drc report comments rwanda

8/8/2019 DRC Report Comments Rwanda

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REPUBLICOFRWANDA N"Jh / rolo HcHR/v S ka Lo

PERMANENTMISSIONOFRWANDAGENEVA

The PermanentMissionof the Republicof Rwanda o the Officeof theUnitedNations ndother nternationalOrganizationsn Geneva resentstscomplimentso the Officeof the High Commissioneror HumanRights nGenevaand the honour to transmit herewith the Commentsof theGovernment f Rwandaon the Draft Mapping eport on the DRC, o bepublished longsidehe rePort.

The PermanentMissionof the Republicof Rwanda o the Officeof theUnitedNationsandother nternationalOrganizationsn Geneva vails tselfof this opportunity o renew to the Officeof the High CommissionerorHumanRightsn Genevahe assurancesf its highest onsideration.-t

ceneva,l.CI'..09o1o

OFFICE FTHEHIGHCOMMISSIONERFORHUMANRIGHTSGENEVA

Vermont 1202Genve


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REPUBLICOFRWANDA

M I N I S T R Y O F F O R E I G N A F F A I R S A N D C O O P E R A T I O N

OFFICIALGOVERNMENTOFRWANDA

COMMENTSONTHEDRAFTUNMAPPING

REPORTONTHEDRC


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TABLEOFCONTENTS

Acronyms 2

ExecutiveSummaryofComments 3

CommentsoftheGovernmentofRwanda 5

I.TheReportFailstoExplaintheHistoricalContextoftheGenocide anditsAftermath 6

The1994RwandanGenocide 7 MassParticipationintheGenocide 8

TheRefugeeCrisis 8

TheMilitarizationoftheCamps 9

RwandasInterventioninEastZaire 10 Conclusion 11

II.RwandaCompliedwithInternationalLawGoverningtheUseofForce 11

RwandasRepeatedWarnings 11 ChapterVII:TheUseofForceinSelf-Defense 13

Ex-FAR/Interahamwe:TheUseofCiviliansasaWeaponofWar 13 RespondingtoParticularAllegationsRegardingtheUseofForce 14

Conclusion 16

III.TheDraftMappingReportsMethodologyisDemonstrablyFlawed 17 Scope:SevenMonthstoCoverTenYears 17

CrimesCommittedManyYearsPrior:TheUnreliabilityofWitnessStatements18 TheTermsofReference 19

DefiningaMappingExercise 20

DelegatingtheInvestigationtoPoliticizedNGOs 21

AssessingthePurportedEvidence 22 TheUnrecognizableStandardofProof 23

Conclusion 24

IV.TheUnsupportedGenocideClaimFailsasaMatterofFactandLaw 24 LackofIdentificationofAllegedVictimsandPerpetrators 24

RwandasSuccessfulNationalIntegrationfrom1993to2003 25 Conclusion 26

V.Conclusion:TheDoubleGenocideTheoryMustbeRejected 27


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ACRONYMS

AFDL AllianceofDemocraticForcesfortheLiberationofCongo

APR ArmePatriotiqueRwandaise

DRC DemocraticRepublicofCongoFAB ForcesArmeesBurundaises

FAR Forces Armees Rwandaises (national army of Rwanda before July

1994)

FDLR DemocraticForcesfortheLiberationofRwanda

GoR GovernmentofRwanda

MONUCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic

RepublicofCongo

MRND MouvementRepublicainNationalpourleDeveloppement

NGO NonGovernmentalOrganization

RPA RwandanPatrioticArmy

RPF RwandanPatrioticFront

TOR TermsofReference(forTheDraftMappingReport)

UN UnitedNations

UNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees

UPDF UgandasPeopleDefenseForce


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EXECUTIVESUMMARYOFCOMMENTS

TheGovernmentofRwandasubmitsthefollowingcommentsregardingtheDraftUN

Mapping Report on the DRC. Rwanda categorically states that The DraftMapping

Report isunacceptable. Rwandasconcernsrelate totheentire report,andare not

limitedtonarrowdefinitionalissuesorspecificallegations.Theseseriousconcerns

include:

1. The manipulation of UN processes by organizations and individualsbothinside and outside the UNfor purposes of rewriting history, improperly

apportioning blame for the genocide that occurred in Rwanda, and reignite the

conflictinRwandaandtheregion.

2. The omissionof the historical context, especially the immediate and seriousthreat posed by armed and ideologically charged refugees positioned right at the

borderofRwandaandZaire,aswellasthenatureoftheconflictwithinZaireatthe

time.ThisisdespitetheUNsknowledgeofthesituationanditsblatantinaction.

3. The contradictionbetween the report and contemporaneous accountsof thesituation from the UNSecurityCouncil,NGOs and many othereyewitnesses in the

regionwho confirmed thatgenocidal forces, oftenposing ascivilianrefugees,wereoperatingunderthecoverofUNrefugeecamps.

4. Theflawedmethodologyandapplicationofthelowestimaginableevidentiarystandard.

5. The overreliance on the use of anonymous sources, hearsay assertions,unnamed, un-vetted and unidentified investigators and witnesses, who lack

credibility;andallegationoftheexistenceofvictimswithuncertainidentity.

6. FailuretoaddresstheglaringinconsistencythatclaimsofgenocidearedirectlycontradictedbyRwandasextensiveandcoordinatedeffortstorepatriate,resettleand

reintegrate3.2millionHuturefugees;effortsthatweresupportedbytheUN.

7. The dangerous and irresponsible attempt by the Report to undermine thepeaceandstabilityattainedintheGreatLakesregion,whichdirectlycontradictsthe


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very mission of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the

DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(MONUSCO),andtheUNgenerally.

