The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 30 | Number 4 | Article ID 3459 | Jul 26, 2010

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Korean Brinkmanship, American Provocation, and the Road toWar: the manufacturing of a crisis　　朝鮮の瀬戸際政策−−危機の製造

Tim Beal

Korean Brinkmanship, AmericanProvocation, and the Road to War:the manufacturing of a crisis1

Tim Beal

The exchange of artillery fire between Southand North Korea on 23 November, 2010 hadpredictable results – a great increase of tensionon the peninsula, a show of force by the UnitedStates, and a torrent of uninformed mediaarticles and pontificating from the securityindustry. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who as JimmyCarter’s National Security Advisor armed theMujahideen in order to draw the Soviet Unioninto Afghanistan, thereby starting that long andcontinuing war (and paving the way to 9/11 forthat matter), opined that

If these actions are deliberate it isan indication that the NorthKorean regime has reached a pointof insanity. Its calculations and itsactions are difficult to fathom inrational terms. Alternatively it is asign that the regime is out ofcontrol. Different elements inPyongyang, including parts of themilitary, are capable of takingactions on their own perhaps,without central co-ordination.2

Robert Kaplan，with a touch of wishful thinking,decided that the clash, and the earlier displayof an experimental Light Water Reactor to USnuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker3 revealed

that the North Korean government was‘imploding’ and would soon be ripe forplucking, though that would have to be shared,in some unexplained way, with China:

An aggressive nuclear programmecoupled with military attacks onSouth Korea, including the sinkingof a South Korean vessel by asubmarine last March, are also away for new leader Kim Jong-eunto cement his credentials. In hist w e n t i e s , a n d w i t h l i t t l eexperience, his ascension is beingspurred along by his powerfuluncle and aunt, Jang Song-taekand Kim Kyonghui, each with theiro w n n e t w o r k s o f p o w e rrelationships.

This means that for the first timein its history, North Korea now hasa multipolar leadership, in whichpower is not concentrated in thehands of one person. A regime thatis illegitimate and divided beststays in power by keeping itspeople on a permanent warfooting, which in turn encouragesdisparate elements of the powerstructure to pull in one direction.

The heightened aggression shownby North Korea therefore may be asign that the regime is in deeptrouble. A sudden implosion couldu n l e a s h t h e m o t h e r o f a l l

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humanitarian problems, withmassive refugee flows toward theChinese border and a semi-starving populat ion of 23mb e c o m i n g t h e w a r d o f t h einternational community – in effectthe ward of the US, Chinese andSouth Korean armies.

The Daily Telegraph’s security guru PraveenSwami decided this was all about getting aidfrom the West:

South Korea is one of the enginesof Asian prosperity, on which theworld's hopes of an early economicrecovery rest on peace in theregion. By attacking Yeonpyeong(Yonphyong4) island, a target of nostrategic value, North Korea'sdysfunctional regime is telling theworld how much pain it couldinflict if it isn't bribed to behaveitself. It hopes that its sabrerattling will force talks where theWest will agree to an aid packagein return for a guarantee thatPyongyang will not produce furthernuclear weapons.5

In London, the Evening Standard editorialisedthat

North Korea wants a resumption ofsix-way talks between the regionalpowers, including the US andC h i n a , a b o u t i t s n u c l e a rprogramme and its leaders maybelieve that a demonstration ofstrength, nuclear and military, canachieve it . The moves have,however, played predictably badlywith the US.6

The writer was correct that the DPRK wantstalks with the US, and the invitation to Heckerwas part of the process of attempting to drawthe Obama administration into negotiations.But claiming that the artillery clash was part ofthat strategy just did not make sense..If theEvening Standard can work out that such anincident would predictably push Washingtonaway from negotiations, then Pyongyang wouldlikely come to that obvious conclusion as well.This particular inherently contradictoryanalysis of the North's intentions is frequentlyrepeated in the English-language media.

What is most striking in the above reports is afailure to attempt to analyse the context inwhich the event is embedded. This context hastwo aspects, the contemporary geopoliticalenvironment, and the historical framework.Once you take an event out of its context,events and the actors that perform them canhave their meaning and significance distorted,often to the point of inversion. Prey becomepredators, victims become villains, and warbecomes peace.

In this case, the provoker is portrayed as theprovoked and the origins of the crisis areobscured.

The fire fight at Yeonpyeong Island seems tohave been a manufactured crisis. It appearsthat, for the first time, South Korea, alone or intandem with the United States, carried out amilitary exercise part of which took place interritory claimed by the North.7 There havebeen innumerable ROK and US-ROK militaryexercises over the decades, some of them verylarge, involving up to 200,000 troops.8 Thesehave taken place either in international waters,or in South Korean territory. The North hascharged the South, and the US, numeroustimes with infringing its territory by plane or byship, and the area between the West Seaboundaries is contested, as discussed below.However, the live fire exercise of the marine’showitzers on Yeonpyeong Island on 23

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November, coinciding with the massive SouthKorean Hoguk exercise, seems to have beenunprecedented. It appears that the Northconsidered it a step too far and warned theSouth a number of times that they wouldretaliate. The warnings were ignored and theNorth shelled the marine base.

The south Korean puppet groupperpetrated such reckless militaryprovocation as firing dozens ofshells inside the territorialwaters of the DPRK side aroundYonphyong [Yeonpyeong] Islet inthe West Sea of Korea from 13:00on Nov. 23 despite the repeatedwarnings of the DPRK whilestaging the war maneuvers fora war of aggression on itcodenamed Hoguk, escalatingthe tens ion on the KoreanPeninsula. 9

The Yeonpyeong incident, therefore, had twocomponents. One was the actual live fire intocontested waters. This, as discussed below, wasa statement of a territorial claim which theNorth declared that it could not tolerate.

The other was the fact that this shelling tookplace during the staging of a major militaryexercise (Hoguk). This included large-scaleamphibious landings: ‘Marines will participatein regiment-level landing drills’.10 The Southbrushed off complaints about Hoguk saying itwas an ‘annual routine drill which has beenconducted by the South Korean military since1 9 9 6 ’ , a s i f t h a t m a d e i t a n y l e s sthreatening.11 The South also claimed that themarine live fire exercise at Yeonpyeong was notpart of Hoguk. That was formally correct butreally a matter of semantics. The marines firinghowitzers from Yeonpyeong were under thesame command as those practising beachassaults. The Guardian’s Tania Braniganautomatically made the connection between the

two, as it would appear did the ROK military:

The incident came during a routinedrill by Southern forces in watersnear the island, the military said.12

The howitzers were introduced to Yeonpyeongand at least one of the other islands in thedisputed area in 2000, after the naval clash in1999 which came to be called the ‘First Battleof Yeonpyeong’. There was a ‘test-firing’ butwhether this involved live shells is unclear. Italso seems to have taken place in isolation, notin combination with major war exercises:

Recently alone, they introduced anew type of 155 mm self-propelledhowitzers and a large quantity ofs h e l l s i n t o P a e k r y o n g[Baengnyeong] and Yongphyong[Yeonpyeong] islets. On February23 and 24 including mid-February,they staged a "test-firing" underthe simulated conditions of a battleto "destroy" warships of thenorth.13

In 2004 the Navy Command of the KoreanPeople’s Army (KPA) complained about firingexercises in the area, and about the artilleryinstalled on the island:

In another development, the southKorean army has staged madcapfiring exercises in waters west ofTaechong [Daecheong] andPaekryong [Baengnyeong] Islandsand in waters off the YonphyongIslets with a flotilla of speed boatsand guard craft involved.

The purpose of the firing exercisesstaged by the south Korean armyin the West Sea is to be proficient

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in firing at warships of the northwith various types naval artillerypieces and 155 mm self-propelledhowitzers deployed on theYonphyong Islets. 1 4

It is not clear from the KPA statement what rolethe howitzers played. They could scarcely havebeen using live shells against their own boats,so it may have been some sort of simulation.

