explicación racionalista de la guerra fearon

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Rationalist Explanations for WarAuthor(s): James D. FearonSource: International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), pp. 379-414Published by: The MIT Press

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903Accessed: 09-09-2015 16:40 UTC

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2/37

Rationalist xplanations

or

war

James . Fearon

Thecentral uzzle boutwar, ndalso themain eason

we

studyt, s thatwars

are

costly utnonetheless ars

ecur. cholars ave

ttempted

o resolve he

puzzle

with

hree ypes

f

rgument.irst, ne

can

rgue

hat

eople and

state

leaders n

particular)

re

sometimesr always

rrational.

hey

re

subject o

biases and pathologies

hat ead them

o neglect

he

costs

of

war

or

to

misunderstandow

heir

ctions

ill

roduce

t.

econd, necan rgue hat he

leaderswhoorderwarenjoy ts

benefits

utdo notpaythecosts,which re

suffered

y soldiers

nd

citizens. hird, ne can argue

thateven

rational

leaders who consider he risks nd costs of war may end up fighting

nonetheless.

This rticle ocuses n argumentsf he hirdort, hich will allrationalist

explanations.1ationalistxplanationsbound

n the

iteraturen interna-

tionalonflict,ssuminggreat

ariety

f pecificorms. oreover,or t east

two

easonsmanycholars

ave

given ationalistxplanations

certain

ride f

place.First, istoriansnd political cientists ho

have

tudied heorigins f

particular

ars ften

ave

oncluded hat

war an be

a

rationallternativeor

leaderswhoare actingn their tates' nterest-theyind hat heexpected

benefitsfwar ometimesutweighhe xpected osts, owevernfortunate

An earlier

version

f this rticle

was

presented

t the annual

meetings

f the

American

olitical

Science

Association,Washington, .C.,

2-5

September

993.The article raws

n

part

n

chapter

ofJamesD.

Fearon,

Threats o Use

Force:

Costly ignals

nd

Bargaining

n

nternational

rises,

Ph.D.

diss.,University

f

California, erkeley,

992. Financial

support

f

the nstitute

n

Global

Conflict nd

Cooperation

of

the

University

f

California

s

gratefullycknowledged.

or

valuable

comments

thank

ddie

Dekel,

Eric

Gartzke,

Atsushi

shida,

Andrew

Kydd,

David

Laitin,

Andrew

Moravcsik,

James

Morrow,Randolph Siverson,

Daniel

Verdier, Stephen

Walt

and

especially

CharlesGlaser and Jack

evy.

1.

Of course, arguments

f the

second

sort

may

and oftendo

presume

rational

behavior

by

individual eaders; that s,warmay be rationalforcivilian r militaryeaders iftheywillenjoy

various

benefits

f war without

uffering

osts

imposed

on the

population.

While

I

believe that

second-image

mechanisms f this sort are

very mportant mpirically,

do

not

explore

them

here. A

more accurate

label

for the

subject

of

the article

might

be

rational

unitary-actor

explanations,

ut this s

cumbersome.

International

rganization9, 3,

Summer

995,pp.

379-414

r

1995

by

The

10

Foundation nd the Massachusetts nstitute f

Technology


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3/37


4/37

War 381

length elow, these arguments re given he followingabels: (1) anarchy; 2)

expectedbenefits reater han expected osts; 3) rationalpreventive ar; 4)

rationalmiscalculation ue to lack of nformation;nd (5) rationalmiscalcula-

tion or disagreement bout relative power.

I

argue that the first hree

arguments imply o not address the question of what prevents tate eaders

frombargaining o a settlement hat would avoid the costs of fighting. he

fourth nd fifth

rguments

o address

the

question, holding

that rational

leaders may miss a superiornegotiated ettlement hen lack of information

leads them to miscalculaterelativepower or resolve. However, as typically

stated,neither rgument xplainswhatprevents ational eaders from sing

diplomacy r otherforms f communicationo avoid such costlymiscalcula-

tions.

If these standard rguments o not resolvethe puzzle on rationalist erms,

what does? I propose thatthere re threedefensible nswers,which ake the

form fgeneralmechanisms,r causal logics,

hat

operate

n

a

varietyf more

specific

nternational

ontexts.3

n

thefirst

mechanism,

ational eaders

may

be

unable to locate a mutually referablenegotiated ettlement ue toprivate

informationbout

relative

apabilities r resolve

nd

incentives

o

misrepresent

such information. eaders know things bout theirmilitary apabilities nd

willingness o fight hatother tatesdo not know, nd

in

bargaining ituations

they an have incentives o misrepresentuch private nformation

n

orderto

gain

a

better

deal.

I

show that

given

hese

ncentives,

ommunication

may

not

allow

rational eaders

to clarify

elative

ower

or

resolvewithout enerating

real risk of war. This is not simply matter f miscalculation ue to poor

information ut rather of specific trategicdynamics

hat result

from

the

combination f

asymmetric

nformationnd

incentives

o dissemble.

Second, rationally

ed states

may

be unable

to

arrange

settlementhatboth

wouldprefer o

war due to

commitmentroblems,ituations

n

whichmutually

preferable argains re unattainable ecause one ormore tateswouldhave an

incentive o renegeon theterms.Whileanarchy understood s

the

absence of

an

authorityapable

of

policing greements)

s

routinely

ited

s

a

cause

of

war

in

the

iterature,

t

s

difficult

o

find

xplanations

or

xactlywhy

he

nability

o

make

commitmentshould

mply

hatwar

will

sometimes ccur. That

is,

what

are

thespecific, mpirically

dentifiablemechanisms

y

which

he

inability

o

commitmakes

t

mpossible

or

tates o strike eals thatwould avoid

the

costs

of

war? I

identify

hree

such

specificmechanisms, rguing

n

particular

hat

preventive

war between rational states stems from commitment

roblem

rather hanfrom ifferentialowergrowth erse.

The third

ortof rationalist xplanation

find ess

compelling

han

the

first

two, lthough

t s

logically

enable.

Statesmight

e unable to ocate a

peaceful

3. The sense of mechanism s similar o thatproposedbyElster, lthough omewhat roader.

See JonElster,Political sychologyCambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress, 1993), pp. 1-7; and

JonElster,Nuts nd Bolts or heSocial Sciences Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress, 1989),

chap. 1.




5/37


6/37

War

383

Second, herationalistrgumentshatdo address hequestion-such s (4)

and 5) above-do notgo far nough

n

answeringt.When ully eveloped,

they rove o be one of thetwomajormechanismseveloped ere,namely,

either commitmentroblem r a problem rising rom rivatenformation

and ncentiveso misrepresent.hese twomechanisms,will rgue, rovide

the oundationsor rationalistrneorealistheoryfwar.

The puzzle

Mosthistoriansndpoliticalcientistsho tudy ardismisss naive he iewthat llwarsmust eunwanted ecause heyntail estructionndsuffering.

Instead,most gree hatwhile fewwarsmayhavebeen unwanted y the

leaderswho brought hem bout-WorldWar I is sometimes iven s an

example-many r perhapsmostwars

were

simply

wanted.The

leaders

involvediewedwar s a costly utworthwhileamble.5

Moreover, any

cholars elieve

hat

wanted ars

re

easily xplained

rom

a

rationalisterspective. antedwars rethoughtobe Pareto-efficient-they

occur

when

o negotiated

ettlementsxist hat

oth

ides

would refer

o the

gamble fmilitaryonflict.onventionalisdom olds hatwhile his ituation

may e tragic,t s entirelyossible etweentates ed by ationaleaderswho

consider

he

costs

and

risks f

fighting.

nwanted

wars,

which ake

place

despite

he existence

f

settlements

oth sides preferred

o

conflict,

re

thoughtoposemore f puzzle, ut ne that s resolvablend lsofairlyare.

The

conventionalistinctionetween anted ndunwanted arsmisunder-

stands he

puzzleposed by

war.

