kaag paper 1 isnasoms

8/13/2019 Kaag Paper 1 Isnasoms

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John Kaa[

Continuity and Inheritance:Kant'sCritique of Judgmentand the Work of C.S. Peirce

I Revisiting Peirce sKantian Inheritance W hen I was a babe in philos oph y, Charles Peirce w ro te, m y bottle was

filled from the ud de rs of Kant. ^ It is widely rec og niz ed th at this early form ofphilosophic nourishment granted young Peirce the opportunity to recognizethe respective shortcomings of empiricism and idealism and provided the pointof departure for his philosophic architectonic. Peirce himself comments on thisindebtedness to Immanuel Kant at multiple points, especially in the earlystages of his work. In reference to his categories of Firstness, Secondness andTh irdn ess , Peirce writes that the list grew originally ou t of the study of thetable of Kant. ^ This table, found in the beginn ing of the Tran scend entalAnalytic of the Critique of Pure Reason is crucial in Peirce's thinking, for itstands as Kant's attempt to bring analytic unity to the manifold ofrepresentations in judgment and supplies the necessary triadic structure thatcharacterizes Peirce's system.

The community of Peirce scholars today seems to acknowledge thecontribution Kant made to the developm ent of Am erican pragm atism ' and,more particularly, Peirce's pragmaticism. This acknowledgement, however, hasbeen somewhat cursory, and often serves as a mere preparatory move inhighlighting the way in which Peirce overcomes and abandons the Kantianproject as framed in the First Critique According to Karl-Otto Apel, AndreDe Tienne* and Sandra Rosenthal,^ Peirce grow s u p , and w ea ns himselffrom Kant's formal theory of cognition. The commentators' perspective on therelation between Peirce and Kant is understandable; despite his praise for the king of m ode rn philos oph y, Peirce regards Ka nt's work as antiqu ated andunderscores the way in which the Critique of Pure Reason stands apart from a


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extrapolate this response from the First Critique. Peirce's extensive study ofthis work has made such an attempt nearly impossible. His analysis of Kantseems accurate if we, like Peirce, only take account ofthe Critique of PureReason. First, I will highlight the way in which Peirce justifiably criticizes partsof the Critique of Pure Reason and the various supporting roles certaincommentators play in Kant's critique. I will then examine the Critique ofJudgment in show ing how K ant himself aba ndo ns, or at least m ediates , someof the dualisms and contradictions that Peirce finds so problematic in hisearlier work. My analysis was motivated, at least in part, by DouglasA nd ers on 's observ ation tha t, in his fixation on logic, Peirce paid littleattention to Kant 's Third Critique ^ and m ight have overlooked K ant'sdevelopm ent of imag ination, gen ius, and aesthetic creation on thegrounds that they had little to do with the formal subjects of the first twoCritiques.^ There is scant evidence that Peirce carefully considered Kant's laterworks.* I will argue that this omission in Peirce's reading encourages him tomaintain a strict demarcation between Kantianism and pragmaticism, one thatseems unnecessary and unproductive in light of Kant's rendering of aesthetics.In the examination of various themes of the Third Critique., I hope to exposePeirce's Kantian inheritance to be far more extensive than Peirce or hiscommentators would like to admit. The lacunae I hope to identify in Peirce'sreading of the history of philosophy seem to be especially important in termsof Peirce's own emphasis on historical continuity. If we are to take Peirce'scomments about continuity seriously, it seems to follow that we mustacknowledge that his philosophical moves are, in a certain way, indebted to thepreparatory maneuverings of earlier thinkers. At the very least, it seemsappropriate to reveal any philosophic debts that might remain hidden.

The pitfalls this project faces are numerous and rather deep. The projectrests on the belief that the Third Critique is a vital culminating moment inKant's corpus, a moment in which theory and praxis co-emerge. This beliefwhile controversial and slow in gaining acceptance, has been supported byKant scholars such as John Sallis,^ Rudolf Makkreel, and John Zammito. 'They suggest that the thematic treatme nt of im agina tion and creative play (in both K ant's m eth od and justification) is no t an afterth oug ht, bu trather the natural terminus of Kant's journey into epistemology. If this is thecase, then Peirce's attention has been misdirected; since the concepts of


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Continuity and Inheritance 51 7

synthetic a priori judg m ents poss ible. ' Th e question reflects a desire on ethat Peirce inherits to establish the groundwork for a pure mathematics anda pure science. Kant examines the possibility of the emergence of apodicticcertainty from the ground of sensibility, yet on his own terms such anexam ination is bo un d to enc ou nter almost imm ediate frustration. All ourknow ledge begins with experien ce, bu t, by Ka nt's acc oun t, the concepts ofpure reason are pure only to the extent that they remain distinct from sensoryexperience.'^

The epistemic loggerhead that Kant confronts encourages him to developthe dist inction between phenomena and noumena. This dist inction, in turn,encourages Kant to develop the concept of the noum enal thin g-in -i tself asthe unknowable ground of hum an cog nit ion. Peirce, as a Crit ical C om m on -sensist, writes tha t, Th e Kantist has only to abjure from the b ot to m of hisheart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, beconceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and hewill fmd himself to have becom e a Critical Com m on- sen sist. As EckartForester^' and others have noted, the gap which opens up between thenoumenal and phenomenal and between knowledge and the thing in-itself isnever effectively bridged in the First Critique On this note, Peirce comments, that Kant draws too hard a line between observation and ratiocination. '* Inthe end , Kant is a sort of idealist hi m se lf and is bo un d to m aintain thesedisjunctions as logical contradictions.'^ Pure concepts are unequivocally notempirical. Empirical observations are not pure. Such contradictions quicklymelt away in light of Peirce's emphasis on triadic mediation in whichobservation and thought are not held apart but co-emerge in a kind ofabductive play. Peircean mediation and abduction will be addressed shortly.

The bifijrcated terms Kant employs to describe human cognition reflectboth his acceptance of and quiet dissatisfaction with the dyadic logic to whichhe adhe res. Kant divides concep ts into the categories of em pirical and p u re in an effort to preserve a kernel of apod icticity in his epistem olog y.This apodictic certainty, however, cannot be accessed in the world ofexperience, and indeed, is forever threatened by the confusion of empiricalobservation. In holding apart these two cognitive realms, Kant believes he hassecured a type of epistemological bedrock, yet in his act of separating, thisbedrock recedes from the empirical world it was supposed to ground. Onceagain, the contradiction of synthetic a priori judgments rears its ugly head.