A KPA statement in 2008 about ‘combinedfirepower drills‘ suggested that this might bewhat is happening:

Combined firepower drills for"striking and destroying" warshipsof the Navy of the Korean People'sArmy and drills for tactical navalm a n e u v e r s a r e s t a g e d o nPaekryong , Taechong andYonphyong Islets and in watersaround them almost everyday.15

It is not until the Yeonpyeong incident thatKCNA uses the phrase ‘live shell’ in connectionwith artillery drills on the island:

The army of the DPRK warnedseveral times that if even a singleshell of the enemy is fired insidethe territorial waters of the DPRK,it will take a prompt retaliatorystrike in connection with the liveshell firing drill they planned tostage from Yonphyong Islet whileconducting the ill-famed warmaneuvers for a war of aggressionagainst the DPRK codenamedHoguk.[emphasis added]16

It is unclear from the available material inEnglish whether the marines had actually firedshells into the contested waters before 23

November. If they had not, then this exerciseon its own would be provocative. If they had,then i t would appear that i t was thecombination of this local exercise and thelarge-scale Hoguk which triggered the DPRKwarning. In addition it may be that the scale ofthis firing was unprecedented, though theywould have found that difficult to know inadvance. According the Nam Kim, quoting aKorean-language source, the marine’s shellingwas intense:

South Korean artillery unitslocated in the West Sea Islands,just seven miles from the NorthKorean coast, engaged in firingexercises on November 23, 2010,for four hours. According to theSouth Korean Ministry of NationalDefense, the units on those islands,including Yeonpyeong Island, fired3,657 times, or over 900 shells perhour, into contested waters.17

While many details remain unclear, we do knowthat North Korea regarded the 23 Novemberlive fire exercise by the marines on Yeonpyeongas a provocation it could not tolerate andwarned the South a number of times that itwould retaliate. In order better to understandhow this crisis came about, and what mayfollow, we must, in addition to scrutinising theevidence about the events, also examine theunderlying drivers of the clash.

Bearing in mind the importance of contextthree key drivers of the clash stand out. Theseare:

• Lee Myung-bak’s policy towardsthe DPRK

• The DPRK’s ‘zero tolerance’strategy

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• The reason for the perpetuationof the Northern Limit Line (NLL)

Lee Myung-bak’s Northern policy

Unlike his immediate predecessors aspresident, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun,Lee has adopted a strongly confrontationalpolicy towards the North. This has been evidentfrom the beginning of his administration, but itbecame increasingly manifest with hisexploitation of the Cheonan incident.

A very important part of Lee’s policy is thebuildup of tension, especially through warexercises. But Lee and the South Koreanmilitary are only part of the decision-makingprocess. War exercises take place because theUS and ROK military want them. Given the vastdisparity in power between North Korea and itsadversaries (primarily the Unites States andSouth Korea but perhaps including Japan) whatcan be the motive for engaging in provocativemilitary exercises? For the US the primeobjective may be sending a message toChina.18 Lee’s motives are probably threefold:to increase pressure on the North to produce acrisis of confidence and eventually collapse, toraise tension and fear of the North in theSouth, and to lock the Americans into hisstrategy.

ROK ships near Yeonpyeong Island in theaftermath of the shelling (Associated Press)

Frequent large scale joint exercises betweenthe US and ROK mil i taries, under UScommand, which have been a feature of thepeninsula for decades, stretch back in variousforms to the late 1940s. The ROK military alsohas its own exercises, with little ostensible USinvolvement. Though since it is dependent onthe US for high-tech intelligence – surveillancefrom aircraft and satellites, and signalsinterception – the Americans are never faraway. In addition, the ROK military is under thewartime operational control (OPCON) of theUS. Former President Roh Moo-hyun hadnegotiated for the US to relinquish operationalcontrol in 2012 but under Lee this has beenpushed back to 2015.19 Control of Joint militaryexercises was also scheduled to be transferredto the ROK, but this has also been rescinded.20

The DPRK has its own exercises, but not withChina or anyone else. A recent report from theCongressional Research Service notes thatthere is still a formal treaty between the DPRKand China, but little more than that:

…..the Treaty of Friendship,C o o p e r a t i o n , a n d M u t u a lAssistance—which committedeither party to come to the aid ofthe other if attacked. This militaryalliance, however, lacks keyoperational components, such as ajoint headquarters, joint planning,or even joint military exercises.21

Indeed, when I raised the issue of the treatywith Chinese scholars in Beijing in November2010, the replies were vague and it wasunclear whether the treaty was still consideredas binding. Whereas the US frequently makes apoint of saying it will come to the aid of its allythe Republic of Korea, China makes no suchpublic promises to the DPRK, calling insteadfor peace and stability.

Differentiating the involvement of the great

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powers, specifically the United States andChina, is essential if we are to understand thesecurity dynamics of the Korean peninsula.Treaties may be no more than scraps of paper.It is the establishment of implementationmechanisms – joint control, exercises,operational plans (OPLAN) and interoperability–that distinguishes the real from the merelyformal. Neither Korea could invade the otherwithout the support of its’ patron’, but clearlythe commitment of the United States and Chinavaries greatly. Moreover, invasions don’t justhappen – they have to be planned andpractised. It is only the United States andSouth Korea that does this repeatedly and on alarge scale, not China and North Korea.

Sometimes it is difficult to disentangle theoffensive from the defensive, and muchdepends on context, and interpretation. The US‘Missile Defense’ programme is touted asdefensive but coupled with the US offensivecapability, which it allows to be utilised withimpunity, it is rightly regarded by targetedcountries as inherently aggressive.22 The US-ROK military exercises are claimed to be‘defensive’ but on close examination we seethat they are quite the opposite. Here is adescription from the Seoul newspaperHankyoreh of the exercise held at the end ofNovember:

Joint South Korea-U.S. drills withthe USS George Washington in theWest Sea will be held from Sundayto Wednesday [28 November-1December 2010]. North Korea haspromised retaliation if bothcountries hold the drills in theWest Sea.

South Korea and the United Stateshave stated that the drills areroutine and defensive in nature,but with the drills being held in themiddle of the West Sea for the firsttime, they strongly take on the

character of a show of forceagainst North Korea...

Moreover, the South Koreanmi l i tary and U.S . mi l i taryreportedly plan to l imit theexercise to waters south ofPyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province.This means they will conduct theexercise in waters outside therange of North Korea’s Samlet(83~95km) and Silkworm and Styx(46km) land-to-sea anti-shipmissiles.

Participating in the carrier strikeforce will be the 9,600-ton Aegiscruisers USS Cowpens and 9,750-ton Aegis destroyers USS Shilohand USS Ste them and USSFitzgerald. One Aegis destroyercarries about 100 Tomahawkcruise miss i les that canbombard North Korea’s nuclearfacilities with precision strikes.

The E-2C airborne early warningaircraft about the carrier is a“flying radar base” that detectsand analyzes the situation in theair and ground from a far distance.The USS George Washingtoncarr ies about 80 aircraft ,including the fighter-bombersF/A-18E/F Super Hornets andF/A-18A/C Hornet. South Koreawill provide two KDX-II destroyers,a patrol boat, frigate, supply shipand anti-submarine aircraft.

As the drill is taking place far fromt h e N L L , t h e M a r i n e s o nBaengnyeong Island, YeonpyeongIsland and the other Five West SeaIslands will not participate. TheMarine artillery drills onYeonpyeong Island will restart

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during the middle of nextmonth, after the damage fromTuesday’s at tack has beenrepaired. On Sunday, the first dayof the joint South Korea-U.S. drill,the Marines will participate inregiment-level landing drills atMallipo, South ChungcheongProvince as part of the HogukExercise, a primarily South Koreand r i l l t h a t i n v o l v e s U . S .participation. [emphasis added]23

On the one hand we have a task force headedby the giant nuclear-powered (and presumablynuclear-capable) carrier USS Washington, a‘warship capable of delivering air poweranywhere in the world’ as its official websiteproudly tells us.24 The taskforce with itsmissiles and aircraft can bomb anywhere inNorth Korea (and much of China as the Chineseare well aware). Deployed against that we haveNorth Korean artillery and shore-to-shipmissiles, both of limited range, and unable tothreaten the task force. And if there were anydoubt about the message all this is designed todeliver, just note the marine landing drills.