The

reason

s

that he standard

onception

does not

distinguish

etween

wo

ypes

f

efficiency-ex

nteand

ex

ost.

As

long

s

both

ides uffer

ome osts

or

ighting,

hen

war

s

always

nefficientx

post-both

sideswouldhavebeen better fffthey ouldhave chievedhe

same inal

esolution

ithout

uffering

he

osts

orby aying

ower

osts).

his

is true ven

f

he

osts ffighting

re

small, r

f

ne

or both ides iewed

he

potential

enefitss

greater

han he

costs,

ince

here re still osts.Unless

states

njoy

he

ctivity

f

fighting

or

ts

wn

ake,

s

a

consumptionood,

hen

war s

nefficient

xpost.

From

rationalist

erspective,

he entral

uzzle

bout

war s

precisely

his

ex

ost

inefficiency.

efore

ighting,

oth idesknow

hatwarwill ntail

ome

costs,

nd even

f

hey xpect ffsetting

enefits

hey

till ave

n

incentiveo

avoid he osts. hecentraluestion,hen,swhat reventstatesna dispute

5. See, for xamples,

Geoffry lainey,

The

Causes of War New

York: Free

Press,1973);

Michael

Howard, The Causes of Wars Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity

ress, 1983), especially hap.

1; and Arthur tein, WhyNations Cooperate:Circumstancend

Choice n International

elations

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

University ress, 1990), pp. 60-64. Even the case of World War

I

is

contested; n important istorical chool argues that this was a

wanted

war. See Fritz

Fisher,

Germany's

ims n the irstWorldWar

New

York:

Norton, 967).




7/37

384 Internationalrganization

from eachingnex nte greementhat voids he osts hey nowwill e paid

expost f hey o to war?Giving rationalistxplanationorwar mountso

answeringhis uestion.

Three f hemost ommon

nd

widelymployedationalistrguments

n

he

literatureo notdirectlyddress r answer he uestion. hese rearguments

fromnarchy,reventivear, ndpositivexpected tility.

Anarchy

SinceKennethWaltz's

nfluential

an,

the

tate,

nd

War,

he

anarchical

nature f the internationalealm s routinelyitedas a root causeof or

explanation

orthe

recurrence

f

war.

Waltz

argued

hatunder

narchy,

without supranationaluthority

o make and enforce

aw,

war

occurs

because

here s

nothing

o

prevent

t....

Among

tates s

among

men

heres

no automaticdjustmentf nterests.

n

theabsence f a supreme uthority

theres then he onstant

ossibility

hat

onflicts

ill e

settled

y

orce. 6

The

argumentocuses

ur attentionn a fundamental

ifference

etween

domestic

nd

international

olitics.

Within

well-ordered

tate, rganized

violence s a

strategy

s ruled

ut-or

at

least

made

very angerous-by

he

potential eprisals f a central overnment.n internationalelations, y

contrast,

o

agency

xists hat an

credibly

hreaten

eprisal

or he

use

of

force

to settle

isputes.7

he claim

s

that

withoutuch credible hreat,

ar

will

sometimes

ppear

he

best

ption

or

tates

hat ave

onflicting

nterests.

While do

not

doubt hat he

condition f

anarchy

ccounts

or

major

differencesetween omestic nd internationalolitics,nd

that

anarchy

encourages

oth

fear f

and

opportunities

or

militaryonflict,

he

tandard

framingf the rgumentsnotenough o explainwhywars ccur ndrecur.

Under

narchy,othingtops

tates

rom

sing

orce

f

hey

ish.

ut

f

using

forcesa costlyption egardlessf he utcome,henwhys t ver mployed?

Howexactlyoes

he

ack

f

centraluthorityreventtates romegotiating

agreements

oth

ides

would

prefer

o

fighting?

s

it

s

typicallytated,

he

argument

hat

narchy rovides

rationalist

xplanation

or

war

does not

address his

uestion

nd so

does not

olve he

problem osedby

war's x

ost

inefficiency.

Neither,

t should

be

added,

do related

rgumentsnvoking

he

security

dilemma,

hefact

hat

nder

narchy

ne

state's ffortso make tself

more

secure an have heundesired

ut

unavoidable

ffectfmakingnothertate

6.

The

quotation s drawn romKennethWaltz,Man, the tate,

nd War:

A TheoreticalAnalysis

(New

York: Columbia

University

ress,

1959),

p.

188.

7. For a careful

nalysis

nd

critique

f this tandard

rgument

n

the

difference

etween

the

international nd domestic renas, see R. HarrisonWagner, The Causes of Peace,

in

Roy A.

Licklider, d., Stopping

he

Killing:

How

Civil

WarsEnd

(New

York: New York

University ress,

1993),pp. 235-68 and especially p. 251-57.




8/37

War

385

less ecure.8 y tselfhis act

ays othingbout he vailabilityrfeasibility

f

peaceful argains

hat

would void he

osts

fwar.More

laborate rguments

arerequired,nd those hat retypicallyiven o not nvision argainingnd

do not ddress hepuzzle f

costs.Consider, ornstance, spiral cenario

n

which n

nsecuretatencreasests rms, endering

nothero nsecurehat t

decides o attack.fthefirst

tate nticipatedhe

eaction roducing ar, hen

by tself

his s a deadlock

rgument;argue gainsthesebelow.

f

the

first

state

id

not nticipate ar nd

did

notwantt, hen he

problem ould eem

to be

miscalculationather han

narchy,nd weneed to knowwhy

ignaling

and

bargainingouldnothave olvedt.AsRobert

ervis as argued,

narchy

and the

ecurityilemmamaywellfosterrms aces nd

territorialompeti-

tion.9 utwith heexceptionf occasional eferencesothepreemptivear

problem,he tandard ecurity

ilemma rguments

o notexplicitlyddress

the

uestion

f

why

he

nability

o

make

ommitmentshould ecessarilyake

for

war

etween ational

tates.10

Below will rgue hat

narchy

s

indeed mplicateds a cause of

specific

sorts f

military

onflict

e.g.,preventive

nd

preemptive

ar

nd

n

ome

ases

warover

trategicerritory).

n

contrasto the

tandardrguments,

owever,

showing ow

anarchy igures

n a

coherent

ationalist

xplanation

ntails

describinghe pecificmechanismywhich tates'nabilityo write nforce-able

contracts akes

eaceful

argains

oth

ideswould

refer

nattainable.

Preventivewar

It

frequentlys argued hat

f

decliningower

xpectstmight e

attacked

by

rising ower

n the

future,

hen

preventive

ar n

the

presentmay e

rational.

Typically, owever,

reventive

ar

arguments

o not consider

whether

he rising

nd

declining owers

ouldconstruct

bargain, erhaps

across ime, hatwould eaveboth idesbetter ff han costlyndrisky

preventivearwould.11

he

ncentives

or uch

deal

surely

xist. he

rising

state hould otwant obe attacked hile t s

relativelyeak,

o what

tops

t

fromfferingoncessions

n

the

present

nd thefuture

hatwould

make he

declining

tate

refer

ot oattack?

lso,

f

war

s nefficient

nd

bargains

oth

sides

prefer

o a

fight

ill

xist,

hy

hould he

decliningower ationally

ear

being

attacked

n

the

future?

he

standard

rgumentupposes

that

an

8.

See John

H.

Herz, Idealist

Internationalismnd the

Security ilemma, World olitics

(January 950), pp. 157-80; and Jervis,Cooperation Underthe Security ilemma. Anarchys

implicated

n

the

security ilemma

xternalityy the followingogic:

but

for

narchy,

tates ould

commit o

use

weapons only ornonthreatening,efensive

urposes.

9. Jervis,

CooperationUnder the

Security ilemma.

10.

For an

analysis

f the

ecurity

ilemma

hat

akes nto ccount ignaling,ee Andrew

Kydd,

The Security

ilemma,Game Theory, nd WorldWar ,

paper presented t the annual meeting

of theAmerican

olitical

cience

Association,Washington, .C.,

2-5

September 993.

