in die hooggeregshof van suid afrika ... and undisturbed access to the rustenburg section...
TRANSCRIPT
IN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF VAN SUID AFRIKA
(BOPHUTHATSWANA PROVINSIALE AFDELING)
SAAK NO: 251/2005
In die saak tussen:
AFRICA WASTE CC Applikant
en
GO WASTE MANAGEMENT
SERVICES (PTY) Ltd Eerste Respondent
RUSTENBURG PLATINUM
MINES LTD Tweede Respondent
SIVIELE SAAK
DATUM VAN AANHOOR : 03 MAART 2005;
17 MAART 2005
23 MAART 2005
28 tot 30 JUNIE 2005;
29 AUGUSTUS tot 01 SEPTEMBER 2005
05 tot 13 DESEMBER 2005
DATUM VAN UITSPRAAK: 24 FEBRUARIE 2006
ADVOKATE VIR DIE APPLIKANT : ADV N HAVENGA
saam met
ADV A BURGER
ADVOKAAT VIR DIE EERSTE RESPONDENT : ADV R DU PLESSIS
______________________________________________________________
UITSPRAAK
HENDRICKS R:
A. Inleiding:
[a] Die Partye:
[1] Die Applikant is Africa Waste CC, ‘n beslote korporasie wat
se hoofbedryf die herwinning en verkoop van skroot metale
is.
[2] Die Eerste Respondent is GoWaste Management Services
(Pty) Limited ‘n maatskappy wat se hoofbedryf die hantering
en bedryf van skroot materiale is.
[3] Die Tweede Respondent is Rustenburg Platinum Mines
Limited, ‘n myn maatskappy.
[b] Die Agtergrond :
[4] Die Applikant het op die 3rde Maart 2005 ‘n aansoek op ‘n
dringende basis geloods teen die Respondente vir die
volgende regshulp:
Eerstens ten opsigte van die tydelike regshulp:
“A.2. That the First Respondent be ordered to restore the Applicant’s
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free and undisturbed access to the Rustenburg Section
(“premises) of the Second Respondent and to restore the
Applicant’s free and undisturbed possession of its plant,
equipment, machinery and rollonrolloff bins standing at
the central salvage yard and various shaft sites at the
premises so that the Applicant can perform its obligation
in terms of the agreement between Applicant and the
First Respondent which agreement is set out in
paragraphs 29, 31 and 33 of the Applicant’s founding
affidavit (“the agreement”).
3. That the Second Respondent be ordered to
restore the Applicant’s free and undisturbed
access to the premises of the Second
Respondent and to restore the Applicant’s free
and undisturbed possession of its plant,
equipment, machinery and rollonrolloff bins
standing at the central salvage yard and
various shaft sites at the premises so that the
Applicant can perform its obligations in terms
of the agreement.”
[5] Die regshulp in “A.2” hierbo is gebasseer op die mandament
van spolie. Sover dit paragraaf “A.3” hierbo aanbetref is dit
duidelik dat ‘n tydelike interdik teen die Eerste Respondent
aangevra word in terme waarvan die Applikant toegelaat
moet word om sy verpligtinge in terme van die subkontrak
tussen die Applikant en die Eerste Respondent na te kom.
[6] Die finale regshulp wat aangevra word ingevolge gedeelte B
3
van die kennisgewing van mosie is as volg:
“B.1. That the First Respondent be ordered to allow the Applicant to
perform its obligations in terms of the agreement between the
Applicant, which agreement is set out in paragraphs 29, 31 and
33 of the Applicants founding affidavit (“the agreement”)
and that the First Respondent further be ordered to
adhere to the terms of the agreement.
2. Declaring that the agreement in the terms as set out in
paragraphs 29, 31 and 33 of Applicant’s affidavit was
concluded between the Applicant and the First
Respondent.
3. Declaring that it was not a term of the agreement that the
agreement could be terminated on 1 month’s notice.
4. Declaring that the First Respondent’s cancellation of the
agreement on the 31st of January 2005 is unlawful and
of no force and effect and that the agreement is still in
force.
