dynamics report

1

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N

The dynamics of conflicts related to land and natural resources in Rupa, Karamoja, Uganda

THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICTS RELATED TO LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN RUPA SUB-COUNTY, KARAMOJA REGION, UGANDA

With funding and support from the European Union's Instrument for Stability

The United NationsInteragency Framework Team for Preventive Action

EU – UN Partnership on Land, Natural Resources and Conflict Prevention

Charles KabiswaIsaac KabongoTom BalemesaSylvia Atugonza

Dr. Arthur Bainomugisha

Ecological Christian Organisation

March 2014

2

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, MEMD), Department of Geological Survey and Mines, DGSM),

December, 2013

About ECO

Ecological Christian Organization (ECO) is a Ugandan non-governmental organization (NGO) working to improve the

quality of life and sustainable livelihoods of the poor and vulnerable groups in Uganda while building a sustainable

future. ECO supports grassroots community through natural resources governance, climate change and livelihood,

Ecosystems Management and Restoration. www.ecouganda.org

About the Associate Partners:

RIAMRIAM is an umbrella of CSOs operating in Karamoja mandated to coordinate, facilitate, build capacity of

organizations, and provide a common platform through which CSOs can advocate for peace, human rights, gender

equality and economic development. www.riamriamcsn.org

Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) is an independent public policy research and

advocacy think tank registered in Uganda with operations in the Eastern and Southern Africa sub region. Over the

last decade, ACODE has established itself as one of the leading public policy think tanks in Africa. Through research,

advocacy, representation, its convening power and expertise, ACODE has become the premier organisation that

facilitates policy dialogue and debate on emerging and cutting edge public policy issues. www.acode-u.org

Authorship

This Report was prepared by the ECO, Riamiriam and ACODE Team comprised of: Isaac Kabongo, Charles Kabiswa,

Sylvia Atugonza, Tom Balemesa, Roselyn Karatsi and Dr. Arthur Bainomugisha.

3

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 51. INTRODUCTION 11Objectives 13Contextual Factors: Geography, Demography, NRM and Conflict in Karamoja Region 13Land and Extractive Mineral Sector in Karamoja: An Overview 142. METHODOLOGY 193. Natural Resource Management and Conflict in Rupa 223.1 Natural Resources Prioritization 223.2 Land and Mineral Exploitation 233.3 Patterns of NRM related Conflicts 243.4 Drivers of conflict related to Natural Resources Management 26 3.4.1 Land related conflicts 26

3.4.2 Mineral related conflicts 29

4. Key actors, institutions and structures in NRM and Conflict 364.1 Introduction 364.2 Regional and International Mechanisms on NRM and Conflict 39 4.2.1 The East African Community 39

4.2.2 The Inter-Governmental Authority for Development 40

4.2.3 The Lokiriama Peace Accord 41

4.2.4 The International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR) 41

4.2.5 The Ngurdoto-Tanzania Agreement in 2007 42

4.2.6 Nairobi Protocol of April 21, 2004 and Eastern Africa Police Chiefs

Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) protocol 43

4.3 National Mechanisms on NRM and Conflict 444.4 Government Policies on Natural Resource Management 44 4.4.1 The Constitution of Uganda 1995 44

4.4.2 The Mineral Policy 46

4.4.3 The National Policy on Oil and Gas 2008 47

4.4.4 The National Land Policy 2013 47

4.4.5 Wildlife policy of 1999 48

4.5 Traditional Natural Resources Management Structures 494.6 Role of CSOs and their level of engagement 52

CHARLES KABISWA

Text

4

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


4.7 Capacity of other Actors, institutions and structures in NRM related conflicts in Rupa Subcounty 545. Critical Issues in NRM Conflict Mitigation and Management 565.1.The interface between UWA, NFA and local community over access to

land and minerals resources 57

5.2 Capacity of the actors to deal especially with the emerging mineral related conflicts 58

5.3 Access to land and mineral Resources- Land Usage and Surface Rights 58

5.4 Co-existence of Artisanal and Small-scale Miners (ASM) and Medium

and Large Scale Mining 59

5. 5. Security of Land Tenure 60

5.6. Improved Information Flows and Communication channels 63

5.7. Inadequate Community Consultation and participation in decision making 64

6. RECOMMENDATIONS 66Table 1: Exploration and Mining License Holders in Rupa Sub-county as of January 31st, 2014 24Annex One: Exploration and Mining License Holders in Moroto District as of January 31st, 2014 71

5

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


With support from EU-UN, the Ecological Christian

Organization (ECO) in partnership with Riamiriam

and ACODE has conducted an Assessment of the

dynamics of conflicts related to land and natural resources in Rupa

Sub-county, Karamoja Region. This study intended to assess the

current situation, challenges and possible solutions regarding actual

and potential conflicts related to land and mining activities in Rupa

Sub-county. The environment of Karamoja offers a number of natural

resources upon which communities depend for daily functional,

economic and social purposes. The region, a home to about 1.147 million people, it is estimated that 80% of the total population is living below the poverty line (UNDP, Human Development Report Uganda, 2007) relative to the national average of 31% making this region the poorest part of Uganda, yet it holds over 50 different economic minerals, including gold, silver, copper, iron, gemstones, limestone

and marble.

After decades of inter-clan and inter-tribal cattle rustling partly

ushered in by a decade of disarmament, many Karimojong and

non-Karimojong see a period of peace, at least in relative terms.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

5

Overview

Busoga Kingdom is composed of seven politically organised

districts that include; Kamuli, Jinja, Iganga, Bugiri, Mayuge,

Kaliro, Namutumba and the recently proposed Luuka district.

The Kingdom lies under the African tropical region bordering with

Lake Victoria shoreline in the South, River Nile in the West, Lake

Kyoga in the North and River Mpologoma in the East, located in the

Republic of Uganda, East Africa.

Her inhabitants are known as Basoga and their history is largely a

matter of speculation. However, there are a few facts that emerge

from the historical shadows of the past related to the neighbouring

tribes, the Baganda located in the West, South and Banyoro in the

Northwest direction from Busoga

Busoga is a land of peace-loving people who traditionally live

in small homesteads. The Basoga (people) subscribe to large

communities with similar traditional norms, culture and origin.

Their large families or communities are classified as clans and

so long as they shared common traditional norms, their sense of

freedom would be complete. With these values, the Basoga will

live in harmony with each other and to-date they continue to

extend such hospitality to their visitors.

“The Basoga (people)

subscribe to large

communities with similar

traditional norms”

View of the mighty Nile River which is the Kingdom’s lifeline

Contiued Next Page

6

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


However, this peace is fraught with another challenge, the increasing quest for

land by internal and external actors. Tensions

over control and benefit of resources tied

to land and minerals are tangible in many

communities throughout Karamoja Region.

Communities describe land disputes as

widespread in Karamoja, with acquisition

of land in the sub-region for the purpose of

establishing game reserves or to commer-

cially exploit minerals such as gold or

uranium pitching residents against the UWA,

local government and commercial investors.

Conflicts are also prevalent between

investors, titleholders and the communities

and in communal land between individuals,

sometimes referred to as the elite (educated/

prominent Karimojong) and the communities.

To better understand the status and

implications of conflicts related to land

and extractive mineral resources in Rupa

Sub-county, Karamoja Region, European

Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) funded

ECO to undertake a Natural Resource

Conflicts assessment in Rupa. It is

within this EU-UN Partnership on Land,

Natural Resources and Conflict that this

assessment was conducted to provide

insight into possible mitigation and response

mechanisms that could in turn improve

prevention of land and natural resources

from contributing to violent conflict in the

Region.

Land and Extractive Mineral Sector in Karamoja

According to January, 2014 statistics from the DGSM, 17,083.34sq.km (61.67%) of the 27,700 sq. km total land area of Karamoja region is licensed for mineral exploration and

exploitation activities. The same data

indicates that Moroto district has 26 companies with 44 concessions (35EL, 5LL, 3ML & 1SML) covering a total land area of 3772,43sq.km. By comparison, regional data indicates that the total land area licensed

for mineral exploration and exploitation

activities is 61.67% of the total land area in Karamoja wherein 11.22% (1917.5sq. km) of this land area lies in Rupa Sub-county. There

are currently 10 Mining companies with 22 mineral concessions (1 ML, 2 LL and 19 EL) in Rupa only. Local people say that it

is not clear how investors come to invest,

especially those who are clearing whole

mountainsides or fencing large areas. There

are companies from India and the Gulf,

as well as contractors from other parts of

Uganda.

Patterns of NRM related Conflicts

Communities in Rupa and Karamoja in

general are confronted by different types

of NRM related conflicts which are either

inter or intra (micro–micro) or micro–macro

levels but all relating to the spheres in which

the community find themselves interacting

7

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


with other groups, individuals, communi-

ties, state or corporate actors on issues

related to land and mineral resources and

these included: Disputes over land and

resource ownership, e.g. between investors,

mining companies, lease holders and

the communities and in communal land

between individual elites or educated/

prominent Karimojong and the communities;

Disputes over land boundaries between

individuals or groups; Conflicts between

herders and cultivators (changing Karimo-

jong economy-conflicts between pastoralist

and agro-pastoralist approaches); Disputes

ignited by the speculation activities of

commercial companies-Mineral exploration;

Conflict between mining private companies

and communal land resource users; Conflicts

among the small scale miners themselves-

driven mainly by jealous and need for

access to perceived areas of better mining

results, sharing of proceeds, alcoholism and

other causes. Small scale miners and the

investors1 which are driven by need for

control of the mining activities, land,

unclear terms of operation, the perception

that investors came to know of the minerals

before the local people; Boundary disputes

over access to resources and; Contradictory

natural resource needs and values, e.g.

between wildlife habitat protection and

local livelihood security/UWA gazette reserve

and reduction in access to grazing land and

farming opportunities (Land conflicts are

evident in areas gazetted as reserves by the

Uganda Wildlife Authority-UWA)

Drivers of Land related conflicts

Land and minerals were reported by the

respondents, as the key drivers of conflict

in Rupa. Conflicts are common between the

investors and communities where mining

and prospecting are taking place, sometimes

driven by speculation and rumours over

unclear land acquisition by the

investors and how politicians made a kill in

the mining or prospecting deals, unfulfilled

promises by investors in terms of royalties

and compensation, investors ignoring of

surface rights regarding communal land,

royalties and utilising wrong channels of

communities to enter communities to do a

start-up of their activities.

The sale and lease of communal land to

private investors in Rupa is also on the

rise, and increasingly fuelling conflicts

amongst community members and between

communities and local government officials

and investors; Land and boundary disputes/

contested boundaries between communi-

ties and between mining companies holding

different concessions due unclear

demarcation of the areas of jurisdiction for

their activities; There exists conflict between

the communities and government and the

agencies like Uganda Wildlife Authority and

1

Investors imply mining companies and individuals who are either mining or prospecting

8

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


National Forestry Authority in some areas

citing Lotithan and Kobebe cases.

Drivers of Mineral related conflicts

Rupa sub-county boasts large deposits

of valuable stones and minerals like gold,

limestone, copper, tantalum, tin and

phosphate. While most of these

valuable minerals remain underexploited, the

potential wealth derived from extracting

minerals has already sparked tensions.

Community members reported insufficient

consultation and participation of local

communities in the process of exploration

and exploitation of resources found in their

land is creating resentment and driving

conflicts across the area; There conflicts

between small scale miners themselves-

driven mainly by jealous and need for

access to perceived areas of better mining

results, sharing of proceeds, alcoholism and

other causes. Small scale miners and the

investors (mining companies or mining

license holders) which are driven by need

for control of the mining activities, land,

unclear terms of operation, the perception

that investors came to know of the

minerals before the local people and what

underlies it as one FGD a respondent

noted with concern; Prices of gold whereby

a few monopolies/buyers over bargain the

price of gold to meet their interest thus

exploiting the local miners; Attributed

these conflicts to have been mainly the

responsibility of governments, local

leaders, Uganda Wild Life Authority, Forestry

department for their failure to come out

clear and engage in discussions with the

local people about issues of demarcation,

gazetting, degazzeting, access and

compensation, concessions, royalties

and other information related to land and

mineral issues; The local government

insists that sometimes they are blamed with

no clear basis and attributes some conflicts

to the general lack of public awareness

about the exact location and abundance of

valuable resources leading to speculation

and rumours, while private investors ’

exploration activities, though often

well within the bounds of the law, are

perceived with suspicion by local commu-

nities and lead to conflicts; The increasing

population in the mining sites and people

struggling for mining holes, the exploitation

of minerals and land use was reported to be a

major cause of conflict in this area; Reports of

licenses being awarded to companies away

from public scrutiny and of companies

operating fraudulently with expired

exploration licenses and failing to

comply with their obligations towards the

local community are fuelling resentment;

Lack of transparency and public informa-

tion about such transactions, fuels anger

amongst communities. Unclear property

rights and restricted communication as well

as lack of representation, consideration and

protection for traditional resource users (e.g.

pastoralists and small-scale and artisanal

miners), are common cause of conflict;

9

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Communities expressed high expec-

tations that mining companies would

create jobs and invest in community

development, though often the opposite has

been the case, with the authorities and private

investors expelling goldsmiths from the

mines, a crucial source of livelihoods for

local communities and; Some general

causes of conflict included rustling; arms

trafficking, background of colonisation that

involved sharing border lands with Kenya

and South Sudan; tax and royalty revenues

issues and, poverty.

Critical Issues in NRM Conflict Mitigation and Management

Assessment of the dynamics of conflicts

related to land and natural resources in

Rupa Sub-county elicits a number of

critical needs and issues. These primarily

relate to: (i) the interface between UWA, NFA

and local community over access to land,

minerals and other natural resources; (ii)

capacity of the actors to deal especially

with the emerging mineral related conflicts;

(iii) core governance issues including those

related to transparency, accountability and

benefit sharing; (iv) Traditional Natural

Resources Management Structures like

the Etem/Ekokwa (men’s gathering/ meet-

ing/ tree of men) and Akiriket (Sacred

Assembly) need to be supported,

(v) popularisation of Land and Mineral

policies; (vi) consultation and participa-

tion of local communities in the process of

exploration and exploitation of resources;

(vii) Effective Information Flows and

Communication Channels; (viii) Security

of Land Tenure and; (ix) Co-existence of

Artisanal and Small-scale Miners (ASM) and

Medium and Large Scale Mining.

Responsiveness to these issues will likely

determine whether Karamoja’s land and

mineral endowments can be used as a

platform for peace, stability and

development while inaction poses the risk

of further undermining the mitigation and

response mechanisms directed towards

prevention of land and mineral resources

from contributing to violent conflict in Rupa

and the entire Karamoja.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

There is need for widespread sensitiza-

tion on mining and land legislation, as well

as the peculiarities of the minerals sector,

would help mitigate such risks, indicating a

critical role for local government.

There is need to strengthen the

capacity of actors especially to deal with the

emerging mineral related conflicts. There is

need for harmonized and well coordinated

NRM conflict-resolution approaches and

tools should be created. There is also need

to support efforts directed toward strength-

ening the statutory land administration and

increases knowledge access of the land and

mineral laws to the NGOs CBOs, district

technical staff and local people.

There is need to reconcile and

harmonize the mining and land legislations

as they apply within the context of Karamoja

is urgently needed as is local capacity to

engage in reform processes.

10

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


In cases where exploration companies

are active, geologists must (for their own

security) necessarily engage and sensi-

tize land owners as they enter areas (e.g.

for sample collection), typically through

government channels (LCIII or LCI Chairper-

sons) and to a lesser extent clan chiefs and

elders.

There is need for increased

collaboration between civil society and other

actors like Local and Central govern-

ment in addressing the conflict issues in

Karamoja. This should avail communities

with necessary information from all actors

so as to safeguard them from the negative

effects of development.

Blending of traditional and modern

approaches. Traditional systems like the

Etem and Akiririkit need to be supported

There is need to support or contribute

to formalization and improvements to ASM

including building functioning effective

local and regional ASM associations.

Building upon and Coordinating with

Existing Initiatives and other partners.

A significant number of initiatives

related to peace and security, land, mining,

livelihoods, environmental protection and

community health, among other critical

issues.