11. The mostdeveloped exception

know f s found n StephenVan Evera,

Causes of War,

Ph.D.

diss.,University

f

California,

erkeley,

984,

pp. 61-64.




9/37

386 International

rganization

anticipatedhift

n thebalance fpower an by tselfe enough omakewar

rational,

ut his s not o.

Positive expected

utility

Perhaps he most ommon nformal

ationalistxplanation

ound

n

the

literatures thatwar mayoccurwhen

two states ach estimate

hatthe

expected

enefitsffightingutweigh

he

xpected osts.

As BruceBueno

de

Mesquita rgued

n an influentialormalizationf thisclaim,

war can be

rational

f

both

ideshave

positive xpected

tility

or

ighting;

hat

s,

f

the

expected tilityf war (expected enefitsess costs)is greater hanthe

expected tility

fremaining

t

peace.12

Informalersions

f theexpected tilityrgumentypically

ail o address

the

question f

how

r

under

what

onditions

tcan be

possible

or

wo tates

both o

prefer

he

ostly amble

fwar o

anynegotiated

ettlement.

ormal

versions

avetended o avoid hequestion

ymaking arious estrictive

nd

sometimesonrationalistssumptions.

o

support

hese

laims,

need to be

more recise bout he xpected tilityrgument.

When will there

exist

bargains

both sides prefer o

war?

This ection onsidershequestion f

whetherndwhen wo

ationallyed

states ould

oth

refer

ar o

anynegotiated

ettlement.

Consider

wo tates,

A and

B,who

have

preferencesver

set of ssues

representedy

he nterval

=

[0, 1].

State

A

prefersssueresolutionsloser

to

1,

while

B

prefers

utcomes loser

o 0. Let the states'utilities

or

he

outcome

E X be

uA(x)

nd

UB(1

-

x),

and assume fornow that

UA(-)

and

UB(O)

are continuous,ncreasing,nd weakly oncave that is, risk-neutralr

risk-averse).

ithout

osing nygenerality,

e can set

ui(1)

=

1

and

ui(0)

=

0

for oth tates

i

=

A, B).

Forconcreteness

e

might

hink

f as

representing

the

roportion

f

ll

territory

etween

and

B

that

s controlledy

A.

In

order o say

whetherhe et

X

contains

egotiatedettlementshat oth

sideswould

refer

o

conflict,

tmust e

possible

o

say

how he tates valuate

the

militaryption

ersus

hose

outcomes.

lmost

ll

analysts

f war have

12. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap

New Haven, Conn.: Yale

University ress,

1981), and The War

Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected UtilityModel, American

Political

ScienceReview 9 (March

1985), pp. 157-76.

For a generalization hat ntroduces he idea of a

bargaining ange, see James

D. Morrow, A Continuous-Outcome xpected

Utility heoryof

War, Journal f Conflict

esolution

9

(September

1985), pp. 473-502. Informal ersions

f

the

expectedutility rgument

re

everywhere.

or

example,Waltz's statement

hat

A

statewill use

force o

attain

tsgoals

f,

fter

ssessing

he

prospects

or

uccess,

tvalues those

goals

more han

t

values the

pleasures

of peace appears

n

different ays

n a

greatmany

works n war. See

Waltz,

Man,

the

tate,

nd

War, .

60.




10/37

War

387

As valueforwar

Bargaining

ange

B's valueforwar

A

_ ,.. A.

,

-- -

A

A's

valuefor n outcome

B's valuefor n outcome

/

.

.. ,, ,. . .

A

o

P-CA

X

P

+

CB

1

B's favorite

utcome

A's

favoriteutcome

FIGURE 1.

Thebargainingange

stressed

hatwar s a

gamble

hose utcome

may

e

determined

y

andom r

otherwisenforeseeablevents.13s

Bueno

de

Mesquita rgued,

his

makes

expected

tility

natural andidate.14

uppose

hat

f

the

states

ight

war,

state

A

prevails

ith

robabilityp [0,1],

nd that he

winner

ets

o choose

itsfavorite

utcome

n

the

ssue

pace.

t

follows

hat

A's

expected tility

or

war

spuA(l)

+

(1

-

p)uA(O)

-

CA,

rp

-

CA,

where

A

is

stateA's

utility

or

he

costs

f a

war.

imilarly,

tateB's

expected

tility

orwarwillbe

1

-

p

-

CB.

Sincewe areconsideringationalistheoriesorwar,we assume hat

A

and

CB

areboth

ositive.

War s

thus

epresented

s

a

costlyottery.Note

hat

n

this

formulation

he erms

A

nd

Bcapture

ot

nly

he tates' alues or he

osts

ofwarbut

lso the

alue

hey lace

on

winning

r

osing

n the

ssues

t

stake.

That

s,

CA

eflects

tate

A's costs orwarrelative

o

any ossible

enefits.or

example,

fthetwo tates

ee little

o

gain

from

inning

war

against

ach

other,

hen

A

nd

CB

wouldbe

large

ven f

neitheride

expected

o suffer

much

amage

n

war.)

We

can now nswer he

uestion

osed

bove.The

following

esults

easily

demonstrated:ivenhe ssumptionstatedn the asttwoparagraphs,here

alwaysxists

setof

negotiated

ettlements

hat oth ides

prefer

o

fighting.15

Formally,

here xists subset f

X

such hat or

ach

outcome

in this

et,

UA(X)

>

P

-

CA

and

UB(1 x)

>

1

-

p

-

cB.

For

example,

n the

risk-neutral

case where

uA(x)

=

x and

UB(1

-

x)

=

1

-

x,

bothstateswill

trictlyrefer

ny

peaceful greement

n the

nterval

p

-

CA,

p +

CB)

to

fighting.

his

nterval

representshe

argaining

ange, ithp

CA

ndp

+

CB

s the eservationevels

that

elimitt.A

risk-neutral

ase s

depicted

n

Figure

.

This

simple ut

mportantesult

s

worth

elaboring

ith ome

ntuition.

Suppose hatwo eople or tates) rebargainingver hedivisionf 100-if

they

an

agree

n a

split hey

an

keep

what

hey gree

o.

However,

n

contrast

13.

See, for lassic examples,

hucydides,

he

Peloponnesian

War

New

York:

Modern

Library,

1951),pp.

45 and 48; and Carl von

Clausewitz, n War Princeton, .J.:Princeton

niversityress,

1984), p.

85.

14. Bueno de

Mesquita,

The

War

Trap.

15. A

proof s given n

the

Appendix.




11/37

388 International rganization

to the usual economic scenarios, n this nternational elations xample the

players lso have an outsideoption.16 or

a

priceof $20, they an go to war,

n

which ase each playerhas a 50-percent hanceofwinning hewhole $100. This

implies hat heexpected alue ofthewaroption s $30 0.5- 100

+

0.5 0

-

20)

for

each side,

so that

f

the

players

re

risk-neutral,

hen neither

hould

be

willing

o

accept

ess

than

$30

in

the

bargaining.

ut noticethatthere s still

rangeof peaceful, argained utcomesfrom $31, $69) to ($69, $31) thatmake

both sides strictly

etteroff han the war

option.

Risk

aversionwill tend to

increase herangeyet urther;ndeed, ven f he eaderspayno costsforwar,

set of

agreements

oth sides

prefer

o a

fight

ill still xist

provided

both

are

risk-averse ver the

issues.

n

effect,

he costs

and

risks f

fightingpen up

a

wedge

of

bargained

solutions

that

risk-neutral

r

risk-averse

tates will

prefer

o the

gamble

of

conflict. he existence

f this x ante

bargaining ange

derives rom

he

fact

hatwar s inefficient

xpost.