5. That the said agreement be reduced to writing.
6. That the First Respondent shall be bound by the orders
in 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 above.
7. Costs of the application.”
[7] Dit is duidelik dat ‘n finale interdik aangevra word teen die
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Eerste Respondent in paragraaf “B.1” om Applikant toe te laat om sy verpligtinge na te kom in terme van die ooreenkoms.
[8] In paragraaf “B.2” word ‘n verklarende bevel aangevra dat
die ooreenkoms soos beweer deur die Applikant, gesluit is
tussen die Applikant en die Eerste Respondent.
[9] In paragrawe “B.3” en “B.4” word verklarende bevele
aangevra naamlik dat dit nie ‘n term van die ooreenkoms
was dat die ooreenkoms beëindig kon word op een maand
kennisgewing nie, en ‘n verklarende bevel dat die Eerste
Respondent se kansellasie van die ooreenkoms op 31
Januarie 2005 onregmatig is en van geen krag en effek is
nie.
[10] Aangesien daar in die kennisgewing van mosie verwys word
na paragrawe 29, 31 en 33 word hierdie paragrawe
verbatim aangehaal vir volledigheidshalwe.
“29.1 Shortly after the 14th November 2003, I
received a call from Bromfield informing me
that First Respondent had been the successful
tenderer. In accordance with the prior
discussions (paragraph 26 above), the First
Respondent, duly represented by Bromfield
and the Applicant, duly represented by myself,
then agreed that the Applicant was to be First
Respondent’s subcontractor in terms of its
agreement with the Second Respondent on an
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ongoing basis and indefinitely as long as First
Respondent is to render the services required
by the Second Respondent in terms of the said
tenders (hereinafter referred to as “the
agreement”).
29.2 It was further agreed that the parties would
meet during the following week at the offices of
the Applicant to discuss the further terms and
detail of the agreement between the Applicant
and the First Respondent.
30. As agreed, a meeting was held at Applicant’s office in
Rustenburg. Bromfield represented the First
Respondent and I represented the Applicant.
31. At the said meeting it was agreed:
31.1 that the Applicant would render the following
services to the Second Respondent in its
capacity as the First Respondent’s
subcontractor:
31.1.1 the Applicant would be responsible for
the general fist phase sorting of waste
material at the various mine shafts and
plants of the Second Respondent as
well as sorting at the Second
Respondent’s central salvage yard
(“yard”). The Applicant was to provide
the equipment and labour.
6
31.1.2 transport of sorted waste material too
large to be placed in skip bins from the
various plants and shafts to the central
salvage yard. Transport in terms of the
agreement would be conducted on the
following basis:
(a) material capable of being loaded
into skip bins would be
transported by the First
Respondent. The skip bins, skip
bin trucks and drivers would be
supplied by the First
Respondent. All costs relating to
this said skip bin transportation
would be borne by the First
Respondent;
(b) all material too large to be placed
in skip bins, would be
transported by the Applicant.
The Applicant would provide the
flat bed trucks and rollonrollof
trucks needed for this purpose;
31.1.3 the Applicant would also be responsible
for the final sorting at the yard of all
material transported from the shafts and
plants to the yard (e.g. all ferrous
metals to be sorted into specific
7
categories of mild steel, stainless steel,
cast iron etc.; nonferrous into brass,
aluminium, copper etc. respectively);
31.1.4 the Applicant would process all scrap
materials in accordance with the
relevant specifications as required by
foundries and steel works (e.g.
electrical cables had to be cropped to
certain lengths, then stripped of the
casing resulting in clear copper);
31.1.5 the Applicant would be solely
responsible for the marketing i.e. calling
of quotations and the subsequent price
negotiations, as well as the sale of all
salvageable materials and scrap metal;
31.2 that the above services would commence on
the 1st December 2003;
31.3 that the First Respondent would pay the Applicant as
follows:
31.3.1 The Applicant’s monthly disbursements /
expenses in terms of the agreement at the end
of every month; the Applicant had to render
its account to the First Respondent by the 25th
of each month. These disbursements /
expenses included salaries and wages,
8
variable costs such as diesel, oil,
maintenance, equipment hire and
administrative costs and was payable at
month end;
31.3.2 An additional amount, also payable by the
First Respondent at month end, representing
Applicant’s management fee/profit which
would be calculated as a specific percentage
of the total monthly sales of all salvageable
materials. It was, however, further agreed that
the relevant percentage would be determined
and agreed upon at a next meeting to be held
a few days later.
