcher with a focus on Chinesecivil society. He has published extensively onpolitical reform in China and was brieflydetained by the police in 2004 for hisdissenting political views. Jiang Qisheng wasborn in 1948 and was a leader of theTiananmen student movement in 1989 when hewas a PhD candidate in Philosophy at People’sUniversity in Beijing. His PhD candidacy wasterminated and he was imprisoned twice, forabout two years between 1989 and1991 forparticipation in the student movement and fouryears during the period 1999 to 2003 fordistributing pamphlets to commemorate theTiananmen movement. To avoid crackdown bythe security apparatus, the draft Charter washand delivered to a small circle in Beijing forcomments and revision, although it was sent asan email attachment for signatures once it wasfinalized. To avoid the accusation of “colludingwith hostile forces abroad”, Chinese overseaswere deliberately excluded from the originalsignatories. After acquiring 303 signatoriesnationwide, the organizers planned to releaseCharter 08 on 10 December 2008 incommemoration of the 60th Anniversary of theUniversal Declaration Human Rights by theUnited Nations. However, it was released onthe Internet one day earlier as Liu Xiaobo andZhang Zuhua were detained on 8 December2008 because of their association with thedocument.

Charter 08 takes its name from Charter 77written by intellectuals and activists in theformer Czechoslovakia and borrows ideas andlanguage from several international documentson human rights and democracy, including the

Constitution of the United States, the FrenchDeclaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,the Universal Declaration Human Rights of theUnited Nations, and the reconciliatoryapproach of South Africa's Truth andReconciliation Commission, as well as relevantChinese documents throughout the modern era,including the Constitution of the People’sRepublic of China.

Vaclav Havel (right) and other Charter 77signatories address demonstrators in

Prague on December 10, 1988, to celebratethe 40th anniversary of the UniversalDeclarations of the Human Rights.

C h a r t e r 0 8 i s a w i d e - r a n g i n g a n dcomprehensive political reform program thatembraces human rights, constitutionaldemocracy and social policies for distributivejustice.4 Part one is a “preamble”, providing anoverview of the Chinese democracy movementover the last century, identifying fundamentalproblems of current communist rule in China,urging the regime to “embrace universalhuman values, join the mainstream of civilizednations, and build a democratic system”. Parttwo lays down five “fundamental concepts” off r e e d o m , h u m a n r i g h t s , e q u a l i t y ,republicanism, democracy and constitutionalrule as fundamental principles and definesthese concepts according to the tenets ofliberal democracy. Part three offers nineteen

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specific recommendations calling for amendingthe constitution, separation and balance ofpowers, democratizing the lawmaking process,judicial independence, nonpartisan control ofpublic institutions, protection of human rights,election of public officials, urban-rural equality,freedom of association, freedom of assembly,freedom of expression, freedom of religion,citizen education, protection of property, fiscalreform, social security, environmentalprotection, a federal republic, and transitionaljustice (seeking social reconciliation on thebasis of the findings of a Truth InvestigationCommission investigating the facts andresponsibilities of past atrocities andinjustices). Part four is a short “conclusion”about China’s responsibility to humankind,appealing to all Chinese citizens to participatein the democratic movement and echoing thecall in the preamble that human rights anddemocracy are vital for China as a majorcountry of the world, as one of five permanentmembers of the United Nations SecurityCouncil, and as a member of the UN Council onHuman Rights. Charter 08 categorically setsconstitutional democracy as the goal forChinese political development and peacefulreform as the means to achieve that goal.

T h e c o n c e p t s , s t a n d p o i n t s a n drecommendations elaborated in Charter 08represent a remarkable progress insophistication of liberal and democratic ideas inChina since the 1989 democracy movementsymbolised by the hunger strike at TiananmenSquare and demonstrations on the streets ofBeijing and other major cities. The connectionbetween the two events is obvious, as all threeprimary drafters and many of the signatoriestook part in the democracy movement in 1989.For all of its significance, impact andextraordinary level of social mobilisation, the1989 democracy movement produced nocomprehensive document of political demandsand aspirations, not even unified slogans forpolitical change and democracy. This limitation

was not due to negligence on the part of thedemocracy movement leaders and activists, butreflected the reality that even they had notunderstood core concepts of democracy andhuman rights.

May 15, 1989, Tiananmen the day after thehunger strike was proclaimed

Charter 08 represents a significant stepforward and provides a remedy for the limits ofthe 1989 democracy movement. Despite harshsuppression of democracy and liberal ideas bythe Chinese party-state, and partly due to thissuppression, liberalism and the quest forhuman rights have been on the rise andachieved a level of sophistication in China sincethe late 1990s. Charter 08 can be seen as anembodiment and synthesis of theoretical andintellectual achievements by Chinese liberalintellectuals over a decade. The f irstachievement is the open embrace ofconstitutional democracy in rejection of one-party dictatorship, including the illusion of“socialist democracy” or “proletariandemocracy”. For those who are critical of thepractice of constitutional democracy or liberaldemocracy in the West, the universal values,l i b e r a l c o n c e p t s a n d d e m o c r a t i crecommendation summarized in Charter 08 arenothing but common sense. However, asargued by the signatories of Charter 08, one-party dictatorship is the root of social ills andinequality in China, whereas constitutionaldemocracy or liberal democracy, less than

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perfect as it is, forms the basic institutionalframework that is the prerequisite for otherimprovements, including deliberativedemocracy, social justice and economicequality. This is a lesson that has been paid forin the blood of millions living under statesocialism.

We know that Chinese “liberal elements” in the1980s, including the most profound thinkerssuch as Wang Ruoshui, Su Shaozhi and YanJiaqi, even the most radical dissidents such asWei Jingsheng, were confined to the Marxistframework in their quest for democracy,typically expressed as “socialist democracy andlegality”. This limit was overcome by Chineseliberals by the late 1990s, when Li Shenzhi, asenior communist expert on internationalaffairs and former vice-president of the ChineseAcademy of Social Sciences with the rank ofvice-minister, solemnly proclaimed that:

After three hundred years ofcomparison and selection in thewhole world since the age ofindustrialization, and particularlyafter more than one hundred yearsof Chinese experimentation, thelargest in scale in human history,there is sufficient evidence toprove that liberalism is the best,universal value. Today’s revival ofthe liberal tradition stemming fromBeijing University will beyonddoubt guarantee the emergence ofa liberal China in the world ofglobalization.5

The conversion to liberalism also means thatChinese liberals are no longer confined toformulations of “socialist democracy” thatguarantee the leading role of the CCP. Theexperience of the June 4 crackdown and thecollapse of communism in the former SovietUnion and eastern Europe provided anopportunity for Chinese liberals to deeply

reflect on the illusion of “socialist democracy”,and they were awakened to the fact that theparty-state had long been deceiving itself andothers in claiming communist one party rule asa higher form of “democracy”. They sharplypointed out that the CCP under Mao’sleadership overthrew the Nationalistdictatorship only to supplant it with the CCPdictatorship, and Mao’s successors, the post-Tiananmen leadership, has maintained thedespotic system and become yet more corrupt.Since the 1990s, based on their new foundconviction that one party dictatorship anddemocracy are not compatible, Chinese liberalshave categorically abandoned one party rulefor constitutional democracy with all of itsinherent features such as multi-party elections,legal safeguard of human rights by limiting thepower of the government, and checks andbalance of powers among legislative, executiveand judicial branches.6

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Front cover of monthly journal Charter 08.

The second achievement is to address theissues of social justice from a l iberalperspective based on an “overlappingconsensus” between liberalism and socialdemocracy. The Chinese new left has labelledChinese liberals “neo-liberals”, resulting ingrave confusion and misunderstanding.7 Evensome China scholars in the West assume as amatter of course that the Chinese new leftchampions the cause of social justice, which isneglected by Chinese liberals. However, in thecontext of the contemporary West, neo-liberalsare widely regarded as a right wing politicaland intellectual force prioritising efficiencyover equal i ty and promoting marketmechanisms at the expense of the welfarestate. Contemporary Chinese liberals differfundamentally from “neo-liberals” in the West.They understand liberalism in the classicalsense as a political philosophy that considersindividual liberty as the most importantpolitical goal and upholds liberal principlessuch as legal protection of individual rights, therule of law and limitations on state power. Theynot only strive for individual freedoms and seekto replace the despotism of the Leninist party-state with liberal democracy, but many alsofight in the forefront against social inequalityand seek to champion the cause of the workingclass quest for equality and a better life. Threeout of nineteen specific recommendations inCharter 08 are devoted to the issues of socialinequality, including the demands to strictlyprotect peasant land rights (recommendation14), build a social security system that coversall citizens (recommendation 16) and repeal thecurrent urban-rural household registrationsystem and implement equal rights for allcitizens.8 Chinese liberals are tackling theburning issues in China, including increasingsocial inequality. Apart from promoting marketefficiency, liberty, democracy and the rule oflaw, they also took pains to advocate socialjustice, well before the new left took up theissue; apart from promoting equality of

opportunity and procedural justice, they alsostand for distributive justice.9 In the eyes ofliberals, without accompanying processes ofdemocratizing political power, China’s reformhas been distorted by the power elite andturned into a process of “stealing what isentrusted to their care” (jianshou zi dao) and“taking all the food by those in charge ofc o o k i n g ” ( z h a n g s h a o z h e s i z h a ndaguofan).10 As summarised by Xu Youyu,“most liberals do not promote the market at theexpense of justice. What they have consistentlyadvocated are as follows: 1) resolutely supportmarkets economy as a mechanism to preventplunder by power; 2) expose the graveinjustices resulting from the current reformand demand further reform to eliminate abusesof power; 3) take political reform as thefundamental solution and the top priority”.11 Asa matter of fact, the social democratic elementswithin the liberal camp in particular havestrongly supported the egalitarian implicationsof the welfare state.