11

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


The Karamoja region is one of the most

impoverished regions in Uganda yet it holds

considerable potential for gold, gemstones,

limestone, marble and other minerals. The environ-

ment of Karamoja offers a number of natural resources

upon which communities depend for daily functional,

economic and social purposes. The Karamoja

sub-region comprises the districts of Moroto,

Kotido, Kaabong, Nakapiripirit, Amudat, Abim and

Napak, The sub-region has suffered perennial conflicts

underpinned by a high level of insecurity, cattle

raiding and inter-ethnic violence. The security

challenges in Karamoja relate to the negative impact

of harsh climatic conditions on livelihoods, porous

borders with South Sudan and Kenya, easy access

to small arms within the population, cattle raiding

and prolonged political and economic marginalisa-

tion. The recent disarmament process in Karamoja has

significantly reduced gun possession, restored relative

peace and spurred economic recovery in some parts

of the sub-region2. The return to security has opened

the door for many corporations to poke their noses into

Uganda’s mineral-rich lands. Karamoja continues to be

plagued by insecurity and intra-Karimojong tensions, all

of which tend to mask the underlying and less well

known processes of mineral exploration, land grabbing

INTRODUCTION

5

Overview

Busoga Kingdom is composed of seven politically organised

districts that include; Kamuli, Jinja, Iganga, Bugiri, Mayuge,

Kaliro, Namutumba and the recently proposed Luuka district.

The Kingdom lies under the African tropical region bordering with

Lake Victoria shoreline in the South, River Nile in the West, Lake

Kyoga in the North and River Mpologoma in the East, located in the

Republic of Uganda, East Africa.

Her inhabitants are known as Basoga and their history is largely a

matter of speculation. However, there are a few facts that emerge

from the historical shadows of the past related to the neighbouring

tribes, the Baganda located in the West, South and Banyoro in the

Northwest direction from Busoga

Busoga is a land of peace-loving people who traditionally live

in small homesteads. The Basoga (people) subscribe to large

communities with similar traditional norms, culture and origin.

Their large families or communities are classified as clans and

so long as they shared common traditional norms, their sense of

freedom would be complete. With these values, the Basoga will

live in harmony with each other and to-date they continue to

extend such hospitality to their visitors.

“The Basoga (people)

subscribe to large

communities with similar

traditional norms”

View of the mighty Nile River which is the Kingdom’s lifeline

Contiued Next Page

2Saferworld, ‘Karamoja Conflict and Security Assessment’, September 2010

12

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


and land gazetting, as well as government-

driven decentralisation processes which

intensify conflicts between pastoralist and

agro- pastoralist groups and livelihoods.

Community land disputes are widely spread

in Karamoja, with continuous acquisition


establishing game reserves or to

commercially exploit minerals such as gold

or uranium, some residentsturn against the

UWA, local government and commercial

investors. According to January 2014 statistics from the DGSM, currently 51 foreign and Ugandan companies with 136 concess ions ,

are actively exploring for large mineral

deposits throughout the region while

estimates also indicate that more than

20,000 Karamajong women and men are permanently or seasonally engaged in

artisanal and small scale mining (ASM)

using crude, hazardous methods as a means

of day-to-day survival (ECO, 2011). Given these tensions, a solid understanding of the

current situation of NRM related conflicts is

critically needed.

The assessment gathered information in

Rupa sub-county on mining licenses, the

areas covered by these licenses, verify

the level of access to that information by

concerned local authorities and communi-

ties; the types of land and natural resources

related conflicts and their drivers. The key

actors, institutions and structures in

NRM and Conflict including regional and

international mechanisms on NRM and

Conflict, the government policies on NRM

have been analysed. The study explores

the role of Traditional Natural Resources

Management Structures and the role of CSO

and their level of engagement including

assessing their capacity, institutions

and structures in mitigating and manag-

ing NRM related conflicts. As work of this

nature has not been conducted in

Rupa-Moroto, the findings of the survey

provides an insight into possible mitigation

and response mechanisms that could in turn

fill a critical gap and improve prevention of

land and natural resources from contributing

to violent conflict not only in Rupa but in the

entire Moroto and the region.

13

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Objectives

The primary aim of the Study was to

assess the current situation, challenges and

possible solutions regarding actual and

potential conflicts related to land and

mining activities in Rupa Sub-county,

Karamoja. By examining the nexus of

mining, land use and management and

conflict, the findings will inform the

subsequent implementation of the project

interventions and will help to formulate

integrated strategies for addressing them

NRM related conflict. Specific objectives of

the Baseline Study:

1. Determine the occurrence and distribution

of different mineral commodities and mining

activities (exploration, artisanal, small and

large scale mining) across Rupa Sub-county

2. To identify the key NRM conflict drivers in

Rupa Sub-county, Moroto District

3. Outline the Mineral Policy and related

legislation, institutional roles and responsibili-

ties and their interface with land policy, with

consideration of their joint and individual

applicability given the unique context of

Karamoja.

4. Understand the current and potential role

of key stakeholders, including local govern-

ment and central institutions with respect to

addressing NRM related conflict.

5. To make targeted policy and

programmatic recommendations to improve

responses to the identified NRM conflict

drivers and inform conflict-sensitive program-

ming by actors

operating in Karamoja

Contextual Factors: Geography, Demography, NRM and Conflict in Karamoja Region

The Karamoja Region a home to about

1.147 million people, 80% of the total population is estimated to be living below

the poverty line (UNDP, Human Development Report Uganda, 2007) relative to the national average of 31% making this region the poorest part of

Uganda yet it holds over 50 different economic minerals, including gold,

silver, copper, iron, gemstones, limestone

and marble. For many decades, conflict

and armed violence have undermined

development in the region, resulting

in some of the lowest poverty, human

development and service delivery indica-

tors for Uganda (Saferworld, 2010, p.6). About 7,506 families with a total population of 34,800 people live in Rupa mineral rich sub-county in Moroto district.

After decades of inter-clan and inter-tribal

cattle rustling partly ushered in by a

decade of disarmament, many Karimojong

and non-Karimojong see a period of peace,

at least in relative terms. However, this peace is fraught with another challenge,

the increasing quest for land by internal

and external actors. Many say it is “the

peace” that has given ground to land con-

flicts3. The recent disarmament process in

Karamoja has significantly reduced gun

possession, restored relative peace and

3Civil Peace Service Programme, ‘Assessment of land related conflicts and current interventions in Karamoja’, December 2013

14

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


spurred economic recovery in some parts of the

sub-region4. The return to security has

opened the door for many corporations to

poke their noses into Uganda’s mineral-rich

lands. Karamoja continues to be plagued by

insecurity and intra-Karimojong tensions,

all of which tend to mask the underlying

and less well known processes of mineral

exploration, land grabbing and land

gazetting, as well as government-driven

decentralisation processes which intensify

conflicts between pastoralist and agro-

pastoralist groups and livelihoods. Acute

poverty, poor service delivery, crumbling

infrastructure and perceived marginalisa-

tion are also described as driving conflict

in the sub-region and not having been

effectively addressed by current development

interventions. The natives, politicians

and opinion leaders in the area warn that

serious conflict might emanate from the

scramble for resources. From the shabby

outposts of Rupa, Bobong, Nakilipa in

Moroto district, to Rata in Amudat district

and Moruita in Nakapiripirit, gold lies in

every tiny pocket of Karamoja, a

region, ironically, enveloped in poverty5. Communities describe land disputes as

widespread in Karamoja, with acquisition


establishing game reserves or to

commercially exploit minerals such as gold

or uranium pitching residents against the

UWA, local government and commercial

investors6. Land conflicts are evident

in areas gazetted as reserves by the

Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) and district

border areas resulting from the creation of

new Districts and the quest for resources

and fertile land. Conflicts are also prevalent

in mineral-rich areas, between investors,

title holders and the communities and

in communal land between individuals,

sometimes referred to as the elite

(educated/prominent Karimojong) and the

communities7

Land and Extractive Mineral Sector in Karamoja: An Overview

Approximately 61.67% of the land area in Karamoja is Exclusive Mineral Exploration

Licenses, Location Licenses and mining

licenses however the status of mining,

extent of concessions, nature and nature or

volume of mineral deposits is not known at

district level; Community knowledge has

remained very law if at it exists in some

areas on mineral rights, land rights,

legal issues, environmental issues and

advocacy engagements, with investors and

leaders at all levels; Investors and Private

Companies estimated to be over 40 com-

panies are taking advantage of the

community’s ignorance, poverty and

4Saferworld, ‘Karamoja Conflict and Security Assessment’, September 2010

5See Mutaizibwa, ‘Secret gold mining sparks conflict fears in Karamoja’, The Observer, 27 MAY 2012

http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18957&Itemid=114

6Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS), ‘Nothern Uganda Conflict Analysis’, September 2013


15

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


illiteracy to confuse communities with partial

or incomplete information to stealthily acquire

land in the region; there is no community

involvement and consultation over land

acquisition or for exploration set by law and

where it exists obligatory compensation

or royalties to land owners as mandated

by law are unpaid due to lack of proof of

customary ownership. There is lack evidence

of land ownership, the basis of claim and

negotiations for the communities with the

companies for acquisition or compensation

for rights over land is not in place; the intent

of government is questioned by communi-

ties and the suspicion of selling off the entire

mineral wealth of the Karamoja is also existent in

the minds of the community and it is merely

considered to be land grabbing, albeit sanction

by either government or those in government;

Exploration and mining is based on

information from private companies

applying for licenses and not understood and

appreciated by the local leaders and

community who view it as a ploy to grab

their land; Local leaders are accusing

government of conniving with mining

companies to grab land of the Karamojong.

These individuals connive with district

officials to stealthily survey land (sometimes

at night), facilitated by concealable hi-tech

handheld digital survey equipment. These

transactions are done in utmost secrecy, and

quickly concluded. Rugadya, et (2010: 42) claimed that Karamojong elites and political

leaders, who had access to information about

degazettement of PUWR, opted not to share

it or publicize it, and instead, used it for

political mileage and self aggrandizement,

16

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


securing for themselves hectares of land and

personal interests in entities investing in

either tourism, mining or commercial

agriculture ventures in Karamoja.

Ultimately, responsiveness to these

critical issues will partly determine whether

Karamoja’s mineral endowments can be used

as a platform for stability, wealth creation

and development while inaction poses the

risk of further undermining environmental

integrity, human wellbeing, tenuous peace

and security and the invaluable cultural

assets that are unique to the region. The 1995 Constitution of Uganda (article 237) vests protected areas in government, which holds

them in trust for the people of Uganda. Under

section 44(1) of the Land Act, government is obliged to protect and conserve natural

resources for the common good of the

people of Uganda. The dominant social

classes mainly target communal lands. They

use their positions and power, because of

the access to information on investment

opportunities, to acquire land likely to

be of interest to investors, which they

alienate from the customary domain by

titling it. Although the 1995 constitution places all minerals under the custody of the

government, the 2003 Mining Act prescribes that “revenue shall be shared amongst the

central government, the local government

and the lawful occupants of the land”

(section 98.2) and that districts are responsible for receiving and forwarding

applications for various mineral rights,

arbitrating compensation, resolution of

disputes and granting of licenses. While

most of these valuable minerals remain

underexploited, the potential wealth derived

from extracting minerals has already sparked

tensions in mineral-rich communities in

Karamoja; one of these communities is

Rupa Sub-county, the location target for this

project.

So far Government has awarded over

seven mining licenses to international and

local companies in Moroto district. These

include Tororo Cement, African Minerals, India

Marble, Jay Magal Gold Mining Company,

and Dao among others. Tensions over

17

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


control and benefit of resources tied to land

are tangible in Moroto especially in Rupa

Sub-county. For example, in June 2012 two investors were attacked by a mob as they

attempted to off-load equipment for gold

mining in Rupa sub-county, Moroto district

(Karamoja sub-region)9. Communities that

have lived in these villages and grazed their

livestock on fields for centuries are routinely

displaced to make room for gold and copper

mines with little benefit from its extraction.

Allegations are emerging that compradors

working on behalf of powerful individuals

are running an opaque gold mining industry.

Exploiting the internecine conflict

pitting clans against one another, powerful

individuals are said to be carting off vast

amounts of gold and other minerals10

. The

licensing of mineral exploration without

adequate community involvement will

continue to drive conflict in many parts

of the region and escalate as more

mineral sites are identified and licensed for

exploitation. District land Boards are also

culprits over leasing large pieces of land in

what apparently appears to be a form of

land grabbing trend. In Rupa sub-county,

Moroto District, a Christian NGO called the

‘Ministry of Prayers Praise’ had been issued

a lease for 10,000 acres of land to construct a University called ‘Karamoja University’. This

raised eye-brows because the area claimed

is rich in minerals, and elders have demanded

that the district relocates the proposed

university project elsewhere, ‘We are

supporting the idea of Karamoja

getting a university but we want it to be

relocated from where the minerals are

because it’s occupying a large part of land

where we could do mining’11

.

In 2009 the government concluded a World Bank-funded airborne geophysical study of

over 80 percent of the country’s landmass

9See Ariong, Steven, ‘Investors barred from putting up gold mining plant’, Daily Monitor, 30 June 2012.

10See Mutaizibwa, ‘Secret gold mining sparks conflict fears in Karamoja’, The Observer, 27 MAY 2012

http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18957&Itemid=114 11See Steven Ariong, ‘Karimojong elders stop varsity project’, The Daily Monitor, August 12, 2011

http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/-/691252/1217428/-/format/xhtml/-/2mxbsh/-/index.html

18

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


to map mineral deposits12

. Due to ongoing

security concerns, the survey did not include

the Karamoja sub-region. This has fuelled

uncertainty and reinforced perceptions of

exclusion amongst local communities,

generating disputes as investors move

into the area for tentative exploration

operations. Reports of licenses being awarded

to companies away from public scrutiny and

of companies operating fraudulently with

expired exploration licenses and failing to

comply with their obligations towards the

local community are fuelling resentment.

The sale of communal land to private

investors in mineral-rich areas, for example in

Moroto district of Karamoja, is also on the

rise, and increasingly fuelling conflicts

amongst community members and between

communities and local government

officials and investors. Residents have fear of

having their land taken by investors and the

government, with reports of “secret surveys”

being carried out on their land. Investors

showing up to begin mining exploration

activities without previous knowledge of the

local residents, fuels resentment and

mistrust13

. Although large areas are

covered by exploration rights (and a few

sites are licensed for extraction of limestone

and marble) the reality of exploration and

distinctions between “surface rights” and

“mineral rights” is often misunderstood and a

source of conflict at local levels14.

Nevertheless, in Karamoja as found across

Uganda, areas are often rapidly picked

up by speculative exploration companies

leaving little opportunity to legalize ASM

activities. Other factors contributing to

over 85% of ASM operating outside of the legal framework seems to include lack of

awareness and capacity to obtain a

license (including cumbersome bureaucratic

procedures and complex legal demands),

unclear and/or discriminatory land

tenure systems contributing to a lack of local

responsibility for sustainable mining

stewardship; communities’ perception of lack

of benefits from legal operation to balance

legal obligations; policy and legal gaps

making illegal operations more profitable

than legal activities; weak law enforcement

and inadequate penalties for illegal operators

when caught (in particular mineral dealers);

and, potentially, a perception among miners

that the law is unfair and out of touch with

reality15

Most mineral trade is illegally transact-

ed across the borders representing gross

revenue loss to the government and the

regional economy. Gold in the region is

reportedly purchased by Somalis and, to a

lesser extent, Kenyans. Also cross border

with South Sudan (links between gold and

the arms trade is suspected). However, since most ASM is unlicensed, there is a problem

tracking such illegal practices. The protract-

ed insecurity situation in the region seems to

have given rise to powerful actors that may

engage in lucrative illegal mineral trading

given the relative ease to “get away with it”.

Thus, artisanal miners in Karamoja may also

be operating illegally because they may feel

they have no choice .

12Department of Geological Survey and Mines, ‘Uganda: Mineral Sector for National Economic Development’, www.uganda-mining.go.ug/dgsm-flyer-low-res.pdf.13Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS) 2013: Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis. http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/accs---northern-uganda-conflict-analysis-report.pdf14Ecological Christian Orgainisation (2011): The Mining and Mineral Sector in Karamoja region: Development Opportunities and Constraints.15Ecological Christian Orgainisation (2011): The Mining and Mineral Sector in Karamoja region: Development Opportunities and Constraints.

19

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


The research presented in this report is based primarily on

assessment conducted by ECO, ACODE and RIAMRIAM

staff between December 15th, 2013 to February 24th, 2014. The research team conducted interviews in Rupa sub-county

and Moroto town in Moroto district; and at national level in

Kampala and Entebbe. We collected qualitative data in 11 semi-structured focus group interviews comprising of 175 community members (100 male and 75 female participants) in the parishes of Rupa, Lobuneit, Mogoth, Nakadeli and

Pupu. Villages with an eye to variation in natural resource

access and exposure to conflict and highly exposed to NRM

related conflicts were purposively selected for interviews. These

communities were: Nakabaat, Nakiloro for gold mining;

Rata, Lomareo for marble& gold; Musupo, Naturumurum, Kadilakeny, Lokitela’kapes, Akwapuwa and Kalenyo for land

use in relation wildlife reserves. For community interviews the

interview guides were conducted in N’gakarimajong using the

translated interview guides.