32. The said next meeting was held during the last week of
November 2003 in the District of Orkney. It was once
again attended by myself on behalf of the Applicant and
by Bromfield on behalf of the First Respondent.
33. At this meeting the parties agreed that:
33.1 the Applicant’s management/profit fee in terms of the
agreement would initially consist of 5% of the total
monthly sales of salvageable material. This
percentage would apply for the first few months only
and would then be revised once the parties had had
the opportunity of ascertaining the scope of the
contract. At the time both parties were aware that
the determination of the actual scope of the
agreement would take a few months for inter alia the
9
following reasons: as at November 2003, the actual
tonnage, volumes of salvageable materials and
prevailing logistics were as yet unknown. It was
agreed by the parties that the Applicant was entitled
to a reasonable profit and the percentage fixed was
to reflect that.
33.2 the agreement between the Applicant and the First
Respondent would be recorded in writing as soon as
the agreement between the Fist and Second
Respondents was reduced to writing. According to
Bromfield, this latter event could take a few months to
take place.”
[11] Paragrawe “B.3” en “B.4” van die kennisgewing van mosie is
verwys na mondelinge getuienis, welke getuienis aangehoor
is op 2830 Junie 2005; 29 Augustus 2005 – 1 September
2005 en dan weer op 05 Desember 2005 – 13 Desember
2005.
[12] Nieteenstaande die verwysing na mondelinge getuienis bly dit steeds ‘n aansoek en is die aansoek nie omskep in ‘n verhooraksie nie.
[13] Die Tweede Respondent het by ooreenkoms aangedui dat
toegang tot die perseel aan die Applikant en sy werknemers
gegee sal word vir die uitvoering van die kontrak onderworpe
aan Tweede Respondent se standaard sekuritietsprosedure,
indien ‘n bevel vir spesifieke nakoming gelas word. Tweede
10
Respondent het nie verder deelgeneem aan die verrigtinge
nie.
[c] Getuienis:
[14] Namens die Applikant het Mnr Roy Burger, die deponent van
die Funderende Eedsverklaring getuig. Hy het die inhoud
van sy funderende eedsverklaring bevestig. Sy getuienis
kan kortliks as volg opgesom word:
[15] Hy is alleen lid van die Applikant. Hy het by Mnr Lubbe
verneem van ‘n tender deur die Tweede Respondent
aangevra vir die verwydering van skroot metale by die
mynskagte in die Rustenburg omgewing. Daar is toe besluit
dat Eerste Respondent moet tender en dat Applikant die
Eerste Respondent behulpsaam sal wees, nie net met die
tender nie maar ook met die uitvoering van die kontrak indien
die Eerste Respondent suksesvol sal wees met die tender.
[16] Die tender is toe aan Eerste Respondent toegeken. Daar is
mondelings ooreengekom dat die Applikant die ‘strategic
alliance partner’ sal wees van die Eerste Respondent in die
hoedanigheid as subkontrakteur. Volgens hom sou die
ooreenkoms bly voortbestaan solank die hoofkontrak tussen
die Eerste Respondent en die Tweede Respondent bly
voortbestaan.
11
[17] Hy ontken dat dit ‘n term van die ooreenkoms was dat die
kontrak beëindig kon word met een maand kennisgewing.
[18] Alhoewel hy toegee dat daar van tyd tot tyd probleme
ondervind is met die uitvoering van die kontrak, ontken hy
dat Applikant wesentlik wanpresteer het wat die kansellasie
van die kontrak deur die Eerste Respondent regverdig.
[19] Volgens hom was Mnr Lubbe ‘n verteenwoordiger van die
Eerste Respondent. Hy erken egter dat hy ‘n skrywe gerig
het aan Mnr Lubbe om hom mee te deel dat aangesien die
subkontrak tussen die Eerste Respondent en die Applikant
beëindig word op 28 Februarie 2005, hy ook die verhouding
tussen die Applikant en Mnr Lubbe beëindig op 28 Februarie
2005.”