Three substantive ssumptions

re needed

for

the

result,

none

of

which

seems particularly trong.First,

the states know that there is some true

probabilityp hat ne statewould

win

n

a

military

ontest.As

discussed elow,

itcould be that hestateshave conflictingstimates f the ikelihood fvictory,

and

if

both sides are

optimistic

bout their chances this can

obscure the

bargaining ange.But evenifthe stateshave private nd conflictingstimates

of

whatwould happen

n

a

war,

f

hey

re

rational, hey

houldknow hat

here

can

be only

one

true probability

hat

one

or the otherwill

prevail perhaps

different

rom heir

wn estimate).

Thus rational tates houldknow hat here

must

n

fact

xist

set of

agreements

ll

prefer

o a

fight.

Second,

t

s assumed

that he

states re risk-averse

r

risk-neutralver the

issues.Because risk ttitude s defined elative

o an

underlying etricsuchas

money

n

economics),

he substantive

meaning

f this

ssumption epends

on

the

bargaining

ontext.

oosely,

t

says

hat he states

prefer fifty-fiftyplit

r

shareofwhatevers at issue inwhatevermetrictcomes, fany)to a fifty-fifty

chance at

all or

nothing,

here thisrefers

o

the value of

winning

r

losing

war.

In

effect,

he

assumption

means that eaders do not like

gambling

when

the downside isk

s

losing

t

war,

which eems

plausiblegiven

he

presumption

that tate eadersnormally

ish o retain

erritory

nd

power.

A

risk-acceptant

leader is analogousto a compulsive ambler-willing o accepta sequence of

gambles

that has the

expected

outcome of

eliminating

he

state and

regime.

Evenifwe admitted uch a leader as rational,tseems doubtful hatmanyhave

held suchpreferencesHitlerbeing possibleexception).

16. On the theoryof bargainingwith outside options,

see Martin J. Osborne and

Ariel

Rubinstein, argainingndMarkets New York: Academic

Press,1990), chap. 3; Motty erry, An

Example of Price

Formation n BilateralSituations, conometrica 0 (March 1986), pp. 313-21;

and RobertPowell, Bargaining

n

theShadow

of Power

University

fCalifornia, erkeley,

993,

mimeographed). ee

also

the

analyses

n R. Harrison

Wagner,

Peace, War, and the Balance

of

Power, American olitical

cienceReview 8 (September1994),

pp. 593-607; and Wagner, The

Causes

of

Peace.




12/37

War 389

Finally, t was assumed that a continuousrange of peaceful settlements

(from to 1) exists.

n

otherwords, he ssues

n

dispute

re

perfectly ivisible,

so that here re always easiblebargains etween hestates'reservationevels

p

-

CA

and

p +

CB.

This

third

ssumption mmediately uggests tenable

rationalist xplanation

or

war. Perhaps something bout the natureof some

internationalssues, uch as which uccessorwill iton a throne, oes not admit

finely raded divisions nd compromise.

f

so, then mallcostsforfightingnd

bad luck

may

make for

ationalwar over uch ssues.

But we would immediatelyike to knowwhatabout the natureof an issue

makes it

impossible o divide up. On more thought, his seems empirically

implausible.

n

the first lace, most issues states negotiate

over

are quite

complex-theyhave manydimensions f concern and allow many possible

settlements.

econd,

if states can

simply ay

each

other

sums

of

money

or

goods (which hey an,

in

principle),

r make

linkages

with ther

ssues,

then

this hould have the effect f

making ny

ssues n

disputeperfectly

ivisible.

Before the age of nationalism, rinces oftenbought, old,

and

partitioned

land.17

n

the nineteenth entury he United States purchased he Louisiana

territory

rom

rance, and Alaska fromRussia, and as late as 1898 President

McKinley xplored

he

possibility

f

buying uba from pain

in

order o

avoid

a war over

t.18

Third, fsomethingbout the natureofan issue means that t

can be

settled

n

only, ay,

two

ways,

hen some sortof

random llocation

or

alternation etween the two resolutions ould

in

principle

erve

to

create

intermediate argains.Mafiadons,for xample, pparently ave avoidedcostly

internalwars

by using

lotteries to allocate construction

ontracts mong

families.19

In practice, reating ntermediate ettlements ith cash, with inkagesto

other

issues, or

with randomization r alternation ften seems difficult

r

impossible

or

tates engaged

n

a dispute.

For

example,

he mmediate ssue

thatgave rise to the Franco-Prussianwar was a disputeover whichprince

would take the

Spanish

throne.

t

doubtless ccurred

o no one to

propose

that

the twocandidates lternate

earbyyear,

r three

years

for he

Hapsburg

nd

one

for

he

Hohenzollern,

r whatever.

n this

ase

as

in

many thers,

he ssue

could in

principle

have been made more continuous nd was

not for other

reasons-here, alternating ingswould have

violated o

many onventions

nd

norms

as

to

have been domestically

nworkable.To

give

a more realistic

17. See, for example, Evan Luard, War in International ociety New Haven, Conn.: Yale

University ress,1992), p. 191. Schroedernotes

that

patronage, ribes, nd corruption

ere a

major lement

f

eighteenth-centurynternationalelations. ee Paul Schroeder, he Transforma-

tion fEuropeanPolitics, 763-1848 Oxford:OxfordUniversityress,1994),p. 579.

18. On Cuba, see Ernest May, mperialDemocracy New York: Harper and Row, 1961), pp.

149-50. On the Louisiana purchase,military hreats aised in the U.S. Senate apparentlymade

Napoleon more eager to negotiate he sale. See E. Wilson Lyon,Louisiana in French iplomacy

(Norman:Universityf Oklahoma Press,1934), pp.

179

and

214ff.

19. Diego Gambetta,The SicilianMafia: The Business f Private rotectionCambridge,Mass.:

Harvard

Universityress,1993), p. 214.




13/37

390

International

rganization

example,nineteenth-

nd

twentieth-century

eaderscannotdivide

up

and trade

territoryn international egotiations s easily as could rulers

n

the seven-

teenth ndeighteenthenturies, ue inpart o domestic olitical onsequences

of the rise of

nationalism; ontrast,

or

xample,

he

Congress

f Vienna

with

thenegotiations ollowing

WorldWar

I.

So

in

principle

the

indivisibility

f the issues that

are the

subject of

international argaining an provide

coherent ationalist

xplanation

orwar.

However,

he

real

question

n

suchcases is

what

prevents

eaders from

reating

intermediate ettlements, nd the answer s likely

o

be

other

mechanisms

(often

domestic

political)

rather han the nature of the issues themselves.20

Both the intrinsicomplexitynd richness

f most

matters

ver

which tates

negotiate and the availability

f

linkages

and

side-payments uggest

that

intermediate argains ypically illexist.

It is thusnot sufficiento say thatpositive xpectedutility y

tself

upplies

coherent r

compelling

ationalist

xplanation

or

war.Provided

hat he

ssues

in

dispute are sufficientlyivisible, r that side-paymentsre possible,there

should exist set ofnegotiated greements hathavegreaterutility orboth

sides thanthe

gamble

ofwar does. The reason

s

that he

expost nefficiency

f

war

opens up an exantebargaining ange.

So, to explainhowwarcould occurbetweenrationallyed states,we need to

answer the

following uestion.

Given the existence

of

an ex ante

bargaining

range,whymight tatesfail either o locate or

to

agree on

an

outcome

n

this

range, o avoiding hecostsand risks

f

war?

War

due

to

private

nformation

nd incentives

to

misrepresent

Two commonly mployedrationalist xplanations n the literature irectly

address thepreceding uestion.Both turn

on

the claim

thatwar

can be

and

often s the

product

of

rationalmiscalculation. ne

explanation

holds that a

state's leaders

may rationally

verestimate

heir

chance

of

military ictory

against

an

adversary,

o

producing disagreement

bout

relative

power

that

only

war can resolve. The other

argues

that

rationally

ed

states

may

lack

informationbout an adversary's illingness o fightversome nterest nd so

may hallenge

n the mistaken elief hatwarwillnotfollow.