In tackling the issues of equity and inequality,Chinese liberals differ from both the Chineseold and new left in two fundamental ways.Firstly, liberals see the despotic politicalsystem, as well as the marketisation of politicalpower in the process of transition to the marketeconomy (rather than the market economy perse), as the primary source of inequality,including the unequal distribution of wealth.Based on the observation that power holdershave abused their power in the course ofpresiding over “yuanshi jilei” (originalaccumulation), Chinese liberals draw theconclusion that unfair distribution in Chinatoday is not primarily manifested in thedistribution of national income in the form ofwages and property, but in the allocation andcontrol of resources through political power.12

“Current social evils in China”, argues leadingliberal Zhu Xueqin, “cannot be simplified andequated with a ‘western disease’ and a ‘marketdisease’. They are a ‘Chinese disease’ and a

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‘power disease’ resulting from the peculiarcircumstances where the market mechanism isparasitical, distorted, and even suppressed byan outmoded power mechanism. Liberals raisedthe issue of social justice earlier than the newleft did, and they dug deeper to the root of theproblem, pointing out that it already existed inthe Mao era, as in the plunder of privateproperty, possession of public property andsuppression of different political views by theprivileged stratum. These social injustices tookshape from the inception of that system, butw e r e c o n c e a l e d b y M a o ’ s i l l u s o r yegalitarianism. The power mechanism has notchanged with the introduction of the marketmechanism but has increased its privileges andaugmented the scope of rent seeking. Hencethere i s s t ruc tura l cor rup t ion andunprecedentedly acute social injustice in oursociety.13 Qin Hui also argues that the secret ofChina's current economic advance is its lowhuman rights standards, a salient feature of“power elite capitalism” (quangui zibenzhuyi).China has become an investor's paradisebecause the prices of the four prime factors ofproduction (human capital, land, credits andnon-renewable resources) have been keptartificially low by reducing the bargainingpower of providers through pol it icalsuppression. 1 4

Secondly, instead of waging an all-out waragainst the market, capitalism and the “middleclass” as the left did, the liberals firmly defendthe market and the “middle class” whilefocusing their attacks on the unjust powerstructure presided over by the party-state,including the “power elite” (quangui) and the“upstarts” (baofahu) who are “getting richahead of others” (xian fu qilai) through theabuse of political power in one way or another.It is the belief of Chinese liberals that universalprotection of rights, including property rights,is the foundation of social justice. Xu Youyupoints out that “the new left picks up otherpeople’s phrases to attack marketisation,ignoring the positive effect of marketisation in

breaking down the oppressive old system”.According to Xu, as equal rights forms thenecessary condition for economic and socialequality, what should be done is to protect theinterests of working people against “bigwigprivatisation” (quangui siyouhua) through thecreation of a just legal framework to regulatethe market and human behaviour.15

Qin Hui points out that since social injustice inChina today is rooted in an unfair process ofcompetition where some abuse political powerto create and accumulate wealth while otherslose out, “what is important is that there shouldbe a simultaneous process of taking away boththe constraints and protections of the oldsystem, avoiding thereby the consequences inwhich some people continue to enjoy protectionafter taking away the constraints and otherscontinue to suffer from the constraints afterlosing the protection, that the opportunities aremonopolised by the former whereas the risksare taken by the latter, and that the formertake the ‘fruits’ whereas the latter pay theprice”.16

The third achievement of Chinese liberalismsince the 1990s is a sound understanding of therule of law. Unprecedented in Chinese history,a clear distinction has been made first byl iberal intel lectuals and then by thegovernment and the public in general betweenrule by law (law as a tool for the rulers) andrule of law (rulers subject to and limited by thelaw).17 Inspired by the liberal discourse onhuman rights and the rule of law, citizens withgrowing rights consciousness have becomeincreasingly assertive in using the constitutionand other laws to protect their rights. Since2003 there has been a powerfu l andcomprehensive rights defence movement(weiquan yundong) involving all social strataand covering every aspect of human rights,ranging from protests by villagers againstforced seizures of farmland by the governmentand developers to strikes by workers againstlow pay and poor working conditions, from

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campaigns by ex-servicemen for unpaid socialentitlements to protests by affected residentsagainst environmental pollution, fromcampaigns by petitioners for redressinginjustice to campaigns by journalists for a freepress, and from campaigns by Falun Gongpractitioners for the freedom of belief tocampaigns by the Christian family churches forthe freedom of assembly.18

Signatories of Charter 08: Rallying theLiberal Camp

To a great extent, signatories of Charter 08 canbe seen as the apotheosis of the Chinese liberalcamp. In term of professional and socialdiversity, the 303 original signatories ofCharter identified themselves as scholars of alldisciplines, lawyers, writers, journalists,editors, teachers, artists, officials, publicservants, engineers, businessmen, workers,peasants, democracy activists and rightsactivists. In political or ideological perspective,they are liberal leaders in all walks of life.

China’s “reform era” can be divided into twodifferent phases punctuated by the June 4massacre of 1989, which brought a prematureend to the heal thy trend of pol i t ica lliberalisation inspired by democratic aspiration.Following the massacre, and in the wake of thecollapse of communism in the former SovietUnion and Eastern Europe, the CCP led byDeng Xiaoping took two resolute measures forsurvival: a ruthless purge of democratic forcesin society and within the CCP on the one handand accelerated introduction of “marketeconomy” on the other. With the aid of capital,technology and consumer markets, facilitatedby globalisation, China rapidly evolved into anew order of market Leninism, a useful termcoined by New York Times correspondentNicholas Kristof in which the Leninist party-state is sustained by the combination ofrelatively free-market economics and autocraticone-party rule.19 In other words, it is anastonishing paradox, putting together

previously incompatible elements of bothcapitalism and communism, the latter of whichby definition aims at eliminating capitalism. Tothe surprise of many throughout the world, thisstrange hybrid has produced an economicdynamism parasitic on the exceptionally lowcost of productive factors, the expanding globalmarket and the expansion of imported andindigenous technologies and expertise. Theenormous wealth generated by this newprosperity has provided greater incentive forChinese communist power holders to hang onto power and more resources to co-opt othersocial groups and repress the opposition. Theresult is a transition to and consolidation of“power elite capitalism (quangui zibenzhuyi)”,in which the capitalism is dominated by thecommunist bureaucracy, leading to rapid,sustained economic growth on the one handand endemic corruption, striking socialinequalities, ecological degeneration andpolitical repression on the other. Thisunexpected outcome has disheartened manydemocracy supporters who fear that China’stransition is “trapped” in a “resil ientauthoritarianism” which could be maintainedfor the foreseeable future.20

However, because it has produced both acutesocial tensions beyond management and thenew social and political forces challenging theone-party dictatorship, market Leninism’sresilience may prove to be limited, especiallywhen facing concurrent economic downturnand deep social unrest. The social tensionshave led to an amorphous but increasinglypowerful wave of “rights defence movements”mentioned above. The most promising newpolitical force engendered by market Leninismin China is the formation of a liberal camp inthe late 1990s, consisting of at least sixdistinctive but partially overlapping categories:liberal intellectuals, democracy movementactivists, liberals within the CCP, Christianliberals, human rights lawyers and grassrootsrights activists.21 Each of these groupspropounded l iberal ism from i ts own

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perspectives through publications andspeeches, took part in a variety of social andpolitical activities for the cause of democracy,sometimes expressed mutual support for oneanother when persecuted by the party-state,and occasionally joined in issuing joint petitionsor open letters on the internet to express theirshared concerns or demands for democraticchanges.

