The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 11 | Issue 26 | Number 3 | Article ID 4142 | Jun 30, 2013

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From Cold War Thaws to the Arctic Thaw: The ChangingArctic and Its Security Implications for East Asia 冷戦解凍から北極圏解凍へ　東アジア安全保障にとっての意義

Kimie Hara

Global climate change is profoundly reshapingthe Arctic region, not only physically but also ininternational politics. Yet Arctic development isof concern to more than the Circumpolarstates. The issues are global, and East Asia isno exception. Japan, South Korea and China inparticular have been increasingly deepeningtheir involvement in Arctic affairs. The evolvingsituation of the Arctic region could also havesignificant impact on political relations and theregional security architecture in East Asia,providing new opportunities for cooperationand additional sources of conflict. This paperconsiders security implications of the Arcticthaw to East Asia, where the structure of theregional Cold War confrontation profoundlyshapes the geopolitical order to this day.

Unlike Europe, where the Cold War structureof the Yalta System was completely demolishedby the early 1990s, the structure of theregional Cold War confrontation remainsprofoundly embedded in East Asia. It has gonethrough political “thaws” or détentes and othernotable transformations over the years; yet thefoundation of the “San Francisco System” laidin the early post-World War II years essentiallycontinues in East Asia even to the present day.Meanwhile, rising temperatures leading torapid thaw in the Arctic has been reshaping theworld both physically and in internationalpolitics. Taking the San Francisco System as itsconceptual grounding, the paper first tracesnotable developments of post-World War IIregional political and security relations in EastAsia, with particular attention to the regional

conflicts including territorial disputes,considers possible impacts of the emergingArctic thaw to the status quo, and concludeswith some recommendations for the concernedstates to prepare for the consequences ofclimate change in the security environmentinvolving the East Asian and neighbouringArctic states.1

THE SAN FRANCISCO SYSTEM

IN POST-WORLD WAR II EAST ASIA

The Cold War structure of the post-World WarII world order was often attributed to the YaltaSystem. This system originated fromagreements over the construction of thepostwar international order made at Yalta inFebruary 1945 by the leaders of the threeAllied powers (the United States, the UnitedKingdom, and the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics [USSR]). However, the San FranciscoSystem — the postwar peace treaty betweenthe Allied countries and Japan, signed inSeptember 1951 in San Francisco, along withits associated pol i t ical and securityarrangements — largely determined thepostwar regional order in East Asia and thePacific (Hara 2007). The San Francisco Systemmay be compared to the Euro-Atlantic’s YaltaSystem, in terms of the three major features ofthe Cold War: ideology as a fundamental valueof social existence, military confrontationincluding security alliances, and regionalconflicts as the frontiers of the Cold Warconfrontation.

Ideology: Ideologically, in the postwar

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decolonization movements, Asia was politicallydivided between “free world” and communistblocs, and economically divided betweencapitalist and socialist blocs under strong US orSoviet influence. The Cold War in Asia,however, developed somewhat differently thanthe bipolar Euro-Atlantic system in that thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC) emerged asanother pole of the communist sphere.

Military and Security Alliances: The US-ledpost-World War II military structure in theregion is called the San Francisco AllianceSystem. In East Asia and the Pacific, with littlesuccess in establishing large anti-communistmultilateral security alliances like the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), theUnited States formed a hub-and-spokessecurity system of separate arrangements withits regional allies.

Regional Conflicts: Regional conflicts are morecharacteristic of Asia than of Europe. WhereasGermany was the only divided nation inEurope, competition over spheres of influencecreated several Cold War frontiers in East Asia.The origin of such regional conflicts is deeplyrooted in the postwar territorial dispositions ofJapan, particularly the San Francisco PeaceTreaty. Vast territories, extending from theKurile Islands to Antarctica and fromMicronesia to the Spratly Islands, weredisposed of in the treaty. The treaty, however,specified neither their final devolution (i.e., towhich state they belonged) nor their preciselimits, thereby sowing the seeds of various“unresolved problems” in the region. The majorregional conflicts in this region — including theterritorial disputes over the NorthernTerritories/Southern Kuriles, Dokdo/Takeshima,Senkaku/Diaoyu, and Spratly/Nansha andParacel/Xisha; the Cross-Taiwan Strait issue;the divided Korean Peninsula; and the so-called“Okinawa problem” — all derived from thepostwar territorial dispositions of the formerJapanese empire.

Strategic Ambiguity

Close examination of the Allies’ documents,particularly those of the United States (whichwas primarily responsible for drafting thepeace treaty), reveals that some, if not all, ofthese problems were intentionally created orleft unresolved to protect US strategic interestsagainst the backdrop of the intensifying ColdWar (Hara, 2007). During the postwar periodleading up to the San Francisco PeaceConference of 1951, the United States carefullyprepared the Allies’ peace settlement withJapan. Its early drafts were, as a whole, veryrigid and punitive toward Japan, reflecting thespirit of the Allies cooperation. Those draftsalso provided detailed and clear borderdemarcations specifically to prevent futureterritorial conflicts. However, as the Cold Warintensified, particularly to the extent that itdeveloped into a “hot” war in Korea, the peaceterms changed to reflect new US strategicinterests. Specifically, Japan and thePhilippines had to be secured for the non-communist West and as pro-US allies in EastAsia, whereas the communist states were to becontained. Accordingly, the peace treatybecame “generous” and its wording “simple” —but thereby ambiguous, leaving the potentialfor conflicts to erupt among East Asian states.The peace treaty was the result of carefuldeliberations and several revisions; issues weredeliberately left unresolved.