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Kant was com pletely igno rant of the logic of relatives '* and consistentlyneglected the logic of relations. '^

This also amounts to saying that Kant did not understand Peirceancontinuity, or understand the way in which the notion of continuity might beable to bridge the schisms found in the Critique of Pure Reason Peirceobserves tha t, K ant confoun ds (c ontin uity) w ith inftnite divisibility, sayingthat the essential character of a continuous series is that between any twomembers of it a third can always be found. ' ' Highlighting the necessity ofdivisibility does not ease tension one ftnds in the First Critique and may onlyexplain Kant's incessant splicing of the cognitive faculties. The Peirceanpalliative for the First Critique lies not in the inevitability of an emergent thirdterm (Kant after all recognized the necessity of this emergence), but in reftningthe scope and determination of this term. It lies in allowing this third term toreside in a realm beyond the strict confines of traditional first-order logic.

Peirce doe s no t fiilly develop the od d disposition of the th ir d until his1898 Cambridge Lectures. In an earlier account of continuity, Peirce grappleswith the concept by identifying the inadequacy of Kantian and Aristotelianno tion s o ft h e co nti nu um . Peirce note s tha t infinite divisibility leaves ga ps inthe continuum and simply calls for ever finer divisibility. This is, once again,the standard reading of Kant's treatment, and confuses the character of seriesof rational fractions with a true continuum. Artistotle's rendering ofcontinuous fields comes even closer to the model that Peirce later proposes,but lacks an essential point that Peirce will eventually recognize. He explainsthe Aristotelical prin ciple , a principle of con tinuity based on limit function s,in relatively simple terms:

Suppose a surface to be part red and part blue; so thatevery point on it is either red or blue, and of course,no part can be both red and blue. What then is theboundary line between red and blue.>...Now as parts ofthe surface in the immediate neighborhood of anyordinary point upon a curved boundary are half redand half blue, it follows that the boundary is both halfred and half blue. ' '

It is important to note, however, that this description assumes the law of non-


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true continuity and the disposition of the mediating third term that itnecessitates. Th e third term between red and blue , betwee n distinct series inthe co ntin uu m , are no t half red and half blu e in the sense of creating yetanother division, but rather embody a type of mediating position that is, atonce , both red and blue.H er e, Peirce suggests the acting role of his th ir d inm ode ling con tinuity. Th e thi rd , and hence con tinuity, defies dyadic logic,for it acts etweenand spans the gap th at appears to sep arate binary term s. In arare m om en t of non-techn ical analysis, Peirce describes thirdness: [I t] is theboundary between the black and the white, is neither black, nor white, norneither, nor both. It is the pairedness of the two. It is for the white, the activesecondness of the black, for the black, the active secondness of the white. ^^Peirce notes that this boundary serves as an effective mediator by virtue of itscontra dictory character, in its ability to break the law of non- con trad iction .At first, it may appear that this paradox arises from the generation of thebinary, firstness-secondness. Peirce, however, insists that thirdness is alwaysalready present in the continuum the undifferentiated possibility thatreceives and grants the possibility of any determination. The third is not justsome random thing placed between two others, but, as the continuum servesas the root from which determination can be made. It is in this respect that heoccasionally rem arks that original pote ntiality is essentially co nt in uo us . Byhis account, the appearance of any particular third is simply another momentof continuity's continual disclosure. It is with this in mind that we have to readPeirce's comment:

First and Second, A^ient and Patient Yes and No, arecategories which enable us roughly to describe thefacts of experience and they satisfy the mind for a longtime. But at last they are found inadequate and thethird is the conception which is then called for. TheThird is that which bridges over the chasm betweenthe absolute first and last, and brings them intorelationship.^'

This bridging is forever present and continually translates between ostensiblyseparate realms. It is worth noting that this third is a bridge only to the extent


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520 John Kaag

Critique. This contention will be developed in full later when I address thereciprocal action of genius and the development of the sensus comm unis thatare so central to the Third Critique. For now, let us temporarily turn ourattention to another section of the First Critique.,to a place P eirce again makesexplicit his departure from Kant. Peirce cites the chapter on the Schematism asKant's most notable and tragic attempt to recognize the role of activemediation.

At the beginning of the Transcendental Analytic, Kant asks two questions: H ow can perception be subsumed under a pure conception.' H ow can acategory be applied in determination of an object of sense.' ^ In a certainsense, Kant is repeating himself reopening the question that initiates the workas a whole, the question concerning synthetic a priori judgments. At thispoint, however, Kant provides at least a temporary answer:

Manifestly, there must be a third thing, which ishomogeneous on the one hand with the category, andon the other hand with the object of sense, and whichthus makes the application of one to the otherpossible. This mediating idea must be pure, or freefrom any empirical element, yet it must be at onceintellectual and sensuous. Such an idea is thetranscendental

Here Kant offers us a moment of continuity that appears almost Peircean.It reflects an odd departure from the dualistic logic that grounds most of theKantian corpus. At many points in this section, Kant comments that theschemata are products of the imagination, of the third and final faculty ofcognition. The schema, however, is no mere product in the sense of being athin g, rather it is a con tinuo us unity in the general dete rm inatio n ofsensibility. Ima gination produc es the schemata only to the extent that theschema actsin its function of m ediatin g betwe en pur e and em pirical con cep tsand objects of the w orld. This follows from K ant's earlier sug ges tion th at, [s ]ynthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see is the mere result of theimagination, a blind but indispensable art of the soul, without which weshould have no knowledge whatever, but of which we are scarcely everco nsc iou s. In conclusion, Kant writes that , w ithou t schemata, therefore,


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blin d faculty o ft h e im agination of which we are scarcely ever con sciou s, isKant returning to the common root of understanding and sensibility? Inresponse to this question, Peirce is dismissive, and perhaps, justifiably so.Having identified what might prove to be the lynchpin of his epistemologicalsystem, Kant seemingly abandons the topics of imagination and schemata. Heglimpses the possibility for real mediation, but quickly withdraws back intohis dualistic framework. In the last sections of the Critique Kant seems torededicate himself to the dualistic logic that characterized the modern era onthe whole.