The media often plays its role in disguising thethreatening nature of these exercises bydescribing them as ‘war games’, as if they wereplayful, pretend, activities with no harm beingdone or contemplated.25

The US-ROK joint military exercises not merelyprepare for a possible invasion of North Koreabut they also serve as weapons of attrition.They force North Korea to devote much more ofits resources to the military than it would ifthere were no palpable threat. An importantcomponent of the exercise is their element ofambiguity. The Korean People’s Army (KPA)can never be sure when a feint might becomethe real thing, so every exercise has to be takenvery seriously. The translation of thiscommentary from the Rodong Sinmun on the

Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercises in 2009may be fractured, but the underling recognitionof the danger of attack is clear:

The said largest-scale saberrattling kicked off by the U.S.imperialists against the DPRK at atime when their scenario for thesecond Korean war is at the finalstage of completion is a veryadventurous and dangerousmilitary provocation that can beseen only on the eve of a war, andthis is an undisguised militarythreat and a sort of declaration ofwar against the DPRK.

No one can vouch that the U.S.imperialist bellicose elements willnot ignite a war against the DPRKby surprise while reinforcingarmed forces and staging warmaneuvers in south Korea and itsvicinity as they did in Iraq.26

Indeed, the clash at Yeonpyeong Islandcoincided with a substantial military exercise,the Hoguk (‘Safeguarding the Nation’):

North Korea fired the artilleryduring South Korea’s military drillcalled the Hoguk Exercise on Nov.22-30 that involves 70,000 SouthKorean mi l i tary troops, 50warships, 90 helicopters and 500p l a n e s . T h e 3 1 s t M a r i n eExpeditionary Unit (MEU) of U.S.Marine Corps and U.S. Seventh AirForce will also participate in theexercise.27

The scheduled participation of the 31st MarineExpeditionary Unit (MEU) is particularlysignificant.28 The 31st MEU, based in Okinawa,

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is America’s ‘forward deployed rapid-response’unit in East Asia. It trains with the ROKmarines practicing beach landings, but itsspecialty appears to be urban warfare.29 One ofits possible functions is to mount a commandotype raid on the DPRK. A Japanese scholarwriting in the authoritative PACNET newsletterof Pacific Forum CSIS (the Honolulu branch ofthe Washington think tank Center for Strategicand International studies) commented thus:

As a collapse of North Korea --rather than a North Koreaninvasion of South Korea -- hasbecome a more likely scenario, the31st MEU can search and seize theNorth Korean nuclear arsenal, andprevent proliferation of thoseweapons.30

It is not surprising, therefore, that the KPA wasconcerned about the Hoguk exercise andresponded to the ROK live firing in line with the‘zero tolerance’ strategy. However, concernsextend beyond specific military exercises, tothe whole policy of building up of tension inpreparation for a crisis that would lead to aninvasion of the North. The KPA barrage can beseen as a message that an attack would be metby a devastating counteroffensive which would,at the very least, imperil Seoul; it was areminder that ‘Seoul [is] not safe from artilleryattacks’.31

The DPRK’s ‘zero tolerance’ strategy

The DPRK’s ‘zero tolerance’ policy longpredates the Lee Myung-bak administration, letalone the present crisis. Basically this strategyis to reiterate than no infringement of DPRKterritory will be tolerated, and any intrusionwill be met by force. There has been flexibilityand restraint in implementing this strategy,especially in respect of the NLL (see below),but the underlying strategic calculation is thatany sign of weakness will lead to further US

and ROK moves against the DPRK.

The case of the US invasion of Iraq is oftencited by the North Koreans as indicative of thedangers of an appeasement policy. This is oftenraised in respect of North Korea’s emphasis onnuclear deterrent. Alexander Frolov, writingrecently in the Russian Ministry of ForeignAffairs journal International Affairs on lessonsfrom the Iraq war, for example, made the pointthat “The leadership in N. Korea also realizedthat nothing less than a nuclear status cang u a r a n t e e t h e c o u n t r y a g a i n s t U Saggression.” 3 2

However, the relevance of Iraq to the non-appeasement policy goes beyond developing anuclear deterrent. In May 2003 after abreakdown in US-DPRK negotiations, theofficial Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) ina lengthy statement refered to Iraq:

On March 20 this year the U.S.provoked a war of aggressionagainst Iraq under the pretext of"finding out weapons of massdestruction" in a bid to topple theSaddam government.

The Iraqi war taught the lessontha t "nuc lear susp i c ion , ""suspected development ofweapons of mass destruction" andsuspected "sponsorship ofterrorism" touted by the U.S. wereall aimed to find a pretext for warand one would fall victim to a warwhen one meekly responds to theIAEA's inspection for disarmament.

Neither strong international publicop in ion nor b ig countr ies 'opposition to war nor the UNCharter could prevent the U.S.from launching the Iraqi war.

It is a serious lesson the world has

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drawn from the Iraqi war that awar can be averted and thesovereignty of the country and thesecurity of the nation can beprotected only when a country hasa physical deterrent force, a strongmilitary deterrent force capable ofdecisively repelling any attack tob e m a d e b y a n y t y p e s o fsophisticated weapons.

The reality indicates that buildingup a physical deterrent force isurgently required for preventingthe outbreak of a nuclear war onthe Korean Peninsula and ensuringpeace and security of the world,now that the U.S. does not showany political intention and will torenounce its hostile policy towardthe DPRK.

The DPRK will increase its self-defensive capacity strong enoughto destroy aggressors at a singlestroke. Any U.S. aerial attack willbe decisively countered with aerialattack and its land strategy will becoped with land strategy.33

In reality, the DPRK cannot hope to match USmilitary power (especially in the air) so itsresponse to attack would be asymmetrical,drawing on its strengths.34 It would probablyutilise its special forces, submarines, and inparticular its artillery.35

As noted, the frequent US-ROK war exercises,the integration of the ROK military into the UScommand structure, and the associatedoperational plans, are recognised by the DPRKas very threatening:

[The United States] made public"strategic guideline No. 1" inNovember 1978 and thus officially

announced the formation of the"Combined Forces Command" insouth Korea. . .

The organization of the "CombinedForces Command" deepened themilitary dependence of southKorea on the United States andincreased the danger for anoutbreak of a new war on theKorean Peninsula.

The Team Spirit joint militaryexercises for invading the northhad been escalated as a large-scalewar exercises involving hugea r m e d f o r c e s o v e r100,000-200,000 strong from1978. Such joint military exercisesas the Reception, Staging, OnwardMovement and Integration (RSOI),Ulji Focus Lens and Foal Eaglehave been staged almost every dayas planned and directed by thecommand.

The aggressive and bellicosenature of the command hasremained unchanged even afterthe June 15 era [the 2000 North-South summit], a new era ofreconciliation and cooperation,was ushered in on the KoreanPeninsula.

Many war scenarios against thenorth including "OPLAN 5030","New OPLAN 5026" and "OPLAN8022-02" have been worked outand war exercises to carry theminto practice conducted in a morefrenzied way.

This year the command changedthe codenames of the RSOI andUlji Focus Lens with Key Resolveand Ulji Freedom Guardian and isholding actual maneuvers to hurl

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U.S. imperialist aggression forcesin the mainland and abroad intoKorean front.

It goes without saying that suchwar exercises and arms builduphad have negative effect on thenorth-south relations and chilledthe ardent desire for the Koreanpeople for reunification.

The south Korean people thuspress for the dissolution of the"Combined Forces Command"disturbing peace in Korea andobstructing her reunification.

The south Korea-U.S. "CombinedForces Command", a tool for warof aggression and a source ofpermanent atmosphere of war andtension on the Korean Peninsula,should be disbanded withoutdelay.36

The most famous example of the efficacy of theUS-ROK strategy is the reported argumentbetween President Kim Young-sam andPresident Bill Clinton in 1994. According toKim, Clinton wanted to bomb the North Koreanuclear reactor at Yongbyon. A 2003 BBCreport recounted the tale:

"Clinton told me that he wouldl a u n c h a n i m m e d i a t ebombardment on the Yongbyonarea. Clinton was very determinedabout it, but I argued to him thatsuch an attack should never takeplace," said Mr Kim.

"So there was quite an argumentbetween him and me. Sometimesthe phone conversations lastedmore than 40 minutes," he said.

Mr Clinton first revealed the 1994plan to attack North Korea lastmonth, but said nothing of thealleged dispute with the South.