These regional conflicts — such as those notedearlier — have generally been treated asseparate and unrelated issues, yet, theyemerged as a result of the Japanese peacetreaty, which was prepared when the USleadership seriously feared that both SouthKorea and Taiwan might be “lost” to, or unifiedby, their communist counterparts. Neither ofthe governments of China (PRC or ROC) norKorea (ROK or DPRK) was invited to the peaceconference. The Soviet Union participated inthe peace conference but did not sign thetreaty. Just as the Northern Territories/Kuriles

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Islands issue was left between Japan and theSoviet Union as an unresolved by-product ofthe Cold War, seeds of territorial disputes wereleft between Japan and its partial and mostlycommunist neighbours of “Korea” and “China”respectively.2 The San Francisco Peace Treatyalso concerned the settlement of other past“history” issues, such as war crimes andreparations. These issues also remained owingto the US policy shift to a generous andambiguous peace with Japan, or what somemight call its “strategic ambiguity.” Theunresolved problems, derived from the postwardisposition of Japan, continue to dividecountries and people in East Asia even to thisday.

C O L D W A R “ T H A W S ” A N D T H ETRANSFORMATION OF THE SANFRANCISCO SYSTEM

During the 60 years since the San Franciscoagreement, East Asia has undergone notabletransformations. After alternating periods ofEast-West tension and the relaxation oftensions, such as the Cold War thaws of the1950s and the 1970s, the Cold War was widelybelieved to have ended by the early 1990s.These changes also affected relations amongneighbouring countries in East Asia, withimportant consequences for some lingeringregional conflicts.

Cold War Thaw in the 1950s

Movement toward a thaw in East Asia began tobe observed soon after Stalin's death in 1953,with a cease-fire in the Korean War. Watershedevents such as the Indochina ceasefireagreement and the US-UKFrance-USSR GenevaConference in 1954, and the BandungConference in 1955 further strengthened thisthawing trend. Against the backdrop ofwarming East-West relations, Japan and theSoviet Union began peace negotiations. In1956, the two countries restored diplomaticrelations and agreed, in a joint declaration, tothe transfer of the Shikotan and the Habomai

Islands to Japan following the conclusion of apeace treaty between them. However, Japanwas pressed by the United States to demandthe return of all four of the island groups in itsso-called Northern Territories. Indeed, theUnited States warned that it would not returnOkinawa to Japan if its claims to Kunashiri andEtorofu Islands were abandoned.

The US support for the four-islandreturnformula was made with full knowledge that itwould be unacceptable to the Soviet Union,thus preventing Japan from achievingrapprochement with the Soviet and communistblocs. The United States feared the thawworking to the Soviet Union’s strategicadvantage, and that a Japan-Soviet peace treatywould lead to the normalization of relationsbetween Japan and communist China. Further,if Japan settled the Northern Territoriesdispute with the Soviet Union, there would beconsiderable pressure on the United States tovacate Okinawa, whose importance hadsignificantly increased as a result of the UnitedStates’ Cold War strategy in Asia — especiallyduring the Korean War.3

The PRC in the East Asian Cold War

In East Asia, the Cold War developeddifferently from the Euro-Atlantic bipolarsystem; rather, a tripolar system, consisting ofthe United States, the PRC and the USSR,emerged following the Sino-Soviet split.Communist China had been targeted by the UScontainment strategy since its intervention inthe Korean War. With its nuclear developmentin 1964, China came to occupy the centralposition in the Asian Cold War.

Conversely, Sino-Soviet confrontations wereinit ial ly confined to oral and writtencommunications, but escalated into militaryclashes along the border, especially overownership of Damansky Island on the UssuriRiver in 1969. This frontier problem did notderive, and was therefore different, from thoseconflicts that emerged out of the postwar

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disposition of Japan. Nevertheless, it came tosymbolize the height of Sino-Soviet tension thatdefined the Cold War in East Asia, setting thes t a g e f o r t h e d r a m a t i c s t r u c t u r a ltransformation during the 1970s thaw.

Thaw in the 1970s

The warming of East-West relations in the early1970s was similar to that of the 1950s, in thatpeace was not necessarily achieved in anideological sense and the relative influence ofthe United States was declining. Exploiting theSino-Soviet difference, the United States tookmajor initiatives to “break the ice” this time,with the Nixon administration entering officewith normalizing relations with communistChina as its top diplomatic agenda. During thisperiod of détente, several major US allies,including Japan, opened diplomatic relationswith the PRC government, which also replacedthe ROC at the United Nations.