2. METHODOLOGY

16 Ibid

20

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


The team also conducted interviews with the

members of Moroto District Mineral Watch

Platform, as well with 35 representatives of national and international nongovernmen-

tal organizations, United Nations agencies,

soldiers of the Uganda Peoples’ Defense

Forces, Uganda Police, mining companies (DAO

Africa Limited and Jan Manga Uganda Ltd),

journalists, and other persons with knowledge

of land and minerals in Rupa and Karamoja.

A final round of validation and consen-

sus-building workshops was held in

Moroto on 12th March 2014, where the draft findings of the report were presented and

discussed with key stakeholders in the field.

Participants from local government, civil

society and communities endorsed the

findings as well as contributing to the

sub-regional and local levels of analysis with

specific recommendations.

This report also draws on synthesis and

analysis of secondary data Maps and reports

from the Dept. of Geological Survey and Mines

describing status of mining in Rupa,

Moroto and Karamoja in general, inclusive

of the concession holders (exploration and

mining licenses), distribution of minerals,

officially reported production (primarily

limestone and marble), unofficial estimates

of “illegal” mineral production of gold and

number of artisanal miners; Land and

Mineral Policy and Legislation, inclusive of a

21

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


recent Statutory Instrument to revise royalty17

sharing arrangements to increase percent-

age sharing benefits to local land owners and

recently approved 2013 national land policy for Uganda. This is particularly significant to

Karamoja where the “land owner” definition

(subcounty versus clan) has not yet been

well defined. The EU-UN Guidance Notes on

addressing NRM and conflict prevention. These

Guidance Notes included: (i) Land and Conflict (ii)

Extractive Industries and Conflict (iii) Renewable

Resources and Conflict, (iv) Strengthening Capacity

for Conflict-Sensitive Natural Resource Management.

Source of data also included Moroto District and

Rupa Sub-county Development Plans and a number of

other development agencies’ study reports and press

monitoring related to conflict, land and natural

resources in Karamoja Region.

17A royalty is essentially a tax imposed on mineral production. While technically this is to be collected by the licensed mineral right holder (producer), in the case of unlicensed artisanal mining, this is often deferred to a licensed mineral dealer (buyer) upon declaration of intent to export (in the case of gold).

22

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


3.1 Natural Resources Prioritization

Respondents mentioned that the existing key natural

resources in the community included: Land, minerals,

pasture, water, trees, soil, gardens and wild fruits. The

respondents were asked to rank, the natural resources

most important to their lives and livelihoods; Focus Groups

Discussions overwhelmingly prioritized land, minerals,

pasture, water and trees.

Land is the most important resource. Land, water, pasture

and minerals co- exist and all these natural resources are

found on the land, which makes it the most important18

.

Water is very important to our animals and us. It

can be used for crop and tree irrigation, bathing,

washing clothes and utensils, cooking and making local

brew, building bricks and smearing huts among others19

.

Gold, Marble, Limestone, redganets, granites, sand,

gravel, and other precious stone that we don’t know are

3. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT IN RUPA

18Key informant interview with office of the DPC Moroto Superintendent of Police Obia George 15th Feb 2014

19Community FGDs, Nakiloro Village (translated from Karamojong)

23

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


some of the minerals that exist in this area.

These minerals, especially Gold, limestone

and marble, are very important to communi-

ties in income generation20

. We also use the

stones for grinding food21

.

We use pasture for grazing animals and

animal feeds, even wild animals feed on the

pasture. During thatching of our manyattas

and protecting granaries, we use grass and

shrubs. We also eat some shrub species,

which are medicinal. Never the less most of

the time trees are used for charcoal burning

and fuel wood22

.

Forests or trees are ranked highly for a

number of uses including: firewood,

charcoal and poles for sale. The trees also

provide us material for fencing kraals,

manyattas and water troughs. They are

also considered sacred when identified as

akiriket; shaded sacred groves for elders’

decision-making and community ceremonies.

We eat tree leaves and fruits and our animals

feed on them too. In treatment of a number of

diseases some trees are used as medicine23

.

Wild fruits are important resources for

meeting our feeding, nutrition and

medicinal needs. We highly value these fruits.

But all these exist on the soil but soil is also

valued for crop cultivation, plastering

manyattas among others24

The Karamoja region is believed to have

Uganda’s largest deposits of valuable

minerals such as gold and limestone and has

the potential to become the “next frontier of

mineral exploitation after oil in the Albertine

region. According to January, 2014 statistics from the DGSM, 17,083.34sq.km (61.67%) of the 27,700 sq. km total land area of Karamoja region is licensed for mineral exploration

and exploitation activities. The same data

indicates that Moroto district has 26 companies with 44 concessions (35EL, 5LL, 3ML & 1SML) covering a total land area of 3772,43sq.km (Annex One). By comparison, regional data indicates that the total land

area licensed for mineral exploration and

exploitation activities is 61.67% of the total land area in Karamoja wherein 11.22% (1917.5sq. km) of this land area lies in Rupa Sub-county

25. There are currently 10 Mining companies with 22 mineral concessions (1 ML, 2 LL and 19 EL) in Rupa only (Table 1). However, the natives, politicians and opinion leaders in the area

warn that serious conflict might emanate

from the scramble for resources. Local people

say that it is not clear how investors come

to invest, especially those who are clearing

whole mountainsides or fencing large areas.

There are companies from India and the Gulf,

as well as contractors from other parts of

Uganda26.

20Key Informant Interview with Deputy CAO Moroto 17th Feb, 2014

21Community FGDs, Kadilakeny village (translated from Karamojong)

22Community FGDs, Nakabaat village (translated from Karamojong)

23Interview with Opinion Leader Naturumurum village (translated from Karamojong)

24Community FGDs, Musupo village (translated from Karamojong)

25This was computed from the data provided by DGSM on Mineral Concession Holders as of 31st January 2014.

26Karamoja Action Research Team, Patta Scott-Villiers, “Eki and Etem in Karamoja: A study of decision-making in a post-conflict society”. 2013

3.2 Land and Mineral Exploitation

24

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Type # License holder Location Granting date

Expiry date

Sheet number

District Commodity / mineral Area/ km2

Mineral rent per year (ugx)

EL 0803 Gold Hunters Limited Kampala 7/25/11 7/24/14 18/3&4. Kaabong Gold and Base Metals 48.00 960,000

EL 0804 Gold Hunters Limited Kampala 7/25/11 7/24/14 26/2 & 27/1. Kaabong Gold and Base Metals 54.00 1,080,000



EL 0807 Gold Hunters Limited Kampala 7/25/11 7/24/14 18/3&4. Kaabong Gold and Base Metals 48.00 960,000


EL 0809 Gold Hunters Limited Kampala 7/25/11 7/24/14 26/2. Kaabong Gold and Base Metals 54.00 1,080,000


EL 0851 East African Mining Limited Kampala 9/22/11 9/21/14 27/1. Moroto Gold, PGEs and Base

Metals

72.00 1,440,000

EL 0852 East African Mining Limited Kampala 9/22/11 9/21/14 27/1. Moroto Gold, PGEs and Base

Metals

86.00 1,720,000

EL 0876 Pramukh Steel Limited Jinja 10/20/11 10/19/1

4

27/3. Moroto Limestone/Marbles 36.90 740,000

EL 1001 Jan Manga (U) Ltd Kampala 7/20/12 7/19/15 27/3&4. Moroto Gold & Base Metals 74.20 1,500,000

EL 1016 Great Lakes Mining Ltd Kampala 8/10/12 8/9/15 18A/3. Moroto REE & Base Metals 55.00 1,100,000

EL 1083 Infinity Minerals Ltd Kampala 2/11/13 2/10/16 27/3&4 Moroto Gold and Base Metals 437.00 8,740,000

EL 1090 Dao Africa Limited Kampala 2/20/13 2/19/16 27/1 Moroto Limestone and Marble 40.70 820,000

EL 1115 Infinity Minerals Ltd Kampala 3/22/13 3/21/16 26/2&18/4 Moroto &

Kaabong

Gold and Base Metals 480.00 9,600,000

EL 1164 Sikander Meghani Kampala 6/4/13 6/3/16 27/3 Moroto Gold and Base Metals 2.00 40,000

EL 1165 Dao Marble Limited Kampala 6/13/13 6/12/16 27/3 Moroto Limestone, Chromite,

Gold & PGMs

124.23 2,500,000

EL 1207 Aljouda Mining Company

Limited

Kampala 10/14/13 10/13/1

6

27/3 Moroto Limestone, Gold &

Base Metals

15.00 320,000

LL 1171 Jinja Marble Products (U)

Limited

Jinja 6/24/13 6/23/15 27/3 Moroto Marble 0.16 250,000

LL 1210 Sikander Meghani Kampala 10/17/13 10/16/1

5

27/3 Moroto Gold 0.11 250,000

ML 1129 Jan Manga (U) Ltd Kampala 4/18/13 4/17/34 27/3&4 Moroto Gold 74.20 148,400,000

Table 1: Exploration and Mining License Holders in Rupa Sub-county as of January 31st, 201427

Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, MEMD), Department of Geological Survey and Mines, DGSM), 31st January, 2014

3.3 Patterns of NRM related Conflicts The recent disarmament process in Karamoja has significantly reduced gun possession,

restored relative peace after decades of inter-clan and inter-tribal cattle rustling.

However, this peace is confronted with another challenge, the increasing quest for land byinternal and external actors. Many say it is “the peace” that has given ground to land mineral

related conflicts28

. Discussions with communities in Rupa revealed that they are confronted by

different types of NRM related conflicts which are either inter or intra (micro–micro)

or micro–macro levels but all relating to the spheres in which the community find

27 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, MEMD), Department of Geological Survey and Mines, DGSM), 31st January, 2014


25

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


themselves interacting with other groups,

individuals, communities, state or corporate

actors on issues related to land and mineral

resources and these included29

:

• Disputes over land and resource ownership, e.g. between investors,

mining companies, lease holders and

the communities and in communal land

between individual elites or educated/

p r om inen t Ka r imo j ong and the

communities

• Disputes over land boundaries between individuals or groups

• Conflicts between herders and cultivators (changing Karimojong

economy-conflicts between pastoralist

and agro-pastoralist approaches)

• Disputes ignited by the speculation activities of commercial companies-

Mineral exploration.

• Conflict between mining private compa-nies and communal land resource users

• Conflicts among the small scale miners themselves-driven mainly by jealous and

need for access to perceived areas of

better mining results, sharing of

proceeds, alcoholism and other causes.

Small scale miners and the investors30

which are driven by need for control

of the mining activities, land, unclear

terms of operation, the perception that

investors came to know of the minerals

before the local people.

• Boundary disputes over access to resources

Contradictory natural resource needs

and values, e.g. between wildlife habitat

protection and local livelihood security/

UWA-gazetted reserve and reduction in

access to grazing land and farming

opportunities (Land conflicts are evident in

areas gazetted as reserves by the Uganda

Wildlife Authority-UWA)

29This is a generalized and summarized responses from all interviews conducted by the research team. They are further discussed in next section-Drivers of conflict related to Natural Resources Management. 30Investors imply mining companies and individuals who are either mining or prospecting

26

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


3.4 Drivers of conflict related to Natural Resources Management

3.4.1 Land related conflictsThe end of armed conflict in Karamoja has

opened up economic opportunities but the

region continues to be affected by disputes

over land and natural resources, including oil,

gold, timber, and the agricultural potential of

the soil. Rupa sub-county is not immune to

these current land related conflicts.

The question of land was never an issue

in the past free Karamoja. People would

grow maize or sorghum anywhere and

graze animals anywhere any time with-

out restriction. But this has changed as

people fight each other over land. Now

that there are minerals all over this

land, the situation has worse and will

continue to be hopeless because land

has become an issue of life and death

on this soil31

Land and minerals were reported by the

respondents, as the key drivers of conflict

in Rupa and the community interviews

revealed that the current conflicts which

revolved around land and mineral will even

become worse if nothing is done to change

the situation for now and in future. “The

entire sub-county is covered with Gold,

Marble and limestone and other minerals

which we don’t know more so the land on

which these minerals are found is big. The

conflict we currently experience revolves

around land and minerals as there are many

speculators and insecurity of tenure is

widespread because land is communally

owned. As investors move in to exploit these

resources, conflicts over land and minerals

will continue to increase even beyond what

we are experiencing”32

.

31Focus Group Discussion, Rupa

32Focus Group Discussion, Rupa

27

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


The conflicts are evident between the

investors and communities where mining

and prospecting are taking place sometimes

driven by speculation and rumours over

unclear land acquisition by the investors and

how politicians made a kill in the mining or

prospecting deals, unfulfilled promises and

obligations by investors in terms of royal-

ties and compensation, investors ignoring

of surface rights regarding communal land,

royalties and utilising wrong channels of

communities to enter communities to do a

start-up of their activities. One respondent

noted: …the fencing off of big chunk of land

by Jan Manga in Rupa has scared away

some local miners in Rupa and there is

latent conflict between the two parties33.

The study further revealed that the sale/

lease of communal or customary land is

considered an infringement on common

interest and readily triggers conflicts.

Land remains an important factor in

shaping the socio-economic and political

relationships between individuals, investors,

and the state. The difficult transition from

customary land to private ownership,

coupled with a lack of knowledge amongst

many ordinary citizens about land

legislation and the difficulty in obtaining

property titles is a common source of

conflict in Rupa. “Land conflicts and

disputes are so many and are even becom-

ing too many for us to document. They are

complex for example; before you respond

to an investor who needs surface rights,

you have community elders/members

claiming land ownership without proof

of ownership since it doesn’t exist in

communal land ownership. Then the

next day you hear cases of communities

complaining about investors who come

and go without consultation. The investors

expect us to endorse prospecting and

exploration licence applications in the

shortest time, which limits scrutiny of the

documents. On the other hand you have the

conflicting law between land usage/owner-

ship and surface rights... and so much more.

All these day to day experiences make the

mineral and land issues very complex with

disputes that become almost impossible

to handle given the magnitude and the

frequency within which they occur, many

times it difficult to reach a consensus with

different conflict parties”34

Respondents in Rupa sub-county cited Land

and boundary disputes/ contested boundar-

ies to be one of the conflict drivers. “All

you see around is conflict; this is between

families, institutions like local govern-

ment, churches, schools, investors and the

community. It is all originated by

boundary disputes, complete ownership

issues and sharing of proceeds from

the natural resources”35

. There are a

number of conflicts in the area; Rupa and

Katikekile sub-counties have a dispute of

over boundaries because of the minerals.

This is a conflict that existed before the

minerals were discovered but the presence

of the minerals has intensified the disputes.

We have been trying to help resolve this

issue together with the ministry of land and

local authorities but with little success”36.

33

Key Informant Interview, Moroto town

34Key Informant interview with an official in Moroto local government

35Key Informant interview with Office of the DPC Moroto Superintendent Police Obia George 15th Feb, 2014

36Key Informant Interview with Deputy DISO Moroto Charles Muhanguzi 17th Feb, 2014

28

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


37

Key Informat Interview Moroto

38

Interview with Lokeris Paul, an elder –Kadilakeny village

Cases of the boundary disputes were

also cited to be between mining compa-

nies holding different concessions. Some

respondents also noted the presence of

conflict between the investors themselves,

though they feared to mention an example

for security reasons. The conflicts come

from unclear demarcation of the areas of

jurisdiction for their activities. The same

respondent noted that the conflicts are

not easy to resolve because of the fragile

nature of the actors. “They have immunity,

come in unclearly, some could be armed

and in fact we are not sure of who we are

dealing with”37

.

There exists conflict between the commu-

nities and government and their agencies

like Uganda Wildlife Authority and National

Forestry Authority in some areas. The

UWA protected areas for the establish-

ment of national parks or natural reserves,

is seen by the community as an attempt

which prevent or limit access to traditional

sources of livelihoods for the community

members. The conflict between the UWA

and residents of Rupa is a dispute over

access to Lotithan and Kobebe. Extension

of Uganda Wild life Authority (Nayoko’tiang)

to areas with high potential of crop and

livestock production is one of the causes of

conflict over land use in communities. “The

Authority has taken away lands where we

would farm and graze our livestock. This

has also prohibited us from settling in such

fertile lands. ‘Kobebe is our cradle land, but

because of insecurity, we moved to this

present place called Kadilakeny village.

After the gun was taken away, govern-

ment allowed us to go back to our former

homesteads. There was a big challenge

of water for both human and livestock.