Peirce criticizes Kant for this oversight, but not before appropriatingKa nt's insight on ima gination, writing, [i]t remains true that there is, after all,nothing but imagination that can ever supply [one] an inkling ofthe truth. Hecan stare stupidly at phenomena; but in the absence of imagination they willnot connect themselves together in any rational way. ^^ In reference to Kant'scursory treatm ent of the schem ata, Peirce asserts that K ant's do ctrin e of theschemata can only have been an afterthought, an addition to his system after itwas substantially complete. For if the schemata had been considered earlyen ou gh , they wo uld have overgrow n his w hole wo rk. ^ ' Peirce's statem ent isundoubtedly correct, that is, however, only if we outline Kant's system strictlyin terms of the First Critique. I will attempt to make the case that the spirit ofthe schemata oes overgrow Kant's system in the Third Critique and grant himthe op por tun ity to fill ou t concep ts such as im ag ina tion , artistic play , ge niu s , and aesthetic taste , ones tha t resem ble, if no t give birth t o ,Peircean tenets.

Peirce's review of the First Critique would not be complete withoutrevisiting the epistemological-ontological separation that most agree Kantmaintains even in light of his brief gestures toward the schematism andimagination. Again, this comment is made simply to examine the divide thatPeirce establishes between his own work and that of Kant. Only in such a waycan the Third Critique be evaluated in its ability to bridge this gap.

Forester and Apel echo Peirce in noting the way in which Kant followsHume's lead in restricting epistemological a priori unity to the realm of thehuman mind. Indeed, even the mediating power of the imagination seems tobe relegated to the constraints of the human psyche. Apel writes that Kant ma kes his synthetic a priori rules which he p uts in the place of H um e's


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522 Joh n Kaag

to the fact that we can be conscious of nothing ascombined in the object which we ourselves have notpreviously combined.And, as it proceeds entirely fromthe self-activity of the subject, combination is theelement, the only element, that cannot be givenby theobject.^

The synthetic unity of apperception that Kant takes up after his discussion ofthe imagination and schemata stands apart from the world , and, for Kant ,orders the scattered and chaotic empirical world that Hume so succinctlyout l ines . According to Peirce, in adopting this philosophic stance one isforced to assume a type of nominalism that is incapable of founding a realscience or mathematics.^ He states tha t, K an t gives us the erroneous viewthat ideasarepresented separated then brou ght tog etherin the mind. '^ Peirceexpands on this argument and underscores its implications when he writesthat , The nominalist, byisolatinghisrealitysoentirely from m enta l influenceashe hasd o n e ,hasmadeit something which the mind cannot conceive;he hascreated the so often talked of ' improportion between the mind and the th inginitself.' ^* Decker echoes Peirce's statementand suggests that Peirce's projectamounts to de-psych ologizing K ant, reinterp reting transcend ental logicw itho ut psychic basis and without relegating the t ranscendent to anunknowable noumenal realm.'^

In light of his distaste for Kant's description of the n o u m e n o n and thenominalism that it necessitates in the First Critique it may seem somew hatsurprising that Peirce arrives at the conclusion tha t Being is wh a t can bethough t . ' *At first glance, this comment seems to reflect an extreme form ofthe constructivism he seeks to reject. A closer examination of this statement,however, in conjunction with Peirce's works such as the Law of M i n d and Evolutionary Love maydeliverone to a radically different conclusion. Peircedoes notwant to recapitulate themistakesheidentifiesin theFirst Critique byeither binding realityto the constraints ofthe mental ,or detaching the mentalfrom the ground of reality. Instead of retracing what he considers to bemodern tendencies and mistakes, Peirce harkens back to the Parminedeanfragment, Thinking and Beingare the same. ' ' 'For Peirce, thereis no dividebetween epistemoiogical orderingand the orderingof the natural world; bothassume the same triadic structuring.It is in this sense tha t Peirce writes: W hat


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Continuity and the possibility of order are found in, and created by,the world in and by the relation of things of which the hum an mind is bu t anotherinstantiation. At first glance, this seems to be a complete departure from theKantian no tio n of the thing-in-itse lf For Peirce, thing s them selves reflect anorde r and type of agency that is wholly com m ensu rate with the o rde ring of thehuman mind and, indeed, s tand as the sine qua non of formal logic and humancognition.

In the forthcoming analysis of the Third Critique., it will be necessary toidentify points in Kant's discussion of aesthetics where he develops the notionof continuity and seems to recognize the triadic structuring that thecontinuum presupposes. An examination of reflexive judgment and aestheticinquiry will serve this purpose. To fully bridge the gap between Kant andPeirce, however, this analysis must also show, at least to some extent, that thestructure of thirdness is not unique, or restricted to, the human mind. It mustbe show n that there is continu ity between the natural and the hum an . O urinvestigation of continuity must not stop at the epistemoiogical, but reach intothe arena of the ontological. This task is undoubtedly the most difficult, butalso the most vital. It will be taken up through the coming sections but mostnotably in the remarks made on the correspondence between artistic creationand natural creation as framed by Kant in the Third Critique.

III. The Third Critique. Imagination, Mediation, and Com mon enseIn the highly technical introductions to the Third Critique, Kant presents

the Critique of Judgm ent as mediating the connec tion between the two partsof philosophy (theoretical and practical) to form a whole. ' ' Right away, one isstruck by Kant's anticipation of the pragmatic, and particularly Peircean,project . This comment about mediation has granted commentators a kind oflicense to interpret the logical and epistemic claims of the First Critique interms of the Third On these grounds, Schaper notes that the Schematism part of the First Critique's D octrine of Ju dg m en t has posed problem s forinterpreters, and many have wondered whether Kant's thought had fullymatured at the time he wrote it . Schaper responds to these interpreters that, The third Critique was still to come. Might it not shed some light on thechapter in which Kant speaks of the schematism as an 'art concealed in thedepth o ft h e hum an soul ' (B 182). ' Likewise, migh t i t no t shed light on thetension, perhaps unfounded, between Kant and Peirce. ' Even in his later