In parallel with these moves, the focus of theSino-Japanese territorial dispute shifted to theSenkaku/Diaoyu Islands, where resourcenationalism was accentuated by the newenergy potential discovered in their vicinity.The United States returned Okinawa to Japanin 1972, realizing the previous administration’spromise, but took “no position on sovereignty”over the disputed islands4; it merely returnedadministrative rights to Japan. Again, theUnited States adopted a policy of strategicambiguity. Leaving the dispute unsettled — bynot taking sides with any disputant, andkeeping the wedges between the neighbouringstates — met US interests, helping to retain itsmilitary presence, particularly in Okinawa, andpolitical influence in the region. Just as thewedge of the Northern Territories problem wasset in place with the four-island-return claimbetween Japan and the Soviet Union during thethaw of the 1950s, the Senkaku/Diaoyu issuewas another wedge left between Japan andChina during the 1970s thaw.

Japan and the USSR also moved closer during

this period, holding a second summit meetingin Moscow in 1971, 15 years after their firstmeeting in 1956. The emerging opportunity ofthe Siberian resource development was one ofthe biggest factors behind that move. However,before they reached the resolution of theterritorial problem or a peace treaty, theirrelations began to sour, especially in 1978, withthe signing of the Treaty of Peace andFriendship between Japan and the PRC,incorporating an “anti-hegemony” clausedirected against the USSR (at China’sinsistence), and the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan. The USSR began a buildup offorces in the Far East, including the disputedislands, which alarmed Japan. In the meantime,the unresolved problems that shared a commonfoundation in the San Francisco Peace Treatycontinued to fester. In addition to a dividedChina, the newly independent countries —(South) Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, andBrunei — joined the territorial disputes in theSouth China Sea.

Remaining Regional Cold War Structure

In the global thaw from the late 1980s to theearly 1990s, the Cold War was widely believedto have ended. Both US-Soviet and Sino-Sovietrapprochement were achieved, and aremarkable relaxation of tension occurred inEast Asia, where expectations soared for asolution to some of the most intractable frontierproblems. The SinoSoviet/Russian bordernegotiations, ongoing since the late 1980s,finally ended with mutual concessions in the2000s. None of the regional conflicts that sharethe foundation of the San Francisco System,however, reached a fundamental settlement. Infact, compared to the Euro-Atlantic region,where the wall dividing East and Westcompletely collapsed, the changes that tookplace in East Asia left fundamental divisionsintact. With the exception of the demise of theSoviet Union, the region’s Cold War structureof confrontation basically continued. Today,more than 20 years later, and 60 years after

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San Francisco, China and Korea are stilldivided, with their communist or authoritarianparts still perceived as threats by theirneighbours embracing alliance with the US.Accordingly, the US military presence and itsassociated issues such as the Okinawa militarybase problem continue. Whereas NATO lost itsanti-communist drive when it acceptedformerly communist Eastern Europeancountries as members, there are no indicationsthat the remaining San Francisco AllianceSystem will either dissolve or embrace NorthKorea or the PRC.

In retrospect, the term Cold War has been usedlargely in two ways: first to signal thatconfrontations between superpowers orconflicting systems are highly strained, andsecondly to suggest the structure of suchconfrontations. The generally accepted view ofthe end of the Cold War in East Asia is basedon the first perception. The relaxation oftension may be a necessary condition forending the Cold War, but it is not sufficientunless accompanied by the demolition of itsfundamental structure. To the extent that thefundamenta l s t ruc ture o f co ld -warconfrontation remains, the dramatic relaxationseen in East Asia since the late 1980s is morelike the periodic thaws than the end of the ColdWar per se. As the 1970s thaw rested in partupon the perceived achievement of Sovietmilitary parity with the United States, China’srecent assertiveness in its aspiration to militarystrength cannot be ignored. The relaxation oftension seen in the Cold War thaws of the1950s and the 1970s gave way to thedeterioration of East-West relations. Similarphenomena have been observed in East Asia,such as US-China conflicts after the Tiananmenincident of 1989, military tensions in theKorean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait,the disruption of negotiations between Japanand North Korea to normalize their diplomaticrelations, and political tensions involving Japan,China, and their neighbours over territorialdisputes.

Deepening Interdependence in Economicand Other Relations

While countries and peoples in East Asia havebeen divided by politics, history and unsettledborders, they have nevertheless deepened theirinterdependence in economic, cultural andother relations. The economic recovery andtransformation of East Asian countries for thelast 60 years from the ruins of war are, in fact,remarkable. Beginning with Japan in the 1950s,followed by the so-called newly industrializingeconomies (NIES) in the 1970s and 1980s, andnow with China’s rise, East Asia (with theexception of North Korea) has become the mostexpansive centre in the world economy.Economy is indeed the glue connecting theregional states.