[20] Namens die Eerste Respondent het Mnre Steyn,
Kichenbrand en Lubbe getuig. Hier volg ‘n kort opsomming
van hul getuienis.
[21] Mnr Douw Steyn het as volg getuig:
[22] Hy is die algemene bestuurder van die Eerste Respondent.
Die Eerste Respondent was die suksesvolle tenderaar om
afval materiale insluitende skroot metale te verwyder vanaf
die mynskagte van die Tweede Respondent. ‘n Interim
12
kontrak is gesluit tussen die Eerste en Tweede Respondente
en verdere onderhandelinge moes nog volg vir die sluiting
van die hoofkontrak.
[23] Volgens hom was Applikant ‘n subkontrakteur van die
Eerste Respondent om behulpsaam te wees met die
uitvoering van die kontrak tussen Eerste en Tweede
Respondente.
[24] Die subkontrak tussen Applikant en Eerste Respondent was
gesluit op ‘n maandtotmaand basis en kon beëindig word
met een maand kennisgewing. Hy ontken dat die sub
kontrak tussen die Applikant en die Eerste Respondent sou
bly voortbestaan vir ‘n onbepaalde periode of solank die
hoofkontrak tussen Eerste en Tweede Respondente bly
voortbestaan.
[25] Volgens hom was Mnr Lubbe die skakelbeampte vir die
Applikant by die sortering areas en was hy nie in diens van
die Eerste Respondent nie. Dit verklaar ook waarom die
salaris van Mnr Lubbe geëis is deur en oorbetaal is aan die
Applikant.
[26] Hy getuig dat die Applikant wesentlik wanpresteer het van
tyd tot tyd en sodanige wanprestasies die kansellasie van die
ooreenkoms met een maand kennisgewing tot gevolg gehad
het.
13
[27] Mnr Kichenbrand, het as volg getuig:
[28] Hy is die takbestuurder van die Eerste Respondent, en moes
die kontrak tussen Eerste en Tweede Respondente bestuur.
Hy getuig oor die verskeie probleme wat ondervind is met die
Applikant wat wesentlik was en daartoe kon lei dat die Eerste
Respondent sy kontrak met die myn (Tweede Respondent)
verloor.
[29] Die probleme sluit in probleme met die veiligheid van
toerusting en voertuie van die Applikant, die nienakoming
van veiligheidstandaarde gestel deur die Tweede
Respondent en probleme met werknemers van die Applikant.
Voorts moes die verkope van herwinbare metale ook van die
Applikant weggeneem word omdat daar gesukkel is om die
geld so geëin vanaf die Applikant te verkry. Dit het daartoe
gelei dat skuldvergelyking toegepas is om sodoende ‘n einde
te maak aan die skuld van die Applikant.
[30] Mnr Lubbe het as volg getuig:
[31] Hy het verduidelik hoe dit gebeur het dat Applikant en Eerste
Respondent getender het vir die kontrak van Tweede
Respondent om die afval materiale wat skroot metale insluit
te verwyder vanaf die mynskagte van Tweede Respondent in
die Rustenburg area.
14
[32] Hy was die skakelbeampte tussen Applikant en Eerste
Respondent. Die Applikant het hom besoldig. Hy was in
beheer van die ‘central salvage yard’ en het aan Mnr Roy
Burger van die Applikant gerapporteer.
[33] Hy was teenwoordig by die onderhandelinge tussen die
Applikant en die Eerste Respondent en bevestig dat dit ‘n
term van die ooreenkoms was dat dit beëindig kon word met
dertig (30) dae kennisgewing wedersyds. As bestuurder van
die ‘central salvage yard’ was hy bewus van al die probleme
wat van tydtottyd ondervind is deur die Applikant met die
uitvoering van die subkontrak.