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and pro duc tive roles, in the Critique of Judgm ent., imagination frees itselffrom its determinant function and plays a creative and reflective role inaesthetic judgments. In the First Critique., Kant writes that if the universal (therule), or principle, or law isgiven., then the judgment is determinant. On theother hand, reflective judgment (Kant further defmes this term in reference totw o m or e, aesthetic and teleological) stands as th e capacity for reflecting o n agiven representation according to a certain principle, to produce apossiblecon cep t. O nce again, K ant's inten t is to reconcile the specific and the gene ral,the particular and the univesal, but here Kant takes a more subtle approach indeveloping reflective judgement. Kant clarifies the initial distinction betweenreflective and determining judgement in the Second (and fmal) Introductiono f t h e Critique of Judgem ent., he restates this sentiment in the Logic ( 1 8 0 0 ) .Kant writes:

Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking theparticular as contained under the universal. If theuniversal (the rule, the principle, the law) be given, thejudgement which subsumes the particular under it(even if, as transcendental judgement, it furnishes, apriori, the conditions in conformity with which thatsubsumption under the universal is possible) isdeterminant. Bu t if only the particular be given forwhich the universal has to be found, the judgement ismerely reflective.*^

Kant 's comment that such judgement is merely reflective doe s no t, despiteour com m on understanding of m ere , diminish the importanc e of thiscognitive faculty. His use of bloss., often translated as m er e, can also m ean on ly, simply, op enly , manifestly, and solely In this light, it m ightbe more accu rate to say tha t if only the particular be given for w hich theuniversal has to be fou nd, the ju dg em en t is solely or can only be reflective. Reflective judgement possesses characteristics that are uniquely itsown and holds a particular and important place in Kant's work.

To better understand the distinction between reflective judgement anddetermining judgement and to emphasize the unspoken l ineage between Kantand Peirce, it seems necessary to make two comments on the character of


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The imagination is in "free play" in the manner inwhich it gathers together the manifold of intuition(CJ, 9)...in the reflective aesthetic judgment, myconcern in the gathering operation is not to find aunity which fits some concept or other that myunderstanding can provide; rather my concern is onlywhether the organization or arrangement is such thatsome concept or other ought to be applicable. Inother words, a successful aesthetic refiective judgmentis achieved wh en the experience culminates: "Aha It the gathered manifold exhibits a rule-governed-ness justas if it could be subsumed under a concept. Itsatisfies the conditions for cognition in general."**

Crawford's description of aesthetic judgment is worth unpacking, for itunderlines the difference between these refiective judgments and thosedescribed as "determinant" in the Critique of Pure Reason. In his earlier work,Kant seems to suggest that the type of investigation implicit in determinatejudgments culminates when a unity is formed from the manifold of appearanceand subsumed under a pure and pre-established rule. In the case of refiectivejudgment, however, no such rule is given a priori. The situation of the playitself supplies the rule and direction for the activity of imagination. Thesituation suggests what conceptual framework might e possi le in application.Peirce repeatedly emphasizes the "A ha " sen sation, the spo nta neo uscoalescence of particular observations and possible order, as the basis for, andoutcome of, scientific investigation.

For Kant, the inquiry of aesthetic play remains provisional, fallible, in avery real sense, hypothetical. The manifold exhibits a structure and dynamic asif it could be subsumed under a concept. The inquiry reaches culmination inan aesthetic feeling a harm onizm ^ between imagination and unders tanding.Makkreel and othe rs are hesitant to describe this harm oniz ing as just a no the rB^ntian "synthesis." As Makkreel notes, "a harmony involves a reciprocalrelation between two distinct elements; a synthesis as Kant conceives it,involves a one-sided influence for the sake of strict unity."*^ It is interesting tonote the family resemblance refiected between Peircean thirdness and aestheticharmony. Peirce 's notion of "thirdness" is a mediating actm^ that brings


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concerning the apprehension of space, the reproduction of images, or theproduction of schemata are described in terms of acts of synthesis. **

To this point, I have discussed the difference between what might becalled epistemic and aesthetic knowing and suggested that the obstacles Kantfaces in the former might be overcome in his treatment of the latter. A lastw ord needs to be said in regard to the position and role of ce rta inty in eachinstanc e. M ore specifically, a distinction needs to be m ade betw een ce rta intyas rendered in Kant's earlier works and the rendition he provides in his analysisof aesthetics. Kant emphasizes the role of imaginative mediation in artisticinquiry and the role of feeling (pleasure) in identifying the efficacy of thismediation. In allowing subjective feeling to ground the harmonizing play ofthe imagination, Kant knows he is treading on rather treacherous philosophicground. One ought to remember as Guyer does that , in the Second Critique.

Kant defines pleasure 'as the idea ofthe agreement of an object or action withthe subjectiveco nd itio ns o f life.' *^ O n e m ig ht also recall the difficulty he facesin both of the earlier Critiques when he fiirts with the subjective character ofknowledge and morality and the inability of this character to be communicatedor universalized. Again, in the Critique of Judgm ent. by recognizing the role ofaesthetic feeling, he risks jettisoning any sort of criterion for the apprehensionof the beautiful. At the very least, he is forced to draw refiective judgmentaway from the pure justification and certainty that seems so important in theCritique of Pure Reason.

In the Critique of Judgm ent Kant exchanges apodictic justification foraesthetic common sense; the s nsus communis now stands as the ever-cvoh/ingbenchmark for artistic production and apprehension. Instead of retreatingfrom the treacherous philosophic ground as he does in the First and SecondCritiques in the Third Kant negotiates this region, providing an alternative tothe static and atemporal vision of aesthetic certainty: the harmonious sense ofthe artistic community. This community shares and shapes history. Kant comesto realize that his hope for a priori certainty is, very literally, a thing of thepast. Like history itself the artistic community provides a certain rendering ofwhat is and subtly directs our attention to what ought to be.Drucilla Co rnell 'sdescription of the sensus comm unis seems particularly appropriate when shewrites, Th e future nature of this com m unity of the ought to beremains openas a possibility in the sensus comm unicus aetheticus. It implies a pub licne ssthat awaits us, not one that is actually given us, or one that can be given to us


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intersubjectively by the community of aesthetic taste and is hypothetical andaffective in nature. It is hypothetical insofar as the result and end of aestheticjudgment (used in both artistic creation and apprehension) cannot by given asa pre-established rule. Kant elaborates on this po int, writing: W e could evendefine taste as the ability to judge something that makes our feeling in a givenperception universally communicable without mediation by any (determinate)concept. *' Here, Kant also insists that the play ofthe imagination can be bothsubjectively felt and universally communicable. That is to say, it can embodyrealms that Kant earlier in the Critique of Pure Reason designates asincommensurable. Kant recognizes that the sensus comm unis is in no way astatic entity or noumenal category. It is a continuous bridging of the artisticgenerations that refiects both a kind of determinacy and a kind of spontaneity.