Economic-driven multilateral cooperation andinstitution building developed notably in EastAsia with the creation of multiple institutions,especially in the 1990s and the 2000s. This alsopaved the way for confidence-buildingmeasures (CBMs) among neighbouring states.Since the 1990s, progress in CBMs at bothgovernmental and non-governmental levelsconstitutes a leap beyond the Cold War era,particularly in non-traditional security areassuch as the environment, food, energy,terrorism and natural disasters. Nevertheless,in contrast to their deeply intertwinedeconomies, the depth of institutionalintegration pales compared with that ofEurope. While the European Community of theCold War era has long since evolved into theEuropean Union, even the idea of an “EastAsian Community” (not an “East Asian Union”)is still a future aspiration. As yet, the EastAsian countries do not have relationships ofsufficient mutual trust. Their countries andpeoples are strongly connected economically,but they remain divided politically, and are stillin dispute over unresolved problems, notablythose over territorial sovereignty and bordersbut also over historical memory issues thathave proven similarly intractable (Hara 2012).

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THE ARCTIC THAW:

P O L I T I C A L A N D S E C U R I T YIMPLICATIONS

In the latter half of the twentieth century, thedramatic changes of the global political andsecurity environment, such as the Cold Warand its thaws, did not bypass East Asia. In thetwenty-first century, the Arctic thaw is nowreshaping the world both physically and ininternational politics. This section considersemerging and possible impacts of this Arcticthaw to the status quo in East Asia.

The Evolving Situation in the Arctic andEast Asia

Global climate change is profoundly reshapingthe Arctic region today, generating heateddiscussions on issues such as new marinetransportation routes, resource development,border disputes and the environment. With theemerging new northern sea passages (theNorthern Sea Route and the NorthwestPassage), the Arctic thaw is opening newopportunities to East Asian states. Thesenorthern transportation routes can significantlyshorten the shipping distance from the Atlanticto the Pacific, from Europe or the east coast ofNorth America to East Asia, making possiblereductions in shipping time, fuel costs and CO2

emissions.

Navigational safety could be yet anotheradvan tage . The ex i s t i ng mar i t imetransportation route from Europe and theMiddle East through the Suez Canal is notalways safe, due to uneasy political conditionsin the Middle East and piracy en route,especially near Somalia. The northern routesare, therefore, becoming attractive alternativesto East Asian states. Resource development andshipping from the Arctic region to Asia usingthe passage are becoming realistic as well.With the advancement of technology, resourcedevelopment in the extremely cold Arcticenvironment (which used to be impossible) and

transporting resources to Asia and otherregions are becoming possibilities. Actualproduction is already underway in some coastalareas (see Figure 1). Melting ice in the Arctic isalso an expanding fishing ground.

Figure 1: Resources in the Arctic

The map shows the main sites of gas and oilproduction, including infrastructure, mining and seaice extent in the Arctic. Source: Nordregio(http://www.nordregio.se/Maps--Graphs/05-Environment-and-energy/Resources-in-the-Arctic/), 2013.(Designer/Cartographer: Johanna Roto and JoséSterling)

Major East Asian states — particularly the PRC,Japan and South Korea — are becomingincreasingly interested in the evolving Arcticregion. China is a growing economic giant, nowthe second largest economic power, surpassingJapan’s GDP in 2011. With the world’s largestpopulation, it is also the world’s largest energyconsumer, surpassing the United States.Following the March 2011 Fukushima disaster,Japan is reducing its dependency on nuclear

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power, expanding imports of oil and gas in theshort run while by seeking alternative energysupplies. It is also seeking new transportationroutes to boost trade as well as resourceaccess. South Korea, which has a strongshipping industry, is also interested in theevolving Arctic situation. In fact, as non-Arcticstates, the PRC, Japan, South Korea, theTaiwan (ROC) and even North Korea, would allpotentially benefit quite significantly fromshorter shipping routes and possible access toalternative energy sources and new fishinggrounds. They also share environmental andscientific concerns in the Arctic region, as well.

New Opportunities for Cooperation andReconciliation

If the Arctic thaw continues, as many scientistsand media reports predict, the region’s geo-economic and strategic importance to East Asiawill further increase and might also providenew opportunities for cooperation, competition,and confrontation among East Asian nationsand other powers. By opening new shippingroutes across the Arctic, marine traffic andtrade volume from Europe and North Americato East Asia and further down to Southeast Asiawould increase. Associated economic effects,such as invigorating shipbuilding and itsrelated industries, hub ports and coastal cities,could also be expected, thus further energizingthe East Asian economy. The East Asian seascould then become vital marine passages.While this has a potential to intensifycompetition and conflict among East Asianstates seeking to protect their respective sealanes, cooperation among the neighbours couldbecome more important and necessary tosecure the safe passage of their ships cruisingand engaging in commercial activities in thisregion, and establish stability in regionalsecurity environment.

The increased Arctic Passage marinetransportation to Asia would also increasemarine traffic near the disputed islands

(Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles,Dokdo/Takeshima, Senkaku/Diaoyu, andSpratlys and Paracels) located in the sea lanesconnecting the Pacific Ocean, the Sea ofOkhotsk, the Sea of Japan (East Sea), the EastChina Sea, and the South China Sea. Thismight motivate the concerned states toeffectively manage and even to reach somesettlement in their territorial and maritimeborder disputes.