[34] Hierdie probleme was wesentlik van aard en kon daartoe lei
dat die Tweede Respondent die kontrak met die Eerste
Respondent beëindig. Hierdie probleme het ingesluit
probleme met toerusting en voertuie, werknemers en ook die
nienakoming van vereiste veiligheidstandaarde.
[35] Hy was ook onderwerp aan ‘n dissiplinêre verhoor deur die
Applikant onder leiding van Mnr Roy Burger en hy is onthef
van sy pos, en moes ‘n laer pos beklee. Kort voor die
kennisgewing van beëindiging van die subkontrak, was Mnr
Roy Burger baie negatief ingestel en het hy geweier om
enigiets positief te doen om die subkontrak in stand te hou
en na behore te dien. So byvoorbeeld het hy geweier om
15
meer en beter toerusting en voertuie in te bring. Die Eerste
Respondent het daarinteen meer voertuie ingebring om die
opgehoopte tonnemaat te vervoer. Daar was duidelik ‘n
ongemak tussen die partye (Burger en Steyn) oor onder
andere die defektiewe toerusting en die nienakoming van
vereistes ter uitvoering van die subkontrak. .
[36] Voorts het Mnr Burger ook die Eerste Respondent bedrieg
deurdat hy die herwinbare metale duur verkoop het en ‘n
mindere bedrag oorbetaal het. Volgens hom het die
Applikant nie te alle tye wesenlik en materieël presteer nie.
[d] Geskilpunte:
[37] Wat beoordeel moet word is of die Applikant geregtig is op
spesifieke nakoming van die ooreenkoms gesluit tussen die
Applikant en die Eerste Respondent. Om dit te kan bereg
moet ook bereg word of die Applikant op ‘n oorsig van
waarskynlikhede aangetoon het dat die kansellasie van die
ooreenkoms deur Eerste Respondent ongeldig was, welke
vraag sal insluit die vraag of die ooreenkoms by wyse van
een maand kennisgewing beëindig kan word; en of die
ooreenkoms deur positiewe wanprestasie aan die kant van
die Applikant beëindig kan word.
[38] Dit is duidelik dat die aangevraagde regshulp ‘n finale
(permanente) interdik in die vorm van ‘n spesifieke nakoming
16
is.
[39] In Croatia Meat CC v Millennium Properties (Pty) Ltd
1998 (4) SA 980 (W) op bladsy 987 IJ bevind Schwartzman
J die volgende:
“Although the relief claimed by Sofokleous is couched
in the form of an interdict, what he is in substance
seeking is specific performance of his contract with
Millennium and it is on this basis that I intend to
approach his application and not on the basis that
this is a claim for an interdict in the usual sense in
which this term is used.”
[40] Ek is van mening dat die aangevraagde regshulpsaak
soortgelyk is aan die in die Croatiasaak, supra, en dat ek
ook dieselfde benadering moet volg wat in die Croatiasaak
gevolg is.
[41] Sover dit spesifieke nakoming aanbetref, is dit voordie
handliggend dat ‘n bevel vir spesifieke nakoming nie gelas
sal word waar dit onredelik, onbillik of onregverdig sal wees
op die Respondent nie.
Sien: Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society
1986 (1) SA 776 (A).
[42] Een van die aspekte wat oorweeg moet word by die
uitoefening van ‘n hof se diskresie om spesifieke nakoming
17
te gelas is die vraag: indien die ander party die kontrak
gerepudieer het, die onskuldige party steeds kan voortgaan
om dienste te lewer in terme van die kontrak wat onbruikbaar
is, en uitgawes aan te gaan wat totaal onnodig is, ten einde
die kontrak af te dwing. Die feit dat ‘n party ‘n kontrak
gerepudieer het, kan nie op gesteun word om ‘n bevel te
maak wat totaal teen die belange van sodanige party is nie
net omdat hy die kontrak verbreek het nie. Daar moet
noodwendig gekyk word of die kontrak nog steeds
uitvoerbaar is.
[43] Die uitvoerbaarheid van die kontrak hang ook ten nouste
saam met die aard of tipe kontrak wat ter sprake is. Dit is
duidelik dat die onderhawige kontrak in essensie een van
dienslewering is en dus ook van ‘n persoonlike aard is.