DoneatKigalionSeptember30th,2010


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COMMENTSOFTHEGOVERNMENTOFRWANDAONTHEDRAFTDRCMAPPINGREPORT

1. The Draft UN Mapping Report on the DRC (The Draft Mapping Report) iscloaked in legal terminology, but provides nothing resembling due process to the

member States mentioned in the report. The authors repeatedly acknowledge the

cursoryandsuperficialnatureoftheirinvestigationsastheysimultaneouslyclaimto

have amassed a critical mass of evidence to satisfy some undefined standard of

proof.ThispurportedevidencewascollectedthroughpoliticizedNGOsatthehands

ofunnamedinvestigators,reliesonblatanthearsayfromunnamedwitnesses,about

unidentifiedvictims,andleveledagainstunnamedperpetrators.Despitethislackof

transparency, the authors claim that their mandate required them to make legal

qualificationsofcrimes,yetnosuchrequirementisfoundintheTermsofReference

ofTheDraftMappingReport.Tomakeassertionsofthemostseriousinternational

crimesbasedonsuchunreliableevidenceinanon-judicialproceedingisanabuseof

themandateand,moreover,itissimplyunfair.

2. Among the list of key facts omitted or summarily dismissed by The DraftMapping Report is that from 1994 through 2003, Rwanda repatriated andreintegrated 1.5 millionHutu refugees from the former Zaire, and over 1.7 million

refugees from Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda alone. The return of millions of

refugees toRwanda isentirely inconsistent with the supposed findingofTheDraft

Mapping Report, yet this central fact is glossed over by the authors. Even more

telling,theauthorsofthereportconcealtherealcontextoftheeventsinCongo:the

ex-FARand Interahamwewerecontinuallyengaginginactsofterrorism,murdering

innocent civilians, and attacking Rwanda. During this period, the ex-FAR and

InterahamwewereactivelypreparingamajorassaultonRwandaaimedatunraveling

thereconstructionandreconciliationprocessinthecountrywiththefinalgoalof

completing the genocide. The authors ignore the failure of the international

communitytorespondtorepeateddemandsbytheRwandangovernmenttostopthe


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rearmament of genocidal forces in Zaire, and liberate genuine Rwandan refugees

takenhostagebythoseforces.

3. These comments contain only a brief review of the most egregiousmisrepresentationsandomissionsoffact,law,process,andmandatethatTheDraft

MappingReportemploystovalidateitsdoublegenocidetheory.1Thesecomments

firstaddressthefailureoftheauthorsofTheDraftMappingReporttoaddressthe

historical and military context surrounding Rwandas intervention in the former

Zaire. Second, the comments discuss the international law based justification for

RwandasuseofforcetodefenditselfanditscitizensintheformerZaire.Third,these

comments analyze the flawed methodology behind The Draft Mapping Report,

includingthestandardofproof,theexcessivescopeofthereport,andtheauthors

complete failure to follow the Terms of Reference established for the mapping

exercise. Fourth, these comments address The Draft Mapping Reports improper

analysisofthefactsinordertoimproperlymanipulatethemintoagenocidecharge.

I. THE REPORT FAILS TOEXPLAIN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE GENOCIDE AND ITS

AFTERMATH

4. TheDraftMappingReportaddressesonlyafractionofacomplexhistory,andignores publicly available information that seriously undermines its findings. The

reader is left with a one-sided account, and provided no context with which to

understandwhoeachoftheseRwandanactorswere,andhowtheyfoundthemselves

in the Congolese forests from 1994 to 2003. The historical and political context

presented in The Draft Mapping Report deals exclusively with internal Congolese

political dynamics.2 The context below provides an entirely different reading of

assertionsputforwardinTheDraftMappingReport.

1 The double genocide theory is part of a political agenda seeking to absolve those who committed the 1994

genocide and to undermine the developments that have taken place in Rwanda by claiming that there isnodifference between those who committed the genocide and those who stopped it; they are equally criminal.2OfparticularinterestareChaptersIandIIofTheDraftMappingReport.


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5. AllegationsofgenocidearejustasseriouswhenleveledinthecourtofpublicopinionaswasdonewhenadraftoftheReportwasleaked--aswhentheyare

madeinacompetentcourt(whichTheDraftMappingReportsauthors,bytheirown

admission, most certainly were not). The authors exploit this asymmetry, hoping

perhaps that the gruesome nature of the charges will divert attention from the

superficialnatureoftheirwork,andtheirconfusionaboutthelawsofarmedconflict.

In so doing, they have sacrificed truth and fundamental fairness on the altar of

politics,tarnishingtheUnitedNations.

THE1994RWANDANGENOCIDE

6. The events described in The Draft Mapping Report grew out of the 1994genocideinRwandainwhichonemillionethnicTutsiperishedinonehundreddays.

As the war to stop the genocide progressed, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)

pushed thebulkofthegenocidal forces --including theForcesArmeesRwandaises

(FAR)and the Interahamwe and Impuzamigabi militias -- westward. These forces

crossedintoZaireinJuneandJuly1994,whileotherRwandanrefugeesandasmaller

numberofthegenocideforcescrossedintoTanzania,BurundiandUganda.

7. A safe zone created by the French military in the Southwest in June 1994,dubbedZoneTurquoise, facilitatedthe flight of300,000peoplewest towards the

Zairean town ofBukavuin July and August 1994. On 18 July 1994, RPA forces

capturedthenorthwestern townofGisenyiinRwanda,whichwasthecenterofthe

genocidalprovisionalgovernment.Itsfallpromptedover800,000Rwandanstocross

intoGoma,ZaireoverafourdayperiodinlateJuly.CrossingintoZairewasastrategic

choicebytheex-FAR/Interahamwetofacilitatetheirreorganizationandrearmament

easierinavast,porousand(atthattime)ahighlydysfunctionalcountrywherethey

hadgovernmentsupport.WhenthegenocidalforcesresponsibleretreatedtoZaire,

theyusedcoercionandforcetobringthecivilianpopulationalongwiththem.