Figure 2: Major Sea Lanes Connecting the Arctic andEast Asia, and the Disputed Territories

Among the territorial and maritime borderproblems in East Asia, the evolving situation inthe Arctic is likely to result in the largestimpact on the Northern Territories/SothernKuriles problem between Japan and Russia. Inrecent years, Russia has successfullynegotiated boundary demarcations with manyof its neighbours, and Russian PresidentVladimir Putin has been sending positivesignals for resolving the territorial problemswith Japan since his first presidency in the2000s. The evolving situation in the Arctic mayprovide Japan further incentives to settle thisterritorial problem.

Japan’s negotiating position with Russia overthe territorial issue has been reversed over thepast two decades. In the early 1990s, with

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Russia still facing the economic and financialcrisis inherited from the collapsed SovietUnion, Japan’s attitude, as the then second-largest economic power, can be described asrather condescending. Japan assumed thatRussia was in desperate need of its economicassistance, and thus linked its economic aid tothe territorial dispute, which eventually invitedcriticism even from its Western allies. Onemajor criticism came from former US PresidentRichard Nixon, who condemned Japan for“conditioning aid on Russia’s return of four tinynorthern islands” (Nixon, 1993). Now, however,the inverse is true, as Russia is a resource-richcapitalist country and the world’s foremost oil-producing country. It is the biggest Arcticnation, and is active in resource developmentand production in the Arctic Circle. WhileRussia has regained its power and influencewith the leverage of its rich resources, Japanhas been in decline in its negotiating positionsince the collapse of the “bubble economy,”followed by the “lost decade” and theFukushima disaster.

The opening of the Arctic Sea is one factormaking Russia a very attractive neighbour toJapan. A report produced by Japan’s OceanPolicy Research Foundation (OPRF) proposes“measures which Japan should takeimmediately towards sustainable use of theArctic Ocean,” and states that “Russia is thelargest coastal country of the Arctic Ocean, andmost of the Arctic-related matters in whichJapan has interests involve Russia.” Further,while the report acknowledges that “there is adiff icult problem in the Japan-Russiarelationship,” it urges the Japanese governmentto work with Russia to deal with evolving Arcticproblems (OPRF 2012). Japan’s present PrimeMinister Abe Shinzo’s administration appearsto have been positively exploring points ofcompromise on the territorial issue with Russia.In April 2013, for example, Abe agreed withPutin to revive the island negotiations byincreasing government contact, includingreciprocal visits by the leaders and their

foreign ministers.5 However, as past experiencehas proven, thaws and the potential forresources may not be enough to resolve thenations’ territorial disputes. In fact, theirbilateral negotiations have stagnated in thecomplex international politics surroundingRussia’s annexation of Crimea and the crisis inUkraine in 2014.

Japan’s relations with South Korea and Chinaalso deteriorated over the island disputes in2005, and again in 2012-2014. Yet, all of thesecountries have track records of advancing theirrelations while shelving the territorial as wellas historical memory disputes. As noted earlier,the economy is the glue connecting regionalstates. Once policy priority shifts to theeconomy or other common areas of interest,further cooperation and development may bepossible in the areas surrounding the disputedislands. Russia has signed a historic 30-yeargas supply deal with China in 2014, which maypossibly pave its way for more energycooperation with Korea and Japan as well.Russia and China have in fact been invigoratingtheir cooperative investment and developmentin various areas, including the Rason SpecialEconomic Zone and its Rajin port facing theSea of Japan (East Sea) in North Korea since2011, showing a potential to revive the early1990s regional cooperation involving NorthKorea (Sankei News 2012; NNN News 242013). This move may be further facilitated bythe opening of an operative shipping route inthe Arctic.

The situation surrounding the nucleardevelopment of North Korea has been one ofthe most destabilizing factors in the region.Instead of isolating and driving North Koreainto a corner where there is no other option butfurther developing weapons of massdestruction — which would only serve toheighten military tensions — peacefulcoexistence or stability of the region may besought by engaging it and exploring andexpanding areas of cooperation.

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Cooperation Framework

Finding ways for East Asian neighbours to worktogether has the potential to create a genuinewin-win situation for the states concerned.Some arrangements or governance cooperationmay be possible to establish stable regionalorder in the areas where disputed islands andother flashpoints are. This could also beconnected to development of the 2002Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)-China Declaration on the Conduct ofParties in the South China Sea, where Chinaconfronts its neighbours over the Spratlys andParacel islands.

Most states have defence programs in order tobe prepared for the cont ingency ordevelopment of undesirable security situations.The US military presence is indispensable forits regional allies and also contributes toregional security. This situation seems destinedto continue for the foreseeable future. Existingsecurity arrangements that can be applied tothe areas covering East Asia and the Arcticinclude the US hub-and-spokes (i.e., SanFrancisco) alliance system in the Asia-Pacificand NATO in the Euro-Atlantic. While thesesystems can be collectively seen as securityassurance for allied members, they can alsoserve as containment networks targeting non-members, specifically Russia, China and NorthKorea. However, there are other multilateraldialogue frameworks, including some or all ofthose countries, such as the Six-Party Talks, theASEAN Regional Forum, and the East AsianSummit.