Liberal intellectuals

The majority of intellectuals in China today areat least prone to liberalism in the sense thatthey share beliefs in market economy,individual rights, criticism of state monopolypower, and, to a lesser extent, l iberaldemocracy, although few dare to activelyconfront the party-state and put their beliefsinto practice. 2 2 Chinese l iberals haveproclaimed a “rebirth” or "resurfacing" ofliberalism since the late 1990s, beginning with1998, a decade af ter the Tiananmencrackdown.23 Several factors contributed to thisdevelopment of liberalism, including theexpectation for change after Deng Xiaoping’sdeath, the belief that the Asian financial crisiswas rooted in authoritarianism, the perceptionof further reforms necessitated by economicdevelopment, the provocative attacks onliberalism by the new left, growing awarenessof the accelerating pace of globalisation, andthe posture of Jiang Zemin’s leadership withrespects to human rights and the rule of law, asshown by the political report of the FifteenthParty Congress and the signing of the“International Covenant on Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights” and the “InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights.”24

The core of the emerging liberal camp is agroup of mainly middle aged scholars andintellectuals who can be broadly identified asmembers of the “Cultural RevolutionGeneration”, such as Zhu Xueqin, Xu Youyu,Qin Hui, He Weifang, Liu Junning, ZhangBoshu, Sun Liping, Zhou Qiren, Wang Dingding

and Zhang Weiying. Their liberalism is rootedin their own political experience as well as theirexposure to liberal theories. While theirexperience in and reflections on totalitarianrule during the Cultural Revolution providedstrong stimuli to search for a new politicalbelief, in the 1970s they were intoxicated withvarious brands of humanism and since the1980s they were attracted to both Western andmodern Chinese liberal traditions. Theypublished their ideas in monographs,theoretical journals, such as Dong Fang(Orient) and Kaifang Shidai (Open Times), andnewspapers, such as Nanfang Zhoumo(Southern Weekends) and Nanfang Dushibao(Southern Metropolitan Daily), and, morefreely, on the internet. The party-state hasprevented them from forming an organisationfor their political endeavour, but they manageto gather regularly on informal occasions andat conferences organised by colleagues.25

Gathering of Chinese liberal intellectualsfor a conference on Chinese liberalism,

Sydney, January 2003. First row from theleft: Xie Yong, Xu Youyu, Zhu Xueqin, Jean-Philippe Beja (guest discussant), Qin Hui,and Gao Hua. Second row from the left:

Qiu Queshou, He Yihui, Feng Chongyi, XiaoGongqin, Wu Guoguang, You Ji (guestdiscussant), Ren Jiantao, and Xiao Bin.

Zhu Xueqin, born 1952, is a leading historianand public intellectual based at Shanghai

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University. He established his belief inliberalism through a thorough examination ofthe French Enlightenment in his PhD thesis andbecame a major exponent of contemporaryChinese liberalism.26 Xu Youyu, born 1947, is aphilosopher and public intellectual based at theChinese Academy of Social Sciences. Apartfrom promotion of liberalism, Xu is also anexpert on Western social theories includingMarxism and the Frankfurt School and a well-k n o w n h i s t o r i a n o f t h e C u l t u r a lRevolution.27 Qin Hui, born 1953, is a historianand public intellectual based at QinghuaUniversity. Within the liberal camp, Qin standsout particularly for his preferences forprivatisation under strict conditions ofdemocratic openness, and the primacy of socialj u s t i c e a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s o f s o c i a ldemocracy.28 He Weifang, born 1960, is a lawprofessor and public intellectual based atBeijing University, striving for judicialindependence and modernisation of theChinese judicial system in accordance with theprinciples of the rule of law.29 Liu Junning, born1961, is a political scientist and publicintellectual currently based at the Institute ofChinese Culture after his dismissal from theChinese Academy of Social Sciences due to hisexpression of liberal views. Liu has played aleading role spreading the concept ofconstitutional government and organisingseveral liberal journals and book series such asGonggong Luncong (Res Publica) and MinzhuY i c o n g ( T r a n s l a t e d W o r k s o nDemocracy).30 Zhang Boshu, born 1955, is aphilosopher and public intellectual formerlybased at the Chinese Academy of SocialSciences. Among liberal intellectuals in Chinatoday, Zhang goes farthest in directlyconfronting the autocracy and systematicallyp r o m o t i n g l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i calternatives.31 Sun Liping, born 1955, is asociologist and public intellectual based atQinghua University. Sun is well known for hiscriticism of the inequities in the current socialsystem and his advocacy of transformation toan open and liberal society.32 Zhou Qiren (born

1950), Wang Dingding (born 1953) and ZhangWeiying (born 1959) are l ike-mindedeconomists and public intellectuals based atBeijing University, sharing an emphasis onprivate property rights.33

Liberals within the CCP

Liberals within the CCP are usually known as“dangnei minzhupai” (democrats within theCCP). They are CCP members who haveshifted their belief from communism to liberaldemocracy and have been actively striving for ademocratic transition in China, although somemay continue to believe in the possibility ofdemocratic socialism.34 What distinguishesthem from the former group of l iberalintellectuals is primarily that they are CCPmembers and in some cases officials. However,liberals within the CCP usually choose to speakmainly to the top party leadership in a codedlanguage familiar to communist officials. Theyalso have special outlets to publish their ideas,such as Yanhuang chunqiu (Chronicles ofChina), Tongzhou gongjin (Advance in theSame Boat) and Zhongguo shichang jingjiluntan wengao (Chinese Market EconomyForum Drafts), the journals under their control.In fact, liberals within the CCP have used theirpositions to create space for the discourse onliberalism and played key roles in facilitatingthe resurfacing of liberalism in China in thelate 1990s.

Most active members of this group are retiredofficials including Bao Tong, former director ofthe Political System Reform Research Office ofthe CCP Central Committee and secretary ofthe CCP Politburo Standing Committee; DuDaozheng, director of Yanhuang chunqiu,former director of the State Press Bureau andformer chief editor of Guangming Daily; DuGuang, former director of Research Office andthe Librarian at the Central School of the CCP;Du Runsheng, secretary general of the CentralRural Work Department in the 1950s and headof the Rural Policies Office of the CCP Central

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Committee in the 1980s; He J iadong(1923-2006), former deputy director ofWorkers’ Press; Hu Jiwei, former chief editorand director of the People’s Daily; Jiang Ping,former president of Chinese University ofPolitical Science and Law; Li Rui, vice-ministerof the Ministry of Water Conservancy in the1950s and deputy chief of the OrganizationDepartment of the CCP Central Committee inthe 1980s; Li Pu, former deputy director ofXinhua News Agency; Li Shenzhi (1923-2003),former deputy president of the ChineseAcademy of Socia l Sc iences; L in Mu(1927-2006), former deputy chief of thePropaganda Department of the CCP ShaanxiProvincial Committee and former PartySecretary of Northwest China University; RenZhongyi (1914-2005), former Party secretary ofGuangdong Province; Wu Jinglian, seniorresearch fellow at the Development ResearchCentre of the State Council; Xie Tao, formerdeputy president of China People’s University;Yang Jisheng, deputy director of Yanhuangchunqiu and former senior journalist of XinhuaNews Agency and chief editor of ChineseMarket; Zhao Ziyang (1919-2005), deposedGeneral Secretary of the CCP;3 5 ZhongPeizhang, former director of the TheoryBureau, the Propaganda Department of theCCP Central Committee; Zhu Houze, formerParty Secretary of Guizhou Province and chiefof the Propaganda Department of the CCPCentral Committee; and Zong Fengming,former Party Secretary of Beijing AeronauticalEngineering University.

Gathering of liberal intellectuals andliberals within the CCP for a forumon liberalism and social democracy,

Beijing, December 2005. First row fromthe left: Zhu Houze, Feng Chongyi, Du

Runsheng, Li Rui, and Zhang Sai.

Democracy movement activists

This group also shares with the liberalintellectuals a common political belief butadopts a different strategy to achieve the goalof democracy. Democracy movement activistsopenly challenge the ban on polit icalorganisation, form various organisations, andreplace the communist government’s monopolyon power through mass movement, peacefullyor otherwise, compared to liberal intellectualswho act within the legal framework and seek topersuade the CCP to reform and play a role indemocratic transition. It is therefore notsurprising that in 1998, while the liberalintellectuals launched an “open discourse” onliberalism and the democracy movementactivists were busy organising the Zhongguominzhudang (China Democracy Party), the twogroups did not communicate with each other atall. The core leaders of the China DemocracyParty are either Democracy Wall Movementveterans, such as Xu Wenli and Qin Yongmin,or former student leaders of the 1989Tiananmen protest such as Wang Youcai andLiu Xianbin.36

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However, within the group of democracymovement activists, many have softened theiractivist stance and moved closer to the liberalintellectuals. Veteran democracy movementleaders such as Chen Ziming and Liu Xiaobobelong to exactly the same “Cultural RevolutionGeneration” of liberal intellectuals and sharesimilar experiences and intellectual sources.Although still identified as a “hostile force” bythe party-state due to their involvement in thedemocracy movement, their publications sincethe 1990s have been almost identical to thoseof the ordinary liberal intellectuals promotingrational, peaceful and lawful approaches toadvance constitutional democracy in China.After his release from prison Chen Ziming waspermitted in 2004 to set up the website Gaizaoyu Jianshe (Reform and Construction), withsupport from He Jiadong and other liberalintellectuals. He has earned wide recognitionas a scholar in the Chinese academiccommunity and has been able to publish widelyon theoretical and practical issues with his realname on major public websites in China suchas Tian Yi (Training & Education in China,TECN for short) and Xuanju yu Zhili (Chinaelections) Liu Xiaobo was elected President ofThe Independent Chinese PEN Center in 2003and worked to substantially expand theassociation among liberal intellectuals duringhis tenure, which continued to the time of hisarrest in 2009. He has been able to developextensive contacts with liberal intellectuals andwork together in preparing many coordinatedactions, including the drafting of Charter 08.Since the late 1990s, some journals publishedabroad, such as Beijing Zhichun (BeijingSpring) edited by Hu Ping and Guancha(Observation) edited by Chen Kuide havepublished regular contributions by moderateliberal intellectuals in China. For those whowere originally officials or advisers servingreform leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang,such as Chen Yizhi, Su Shaozhi and Yan Jiaqi,exile to the West has also provided themopportunities for reflection and furtherunderstanding of liberalism.