Through our elected leaders, we requested

government to construct a dam and

Kobebe dam was constructed. All this time

round UWA was nowhere to be seen and

we settled with our small crop fields and

grass thatched shades, UWA came in and

harassed us by burning our shades and

destroying our crops claiming that we had

encroached in the wildlife reserves. We

were forced to come back to Kadilakeny

area where we are not sure how long we

will stay because we are told some minerals

have been discovered”38

Respondents further reveal that there

seems to be a preference of wild life to stay

in Lotithan by the government other than

the people-who are trying to resettle after

the conflict. Community members knew of

the Bokora-Matheniko Game Reserve, but

little did they know of Lotithan gazetting,

a place they claim to be their land. The

area is suitable for agriculture and grazing

with water points like Kobebe dam. One

respondent from Rupa noted: …the issues

with NFA and UWA are a serious cause

for conflict over access and utilisation

of the land and water points, given our

background this is a very serious issue

that deserves attention before it gets out

of hand. For instance we are the ones who

chose Kobebe for the construction of the

dam, then how can it considered part of

the reserve”. Whereas the community mem-

bers’ claim is based on tradition, livelihood

and ancestral right, the Wildlife Authority

invokes legal statutes and the necessity

for conservation for these disputed areas.

29

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


3.4.2 Mineral related conflicts

Rupa sub-county boasts large deposits

of valuable stones and minerals like gold,

limestone, copper, tantalum, tin and

phosphate. While most of these

valuable minerals remain underexploited, the

potential wealth derived from extracting

minerals has already sparked tensions.

“Officials of any company got carrying

Karamoja minerals this month will be

arrested,” resolved the councilors. Mr. Joseph

Otita, the councilor for Rupa Sub-county, told

the council that a big chunk of land in Rupa,

a mineral-rich area, has been gazzetted by

unknown people and that some of them

have already processed land titles without

the knowledge of the local community and

the district39

.

Community members expressed con-

cern over insufficient consultation and

participation of local communities in the

process of exploration and exploitation of

resources found in their land as it is creating

resentment and driving conflicts across

the area. “We have been mining Gold in

Nakabaat for many years even before the

coming of the foreign companies, when

they came they quickly set up permanent

buildings and water facilities for themselves

midway between Nakiloro and Nakabaat.

No one informed us about their coming but

we then moved away from that area deep

down the valleys were we finally settled to

continue with the mining. After few

months we were then told to move further.

Unfortunately some of the people who would

have defended us instead were moving

with them and they played a big role to

convince us that the investors were directed

by government to come and develop the area

by extracting gold. We now stay here but we

feel insecure and always in fear and under

threat, thinking that any time we may be

told to move further and further. Surprisingly

we are not even allowed to use the water

points the companies have set up. They have

support of the army and some selfish local

leaders”40

Such irregularities have fuelled

uncertainty and reinforced perceptions

of exclusion amongst local communities,

generating disputes as investors move into

the area for tentative exploration operations.

38Interview with Lokeris Paul, an elder –Kadilakeny village

39See Ariong, Steven, ‘Moroto council suspends all mining activities’, Daily Monitor, 15 September 2011. http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-

/688334/1236554/-/bj8jxsz/-/index.html

40Interview with local miner in Nakabaat Village

30

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


There conflicts between small scale miners

themselves-driven mainly by jealous and

need for access to perceived areas of better

mining results, sharing of proceeds, alcoholism

and other causes. Small scale miners and

the investors (mining companies or mining

licence holders) too conflict due to need for

controlling mining activities, land, unclear

terms of operation and, the perception that

investors come to know of the minerals

before the local people How come the people from Kampala know about

minerals other than us the locals?41

. While

another noted: In all the conflicts perceived

and experienced land is very critical, in fact

as people are looking for where to settle,

animals too have no where to graze, it’s

saddening42

The experience of Nakabaat

local miners with mining companies as

told by Awosit Marita is harsh ‘besides

sending us to the valleys, the investors

don’t allow us to use the water they have

piped all the way from Nakiloro river down

through to Nakabaat mining site. Life is

very challenging for us in this area especially

in this dry season of the year. The popula-

tion of the three different communities in

this place is growing steadily and yet we

have no source of basic necessities of life.

This is a very bitter experience; we feel we

are being treated unfairly in our own land’.

Price control is also a major cause of conflict

over minerals in Nakabaat and other mining

communities in Rupa. A few monopolies/

buyers over-bargain to meet their selfish

interest while exploiting the local miners.

According to the local miners, “We have had

many cases where an increase or decrease

in the price of gold has been a source of

conflict as one buyer wants to out compete

the other. Police always comes in settle such

disputes, buyers and miners always fight

because of the slight change in the

prices. We always feel cheated especially by

one buyer who always does not want other

buyers on the scene”43

. We fear to complain

for any basic services including low prices

set by the few monopolies (gold buyers) that

claim they are allowed by government to come

and buy gold from us. Many of them have

strong protection from police/army officers”44

Respondents from all the FDGS claimed

these conflicts are the responsibility of

government, local leaders, Uganda Wild Life

Authority, Forestry department for their

failure to come out clear and engage in

discussions with the local people about

issues of demarcation, gazetting, degazzeting,

access and compensation, concessions,

royalties and other information related to

land and mineral issues. We are told that

Musupo, which is a forest reserve yet we

hear part of it, was given to the investors.

There was no consultation with the local

people when the land was being allocated.

It was also noted that the local leadership at

district level are responsible for the conflict in

Musupo because they don’t inform the local

community of the coming of the investors,

community members are surprised when

investors come being directed by local

leaders to such places of interest.

41FGD interview, Rupa Parish

42FGD interview, Rupa Parish

43Interview with Awosit Martina a local miner – Nakabaat village.

44Interview with local miner in Nakabaat Village

31

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


The local government and other government

agencies are argued to address these

many complaints and confusion through

continuous dialogue.

The local government asserts that they

are sometimes blamed with no clear basis

yet some conflicts are a result of general

lack of public awareness about the exact

location and abundance of valuable resources

leading to speculation and rumours, while

private investors’ exploration activities,

though often well within the bounds of the

law they are perceived with suspicion by

local communities which leads to conflicts.

“The gazetting of the Matheniko game

reserve also caused a conflict because

the community wants the land especially

because of the minerals. The Tepeth claim

the boundary is in the valley and the

Matheniko claim the boundary is on the

foot of the mountain. This conflict is mainly

because of mineral extraction and they

are both fighting for ownership of the land

that has more minerals. Tapach is too is

accusing Local government of not giving

them a chance to manage their resources.

But the district says that it’s the central

government in charge. There is an as-

pect of ignorance that needs to be sorted;

32

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


the people need to be enlightened. The

challenge however is the community

confronts the local government instead of

asking. From the ground analysis it is not

logical for the sub-county to accuse the

local government. They should instead ask

government to pay them their royalties”45

.

The general misinterpretation or poor

understanding of the land and mining laws

seems to increase mineral and land related

conflicts. Although the 1995 constitution places all minerals under the custody of the

government, the 2003 Mining Act prescribes that “revenue shall be shared amongst

the central government, the local govern-

ment and the lawful occupants of the land”

(section 98.2) and that districts are responsible for receiving and forwarding applications for

various mineral rights, arbitrating compen-

sation, resolution of disputes and granting of

licenses which is information that the local

people lack.

The struggle for mining holes is

manifest in the mining sites because of the

increasing population. Since the disarma-

ment was completed, people have spread

out from where they were confined, going

back to their places. This movement has

increased the pressure on land and revealed

disagreements between those who have

claims to it; a case in point is the Karimojong

and the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA).

The increasing population has further led to

increased pressure on other resources like

water. And exploitation of minerals and land

use are seen as a major cause of conflict.

“The population in Nakabaat is growing

rapidly, as a result local miners struggle for

mining sites. And in some other areas the

land and minerals have been sold yet we

thought we would settle their, UWA is on

alert to arrest any one who goes there”46

.

Reports of licenses being awarded to

companies away from public scrutiny and

of companies operating fraudulently with

expired exploration licenses and failing

to comply with their obligations towards

the local community continue to upturn

45Key Informant interview with office of the DPC Moroto Suprintendet of Police Obia George 15th Feb 2014

46

Interview with Natur Teresa, a local miner, Kadilakeny village

33

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


resentment. “Involvement in unclear deals

by investors intensifies conflict; initially

some other investor had the prospecting

licence which he sold to Dao and got a

dealers licence. Such an event causes

confusion in the community if they don’t

come out clear though the law does not

prevent the investors from this kind of

dealings47

.

The sale and lease of communal land to

private investors in Rupa is also on the

rise, and increasingly contributing to

conflicts amongst community members and

between communities and local government

officials and investors. Participants

described residents’ fear of having their

land taken by investors and the govern-

ment, with reports of secret surveys being

carried out on their land. They noted that

investors showed up to begin mining and

exploration activities without previous

knowledge of the local residents, which

fuels resentment and mistrust “…. Whatever

companies are working on is not clear

even to the district leaders, CSOs and the

communities. We just see graders

clearing the land and not even our elders are

informed. They come in with a lot of immu-

nity and exploit the ignorance of the people

for their benefits”48

Lack of transparency and inability to share

information with the public about such

transactions is a recipe for anger amongst

communities. Unclear property rights and

restricted communication as well as lack of

representation, consideration and protection

for traditional resource users (e.g. pastoral-

ists and small scale and artisanal miners) are

a common cause of conflict. According to

the study findings, the licensing of mineral

exploration without adequate community

involvement will keep driving and escalat-

ing conflicts in many parts of the region

as more mineral sites are identified and

licensed for exploitation. Regarding the

question on whether or not, local communi-

ties are consulted when it comes to land use

and minerals; of the ten FDGs in 10

47

Key Informant interview with office of the DPC Moroto Suprintendent of Police Obia George 15th Feb, 2014

48Key Informant Interview in Moroto town.

34

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


villages consulted by the research team only

one FGD could explain how the investors

get access to the land. In Namoru-Pokoi

(a newly discovered mine in Naturumrum

village), the experience was that there

was a company (an Indian) that consulted

the community but only twice to beg the

community to allow them to access this area

in order to extract marble.

“We said no because we would not want

to sell our land to such people. The

company was not satisfied with our

decision and promised to come back later

to adequately discuss with us, only to our

surprise a different company in the names

of Alhajji has accessed Namoru-pokoi area

this time. We were not aware of this”49 .

An except is Musupo whereby the

participants reported some levels of

community consultation. The local leaders

(LC 1s of 3 villages and an opinion leader) who were among the participants testified

that the community was consulted about

DAO Africa Limited a marble company.

A number of times community dialogue was

held to inform the local community of their

intention. They also promised in writing to

support the communities by constructing

basic facilities of schools, health centers

provide employment for the local population

and construct a housing facility for elders

worth UGX 300,000,000. “Eight (8) of our elders including district local authori-

ties were invited by DAO & Jan Manga mining companies to Kampala to discuss

how the company’s presence in the area

would benefit the communities. All was

agreed upon and sealed through documen-

tation and signing of the agreement but

nothing has ever happen”50

.

“There are complaints from the

community about investors who promise to

do a number of things to get the community

cooperation. They just disappear with the

precious stones without fulfilling their prom-

ises. Abuse of the licenses is key in driving

conflict besides the other origins. It is said

that Dao Africa Limited was initially selling

a product that it had no right to sell since it

did not have a mining licence at the time.”51

Communities expressed high expectations

that mining companies would create jobs

and invest in community development,

though often the opposite has been the case,

with the authorities and private investors

expelling goldsmiths from the mines,

a crucial source of livelihoods for local

communities. In Rupa, the foreign

presence of Jan Manga Limited has

prompted mistrust among locals. It is

popularly assumed that the benefits will

flow toward the wealthy, leaving the poor

even poorer. “We don’t know where the

gold is going, we only hear the land is sold

to investors and we are afraid we will not

see any benefits from the gold. At least

if the landowners are able to build their

permanent houses as a result of gold, then

we would see the impact of Gold. Lokora

for instance has no schools and it would be

nice to have the investors in the areas put

up a school. The situation is horrible and

wanting as the locals have nothing to show

from Gold”52

49Interview with Lokol Losigiria – an opinion leader of Naturumurum village.

50Interview with Mzee Ochwe Zachary – LC 1 Musupo Village

51Key Informant interview with office of the DPC Moroto Suprintendent of Police Obia George 15th Feb, 2014

52Key Informant Interview with employee at the gold mine Jan Mangal 15th Feb 2014

35

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


“There is almost no schools in the

sub-county of Rupa and ignorance is so high.

Some people use caves as their shelter without

caring about the risk of getting killed when

it rains. They hide their money instead of

using it to develop themselves. Despite the

risks that come with mining there are no

hospitals or health centers near the fields and

the few that survive the injuries incurred are

taken care of by the NGOs come to their rescue

in the mines. There have been some deaths

and injuries incurred in caves but people still

go there”53

.

Some general causes of conflict gathered from

the respondents included the geographical

nature of Karamoja which has been exploited

for unhealthy reasons like cattle rustling, arms

trafficking, and avoidance of disarmament all

leading to resolving conflicts in the region.

Another respondent analysed the

conflicts in Karamoja in a historical perspective

giving the background of colonization that

involved sharing border lands with Kenya

and South Sudan, the government grabbing

of land and giving it to wild life in anticipa-

tion to curb rustling and ease disarmament

which were good intentions but have led

to latent conflict amidst the relative peace.

Central government officials often appropriate

tax and royalty revenues from mining companies

without adequately consulting and compensat-

ing communities. This mismatch is closely tied

to the absence of democratic or participatory

decision-making processes and fuels conflict.

In some communities according to a district

official there is livelihood insecurity, he

preferred anonymity as he described

the situation; …there is a time bomb as

unknown people are taking unknown land

as people are sleeping, by the time they

wake up all the land will have been taken.

Poverty was noted as a significant

driving factor in all these land conflicts, and the

increasing commercialisation of land, teamed

with communities’ growing realization of

its worth, is dramatically increasing land

disputes. Widespread extreme poverty and

a complex tenure system leave communi-

ties vulnerable to property rights abuses and

exposed to a growing risk of violent conflicts.

53Key informant Interview with employee at the gold mine Nakabat 15th Feb 2014

36

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


4. KEY ACTORS, INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES IN NRM AND CONFLICT

4.1 IntroductionThere are various actors, institutions and structures

in Natural Resource Management and Conflict54

. The

Fig.1 below shows the different levels of interaction among regional and national actors, institutions’ and

structures’. The structures are perceived as the laws

and principles, while the institutions are the formal

legal persons like the regional economic bodies.

They are interrelated which affects their relationship

accordingly. The cloud call out sign shows the

structures. The dotted blue

shows the relationship between predominantly

national level actors, institutions and structures. The

dark shows the deep relationship among the

actors at continental level. The green oval institutions

and their structures feed into the orange oval major

actors and vice versa.

54USIP(2010) Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments Eds John Agoglia et-al, looks at % of natural resources brought under transparent government regulation, compliance with International standards and level of investment in public and private sector in natural resources as key indicators in Natural resource bases conflicts.

37

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Fig.1 The regional and national key actors, institutions and structures in NRM and Conflict

Continental-EU/UN,AU (Regional Economic Bodies

National

Central and Local Government

Private Investors Policies

Community

Intergovernmental (IGAD, EAC,

Lokiriama)

Statutory bodies (UWA,NFA)

Ministries (Energy and Mineral Development, Water

and Environment, Lands, Housing and Urban

Development Customs and National Laws

Acts and Regulations

Treaties, Protocols and Charters

Protocols

Formal and Informal structures

Constitution, Acts, Byelaws

Constitution

CSOs

Acts and regulations

Source: Secondary and field data, Illustration by Tom Balemesa

38

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Below is the local level actor analysis (Rupa Sub county).55

Source: Field Data, illustration by Tom Balemesa K

The government occupies the central role due to its mandate

Media plays a facilitating role for all actors

There exists a perceived and observed broken relationship between CSOs and Local

Government, Government, Community with local leaders and Government of Uganda, Community and

their local leaders, NFA and Community.

There is bad relationship between warrior groups, Government of Uganda and

Communities, Investors and Communities

There is a direct relationship between customary institutions and Community

There is observable and perceived good relationship between the different agencies of

government

The connection between Investors, Government and NFA was not clear

There was a mixed relationship between CSOs and Community.

NFA

Warrior groups

CSOs

UWA

Local Government

Investors

Community

Government of Uganda

Community Leaders Customary

institutions

Media

Media

Media

Med

ia

Med

ia

55Design adopted from Africa Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) (2002), Transforming Conflict Facilitators Reference Manual, Durban South Africa and Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999) Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Wiley Publishers.

39

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Natural resources are an important component in understanding the nature of conflict in

Africa because of their effect on such conflict. Arguably, natural resources are embedded in an

environment, geographic, geopolitical and interdependent space where actions by one

individual or group may generate effects far beyond specific localities or even national

jurisdictions. This is particularly true of shared trans-boundary resources as the term is widely

understood56

. It’s from this background that regional and international mechanisms on natural

resource management and conflict shall be discussed.