This brid gin g is perhaps most pron oun ced in Ka nt 's rendering of theartistic genius. Genius stands as a moment of continuity in relation to both theorde r of aesthetic co m m on sense and the orde r of natural beauty. Let usbegin by examining this relation in terms of the natural world. It was alreadymentioned that the play of the imagination as framed in the Critique ofJudgment was produc tive and creative rather than m erely repro duc tive. Thisproduction is intended and realized by genius:

Genius is the talent (natural gift) which gives the ruleto art. Since talent, as the innate productive faculty ofthe artist, belongs itself to nature, we may express thematter thus: Genius is the innate mental disposition{ingenium) thr ou gh which nature gives the rule to

Note the turn of words that Kant uses in this passage. Genius is given bynature as a natural gift, yet it is precisely through this gift that the geniusacquires the ability to give the rule to ar t. G en ius , in this sense is who llypassive, and yet, at once, wholly active. Sobel expands on this point, notingtha t, altho ug h 'ge niu s' is prod uctive, Kan t's description of this faculty is alsoreceptive.It is tha t thr ou gh which n atur e gives the rule t o art. N attire acts 'bythe medium of genius. ' ^ ' The contrast between this description of genius andthe typical reading of the transcendental unity of apperception in the FirstCritique is truly remarkable. Genius is not in, above, or below nature. Genius


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to his genius...he does not know himself how he came by his ideas...Geniusitself cannot describe or indicate scientifically how it brings about its products,and it is rather as nature that it gives the ru le . Th ere is always an elem ent o fsurprise in the inquiry of genius, for an element of the inquiry is always beyondhis control. Genius is simultaneously discovering and creating the harmony ofthe beautiful; again, this remark gels with the comment that genius is u n so u g h t and u n d es ig n ed .

Kant repeatedly emphasizes gen ius' originality, suggestion th at on thispoint everyone agrees: that genius must be considered the very opposite of thespirit of im itation. In Section 49 , Kant states tha t the im agin ation 's freeharm ony canno t be bro ug ht abo ut by referencing the rules of science ormechanical im itation, bu t can only be realized by the subjec t 's nature. ^*Despite Kant's emphasis on the originality of genius, the products of genius, inas m uc h as they are beautiflil, are n ot who lly free from co ns tra int . In faithfullytranslating the orderability of the natural world, genius is forever bound tonature s structure and emergence. In the thick of things, nature gives geniusits cues. Genius responds by reading these cues more or less faithfully.Admittedly, no reading is exact, and no two translations are exactly alike. Thisbeing said, however, all readings, to the extent that they are translations, arelimited in a certain respect. Just because the free play of the imaginationcannot have a determinate concept as its ruling basis, does not mean that thebeautiful is free from rules altogether.

This freedom within limits, a productive tension later situated in Peirce'snotion of pragmatic creativity, appears again when Kant begins to talk aboutthe genius in relation to the common sense of aesthetic taste. He writes thattaste, embodied in the sensus communis severely clips (ge niu s') wings andmakes it civilized, polished ... It introduces clarity and order in the wealth ofthought and hence makes the ideas durable, fit for being followed by othersand fit for an ever advancing cultu re. The flight of genius is gr ou nd ed , atleast in part, by the past forms of the sensus communis, yet this playful facultystill has the force to stretch and challenge these constraints. Indeed, it is thepower of genius that expands the notion of aesthetic taste and propels Kant's ever advancing cu ltur e. Th e act of genius is executed o n the paradoxicalcusp between past actualities and future possibilities, in th at od d m idd legr o un d wh ere universality and particularity, determinac y and freedom, holdequal sway. Interestin gly, Kant describes this cusp as a type of ha pp y r ela tion


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to hit upon a way of xpr ssing these ideas that enablesus to communicate to others, as accompanying theconcept, the mental at tunement that those ideasproduce. '^

Kant is careful not to speak of determinate point towards which this aestheticdiscovery and expression advances, nor a particular terminus in the evolutionof culture. Such a pre-established teleology would compromise the freedomwhich he attributes to artistic genius. This passage is unique not only in itsexpression of a rendering of creativity that might support certain pragmaticsentiments, but also in the way in which Kant slips between the use of ge niu s and the use of u s. It seems quite plausible tha t genius is keystonefor fme art, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the very lynchpin ofdiscourse and conceptual meaning.

At this point, a cautionary note needs to be voiced. In the current analysis,I am not suggesting that Kant's Third Critique is classically pragmatic, nor amI implying that Kant wholly discards his earlier notion of determinacy and hishope for apodictic certainty. I merely hope to point to a place at whichcommon ground can be exposed between the later Kant and the Americantradition, especially between Kant and Peirce. Implicidy, I am suggesting thatPeirce's criticism of Kant may at points amount to a kind of attack on aphilosophic straw man. The Critique of Pure Reason was not the only, nor theculminating, work of Kant. Peirce's notion of abduction (in both its methodand justificatory streng th) and m usem ent seem to resemble K ant'sdevelopment of reflective judgment in the Third Critique.

IV. Peirce on Musement Abduction and Com munityOn December 23, 1908, Peirce wrote to Lady Welby, referring at multiplepoints to works and writers that had inspired his interest in abductivereasoning and the dispositions of m us em en t and play that accom pany it.H e writes tha t, as for the w ord 'play,' the first boo k I ever read ... wasSchiller's Aesthetic Briefe where he has so much to say about the Spiel-Trieb;and it made such an impression upon me as to have soaked my notion of 'play'to this day. ^* Peirce's admiration for Friedrich Schiller is deep and heartfelt.In his Gen eral and Historical Survey of Lo gic , Pierce reco unts the manydays spent during his youth reading this text, but also acknowledges the


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It is only very recently that I have become persuadedthat seeming is illusory, and that, on the contrary,logic needs the help of esthetics. The matter is not yetvery clear to me; so unless some great light should fallupon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a shortone filled with doubts and queries

It is not necessarily surprising that Peirce draws so heavily on Schiller in hisdevelopment of normative science, abductive play, and triadic logic. Schillervery obviously believes that through artistic and interactive Spiel one comes torecognize the order of things as the order of the mind. What is surprising isthat, in his young reading of Schiller, Peirce does not recognize the wellspringfrom which this proto-pragmatist has received philosophic nourishment.Schiller's notion of play {Spict is taken in large part from the work of Kant.Schiller bypasses the Critique of Reason and assumes the Kantian aestheticproject as given in the Critique of Judgm ent, While he und oub tedly does abetter job in describing artistic play and production, Schiller maintains thebasic structure of reflective judgment its hypothetical and spontaneousgro w th, and its m ode of justification. H e hands these concep tions dow n toPeirce.