Christian liberals

The emergence of Christian liberals is a newphenomenon of the social and politicallandscape in the first decade of 21st centuryChina. 3 7 The journey from pol i t ics toChristianity among some Chinese democracyactivists started with Yuan Zhiming, who firstbecame well-known as one of the three authorsof the influential political TV Series River Elegyaired in 1988. As a PhD candidate in philosophyat China People’s University, Yuan escaped tothe United States in 1989 after the June 4massacre and, due to profound disappointmentwith the failure of the Chinese democracymovement and infighting among its leaders inexile, he converted to Christianity in 1991while a visiting scholar at Princeton University.The circulation of his 12 part VCD Why Do IBelieve in Jesus Christ circulating widely inChina, sent shock waves among colleagues ofthe Chinese democracy movement. Equallyinfluential was the conversion of Yang Xiaokai(1948-2004), a forerunner of the Chinesedemocracy movement who was well knownduring the Cultural Revolution for his big-character poster Zhongguo xiang hechu qu(Whither China) circulated widely in 1968 whenhe was 19 years old. Yang earned a PhD ineconomics from Princeton University in 1988,became a well-known neoclassical economist atMonash University, and was twice nominatedfor the Nobel Prize in Economics (2002 and2003). For his Chinese audience, Yang isparticularly recognized for promotingxianzheng jingjixue (constitutional economics),championing the view that constitutionaldemocracy provides the best framework foreconomic development.38

In the last few years many liberal intellectualshave converted to Christianity and some havebecome leaders of the rapidly expanding“family churches” (jiating jiaohui), whosemembership has been estimated in the range of50-100 millions.39 Chinese “family churches”,also known as the "Underground" Church or

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the "Unofficial" Church (they do not belong to asingle church but operate autonomously), areassemblies of unregistered Chinese Christiansindependent of the Three-Self PatrioticMovement, the government-run Christianorganisation.40 “Family churches” operateoutside government regulation and restriction,but they are not officially outlawed.41 Theirleaders and members are often harassed byChinese authorities who regularly break up thegatherings organized by “family churches”,confiscate bibles and other property, and evendemolish venues used as temporary churchesand arrest church leaders,42 mainly for fear ofpopular mobilisation beyond governmentcontrol. The rank and file members of “familychurches” are originally apolitical, butgovernment persecution and harassment havedriven many into reluctant opposition, ashappened to Falun Gong practitioners in the1990s.

Gathering of Chinese liberal intellectualsand Christian liberals for a conference onprospect for constitutional democracy inChina, Sydney, February 2006. First row

from the left: Edmund Fung (guestdiscussant), Feng Chongyi, Chen Kuide,

Qin Hui, He Weifang, Jin Yan, Li Dong, andDing Dong.

Christian liberals have served in a dualcapacity as liberal intellectuals and Gospelpreachers.43 They have encountered mixedresponses among Christians of family churches,which are characterized by internal diversity.In terms of geography and demography, familychurches can be divided into two major

categories, namely the rural family churches asthe main stay and the emerging urban familychurches, with the former populated byvillagers and the latter by young, educatedurban Christians. In terms of organizationalstructure, these churches can be divided intothe centralized hierarchical model, popular inthe rural areas in inland provinces such asHenan, Anhui and Shanxi before the 1990s, andthe decentralized federal model, prevalent inbig cities and rural areas in coastal provincess u c h a s Z h e j i a n g J i a n g s u a n dFujian.44 Members of urban family churches,predominantly university students and youngprofessionals and business people who havereceived higher education, are closer toChristian liberals. As stated by family churchtrainer Zheng Muxing in an interview, thesemembers are open-minded and versed in law,sociology and other social sciences. They areattracted to the modern political system basedon the core values of human rights, toleranceand universal fraternity.45 To a lesser extent,other members are fellow travellers ofChristian liberals too, particularly in theircommon struggle for autonomy, freedom ofbelief, freedom of association, freedom ofspeech and freedom of press. However, mostmembers and pastors of family churchesprioritize autonomy and independence of thechurches and maintain a distance fromdemocracy activists who are perceived to usechurches as a political tool. According to familychurch trainer Yu Tianyuan, separationbetween politics and religion is a fundamentalprinciple of genuine Christians who oppose theuse of churches for political purposes.46

Leading Christian liberals are convertingChinese family churches and bringing themtoward liberalism, in both internal governanceand external relations. As believers in theliberal principle of separating politics fromreligion, they are fully aware of the tension anddilemma between striving for the legal statusand independence of the family churches onthe one hand and maintaining the neutral

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position of the churches on the other, adilemma rooted in the Chinese communistregime which does not tolerate religiousindependence and regards religion as a unitedfront tool of the party state. The strategyadopted by Christian liberals to overcome thisdilemma is to “defend rights according to thelaw” (yifa weiquan), promoting the rule of lawand establishing a new relationship with thegovernment within a legal framework andseeking change through legal channels, ratherthan rebelling against the government. YuTianyuan argues that, according to bothChristian creed and Chinese law, a responsibleChinese citizen can act as both a goodChristian and a rights activist at the same time,because Christians have the right and duty todefend the integrity of their beliefs and humanrights of other citizens.47 By involvement in orproviding leadership for rights defencemovements, Christian liberals are exercisingtheir constitutional rights and performing theirduties as Christians and citizens, but they arenot responsible for politicizing Christianity inChina. “Under a tolerant social environment”,wrote a Chinese scholar, “the churches showtheir social concerns in cultural development,social service and charity. . . . The socialconcerns of the churches focus on rightsdefence and other political aspects in theenvironment in which the churches are notlegalized”.48

It is precisely the strategy to “defend rightsaccording to the law” that has become arallying point and transformative force ofChinese Christian churches. At the outset,Christian family churches in China werecharacterized by underground activities,hierarchical structure and personal cult, similarto secret societies in traditional China. Underthe leadership of Christian liberals, struggle forlegal status and independence of familychurches have become an essential part of thebroad rights defence movement characterizedby openness, peace and rationality. Christianchurches in China today openly organize

worship service, training and other activities;establish federal structures and elect theirleaders through democratic processes.49 Thedecisions to maintain independence from thegovernment and not register as subsidiaries ofthe “Three-self Patriotic Movement Committee”are also achieved through debates anddemocratic processes. The consensus amongleaders of family churches is that thesechurches should not directly participate inpolitics but play a role as an indirect drivingforce in democratic transition, providingspiritual resources and preparing qualifiedcitizens.50 Fan Yafeng even believes that if theparty-state cannot take down the familychurches in the current round of suppression,“a big opening will be made for China’sdemocratization and Christianization, andreligious freedom will become a pioneer ofChinese freedoms”.51

Human rights lawyers

Known as “weiquan lüshi" (rights defencelawyers), these liberals use the courts to fightfor justice, the rule of law and constitutionaldemocracy. Rights lawyers have not onlyrigorously defended various victims whoserights were abused by the party-state orcorporations, but also played a role as opinionleaders in linking rights defence cases withpolitical aspirations for the rule of law andconstitutional democracy. Apart fromrepresenting clients in ordinary cases, theytake up politically sensitive cases involvingvictims of state power, defend political and civilrights in cases of wide social and politicalsignificance, and provide legal aid forindividual and collective rights defence actions.Some have also played important roles as legalactivists and opinion leaders. They publishregularly on “sensitive topics” via the Internetand other media outlets, organise or participatein Political petitions, and consciously uselawsuits as social mobilisation linking rightsdefence cases with political aspirations for therule of law and constitutional democracy.52

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Zhang Sizhi, born 1947 and known amongChinese lawyers as “the conscience oflawyers”, is the human rights lawyer with thehighest prestige in China today, although hemocks the fact that he has never won a case.This prestige comes with his seniority as a longtime CCP member, as a Rightist serving in alabour camp for 15 years during the 1950s and1960s, and as a human rights advocate and adefense lawyer for prominent state enemiesranging from the “Lin Biao Clique” and the“Gang of Four” to Wei Jingsheng, Wang Juntaoand Bao Tong since 1980. Zhang has fought forhuman rights and judicial independence fordecades and believes that every lawyer shouldbe a human rights advocate. Awarded the 2008Petra Kelly Prize by the Heinrich BöllFoundation for his “exceptional commitment tohuman rights and the establishment of the ruleof law in China” , Zhang was praisedinternationally for “shaping China’s difficultpath towards democracy and the rule of law” inhis unique way.53

Following in Zhang Sizhi’s path are ageneration of younger Chinese human rightslawyers, including Mo Shaoping (born 1958) inBeijing who has defended tens of politicaldissidents; Zheng Enchong (born 1950) inShanghai who was sentenced to 3 years inprison in 2003 for representing evictedShanghai residents in a lawsuit against realestate developers and the local government; LiBaiguang (born 1968) in Beijing who wasarrested in 2004 for representing peasants inFujian Province fighting for their land rights;Zhu Jiuhu (born 1966) in Beijing who wasarrested in Shaanxi in 2005 for representingoil-field operators in Shaanxi who werearbitrarily stripped of contractual right tooperate oil wells by the local governmentwithout proper compensation; Guo Guoting(born 1958) in Shanghai, whose licence wassuspended in 2005 for representing politicaldissidents and Falun Gong practitioners; GaoZhisheng (born 1966) in Beijing, who in 2006was sentenced to 3 years in prison with 5 years

of probation and whose law firm was shut downby the government for representing politicaldissidents and Falun Gong practitioners; LiHeping in Beijing who was beaten by secretpolice in 2007 and 2008 for representingpolitical dissidents, Falun Gong practitionersand family church Christians; Teng Biao inBeijing who was abducted and detained bysecret police for representing politicaldissidents, Falun Gong practitioners and familychurch Christians; Pu zhiqiang (born 1965) inBeijing who regularly represents politicaldissidents; Zhang Xianshui (born 1967) inBeijing who regular represents politicaldissidents and family church Christians; and XuZhiyong (born 1965) in Beijing who focuses onthe cases of wronged petitioners.54 It isinteresting to note that many of these humanrights lawyers are also Christians.