4.2.1 The East African Community The East African Community came into existence in Arusha on 30 November 1999. The Treaty entered into force on 7 July 2000 following the conclusion of the process of its ratification and deposit of the Instruments of Ratification with the Secretary General by all the three Partner

States57

. The East African Community has a protocol on Environment and Natural Resources

Management that came into force in April 2006. Particularly there is:Art.7 on Co-operation on Environment and Natural Resources Management,Art.18. on Management of Mineral Resources for which Section1 states, The Partner States

shall develop and harmonise common policies, laws and strategies for access to and

exploitation of mineral resources for the socio-economic development of the Community.

Article 22, Management of Rangelands, Article 23, Combating Desertification and Mitigating Effects of Drought

58. The East African Community too has in place a protocol on Peace and

Security that came into BM8I V force in February 2013. Its scope of operation is shown below in Box 1:

4.2 Regional and International Mechanisms on NRM and Conflict

In this protocol the scope of operation includes:

a) conflict prevention, management and resolution;

(b) prevention of genocide;

(c) combating terrorism;

(d) combating and suppressing piracy;

(e) peace support operations;

(f) disaster risk reduction, management and crisis response;

(g) management of refugees;

(h) control of proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons;

(i) combating transnational and cross border crimes; including drug and human trafficking, illegal

migration, money laundering, cyber crime and motor vehicle theft;

(j) addressing and combating cattle rustling;

(k) Prisons and Correctional Services including exchange of prisoners, detention, custody

and rehabilitation of offenders.

56Philip Arthur Njuguna Mwanika • ISS Paper 216 • SEPTEMBER 2010 Natural Resources Conflict Management Processes and Strategies in Africa

57http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44&Itemid=54

58http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=5&Itemid=163

40

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Below are some of the articles in the

protocol and some of their provisions;

Article 4 - Conflict Prevention, Manage-ment and Resolution has the following

subsections related to

1. The Partner States undertake to develop an East African Community

conflict prevention, management and

resolution mechanism.

2. For purposes of paragraph 1, Partner States shall manage and seek to

resolve any dispute or conflict within

and between two or more Partner States

or with foreign countries by peaceful

means.

3. The Community may, in consultation with the United Nations Security

Council and the Peace and

Security Council of the African Union,

offer to mediate in disputes or conflicts

within and between two or more

Partner States or with foreign countries.

Article.13 Preventing and Combating Cattle Rustling for instance has the following

subsections:

1. The Partner States that do not have policies and laws to prevent and

combat cattle rustling agree to develop

and adopt policies, law and strategies

to achieve this.

2. The Partner States agree to harmonise their policies, laws and strategies to

prevent and combat cattle rustling59.

4.2.2 The Inter-Governmental Authority for Development It is another actor, institution with

structures regarding Natural Resource

Management and Conflict. The institu-

tion has the Conflict Early Warning and

Response Mechanism (CEWARN) since

200260. This is a collaborative effort of the

seven IGAD Member States (Djibouti, Eritrea,

Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda)

targeted at mitigating and preventing

violent conflicts in the sub-region. Through

its national network of governmental and

non-governmental stakeholders – Con-

flict Early Warning and Response Units

(CEWERUs); National Research Institutes

(NRIs) and Field Monitors (FMs), CEWARN

undertakes its conflict early warning and

response function in three clusters or

pilot areas. These are the Karamoja Cluster

(covering the cross-border areas of

Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda); the

Somali Cluster (covering the cross-border

areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia) as

well as the Dikhil Cluster (covering the

cross-border areas of Djibouti and

Ethiopia)61

.

A cluster meeting focusing on Karamoja

was hosted by Janet Museveni with Cluster

affairs from Ethiopia, Kenya, South

Sudan and Uganda convened in Kampala’s

Munyonyo Commonwealth resort on 14 October 2013. The meeting concluded with the launch of an annual ministerial forum

as well as a collective commitment on

59East African Community (2013) East African Protocol on Peace and Security, p.12

60http://cewarn.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=53

61Ibid

41

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


harmonizing peace, security and development

initiatives across the Cluster. In the same

meeting was a 12-point communiqué issued by the meeting, ministers committed to the

establishment of strong institutional arrange-

ments that ensure multi-state coordination

and harmonization of interventions

4.2.3 The Lokiriama Peace Accord This was signed in December 1973 as another initiative that was brokered between the

Turkana people of Kenya and the Matheniko

of Uganda. Inter-tribal conflict amongst the

two pastoral communities between the Kenya

Uganda borders characterized by armed

clashes that led hundreds of lives being lost

informed the crafting of the peace accord.

The need to co-exist peacefully was greatly

influenced by the tragic Nakiloro River

encounter between the two communities

where hundreds perished. For many years,

a fore mentioned communities had engaged

in violent conflicts mostly over the access

and control of the resources revolving around

livestock and pasture.62

As a result of the peace treaty, the two

communities have had peaceful co-exis-

tence for more than four decades. The Peace

accord has withstood the test of time and has

enabled over 20,000 Turkana herders to move to Uganda to access pasture and water

during the reporting period. This celebration,

which also brought on board the Toposa of

South Sudan, the Nyang’atom of South Omo

zone of Ethiopia, the Pokot of Kenya, the Jie

and Dodoth of Uganda was attended by over

500 people63.

4.2.4 The International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR)

This is an intergovernmental organization of

African countries in the African Great Lakes

region. It is a multilateral framework in the

diplomacy of conflict management that has

also been a major actor regarding natural

resources conflict management. It stemmed

from the conflicts and tragedies in the region,

especially the genocide in Rwanda and the

situation in the DRC, which constituted a

threat to international peace and security64

.

In 2000 the UN Security Council, through its resolutions 1291 and 1304, called for an

62Ibid

63http://www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/ourwork/PBCR/successstories/lokiriama-peace-accord/

64Opcit Philip Arthur Njuguna Mwanika, Natural Resources Conflict Management Processes and Strategies in Africa

42

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


international conference on peace,

security, democracy and development in the

Great Lakes region. Later that year such a

conference was established with its joint

UN–AU Secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya. The

11 core countries are Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of

Congo, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania,

Uganda and Zambia. In November 2004 the 11 heads of state and government of the IC/GLR member countries unanimously adopted

the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Peace,

Security and Development in the Great

Lakes Region in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

In this declaration they declared positive

determination to form the Great Lakes

region into a space of sustainable peace

and security, political and social stability,

and shared growth and development for all

its states and people. In December 2006 the heads of state and government convened

again in Nairobi and signed a pact on

security, stability and development. This

pact incorporates the Dar es Salaam

Declaration’s programmes of action and

protocols65

4.2.5 The Ngurdoto-Tanzania Agreement in 2007

This came into existence after prior

agreements a cross border initiatives

between Uganda and Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC). Its history is

traced from 1990 when an agreement for ‘’cooperation for the exploration of hydro

carbons and exploitation of common fields’’

was signed with DRC (the Zaire). The

agreement sets the precedent for Joint

Exploration and Exploitation of Shared

Petroleum Deposits within the Albertine

Graben66

. The nitty-gritties of the shared

65The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region of 15 December 2006 can be accessed in the ‘Repository’ section of the official ICGLR webpage http://www.icglr.org/66Tim Altork(n.d) The Ngurdoto-Tanzania Agreement in 2007 available at http://www.ehow.com/facts_7195673_ngurdoto-agreement.html accessed on 1/03/2014

43

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


border of 896km and how cross boundary exploitation of petroleum resources has evolved

from the law of capture to joint exploration.

To this there is existing framework between

Uganda and DRC that includes; Establishment

of a Joint Permanent Commission of Coopera-

tion in 1986, Agreement of cooperation for the exploration of hydrocarbons and exploitation

of common fields of 1990 and an addendum signed in 2008 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 1999 Luanda Agreement on Cooperation and Normalization of Relations, 2002,The Tripartite Agreement, 2003, Principles of good neighbourly relations and Cooperation, 2003, Pact for Security, Stability and Development

in the Great Lakes Region, 200667

4.2.6 Nairobi Protocol of April 21, 2004 and Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) protocol68

The other regional framework for stemming

the proliferation of small arms and light

weapons is the Nairobi Protocol69, Article 4 of

which commits the States Parties to strengthen

regional cooperation among law enforcement

agencies “in combating illicit circulation and

trafficking in small arms and light weapons

and suppressing criminal activities relating to

the use of these weapons”.

Cattle rustling ranks among the main

criminal activities that are directly related

to the spread of illicit arms and the East

African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation

(EAPCCO) identified the Protocol on Prevention,

Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling

in Eastern Africa70 to address the issue

holistically. When ratified in the member states

the Protocol shall provide a framework for

Parties who are signatories to the Protocol to

work together in developing and implementing

appropriate mechanisms to address the

problem of cattle rustling. The Protocol

has four objectives: Prevent, combat and

eradicate cattle rustling and related criminal

activities in the Eastern Africa region; System-

atically and comprehensively address cattle

rustling in the region in order to ensure that its

negative social and economic consequences

are eradicated and that peoples’ livelihoods are

secured; Enhance regional cooperation, joint

operations, capacity-building and exchange

of information and; Promote peace, human

security and development in the region.

From the above protocols there is enhanced

cooperation between security chiefs For

example the Kenyan and Ugandan

security agencies (police and military) along

the border usually liaise and collaborate for

the return of animals. In addition due to

this cooperation pastoralists from Ethiopia

are now given letters from their security

organs so that they are allowed to graze in

Kenya without harassment from the Kenyan

authorities. Pastoralists from Kenya have also

been given permission to graze in Uganda.

68http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/CATTLEPROTFINAUG08.PDF

69http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SAAF12.PDF

70http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/CATTLEPROTFINAUG08.PDF

44

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


The approaches that are being used

by government are contained in the

Karamoja Disarmament and Develop-

ment Programme (KIDPP)71

which uses

a combination of forceful and non-forceful

means. The KIDPP programme comple-

ments the Restoration of Law and Order in

Karamoja (RELOKA) programme being

undertaken under the Police

Anti-Stock Theft Unit. The RELOKA

uses the community policing approach.

Community policing focuses attention

on police partnership with the communi-

ties it serves. Its intention is to produce a

cooperate process of identifying police

priorities and to provide a more efficient

method of achieving results by a joint

effort of the police and the communities it

serves. The community should however, be

at the center of this process. Recently the

Uganda Police Force deployed 200 police officers under the RELOKA programme to

boost security in Karamoja.

4.4 Government Policies on Natural Resource Management

4.4.1 The Constitution of Uganda 1995 In its National Objectives and Directive

Principles of State Policy SECTION XIII

commits to Protection of natural resources

and it states; The State shall protect

important natural resources, including

land, water, wetlands, minerals, oil,fauna

and flora on behalf of the people of

4.3 National Mechanisms on NRM and Conflict

71Office of The Prime Minister (2007). Karamoja Integrated Disarmament And Development Programme (2007). “Creating Conditions for Promoting Human Security and Recovery in Karamoja, 2007/2008-2009/2010”.

45

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Uganda. The Uganda’s constitution therefore

mandates that the government must protect

and enhance ‘the right of the people to

equal opportunities in development...regulate

the acquisition, ownership and use of land

and other property, in accordance with the

Constitution’ and ‘take special measures

in favour of the development of the least

developed areas72

The constitution also

explicitly protects the right of ‘Minorities...to

participate in decision-making processes, and

their views and interests shall be taken into

account in the making of national plans and

programmes73

In the same Constitution 2006 (Article 244) specifically hinges on Minerals and petroleum

as shown below:

(1) All minerals and petroleum in Uganda are held by the Government on behalf of the

people of Uganda.

(2) Parliament shall make laws regulating the following—

(a) exploitation of minerals and petroleum;

(b) sharing of royalties arising from mineral

and petroleum exploitation;

(c) conditions of payment of indemnities

arising out of exploitation of minerals and

petroleum and74

;

(d) the conditions regarding the restoration

of derelict lands.

(3) Minerals, mineral ores and petroleum shall be exploited taking into account the interest

of individual land owners, local governments

and the government75

.

72Uganda Constitution Directive Principles of State Policy, Principle XI(i), XI(iii) and XII(iii).

73

Constitution of Uganda (1995), art. 36. 74 http://www.statehouse.go.ug/sites/default/files/attachments/abridged_constitution_2006.pdf

75Constitution of the Republic of Uganda as at February 2006, Article 244

46

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Uganda’s constitution creates district land

boards, which are constitutionally recog-

nized as independent from the national land

commission. The land boards are

mandated: ‘(a) to hold and allocate land

in the district which is not owned by any

person or authority; (b) to facilitate the

registration and transfer of interests in

land; and (c) to deal with all other matters

connected with land in the district...76’

However, local land boards are underfunded and don’t function effectively, and parish

level land recorders are largely non-existent77

Local level land tribunals in Uganda were in

place until 2007, at which point they were all suspended because of implementation

problems and a backlog of 8,000 cases78.

In Uganda, there is evidence that local

government officials have little capacity to

enforce effective management regimes or

address resulting conflicts. In the FDGs,

participants reported that they had brought

their land-related concerns to local officials

to secure their rights in relation to a mining

operation on their traditional lands with no

ultimate resolution. The community reported

in focus groups that their concerns seem to

have been ignored79

.

These provisions, if effectively implemented

would provide important gains for people

of Karamoja. As described in the many

examples throughout this report, these

provisions are not always reflected in the

operation of policy at the community level.

4.4.2 The Mineral PolicyMineral resources on the land generally

are vested in the state as stated in the

Constitution and the subsequent Mineral

Policy 2000. For instance, Uganda’s 2003 Mining Act

80. Anyone extracting these

minerals is required to pay royalties to

the Government. As a result, pastoralists

cannot benefit maximally from quarrying

limestone and marble. The act provides that

80 per cent of state revenue from mining goes to central government, 17 per cent to local governments, and 3 per cent to landowners

81. In order for communities to

become landowners, however, they must

form a community association and then

proceed through an extensive application

process.

On top of this, Exclusive Mining and

Prospecting Licences (EMPL) have been

offered by the Government to various

companies, most of the areas where EMPLs

have been issued cover dry season grazing

and critical water points for the pastoralists.

In Karamoja the 3% royalty provision has not been implemented. Besides, local communi-

ties are not aware of the 17% provision and many do not know how local governments

should use the revenues accruing from the

mineral royalties.

76Constitution of Uganda (1995), art. 241.

77USAID, ‘Country Profile: Property rights and resource governance – Uganda’, 2011, p. 6.

78

USAID, ‘Country Profile: Property rights and resource governance – Uganda’, 2011, p. 6

79Community FGDs, Rupa (translated from Karamojong)

80

Mining Act (Uganda 2003), para. 3.

81Mining Act (Uganda 2003), section 98(3) of 2nd schedule.

47

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


4.4.3 The National Policy on Oil and Gas 2008

The policy identifies the following

issues for the country with regard to the

petroleum sub sector:-

1. Development of institutions, including legislation and manpower, necessary for

effective management and regulation of the

sub-sector.

2. Establishment of the country’s oil and gas resource base so as to facilitate short,

medium and long term planning for the

sub-sector.

3. Management of the country’s oil and gas resources together with the revenues

accruing therefrom, in a manner that facili-

tates sustainable development and avoids

distortion and destruction of the nation’s

economy.

4. Managing the impact of an emerging oil and gas sub sector on, among others, the

country’s governance system, the economy,

the environment and subsequently human

development.

5. Contribution of oil and gas resources to the country’s energy mix.

6. Ensuring that the country provides a conducive environment for attracting the

levels of investment required to estab-

lish the country’s resource potential and

facilitate its development.

7. Participation of the country’s private sector and its entrepreneurs in the oil and

gas activities.

8. Management of expectations, arising out of the perceived benefits of oil and gas

activities, together with the anxiety

arising from some experiences of poor

management of this sub-sector in other

parts of the world.

The policy emphasis on natural resource

management is also rooted in its principles

interlia:

i) Using finite resources to create lasting

benefits to society;

ii) Efficient Resource Management;

iii) Transparency and Accountability;

iv) Protection of the Environment and

Biodiversity;

v) Spirit of Cooperation; and

vi) Capacity and Institutional Building;

4.4.4 The National Land Policy 201382

Uganda’s former land policy framework

has been operating against a backdrop of

decades of colonial and post-colonial land

injustices. Uganda has gone through several

land laws and policies in the recent past.

The Land Act was amended in 2001, 2004, and 2010. Cabinet chaired by President Museveni on February 7, 2014 approved the national land policy for Uganda

83

82Ministry Of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (March 2011), The Uganda National Land Policy, final draft approved by Parliament in 2013.