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THEMILITARIZATIONOFTHECAMPS

10. The refugees who arrived in Zaire were well organized. In fact, theytransplanted localRwandanadministrativestructures intoZaireandkeptthesame

leadership in place: individuals who were responsible for the genocide. Non-

Governmental organizations and the UNHCR relied on these individuals to help

distribute aid. The genocidal leaders, in turn, inflated the number of refugees to

obtain additional aid, and used the surplus to finance the purchase of arms.

Meanwhile, soldiers of the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe militia created armed

outposts onthe outskirts of the refugee camps. The former Rwandangovernment

officials,whocontrolledthecamps,passedoutlargesumsofmoneytothemilitiato

controltherefugeesontheirbehalf.Thosewhoprotestedthispreposterousstateof

affairs were either beaten into submission orkilled. UNHCRofficials wroteat the

time, [w]e are in a state of virtual war in the camps.4 Accused of feeding the

killers, five major humanitarian organizations left Zaire includingMdecins Sans

Frontires,theInternationalRescueCommittee,Oxfam,SavetheChildrenandCARE.

11. Whentheex-FARcrossedtheborderintoZaire,theybroughtwiththemtonsofmachineguns,grenades,mortars,andotherlightweapons.5Theyalsobroughtwith

themtheirarmoredcars,fieldartillery,fouroperationalhelicopters,andalightfixed-

wing attack aircraft. The ex-FAR forces received arms shipments in the camps,

conducted military training exercises, recruited combatants and planned a final

victory.Thesegenocidaires"openlydeclaredtheirintenttoreturntoRwandaand...

killallTutsiwhopreventusfromreturning"andto"wageawarthatwillbelongand

full of dead people until theminority Tutsi are finished and completelyoutof the

country."6In1995,thesemilitantsfromthecoveroftheUNrefugeecampsinwhich

4

AFP (SWB/AFP 27 August 1994).5(Yett1996,14).

6HumanRightsWatch.RearmingwithImpunity.May1995,pages2-3.


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they resided regularly launched raids into Rwanda todestabilize the country by

killingsurvivorsofthegenocideandlocaladministrativeofficials.

12. In1996,crossborderattacksandterrorismintensified.WordofamajorattackonRwandabegantocirculateinthelatterhalfof1996.Rwandacontinuallypleaded

with the international community to move the camps away from the border, to

disarm the militants, and to separate genuine refugees from the genocidal forces.

These pleas fell on deaf ears. Joel Bouetroue, head of the UNHCR office in Goma,

declared, [W]e are headed for surge of violence and destabilization in the Goma

regionConditionsareripeforadisaster.7

RWANDASINTERVENTIONINEASTZAIRE

13. InOctober1996,aZairiangovernmentofficialbasedinBukavudeclaredthattheBanyamulenge primarily ethnic Tutsiwouldbe forced to leavethe country.

The rebelgroup Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire(AFDL),

which included the Banyamulenge militias, began a campaign against the Zairian

government. The mass movement of refugees and the accompanying risk of a

humanitariancrisiswerewidelyreportedinthemedia.On15November1996,the

AFDLandtheRPAmovedagainsttheex-FARandInterahamweforcesinthecamps,

andintheprocess,rescuedandrepatriated600,000Rwandanrefugeesinthecourse

of four days from the Mugunga camp only. This spectacular return of refugees

promptedthemassrepatriationofRwandanrefugeesfromTanzaniaandBurundiin

thefollowingweeks,allowingthebulkoftheRwandanrefugeepopulationtoreturn

home.8

CONCLUSION

7Reuters,15July1995.

8AccordingtoRwandagovernmentfigures,in19941,208,000refugeeswererepatriatedfromdifferentcountries;

338,825in1995;1,362,273in1996;219,750in1997and271,895from1998toMach2010.MINALOC2010.


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14. First,anyRwandaninvolvementintheconflictthatengulfedZairein1996wasinself-defenseagainsttheperpetratorsofthe1994genocide.ThoseforcesusedZaire

asastagingground tore-armand continuetheirgenocidalagendaagainstRwanda

(throughcross-borderattacks)andextendittoZaire. Second,underterroristattack

andinthefaceofinternationalinaction,Rwandahadnochoicebuttointervenein

Zairetoneutralize the threat and resolve the refugeeproblembyrescuingits own

citizensandfacilitatingtheirreturnandreintegration.Third,asinsimilarsituations

whereterrorists groups and insurgentsmix with civilians and refugeesanddonot

wear uniforms or otherwise follow the law of armed conflict, the demarcation

betweenillegalcombatantsandcivilianswasnotalwaysclear.Thisconfusionwasa

by-productofthemannerinwhichthegenocideitselfwascarriedoutin1994with

themassparticipationofthegeneralpopulationaswellasthemilitarymobilization

of refugees in the camps in Zaire, at times through coercion. The Draft Mapping

ReporttooknonoticeofthedynamicsituationinwhichRwandaandothermember

stateswereoperating.

II.RWANDACOMPLIEDWITHINTERNATIONALLAWGOVERNINGTHEUSEOFFORCE

RWANDASREPEATEDWARNINGS

15. TheGovernmentofRwanda(GoR),beginninginlate1994,repeatedlywarnedtheinternationalcommunityasawhole,andtheSecurityCouncilinparticular,that

the ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces were preparing and carrying out attacks on the

territoryandpeopleofRwanda.InFebruary1995,theRwandanAmbassadortothe

United Nations explicitly warned the Security Council of the events that would

ultimately unfold, and encouraged them to engage in preventive measures.9 In

December1995,thesewarningswererepeated.10

16. It was not just the GoR that raised its concerns about attacks during theseSecurityCouncilmeetings.Manyothernationsexplicitlyrecognizedthatattackswere

9SeeU.N.SecurityCouncil3604

thMeeting,UNDocS/PV.3504(27February1995),page4.