Liberal intellectuals and rights lawyerscommemorate the first anniversary of thedeath of liberal scholar Bao Zunxin at his

tomb, October 2008. Rights lawyer MoShaoping holds the spade. Others includeliberal intellectuals Yu Haocheng (blue

jacket and hat, centre), Liu Xiaobo (blackleather jacket , fourth from the right),

Zhang Zuhua, Jiang Qisheng and Yu Jie;and rights lawyers Ten Biao and Pu

Zhiqiang. All are prominent Charter 08signers.

The clashes between rights lawyers and the

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party-state indicate profound contradictions incurrent legal and political systems. On the onehand, since 1978 when the legal profession didnot exist and there were only two laws (theconstitution and marriage law), remarkablelegal reforms have taken place, such asimporting legal institutions from the West,establishing a modern court system, enactinghundreds of laws, establishing hundreds of lawschools, and participating in the internationalhuman rights regime.55 On the other hand, theChinese Communist Party seeks to maintain amonopoly on political power and the entirepower structure of the Leninist party-state,creating intrinsic contradictions between therule of law and the supremacy of the Party. Theconstitution is granted the “highest legalauthority”; courts are granted power to handlelegal cases; and legal norms and proceduresare created to protect citizens against abuses.However, under the concept of “socialist rule oflaw”, the principle of “Party leadership” mustbe upheld and Party power must not beundermined by law. As a consequence, rightslawyers are punished when they cross thearbitrary line drawn by the Party, although theauthorities have refrained from suppressing thelegal activism of rights lawyers entirely, atleast partly because they operate carefullywithin the law and use China’s judicial systemto advance their aims.

Grassroots rights activists. Legal activism ofhuman rights lawyers has led to the emergenceof a vibrant “rights defence movement”(weiquan yundong) since 2003, which can bedefined as assertion of human rights throughlitigation (falü susong) supplemented by thepressure of public opinion (yulun yali).56 Rightslawyers’ leadership of the emerging “rightsdefence movement ” is shared with grassrootshuman rights activists, an encouragingindication that liberalism has reached down tothe bottom of Chinese society.

Chen Guangcheng (born 1971), a blind“barefoot lawyer” who could not acquire a

formal licence to practice law but managed toaudit law classes and learn enough to advisefellow villagers when they sought his assistanceon legal issues, is a typical grassroots activistfighting at the forefront of the “rights defencemovement”. In early 2005, Chen exposed harshillegal measures by local authorities enforcingthe one-child policy in Linyi County, Shandongprovince. Family planning officials there forcedthousands of people to undergo sterilization orto abort pregnancies. The officials were alsoaccused of detaining and torturing relatives ofpeople who had evaded the forced measures.Chinese national regulations prohibit suchbrutal measures, but they have been commonpractices throughout the country, especially inthe 1980s and 1990s. Chen filed a class-actionlawsuit on the women's behalf against Linyiofficials and drew attention to the plight of thevillagers. He also travelled to Beijing in June2005 to seek redress. When local authoritiesarrested Chen in September 2005, humanrights lawyers from Shandong and Beijingimmediately formed a defense team anddemanded a fair trial, only to be beaten,detained and barred from the court room. Aftermuch delay Chen was tried in November 2006and sentenced to four years and three monthsin prison on charges of "damaging property andorganising a mob to disturb traffic".

Similarly, Yang Maodong (pen name GuoFeixiong, born 1966) has also been imprisonedfor rights activism on behalf of villagers. In July2005, Taishi villagers in Panyu County,Guangdong, attempted to recall a corruptvillage head only to face crackdowns by thelocal government and police. Civil rightsactivists and Chinese and foreign journalistswho went to report on the incident wereblocked or threatened. With other rightsactivists Guo, who had worked in Guangdongfor many years as a private publisher and inother capacities, provided legal advice to thevillagers in his capacity as a legal adviser of theBeijing-based Zhisheng Law Firm. Repeatedlydetained, beaten and harassed, he was finally

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arrested in September 2006. In November2007 Guo was sentenced to five years in prisonon charges of “illegal business dealings”. Thesentences to Chen, Guo and others sendpowerful signals to lawyers who dare to defendcitizens against official malfeasance.

Yao Lifa (born 1958) of Qianjiang City in Hubeiis the first deputy to be elected through self-nomination to a municipal-level people’scongress. Yao, who runs a vocational schooleducation program and teaches in anelementary school, began competing for a seatin the local people’s congress in 1987, whenthe election law was first promulgated. The lawallows for self-nominated candidates, and Yaoused this provision to run for office. Twelveyears later, in 1998, he finally succeeded. Overthe course of the next five years, Yao was abusy and controversial figure—he raised 187 ofthe 459 suggestions, opinions, and criticismspresented to the local people’s congress. Yaohas campaigned on issues of excessive taxesand levies, seizures, corruption, and access tohealth care. Sensing a mandate, he railedagainst the detention of peasants who refusedto pay illegal fees, collected more than 10,000signatures criticizing a Party official, anddenounced the waste of public money ondubious projects.57 With Yao’s example andhelp, more independent candidates have turnedto grassroots democracy; a small number havewon seats in local congresses.

Election campaign poster for Yao Lifa.

Massive environmental protests representanother new social movement arena in China.Apart from the growing claim of victimhoodthrough official channels, protests led byenvironmental non-governmental organisations(ENGOs) and other popular actions areincreasing rapidly. According to Pan Yue,deputy minister for State EnvironmentalProtection, pollution-induced mass incidentsgrew about twelve times in ten years between1995-2005, an increase of 29% every year, withmore than 50,000 pollution disputes across thecountry in 2005 alone.58 Yu Xiaogang (born1 9 5 1 ) i n Y u n n a n i s a g r a s s r o o t senvironmentalist who set up the ENGO GreenWatershed and succeeded for the first time inChina in involving local villagers in watershedprojects. His campaigns have helped raiseconsciousness of environmental protectionamong both villagers and government officialsw h o b e g a n t o p a y a t t e n t i o n t o t h esocioeconomic impact of dam construction onlocal Chinese communities. Yu played a keyrole during 2003 and 2004 in blocking theYunnan provincial government’s plans toconstruct 13 new dams on the Nu River, one ofthe Three Parallel Rivers – the Nu, Jinsha

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(Yangzi) and the Lancang (Mekong), for whichhe was awarded the prestigious GoldmanEnvironmental Prize in 2006.

Wu Xian (born 1987) in Fujian is a youngenvironmentalist who played an important rolein the Xiamen PX (Paracylene) Project Incidentin 2007. When Wu, a small karaoke barmanager, heard about the plan for the giantpetrochemical plant (investment of US$1.41billion) with strong political connections, heimmediately set up an online discussion groupand urged Xiamen residents to protest againstthe plant. Local residents eventually launchedstrong campaigns that forced the plant to berelocated to a safer location.

Protest of Xiamen residents against theXiamen PX (Paracylene) Project, June

2007.

Likewise, Yang Yang (born 1977) in Shanghai, as h y y o u n g s a l e s w o m a n , i s a l s o a nenvironmental protection activist who hasachieved great success. When she learned fromher housing development's electronic bulletinboard of the city's plans to extend Shanghai'sfuturistic magnetic levitation, or maglev, trainline within 30 meters of her house, angered bythe noise and radiation pollution, the misuse oftaxpayers’ money and the effect on propertyvalues, she began networking with otheropponents both in her neighbourhood and all

along the planned train route. Word ofopposition sentiment quickly gatheredmomentum and Yang and her fellow residentsorganised a “collective walk” (jiti sanbu) on thePeople’s Square. On 12 Jan 2008, a sunnySaturday afternoon, Yang found herself inShanghai's most important public square, witha few thousand other disgruntled residents inone of the largest demonstrations the city hadseen in recent years. Yielding to the pressure,the Shanghai government put on hold theMaglev Train project to connect the HongqiaoInternat ional Airport to the PudongInternational Airport.

Shanghai residents’ “collective walk” atPeople’s Square in protest against theMaglev Train project, January 2008.