In

this

section

I

argue

that while these ideas

point

toward a tenable

rationalist xplanation orwar, neither oes farenough and neitherworksby

itself. oth

neglect

he fact hat tates an

in

principle

ommunicate ith ach

other

nd so

avoid a

costly

miscalculation frelative

ower

r

will.The cause of

20. In one of the only articles on

this

problem,

Morrow

proposes

a

private

nformation

explanation

or tates' failures o

link

ssues n

manydisputes.

ee

JamesD.

Morrow, Signaling

Difficulties ithLinkage n CrisisBargaining, nternationaltudies

Quarterly

6

(June 1992), pp.

153-72.




14/37

War 391

war

cannot be

simply ack ofinformation,ut whatever t is

thatprevents ts

disclosure. arguethat hefact hat

tateshave

ncentiveso misrepresent

heir

positions s crucialhere, xplaining nrationalistermswhy iplomacymaynot

allow

rational tates

to

clarify isagreements bout

relative oweror to

avoid

the

miscalculation f resolve.

The

mainstream

nternationalelations

iterature

ecognizes heexistence f

both

private nformationnd

incentives o

misrepresent, ut

typically iews

them

as

background onditions

o

be taken for

grantedrather han

as key

elements f

anexplanation

fhow

rationally

ed

statesmight nd

up

at war.

For

example,JackLevy's mpressive eview f

the iterature n the

causes of war

contains

nothing

on

the

role

of

incentives

o misrepresentnd

discusses

private nformationargely n the context fmisperceptions f otherstates'

intentions

which are

linked to

psychological iases). This

is

an

accurate

reflectionf

where hesefactors tand

n themainstream

iterature.

Disagreements

about relative

power

Geoffrey lainey's

well-known nd often-cited

rgument

s

that

wars

usually

egin

whentwo

nations

disagree

on

their elative

trength. 22

t

is

easy

to see howa disagreementboutrelative trength-understoods conflicting

estimatesof

the

likelihood

of

military

ictory-can

eliminate

any

ex

ante

bargaining ange. Recall the

example givenabove,where two states

bargain

over

the

division f

$100,

and each has

the

outside

option

of

going

to

war. If

each

expects

hat t

surely

would

prevail

t

war,

hen

ach side's

expected

alue

for

the

war option s

$80 (1 *

100

+

0 0

-

20).

So

given

these

expectations,

neither ide will

accept

less

than

$80

in

the

bargaining, mplying

hat no

negotiated

utcome s

mutually referred

o war. More

generally,uppose

that

state

A

expects

o winwith

robabilityp,

tate

B

expects

o win

with

robability

r, and p and r sum to greaterthan one. Such conflictingxpectationswill

certainly

hrink nd could

eliminate

ny

x

ante

bargaining

ange.

But how

could

rationally

ed states

have

conflicting

xpectations bout the

likely

utcomeof

military

onflict?

n

the

extreme

ase,

how could

both

sides

rationally xpect

to

win?

The literature

barely

addresses

this

question

in

21.

See Jack Levy, The Causes of

War: A

Review of Theories and Evidence,

in Philip E.

Tetlock et

al., eds.,

Behavior, ociety,

nd

Nuclear

War,

vol.

1

(Oxford:OxfordUniversity ress,

1989),

pp. 209-333. Recent work

using limited-information

ame theory to

analyze crisis

bargaining laces thestrategic onsequences ofprivate nformationt thecenter f the analysis.

See,

for

xamples,

Bruce Bueno

de

Mesquita

and

David

Lalman,

War nd

Reason

(New Haven,

Conn.: Yale

University

ress, 1992);

James D.

Fearon,

Domestic

Political Audiences

and

the

Escalation

of nternational

isputes, American olitical

cienceReview 8

(September1994), pp.

577-92;JamesD.

Morrow, Capabilities,Uncertainty,nd

Resolve:

A

Limited nformation odel

of

Crisis

Bargaining, merican ournal

fPolitical cience33

(November 989), pp.

941-72; Barry

Nalebuff,

Brinksmanship nd Nuclear Deterrence:

The Neutrality f

Escalation, Conflict

Managementnd

Peace

Science

9

(Spring1986), pp.

19-30;

and

RobertPowell,Nuclear

Deterrence

Theory:he

Problem f Credibility

Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityress,1990).

22. Blainey,The

Causes of War, . 246.




15/37

392

International rganization

explicit

erms.Blainey,

whom the literature iewsas advancing

rationalist

explanation

or

war,

nfactexplainsdisagreements

bout relative

power as a

consequence of human irrationality. e says that mutual optimism bout

victory

n

war

s

the

product

f moods which annot

be groundedn fact nd

which permeate

what appear

to be rational assessments

of the relative

military

trength

f twocontending owers.

Mutualoptimisms

said to result

from

process by

whichnationsevade

reality, which

hardly ounds like

a

rationalistxplanation.23

Conflictingxpectations

bout the

ikely

utcome

of

military

onflict

may

be

explained

n

three

ways. First,

s

Blainey suggests,

motionalcommitments

could irrationally

ias

leaders'

military stimates.

They might,

or nstance,

come to believe nationalistrhetoricholdingthat their soldiersare more

courageous

and

spirited

han those

of

the

adversary.24

econd,the

world s

a

very

complex place,

and for this reason

military

nalysts

n

different

tates

could reach different

onclusions

bout the

ikely mpact

f

different

echnolo-

gies,

doctrines,nd

tactics nthe expected

ourseof

battle.Third, tate eaders

mighthave private

information

bout

militarily

elevantfactors-military

capabilities,

trategy,

nd

tactics;

he

population's

willingness

o

prosecute

a

long war;

or third-statententions.

f

a state has superior and

so private)

informationbout any suchfactor, hen ts estimate fthe probablecourseof

battle

may

differ rom

hat f an

adversary.

Under

a strict ut

standarddefinition

f

rationality,

nly

he third

xplana-

tion

qualifies

s an account

of how

rationally

ed statescould have

conflicting

estimates

f the

probability

f

winning

n

war.

As

arguedby

John

Harsanyi,

f

two rational gentshave the

same

informationbout

an

uncertain vent, hen

they

hould have the same

beliefs bout its ikely

utcome.25he claim s

that

given

dentical nformation,

ruly ational

agents should

reason to the same

conclusions

about the

probability

f

one uncertain

outcome or another.

Conflictingstimates hould occuronly f the agentshave differentand so

necessarily rivate)

nformation.26

23. Ibid., p. 54.

Blainey also blames patriotic

nd nationalistic ervor, eaders' (irrational)

tendency o surround hemselves

ith

yes-men,

nd crowdpsychology.

24. See Ralph K.

White,NobodyWanted

War:Misperceptionn Vietnam nd OtherWars

New

York: Doubleday/Anchor),

hap. 7; Blainey,The Causes of War,p.

54; and RichardNed

Lebow,

BetweenPeace and War: The Nature of

International rises Baltimore,

Md.: Johns Hopkins

Universityress,1981), p.

247.

25. JohnC. Harsanyi, Games with ncompletenformation layed By Bayesian' Players, art

III, Management cience

14

March 1968), pp.

486-502.

26. Aumann observed an interesting

mplication f this doctrine:

genuinely ational agents

cannot agree to disagree,

n the sense that t cannotbe commonly

nown hat hey re

rational

and that theyhold

differentstimates

f the likelihoodof some uncertain

vent. See Robert

Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree,

The Annals of Statistics (November

1976), pp. 1236-39.

Emerson Niou, Peter

Ordeshook, nd GregoryRose note that this

mplies that rational tates

cannot agree

to disagree

about

the probability

hat

one

or

the

otherwould win n a

war

in The

Balance of Power:

Stabilityn the nternational

ystem Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity

ress,

1989), p. 59.




16/37

War 393

It follows that the second explanationfor disagreements bout relative

power isted bove-the complexity

f the

world-is not a rationalist ccount.