Peirce, in turn, unknowingly, extends the movement of Kantian aesthetics[via Schiller) in a pragmatic and relational inquiry. Ironically, this revision ismeant to expose the inadequacies of the Critique of Pure Reason,,a work thatPeirce thinks accurately summarizes Kant's corpus on the whole. At this pointsuch a summary ought to seem inadequate at best. By overlooking theCritique of Judgm ent,, by overlooking the very work that Peirce disregards,com m enta tors such as Apel are able to assert w itho ut qualification tha t, Peirce replaces K ant's alternative of synthetic a priori and synthe tic aposteriori propositions with the fruitful circle of the correlative propositions ofhypothetical abductive inference and experimental confirm ation. ^ ' Aqualification is in order. The previous discussion has attempted to show howKant himself replaces the dichotomies of the First Critique with the fruitfulcircle of aesthetic play and reflective jud gm en t, and, th ro ug h thisreplacement, provides a certain legacy to the unwittingly critical Peirce. In abrief explication of Peircean musement, abduction and community, I will nowattempt to highlight the similarities between the work of Peirce and that of the


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liberty. It bloweth were it listeth. It has no purpose,unless recreation... It begins passively enough withdrinking in the impression of some nook in one of thethree Universes. But impression soon passes intoattentive observation, observation into musing, musinginto a lively give and take of communion between selfand self If one's observations and reflections areallowed to specialize themselves too much, the Playwill be converted into scientific study; and that cannotbe pursued in odd half hours.^'

Play's purpose is re-creation; its purpose is to literally create again. The museris attentive and, like the artistic genius, is receptive to the natural ordering.M use m en t blow eth w here it listeth. Th e voices of these verbs areintentionally ambiguous hovering oddly between activity and passivity. Onecan blow , but also be blow n. T o list is to desire, bu t also to be com pelled.Here, Peirce seems to know exactly what connotation his words convey.Gram matically, he is attem pting to express the to and fro, give and take,of imaginative Spiel Musement, l ike Kantian aesthetic judgment, is notprescribed by anya priori rule or constraint, but rather discovers and developsthe constraints of an evolving situation. Musement cannot be described interms of traditional logical analysis. While musement is unable to be describedlogically, it nonetheless gives rise to inquiry, or rather a specific type of inquiry.Peirce notes that m usem ent hints at an hypothesis (as it does in Th eNeglected Argument for the Reality of God ) and also points to the abductivelogic that develops this hypothesis.

Peirce repeatedly comments that abductive reasoning has the structure ofhypothesis formation and acts between the natures of deduction andinduction. Abduction does not proceed from fixed principles, nor does itoperate strictly from the apprehension of chance phenomena. At one point,Peirce calls abd uct ion pro ba ble inference. * M ore specifically, he w rites:

An Abduction is a method of forming a generalprediction without any positive assurance that it willsucceed either in the special case or usually, itsjustification being that it is the only possible hope of


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because hypothesis gives us stron g enco urag em ent to ho pe tha t it will besuccessful in the futu re does no t m ean tha t on e can rely on this hop eunc ond itionally . Ag ain, em ploying Schiller, Pierce writes th at , M r. Schillerhimself seems sometimes to say, there is not the smallest scintilla of logicaljustification for any assertion that a given sort of result will, as a matter of fact,either always or never com e to p a ss . Peirce, by way of Schiller, isrecapitulating Kant's understanding that the play of the imagination canneither be predicted nor determined for all time. Neither induction nordeduction allows for the type of spontaneity that Peirce both witnesses in theworld and creates in his logic of relations. N o new truth can come frominduction or from deduction. *^ Abduction, like creative play, fits the bill inprov iding an original suggestion. **

Just as Kant's genius cannot give an articulate explanation of aestheticappre hension , Peirce's inquirer can not give a reason for (a bd uc tio n) ...a nd itneeds no reaso n, since it merely offers suggestions. *^ In a certain se nse ,Peircean inquiry is beyond the knowledge and power of the inquirer. To useKan tian langu age tha t rem ains faithful to Peirce, the inquire r is the natu ralgift th ro ug h which natur e gives the rule to inves tigation. A gain , this rule isno t a conce pt, but an informed suggestion, a type of pr om ptin g. Theinquirer is, at once, productive and receptive. Abduction depends on one'sability to listen and respond to the natural ordering of the world. Peirceelaborates on the necessary continuity between investigation and the naturalwo rld, writing in Th e Arch itecture of Th eor ies :

Thus it is that, our minds having been formed underthe infiuence of phenomena governed by the laws ofmechanics, certain conceptions entering into thoselaws become implanted in our minds, so that wereadily guess at what the laws are. Without such anatural prompting having to search blindfold for a lawwhich would suit the phenomena, our chance offinding it would be as one to infinity.**

It is true that abductive reasoning simply amounts to suggesting or gue ssing , but here Peirce notes that this guessing is no t simply ra nd om .Abduction relies on the fact that nature lends itself to the order-ability of the


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these hints of sense, adds immensely to them, makes them precise, and showsthem in intelligible form in the intuitions of space and time. *' ' This is preciselythe role that imagination assumes in reflective judgments as presented in thenird Critique and briefly addressed in our earlier discussion. Peirce in the M eth od s for Attaining Tr ut h, like Kant in the Critique of Judgmentrepeatedly insists that the genius of abductive inquiry must simultaneously bereceptive to the natural light of the w orld 's order and becontinu ous withthis lume naturale. H e no tes that if the general ob servation s of the universe allbut demonstrate its conformity to a type of lawfulness, and if the human mindhas been shaped un de r the force of these laws, it is to be expecte d th at(human beings) should have a natural light or light of nature or instinctiveinsight or genius tending to make (them) guess those laws aright, or nearlyaright. * Peirce insists that the re is a type of free a ttu ne m en t, a kind of geniu s,that allows one to study the ordering of nature.