In every one of these events, liberal bloggersand “citizen reporters” (gongmin jizhe)launched Internet campaigns and playedimportant roles in social mobilisation. Hu Jia(born 1973) joined ENGO Friends of Nature in1996 and participated in protests againstdeforestation in northern China. He then hebecame an AIDS activist and rights activist andpublished regularly on the internet criticizinggovernment abuses of human rights. He wasdetained by the police several times andsentenced in April 2008 to three and a halfyears in prison for “inciting subversion of statepower”. Ai Weiwei (born 1957), a designer byprofession, in December 2008 took a team to

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collect data on the Wenchuan earthquakevictims for government compensation andpunishment of those responsible for shoddyconstruction resulting in fatal injuries. Aiquickly became one of the most popularbloggers in China, attacking corruption andpower abuses. Another extremely popularblogger is Yang Hengjun (born 1965) whoearned his BA in Politics from Fudan Universityand PhD in China Studies from The Universityof Technology, Sydney. Yang became afreelance writer well-known for his penetratingcurrent affairs commentaries.

It bears noting that, given internal diversitywithin the liberal camp, what Charter 08 hasexpressed is a minimum consensus. Even so,some leading liberals have expressedreservations and have not signed thedocuments. Leading liberals within the CCP,such as Li Rui and Zhu Houze, regardedCharter 08 as a direct confrontation with theParty leadership and politely declined theinvitation to join.59 Their concern is shared bysome leading liberal intellectuals such as ZhuXueqin and Xiao Han who held that thedocument should have allowed greater space toaccommodate the ru l ing communistparty.60 Some leading social democrats withinthe liberal camp, such as Qin Hui, did not signthe document either, on the ground that it didnot go far enough in spelling out demands forsocial welfare and economic rights of thepoor.61

Conclusion

Charter 08 is the most important collectiveexpression of Chinese liberal thought toemerge since the founding of the People’sRepublic in 1949. It embodies Chinese liberals’sincere invitation to both the government andthe public for constructive interaction andnegot ia t ion to e f fec t and manage afundamental polit ical change towardconstitutional democracy. Despite theCommunist Party’s official agenda for

democratic reform and human rights, thecurrent leadership lacks the confidence todirectly engage the Charter 08 framers andsigners in theoretical debate on the issuesraised, or to launch all-out war againstsignatories of the document. After hesitatingfor one year, the Chinese authorities severelypunished Liu Xiaobo, but at this writing haveleft other signatories alone, although most ofthe 303 original signatories were “summonedfor interrogations” (chuan huan) by the policewithin a month of the publication of thedocument. Out of fear of organized opposition,the authorities have emphasized blockingcirculation of the document and “punishing oneas a warning to others” to minimize the impactof Charter 08. This strategy has not succeededin forcing one single signatory to withdraw, norhas it prevented more than ten thousandChinese at home and abroad from adding theirnames to the document. However, the strategyof Chinese authorities has had a certain effect,at least for the time being, in leading manymore who share the values and aspirations ofCharter 08 to remain silent. In the long run, theproposals made in Charter 08 could serve as aguide for the emergence of a genuine Chinesedemocracy.

Feng Chongyi is Associate Professor in ChinaStudies at the University of Technology,Sydney, and adjunct Professor of History,Nankai University, Tianjin. He is author ofnumerous books in English and Chineseincluding Peasant Consciousness and China;From Sinification to Globalisation; The Wisdomof Reconciliation: China’s Road to LiberalDemocracy and Liberalism within the CCP:From Chen Duxiu to Lishenzhi. He is also theeditor of Constitutional Government and China;Li Shenzhi and the Fate of Liberalism in China;Constitutional Government and China; andConstitutional Democracy and HarmoniousSociety. He wrote this article for The Asia-Pacific Journal.

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This article, originally published on January 11,2010, is being republished with a newintroduction on October 11, 2010 following theaward of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo.

Recommended citation: Feng Chongyi,"Charter 08, the Troubled History and Futureof Chinese Liberalism," The Asia-PacificJournal, 41-5-10, October 11, 2010.

Notes

1 The sentence also sent shock waves throughthe international community, the governmentof the United States in particular, which hadhailed the Charter and asked for the release ofLiu Xiaobo.

2 For instance, Feng Chongyi and YangHengjun, ‘Mingnian qibu, sannian chengjiuxianzheng daye’ (Start Next Year and AchieveConstitutional Democracy in China withinThree Years).

3 Link.

4 There are two slightly different versions of thetext available in English. One English text wasprovided by Perry Link whose translation wasbased on a draft version of the original text andpublished in The New York Times Book Review,volume 56, number 1, January 15, 2009; theother translation with the l ist of 303signatories, based on the finalised version ofthe original text, was provided by HumanRights in China and is available at its website,which also provides a link to a Chinese text inboth full and simplified Chinese characters. Thetext in other languages, such as Japanese andFrench can be found on this website.

5 Li Shenzhi, ‘Hongyang Beida de ziyou zhuyichuantong, (Promoting and developing theliberal tradition of Beijing University), in LiuJunning, ed., Ziyou zhuyi de xiansheng: Beidachuantong yu jinxiandai Zhongguo (The

harbinger of liberalism: The tradition of BeijingUniversity and modern China), (Beijing:Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1998), 1-5.Similar ideas had been put forward by othersearlier, albeit with much less impact. Forexample, see Xu Liangying, ‘Renquan guannianhe xiandai minzhu lilun’ (The concept of humanrights and modern theory of democracy),Tanshuo (Exploration), August 1993; also in XuLiangying, Kexue Minzhu Lixing: Xu LiangyingWenji (Science, Democracy and Reason:Selected Works of Xu Liangying), New York:Mirror Books, 2001, p.258-276.

6 See Bao Tong’s recent work Zhongguo deyousi (China’s Anxiety) , Hong Kong:Taipingyang Century Publishing House, 2000;Hu Jiwei, “Xin chun fang yan: yige laogongchandang yuan de shensi ” (Unrestrainedcomments at new spring: reflections by a seniormember of the CCP), Beijing zhi chun (BeijingSpring), no. 34, March 1996, p.6-14; Hu Jiwei,‘Mingbian xingshuai zhilu, huainian Hu Zhaoxin zheng’ (Understanding the causes for therise and decline in commemoration of newundertakings by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang);Li Rui, “Yingjie xin siji yao sijiang” (Fourstresses to usher in the new century),Yanhuang chunqiu (Chronicles of China), no.12,1999, p.5; Li Shenzhi, ‘Fifty years of stormsand disturbance’, China Perspectives, no. 32(November-December 2000), p. 5-12; GuanShan, ‘Ren Zhongyi tan Deng Xiaoping yuGuangdong gaige kaifang’ (Ren Zhongyi’s talkson Deng Xiaoping and the reform and openingin Guangdong), Tongzhou Gongjin (Advance inthe Same Boat), no.8, 2004, p.6-14; Xie Tao,‘Minzhu shehui zhuyi moshi yu zhongguoqiantu’ (The model of democratic socialism andthe future of China), Yanhuang chunqiu(Chronicles of China), no. 2, 2007, p1-8.

7 For details see Feng Chongyi, ‘The Third Way:The Question of Equity as a Bone of ContentionBetween Intellectual Currents’, ContemporaryChinese Thought, 34: 4, Summer 2003, p.75-93.

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8 For a discussion by leading liberals on China’shousehold registration system from anhistorical perspective, see Qin Hui, ‘QianguCangsang hua huji (Vicissitudes of HouseholdRegistration System through the Ages), in QinHui, Shijian Ziyou (Practising Freedom),Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 2004,p.3-10.

9 Qin Hui (Bian Wu), ‘Gongzheng zhishang lun’(On Supremacy of Justice), Dongfang (Orient),1994:6; Qin Hui (Bian Wu), ‘Zailun gongzhengzhishang: qidian gongzheng ruhe keneng’ (TheSecond Essay On Supremacy of Justice:Possibility of Justice as the Starting Point),Dongfang (Orient), 1995:2; Qin Hui, ‘Shehuigongzheng yu zhongguo gaige de jingyanjiaoxun’ (Social Justice and the Lessons ofReform in China), in Qin Hui, Wenti yu Zhuyi(Issues and Isms), Changchun: ChangchunPublishing House, 1999, p. 33-40; Qin Hui,‘Ziyou zhuyi, shehui minzu zhuyi yu dangdaizhongguo “wenti”’, Zhanlue yu Guangli(Strategy and Management), 2000:5, p. 83-91;He Qinglian, Xiandaihuade Xianjing (The Pitfallof Modernisation), Beijing: China TodayPublishing House, 1998; Xu Youyu, ‘Ziyouzhuyiyu dangdai zhongguo’ (Liberalism andContemporary China), Kaifang Shidai (OpenTimes), 1999:3, p.43-51; Xu Youyu, ‘Ziyouzhuyi, falankefu xuepai ji qita’ (Liberalism,Frankfurt School and Others), in Xu Youyu,Ziyoude Yanshuo (Liberal Discourse),Changchun Publishing House, 1999, p.305-318; Zhu Xueqin, ‘1998: ziyouzhuyi xuelide yanshuo’ (Discourse on Liberalism in Chinain 1998), Zhu Xueqin, Shuzai li de geming(Revolution in the Study), Changchun:Changchun Publishing House, 1999, p.380-399.