Instead, it is an account that explains conflictingmilitary stimates as a

consequence of bounded rationality.

n

this

view,

eaders

or

militarynalysts

with

the

same

information

bout

military echnology, trategy, oliticalwill,

etc.

might

eason to differentonclusions bout

the

likely

ourse

of a

war

because of differentialbility o cope with omplexity f the problem.This is

entirely lausible,

but

t s

a bounded

rationalityxplanation

ather han

fully

rationalist ne.27

The

rationalist ccount of how disagreements

bout

the probability f

winningmight

rise also seems

empirically lausible.

States

certainly

ave

private nformation bout factors ffecting he likelycourse of battle-for

example, they ealously guard military

ecrets

and

often have

superior

informationbout what an ally will or will not fight or. Nonetheless,while

private nformation

bout

militarilyelevant apabilities rovides

first

tep,

t

does notprovide

coherent ationalist

xplanation

orwar.The

problem

s

that

even

f

eaders

have such

private nformation,hey

houldunderstand hat heir

ownestimates ased on this nformationre suspectbecause they o not know

the other

side's private

nformation.n

principle,

oth

sides

could

gain by

sharing nformation,hichwouldyielda consensusmilitarystimate absent

bounded

rationality). nd,

as

shown bove, doing

o could not

help

but reveal

bargains

hatbothwould

prefer

o

a

fight.28

So the

question

f

how

rationally

ed states an

disagree

boutrelative

ower

devolves

o

the questionof whatprevents tates

from

haring rivate nforma-

tion

about

factors

hat

might

ffect

he

course

of battle.

Before

turning

o

this

question,

will

consider

the

second common

explanation

orhow a rational

miscalculation

mayproduce

war.

War due to themiscalculation ofan opponent's willingness

to

fight

Many wars have been given he followingo-called rationalist xplanation:

state A

transgressed

ome

interest f

state B in

the erroneousbelief

that

B

would

not

fight

war over

the matter. hough

rationallyed,

state A lacked

informationbout B's willingnessofightndsimply appenedtoguesswrong,

causing

a war.

Thus,

some

say

that

Germany

miscalculatedRussian

and/or

British

willingness

o

fight

n

1914;

Hitler

miscalculated

Britain nd

France's

27.

On bounded rationality,

ee

Herbert

A.

Simon, A

BehavioralModel

of Rational Choice,

Quarterlyoumal f

Economics 9

(February 955),pp.

99-118.

28. This

analysis

uns

exactly arallel to work

n

law and economicson pretrial argaining

n

legal disputes.Early studies explained costly itigation s resulting romdivergent xpectations

about the likely rialoutcome,while n more recentwork uch expectations erivefrom rivate

informationbout the strengthf one's case. For a review nd references, ee RobertD. Cooter

and

Daniel

L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis f Legal Disputes

and Their

Resolution, ournal f

EconomicLiterature7 (September 989), pp. 1067-97.




17/37

394 International rganization

willingness o resist

his

drive

o the

east; Japanese

eaders in

1941 miscalcu-

lated U.S. willingness o fight long war over

control

n

the South Pacific;

NorthKorea miscalculated .S. willingnessodefend outhKorea; theUnited

States

miscalculated hina's

willingness

o

defend

North

Korea;

and so on. In

each

case,

the

argument

ould hold that

ack

of nformationed

a

more-or-less

rational ctor o guesswrong bout the extent fthebargaining ange.

Blainey has argued that if states agree on

relativepower they are very

unlikely

o

go

to

war

against

ach other.29

t is

worth ointing ut that

n

the

preceding rgument, ar

can

occur despite

complete agreement n relative

power

across states.To show how

and for

ater

use,

I

will ntroduce

simple

model

of

international argaining.

As

in

the empirical xamples ust men-

tioned,

n the model one state

unilaterally

hoosessome revision f thestatus

quo.

The

second state an then

ither

cquiesce

to the

revision

r can

go

to war

to reverse t.

Formally, uppose there

s

a

status

quo

resolution

f the

issuesq

E

X and

that tate

A has

theopportunity

o choose

any

outcome

E

X, presentingtate

B with fait

ccompli.On observing

hat

tate

A did

whichmight

e

nothing,

i.e.,

x

=

q), state

B can choose whether

o

go

to war

or

to

acquiesce to A's

revision

f

the status uo.

If neither tate has anyprivate nformation,o that ll payoffsre common

knowledge, tate

A does best

to

push

the

outcome ust up

to B's reservation

levelp

+

CB,whichmakes

B

justwilling

o

acquiesce

rather hango to war.With

complete nformation,hen,

he

statesavoid the inefficientutcomeof war.30

On the other

hand,

if state

B

has

private

information bout either its

capabilities which

ffect

)

or its value

for

he- ssues at

stake

relative o the

costs

of conflict

CB),

then

state

A

may

not know

whether a

particular

demand x will

yield

war

or

peace. Lacking

this

nformation,

tateA faces a

trade-off

n

deciding

whether nd howmuch

erritory

o

grab :

The

larger

he

grab,the greaterthe risk of war, but the betteroffA will be if state B

acquiesces.

Suppose,

for

example,

hat

A

and

B

share

a commonestimate

f

p-they

agree

about relative

ower-but

thatA is

unsure

bout B's

costs for

fighting.

Under

very

road

conditions,

f

A cannot earn B's

private

nformationnd

if

A's

own

costs

re

not

too

large,

hen tateA's

optimal

grabproduces positive

chance ofwar.31

ntuitively,

f

A is

not

too fearful f the costsofwar relative o

29. Blainey,The Causes of War.

30. This take-it-or-leave-itodel of international argaining s proposed and analyzedunder

conditions f both complete and incomplete nformation

n

James D. Fearon, Threats to Use

Force: The Role of Costly ignals n International rises, Ph.D. diss., University f California,

Berkeley, 992, chap. 1. Similarresults

ormore

elaborate bargaining

tructures

re given

n

my

own work

in

progress. See James

D.

Fearon, Game-Theoretic

Models of International

Bargaining: n Overview, Universityf Chicago, 1995. Powell

has

analyzed n alternativemodel

in whichboth sides must gree

if

the statusquo is

to

be revised. ee Powell, Bargaining

n

the

Shadow of Power.

31. See Claim 2

in

theAppendix.




18/37

War 395

what might

e gained

in

bargaining,

t will run some

riskof war

in

hopes

of

gaining

on

the

ground.

So Blainey's suggestion

hat

a

disagreement

bout

relative ower snecessary orwar s incorrect-allthat s necessary sthat he

states

in

dispute

be unable

to locate

or agree

on

some

outcome in

the

bargaining

ange.

Sincethe bargaining

ange s determined

ot

ust byrelative

power

but also by

states'values

for heissues

at stake

relative o the costs

of

fighting,

ncertainty

bout

the atter an

(and apparently

oes)

producewar.

Once again,

t

s entirely

lausible

hat tate eaders

have private

nformation

about

their

value

forvarious

nternational

nterests elative

o their osts

of

fighting

ver them.32

hus it seems we

have a second

tenable

rationalist

explanation

or

war, gain

based on

the

concept

of

private

nformation.

ut

as

inthecase of disagreementsboutrelative ower, heexplanation ails s given

because

it

does notexplain

why

tatescannot

avoid miscalculating

potential

opponent's

willingness

o fight.

n the model,why

annot state

A simply

sk

state

B whether

t

would

fight ather

han cquiesce

to

a

particular

emand?

To

give

a concrete xample,why

did

German

eaders

n

1914

not

simply

sk their

British nd Russian

counterparts

hat

they

would

do

if

Austriawere

to attack

Serbia?

f

they

ould have

done

so and

if

he answers

ould have

been believed,

the Germansmight

not have miscalculated

oncerning

Russian and,

more

importantly,ritishwillingness o fight. n consequence theymighthave

avoidedthe

horrendous ostsof World

War

I.