Mr Kim said that a US attackwould have led to a tremendousloss of life, and would have turnedSeoul into a "sea of fire".

"Finally I told him that if theUnited States attacks North Korea,I cannot send one single memberof South Korea's 650,000 armedforces into battle."37

Kim’s version of events was contradicted byTong Kim (Kim Dong-hyun) a Korean-Americanwho worked as an interpreter for the StateDepartment for over 30 years, only to suggestthat such plans were actually mooted at thedefense minister level. According to him,

It simply is not the case [...]. Therewas no discussion about a possibleU.S. attack on North Koreabetween the two presidents viaphone. Such discussions indeedtook place between their defenseministers Kwon Young-hae andWilliam Perry with the SouthKorean minister obviously opposedto the military action.38

The consequences of a Northern counterattack,and specifically an artillery offense againstSeoul, was not the only consideration, althoughit was the main one. A South Korean simulationexercise predicted that ‘bombing of NorthKorea’s nuclear facilities could in the worstcase make the whole of Korea uninhabitable fora decade’.39 The bombing of Yongbyon was butone variant of the ‘military option’ that theUnited States has been examining, if perhapsthe favoured one.40 The release of radioactivity

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aside, a US attack would mean war withimmense devastation of the Korea peninsula, soit is to be expected that there has been, in thepast, opposition across the political spectrum,from progressive President Roh Moo-hyun toconservative legislator Park Jin.41 Therenevertheless remain those who pin their hopeson precipitating a collapse that they hopewould prevent the North from making acounterattack. This is an ongoing issue but aslong as the DPRK functions as a viable state,committed and able, to retal iate, theconsequences of an attack would be weightyindeed. Part of the reason for the vigorousDPRK response at Yeonpyeong was presumablyto demonstrate that the KPA was still inbusiness.

The DPRK has been threatened, and blockaded,by the United States for decades, but unlikeother countries that have been targeted as athreat to the United States, it has not beeninvaded, or bombed since 1953. To that degreethe zero-tolerance strategy can be said to work.But it comes at heavy cost. It is a high-riskstrategy. If there is a miscalculation or amisunderstanding, or ‘maverick’ action bysoldiers on the front line, the situation couldrapidly whirl out of control. War would bedisastrous for North Korea, despite the bravewords. It would also have grave consequencesfor the South, and Japan. If it spread to Chinathe results for the entire Asia-Pacific and theworld are incalculable.42 In such a war, theDPRK would suffer most, but the ROK and theUS would also suffer unacceptable damage andthat could be considered sufficient to keep thepeace.

The strategy has other disadvantages. It allowsthe DPRK to be portrayed as belligerent, andcertainly the coverage of the Yeonpyeonginc iden t , w i th in Sou th Korea , andinternationally has been virtually uniformlyhostile toward the dPRK. Not everyone hasjumped on to the bandwagon and there arethose, in particular Korean-Americans, who

oppose the drift towards war and call forengagement.43 But these are only a tinyminority.

The strategy also runs counter to the mainthrust of DPRK strategy which is to negotiatethe United States into accepting peacefulcoexistence. Recourse to confrontation, andmilitary action, makes that more difficult toprosecute.

Finally, it gives a hostage to fortune. The others ide (here South Korea but in o thercircumstances it could be the US) can constructa provocation knowing that it will trigger aresponse that can be labelled as belligerent.The trick for the ROK here is to do somethingwhich the DPRK will regard as provocative butwhich can be disguised as normal andlegitimate. The military exercises in general fallwithin this category. For the DPRK (and China)they are intimidating and provocative, but thatis not how they are described in the Westernmedia. No doubt if the tables were turned andit was a North Korean carrier stalking up theAmerican or even the South Korean coast,perceptions would be different.

In the particular case of Yeonpyeong the ROKdid something that was portrayed as legitimateand non-threatening but which the DPRK foundintolerable. To understand why that was so weturn to the question of the Northern Limit Line(NLL).

Northern Limit Line

The Northern Limit Line is a very strangebeast, as a glance at the map shows (fig 1).

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Source: Wikipedia, downloaded 30 November2010

On this map #1 indicates Yeonpyeong Islandwhere the artillery clash took place, and #2Baengnyeong Island, off which the Cheonansank. The upper(blue) line represents theNorthern Limit Line (NLL) and the lower (red)one the West Sea Military Demarcation Line(MDL) claimed by the DPRK.

The NLL was unilaterally established by theAmericans (officially the United NationsCommand) in August 1953 and has beenclaimed by the US and ROK thereafter.44 TheNLL, instead of striking out directly from thecoast at the end of the land Mi l i taryDemarcation Line (MDL), snakes up the westcoast of North Korea, through rich crab fishgrounds, and taking in various islands the mainthree of which are Yeonpyeong (1) ,Baengnyeong (2), and Daecheong (3). It hasbeen argued that the line was set to preventSouthern incursions into Northern waters(Syngman Rhee had not signed the ArmisticeAgreement and wanted the war to continue),however, it seems more plausible to see it also,or primarily, as affording bases for inserting

intelligence and commando teams in position toharass the DPRK. Be that as it may, by the1990s commando raids were a thing of thepast, yet the ROK refused to negotiateconcerning the NLL. This was despite twomajor incidents in 1999 and 2002 which were adistinct threat to the ‘Sunshine Policy of thenpresident Kim Dae-jung.45 A further clashoccurred in November 2009 under thepresidency of Lee Myung-bak.46 This 2009incident may have owed something to the moreassertive North Korea policy of the Leeadministration.47

The NLL did not receive much internationalattention until the Cheonan incident of March2010. There were a number of reasons for this.Most of the casualties in previous incidentswere Northern and so, in the eyes of most ofthe international media, warranted lessattention. The Cheonan was the largest singledisaster for the ROK navy.

Many commentators were quick to point outwhat a dangerous situation the sinking of theCheonan illustrated. Typical was NicoleFinnegan of the Washington-based KoreaEconomic Institute: ‘Regardless of what welearn the true cause of the tragedy to be, thesinking of the Cheonan has revived fear anddebates on how easily North and South Koreacould lurch into war unexpectedly.’48

There is nothing new in these concerns. TheNLL by its unilateral nature, its configurationclose to the North Korean coast, and runningthrough highly prized crab grounds, is a recipefor conflict. Fishing boats from both South andNorth sometimes ignore the NLL during thecrab season and their respective navies tend tofollow them. The NLL is also at variance withthe now standard territorial sea limit of 12nautical miles.49 Writing in 2002, after the clashof June that year, John Barry Kotch and MichaelAbbey, point out that:

If the two Koreas are genuinely

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committed to reconciliation, thesedifferences can be resolvedthrough negotiation, therebypreventing future incidents. A linethat was drawn more than a half-century ago for an ent irelydifferent purpose should no longerbe allowed to fester as a source ofconflict, thereby retarding thepeace process.50

The differences were not resolved, so thequestion is why? If this failure to negotiate aresolution had occurred during the Lee Myung-bak administration it might not have beensurprising. But this was during the time of KimDae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. It is clear that aresolution would have meant the Southabandoning the NLL in whole or in part, andagreeing to something more c loselyapproximating the North’s line. Whatever therole of Americans behind the scenes it seemsclear that resolution of the NLL was opposed,successfully, by the ROK military. The logicalconclusion is that there were strong forces inthe ROK political elite, revolving around themilitary, who wanted to keep the NLL preciselybecause it would “to fester as a source ofconflict, thereby retarding the peace process.”

All of the previous conflicts around the NLLhad been at sea, and the artillery duel atYeonpyeong was the first one on land. To

understand how that came about we mustreturn to the map. It appears that the DPRKacknowledges ROK control over the islands, butclaims these are its territorial waters, exceptfor the access channels shown on the map.51

Whilst the NLL has long been a bone ofcontention, the situation greatly worsenedsince the Lee Myung-bak administration cameinto office. One rough way of measuring that isto calculate the number of times the officialKCNA news agency mentions the NLL. RohMoo-hyun was in office from 25 February 2003to 25 February 2008 when Lee Myung-bak tookover. Fig 2 shows the monthly average of NLLstories over those two administrations. This isadmittedly an imperfect metric, but thedifference between the two administrations iscompelling: under Lee Myung-bak the numberof North Korean complaints rose nearly three-fold.