10 Liu Junning, ‘Ziyou zhuiyi yu gongzheng: duiruogan jienan de huida’ (Liberalism andJustice: a reply to some criticisms), DandaiZhongguo Yanjiu (Modern China Studies),No.4, 2000; Qin Hui, ‘Chanquan gaige yuminzhu’ (Democracy and Property RightsReform).

11 Xu Youyu, ‘Dangdai zhongguo shehui sixiangde fenhua he dui’ (Ideological Division inContemporary China).

12 He Qinglian, Xiandaihuade Xianjing, p. 4.

13 Zhu Xueqin, ‘Ziyouzhuyi yu xin zuopai fenqihezai’, ‘What Is the Difference BetweenLiberals and the New Left’, in Zhu Xueqin,Shuzai li de geming (Revolution in the Study),Changchun: Changchun Publishing House,1999, p.419-420. There are those who arguethat state socialism cannot be reformed andmarket socialism is an illusion, simply becausemarket coordination and bureaucraticcoordination are not compatible. See JanosKornai, The Socialist System: the PoliticalEconomy of Communism, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1992.

14 Qin Hui, ‘Zhongguo jingji fazhan de direnquan youshi’ (The Advantage of PoorHuman R ights in Ch ina ’s EconomicDevelopment).

15 Xu Youyu, ‘Jiushi niandai de shehui sichao’(Intellectual Trends in the 1990s), in Xu Youyu,Ziyoude Yanshuo (Liberal Discourse),Changchun: Changchun Publishing House,1999, p. 257, 260.

16 Qin Hui, ‘Shehui gongzheng yu xueshuliangxin’ (Social Justice and AcademicConscience), in Li Shitao (ed), Ziyouzhuyizhizheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie defenhua (Debate on Liberalism and the Split inthe Chinese World of Thought), Shidai WenyiPublishing House, 2000, P.395-396.

17 Li Buyun, ‘Cong fazhi dao fazhi: ershi niangai yige zi’ (From the Rule by Law to the Ruleof Law: taking 20 years to change one word),Faxue (Legal Studies), no.7, 1999; The LawInstitute of Chinese Academy of SocialSciences, ed., Zhongguo fazhi sanshi nian (TheRule of Law in China during the Past 30 Years,1978-2008), Beijing: Social Sciences AcademicPress, 2008, p.59-65.

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1 8 Feng Chongyi, ‘The Rights DefenceMovement, Rights Defence Lawyers andProspects for Constitutional Democracy inChina’, Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: AnInterdisciplinary Journal, Vol 1, No 3 (2009).

19 Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Sees 'Market-Leninism' as Way to Future," The New YorkTimes, September 6, 1993.

20 Andrew Nathan, ‘Authoritarian Resilience’,Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1, 2003, pp.6–17;Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: TheLimits of Developmental Autocracy, HarvardUniversity Press, 2006.

21 Feng Chongyi, ‘The Liberal Camp in Post-June 4th China’, China Perspectives, no.2 2009,p.30-42

22 The term “liberals” in this article refers tothose who firmly believe in philosophical,economic, and political liberalism and openlydefend their belief in practice. In the context ofcontemporary China a clear distinction can bemade between liberals and semi-liberals, thelatter being proponents of economic liberalismwho support the project of privatization andmarketization but reject political liberalism andoppose or lack interest in the democratizationproject. For details see Feng Chongyi, ‘TheReturn of Liberalism and Social Democracy:Breaking through the Barriers of StateSocialism, Nationalism, and Cynicism inContemporary China’, Issues & Studies, 39: 3,September 2003, p. 1-31.

23 Zhu Xueqin, “1998: ziyou zhuyi xueli deyanshuo” (Discourse on liberalism in China in1998), Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend),25 December 1998; Liu Junning, “Ziyou zhuyi:jiushi niandaide ‘busuzhike’” (Liberalism: An“unexpected guest” of the 1990s), Nanfangzhoumo (Southern Weekend), May 29, 1999; XuYouyu, “Ziyou zhuyi yu dangdai Zhongguo”(Liberalism and contemporary China), Kaifangshidai (Open Times), no. 128, May/June 1999.

24 For the impact of human rights discourse onChina, see Merle Goldman, From Comrade tocitizen: The struggle for Political Rights inChina, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 2005; also Michael C. Davis, ed., HumanRights and Chinese Values: Legal, Philosophicaland Political Perspectives, New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1995.

25 The first conference exclusively comprised ofChinese liberals was organised by FengChongyi at University of Technology, Sydney onConstitutional Government and China, January2003, leading to publication of the book seriesZhongguo Ziyouzhuyi Luncong (ChineseLiberalism Series).

26 For Zhu’s liberal ideas see Zhu Xueqin,Daode lixiang guo de fumie (Downfall of theMoral Utopia), Shanghai: Sanlian, 2004; andZhu Xueqin, Shuzhaili de geming (Revolution inthe Study), Changchun: Changchun PublishingHouse, 1999.

27 For Xu’s liberal ideas see Xu Youyu, Ziyou deyanshuo (Discourse on Liberalism), Changchun:Changchun Publishing House, 1999

28 For Qin’s liberal ideas, see Qin Hui, Wenti yuzhuyi (Issues and isms; and Qin Hui, Shijianziyou (Practising Liberalism), Hangzhou:Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 2004.

29 For He’s liberal ideas, see He Weifang, Sifade linian yu zhidu (Judicial Ideals andInstitutions), Beijing: Chinese University ofPolitical Science and Law Publishing House,1998; and He Weifang, Yunsong zhengyi defangshi (Ways to Carry Out Justice), Shanghai:Sanlian Books, 2003.

30 For Liu’s liberal ideas, see Liu Junning,Minzhu, gonghe xianzheng: ziyou zhuyi sixiangyanjiu (Democracy, Republicanism andConstitutional Government: A Study ofLiberalism), Shanghai: Sanlian Books, 1998.

31 For Zhang’s liberal ideas, see Zhang Boshu,

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Zhongguo xianzheng gaige kexingxing yanjiubaogao (A Study of the Feasibi l i ty ofConstitutional Democracy Reform in China),Hong Kong: Chenzhong Books, 2008; andZhang Boshu, Cong wusi dao liusi: 20 shijizhongguo zhuanzhi zhuyi pipan (From May 4 toJune 4: Criticism of Chinese Despotism in the20th Century), Hong Kong: Chenzhong Books,2008.

32 For Sun’s liberal ideas, see Sun Liping, Boyi:duanlie shehui de liyi chongtu yu hexie(Contestations: Conflict of Interests and SocialHarmony in a Rift Society), Beijing: Socialsciences Academic Press, 2006.

33 For their liberal ideas, see Zhou Qiren,Chanquan yu zhidu bianqian (Property Rightsand Institutional Change), Beijing: BeijingUniversity Press 2005; Wang Dingding,Yongyuan de paihuai (Wavering Forever),Beijing: Social sciences Academic Press, 002;and Zhang Weiying, Qiye lilun yu zhongguoqiye gaige (Enterprise Theory and EnterpriseReform in China), Beijing: Beijing UniversityPress,1999.

34 See Feng Chongyi, ‘Li Shenzhi he zhonggongdangnei ziyou minzhu pai’ (Li Shenzhi andLiberal Democrats within the ChineseCommunist Party), in Feng Chongyi, ed., LiShenzhi yu ziyou zhuyi zai zhongguo demingyun (Li Shenzhi and the Fate of Liberalismin China), Hong Kong Press for Social Sciences,2004, p. 121-146; and Feng Chongyi,‘Democrats within the Chinese CommunistParty since 1989’, Journal of ContemporaryChina, vol.17, no. 57, November 2008, p.673-688.

35 For Zhao’s liberal ideas in his final years, seeZhao Ziyang, The Secret Journal of ZhaoZiyang, Hong Kong: New Century Press, 2009;Zong Fengming, Zhao Ziyang: ruanjin zhong detanhua (Zhao Ziyang: Captive Conversations),Hong Kong, Open Publishing House, 2007.During the 1980s Hu Yaobang was more liberal

politicly than Zhao Ziyang, but Hu did not haveopportunities to convert from a Marxist to aliberal.

36 For details of their activities and thecrackdown by the Chinese communist regime,Teresa Wright, ‘Intellectuals and the Politics ofProtest: The case of the China DemocracyParty’, in Edward Gu and Merle Goldman, eds.,Chinese Intellectuals Between State andM a r k e t , L o n d o n a n d N e w Y o r k :RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, p.158-180; see alsoMerle Goldman, From Comrade to citizen: Thestruggle for Political Rights in China,Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,2005, chapter 6.

37 Not counting contacts during ancient times,the Chinese have experienced modernChristianity for more than three centuries sincethe Ming Dynasty, which received the firstgroups of Western missionaries. Millions ofChinese were converted to Christians duringthe late Qing and the Republican period when,in spite of many troubles, Christianity was legaland welcome as a healthy religion and theChurches were allowed to be independent fromthe government, contr ibut ing to thedevelopment of modern education, modernscience, modern medicine, and modern charity.Many Chinese reformers saw the trinity ofmodern industry (science), democracy andChristianity as the secret of Western success.This development was brought to an end in1949 when China was taken over by thecommunist regime, which regarded Christianityas a hostile force and brought it under strictgovernment control.

38 Yang Xiaokai, ‘Jingji gaige yu xianzhengzhuanx ing ’ (Economic Re fo rm andTransformation to Constitutional Democracy).