Engagement in Arctic affairs is an emergingcommon interest among East Asian states andcould be a new area of cooperation amongthem; however, states appear to be in acompeting mode, as each country has beenindependently seeking its own way of engagingin Arctic affairs. Now that the PRC, Japan andSouth Korea are all Permanent Observers ofthe Arctic Council (since May 2013), a unified

strategy may become their mutual interest. Itseems worth investigating the possibility ofestablishing a new cooperative framework,combining the existing PRC-Japan-South Koreatrilateral framework and the neighbouringthree Arctic powers of Russia, the UnitedStates and Canada, or a similar framework withNorth Korea (i.e., the existing Six-Party Talksplus Canada). Canada, Russia and the UnitedStates have extensive commitments and longhistories of engagement in the Arctic. Theseare the major Arctic nations with gateways tothe Pacific, and also have long histories ofengagement in East Asia. The combination oftheir northern responsibilities, geography andengagement in East Asia, and East Asia’sgrowing interest in the Arctic, make nations ofboth regions key players in determining thefuture d i rect ion o f governance anddevelopment in the region.

The vulnerable character of maritime securitymakes it necessary to establish a practice offollowing and making common rules. That allthe concerned states become signatories of theUN Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) will be a very important base tosolve disputes. In this sense, the participationof the United States, which has not yet ratifiedUNCLOS, will be an important step.

From Thaw to the Next Cold War?

Whereas there may be good potential forcooperation among East Asian states in areassuch as the development of resource andnorthern passages, there may also be a dangerthat tensions among the regional countries mayincrease, especially in the disputed areas. Asseen in the past, similar tensions may riseagain from the remaining structures of ColdWar confrontation, where relations amongneighbours, including their territorialproblems, may be involved in a new powergame. The Arctic thaw may become a newfactor. As noted earlier, during previousperiods of warming of East-West relations, the

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United States did not necessarily facilitatereconciliation or clear settlement of theterritorial problems between Japan and itsneighbours for reasons of realpolitik. Continuedconflicts may still be seen by policymakers inWashington as meeting US interests, as long asthey are manageable and do not escalate into alarge-scale war. Although an accommodationbetween Japan and its neighbours is preferablefor regional stability, it may not be viewed asbeneficial to US interests if it is perceived aslikely to reduce or exclude US influence.“Manageable instability” actually helps justifythe continued substantial US military presencein the region, not only enabling the UnitedStates to maintain its regional influence, butalso contributing to operations farther afield,such as in the Middle East and, in the future,possibly the Arctic.

The United States has redirected its strategicfocus toward the Asia-Pacific in recent years. Itis stepping up its naval presence in the Pacificby shifting the bulk of its naval fleet from theAtlantic as part of the so-cal led Asia“rebalancing” initiative. On June 2, 2012, USDefense Secretary Leon Panetta announcedthat “By 2020 the Navy will reposture its forcesfrom today’s roughly 50-50 split from thePacific and Atlantic to a 60-40 split in thoseoceans” (cited in Neisloss 2012). This includesa troop deployment in Darwin, Australia andmilitary engagement with the Philippines andother ASEAN countries in the South China Sea.M a n y h a v e e x p l a i n e d t h i s s h i f t a scounterbalancing China in the Asia-Pacific.However, it may also serve as a possiblemeasure directed to its future defence of thenorth Pacific and the Arctic. The premise ofconventional strategy — that the Arctic Oceanis frozen and the cruise of a naval fleet isimpossible — now appears to be collapsing.There is a possibility that the Arctic may serveas a stage of military operation or become anarena of the marine power balance game.

In recent years, Russia has become active in its

military activities in the Arctic Ocean,protecting its rights to seabed resources,controlling the Northeast Passage to preventforeign intervention, and defending the sealane to East Asia (OPRF 2012). A statement ofprinciples, approved by then Russian PresidentDmitry Medvedev in 2008, regards the Arcticas a strategic resource base of primaryimportance to Russia. Foreseeing the possiblerise of tensions developing into militaryconflict, the document prescribes “buildinggroupings of conventional forces in the Arcticzone capable of providing military security indifferent militarypolitical conditions”(Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2009).

A r t u r C h i l i n g a r o v(http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_To_Chart_Arctic_Claim/2043546.html), head of Russian expedition tothe Arctic-2007, shows picture of Russian flag in theseabed below the North Pole in August 2007.

The Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories,located in the northern limit of the ice-freepassage and at an important gateway to thePacific Ocean, were once considered to havevital strategic importance, especially in the late1970s and 1980s, when the Sea of Okhotskbecame a bastion for Soviet missile firing ofnuclear-powered submarines.6 As the southernlimit of the ice-free passage moves north due toglobal warming, these disputed territoriesmight become less important in this sense, buttheir strategic value might increase in another.For the purpose of basing the coast guard to

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protect sea lanes, port and military facilitiesmay be strengthened or established. Japan islocated in such a way as to block the advanceof its neighbouring states—China, Russia andKorea—to the Pacific Ocean. In 1950, then USSecretary of State Dean Acheson announcedthe US Cold War defence perimeter to confrontcommunism in the western Pacific, runningalong the Aleutians to Japan and then to thePhilippines, which came to be known as“Acheson Line”. Now, China, havingsuccessfully demarcated its long northernborder with Russia, has shifted the focus of itsborder defence to its ocean frontiers. It is nocoincidence that the “First Island Chain” in thepresent Chinese defence doctrine overlaps withthe Acheson Line.7

According to the OPRF (2012), “If melting iceprogresses in the Arctic Ocean and the powergame over the naval supremacy of the ArcticOcean aggravates, along with the US militarydeployment, operation of the Marine SelfDefense Force of Japan would also be affected,e.g. in dealing with the Chinese navy, theRussian Far East fleet near Hokkaido andsurrounding ocean area of the Kurile islands.”This could mean that the importance of Japanin the US-Asia strategy, and the strategicimportance of the Northern Territories andother disputed territories might increase. Thus,there is a possibility that the new securityclimate change created by the Arctic thaw mayre-intensify the remaining structure of ColdWar confrontation. Accordingly, the resolutionof territorial problems may become yet moredifficult.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Cold War thaws provided opportunities forsettling territorial problems and politicalrapprochement among East Asian neighbours.However, those chances were lost and nodefinitive settlements have been reached.Divisions in East Asia continue, as does the SanFrancisco System. Although the system has

gone through notable transformations, with thestructural foundation for its predominance stillin place, the United States continues to holdthe most important key to future direction ofthe political and security order in the region.

The Arctic thaw is likely to provide newopportunities for regional and intra-regionalcooperation, as well as additional sources ofconflict. Whereas the Arctic thaw and theopening of the northern sea routes mightfurther stimulate the regional economy —especially in trade and associated industries inEast Asia — they would also pose additionalchallenges in the security environment,especially in the defence of sea lanes from theArctic to East Asia. Regional and intra-regionalsecurity may become a comprehensive conceptcovering multi-layered areas including thetraditional, non-traditional, economic andenergy security. The East Asian states(especially China, Japan and South Korea), thePacific-Arctic states (the United States, Canadaand Russia) are key players capable ofcontributing to regional and intra-regionalsecurity and stability. Although there aredifferences among them, these states all sharebroad areas of interests and cooperation.

Just as Cold War thaws did not lead to thecollapse of the San Francisco System, theArctic thaw alone may not be enough to bringfundamental change to the continuing structureof confrontation in East Asia. However, thepromotion of CBMs in wide-ranging areas cancontribute to expanding common interests andcooperation in regional and inter-regionals e c u r i t y , a s w e l l a s p r e v e n t i n gmisunderstandings and confrontations. Toprepare for the possible changes that climatechange may bring to the Arctic’s securityenvironment, there are several measures andadjustments which the concerned states cantake:

The vulnerable character of maritimesecurity makes it necessary to establish

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common rules. That all concernedbecome signatories of the UNCLOSwould be a very important base to solvedisputes according to rule of law. TheUnited States should ratify the UNCLOS.In order to prevent a dangeroussituation, such as an accidental militaryclash and escalation of confl ictsthereafter, the concerned governmentsshould build a system of governancecooperation, which would includearrangements of hotlines, regulardiplomatic and defence/strategicdialogues, and joint exercises.In addition to existing bilateral andmultilateral frameworks, it is worthinvestigating a new multi lateralframework involving coastal statesranging from the Arctic to East Asia,including Canada, the United States,Russia, Japan, China, South Korea andpossibly North Korea.The academic, NGO, and intellectualcommunity can play a useful role inproviding knowledge and ideas toconcerned governments, businesses, non-governmental organizations and otherinternational organizations. From theviewpoint of contributing to theprosperity and stability of the East Asia-Arctic region, further investigation of thetopics covered East Asia-Arctic Relations:Boundary, Security and InternationalPolitics, should continue.

This paper, originally presented in March 2013at a conference in Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada,is a slightly revised version of the author’schapter that appears in a volume entitled EastAsia-Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security andI n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s(http://www.cigionline.org/publications/east-asia-arctic-relations-boundary-security-and-international-politics) (Kimie Hara and KenCoates eds., CIGI, 2014).