10SeeU.N.SecurityCouncil3605

thMeeting,UNDocS/PV.3605(12December1995),page15.


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being orchestrated and carried out against Rwanda. In Security Council meetings

throughout1995,UnitedNationsAmbassadorsfromahostofstates acknowledged

theattacksonRwandaoriginatingfromthemilitarizedrefugeecampsintheformer

Zaire.11

17. TheSecretaryGeneralissuedaprogressreportinAugust1995denouncingtheattacksonRwandaaswellastherearmamentofthegenocidalforces. 12InDecember

1995, a Security Council resolution acknowledged that attacks had already taken

placeontheterritoryofRwandafromarmedcombatantsintheformerZaireresiding

ininternationallyfundedrefugeecamps.Italsonotedthatthesamecombatantswere

preparingfurtherarmedattacksagainstRwanda.13

18. During the 48th session of the UNHCR Executive Committee, the HighCommissioner acknowledged the total failure of the international community to

addresstherefugeecrisisinEasternZaire,andimplicitlyconcededtothelegitimacy

ofRwandasmilitaryinterventionbasedonself-defense:

Theprimaryproblemwas the international community's failure toseparate

thosewhodeservedinternationalprotectionfromthosewhodidnot,ensuring

thephysicalsecurityoftheformerandpreventingthelatterfromcommittingviolent attacks on both nationals and refugeesThe rights of refugees toasylumandnoblockingoutwerethefoundationoftheUNHCRmandateand

UNHCR's commitment to defend and promote them was non-negotiable.

However,thoseprinciplesmustbeimplementedinconstructive,realisticand

creativewaysthattookaccountofthelegitimateconcernsofStates.14

CHAPTERVII:THEUSEOFFORCEINSELF-DEFENSE

11SeeUNSecurityCouncilMeetings3542,3566,3574,and3605respectivelyS/PV.3542(9June1995);S/PV.3566

(16August1995);S/PV.3574(7September1995);S/PV.3605(12December1995).12SeetheProgressReportoftheSecretaryGeneralontheUnitedNationsAssistanceMissionforRwanda,UNDoc

S/1995/678.(9August1995),paragraph14.13SecurityCouncilResolution1025UNDocS/RES/1029(1995),page1.

14UNDocA/AC.96/SR.516,17October1997.


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19. ChapterVIIoftheUnitedNationsChartergovernstheuseofforcebymemberstates. Though the organizationsprimary role is to settle threats to international

peaceandsecurity,Article51clearlypreservesastatesrighttoself-defense. 15Inthe

face of repeated attacks on Rwandan territory by ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces

operatingoutofrefugeecampsintheformerZaire,theGoRrepeatedlyappealedto

theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilforassistance.Whenthesepleasweremetwith

words not deeds, Rwanda, relying on Article 51 authority, employed proportional

forcetoneutralizethethreat.

20. Rwandans learned the hard way not to rely on empty promises from theinternational community. In1996 the country sought anend toarmedattacks on

innocent Rwandan civilians, and moved to liberate innocent refugeeswho the Ex-

FAR/Interahamwe cynically exploited as human shields. Rwandas actions in this

regardwerewellwithinitsrightsunderArticle51oftheUnitedNationsCharter.

EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE:THEUSEOFCIVILIANSASAWEAPONOFWAR

21. The genocidal forces tactical use of civilians in their military campaigncomplicated the situation in the former Zaire. As stated previously, the exodus of

refugeesintoZaireintheaftermathofthegenocidewasbyallstandardsapolitical-

military strategy to serve the purposesof the genocidal government in exile. The

outflowwasalsohighlyorganized,withadministrativestructuressimplytransferred

acrosstheborder.ThereareseveralreasonswhytheEx-FARand Interahamwehad

tocoerceinnocentcivilianstogowiththem.

22. First, they wanted touse the refugeesas a future military recruitmentpool.Second,theyintendedtousethemashumanshields. Third,thepresenceofalarge

number of refugeesoffered convenient cover for theirmilitaryactions. Fourth,by

15NothinginthepresentChartershallimpairtheinherentrightofindividualorcollectiveself-defenceifanarmed

attackoccursagainstaMemberoftheUnitedNations,untiltheSecurityCouncilhastakenmeasuresnecessaryto

maintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity.


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holdinga largenumber ofrefugees, they sought todiscredit the GoR and,asa last

resort,usethemasbargainingchipfornegotiationswiththeGoR.Fifth,theyusedthe

refugees to leverageaid from humanitarian organizations which they coulduse to

supportthewareffort.

RESPONDINGTOPARTICULARALLEGATIONSREGARDINGTHEUSEOFFORCE

23. Responding to each allegation leveled in The Draft Mapping Report is notpossible given its lack of transparency: unnamed victims,witnesses, perpetrators,

andinvestigators.However,theGoRcanonlycommentonthoseallegationsbasedon

documentation regarding specific regions at specific times. This section offers

examples to clarify the record, and proof that an evaluation of the incidents, as

reportedbyTheDraftMappingReport,wasflawed.

24. Paragraphs219,220and221ofTheDraftMappingReportallegethattheRPAindiscriminatelyfiredheavyweaponsattheMugungarefugeecamp.Theintentionof

theRPAandtheconductofoperationsaroundtheMugungacampaimedatliberating

and repatriating innocent civilian refugees. In the conduct of operations, the RPA

occupiedpositions thatblocked exits farther inside the former Zaire, and leftopen

safe corridors leading to Rwanda, but never fired any weapons into the camp.