39 Yu Jianrong, ‘Jidujiao de fazhan yu zhongguoshehui wending: yu liangwei jidujiao jiatingjiaohui peixun shi de duihua’ (Development ofChristianity and Social Stability in China:

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dialogue with two trainers of Christian familychurches ); Yu Jie, ‘Zhongguo dangdai zhishifenzi de guixin licheng (The conversion ofintellectuals to Christianity in contemporaryChina), in Yu Jie, Bai Zhou Jiangjin (DaylightApproaching), Hong Kong: Chenzhong Books,2008, p. 241-249.

40 The organization was founded in the early1950s by a group of government officials andchurch leaders who were sympathetic to thenew Communist regime. It took its name fromthe principles of self-government, self-propagation, and self-support, which foreignmissionaries years before had set forth as goalsfor the Chinese Church. Thousands of ChineseChristians refused to join the government-runorganization, precisely because they wanted tomaintain their independence and the principlesof self-government, self-propagation, and self-support. After 1955 the independent Christianswere driven underground and many werejailed. The first known Chinese “family church”was founded by a senior priest Yuan Xiangchenin Beijing in 1980, when he was released afterimprisonment of 21 years. After three decadesof quiet development, members of “familychurches” are several times more numerousthan those of official churches, which manydevoted Christians view as harmful to theintegrity of their belief precisely because of theclose relationship with the government. See YuJianrong ‘Zhongguo jidujiao jiating jiaohuixiang hechu qu: yu jiating jiaohui renshi deduihua’ (Whither the Christian FamilyChurches in China: dialogue with Christians ofFamily Churches).

41 Apart from the atheist state ideology, thebasic institutional obstacle to legalize familychurches in China is the state corporatistapproach adopted by the party-state towardcivil society, allowing only one association forone profession. The Religious Affairs Office andthe Civil Affairs Bureau do not approve theregistration of any Christian churches unlessthey are affiliated to the Three-Self Patriotic

Movement Committee. Most ChineseChristians, as their counterparts elsewhere,believe it is unacceptable to reduce thechurches to subsidiary bodies of the state. Foran analysis of contradictions and flaws in thelaws and regulations governing religious affairsin China, see Wang Yi, ‘Zongjiao fagui:dangqian de zhengjiao chongti jiqi qushi’ (TheReligious Laws and Regulations: conflictsbetween religions and the government atpresent and the trends in the future).

42 Most publicized major cases in recent years,as reported on the website of Chinese HumanRights Defenders and other media outlets,included the sentence of pastor Cai Zhuohua tothree years in prison on the charge of “illegalbusiness operation” (printing and distributingthe Bible) in Beijing in November 2005; thedemolition of Dangshan Church and arrest ofits leaders in “Xiaoshao Religious Case” inZhejiang Province in July 2006; the mass arrestof 270 participants in the training course forfamily church Christians in Linyi, ShandongProvince in July 2007; the ban on the NationalFederation of Chinese Family Churches and thearrest of its president Zhang Mingxuan inNovember 2008; the mass arrest of 50participants of the Fourth Conference of theNational Federation of Chinese FamilyChurches in Nanyang, Henan in July 2009; andthe current round of systematic suppressionhighlighting by the demolition of FushanChurch and the mass arrest of tens of familychurch members in “Linfen Religious Case” inShanxi Province in September 2009, forcingabout one thousand members of the ShouwangChurch in Beijing to attend worship serviceoutdoors in the snow on 1 November 2009,banning Wanbang Church in Shanghai on 2November 2009 and dismissing Fan Yafeng,leader of Shengshan Church in Beijing, fromthe Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on 3November 2009.

43 Active Christian liberals include Yu Jie (born1973), one of China's most independent and

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outspoken writers and social critics who earnedan MA in Chinese literature from BeijingUniversity in 2000 after publishing six books,served as Secretary Genera l o f TheIndependent Chinese Pen Center for a termand has published more than 20 books onChinese political, social and cultural issues; AiXiaoming (born 1953), professor of Chineseliterature, well-known feminist and publicintellectual based at Zhongshan University;Wang Yi (born 1973), former lecturer in law atChengdu University and current leader ofQ iuyuzh i fu Church , who earned anundergraduate law degree from SichuanUniversity and has become one of the mostinfluential Chinese public intellectuals withexpertise in legal studies; Fan Yafeng (born1969), former research fellow at The ChineseAcademy of Social Sciences where he earned aPhD in Law; Wang Dongcheng, a professor inChinese Literature at Chinese Youth PoliticalCollege; Fu Guoyong (born 1967), a freelancewriter and public intellectual, was imprisonedfive times for his political commentaries during1989-1998; Qi Yanchen, another freelancewriter and public intellectual who wasimprisoned four years for his politicalcommentaries; Ren Bumei (born 1967), afreelance writer who was probably the first toargue the case for “theological liberalism” incontemporary China; Wang Guangze (born1972), a freelance writer who earned his firstdegree in law from Henan University and MA inPhilosophy from China People’s University butlost his positions one after another as editorand journalist at Xinyang Daily, Legal Daily,21st Century Economic Herald, and PhoenixWeekly, in each instance due to his dissentingviews; and Zan Aizong (born 1969), a freelancewriter who was dismissed by the ChineseOcean Daily in August 2006 for his report onthe case of police demolishing a four storey“family church” in Xiaoshan, Zhejiang Provinceon 29 July 2006. These Christian liberalspublish journals such as Fangzhou (Ark) andLingshan (Holy Mountain), discussing religion-related political issues as well as Christian

creeds

44 Yu Jianrong, ‘Jidujiao de fazhan yu zhongguoshehui wending’.

45 Quoted in Yu Jianrong, ‘Jidujiao de fazhan yuzhongguo shehui wending’.

46 Quoted in Yu Jianrong, ‘Jidujiao de fazhan yuzhongguo shehui wending’.

47 Quoted in Yu Jianrong, ‘Jidujiao de fazhan yuzhongguo shehui wending’.

48 Sun Yi, ‘Xinxing chengshi jiaohui de zhuyaoshehui guanqie’ (Major Social Concerns of theNew Style Urban Churches).

49 Yu Jianrong, ‘Jidujiao de fazhan yu zhongguoshehui wending’;Yu Jianrong ‘Zhongguo jidujiaojiating jiaohui xiang hechu qu’.

50 Fan Yafeng, et al, ‘Zhongguo minzhuhua dezhuanxing moshi yantaohui jiyao' (Summary ofthe fo rum on mode l s o f democra t i ctransformation in China).

51 Fan Yafeng, 'RFA Interview with Zhao Min’.

52 Ji Shuoming & Wang Jianmin, ‘Zhongguoweiquan lüshi: fazhi xianfeng (Rights defencelawyers in China: the vanguard of the rule oflaw), Yazhou Zhoukan (Asia Weekly), coverstory, vol.19, no.52, 18/12/2005.

53 ‘Zhang Sizhi-Outstanding Commitment toHuman Rights and the Rule of Law in China’.

54 For details see Human Rights Watch,‘“Working on Thin Ice”: Control, Intimidation &Harassment of Lawyers in China.’

55 Zou Keyuan, China’s Legal Reform towardsthe Rule of Law, Boston: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 2006.

56 Qiu Feng, ‘Xin minquan xingdong nian’ (Theyear of the new rights movement), Xinwenzhoukan (News Weekly), no.161, Special Issue

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on The New Rights Movement, 22 December2003, pp. 52-53; Wang Yi, ‘2003: “Xin minquanyundong” de faren he caolian’ (2003: Theorigins and practices of the “new civil rightsmovement”), Guangcha (Observation), 19December 2003; Fan Yafeng, ‘Weiquanzhengzhi lun’ (The politics of rights defence).

57 For details of Yao’s story, see Zhu Ling, Wofandui: yige renda daibiao de canzheng chaunqi(I Object: A Legend of the Road to Politics by aDeputy of a People’s Congress), Haikou:Hainan Publishing House, 2006.

58 Pan Yue, ‘Hexie shehui mubiao xia dehuanjing youhao xing shehui’ (Environmentallyfriendly society is congruent with the goal ofbuilding a harmonious society), July 2006.

59 Similarly, when Jiang Qisheng took the draftof Charter 08 to consult Xu Liangying, a

prominent liberal who was expelled from theCCP after the June 4th massacre in 1989, Xu’sfirst reaction was to warn that the documentwould send its organizers to jail. See JiangQisheng, ‘Shuo liangjian wo yu lingbaxianzhang de shi’ (Two episodes about myassociation with Charter 08’, in Li Xiaorong andZhang Zuhua, eds., Lingba Xianzhang (Charter08), Hong Kong: Open Books, 2009, p. 16.

60 Xiao Han, ‘Guanyu lingba xianzhang’(Concerns about Charter 08), in Li Xiaorongand Zhang Zuhua, eds., Lingba Xianzhang p.109-114.

61 Qin Hui, ‘Zhongguo geng xunyao minzhubianlun yu zhongxin qimeng’ (What Chinaneeds more urgently are debates on democracyand a fresh enlightenment), in Li Xiaorong andZhang Zuhua, eds., Lingba Xianzhang p.138-144.