[44] Christie in “The Law of Contract in South Africa”, 4de
uitgawe op bladsy 613 skryf die volgende:
“An order for the specific performance of a contract of
employment will, in the exercise of the court’s discretion,
not normally be granted. The tendency to regard it as a
rule of law that specific performance of such contracts
would never be granted was corrected in National Union
of Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd 1982
(4) SA 151 (T) but the reasons why the courts have
not granted such orders remain as valid as ever,
provided it is remembered that in every case the
18
court has a discretion. The court was clearly correct
in exercising its discretion in Seloadi v Sun
International (Bophuthatswana) Ltd 1993 (2) SA
174 (BG) 186 I190 E by not ordering a hotel
company to reemploy workers it had summarily
dismissed. Because such a contract calls for the
performance of personal services of a continuing
nature and because of the personal relationship involved, there would be a constant danger of disputes arising over whether the contract was being properly performed (that is, whether the defendants was in contempt), and the court is not equipped to provide the constant supervision which would be necessary to prevent such disputes arising or adjudicate on them as they arose.
For the same reasons no interdict or declaratory
order having the effect of enforcing the contract is
likely to be granted, so normally the only remedy
open to an employee who has been wrongfully
dismissed is damages.”
Sien ook: Myburgh v Daniëlskuil Munisipaliteit 1985 (3)
SA 335 (NC).
Rossouw v SuidAfrikaanse Mediese Navorsingsraad 1990 (3) SA 297 (C).
Stinise v Kayo Shoes Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 643 (CK).
Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A).
Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 545 (C).
19
[45] Bogenoemde beginsel is as volg bespreek deur Blieden R in
Unibank Savings and Loans (formerly Community Bank)
v ABSA Bank 2000 (4) SA 191 (WLD) op bladsy 219 E –
220 A:
“In the instant case there is no question of impossibility of
performance. The curator could have continued to pay the
executives even though there was no work for them to do.
However, forcing him to do so would have resulted in an
injustice which could easily have been prevented by the
applicant cancelling the contract with the respondent,
arranging a retrenchment package with the executives and
claiming the costs of such package from the curator.
Instead of doing this the applicant insisted on continuing to
pay the executives for doing nothing. In my judgment the
learned Judge in the Court a quo erred in exercising his
discretion as he did as this resulted in an injustice.
I agree with the remarks of Professor McKerron in his
article ‘Effect of election not to accept anticipatory
repudiation of contract: White & Carter v McGregor’
in (1966) 79 SALJ at 309. The learned writer
criticised the majority judgment in White & Carter
(Councils) Ltd v McGregor (1961) 3 All ER 1178 (HL)
referred to in the judgment of the learned Deputy
Judge President. In particular I agree with what he
said at 312:
‘It would seem to be contrary to the public
interest that a party to a contract,
notwithstanding repudiation by the other
20
party, should be entitled to go quietly on,
as if the contract still continued to be fully
operative, and render unwanted services
and incur useless expense in order to
claim in debt his stipulated remuneration.’
The fact that the respondent repudiated the contract in the circumstances of this case, in my view, cannot be relied upon to make an order which is adverse to its interests. If one looks at the totality of all the evidence in this case ordering the respondent to pay for the nonwork of the executives concerned has resulted in an injustice.
I have not placed any reliance on the judgment in
South African Harness Works v South African
Publishers Ltd 1915 CPD 43, nor on the various
articles in law journals and similar publications to
which we were referred dealing with the principle of
‘waste’ or ‘wasteful expenditure’ as being a legal
basis for refusing an order for specific performance.
In my view, considerations of justice and public policy
are sufficient justification for a refusal to order specific
performance.”
[46] Mnr du Plessis, namens die Eerste Respondent, het
gesubmenteer dat die argument daarop gebaseer is dat
waar ‘n party in werklikheid “wasted performance” gaan
lewer uit hoofde van ‘n bevel tot spesifieke nakoming, en
waar skadevergoeding in werklikheid die onskuldige party sal
vergoed, behoort spesifieke nakoming nie toegestaan word
nie. Na my mening is dit ‘n korrekte interpretasie van die
beginsel soos neergelê in die Uniebanksaak, supra.