In surveying Peirce's expansive corpus, one is initially struck by hishesitancy to speak of truth simpliciter. Of course his hesitancy isunderstandable when one recognizes Peirce's reliance on abductive reasoning,on the creative guesswork that sediments his notion of pragmatic truth. In atypically bro ad g en era liza tion , Peirce goes so far as to say th at , if you carefiiUyconsider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else thanthe question of the logic of abd uctio n. Th e puz zlem ent, however, remains:How might the question of pragmatism, of abduction, be answered with anytype of certainty. ' In light of the current comparison between Kantianaesthetics and the work of Peirce, one might ask several related questions. Ifabductive reasoning, in the Peircean sense, resembles Kant's conception ofaesthetic judgment, might one also expect similarities to emerge in thejustificatory frameworks of each method of inquiry? More simply put, mightaesthetic jud ge m en t and abductive validity be of the same order.' M orespecifically, might one expect to find a version of the Kantian s nsus communisand aesthetic sensibility lurking beneath the surface of Peirce's formal system.'

It seems fairly straightforward to say that a particular abduction cannot beproven as formally or universally valid according to the standards of binarylogic. For Peirce, at least in the cases of ind uc tion and ab du cti on , validity isexperienc ed in a type of felt har m ony in a particula r situ ation . Effectiveabductions are affective. This type of validity is a feeling of appropriateness inrelation to a given premise. The goodness of a good guess is felt for the


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enco urage d him to maintain a cond itional idealism.This con dition al idealism has already been partially described in Kan t's

development of the aesthetic sensus communis that is paradoxically free anddeterminate. This communal sense is determinate in that it establishes the rule s and gu idelines for gen ius. It is free precisely to the exte nt tha t gen iusexpands these rule s and extends these established guidelines. Th e sensuscommunis and hence, aesthetic justification, evolves and is evolving.Interestingly, the genealogical m ovem ent of tho ug ht presented in the Law ofM ind and the continu ous l ineages highlighted in Evolutionary Lo ve seemto progress in a similar fashion and adhere to similar modes of justification.

In the Law of M in d, Peirce identifies this one law in the followingma nner: [I]de as tend to spread continuo usly and to affect certain other swhich sta nd t o them in a peculiar relation of affectability. In this spre adin gthey lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting others, but gaingenerality and b ecom e welded w ith other ideas. ^^ Ideas spread, bu t do no tspread randomly. Each thought is affected by the entire history of thought, bya//previous thoughts, to a greater or lesser extent. Being bound to this historydoes not mean that a particular thought is not free, it simply means thatthought is both free and constrained. The genealogy of the mind delimits thefield of free possibility for future moments of thought.^' It seems appropriatefor Pierce to first describe the free individuality of thought, as he does in theinitial section of this essay, and then provide the conditions of this possibilityby describing its continuity in the second section.

It is clear that Peirce's notion of the mind's continuity does apply simplyto a particular mind, but also to the collective Mind of the community ofinquiry. One ought to remember that Kant's notion of reflective (aesthetic)judgment hinges on the subjective feeling of the judgment and this feeling'scontinuity with the nature of the sensus communis. Josiah Royce makes thispoint more poignantly in his emphasis on community and inter-subjectivity,but Pierce also seems well aware of its implications. On this note, Peirce opensthe Law of M ind by noting that the thou gh t of Em erson stands in and as atype of intellectual lineage, and has been affected and constrained by Schelling,Plotinus, Boehm, and the Eastern mystics. The realization of continuity itself continuity with the social nature of Mind becomes the dynamicbenchm ark for Peircean certain ty. Perhaps m ore light can be shed on thisstatement by suggesting that in the movement of common sense, an inquirer


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again, Peirce presents various genealogies (organic, literary, intellectual, andhistorical) that exhibit the type of triadic mediation that continuitypresupposes. By om itt ing the new terms ( agapism and tychism ) thatPeirce presents in this wo rk, we can m ore easily glean som ethin g from the no tePeirce makes after providing these genealogies: T he dev elop m ent .. . ofthought should, if it exists, be distinguished by its purposive character, thispurpose being the develop me nt of an idea. H ere we see a type of circularityemerge in the structure of thought's purpose. It is, however, not a vicious, buta hermeneutic, or pragmatic circularity. The purpose of thought is to developever-more-refmed thoughts that, in turn, substantiate ever-deeper feelings ofcontinu ity and m ediation. W e should have a direct agapic or sympatheticcomprehension and recognition of it (this purpose) by virtue ofthe continuityof thought. ^2

From Parmenides, to Aristotle, to Scotus, to Kant Peirce's works reflectan intimate familiarity with the history of philosophy. Indeed, he has theuncanny ability to expose the common ground between various, and oftenantagonistic, thinkers. His treatment of the genealogy of philosophy bothrecognizes the similarities and preserves the discrepancies between moments ofinquiry. Peirce himself usually acknowledges the lineage of inquirers thatcleared the way for and directed his own freedom of thought. He is,after all, just ano ther em bodie d m om en t of the abductive process he seeks todescribe. In examining Kant's Critique of Judgm ent in relation to theepistemological and ontological stances that Peirce assumes, I have aimed todeepen the sense of continuity between Peirce and Kant who are usually heldapart by commentators who concentrate on the concepts developed in theCritique of Pure Reason. I have also aimed to identify lacunae in Peirce's ownreading of the history of philosophy a fertile area developed by Kant thatPeirce seems to have neglected. Such neglect leads Peirce and contemporaryscholars astray; they dismiss Kan t as bein g strictly m o de rn , as bein g an ti-pra gm atic . W hile the current project can not afford it ample tim e, I believe aninvestigation of Kant's lesser works such as the Anthropology will yield similarmediating results. It will both shed light on the unacknowledged inheritancethat K ant offers pragm atism and expose a genu ine co ntinuity be twe en thefreedom of Am erican tho ug ht and the constraints o ft h e historical tradition .University of Oregon


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2 . C P 1 3003. M urph ey highlights the way in which Kant und erpin s Am erican

thou ght in M. M urphey, Kant ' s Children: The Cambridge Pragmatis ts . TheTransactions of the CharlesS PeirceSociety. 4 (Winter 1968), 3-34.4. A. D e Tienn e, Peirce 's Early M eth od of Finding the Ca tego ries.