To recap,

have

argued hat

n a rationalist

ramework,

isagreements

bout

relative ower

nd uncertainty

bout a potential

pponent's

willingness

o fight

must

have the same source:

eaders' private

nformation

bout factors

ffecting

the ikely

ourse

of a

war

or their esolve

ofightver pecific

nterests.

n

order

to avoid

war's ex post inefficiency,

eaders

have incentives

o share

anysuch

private

information,

hich would

have the

effectof revealing

peaceful

settlements

hat ie within

he

bargaining

ange.So,

to

explain

how war could

occurbetween tates ed byrational eaders whoconsider he costsoffighting,

we need to

explain

what

would

prevent

them

from

sharing

such

private

information.

Incentives

to

misrepresent

n

bargaining

Prewar

bargaining

may

fail

to locate

an outcome

n the

bargaining ange

because

of strategic

ncentives

o withhold

r

misrepresent

rivate

nformation.

While tates

have an incentive

o avoid the

costs

of

war,

hey

lso wish

o obtain

a favorableresolutionof the issues. This latter desire can give them an

incentive

oexaggerate

heir ruewillingness

r

capability

o

fight,

f

by

doing o

they might

deter futurechallenges

or

persuade

the other side

to make

concessions.

tates

can also have an

incentive

o

conceal

their

apabilities

r

resolve,

f

they

re concerned

hatrevelation

would make them

militarilyand

32. For examples

nd discussion

n

thispoint, ee Fearon,

Threats

o Use Force,

chap.

3.




19/37

396

International rganization

hence politically)

ulnerable r would reduce the

chances for successful

irst

strike. imilarly,

tates

may conceal

their ruewillingness o fight

n order to

avoid appearing s the aggressor.

Combinedwiththe factof private nformation,

hese various ncentives o

misrepresent

an explainwhy

ven rational eaders

may

be unable to avoid the

miscalculations

f relative

will and

power

that an cause

war. This

section irst

considers why

this is so

theoretically

nd then discusses two empirical

examples.

A drawback

f the

simple

bargaining

model

given

bove

was that tateB had

no opportunity

o try o communicate

tswillingness

o

fight

o

state

A. It

s easy

to magine hat

f

ommunication

ere possible-say,

if

B

couldannounce

what

interests

n

X it considered

ital

nough

o

fight

ver-this mightt least ower

the chance

of war by miscalculation.

o check this,

we

give

state B an initial

opportunity

o make a

foreignpolicy

announcement

which can be

any

statement bout

ts

foreign olicy

r

what t considers o

be vitalor

peripheral

interests.Assume

as before hatA

is

uncertain

bout B's capabilities

r

costs

for

ighting.)

If

the announcement

tself as no effect

n either ide'spayoffs,hen

t can

be shown hat

n

any equilibrium

n which tate A does

not choose

randomly

amongdemands,A willmake the same demandregardless fwhat tateB says,

and the

ex

ante risk

of war will remain the same as

in

the game

without

communication

y

state

B. To

gain

an intuition

or

hese

results,

uppose

that

A conditioned

ts behavioron

fi

rabbing

more

or less

depending

n

what B

announced.

Then

regardless

fB's true

willingness

o

fight,

does

bestto make

the announcement

hat eads to

the

smallestgrabby

A-that is,

B

has

an

incentive

o misrepresentts actual willingness

o resist.But then A learns

nothing rom he announcement.33

This conclusion

is

slightly

ltered

if

the leaders

of B can render the

announcement costly o make.34 n practice, ive ommonmethods nclude

buildingweapons, mobilizing

troops, signing

alliance

treaties,supporting

troops

n a

foreign and,

and

creating

domesticpolitical

costs thatwould

be

paid

if

the announcement

proves

false. Of

course, signaling

by

means of

domestic

political

audience

costs

lies

outside

a

purelyunitary

ational-actor

framework,

ince this

presumes

staterun

by

an

agent

on behalf

f

a principal

(the audience )

rather

han

unitary

tatewith

perfectly

ecure

eadership.

In

the atter ase, leaders may

be

able to make

foreign olicy nnouncements

33. See theAppendix or roofs fthese

laims.

Cheap

talk nnouncements

an

affect

utcomes

in some bargaining ontexts. or an example from conomics, ee Joseph Farrell

and Robert

Gibbons, Cheap

Talk

Can

Matter n Bargaining, ournal f

Economic Theory

8

(June1989),pp.

221-37. These authors

show

how

cheap

talk might redibly ignal a willingness

o negotiate

seriously hat hen

ffectsubsequent erms f trade.For an example

from nternationalelations,

see JamesD. Morrow,

Modeling the

Forms of International ooperation:

Distribution ersus

Information,

nternational rganization

8 (Summer1994), pp.

387-423.

34. The

conclusion s likewise ltered

f

the

possibility

f

repeated

nteractionsn sufficiently

similar ontexts s

great nough hat eputation

uilding

an be

supported.




20/37

War

397

credible nlyby engaging n

international

eputation, aking inanciallyostly

mobilizationmeasures, or bearing the costs and

risks

of

limited

military

engagements.35

Even when the signal s costly, owever, hiswill not n generalcompletely

eliminate ll risk fwarbymiscalculation-indeed,

t

may

ven ncrease t.

The

reasonconcerns

henature f the

signals

hat tateshave ncentives o send. To

be genuinelynformativebout a state's actualwillingnessr ability

o

fight,

signalmustbe costly

n

such a waythat state

with esser

resolve

r

capability

might otwish o send t.Actions hatgenerate

real risk f

war-for example,

troopmobilizations

hat

ngage a leadership's eputation efore nternational

ordomestic udiences-can easily atisfyhis onstraint,ince stateswithhigh

resolve are less fearful f taking hem. n otherwords, rational tatemay

choose to run real

risk

f

inefficient)

ar

n

order o

signal

hat twill

fight

f

notgiven good

deal in

bargaining.36

The July risis fWorldWar provides everal xamples fhow ncentives o

misrepresent an make miscalculations f resolvehard to dispel. Soon after

German

leaders

secretly

endorsed Austrian

plans

to

crush

Serbia, they

receivedboth direct nd indirect erbal ndications rom t. Petersburg hat

Russia would fight ather than acquiesce.37For example, on 21 July, he

Russian ForeignMinister oldthe German mbassador hat Russia would not

be able

to

tolerateAustria-Hungary'ssingthreateninganguage

to

Serbia

or

takingmilitary

easures. 38

uch

verbal tatements ad

little

ffect

n

German

leaders' beliefs,however, ince they knew Russian leaders had a strategic

incentive o misrepresent. n 18 July n a cable explaining erlin'spolicy o

Ambassador Lichnowsky

n

London, Secretary

of

State Jagow wrote that

there

s certain

o be

some blustering

n St.

Petersburg. 39imilarly,

henon

26

July ichnowsky egan

to

report

hat

Britain

might oin

with

France

and

Russia in the eventofwar, German ChancellorBethmannHollweg

told

his

personalassistant f the dangerthat France and Englandwillcommit heir

support

o

Russia

in order

not to alienate

it,perhaps

without

eallybelieving

35. On signaling osts

n

crises and audience costs n particular,ee Fearon, Threats to Use

Force, and Domestic Political

Audiences

and

the Escalation

of

nternational isputes.

For an

excellent nalysis f international

ignaling

n

general, ee

Robert

Jervis,

he

Logic of mages

n

Intemational

elations Princeton, .J.:

Princeton niversityress,1970).

36. For developed models thatmakethispoint, ee JamesFearon, Deterrenceand theSpiral

Model: The Role of Costly ignals n CrisisBargaining, aper presented t the

annual

meeting f

the AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation, 0 August-2 September1990,San Francisco,Calif.;

Fearon, Domestic PoliticalAudiences

and the Escalation of International isputes ; Morrow,

Capabilities,Uncertainty,nd Resolve ;

Nalebuff,Brinkmanship

nd Nuclear

Deterrence ;

nd

Powell,NuclearDeterrence heory.