K i m i e H a r a ( e m a i l

(https://apjjf.org/mailto:khara@uwaterloo.ca))is the Director of East Asian Studies at RenisonUniversity College, the Renison ResearchProfessor and a management team member oft h e J a p a n F u t u r e s I n i t i a t i v e(http://jfi.uwaterloo.ca/)at the University ofWaterloo (Canada), and an Asia-Pacific Journalassociate. Her books include NorthernTerritories, Asia-Pacific Regional Conflicts andthe Aland Experience: Untying the KurillianK n o t(http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415666046/) (with Geoffrey Jukes), “Zaigai”nihonjin kenkyusha ga mita nihon gaiko(Japanese Diplomacy through the Eyes ofJ a p a n e s e S c h o l a r s O v e r s e a s(http://www.fujiwara-shoten.co.jp/shop/index.php?main_page=product_info&products_id=1078)), Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific:Divided Territories in the San Francisco System(http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415646789/) and Japanese-Soviet/RussianRelations since 1945: A Difficult Peace(http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415194990/).

Recommended citation: Kimie Hara, "FromCold War Thaws to the Arctic Thaw: TheChanging Arctic and Its Security Implicationsfor East Asia", The Asia-Pacific Journal: Vol. 11,Issue 26, No. 3, June 30, 2014.

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•John W. Dower, The San Francisco System:Past, Present, Future in U.S.-Japan-ChinaR e l a t i o n s(https://apjjf .org/-John_W_-Dower/4079)

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Works Cited

Hara, Kimie. 2007. Cold War Frontiers in theAsia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the SanFrancisco System. London: Routledge.

———. 2012. “The San Francisco Peace Treatyand Frontier Problems in the Regional Order inEast Asia A Sixty Year Perspective.” The Asia-Pacific Journal 10 (17).

Jukes, Geoffrey. 1993. “Russia’s Military andthe Northern Territories Issue.” Strategic &Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No.277.

———. 2009. “Can the Southern Kuriles beDemilitarized?” In Northern Territories, Asia-Pacific Regional Conflicts and the AlandExperience: Untying the Kurillian Knot, editedby Kimie Hara and Geoffrey Jukes. 62–82.London: Routledge.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2014.“ J a p a n - R u s s i a R e l a t i o n s . ”(http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/)

Neisloss, Liz. 2012. “U.S. Defense SecretaryAnnounces New Strategy with Asia.”(http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/02/us/panetta-asia/index.html) CNN, June 2.

Nixon, Richard. 1993. “Clinton’s GreatestC h a l l e n g e . ”(http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/05/opinion/cli n t o n - s - g r e a t e s t -challenge.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm) TheNew York Times, March 5.

NNN News 24. 2013. “Speculation Match ofTwo Railway Connecting the North Korea andR u s s i a . ”(http://www.news24.jp/articles/2013/11/29/10241224.html) [In Japanese.]. November 29.

Nordregio. 2013. “Resources in the Arctic.”(http://www.nordregio.se/Maps--Graphs/05-Environment-and-energy/Resources-in-the-Arctic/)OPRF. 2012. “The Measures that Japan ShouldTake Immediately Towards the Sustainable Useo f t h e A r c t i c O c e a n . ”(http://www.sof.or.jp/jp/report/pdf/12_06_02.pdf) [In Japanese.] March.

Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 2009. “Principles of StatePolicy of the Russian Federation in the Arcticu p t o 2 0 2 0 a n d B e y o n d . ”(http://www.rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html) [In Russian.] Rossiyskaya Gazeta,March 27.

Sankei News . 2012. Hokkyokukai Kiho(“Seasonal Report of the Arctic Ocean”)(http://www.sof.or.jp/jp/monthly/season/pdf/14.pdf). [In Japanese.] No.14, June-August.

USA. Congress. Senate. Committee on ForeignR e l a t i o n s(http://www.google.ca/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22USA.+Congress.+Senate.+Committee+on+Foreign+Relat ions%22) ,Okinawa Reversion Treaty: Hearings Before theCommittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,92d Congress, 1st Session, on Ex. J.92-1. TheAgreement Between the U.S.A. and JapanConcerning the Ryukyn Islands and the DaitoIslands. Oc. 27, 28 and 29, 1971 , U.S.Government Printing Office, 1971.

1 This paper builds in part on the author’searlier research and publication on the SanFrancisco System, and accordingly containssome overlapping content. See Hara (2007) and(2012).

2 The territorial dispute between Japan andChina was originally over Okinawa. Chiang Kai-

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shek’s Republic of China (ROC) was demandingOkinawa’s “recovery” to China in the early postWorld War II years.

3 See Hara (2007), particularly chapters 4 and7.

4 Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearings, p.91.

5 For recent developments concerning Japan’srelations with Russia, see the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Japan webpage (2014).

6 For an excellent analysis on Russia’s militaryand the strategic importance of the disputed

territories, see Jukes (1993) and (2009, 62–82).

7 “The Second Island Chain,” running from theJapanese archipelago to the south along theBonin and Northern Mariana Islands and alongthe western edge of Micronesia, which used tobe called Nanpo Shoto and Nanyo respectivelyduring the period of Japanese control, overlapswith the US defence line of the early postWorld World II (pre-Cold War) years, i.e. whenthe US still considered Japan as an enemy,based on which the US postwar defensestrategy was being formulated. For details, SeeHara (2007), particularly chapter 4.