LoudspeakerswereusedtocalluponrefugeestoreturntoRwanda.Thisconceptof

operationappliedtomostcampsoccupiedbylargegroupsofrefugees.Inresponseto

suchmeasures,theex-FARandInterahamweusedtherefugeesashumanshields.

25. TheinitialciviliancasualtieswithinMugungaresultedfromtheshootingbytheEx-FAR/Interahamwe,whosoughttopreventtherefugeesfromreturningtoRwanda.

ThesubsequentciviliancasualtiesresultedfromtheEx-FAR/ Interahamweattempts

to break through the RPA lines. The third group of casualties included Ex-

FAR/Interahamwe and lamentably, civilian refugees held hostage, resulting from

clashesbetweentheEx-FAR/InterahamweandtheMaiMaialongSake-Masisiroad.


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26. Inparagraphs32and222,TheDraftMappingReportallegesthatonthedayofthe fall of the Mugunga camp, 15 November 1995, the AFDL/APR units sorted

refugeesbyageandgender,allowingthewomen,childrenandelderlytoescapewhile

killingthemen.Again,thepriorityobjectiveoftheoperationwastohaveallrefugeesreturn to Rwanda. In order to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of

refugees, the APR formed a blocked corridor eastward from Lac Vert to Mugunga

throughGoma,andfinallytheborderwithRwanda.Thiscorridorkepttherefugees

fromfleeinginthewrongdirection,aswellasprotectingthemfromoutsideviolence.

Atthatpoint,therewasnodemarcationbetweentheMugungaandLacVertrefugee

camps.

27. Themassivenumberofrefugees600,000combinedwiththeatmosphereofpanic created by fighting against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe on the outskirts of the

campscreateda seaofrefugeeswalkingtowardRwanda. Theseconditionsdidnot

allow for screening of any sort, and, in fact, this incident resulted in the return of

thousandsofarmedcombatantstoRwandawholaterinitiatedtheinsurgencyinthe

North.

28. TheDraftMappingReportalleges,inparagraphs200and202respectively,thatOn20October1996,unitsoftheAFDL/APRfromBwegeraandtheRwandantownof

BugaramaattackedtheKamanyolarefugeecampintheWalunguterritory,killingan

unknown number of refugees and On 2 November 1996, AFDL/APR units

attacked the Kashusha/INERA camp in the Kabare territory with heavy weapons,

killing hundreds of refugees In line with the RPAs concept of operation, the

refugeecampswereneverattackedassuch.ThesetupoftherefugeecampsinSouth

Kivu was such that the Ex-FAR/Interahamwe provided a perimeter defense with

trenches.Therewerealsoinnerdefensivepositionsinsidethecamps.Wheneveran

RPAadvancewasdetected,theEx-FAR/Interahamweforwarddefenseswouldattack

the advancing RPA force to avoid being encircled. In the process, the refugee


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population would flee. This is precisely what happened in Kamanyola, Kashusha,

Inela,ADI-Kivuandothercamps.Thecasualtiesreportedinthoseparticularcamps

werearesultoffiercefightingbetweentheRPAandtheEx-FAR/Interahamwe.

29. It is alleged in paragraph 245 that 22 April 1997, AFDL/APR units,accompaniedbyvillagers,killedatleast200refugeesintheKaseseIandIIcamps,in

thepresenceofseveralAPRseniorfigures. However,theRPAnevercarriedoutany

operationsinKaseseduringthefirstmilitarycampaigninZaire.

30. More generally, allegations are made throughout The Draft Mapping ReportthattheRPAemployedtheuseofedgedcoldweapons.16Aconventionalfightingforce

suchastheRPAwouldnevercarrythesetypesofprimitiveweaponswhiletraversing

a vast country during a military campaign. Theses types of cold weapons would

simply add unnecessary baggage. This is an attempt by the authors of The Draft

Mapping Report to mirror-image the methods, tools and cruelty used by the

perpetratorsofthe1994genocide.

CONCLUSION

31. InordertoaccuratelyunderstandtheincidentsleadinguptotheuseofforceintheformerZaire,thecomplicationsconfrontedduringthemilitarycampaigndueto

theuseofciviliansasaweaponofwaronthepartofEx-FAR/Interahamweforces,and

details of specific battles, the authors of The Draft Mapping Report would have

benefitedgreatlyfromconsultingthemilitariesofeachnationinvolvedinthemilitary

strugglefrom19932003.

32. TheDraftMappingReportsystematicallyextractstheeventsitreferstofromtheirmilitarycontext. Itisdespicablethat civilianswereusedasaweaponofwar,

and that innocent Rwandan lives were lost as collateral damage in a military

16See,forexample,TheDraftMappingReportparagraphs213,221,251,253,255,and287.


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campaigntodisarmcombatants. However,to characterize thisuseofforcenowas

war crimes, crimes against humanity, or even genocide ignores all of the realities

surroundingthecombatinZaire.

III.THEDRAFTMAPPINGREPORTSMETHODOLOGYISDEMONSTRABLYFLAWED

33. The methodology employed in The Draft Mapping Report, a creation of theauthorsthemselves,isdeeplyflawedandone-sided.Thefollowinganalysisintothe

scopeofthemappingexercise,thequalityofitssources,thestandardofproofandthe

lackoftransparencypresentsseriousquestionsaboutthecredibilityandreliabilityof

itsconclusions.Someofthemisrepresentationscanhardlybeunintentional,suchas

theconstantassertionthattheTermsofReferenceforthemappingexerciserequire

thattheymakelegalqualificationswhichtheydonot.