21
[47] In Carpet Contracts (Pty) Ltd v Grobler 1975 (2) SA 436
(T) verskyn die volgende op bladsy 441 EH:
“The difficulty which both Mackeurtan and O’Donovan
foresaw is, in my view, well illustrated by the facts in
the present case. To pay the price is not the
purchaser’s only obligation, as it is clear from the
conditions on the reverse side of the order form to
which I have referred. The defendant has to make
fairly elaborate preparations to facilitate matters for
the workmen who are to fit and lay the carpets. The
defendant may refuse to do this; he might already
have had carpets laid in his house by some other
firm. I do not think that in such circumstances any
court would make an order for specific performance
which would necessarily include his accepting the
carpeting and preparing the floors for the fitting and
laying. In such a case the court would rather order
him to pay damages. This is also clear from para.
468 (a) on p. 329 of Mackeurtan’s book, edited by
O’Donovan says:
‘Examples of the grounds on which the
courts may exercise their discretion in
refusing to order specific performance
a) where damages would adequately
compensate the plaintiff …’;
and in my view this is the type of contract in which the plaintiff should rather claim damages than institute a claim for specific performance.
22
Mr. Nathan, in support of this argument, has also
referred us to the cases of Schierhout v Minister of
Justice, 1926 A.D. 99, and Dennill v Atkins & Co.,
supra at p. 287, which reads as follows:
‘If then the plaintiffs are entitled to some
relief, the next question is what relief should
they get. They ask the Court to enforce the
contract by making Dennill pay the full
contract price of the balance of the meat.
Specific performance is hardly an appropriate
term to apply to such a claim; it is really the
actio venditi to recover the purchase
price. That form of relief is one which, in
the absence of special circumstances, is
available to every vendor when the
purchaser repudiates the contract and
refuses to take what he has bought.’”
[48] Bovermelde saak is myns insiens ‘n goeie voorbeeld
daarvan dat dit in ‘n gegewe geval moeilik en onprakties sal
wees om ‘n bevel tot spesifieke nakoming af te dwing.
[49] In hierdie saak is daar egter ook ‘n dispuut of die kontrak
onregmatiglik gerepudieer is deur die Eerste Respondent en
of daar positiewe wanprestasie gepleeg is deur die Applikant
wat die kansellasie van die kontrak regverdig. Ek sal
aanstons daarmee handel.
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[50] In paragraaf 60.2 van die funderende eedsverklaring verklaar
die Applikant die volgende:
“60.2 The scope and nature of the services required by
the Second Respondent are such that there
cannot be an interruption of more than a few
days in the rendering of the said services.”
[51] Dit is duidelik dat tot op die datum dat alle getuienis
aangebied is, ‘n tydperk van ongeveer tien (10) maande
verstryk het. Die Applikant was dus reeds vir hierdie tydperk
van tien (10) maande nie op die perseel nie. Die Eerste
Respondent het in die tussentyd ander maatreëls in plek
gestel sodat uitvoering gegee kon word aan die kontraktuele
verpligtinge teenoor die Tweede Respondent.
[52] Nuwe personeel is aangestel, nuwe subkontrakte is gesluit
ten einde die werk te doen en nuwe masjinerie en toerusting
is aangekoop, soos duidelik blyk uit die getuienis van Mnre
Steyn, Kichenbrand en Lubbe.
[53] Vir die afgelope tien (10) maande en meer is die hoof
kontrak tussen Eerste en Tweede Respondente gediens en
in stand gehou.
[54] Mnr Steyn het getuig dat dit nie moontlik is dat die Applikant
net kan terugkeer en dat dinge weer kan wees soos
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voorheen nie. Volgens hom sal dit geweldige praktiese
probleme veroorsaak.
[55] Mnr Kichenbrand het getuig dat daar geen
vertrouensverhouding meer bestaan tussen Applikant en
Eerste Respondent nie. Dinge het dermate verander dat dit
nie meer moontlik is vir die Eerste Respondent om die
Applikant te akkommodeer nie aangesien die werksopset
verander het. ‘n Nuwe subkontrak is gesluit, nuwe voertuie
is aangeskaf en nuwe werkers is in diens geneem. Die
situasie het dus onomkeerbaar verander.