83Uganda National Land Policy (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2013) http://landportal.info/sites/default/files/the_uganda_na-

tional_land_policy-_february_2013.pdf (Accessed on 26th February, 2014)

48

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Another important feature of Uganda’s

land framework is the constitutional

recognition of customary tenure, which

accounts for 70–80 per cent of land holding in Uganda

84. The 2013 land policy contains important recognition of

the rights of minorities and, moreover,

of pastoralists. For instance, the policy

recognizes ethnic minorities as ‘ancestral

and traditional owners’ and further makes

clear that development of natural resources

often ‘takes place at the expense of the

rights of such ethnic minorities85

Under the approved policy, the Ugandan

government commits to pay fair compen-

sation to ethnic minority groups displaced

from their ancestral lands, both in the past

and into the future86

In a stark departure from previous

policy documents that have not recognized

pastoralism, under the 2013 Land Policy the ‘rights of pastoral communities will be

guaranteed and protected by the State87

.

While the proposed strategies appear

promising, the policy presents no frame-

work for the participation of pastoralists

in many of the policy decisions that will

affect them88

. Nevertheless, this policy

reflects an important shift in the attitude

of the Ugandan government.

The land policy is expected to strengthen

other existing land laws in Uganda. Its

vision is sustainable and optimal use of

land-based resources for transformation

of Ugandan society and the economy. Its

goal is to ensure efficient, equitable and

sustainable utilisation and management of

Uganda’s land and land-based resources

for poverty reduction, wealth creation and

also socio-economic development89

.

Its rationale number one (1) is to … reduce

ambiguity at sector level by integrating

scattered and isolated policy statements

on different aspects of sustainable land

use… natural resource management…90

The public trust doctrine is set out;

whereby the state is expected to

manage and protect natural resources that

are held under public trust in conformi-

ty with wee-established principles of the

public trust doctrine.

In the same policy document Chapter

6 on Land Use and Land Management Framework, section 6.7 on Natural Resources and Environmental Manage-

ment subsections 138 and 139 give the preambo, while 140 commits govern-ment through policy statements, 141, identifies strategies, 142 and 143, themeasures to be taken in achieving the

policy commitments .

4.4.5 Wildlife policy of 1999 This denies pastoralists access to pasture

land in the game reserves and also to wild

game meat, wild fruits and honey in game

reserves and national parks. However, the communities still illegally access these

resources, often resulting in conflict with

the authorities.

84

USAID, ‘Country Profile: Property rights and resource governance – Uganda’, 2009.

85Uganda National Land Policy (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2013), Pg57

86Ibid. 58(a), 59(ii). 87Ibid. 61. 88Uganda National Land Policy (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2013), pg 62-63. 89Ibid p. 10 90Ibid p.5

49

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Despite progressive constitutional and

national policy statements, it remains a huge

challenge for the people in Karamoja to use these

legal regimes to deal with conflict over and

natural resources. Instead, the formal law is

often used against communities to dispos-

sess them of their land and other resources,

leading to conflict. Many have looked to

increasing local control over land resources as

a policy response to this issue. Uganda has

laws that provide for land management at the

local level, but the country still has trouble

implementing the local level land laws,

policies, and management structures.

4.5 Traditional Natural Resources Manage- ment StructuresDespite the continuing proliferation of land

and natural resource laws, policy frameworks,

land commissions, and land boards among

others in Uganda, the local communities in

Karamoja always have had and in many cases

continue to have their own customary

management structures. These management

systems have often controlled both intra- and

inter-community access to resources.

Traditionally, pastoralists considered natural

resources as gifts of nature and therefore had

no private ownership to claim. Everybody

could access and use them wherever they

were located. The safeguard of these resourc-

es was the concern of all users, and conflicts

developed as a result of the manner in which

they were utilized. Wasteful and destructive

utilization undisputedly lead to confrontations.

Traditional norm necessitated that the

resources be used in a protective way for the

benefit of all the people in the society. “These

conflicts are always minimized through use

of established systems of governance like the

elders’ council and local councils. But not

conflicts related to minerals, these seem to be

bigger beyond local reconciliation”93

“From generation to generation, traditional

management structures governing the use

of natural resources have flowed in Karamo-

ja and land use being at the center of these

structures as shown in the box 1 below. The local people have had a variety of social

controls relating to access and use of

natural resources for example reserves for

grazing during the dry season, land

cultivation. Through the same system mech-

anism were in place to reserve water points

either for livestock or for domestic use and

drinking”94


94Key informant interview with an opinion leader- Moroto

50

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Councils of eldersThis is the traditional unit that governs ownership, use and management of natural

resources in pastoral societies in Karamoja. The elders make all decisions regarding

control and utilization of natural resources, and they counsel the youth who are the

implementing arm of territorial resources management. The council of elders decides

on the time and direction of migration of Alomar/ adakar, based on natural resource

availability. As an authority, the elders define what pasture belongs to what livestock.

They set up Apero/ Kuwanjamou (rangeland) for specific animals such as calves, goats

and sheep, kids or sick animals. They even reserve pastures for supplementary feeding

of livestock during periods of pasture scarcity. The elders settle disputes and mete out

punishment against cases arising from the misuse and mismanagement of natural

resources. They protect the community’s natural resources against misuse and outsiders.

Akiriket (Sacred Assembly)Akiriket is a traditional sacred assembly attended by all male adults of the Karamajong

tribe. Traditional rituals and sacrifices for the welfare of the people and society are per-

formed in this sacred place. The senior elders in this ceremonial place pass decisions on

the better utilization of pastures and course of movement of Alomar/ adakar. Likewise,

this institution addresses all decisions relating to the sharing of resources or settlement

of disputes with other tribes. This institution is effective in the management of natural

resource or any other problems faced by the community by virtue of its being a sacred

and dreaded institution. The problem with Akiriket is that it tends to make compromises

on certain grave issues such as punishment of criminals.

Etem/ Ekokwa (men’s gathering/ meeting/ tree of men)Like the council of elders, this is an institution where men make decisions on issues

pertaining to the clan. It is a body that determines the use of natural resources and

punishes those who breach the by- laws governing the use of natural resources. Disci-

plinary procedures are defined for resource misuse or mismanagement. This body is also

involved with framing the by-laws that govern the allocation and utilization of resources

such as rangelands. This structure is effective because it includes the council of elders.

Formed either sectionally, by village, or by age-set based, this institution strengthens

community solidarity and can deter crime or deny criminals from hiding in the com-

munity (Kimuk/ tarap ekile).

Alomar/ Adakar/ Kraal leadersThis institution is a replica of the council of elders when Alomar/ Adakar/ Kraals are

farther away in the dry season grazing areas. This body assumes full responsibility for

the elders and entire command of grazing areas. This group is composed of prominent

warriors and elders. These leaders define the migration route for the Alomar/ adakar/

Kraals based on accessibility of pasturage. Alomar/ Adakar leaders usually travel through

lands to locate better pastures for the Alomar/ Adakar to reposition after pasture in the

present location is downgraded.

Box 2

51

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Additional discussion amongst commu-

nity members in Rupa, however, revealed

that customary management has been less

effective in the face of mineral extraction.

Focus group participants report that despite

the many mineral resource conflict, there

is success attempt where the elders have

intervened. “Whereas elders have tried to

intervene in these disputes, there has always

been less success than it is in the manage-

ment of grazing and water access”95

. “Our

traditional attempts on conflict resolutions

worked well for us in the past, but now

have been interrupted by modern systems”96

Participants acknowledged local conflict

resolution attempts to a smaller extent

through forming their own local land

committees at village level to address land

wrangles is outweighed by government

authorities including UWA and foreign

investors/mining companies. “When you are

still discussing one case for land grabbing

and mining companies, other companies

begin flowing in, they become bigger

cases to deal with at a local level. The

companies also have backing of big

people in the government and sometimes are

accompanied by the security guards”97

In order to effectively address conflicts around

land and natural resource access and manage-

ment, a key component will be the effective

development of systems of legal pluralism,

including recognizing the value of customary

practices and indigenous peoples’ knowledge

of resource management. Although many

policies are written with these principles

in evidence, effective implementation is a

continuing struggle.

Predominantly responses from the study

indicated there were no formal/institutional

mechanisms in place.

It is this institution that mediates access and use of resources with

neighboring clans. They punish those who breach the norms governing the use and

management of natural resources. Alomar/ adakar usually follows roughly, but not

precisely, the same annual movements, and retains a relationship with other

Alomar/ Adakar controlling different grazing areas and who may want or need to use an

alternative route. A number of factors are making this institution less effective. The

Alomar/ Adakar leaders are becoming powerless because a new wave of leaders

is emerging. Individualization of authority has further eroded the influence of this

institution. Every young man based on his economic position assumes a role of a Kraal

leader in his kraal and can make and implement his own decisions without reference

to the entire group. Most of these leaders are too young to command respect and as a

result offer no respect to the elders or societal norms.

95

Interview with Akudo Apakacha – an elder, Kadilakeny village


97

Community FGDs, Nakabaat (translated from Karamojong)

52

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


The customary institutions are strong; we value and encourage them to be models to the

community in problem solving. They help in transforming the community as the people

respect the elders a lot and believe in them.98

Local authority intervention, local leaders and security resolve issues amicably

as well as the district land board is on ground.99

Retired civil servants are opinion leaders though culturally decision making

is by men.100

Traditionally there are councils of elders, intervention of the district council and sometimes

the MPs and the communities and district administrations and sometimes a combination

of all. We sometimes call meetings with the investors, local leaders, district council and

stake holders which are a proactive method instead of resolving conflict101

.

Despite the number of institutions involved

in conflict resolution, conflict continues

unabated in the region. NGOs and

other CBOs have played a very big part

in the past especially in integrating the

traditional and conventional methods of

conflict

resolution but they continue to face

challenges especially when it comes to

mineral resource related conflicts.

“Conflict related to minerals is becoming

a key priority in this region and requires a

different approach from other conflicts in

the past. We lack a harmonized approaches

and tools in addressing mineral related

conflict. We also deal with conflict on an adhoc

basis, depending on whether we have

funding or not and even use different

approaches depending on who is funding”102

Most NGOs interviewed indicated a short-

term donor funding as a big challenge.

“The failure of donors and governments to

recognize the need for long-term support

to conflict resolution. Some funding cycle

is for one or two year which is a short

period of time that makes the

long-term work of conflict resolution almost

impossible. At the end of it all you do not

�‘Our traditional attempts on conflict resolutions worked well for us in the past, but now have been interrupted by

modern systems�’

Akudo Apakacha – an elder from Kadilakeny village

4.6 Role of CSOs and their level of engagement

98Key Informant interview with Moroto Deputy DISO Muhanuzi Charles 17th Feb 2014

99

Key Informant interview with office of the DPC Moroto Superintendent of Police Obia George 15th Feb, 2014

100Key informant interview with Moroto Deputy DISO Muhanguzi Charlse 17th Feb, 2014

101

Key informant interview with Moroto Deputy CAO 102

KI informat interview in Moroto NGO

53

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


have follow-up mechanism, monitoring and

long-term engagement becomes difficult

which undermines community confidence in

conflict-resolution initiatives, making success

harder to achieve as time goes on”103

The Karamoja Miners Association in

partnership with Earth Savers has been able

to develop a citizen daily card to track

minerals, participate in policy and studies

to inform peaceful extraction of minerals in

Karamoja, sensitised communities on their

land rights, interfaced with investors and

government on issues related to minerals

and conflict. The association has stretched

to Kotido, Amudat Nakapiripirit, Abim mad

Kabong.

Save the Children was found to have a lot of

experience in Karamoja having implemented

a Peace building and Human rights project that addressed among many issues peace in

relation to natural resources exploitation and

livelihoods.

Moroto District Mineral Watch Platform:

The formation of the District Mineral Watch

Platform was supported under the Karamoja

Mineral Sector Transparency and Account-

ability project comprised of local community

members who are promoting the effective,

transparent and accountable management of

mineral resources for the public good.

MADEFO is yet another actor that started

in 1998 as an indigenous community based organisation. It was supported by Cordaid

in 2002-2011 to implement the Matheniko Community Development Program. The

program included building community

structures for peace, had collaboration with

local government in implementation of

activities. It faced challenges of a politi-

cally filled environment and complexity of

change but managed to complete of the

program with registered success stories.

103

Key Informat Interview in Moroto NGO

54

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Irish Aid as a bilateral donor with

Democratic Governance Facility (DGF)

in Moroto District: has worked through

local government, central government, CSOs

to fund tracking of accountability which

stretches to the mineral sector. The same

donor has worked with the Uganda Land

Alliances to come up with various initiatives

to address land related conflict drivers and in

some instances mitigation measures.

The Uganda Land Alliance, though new in

Moroto has sensitised communities in areas

like Rupa on their rights and how they can

be protected. Approximately, it has worked

with 20 communal land associations in Rupa Subcounty.

Riam Riam as a civil society network

started in 2003 and has done quite a lot in addressing NRM conflict. With assistance from

Trocaire, the network embarked on facilitating

the formation of community parliaments in

Rupa and other areas. The structure of the

parliament is one feasible way to assist

community air out their issues thus averting,

mitigating and resolving conflicts. Below is

the structure;

NB.Parliament is for community members

above 18, without leadership role in communityCommittee members monitor respective fields

then meet at an agreed time to share with

all other members of the committees. This

initiative is so good though it was

comprehended that it faces logistical

challenges in building capacity to match

existing contexts of conflict in Karamoja. With

support from OXFAM the coalition made a

tremendous contribution in the formulation of

the Rangelands and Pastoralist Policy through

dialogues at different levels.

The network has been grounded in

supporting peace initiatives among the

leaders and the community in Rupa; for

instance it coordinated the Lokiama Peace

Accord.

The general observations present that

communities are willing to work with all the

above mentioned stakeholders, Moroto is

an aid saturated environment with possible

challenges of turnover and duplication of

activities that could do harm during

programming.

4.7 Capacity of other Actors, institutions and structures in NRM related conflicts in Rupa Subcounty

In a conflict setting – and in society more

generally, for that matter – there are

constituents or individuals who directly

experience and are affected by armed

confrontations over natural resources. This

calls for identification of the actors, institu-

tions and structures. Specifically for Rupa

sub county most of the organisations the

researcher interacted with had levels of

capacity in relation to natural resource

management and conflict.

NB. Parliament is for community members above 18, without leadership role in community

Vice Chairperson

Secretary

Mobiliser

Treasurer

Publicity

Committees@ with 5 members (Education, Infrastructure, Natural Resources, Health, HumanRights)

55

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


The media was indentified as a vehicle

through which all actors, institutions and

structures convey their messages. New

Vision/Uganda Radio Network (URN) was

very rich in information regarding conflict,

minerals in Karamoja. Their information was

found to be very helpful in addressing the

issues in question. The Moroto District Land

Board was realised to possess the potential

for addressing some of the conflicts in the

area though the challenge is the facilita-

tion. For instance there was a suggestion to

unpack the land policy and the Range lands

Policy into district ordinances that could

address the lifestyle of Karamoja specifically.

The Uganda Human Rights Commis-sion had not received any cases brought

before them particularly involving minerals

in Rupa, which was perhaps because of their

mandate. However there is a process to develop templates to inspect extractive

industries given the context of Karamoja.

Uganda Revenue Authority noted; there is

a lot of underground work this caused by

limited capacity of weak enforcement.

Investors are accused of evading taxes

especially since they are not transparent.

They do not give the real information

concerning their activities which makes

it difficult to levy the appropriate taxes.

According to the URA personnel in Moroto

investors are expected to pay different taxes

which include VAT on machines, service tax

to the district, income tax and holding tax

which is paid by their contracts, customs

duty and import duty104 .

Despite the investors being tricky the legal

system has a loophole as the top personnel

cripple the system easily.

The fact that the officers who should support

the law abuse it is evident in their choices.

It was discovered that government officials

and some politicians use their positions

to get shares in the companies and in the

process shield the investors from taxes.

Local leaders also assist the investors and

government officials to embezzle from the

community which limits the community’s

level of support in holding the investors to

pay taxes.

Sub-counties are supposed to collect daily

revenues and the district is responsible

for collection of ground rent but they don’t

because they are probably threatened by the

security that hangs around the investors.

This therefore limits them from acquiring

the proper information as well as monitor-

ing land use and exploitation of natural

resources.

Low capacity of the actors especially with

the emerging mineral related conflicts;

lack of harmonized/ coordinated NRM

conflict-resolution approaches and tools

created expresses that there is no effective,

comprehensive resolution framework for

conflicts over land and natural resources in

the region.