SCOPE:SEVENMONTHSTOCOVERTENYEARS

34. TheMappingTeamhadjustundersevenmonths,from17October2008to15May 2009 to (1) create a chronology of events through the analysis of 1500

documents which covered alleged atrocities committed throughout the DRC (a

countryninetytimesthesizeofRwanda)17,and(2)oncethistimelinewascreated,

five teams of three people fifteen people in total verified as many incidents as

possible throughout the DRC. Each incident recorded in the timeline had to be

verifiedbyonlyoneindependentsourceinadditiontotheprimarysource.18Aswill

bediscussedbelow,theprimarysourcethe1500documentsusedtocreatethe

timelinewascollectedfromNGOs,theCongolesegovernmentandthemedianone

ofwhosecredibilityorbiashasbeenassessed.19

17TheDraftMappingReport,paragraph109.




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37. The authors note two huge, separate problems that speak to the absolutenecessityofverifyingallegationsbymorethanonlyoneindependentsource.First,

everycommunityhas itsownversionofthefacts. Giventhisadmission,onlyone

possibleversionofeventscanbethetruth.Morelikely,noneoftheversionsofthe

event is the absolute truth, but instead contains elements of truth. Thus, many

version[s]of the facts are simplynot true,and knowing that, the authors ofThe

DraftMappingReportnevershouldhaveallowedincidentstobeincludedthatwere

validatedbyonlyoneindependentsource.

38. Second,itisraretofindfirsthandwitnessestotheeventsTheauthorsofTheDraftMappingReportadmitthattheoneoutsidesourcethatwasconsultedvery

likelywasnotafirsthandwitnesstotheevents.Dothewitnessaccountscomefrom

things they haveheard fromothers, yearsprior? Is all of the evidence hearsay?

Eveninitialhypothesesofsuchseriousallegationsshouldbeconfirmedbyevidence

morecrediblethanthat.

THETERMSOFREFERENCE

39. The Terms of Reference (TOR) that govern the objectives of The MappingExercisestatethreemainobjectives:(1)toconductamappingexercise;(2)toassess

the justice system of the DRC; and (3) to suggest appropriate transitional justice

mechanisms.22 However, on multiple occasions, the authors assert that the TOR

requires them to make legal classifications of crimes saying, [n]onetheless, as

describedpreviously,theTermsofReferenceoftheMappingExerciserequireditto

carryoutagenerallegalclassificationofthecrimescommitted,includinggenocide.23

40. Theseclassifications,allegedlyrequiredbytheTOR,formulatetheentiretyofChapterVofTheDraftMappingReport.However,inreviewingtheentireTOR,itat


23TheMappingExercise,paragraph509.Seealsoparagraph462.


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notimerequiresthemappingteamtomakesuchaclassification.Infact,thewords

legal classification are nowhere to be found in the TOR. Furthermore, the TOR

explicitly recognizes the limits of this mapping exercise, stating [i]t should gather

basic informationand not replace in-depth investigations into the incidents

uncovered.24

41. Giventhismandate,legalclassificationsofcrimeswereinnowayrequiredbytheTORaswritten. Further,given the languageof theTOR,a legalclassificationis

beyondthescopeoftheobjectivesofamappingexercise,insomuchasthatobjective

is,asstated,togatherbasicinformation.TheauthorsofTheDraftMappingReport

wentbeyondthetermsoftheirmandate,indeedbeyondthelogicalapplicationofthe

quality ofevidencegathered inmaking such legalclassifications, especially as they

relatetogenocide.

DEFININGAMAPPINGEXERCISE

42. Again,thefirstofthethreedefinedobjectivesforTheDraftMappingReportisto[c]onductamappingexerciseofthemostseriousviolationsofhumanrightsand

internationalhumanitarianlawThemethodologybehindthemappingexerciseisa

tailor-made creation of the authors themselves, based in no precedent or legal

standard whatsoever. The report first unsuccessfully seeks to shed light on the

nature of a mapping exercise, describing it as a generic expression implying no

predefinedmethodologyorformat25. Despite thisrecognitionof the termsutterly

amorphousandmalleablenature(orperhapswiththisrecognition),theauthorsgo

on to define a mapping exercise as requiring various activities to be carried out,

includingthecollection,analysisandassessmentofinformationcontainedinmultiple

reportsanddocumentsfromdifferentsources,meetingsandwitnessinterviews,as

wellasconsultationwithfieldexpertsandconsultants.26Thisisthefirstindication

24SeetheTermsofReference,section4.2.




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thattheauthorsdidnotfeelthatconsultationswiththeimplicatedgovernmentsor

militaries was a required activity to be carried out during a successful mapping

exercise.

DELEGATINGTHEINVESTIGATIONTOPOLITICIZEDNGOS

43. Facedwithalargetaskandalimitedtimeframe,butalsowantingtomaketheirpoint, the authors of the report delegated the initial investigation to politicized

CongoleseNGOswhoprovidedmanyofthe1500primarysourcedocumentswhich

laid the foundation for future investigation.27 Illustrating the circular nature of

information gathering, these same NGOs provided access to witnesses who later

servedasindependentconfirmationoftheirownprimarysourcedocuments.28

44. The investigation relied disproportionally on the information provided byCongoleseNGOswhosebiasandcredibilityisneverassessedbyTheDraftMapping

Report.AnyonefamiliarwiththedynamicsofCongolesecivilsocietyknowsthatNGOs

didnotremainpoliticallyneutralduringtheconflict.ManyoftheseNGOstookvocal

politicalsides,someevenactivelydiffusedmessagesofintoleranceagainstCongolese

Tutsi in North and South Kivu, and Rwandans. Not onlydoes The Draft Mapping

ReportfailtodisclosetheidentityoftheNGOsassociatedwiththeinvestigation,but

considering theparticularsocio-politicalsituationin theregion, theauthorsputno

distance whatsoever between their investigations and these strongly politicized

organizations.