In March 2008, for instance, the KPA navywarned:

Combined firepower drills for"striking and destroying" warshipsof the Navy of the Korean People'sArmy and drills for tactical navalm a n e u v e r s a r e s t a g e d o nPaekryong , Taechong andYonphyong Islets and in watersaround them almost everyday.

A situation in which an armedconflict may break out any momentis prevailing in the frontline watersin the West Sea due to the recklessmilitary provocations of the southKorean military warmongers.

Any attempt on the part of thesouth Korean military authoritiesto "protect" the "northern limitline" at any cost would only sparkoff a clash in the said waters.52

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The following year, as the Lee administrationmoved to join the US-led Proliferation SecurityInitiative (PSI), the KPA navy issued anotherwarning:

3. For the present, we will notguarantee the legal status of thefive islands under the south side'scontrol (Paekryong, Taechong,Sochong, Yonphyong [Yeonpyeong]and U is lands) in our side'sterritorial waters northwest of thee x t e n s i o n o f t h e M i l i t a r yDemarcation Line in the West Seaof Korea and safe sai l ing ofwarships of the U.S. imperialistaggression forces and the southKorean puppet navy and civilianships operating in the watersaround there.53

The PSI is in many ways similar to the NLL. Itis unilateral and has no legal standing. The PSIclaims that the US and its clients are aboveinternational law and may stop and searchships on the high seas. Ostensibly this is to stopthe shipping of weapons of mass destructionwhich, given the United States pre-eminence inthe international arms trade, smacks of acertain degree of chutzpah.54 Indeed, as HazelSmith has documented, ‘There is little hardevidence that the government of North Korea isinvolved in the illicit shipping of WMD orcomponents of WMD.’55 The PSI seems to bereally about harassing the DPRK and stokingtension, and that also holds for the NLL.

The NLL seems to have been much moresuccessful in attaining these objectives so farthan the PSI. The NLL was perhaps onlyperipheral to the Cheonan incident. True theship sank in disputed waters, and had the NLLnot existed, that is, had the two Koreas beenseparated by a mutually agreed maritimeborder, the sinking would probably not haveoccurred. It appears, as Russian investigators

concluded, that it ran aground in shallowwaters and in an attempt to extricate itself,may have been sunk by one of the South’smines.56 If the actual sinking of the Cheonanmay have been an accident, the subsequentinvestigation was deliberately fraudulent.57 TheYeonpyeong incident is different in that itoccurred because of a deliberate provocationby the South.

The artillery duel at Yeonpyeong

Much remains contested about this incident.But the essentials can be traced. The mediatends to give the impression that the NorthKorean barrage against the marine base onYeonpyeong island on 23 November came outof the blue, with nothing preceding it. TheChosun Ilbo specifically makes that claim:

… the latest artillery bombardmenton Yeonpyeong Island camecompletely out of the blue, andthere is no way of telling when,where and how North Korea willstrike next.58

A slightly more nuanced version is theWashington Post narrative, with the Northlaunching a barrage and the South responding:

North Korea launched a massiveartil lery barrage on a SouthKorean island Tuesday, killing twoSouth Korean marines, woundingat least 19 other people andsetting more than 60 buildingsablaze in the most ser iousconfrontation since the North'ssinking of a South Korean warshipin March.

Sou th Korea immed ia te l yresponded with its own artillery

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fire and put its fighter jets on highalert, bringing the two sides -which technically have remained ina state of war since the Koreanarmistice in 1953 - close to thebrink of a major conflagration.59

Yet there is no mention here of the South’sarms buildup on the island, the North’swarnings, the provocative nature of theNorthern Limit Line, or the South’s threateningmilitary exercises preceding the barrage.

Back in 2008 the KPA complained about theROK introducing new weaponry into the NLLislands: ‘They also issued an order to batteriesof 155 mm caliber howitzers and various typeguided weapons deployed on the above-saidfive islets to be ready to go into action.’60

The KPA statement also claimed that:

Combined firepower drills for"striking and destroying" warshipsof the Navy of the Korean People'sArmy and drills for tactical navalm a n e u v e r s a r e s t a g e d o nPaekryong , Taechong andYonphyong Islets and in watersaround them [take place] almosteveryday.

A situation in which an armedconflict may break out any momentis prevailing in the frontline watersin the West Sea due to the recklessmilitary provocations of the southKorean military warmongers.

Any attempt on the part of thesouth Korean military authoritiesto "protect" the "northern limitline" at any cost would only sparkoff a clash in the said waters.61

The live fire drills that the ROK conducted on23 November were not just artillery practice;they were specifically focussed on possiblecombat against KPA ships in waters around theisland. However, it was the specific contestedstatus of those waters, in a tense situationexacerbated by the military exercises since theCheonan incident, which sparked the NorthKorean response. It appears that the Northwarned the South against the drills, but thewarnings were disregarded.

The Seoul newspaper Chosun Ilbo reported on24 November that,

North Korea in a telegram onTuesday morning [23 November]criticized an annual South Koreandefense drill now underway. Thesame afternoon the North Koreanmilitary fired on YeonpyeongIsland.

An official at the Joint Chiefs ofStaff said, "At around 8:20 a.m. onTuesday, North Korea sent atelegram that said they would notsit idly by and watch if SouthKorea fire at North Korean watersduring the military training." NorthKorea already criticized the drill onNov. 17 on the website of theCommittee for the PeacefulReunification of the Fatherlandand again on Monday when thedrill began.

But the military dismissed NorthKorea's claims, saying an artilleryfiring drill by the Marine Corpsthat took place in YeonpyeongIsland on Tuesday had nothing todo with the annual drill but was apart of monthly training there.Moreover, the drill the North citedas an excuse for the attack is anannual routine drill which has been

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conducted by the South Koreanmilitary since 1996.

A spokesman for the Joint Chiefs ofStaff said, "The training wasdirected at South Korean waters tothe southwest of YeonpyeongIsland, and the training site hadbeen announced already throughthe international network ofcommunication of merchantships.62

To say that the marine artillery drills hadnothing to do with the Hoguk exercise is surelysophistry. Moreover, the DPRK warningsstretched further back. The informationavailable on the English-language KCNAwebsite is only a portion of the publishedKorean-language material, and on top of thatthere are the direct communications betweenNorth and South (such as the telegrammentioned above). However, there is enoughEnglish-language for us to get a certain pictureof preceding events, even though the Englishtranslation is often of poor quality.

This picture taken on November 23, 2010by a South Korean tourist shows huge

plumes of smoke rising from Yeonpyeongisland in the disputed waters of the YellowSea on November 23, 2010. North Korea

fired dozens of artillery shells onto a South

Korean island on November 23, 2010,killing four people, setting homes ablazeand triggering an exchange of fire as the

South's military went on top alert.(STR/AFP/Getty Images)

On the 4th of June 2010 a Rodong Sinmuneditorial headlined ‘S. Korea Accused ofDangerous Provocations’ warned that:

The puppet military is massivelyamassing offensive forces in thewaters off five islets of the WestSea including Paekryong andYonphyong [Yeonpyeong] isletswhile vociferating about "defenceof the northern limit line" andceaselessly infiltrating its warshipsinto the territorial waters of theDPRK for the purpose of sparkingoff a new armed conflict.

It is needless to say that the large-scale "demonstration of militarymuscle" and war maneuvers takingplace under this situation are asdangerous acts as playing with fireby the side of a powder magazine.These moves are, in fact, a preludeto an all-out war.

The DPRK loves peace and doesnot want a war. But it is theDPRK's spirit and mettle to reactto fire with fire and punish theprovocateurs with a mercilessretaliation of justice.63

This is a generalised warning about retaliation‘for starting a war of aggression’ rather thanspecifically threatening a response to militaryexercises at Yeonpyeong.

This warning was followed by another on 3August which specifically threatened retaliationfor ‘naval firing maneuvers’ from Yeonpyeong

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and other islands in the area:

The Command of Forces of theKorean People's Army in thewestern sector of the front issuedon Tuesday the following notice inthis connection:

The naval firing maneuvers to bes t a g e d b y t h e a b o v e - s a i dwarmongers in the waters nearPaekryong , Taechong andYonphyong islets in August with allground, naval and submarineattack means involved are notsimple drills but undisguisedmi l i tary intrus ion into theinviolable territorial waters of theDPRK and reckless politicallymotivated provocation to preservethe illegal "northern limit line" tothe last. ….