[56] Mnr du Plessis het namens die Eerste Respondent
gesubmenteer dat die hof sy diskressie ten gunste van die
Eerste Respondent moet uitoefen en nie spesifieke
nakoming gelas nie onder andere om die volgende redes:
[i] daar bestaan geen vertrouensverhouding meer tussen
die Applikant en Eerste Respondent nie;
[ii] die inbring van Applikant op die terrein sal ‘n
ontwrigting van ten minste vier weke veroorsaak;
[iii] hierdie ontwrigting sal tot skade lei vir die Eerste
Respondent;
[iv] dit sal onmoontlik wees om die Applikant te akkommodeer
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op die werksperseel, en daar sal geen werk vir die Applikant wees nie;
[v] dit wat aan die Applikant betaal sal moet word sal derhalwe “wasteful expenditure” wees aangesien daar geen werk vir die Applikant sal wees nie;
[vi] die nuwe werkers en nuwe subkontrak wat gesluit is en alreeds in plek is vir die afgelope tien (10) maande en langer sal geaffekteer word.
[57] Myns insiens moet spesifieke nakoming nie gelas word
onder bovermelde omstandighede nie. Dit beteken egter nie
dat die Applikant sonder enige remedie gelaat word nie. Ek
wil geensins ‘n verdere aksie vooruit loop nie. Ek is van
mening dat dit nie nodig is om te bepaal of die kansellasie
van die ooreenkoms regsgeldig was aldan nie of dat die
Eerste Respondent die kontrak gerepudieer het aldan nie.
[58] Selfs die vraag of die kontrak met een maand kennisgewing
gekanselleer kon word hoef nie nou besleg te word nie.
[59] Die beregting hiervan sal meebring dat
geloofwaardigheidsbevindinge noodwendig gemaak moet
word wat moontlik nadeel vir die partye kan inhou indien ‘n
aksie ingestel word.
[60] In navolging van die reeds gevestigde regsbeginsels waarna
hierbo verwys is, is dit myns insiens nie nodig om enigsins
hierdie aspekte te bereg nie.
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[61] Derhalwe is ek van mening dat ek nie spesifieke nakoming
kan gelas nie. Die aansoek moet derhalwe van die hand
gewys word.
B. Koste:
[62] Mnr du Plessis het gesubmenteer dat koste op ‘n prokureur
en kliënt skaal toegestaan word aan Eerste Respondent. Hy
voer aan dat alhoewel die twee geskilpunte wat na getuienis
verwys was, twee eenvoudige geskilpunte was wat binne ‘n
paar dae opgeklaar moes gewees het, die kruisverhoor van
die Eerste Respondent se getuie, Mnr Steyn, buitensporig
lank en uitgerek was.
[63] Dit is egter waar dat Mnr Steyn baie lank gekruisondervra
was en net so waar is dit dat daar oormatige herhalings van
vrae en antwoorde was, maar ek is egter van mening dat
hierdie nie ‘n gepaste geval is waar koste op ‘n prokureur en
kliënt skaal toegeken moet word nie. Dit is duidelik dat dit
hier ‘n kwessie van ondervraging of kruisverhoor styl was.
Ook die ander redes deur Mnr du Plessis gesubmenteer
oortuig my nie dat so ‘n kostebevel toegestaan moet word
nie.
[64] Koste volg gewoonlik die resultaat en daarom is ek geneë
om ‘n gewone kostebevel ten gunste van die Eerste
Respondent toe te staan.
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[65] Derhalwe maak ek die volgende bevel:
Die aansoek van die Applikant word van die hand gewys met
koste. Hierdie koste sluit in die koste van 17 Maart 2005 wat
voorbehou is.
R D HENDRICKS
REGTER VAN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF
Prokureur vir die Applikant:
F R PANDELANI INCORPORATED
c/o KGOMO, MOKHETLE & TLOU ATTORNEYS
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