ASSESSINGTHEPURPORTEDEVIDENCE

45. The Draft Mapping Report states that [a]ssessing the reliability of theinformationobtainedwasatwo-stageprocessinvolvingevaluationofthereliability

and credibility of the source, and then the validity and truth of the information

27 The Draft Mapping Report, paragraph 114.28 The Draft Mapping Report, paragraphs 11 and 112.


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itself.29Thecredibilityofeachsourcewasdeterminedusingtheadmiraltyscale.30

Once again, the authors fail to explain the admiralty scale or cite to any source

whatsoever. Apparently, in employing this scale, the authors assess the nature,

objectivityandprofessionalstandingofthesource,themethodologyused,andthe

qualityofpriorinformationobtainedfromthatsource.31Despitethisexplanation,it

isdifficult toassess how credibilitywas measuredwithout further explanations of

thesetermsorreferencetoanyprecedentorrulesof evidence. First, objectivityis

crucialand,inacriminalproceeding,thedefensewouldbringtolightanybiasonthe

partofthe witness. Inassessing methodology, this isanadmission thatworkwas

delegatedouttootherNGOs,andnowheredotheauthorssayhowtheyassessedthe

methodological standards of over 200 NGOs and 1500 documents. Finally, the

referencetopriorinformationgivensuggeststhatatleastsomeindividualsorsources

providedevidence inreference tomultiplealleged incidents. Thus, ifone source

werelaterfoundtobeunreliable,itwouldtainttheaccountofeveryallegedincident

he/shereported.

46. Thevalidityoftheinformationwasevaluatedthroughcomparisonwithotherdata on the same incidents to ensure cohesion with other verified elements and

circumstances.32 The authors state that each incident is backed by at least two

independentsources.Thisstatementismisleadingintwoways.First,collectionof

theprimarysourcedocumentsandaccess towitnesseswerebothfacilitatedby the

same NGOs, thus raising legitimate concerns about the interconnectedness of the

primaryandconfirmingsource.Second,anincidentwasreportedifitwasallegedin

documentationobtainedfromanNGO,Congolesegovernmentorthemediaplusone

independentsourceinadditiontotheprimarysource.33Giventhattheauthorsmet

with1280witnessesrelatingtoover600reportedincidents,iteitherimpliesthat




32TheDraftMappingReport,footnote15.



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withveryfewexceptionsatmosttwoindependentsourcesvalidatedeachincident

or that the authors relied on the same sources repeatedly in relation to multiple

incidents who continually validated one another. Either way, this raises serious

questionsregardingthevalidityofinformation.

THEUNRECOGNIZABLESTANDARDOFPROOF

47. Theauthorsassertthatamappingexercisedoesnotrequirethecollectionofevidencemeetingthecriminallawstandardofproofbeyondreasonabledoubt.The

purposeofthemappingexercise,itseems,istoformulateinitialhypotheses,andthe

standardofproofrequiredisthatofreasonablesuspicion.Reasonablesuspicionis

definedasareliablebodyofmaterialconsistentwithotherverifiedcircumstances

tendingtoshowthatanincidentoreventdidhappen.34Thecitationattheendof

this definition is to the authors themselves, and states an alternative definition:

reliable and consistent indications tending toshow that the incidentdid happen.

Theauthorscitenooutsidesupportofanykindforthisformulationofthestandardof

proof. Reasonablesuspicionhas,however,beendefinedbytheU.S.SupremeCourt

and is the absolute lowest evidentiary standardarticulated inU.S. law.35 Put into

context,inorderofreliability,itisalesserstandardofproofthanprobablecause36,

preponderanceof theevidence37, clear and convincing evidence38, and beyond

reasonable doubt39. It is fitting that the authors chose the term reasonable

suspicion,asthequalityoftheevidencemerits,atmost,cursoryattention.

Conclusion

48. These methodological weaknesses highlight the inherent conflict of interestcreatedwhereboth the standardofproofand the reliability indicators are defined

andassessedby thesameindividualswhoconductthe investigationsandwritethe34TheDraftMappingReport,paragraphs5&7.

35SeegenerallyTerryv.Ohio,392U.S.1(1968).

36UnitedStatesv.Sokolow,490U.S.1(1989).

37Santoskyv.Kramer,455U.S.745(1982)

38Schlupv.Delo.513U.S.298at327.Thestandardisdefinedasmorelikelythannot.

39Johnsonv.Louisiana,406U.S.356,at360.


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conclusions.Anathematotransparency,thissystemlacksanysortofchecksonthe

authorsandinvestigatorsthemselves,orontheirsources.Thisbecomesespecially

egregious considering that neither the alleged perpetrators nor their governments

wereeverconsultedforinput.

IV.THEUNSUPPORTEDGENOCIDECLAIMFAILSASAMATTEROFFACTANDLAW

49. Rwanda,havingbeenthevictimofoneofthemostintensemoderngenocides,cannot allow the crime of genocide to become a political tool in the hands of

individualswhoseektomanipulateit.Thisdoesnothonororbringjusticetoany

victim,pastorfuture.

50. By addressing the charges of genocide specifically, the GoR is in no wayconcedingtotheaccusationsofwarcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity,orignoring

thegravityofsuchaccusations.However,giventhelackoftransparencyinthereport

in terms of anonymous witnesses, victims, perpetrators and investigators, we are

simplyunabletoaddressthosechargesinaninformedmanner.