In view of the prevailing situation,the Command of Forces of theKorean People's Army in thewestern sector of the front made adecisive resolution to counter thereckless naval firing projected bythe group of traitors with strongphysical retaliation. ….

It is the unshakable will andsteadfast resolution of the armyand people of the DPRK to returnfire for fire.64

Whether the ROK marines carried out anyfiring exercises after that warning is unknown.The Chosun Ilbo report quoted above says thedrills were held ‘monthly’ but the [London]Telegraph talks about ‘monthly air raid drills’,so the exercises on 23 November may havebeen the first since the August threat. As theTelegraph put it, ‘The island, lined with tanktraps and trenches, and equipped with 19 fully-

stocked bomb shelters in which residentsconduct monthly air raid drills, is permanentlyready for war.’65

The South Koreans admitted carrying out livefiring exercises on 23 November but justifiedthese by saying they were fired into the sea,away from the direction of the North Koreanmainland. There seems no doubt they werefiring into the sea (on the technical level it waspresumably an anti-ship exercise), though theactual direction of fire is unclear. One reportsays southward.66 Another says to the west.67

Yet another has it to the southwest.68

In fact, as far as the North was concerned, thedirection was irrelevant because in any casethe shells landed in their territorial waters. Andtherein lies the rub. The DPRK argues that if ittolerated the exercise it would be relinquishingits claim to the waters.

The enemy fired shells from theislet which is so close to theterritory of the DPRK that it iswithin each other's eyeshot despitethe fact that there are so manymountains and rivers, sea watersand islets in south Korea. Thispowder-reeking saber-rattlingcannot be construed otherwisethan a politically motivatedprovocation.

The enemy is claiming that theyfired shells southward from theislet in a bid not to get on thenerves of the DPRK but YonphyongIslet is located deep inside theterritorial waters of the DPRKaway from the maritime militarydemarcation line. If live shells arefired from the islet, they are boundto drop inside the territorial watersof the DPRK side no matter in

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which direction they are firedbecause of such geographicalfeatures.

The ulterior aim sought by thee n e m y i s t o c r e a t e t h eimpression that the DPRK siderecognized the waters off theislet as their "territorialwaters", in case that there wasno physical counter-action onthe part of the former.

Herein lies the crafty and viciousnature of the enemy's provocation.

The army of the DPRK took such aself-defensive measure as making aprompt powerful strike at theartillery positions from which theenemy fired the shells as it doesnot make an empty talk. [emphasisadded].69

As can be seen from the map (fig 1), the DPRKseems to accept ROK control of the island (butnot necessarily sovereignty), but it rejects anyclaim over the surrounding sea.

It would appear that the DPRK claim to thesewaters has much to justify it; the NorthernLimit Line is manifestly iniquitous; it isunilateral and provocative and should havebeen abolished years ago. But does that justifythe DPRK artillery barrage?

An important point here is the number ofwarnings that were given and the nature of theROK military exercise. We have already quotedthe public statements, and mentioned atelegram, but the North also claims it made atelephone call to the South:

T h e s o u t h K o r e a n p u p p e twarmongers' firing of shells intothe territorial waters of the DPRK

side in the West Sea of Korea onNov. 23 was a premeditated anddeliberate military provocationfrom A to Z and a war action infact.

On Nov. 22, the south Koreanpuppet forces made no scruple ofannouncing that they would fireshells into the territorial waters ofthe DPRK side with artillery piecesthey deployed on Yonphyong Islandwhile staging Hoguk exercises fora war of aggression against theDPRK, straining the situation onthe Korean Peninsula.

In this connection the DPRK sidesent a telephone notice to thesouth Korean puppet military at 8a.m. on Nov. 23, strongly urging itto immediately cancel the plan forfiring shells into the territorialwaters of the DPRK side. In thenotice the DPRK side seriouslywarned that if it paid no heed tothis demand, it would face aresolute physical counter-strikeand would be held fully responsiblefor all the ensuing consequences.70

This telephone call, and the previous publicwarnings, have received very little coverage inthe Western media, but they were reported bythe Seoul newspaper Korea Herald quotingROK military sources:

In the morning [of the clash], theNorth sent a telephone message tothe South, saying “The Northwould not just sit back if the Southfired shots into the North Koreanterritorial waters,” according toJCS [South Korean Joint Chiefs ofStaff] officials.71

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We do not know how explicit that warning was,but since it was a telephone call, the Southernofficer could presumably have soughtclarification.

Moreover, other reports indicate that the ROKmilitary was aware that that DPRK had movedartillery into position. This was then followedby practice shooting:

A senior military said several hoursbefore the shelling began theNorth Korean military deployedone battery of six 122-mm MLRSshells and later two batteries of 12112-mm MLRS shells. It alsocarried out preparatory shootingpractice just before the attack. "Asfar as I know the South Koreanmilitary was aware of this," hesaid.72

It seems fair to assume that the local ROKmilitary commander was aware of the possibleconsequences if the firing exercise went ahead.Whether he relayed this to higher levels andasked for confirmation to go ahead we do notknow, but it seems likely. There was no greattime pressure and taking action which wouldresult in the first artillery exchange since theKorean War would surely have been referredup to higher levels.

The warning/foreknowledge issue become evenmore convoluted with revelations on 1December that South Korean intelligence hadknown since August that the North wouldrespond. The Director of the NationalIntelligence Service [NIS] gave testimony to aclosed-door session of a committee of theNational Assembly.

Members of the National AssemblyIntelligence Committee quoted NISDirector Won Sei-hoon as saying

the agency knew from wiretappingthat the North Korean regimeordered the military to prepare toattack the five islands in the WestSea. He said the NIS submittedthe intelligence report toP r e s i d e n t L e e M y u n g -bak .[emphasis added] 7 3

The phrase ‘prepare to attack’ implies, and ismeant to imply, a Northern provocation, anunprovoked assault. In fact, we have fromanother story a much more plausibleformulation:

The [Asahi Shimbun] quoted thesource, who is familiar with NorthKorea-China relations, as saying,"Early last month, the NorthKorean military issued instructionsin Kim Jong-un's name to seniormilitary commanders to get readyt o c o u n t e r t h e e n e m y ' sprovocations any time." Thesource quoted an unnamed NorthK o r e a n A r m y o f f i c e r a scommenting on the artillery attackon Yeonpyeong. "It had beenplanned. We had been preparingfor that for a long time." [emphasisadded].74

This countering of what the North regarded asa Southern provocation is consistent with thepublished and telephone warnings. It gives aquite different take on who was provokingwhom. This did not prevent the Chosun Ilbo,which ran the story, from heading it ‘Kim Jong-un 'Ordered Attack in Early November'. Not thefirst time a newspaper has mendaciously givena headline which is contradicted by the actualstory. In fact, the Chosun Ilbo, which has avirulent ideological position, often does this.75

The assertion that the NIS submitted the

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intelligence report to President Lee Myung-bakhas to be taken cautiously. From the publicaccount we do not know whether he was givenit personally, and the warning drawn to hisattention. It may have just been passed to hisoffice, and he may never have read it. That is agenerous interpretation. Whether Lee wasaware personally, it is clear that the NorthKorean warning that they would retaliate if theexercises took place was known at the highestlevels of the South Korean command.

Events of the day

The actual sequence of events is more complexthan most press reports and commentariessuggest. According to the Korea Herald, theNorthern shelling started at 2.34pm, but wasperhaps not the ‘massive onslaught’ that it wasoften called:

“As the North fired coastal artilleryshells at around 2:34 p.m. intowaters off the YeonpyeongIsland as well as on the island, weimmediately fired back in fullaccordance with combat rules,”said Lee Hong-kee, chief directorfor joint operations at the JCS, in apress briefing. [emphasis added]76

Either the accuracy of the Northern artillerywas poor, or firing into the water wasdeliberate.

According to the report, here is the sequence ofevents

This raises some intriguing questions.

• Did the North fire simultaneouslyat the island and into the sea, ordid the land fire come later?