Transactions ofthe CharlesS Peirce Society, 25 : 385-407 , 1989 .5. Sandra B. Ros enthal, A Pragm atic A ppro priation of Kan t: Lewis

and Peirce. Transactions ofthe CharlesS PeirceSociety38( 1-2): 2 53 -2 66 , 20 02 .6 . 5 .452.7. Douglas Anderson, Strands of System: The Philosophy of C harles

Sanders Peirce. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1995, p. 21.8. This omission is noticeable in Joseph Bre nt's acc oun t of Peirce'sreading of Kant. See, Brent, Joseph. Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life. Bloomington :

University of Indiana Press (1998). And Charles Peirce, Collected Papers of CharlesSanders Peirce,Vol. I-VI, ed. Charles H artsho rne and Paul Weiss, Vol. V II-V III, ed.Arthur W . Burks (Cam bridge , Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960 ).

9. Jo hn Sallis. The Force of Imagination : the Sense of the Elemental.Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000.

10. John Zam mito . TheGenesisof Kant s Critique offudgment. Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1992.

11. Imm anuel Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. W. Pluhar,Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996. References to the Critique of Pure Reason will be given inthe usual manner; thus CPR A10/B23.

12. C P R A l .13. E. Forester. Kant s Final Thesis: An Essay on the Opus Postumum .

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.14. C P 1 . 3 5 .15. C P 1 . 3 9 .16. CP 3 .560 .17. CP 5 .177 .18. CP 6 .120 .19. Charles Peirce. The Essential P eirce: Selected Philosophical Writings.

vol. 1. ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel. Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1992 . Law of M ind p . 32 2.

2 0 . C P 6 .20 3 .2 1 . Italics m ine C P1 3592 2 . C P R A 1 3 8 .2 3 . C P R A 1 3 8 .2 4 . Italics mine CP R A 78.2 5. C P R A 1 4 7 .


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inEssaysin Kant s Aesthetic, P. 301.52. CJ 308.53. CJ3 1 7 .54. Ibid55. (Italics mine) CJ 317 .56. Charles Peirce. Selected Writings: Values in theUniverse of ChanEd. Phillip Wiener. New York:Dover, 1958. p. 4 01 .57. CP 2.197.58. Ibid p. 106.59. CP 6.459.60. CP2.101.61. CP 2.270.62. CP 5.494.63. CP 7.219.64. CP 6. 526.65. CP S. 171.66. CP6.10 .67. CP1 38368. CP 5.604.69. (Italics mine) CP1 47370. CP 6.104.71. Interestingly, Peirce's discussion of the sheet of assertion and theway that existential cu ts both limit and create new fie lds of possibility often reflectsthe evolutionary story told here in terms of the movement of inquiry.72. CP 6.315.

REFERENCESAnderson, D.1995

1987Apel, K. 1972

1981

Strands of System: ThePhilosophy of Charles Peirce. West Lafayette:Purdue University Press. reativityandthe PhilosophyofCS Peirce, Boston: Martinus NijhoPublishers. From Kant to Peirce: The Semiotical Transformation ofTranscendental Logic, in Lewis White Beck, ed..Proceedingsof theThird International Kant ongress (Dordrecht, Holland: D. ReidelCo.) pp. 90-104.From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism. Trans. J. Krois, Amherst:


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C o d e , M.1999

Cozzo , C .1998

Decker, K.2 0 0 1

De Tienne, A.1989

Esposito, J.1979

Forester, E.2 0 0 0

Hausman, C .1993

Heidegger , M.1 9 9 71998

1987Kant, I.

19001970

Kapitan, T.1990

Ketner, K.1998

Interp reting the 'Raw Universe ' : Me aning and MetaphysicalImaginaries. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. 35(4) :6 9 8 -7 2 2 . Epistemic Truth and Excluded M iddle Theoria. 6 4 (2 -3 ) : 2 4 3 -2 8 2 . G rou nd , Relation, Representation: K antianism and the EarlyPeirce. Transactions of the CharlesS. Peirce Society. 37(2) : 179-206 .Peirce 's Early Method of Finding the Categories. Transactions oftheCharlesS. Peirce Society, 25 : 385-407 . The Development of Peirce 's Categories, The Transactions of theCharlesS. Peirce Society, 15 : 51-60 .Kant s Final Thesis: An Essay on the Opus Postumum. Cambr idge :Harvard University Press, 2000.Charles S. Peirce s Evolutionary Philosophy.Cam bridge: Camb ridgeUniversity Press.Phenomeno logical Interpretation of Kant s Critique of Pure Reason.Trans. P. Emad, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Pathmarks. Ed. W. McNeill , Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.The Critique of fudgment. Trans. W. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Ha ckett .The Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. W. Pluhar, Indianapolis:Hacket t .Dreams of a Spirit Seer Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics.Trans.E. Goerwitz, New York: MacMillan.Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Trans. J . Ellington,Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill. In W hat Way is Abd uctive Inference Creative? Transactions of theCharlesPeirce Society. 2 6 : 4 9 9 -5 1 2 .His Glassy Essence: An Autobiography of C harles Sanders Peirce.


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Murphey , M.19611968

Peirce, C.S.193419921992

Rosenthal, S.2 0 0 2Salis, J.

The Developm ent of Peirce s Philosophy. Cam bridge: HarvardUniversity Press. Kant 's Children: The Cambridge Pragmatists. The Transactions ofthe CharlesS Peirce Society, 4: 3-35.The ollectedPapers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934.Reasoning and the Loiic of Thin^. Ed. K. Ketner, Cam bridge :Harvard University Press.The Essential Peirce:Selected Philosophical W ritings. Vol. I , Ed. N.Houser and C. Kloesel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. A Prag m atic Ap prop riation of K ant: Levifis an d Pe irc e.Transactions of the CharlesS PeirceSociety38{l-2): 2 5 3 - 2 6 6 .

Force of Imagination : the Sense of the Elemental. Bloomington :Indiana University Press.Shin, S.199 7 K ant 's Syntheticity Revisited by Peirc e. Synthese. 113(1): 1-41.Thompson, Manley.1953 The Pragmatic Philosophyof Charles S. Peirce.Ch icag o: Univeristy ofChicago Press.Zam mito , J.1992 TheGenesis of Kant s Critique of Judgment. Ch icago : University ofChicago Press.


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