Coordination and sustainability of these

efforts is the greatest challenge for both

communities and policy makers, because

when applied in an uncoordinated manner

these conflict resolution strategies can

engender more conflict in the long term.

Due to their weak financial status they can

only sustain peace building interventions

as long as they have funding. When the

projects end and there is no funding, they

are unable to sustain any action and this

leads to an escalation of conflict among their

target groups. 104

KII with URA office-Moroto

56

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Assessment of the dynamics of conflicts

related to land and natural resources in Rupa

Sub-county elicits a number of critical needs and

issues. These primarily relate to: (i) the interface

between UWA, NFA and local community over

access to land, minerals and other natural resourc-

es; (ii) capacity of the actors to deal especially with

the emerging mineral related conflicts; (iii) core

governance issues including those related to

transparency, accountability and benefit sharing;

(iv) Traditional Natural Resources Management

Structures like the Etem/Ekokwa (men’s gather-

ing/ meeting/ tree of men) and Akiriket (Sacred

Assembly) need to be supported, (v) popularisation

of Land and Mineral policies; (vi) consultation and

participation of local communities in the process

of exploration and exploitation of resources; (vii)

Effective Information Flows and Communication

Channels; (viii) Security of Land Tenure and; (ix)

Co-existence of Artisanal and Small-scale Miners

(ASM) and Medium and Large Scale Mining. In

this section, these issues are analyzed further,

5. CRITICAL ISSUES IN NRM CONFLICT MITIGATION AND MANAGEMENT

57

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


providing a basis for a series of specific

recommendations. Ultimately, responsive-

ness to these issues will likely determine

whether Karamoja’s land and mineral

endowments can be used as a platform

for peace, stability and development while

inaction poses the risk of further

undermining the mitigation and response

mechanisms directed towards prevention

of land and mineral resources from contrib-

uting to violent conflict in Rupa and the

entire Karamoja.

5.1. The interface between UWA, NFA and local community over access to land and minerals resources

The potential for the people of Karamoja

to benefit from increasing mining on land

they have used for generations largely

depends on their ability to prove owner-

ship rights over the land where minerals

are being explored and eventually extracted.

Land among the peoples of Karamoja

is generally held communally though a

great deal of land in the region is held

by the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA)

and the National Forest Authority (NFA),

which has historically been a source of

significant tension and curtailed mobility105

.

Ugandan law upholds the rights of custom-

ary land owners, in principle but in practice,

asserting those rights and securing

evidence of that ownership has been

nearly impossible for Karamoja communities,

putting them in jeopardy when private

investment and development projects are

pursued on their lands. It also creates

tension between companies and the

community and within the community

as companies arrive seeking to mine,

negotiate surface rights agreements, and

eventually pay royalties to affected land-

owners. Proof of ownership is important

for communities to be able to protect

themselves from outsiders claiming their

land. The community recommended that

UWA and the mining companies should

increase consultation, involvement and

be ready to negotiate with the local

communities. In one of the study visits

respondents expressed uncertainty and

scale of conflict;

This conflict between local communities

and UWA is terrible and I am sure our

fellow natives in the surrounding of Rupa

Sub County appreciate our challenge.

They are equally threatened because UWA

is taking a wider coverage of land while

stopping people from settling in potential

areas106

.

105

Human Rights Watch (2014): “How Can We Survive Here”, The Impact of Mining on Human Rights in Karamoja, Uganda pg 65

106

FDG in Naturumurum and Kadilakeny communities

58

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


5.2 Capacity of the actors to deal especially with the emerging mineral related conflicts

Low capacity of the actors especially with

the emerging mineral related conflicts;

lack of harmonized/ coordinated NRM


created; there is no effective, comprehensive

resolution framework for conflicts over

land and natural resources in the region as

reported. Weak coordination and

sustainability mechanisms of these NRM

conflict related resolution and prevention

efforts was reported to be a big challenge for

both NGOs, CBOs, communities and policy

makers, because when applied in an

uncoordinated manner these conflict

resolution strategies can engender more

conflict in the long term. Due to their weak

financial status they can only sustain peace

building interventions as long as they have

funding. When the projects end and there is no

funding, they are unable to sustain any

action and this leads to an escalation of

conflict among their target groups.

5.3 Access to land and mineral Resources - Land Usage and Surface Rights

One of the most contentious issues in the

minerals sector concerns perceptions of

State ownership of minerals and powers of

GOU to grant “mineral rights” for explora-

tion and mining on land owned or occupied

by others. In most rural areas of Uganda,

many owners, occupants and land users in

mining areas have difficulty accepting that

ownership of land provides “surface rights”

but not the right to extract minerals and

limited say in whether mineral rights

should be granted there. This situation is

exacerbated by lack of understanding of the

difference between “exploration” and

“mining”. Oftentimes, owners and occupants

(inclusive of artisanal miners) and even local

leaders are unaware that they reside within

an EL, which is largely a consequence of

License size (up to 500 km2) and nature of exploration in Karamoja (i.e. most is at

greenfields stage and many companies are

largely inactive). The nature of exploration

actually precludes such harsh disturbances

( inc luding a l leged fencing of areas ,

disturbance to cattle corridors, restricted

access to watering points) and any

activities to the contrary would be illegal (e.g.

exploration companies commencing

unauthorized mining; use of force or

intimidation to obtain access to land).

59

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Unfortunately, a subset of local opinion

leaders and others do seem to be aware

of the differences between exploration and

mining yet seem to be perpetuating fears

for reasons that are unclear, thereby height-

ening risks of conflict, hostility towards

exploration companies and decreasing the

attractiveness of exploration in the region.

5.4 Co-existence of Artisanal and Small- scale Miners (ASM) and Medium and Large Scale Mining

The dependency of almost 432,000107 Karamajong men, women and children

on ASM – largely driven by challenges in

sustaining traditional pastoral livelihoods –

poses a number of challenges, particularly

given that support for ASM activities as a

legitimate livelihood choice may not be

appreciated by all. ASM now seems to be

entrenched as a livelihood strategy for many

Karamojong, yet since 1995, it has been recognized that ASM is unlikely to progress

positively in the absence of legal title and

recognition of artisanal miners108

. Cases of

miners’ activities being halted by explora-

tion or mining companies, were mentioned

during field assessments. Lack of mining

rights there leaves artisanal miners in a

precarious position and at risk. Despite the

existing of an ASM licensing provision,

findings did not show any artisanal

miners in Rupa holding or working on location

Licenses. In Rupa and Karamoja, this seems

to be attributed to two key factors109

:

(i) Lack of Availability of Suitable Areas:

Almost all ASM areas for gold, limestone

and other minerals are already covered by

exploration Licenses (ELs). Although EL

holders are required to relinquish 50% of their areas within the first 3 years of explora-tion, available areas are almost immediately

taken up by another company. Also, most

Location Licenses in Karamoja, as in the

rest of the Country, are held by small, better

capacitated companies.

107

Informal ASM: 20,000 miners; Indirect and Induced Labour: 54,000; Dependency (5): 360,000. Total=432,000

108Barry Mamadou, 1996: Regularizing Informal Mining A Summary of the Proceedings of the International Roundtable on Artisanal Mining. World Bank. www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/.../WDSP/IB/1999/.../multi_page.pdf . Accessed 20th Jan. 2014

109Ecological Christian Orgainisation (2011): The Mining and Mineral Sector in Karamoja region: Development Opportunities and Constraints.

60

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


(ii) Capacity to Obtain and Maintain Licenses:

Most artisanal miners have little if any

awareness of legislation and, even if

aware and interested to obtain a License,

procedures are daunting to most many. Most

obvious constraints relate to costs, language

(all documents are in English), illiteracy,

licensing costs, transportation, accommoda-

tion and unforeseen, unofficial facilitation

costs as well as the potentially intimidating

experience of navigating the bureaucratic

channels of Central Government.110

Due to gender inequalities, these constraints

are likely more pronounced for women

miners, who face additional challenges

in terms of autonomy and confidence to

travel to Kampala/Entebbe to facilitate the

process, literacy and savings, among others.

Given women’s participation of up to 90% of miners at some sites, formalization may be a

relatively low priority for men in mining.111

Models provided by initiatives such as the

Property Rights and Diamond Development

Project (PRADD), which is currently being

implemented in Central Africa Republic

(CAR) and Liberia112

, may be useful within

the Karamoja context and, in particular, in

sites such as Acherer, where conflict risks

may increase as resources in a given area

are depleted. The bottom-up approach

calls for close engagement with land users

to develop tenure systems appropriate to

a situation, working closely with commu-

nity stakeholders to identify and demarcate

plots and their owners (whether individuals,

households, groups or clans), a system that

lends itself well when ASM is undertaken in

small groups (often family units) rather than

through “site based” approaches. Linked

with this approach is engagement with

government to recognize such tenure and

formalization of the mineral trading chain,

ideally yielding both fairer prices to

miners and benefits to government by way of

royalties and fees. Mining legislation in

many countries is developed in a “top down”

manner despite the fact that it is widely

recognized that inadequate consultation with

women and men miners is a key factor that

has led to failure of much ASM legislation

fails. Furthermore, given that legislation that

claims to be “gender neutral” has potential

to actually exacerbate gender disparities,

gender responsiveness if often overlook. It

is worth noting that sometimes a complete

review and redrafting of the entire mining

legislation might be the best approach. In

Peru, it was shown that engaging miners in

policy and legal reform processes can not

only result in legislation that is appropri-

ate for ASM but can create an opportunity

to unify miners nationally through a shared

goal113

.

5. 5. Security of Land Tenure

The potential for the people of Karamoja to

benefit from increasing mining on land they

have used for generations largely depends on

their ability to prove ownership rights over

the land where minerals are being explored

111Ibid.

112Ecological Christian Orgainisation (2011): The Mining and Mineral Sector in Karamoja region: Development Opportunities and Constraints

113Hruschka, F., 2003. Review of the Organisation Process of the Artisanal Miners in Peru (2000–2002). Unpublished; http://www.community

mining.org/attachments/213_Review%20of%20ASM%20in%20Peru%202002_Felix_Hruschka.pdf?phpMyAdmin=cde87b62947d46938306c1d 6 ab7a0420. Accessed on 25th January, 2014

61

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


and eventually extracted. In the process

of applying for a Mining Lease, the propo-

nent company is required to show proof of

ownership of exclusive rights over the land

covering the intended mining period or verify

that an agreement has been reached and

approval received from the lawful land

owner. Identification of lawful land

owners could take the form of a Freehold or

Leasehold Title, a Certificate of Customary

Ownership or, in the case of Sub County

governments, “holding documents affirm-

ing that they hold the communal lands in

public trust” (the latter of which has not been

invoked).

In some cases in Uganda, mining companies

have sought to purchase the land outright.

Although this doesn’t seem to yet be the

case in Karamoja, if such an action were to

transpire, obvious challenges emerge.

Typically, companies commence by

negotiations with land owners and

lawful occupiers. Given that failure to secure

land (through purchase or approval) can be

regarded, under the Mining Act (2003), as a form of blockage of access for mineral

extraction, this can move towards decisions

by the District Valuer for adequate compen-

sation rates and, if sale or lease is not tenable,

then GOU can invoke powers of compulsory

acquisition, mandating a valuation against

which payment is made for purchase

of the land by either the licensee or the

Government.

Whether land ownership is retained or

land is purchased by a company, the

current status of land tenure is critical. Land

among the peoples of Karamoja is generally

held communally. Ugandan law upholds the

rights of customary land owners, in principle

but in practice, asserting those rights and

securing evidence of that ownership

has been nearly impossible. Although

customary tenure seems compatible with

pastoralists’ land holding system, there seems

a divergence with pastoralists understanding

of land ownership. This is has put the people

of Karamoja on tension whenever the mining

companies come in for exploration or mining.

This also has an effect on the subsequent

benefits like who to pay the loyalties. Proof

of ownership is important for communities to

be able to protect themselves from outsiders

claiming their land.

The Land Act does provide for the

formation of Communal Land Associa-

tions for the purposes of ownership and

management of land under customary

law or other law114

. A Communal Land

Association may own land under a CCO,

leasehold or a freehold. Members of the

association can also hold some or all of the

land within it, in an individual capacity while

other parts are set aside for common use

under a common Land Management Scheme.

It should however be noted that, registra-

tion of communal interests or group rights

in natural resources and other common

pool resources is not in the names of the

Communal Land Associations but rather

in the management committees under the

Common Land Management Scheme.

Attempts were previously made to form and

register communal land associations but

without much success because of the

absence of personnel in the district land

office and the hefty survey costs,

besides the would-be beneficiaries of these

104 Land Act 1998, sections 16 – 17

62

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


associations were also very ignorant of

the intent of the associations. Respon-

dents suggested that, “…the only way

to deal with it is to encourage people to

strive to register the land. Communal land

associations should be activated so that

the communities can have a say and also

reduce fake owners. Individuals should

register their land too. Amendment of the

land and mining act can help increase

the input of the community in activities

concerning their land whether in prospect-

ing or exploration as these don’t involve

consultation of the community or land

owners”115

.

Many are reportedly now seeking

Certificates of Customary Ownership. Only

freehold and leasehold tenure is

granted at central levels, while procedures to

obtain a certificate of customary land

ownership are, at first glance, seem to

be comparatively simple. During the

application process, the application form

and fee for a certificate for customary

ownership must be submitted to the

committee or parish in which the land

subject to the application is situated, where

reference to a parish or committee implies

a settled community116

. A parish is a unit

of local government authority at sub-coun-

ty level in a district set up in rural settled

areas while the committee is a local

government office at county level.117

In

essence these are permanent office

structures set up to administer land

issues but such structures may not be viably

accessible to many Karamojong.118

Claims of any other person affected by

the land, for example, through rights of

way, must also be heard and the Land

Committee can adjourn its proceedings if

necessary to carry out more detailed

investigations. On conclusion of its

hearing, the Land Committee is required to

write a report setting out its findings with

respect to the claim and its own conclu-

sions and recommendations’ regarding the

application and a report is submitted to the

relevant district land board together with the

original application. The Land Committee

could recommend acceptance, rejection or

conditional acceptance of this application.

On receipt of this report, the District Land

Board can then decide whether or not to

issue a Certificate of Customary Ownership

(CCO). Once the board has made a decision

it must communicate this to the Recorder.

Where the board recommends that a certifi-

cate be issued the Recorder should do this,

subject to any qualifications or restrictions

required by the board119

.

Despite these provisions, limited awareness

of procedures, low capacity for statutory land

administration and lack of knowledge of the

land law by both the district technical staff and

local people were commonly noted during

field assessments, challenges that are com-

pounded by limited staffing and resources

in the relevant departments (e.g. the District

115

Key Informant interview with Deputy CAO Moroto 17th Feb 2014

116S 4(3) Land Act.

117Local Government Act 1997, Chapter 243 Laws of Uganda ss 3 & 45.

118Knighton (n. xi above) 29-30.

119

Land Act, section, 5 6, 8 and 9

63

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Land Office). A number of applications have

nevertheless been vetted and approved but

certificates have not been granted.

Suspicions of ill motivations of central

government seem to be high. It has also

been reported by the recent Human rights Watch report that “the area land commit-

tees are weak, lack funding, personnel, and

technical knowledge to adequately perform

their role”.120

5.6. Improved Information Flows and Communi - cation channels

Many issues seemed to be founded on lack

of information and transparency. Ensuring

full and mandatory disclosure of documents

of public interest concerning the minerals

sector will enable people to contribute

directly to law enforcement by

e q u i p p i n g

them with a knowledge of which explora-

tion and mining operations in their local

area are legal, and who to talk to if they

are not. This can improve legal compli-

ance and give public credibility to the

decisions and actions of the regulating

authorities. The following informa-

tion should therefore be in the public

domain: all mining-related legislation and

associated rules, regulations, decisions and

decree; an inventory which shows mineral

potential, mineral reserve estimates or

proven reserves, whether the type of

activity is exploration or mining, its

location and a value; concession maps

with boundaries and current status;

concession and investment agreements,

showing the social and environmental

responsibilities of the mineral right

holders, and including the explicit right of

regulators and independent monitors such

as Civil Society Organisations to inspect

the tenement areas at any time; details of

ownership of concession holders; the

structure of Mines Departments and

the contact details and roles of Mines

Department personnel; a registry of

business flow processes familiar to the

minerals industry for all government

officials; blacklists of companies/ASM

groups that have been found to operate

illegally, including an explicit ban on

participating in subsequent concession

allocation processes. The government’s

structures in place need to be properly

used as their only challenge is the actors. A

respondent noted: …selfish people have

ambitious interests that are against the

system. Every person needs to appreci-

ate the law because the law will bring

120Human Rights Watch (2014): “How Can We Survive Here”, The Impact of Mining

on Human Rights in Karamoja, Uganda pg 66

64

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


them to order with ease. The personnel in

formal positions need to be guided as the

decisions they make can backfire to the

people in given organisations and to the

people in charge121

.