• Did the North fire onto the islando n l y a f t e r t h e S o u t h e r ncounterattack on its positions?

• Why did the South make atelephone call asking the North tostop if it had already done so?

• Did the North recommence firingsometime after 3.42 pm?

• As of 9.30 pm we have threecivilians reported with minorinjuries but subsequent reportsgive two dead. Were the deadamongst these three, or were theydiscovered later?

The ‘fog of war’ no doubt produces confusionbut these discrepancies suggest that we havenot had the full story by any means.

The quite erroneous claim that this was an‘unprovoked attack’ by the North has beenrepeated so many times by ROK officials, andby the media, that even independent-mindedanalysts such as the American investigativejournalist Tim Shorrock have been taken in.77

The other main canard in the official narrativeconcerns civilians. The theme is set at the top

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with statements from Lee Myung-bak. On 29November he gave a short address to thenation: ‘During a seven-minute speech Leeexpressed outrage over the North's ruthlessattack on civilians, calling it an "inhumane"crime [emphasis added].’78

Others were more circumspect. A JCSspokesman called the firing ‘indiscriminate’:

“ T h i s p r o v o c a t i o n i s apremeditated, intentional illegalattack in violation of the U.N.Convent ion, the Armist iceAgreement and the inter-Koreannon-aggression accord. It is also aninhumane atrocity, in which itindiscriminately fired shells intounarmed civilian residentialareas.”79

Song Min-soon, former Minister of ForeignAffairs and Trade and currently a DemocraticParty (i.e. opposition) member of the NationalAssembly attacked what he cal led an‘outrageous indiscriminate artillery attackagainst civilians and military alike.’80

The American author and Korea specialist JohnFeffer wrote of a ‘disproportionate response’which killed ‘two civilians and two soldiers’.81

Early reports (such as the Korea Herald oneabove) mention only minor civilian injuries,though they talk of a ’civilian area’:

..killing two South Korean marines,wounding 16 soldiers and threecivilians, and damaging homes andfacilities. This was the first timesince the Korean War that theNorth has fired artillery shells on acivilian area in South Korea.82

‘Civilian area’ is a rather elastic term. Most

military bases have civilians living in thevicinity, some more than others. The giant USheadquarters in South Korea, YongsanGarrison, occupies 2.5 sq km in the centre ofthis city of 10 million people; the site wasoriginally developed by the Japanese ImperialArmy.

By 24 November the casualties changed to four– two military and two civilians. ‘In addition tothe two marines killed, the bodies of two men,believed in their 60s, were pulled from adestroyed construction site, the coast guardsaid. At least 18 people - most of them troops -were injured.’83

It was not stated where this construction sitewas in relation to the marine camp. If it wereon the other side of the island, then that wouldindicate fire that was either indiscriminate orhighly inaccurate. If it were close by, or evenon the camp, then this would be quite different.

It is clear that the main target was the Marinecamp, as this quotation from the JCS indicates:

Many landed on a military campbut others on a civilian village onthe island. Flames and thickcolumns of smoke were seen risingabove the village and a nearbymountain. "The North must havecareful ly premeditated theprovocation against the camp," aJCS officer speculated.84

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A K-9 Marine artillery base on YeonpyeongIsland under attack by North Korea onTuesday /Courtesy of the Ministry of

Defense ["N.Korean Shelling 'Aimed forMaximum Damage to Lives, Property'."

Chosun Ilbo, 26 November 2010.

The Washington Post went one step further andreported that ‘Most of the shells landed on amilitary base on Yeonpyeong island [emphasisadded].’85

However, most reports either did not mentionthe marine base, or gave no details. Forinstance, another Washington Post articletalked of ‘civilian-inhabited Yeonpyeong Island’without any reference to the marine base.86 Infact the military installations were significantas a New York Times article makes evident.

… [Yeonpyeong Island] houses agarrison of about 1,000 SouthKorean marines, and the navy hasdeployed its newest class of “patrolkiller” guided-missile ships in theWestern Sea, as the Yellow Sea isalso known.87

This New York Times article gave the civilianpopulation as 1,600 but this was later reviseddown to 1,350.88 Most appear to be connected,as one might expect, to fishing (the area isfamous for crabs); how many work on the baseis unclear.

The most detailed, technical, assessment of theartillery duel is given by the US ‘geopoliticalintelligence’ company STRATFOR. It released areport, accompanied by a pdf file showingsatellite images taken after what it called the‘North Korean attack on Yeonpyeong Island’.

The STRATFOR reports are interesting partlyfor what they reveal, but also for what theyhide or obscure, and for what might beconsidered a surprising lack of geopolitical

intelligence in an organisation in the businessof selling intelligence. It admits that ‘A [SouthKorean] battery of six K9 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, which was conductinglive-fire drills on a Yeonpyeong Island militarybase, fired some 80 rounds.’

And then, a bit further down:

Significantly, the South claims itsYeonpyeong Island drill was notpart of the larger Hoguk exercisesunder way s imul taneous lythroughout South Korea. NorthKorea has occasionally protestedthese drills — including recently —and claims dozens of shells fell inNorth Korean waters near theisland, provoking it to f ire.However, as the North does notrecognize the Northern Limit Lineand considers the entire island andits surrounding water to be NorthKorean territory, it does not seemto be clear that this particularincident was any more provocativethan any other drill.89

This is a curious argument. Hoguk and theother military exercises over the decades havetaken place in South Korean territory orinternational waters. This one was being heldin what the North considered to be DPRKterritory. It was not merely provocative from amilitary point of view, but as they made clear intheir statement of 24 November, from a legalone as well. That is a very important distinctionwhich differentiated the Yeonpyeong exercisefrom others.

Although the STRAFOR report mentions themilitary base in passing, it is absent from thesatellite images document. We have satellitephotos of destroyed houses, but nothing thatshows the base, which is not even identified.Since the base was the main target of attack,

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and early reports focused on military dead andwounded, this is a rather telling omission.

The STRATFOR report and images do,however, throw considerable light, albeitinadvertently, on the issue of civilian casualties.It would appear from this, and other sources,that the North Korean fire was not veryaccurate. The North Koreans either exclusively,or mainly (it is not clear which), used MultipleLaunch Rocket System [MLRS] artillery. Theseare, as the name suggests, basically a bundle oftubes which can fire rockets. Interestingly, it issaid that they can be traced back to the 15th

century Korean hwacha (‘fire vehicle’), whichcould fire a hundred or more projectiles in onesalvo.90 The most famous example in moderntimes was the Soviet Katyusha, used in theSecond World War and nicknamed the ‘Stalinorgan’.91 The Americans used them in 1991 inthe Gulf War, and the ROK military is equippedwith them.92

MLRS can deliver formidable devastation butare not very accurate, especially the olderversions with which the KPA is equipped:

The initial barrage consisted of150 rounds, followed by 20 moreintermittently — meaning thatwhile a full battalion appeared tobe in position, a fully armed singlebattery could have conducted theentire attack. Of these 170 rounds,80 struck Yeonpyeong Island,though 20 failed to detonate…..

With a few modern exceptions,artillery rockets are unguided andachieve results through massedfires rather than exceptionalaccuracy. Here, North Korea hadno opportunity to register targetsor adjust fire based on input fromforward observers; South Koreahas subsequently conjecturedbased on the targets that the

North’s maps of military positionson the island may have been dated.The failure of so many rounds toreach the island and a dud rate ofroughly a quarter of those that didsuggest issues of quality control inmanufacture and/or poorlycontrolled storage, as well as thepotential for there to have beenissues in the fire direction or onthe gunline.93

So it would appear that the reason that shellsfell on the town was not so much that that thefiring was indiscriminate, as that it wasinaccurate.

The North Koreans do not have a monopoly onthis, indeed there was anger in the ROKNational Assembly Intelligence Committeewhen they were presented with the satellitephoto (Fig 5) which showed that Southernshells fired from their much more accuratehowitzers had missed their target, the NorthKorean artillery positions: ‘Committeemembers reportedly reacted angrily since theyshow impact points scattered mainly in paddyand dry fields.’94

In this satellite photo released by the U.S.private intelligence agency Stratfor, ricepaddies and fields in North Korea beartraces of South Korean artillery shells

["Spies Intercepted Plans for Yeonpyeong

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Attack in August ". Chosun Ilbo, 2December 2010.