37. Luigi Albertini, heOrigins f theWar

of 1914,

vol.

2

(London: OxfordUniversity ress,

1953), pp. 183-87.

38.

Ibid.,p. 187.

39. Ibid., p. 158. For the fulltextof

the cable, see

Karl

Kautsky, omp., GermanDocuments

Relating

o

theOutbreak f heWorldWar New York: OxfordUniversityress,1924),doc. no. 71, p.

130.




21/37

398

Internationalrganization

that or s mobilization

eans

war, hinkingf tas

a

bluff hich

hey nswer

with counterbluff. 40

At the sametime, heChancellor ad an incentiveomisrepresenthe

strength

nd

natureof German upport

or

Austria's

plans.Bethmann

correctlynticipated

hatrevealing

his nformation

ould

make Germany

appear

he ggressor,

hichmight ndermine

ocialDemocraticupport

or

his policies

n Germany

s well as turn

ritishublic pinion

more olidly

against

is

tate.41

his ncentiveed the

Chancellor

o

avoid

making

irect r

pointed

nquiries

boutEngland's ttitude

n

case

ofwar.The incentivelso

led

him

o pretend

o

go

alongwith he

British oreign ecretary's

roposals

for conference

o mediate

he

dispute.42

n

consequence,

ord

Greymay

ot

have raspedheneedfor strongerarningoGermanyntil airlyate n he

crisis

on

29

July),y

which ime

diplomatic

nd

military

ctions

ad

made

backing

ffmore ifficult

or othAustria

nd

Germany.

In

July 914,

ncentives

o

misrepresentrivate

nformationostered

nd

supported

miscalculations

fwillingness

o

fight.

iscalculations

f

relative

poweran

rise rom

his

ame

ource. n the

ne

hand,

tates

ttimes ave n

incentive

o

exaggerate

heir

apabilities

n an

attempt

o do better

n

bargaining.

nthe ther

and, hey

an

also have hewell-known

ncentiveo

withholdnformationbout apabilitiesndstrategy.resumablyecauseof

the tronglyero-sum

spect

fmilitaryngagements,

state hat

as

uperior

knowledge

f

n

adversary's

ar

plans

may

o

better

n

war

ndthus

n

prewar

bargaining-hence,

tates arely ublicize

war

plans.

While

the theoretical

logic

has not beenworked ut,

t

seems

plausible

hat

tates'

ncentiveso

conceal

nformation

bout

apabilities

nd

strategy

ould

help explain

ome

disagreements

bout

elative

ower.

The

1904

war etween

apan

ndRussia erves

o llustratehis cenario. n

the

eve of the

war,

Russian eaders elieved

hat heir

military

ould

lmost

certainlyefeat apan.43nthis onvictionhey ifferedittle rom heview f

most

uropean

bservers.

y

contrast,

t

the mperial

ouncil

f

4

February

that ecided

or

war,

he

Japanese

hief

f

taffstimated

fifty-fifty

hance f

40. Konrad

Jarausch,

The Illusion

of LimitedWar: ChancellorBethmannHollweg's

Calcu-

lated Risk, Central uropean

History (March

1969), pp. 48-76. The

quotation s drawnfrom .

65.

41. See L. C. F. Turner,Origins f

theFirstWorldWar New

York: Norton, 970), p. 101;

and

Jarausch,

The Illusionof LimitedWar,

p. 63.

Trachtenberg rites hat

one of Bethmann's asic

goals was forGermany o avoid coming cross as the aggressor. ee Marc Trachtenberg, istory

and Strategy

Princeton, .J.:Princeton

niversityress,

1991), p. 90.

42. Albertini oncludes

hat on the evening f the

27th ll the Chancellor ought

o do was to

throw ust

n

the eyes of Grey

and lead himto believe that

Berlinwas

seriously rying

o avert

conflict,

hat

f

war brokeout it

would be Russia's

fault nd thatEngland could therefore

emain

neutral. ee Albertini,

he

Origins f

heWar f1914,

vol.

1, pp.

444-45. See alsoTurner, rigins f

the irstWorld

War, . 99.

43.

See J.

A.

White,

The

Diplomacy

of

the

Russo-Japanese

War

(Princeton,

N.J.:Princeton

University

ress,1964), pp. 142-43;

and

Ian

Nish,

The

Origins f

the

Russo-Japanese

War London:

Longman,

985), pp.

241-42.




22/37

War 399

prevailing,

f

their

ttack

egan mmediately.44hus

Japanese

nd Russian

leaders

disagreed boutrelative ower-their

stimatesf the ikelihood f

victoryummedogreaterhan .

Moreover, istoricalccounts

mplicate

his

isagreement

s a

major ause

of the

war:

Russia's

refusal o compromiseespite

epeated

ffers

y the

Japanese

as motivatedn

argemeasure

y

heir elief hat

Japan

would

not

dare

ttack hem. he Japanese abinet inallyecided

orwar fter heTsar

andhis

dvisersailed omake

ny

eal

ompromises

verKorea rManchuria

in a

series fproposalsxchangedn 1903.The Tsar

nd his op dvisers ere

hardlyager ofight,ot

ecause hey xpectedo ose

butbecause hey aw n

Asianwar

s a

costly

iversionfresources

o thewrongheater.45onethe-

less, hey efusedo make oncessionsrom hat hey iewed s a positionf

great

militarytrength.hey elieved

hat

Japan

wouldhave

o settle

or

ess,

givents elative

ilitary

eakness.46

The

disagreement

rose n substantial

art

rom

apanese rivate

nforma-

tion bout heir

militaryapabilities

nd

how

hey

ompared

ithRussia's.A

far

uperior

ntelligence

ervice ad

provided

he

Japanese

military

ith clear

picture

f

Russian

trengths

nd weaknessesn Northeast

sia

and enabled

them

o

develop

n

effective

ffensive

trategy.ccording

o JohnAlbert

White, ue tothisntelligencetheJapanese overnmentpparentlyaced he

warwith farmore

ccurateonception

f

heir

ask han

heir

nemy

ad. 47

In

addition,ompared ith he

Russians

r

ndeed

with

ny uropean ower,

Japanese eaders

had

muchbetter nowledge

f the

fightingbility

f

the

relativelyntested apanese

rmy

ndof he

ffect

f

he eforms,raining,nd

capital evelopment

f he

previous

ecade.48

If

by ommunicating

his

rivate

nformationhe

Japanese

ouldhave

ed

the

Russians

o

see

that heir hances

f

victoryere

maller han

xpected,hey

might

ave

done

o. Almost ll historiansho

have

arefully

xaminedhe ase

agree hat heJapanese overnmentasnot ent nwar orts wn ake-they

44. J. N. Westwood,Russia AgainstJapan, 1904-5: A New Look at the

Russo-JapaneseWar

(Albany: State University

f

New York Press, 1986),

p.

22.

Estimates

ariedwithin he

Japanese

leadership, utwith heexception f unior-level fficers,ew eem to havebeen

highlyonfident f

victory.

or

example,

s

the decisionforwar

was taken

the Japanese navy equested

a

two-week

delay

to allow it to even the odds at

sea.

See

Nish,

The

Origins f

the

Russo-JapaneseWar,pp.

197-200

and

206-7.

45.

See,

for

example,

David

Walder,

The Short ictorious

War: The

Russo-Japanese onflict,

1904-5 London: Hutchinson, 973),pp. 53-56; and Nish,The Origins f he

Russo-JapaneseWar, .

253.

46. See White,TheDiplomacy ftheRusso-JapaneseWar, haps. 6-8; Nish,The

Origins f the

Russo-JapaneseWar, . 241; and Lebow,Between eace and War, p. 244-46.

47.

White,

The

Diplomacy f

the

Russo-JapaneseWar,p.

139. Nish

writes hat manyRussians

certainly ook viewof theJapanesemilitary] hichwas der