The different structures of leadership

such as district council, executive and

management team, sub-county and county

executive need to be empowered. This will

to be able to assist the ministry in transpar-

ency and accountability. It is good practice

to ensure that these documents should, to

the extent possible, be made available on

the Internet, while printed copies should

also be made available via DGSM to Local

Government and other stakeholders.

5.7. Inadequate Community Consultation and

participation in decision making

As already noted, there is hardly any

attempt to consult with the local communi-

ties prior to granting exploration licenses to

companies over the peoples’ lands,

either through the DGSM, the district

governments, or sub-county governments.

Apart from Karamojongs participating as

Artisanal Small-scale Gold Mining (ASGM) or

“subsistence gold mining” as a safety net

option, they don’t feature anywhere in the

crucial community participation aspects.

What is the common practice is that the

deals are made between companies and

the government without the consent of

the people who inhabit within the mineral

rich areas. Consultation and involvement

of local communities in the issues that

concern land use and minerals should be

consistent throughout all processes. This

was noted as lacking in most cases and

where it was observed there were empty

promises as described by communities.

DAO Africa Limited a marble company

was found to have held several community

dialogues to inform the local community of

their intention and also promised in writing

to support the communities by construct-

ing basic facilities of schools, health centers

provide employment for the local population

and construct a housing facility for elders

worth UGX 300,000,000.

…8 of us elders including district local authorizes were invited by DAO & Jan Manga mining companies to Kampala to

discuss how the companies presence in the

area would benefit the communities. All was

agreed upon and sealed through documen-

tation and signing of the agreement’122

.

Government procedures require a district

official to sign off before licensing a

company, but traditional decision makers

are excluded. “Leaders should give out more

information concerning foreign inves-

tors coming to our land and extraction of

minerals”123

Failure to engage the commu-

nity into the land and mineral processes is

expected to lead to future tensions as people

see the companies’ activities as infringing

on their ancestral land.

121

Key Informant interview with office of the DPC Moroto Suprintendent of Police Obia George 15th Feb, 2014

122FGD in LC 1 Musupo village 15th Feb 2014

123 FGD in LC 1 Musupo village 15th Feb 2014

65

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


66

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


There is need for widespread sensitization on

mining and land legislation, as well as the

peculiarities of the minerals sector, would

help mitigate such risks, indicating a critical role for

local government. Civil society organizations, local

government and other actors should be persistent and

consistent on the sensitization of citizens about their

rights, the laws that govern them, the dangers of manip-

ulation and exploitation by selfish people as a safeguard

against the re-occurrence of conflict. Communities at all

levels also need to develop a deeper understanding of

peace and justice as a basis for development because

peace and justice are part and parcel of development.

Legal education and advocacy: There is need for a

concerted legal education and advocacy through

partnership with CSOs (including CBOs, local and

international NGOs) to provide the community,

leaders and the elders with information on key gaps in the

mining laws and the Constitution to guarantee the

rights of communities living in natural resource rich

RECOMMENDATIONS

67

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


areas. This will enable the communities in

Karamoja to legally assert their land and

mineral ownership rights during negotia-

tions for surface rights agreements or claim

benefits and/or royalties. As it stands, the

exploration and mining licensing regime is

already functioning at a much faster pace

leaving communities in tensions.

There is need to strengthen the capacity

of actors especially to deal with the emerg-

ing mineral related conflicts. The need for

harmonized and well coordinated NRM


should be created. There is also need to

support efforts directed toward strengthening

the statutory land administration and increase

knowledge access of the land and mineral

laws to the NGOs CBOs, district technical

staff and local people.

It is important to reconcile and

harmonize the mining and land legislations

as adaptation within the context of Karamoja

is urgently needed as much as local capacity

to engage in reform processes. In the interim,

simple mechanisms may be acceptable to

MEMD with respect to Location License and

Mining Lease applications. Given the role of

the CAO’s office in signing off of applications,

an intermediary step of cross referencing

areas with pending or current Certificates of

Communal Ownership or other title would

be useful. Given that land owner approval

is needed to vet a Mining Lease applica-

tion, some of the onus can also be placed on

companies (particularly during the EIA

process) to identify land owners and by

local residents and land users and support

formalization of their tenure rights.

Reconciling mining, land and other

legislation, bringing clarity to institutional

roles and ultimately formalizing such roles

in support of responsible minerals sector

development is required. It was noted from

the community that the linkages between

landlessness, land tenure, cultural practices

and habits, land use and natural resourc-

es management need to be addressed by

different stakeholders for instance the

findings of the study noted in words of a

respondent; The ministry in charge of

minerals should come up with better

guidelines having coordinated with lands,

gender and other sectors on how to

implement the activities related to mining,

it’s not only about royalties…short of that the

local man continues to loose resources124

124

Key Informant Interview-Moroto District Land Board official, Albert Lokoru 16th Feb.2014

68

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


In cases where exploration companies are

active, geologists must (for their own

security) necessarily engage and sensi-

tize land owners as they enter areas (e.g.

for sample collection), typically through

government channels (LCIII or LCI Chairper-

sons) and to a lesser extent clan chiefs and

elders. In most cases, these are primarily

men and seem to focus sensitization towards

household “heads” or land owners, who are

mainly also taken to be men, bringing to light

concerns the gender dimension of

such communication, which seem to be

overlooking information needs of women125

.

With limited knowledge of the explora-

tion sector, fears seem to abound that

companies are there to “take the land”,

mine without sharing benefits, evict

residents and artisanal miners or a

combination thereof126

.

There is need for increased collaboration

between civil society and other actors like

Local and Central government in addressing

the conflict issues in Karamoja. This should

avail communities with necessary informa-

tion from all actors so as to safeguard them

from the negative effects of development.

The central government needs to work

more with CSOs and other actors to bridge

the gap between making policies and

proper implementation in an area like

Karamoja. This could take forms of capac-

ity building and direct implementation

of the policies. Strengthening linkages

(inclusive of communication and reporting

mechanisms) between Local Govern-

ment, DGSM, Ministry of Lands and other

authorities (e.g. NFA), private sector

players (inclusive of artisanal miners) and

mining affected communities and need for

instituting mechanisms that improve

collection and use of revenues from the

minerals sector. This will further improve

stakeholder engagement and empower-

ment of communities via multiple efforts

(inclusive of those related to legal reforms,

formalized communication mechanisms of

companies, etc.). Blending of traditional and

modern approaches: In order to effectively

address conflicts around land and natural

resource access and management, a key

component will be Blending of traditional

and modern approaches, which recogniz-

es the value of customary practices and

indigenous peoples’ knowledge of resource

management. Develop and empower the

traditional mechanisms of conflict resolu-

tion like the Etem and Akiririkit. The best

aspects of traditional and modern

a p p r o a c h e s

126Ecological Christian Orgainisation (2011): The Mining and Mineral Sector in Karamoja region: Development Opportunities and Constraints.

69

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


should be intertwined in mediation,

negotiation, arbitration and reconciliation for

better results. This also calls for improving

dialogue between different groups i.e. between

small-scale miners and medium or large-

scale companies or land-owners, herders and

cultivators, government (including national,

local and government agencies like UWA,

NFA) and the communities. Frequent meetings

between leaders, elders, Peace Committees

and Environment Management Committees

from different groups and neighboring areas

should be promoted in order to foster peaceful

coexistence.

There is need to support or contribute to

formalization and improvements to ASM

including building functioning effective local

and regional ASM associations.

Respondents

recommended that this will be key in

transforming the ASM activities. Intense

sensitization of miners on legislation and

procedures, ideally through approaches that

bridge gaps between miners, local government

and DGSM would help the situation. However, a degree of organization to help miners overcome

these shared barriers is nevertheless essential.

Building upon and Coordinating with

Existing Initiatives and other partners.

A significant number of initiatives

related to peace and security, land, mining,

livelihoods, environmental protection and

community health, among other critical

issues. There are promising projects which are

currently being implemented by a wide range

of national and international organizations like

70

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


ECO, GIZ, SaferWorld, IUCN, Riamri-

am, ACODE, Uganda Land Alliance, UN

Agencies, among others. For instance:

the Civil Peace Service Programme of

GIZ, initiative on conflicts around land i.e.

land use, management and administra-

tion. Made some linkages with the current

ECO-DGF funded project.

ECO’s DGF funded Karamoja Extrac-

tive Mineral Sector Transparency and

Accountability Project (KEMSTAP) in the

distrcits of Moroto and Abim funded by

Democratic Governance Facility (DGF)127

.

The primary objective of the “Karamoja

Extractive Mineral Sector Transpar-

ency and Accountability Project” is to

bridge the gap between civil society and

decision makers in promoting responsi-

ble mineral development in the Karamoja

Region through grassroots participation

and inc reased accountab i l i t y and

transparency in minerals sector manage-

ment. The purpose of this project is to

strengthen local voice, engagement and

capacity to hold local government bodies

and line agencies accountable and respon-

siveness to the demands of local citizens

in the Karamoja Extractive Sector.

Ensuring complimentarity with these

efforts would further support a strength-

ened coordinated approach to NRM

conflict prevention and management in

region.

127The Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) was established in July 2011 in order to strengthen democratisation, protection of human rights,

enhance access to justice, promote peaceful coexistence and improved accountability in Uganda. The Development Partners currently contributing to the DGF include Austria, Denmark, European Union, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The DGF has three components: 1. Deepening Democracy, 2. Rights, Justice and Peace and 3. Voice and Accountability

71

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Annex One: Exploration and Mining License Holders in Moroto District as of January

31st, 2014128

Type # Licence Holder Location Granting Date

Expiry Date

Sheet # District Commodity /Mineral Area/Km2

Mineral rent per year

(UGX) EL 0319 Moroto Cement Industries

(U) Limited

Kampala 5/6/08 5/5/15 27/1 Moroto Marble, Limestone 62.50 1,260,000

EL 0425 AVR Engineering &

Infrastructure Limited

Kampala 2/20/09 2/19/14 36/1 Moroto Iron & Basemetals 10.00 200,000

EL 0426 AVR Engineering &

Infrastructure Limited

Kampala 2/20/09 2/19/14 27/3 Moroto Gold & Basemetals 2.00 40,000

EL 0735 Great Lakes Cement

Limited

Jinja 3/25/11 3/24/14 27/3. Moroto Limestone & Marble 11.00 220,000

EL 0751 Jinja Marble Products (U)

Limited

Jinja 4/11/11 4/10/14 27/3. Moroto Marble 56.50 1,140,000

EL 0851 East African Mining

Limited

Kampala 9/22/11 9/21/14 27/1. Moroto Gold, PGEs and Base

Metals

72.00 1,440,000

EL 0852 East African Mining

Limited

Kampala 9/22/11 9/21/14 27/1. Moroto Gold, PGEs and Base

Metals

86.00 1,720,000

EL 0876 Pramukh Steel Limited Jinja 10/20/11 10/19/14 27/3. Moroto Limestone/Marbles 36.90 740,000

EL 0977 Kripto International

Limited.

Kampala 4/24/12 4/23/15 36/1 Moroto Gold, PGM, Uranium &

Base Metals

10.00 200,000

EL 0978 Kripto International

Limited.

Kampala 4/24/12 4/23/15 27/3. Moroto Gold, PGM, Uranium &

Base Metals

2.00 40,000

EL 0995 Ndovu Investments Ltd Jinja 7/3/12 7/2/15 36/2. Moroto Marble & Gypsum 7.00 140,000

EL 0996 Ndovu Investments Ltd Jinja 7/3/12 7/2/15 36/2&4

.

Moroto Marble & Gypsum 308.60 6,180,000

EL 1001 Jan Manga (U) Ltd Kampala 7/20/12 7/19/15 27/3&4

.

Moroto Gold & Base Metals 74.20 1,500,000

EL 1016 Great Lakes Mining Ltd Kampala 8/10/12 8/9/15 18A/3. Moroto REE & Base Metals 55.00 1,100,000

EL 1071 Angaro Investment

Company Ltd

Moroto 2/18/13 2/17/16 36/3 &

45/1

Moroto Gold and Base Metals 102.00 2,040,000

EL 1079 Blackstone Ichiban Ltd Kampala 2/5/13 2/4/16 36/1 - 4 Moroto

and

Nakapi

ripirit


EL 1080 Blackstone Ichiban Ltd Kampala 2/5/13 2/4/16 27/3,4,

36/1&

2

Moroto Gold and Base Metals 212.50 4,260,000

EL 1081 Rhino United Agencies Ltd Moroto 2/18/13 2/17/16 36/1 - 3 Moroto Gold and Base Metals 97.00 1,940,000

EL 1083 Infinity Minerals Ltd Kampala 2/11/13 2/10/16 27/3&4 Moroto Gold and Base Metals 437.00 8,740,000

EL 1090 Dao Africa Limited Kampala 2/20/13 2/19/16 27/1 Moroto Limestone and Marble 40.70 820,000

EL 1091 Emmanuel Kyoyeta

Makaga

Kampala 2/20/13 2/19/16 27/3 Moroto Gold, Base Metals,

Limestone and Marble

40.00 800,000

EL 1100 Earth Cement (U) Limited Kampala 2/22/13 2/21/16 27/3 Moroto Limestone 50.00 1,000,000

EL 1101 Earth Cement (U) Limited Kampala 2/22/13 2/21/16 36/2 Moroto Limestone 51.00 1,020,000

EL 1115 Infinity Minerals Ltd Kampala 3/22/13 3/21/16 26/2&1

8/4

Moroto

&

Kaabo

ng


EL 1126 MCB Resources Limited Kampala 4/9/13 4/8/16 27/1 Moroto Gold and Base Metals 19.84 400,000

EL 1157 Clear Water Mining

Limited

Kampala 5/28/13 5/27/16 26/1&3 Moroto Gold and Base Metals 272.00 5,440,000


Limited

Kampala 5/30/13 5/29/16 27/1 Moroto Gold and Base Metals 131.24 2,640,000

EL 1164 Sikander Meghani Kampala 6/4/13 6/3/16 27/3 Moroto Gold and Base Metals 2.00 40,000

EL 1165 Dao Marble Limited Kampala 6/13/13 6/12/16 27/3 Moroto Limestone, Chromite,

Gold & PGMs

124.23 2,500,000


Limited

Kampala 7/4/13 7/3/16 26/1&2 Moroto Gold, Base Metal 224.00 4,480,000

72

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


EL 1175 Kiboko Cement Industries

Limited

Kampala 7/5/13 7/4/16 27/1&2 Moroto Limestone, Marble 41.44 840,000


Limited

Kampala 10/14/13 10/13/16 27/3 Moroto Limestone, Gold &

Base Metals

13.64 280,000


Limited

Kampala 10/14/13 10/13/16 27/3 Moroto Limestone, Gold &

Base Metals

15.00 320,000


Limited

Kampala 11/18/13 11/17/16 36/1 Moroto Gold and Base Metals 7.00 140,000

LL 1171 Jinja Marble Products (U)

Limited

Jinja 6/24/13 6/23/15 27/3 Moroto Marble 0.16 250,000

LL 1210 Sikander Meghani Kampala 10/17/13 10/16/15 27/3 Moroto Gold 0.11 250,000

LL 1223 Sikander Meghani Kampala 11/6/13 11/5/15 27/3 Moroto Gold 0.15 250,000

LL 1260 Lokwang Peter Moroto 12/10/13 12/9/15 27/3 Moroto Limestone and Marble 0.08 250,000

LL 1261 Lokwang Peter Moroto 12/10/13 12/9/15 27/3 Moroto Limestone and Marble 0.08 250,000

ML 0593 Tororo Cement Limited Tororo 4/16/10 4/15/31 36/2 Moroto Limestone 49.77 99,540,000

ML 1129 Jan Manga (U) Ltd Kampala 4/18/13 4/17/34 27/3&4 Moroto Gold 74.20

148,400,00

0

ML 1230 Moroto Cement Industries

(U) Limited

1/17/14 1/16/17 27/1 Moroto Marble, Limestone 62.57

125,160,00

0

SML 4622 Tororo Cement Limited Tororo 12/20/02 12/19/23 36/2 Moroto Limestone 20.01 40,020,000

Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, MEMD), Department of Geological Survey and Mines, DGSM), January, 2014

73

REPO

RT T

O E

U-U

N


Ecological Christian Organization (ECO)

Plot 2140, Old Kira road, P.O. Box 34485,

Kampala-Uganda

Tel: 0464-660273 / 0414-535212, Email: eco@

ecouganda.org

Website: www.ecouganda.org

Ecological Christian Organisation

dynamics report

Documents