LACKOFIDENTIFICATIONOFALLEGEDVICTIMSANDPERPETRATORS

51. The Draft Mapping Report documents alleged crimes committed against abroadarrayofunidentifiedvictimsRwandanandCongolese,HutuandTutsialike

byalargenumberofstatearmiesandarmedinsurgencies.Inthissense,itservesto

illustratethatinwar,asopposedtogenocide,therearecasualtiesonallsides.

52. TheDraftMappingReportfailstodistinguishbetweenallegedperpetrators.Inmostoftheallegedincidents,theauthorslumptogethertheRPAwithAFDL,FABand

UPDF.Suchlumpingatbestservestocreateconfusion.WheretheRPAisbundled

withFABandsometimesUPDF,itisonrecordthattheRPAforcesnevercarriedout

anyjointoperationswitheitherFABorUPDFinthefirstwarintheDRC,thesame


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timeperiodthatgivesrisetomostoftheallegationsofgenocideinTheDraftMapping

Report.

RWANDASSUCCESSFULNATIONALINTEGRATIONFROM1993TO2003

53. During the period of The Draft Mapping Report, there were millions ofRwandan Hutu citizens living in Rwanda freely. Moreover, prior to the Rwandan

intervention, in1995,theRwandan forces integrated2,000ex-FAR.40TheSecurity

Council noted this reintegration, saying that [t]he Security Council welcomes

progressmadebytheGoRinthereconciliationprocess,includingtheintegrationof

morethan2,000membersofformerRwandanGovernmentForces(RGF)troopsinto

theRwandanPatrioticArmy(RPA).Thesenewrecruitsweredeployedtotheformer

Zaire.Assuch,iftheRwandanforcesarebeingaccusedofcommittinggenocide,the

argument follows that these ex-FAR, then integrated into the RPA, targeted their

formercomradeswithgenocidalintent.

54. HutucivilianrefugeeswerebeingrepatriatedandreintegratedintoRwandansocietybythemillionsfrom1993to2003. AtonepointTheDraftMappingReport

statesthatcertainelementscouldcauseacourttohesitatetodecideontheexistence

ofa genocidal planseveral tensof thousands ofRwandanHutu refugees, manyof

whomhadsurvivedpreviousattacks,wererepatriatedtoRwandawiththehelpofthe

AFDL/APR authorities and that hundreds of thousands ofRwandan Hutu refugees

wereabletoreturntoRwandaThisinformationwouldleadacourttodomore

thanjusthesitate.TheDraftMappingReporttrivializestherepatriation,reintegration

andreconciliationprocess thatwascentraltothepolicyof theGoR throughoutthe

entireregion.Thenumbersofrefugeesrepatriatedandreintegratedfromacrossthe

regionareasfollows:

40S/PRST/1995/53

Year Congo Burundi Tanzania Uganda

1994 450,000 338,000 210,000 210,000

1995 73,367 39,649 125,521 100,288

1996 719,307 150,000 483,445 9,521

1997 176,428 5,579 25,656 9,640


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Source:MINALOC2010

55. Atotalof1,528,626HuturefugeeswererepatriatedandreintegratedfromtheformerZaire,and1,763,828refugeeswererepatriatedandreintegratedfromUganda,

Burundi,andTanzaniaalone.Therehaveneverbeenanyallegationsofgenocide,war

crimesorcrimesagainsthumanitycommitagainstthereturningHuturefugeesfrom

countriesotherthantheformerZaire.ThecriticaldifferencebetweenZaireandtheseothernationsisthattherewasawarintheformerZaire.Thecasualtiesdidnotresult

froma genocidal plan; rather, the casualties resulted fromcombat between armed

combatantswhowereintentonfinishingthegenocide,Rwandangovernmentforces,

andothergovernmentforcesandinformalmilitarygroups.

CONCLUSION

56. These numbers illustrate that the GoR did, indeed, have a clear policy from1994 through 2003, and that policy continues today: to bring home all Rwandan

refugees.Thisappliestorefugeeswhohavenevertakenapartinthehostilities,and

combatants who have chosen to lay down their arms and return. During the

timeframethatTheDraftMappingReportallegesgenocide,theGoRrepatriatedover

three million Hutu refugees and began down the path of reconciliation with the

participation of an additional number of Rwandan Hutu, Tutsi and Twa citizens

numberinginthemillionswhoremainedinthecountry.

V.CONCLUSION:THEDOUBLEGENOCIDETHEORYMUSTBEREJECTED

57. TherealmotivebehindTheDraftMappingReportwasmadeclearwhentheleadinvestigator,LucCote,gaveaninterviewonedayaftertheleakofthereport

1998 2,323 1,257 2,505 4,306

1999 36,558 477 1,056 580

2000 21,659 2,091

2001 16,778 36 4,687 32

2002 14,050 354 25,288 17

2003 18,156 11,443 2,400

Total 1,528,626 535,352 891,692 336,784


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60. The incapacity of MONUC a peacekeeping mission that costs one milliondollarsadayandwhichhasbeengivenamandateauthorizingtheuseofforceto

protectinnocentCongoleseisthebestdefenseoftheRPAsinterventioninCongo.

Thecontinuing violencedirectedagainst thecivilianpopulationillustrates that in

dealingwithaperniciousterroristgroupliketheFDLRwhosetrademarktacticis

toutilizeciviliansasaweaponofwarlargeamountsofmoney,preparationand

goodwill are not sufficient to prevent collateral damage. The experience of

MONUSCOtoday,likethatoftheRPAduringtwowarsintheDRC,demonstratesthat

evenwhenthebestandmostwell-intentionedeffortsaremadetopreventcivilian

deaths, they unfortunately occur regardless such efforts. This has long been

recognizedbythelawofarmedconflict,anditiswhollyirresponsibleforTheDraft

MappingReporttoignoreit.

61. TheGovernmentofRwandacategoricallyrejectsthisreport.

drc report comments rwanda

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