There was also much dispute about the damagesuffered by the North. The DPRK has releasedno statement about casualties. In the South,some pointed out that ROK military equipmentwas far superior and more deadly and hencethere must have been many casualties, whileothers pointed to various satellite photosshowing hits missing targets.95

Sometimes military action is intended primarilyto terrorise and demoralise the civilianpopulation – the London blitz, the firebombingof Tokyo, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima andNagasaki, the ‘shock and awe’ bombing ofBaghdad prior to invasion – are just a few wellknown examples. If the DPRK fired on Seoul tounleash ‘a sea of fire’ it would be the civilianpopulation that would be hit, and the militaryimpact would be secondary. However, muchmilitary action is aimed primarily at the enemymilitary, and if this occurs in a populated area,civilians become, in the US euphemism,‘collateral damage’. Clearly the distinctionbetween the two is often blurred in practice,and it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to besure, but the available evidence suggests thatthe target for the North Korean fire was themarine base and that civilian casualties anddamage were accidental.

There are several reasons for assuming this.Firstly, the inaccuracy of the MLRS. Secondly,if the intention had been to cause civiliancausa l i t i e s as a warn ing about theconsequences o f Lee Myung -bak ’ sconfrontational policy – ‘today Yeonpyeong,tomorrow Seoul’ – we would expect that pointto be made. There is little point in giving awarning unless it is reasonably explicit. I canfind no indication that the DPRK has made anysuggestion that the Yeonpyeong incidentcarried such a lesson for the people of the ROK.On the contrary, the public statementexpressed regret for civilian casualties and laid

the blame on the Southern side:

The DPRK side warned severaltimes against the enemy's plan forshelling in the sensitive areasaround Yonphyong Island and senta telephone notice on the morningof the very day the incidentoccurred as part of its superhumanefforts to prevent the clash to thelast moment, but the south sidepreempted the firing of shells intothe territorial waters of the DPRKside. The enemy side, however, haskept silent about all these facts.

Moreover, it is now working hardto dramatize "civilian casualties"a s p a r t o f i t s p r o p a g a n d acampaign, creating the impressionthat the defenceless civilians wereexposed to " indiscriminateshelling" all of a sudden from theDPRK side.

If that is true, it is very regrettablebut the enemy should be heldresponsible for the incident as ittook such inhuman action ascreating "a human shield" bydeploying civilians around artillerypositions and inside militaryfacilities before the launch of theprovocation.

The fact that there were humancasualties inside the military baseclearly proves itself the ulteriorintention of the enemy. . .96

This statement brings up a third factor. Theclaim about a ‘human shield’ doesn’t carrymuch weight. Civilians live on the island forhistorical and economic reasons and there is noreason to suppose that they were used to shieldthe military. However, the claim that civilian

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casualties occurred within the camp is notimplausible. Civilians must have worked at thecamp. Indeed, one report from the UnitedStates said of the shelling that ‘this resulted inthe killing of two South Korean soldiers andtwo civilian contractors working on amilitary base’ [emphasis added].97 As with theCheonan incident we need a proper, impartial,investigation if we are to draw any firmconclusions, but as with the Cheonan no suchinvestigation is likely.

It is interesting to note that the DPRKstatement does not claim that it suffered anycivilian casualties, merely that enemy shells‘dropped in the area close to civilian houses’.North Korean propaganda is frequentlyportrayed as dishonest and deceitful. Here issurely a case where it would have been to theiradvantage, in terms of international opinion, tofabricate civilian casualties, but they did not doso.

Finally, it should be remembered that the ROKmilitary on Yeonpyeong Island are not justordinary soldiers, they are Marines, an eliteforce trained for amphibious assault. Indeed,back in 2009 Rodong Sinmun commented onthe buildup up in the area.

The puppet military reinforcedwarships and armed forces alongand near the "northern limit line inthe West Sea" and formed a "taskforce to be ready to go intoaction in half an hour" anddeployed it on Yonphyong Islet[emphasis added].98

The road behind, the road ahead

There have been frequent naval clashes aroundthe Northern Limit Line, indeed it seems likelythat it has been preserved by the current ROKand US authorities for that purpose. PresidentRoh moo-hyun and Chairman Kim Jong Il, at

their summit on 4 October 2007 agreed to a‘special peace and cooperation zone in theWest Sea’, but this peace initiative wasoverturned, as so many others, by incomingpresident Lee Myung-bak.99

Preserving the NLL as an area in whichincidents are likely to occur is one thing, bututilising the NLL deliberately to create anincident is another. Warnings and intelligencereports aside, it must have been known that amilitary exercise within the NLL area would beprovocative. The legal implications, moreover,made it intolerably provocative. This suggeststhat the crisis was planned, not necessarily ingreat detail, but with sufficient surety ofoutcome. This reading is quite consistent withLee Myung-bak’s policy, which is one ofbuilding up tension in order to precipitate acrisis on the peninsula that would lead to acollapse of the DRPK, and its absorption by theROK.

The DPRK is well aware of this, hence thereaffirmation of the zero tolerance policy atYeonpyeong. On 23 November, in the aftermathof the clash, the KPA issued a communiquéwhich reiterated the policy:

It is a traditional mode ofcounter-action of the army ofthe DPRK to counter the firingof the provocateurs withmerciless strikes.

Should the south Koreanpuppet group dare intrudeinto the territorial waters ofthe DPRK even 0.001 mm, therevolutionary armed forces ofthe DPRK will unhesitatinglycontinue taking mercilessmilitary counter-actionsagainst it.100

This is a calculated policy of brinkmanship that

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is designed to avert war by threatening war.The danger is, of course, that the momentum ofeven t s w i l l b r ing war abou t . Tha t ,unfortunately, is becoming ever more likely

Lee Myung-bak is a consummate politician. Hehas set things in motion to produce, andreplicate crisis, while giving the appearance ofbeing reluctant. His address to the nation on 29November used the same rhetorical device asAntony’s speech about Julius Caesar, in whichhe states “I come to bury Caesar, not to praisehim,” but of course is doing just that; he wantsto turn the crowd against the killers of Caesarbut has to dissemble. Lee combined ‘humility’with an aggressive stance in such a way as tosuggest he was reluctant to exacerbate thesituation but was being forced into it.

President Lee Myung-bak’sa d d r e s s M o n d a y i s b e i n gsummarized as consisting mainlyof “humility toward the people ofSouth Korea” and an “ultra-hardline response to North Korea.”A n a l y s t s s a y i t s h o w s t h epresident’s perception of thecurrent crisis facing him and itssolution following the NorthKorean ar t i l lery a t tack onYeonpyeong Island.

Although even North Koreaacknowledged the attack to bea “provocation,” President Leehas f aced harsh c r i t i c i smdomestically. Surveys show thatmore than 70 percent of SouthKoreans, conservat ive andprogressive alike, feel that themilitary and Lee Myung-bakadministration did not respondappropriately at the time of theattack. The fact that the presidentbegan his address Monday withwhat amounted to an apology tothe peop le o f South Korea

reflected a consideration of thissituation. [emphasis added]

The performance so impressed the reporterfrom the liberal Hankyoreh that he made themanifestly false statement that ‘North Koreaacknowledged the attack to be a ‘provocation’(on its part).

Throughout the crises of 2010, especially overthe s inking of the Cheonan and thenYeonpyeong, Lee Myung-bak adroitly fannedthe flames while giving the impression that hewas attempting to put them out. In respect ofthe Cheonan incident President Obama wasreported as saying, ‘I think President Lee hasshown extraordinary restraint given thesecircumstances.’101

To be sure, this was a public statement andpoliticians often say in public the opposite ofwhat they think in private. However, there doesseem to be a consensus among Westernobservers at least that Lee is a reluctantwarrior being driven into taking steps by theprovocative obduracy of the North.102 Consider,for instance, this STRATFOR interview wherethe interviewer comments: ‘I talked to threeformer [US?] envoys to Seoul this week and allof them agreed that South Korea had handledthis in a pretty cool and sensible fashion.’103

The South Korean public is rather moresceptical.

One of the WikiLeaks cables [09SEOUL59]illustrates the confusion in the minds of USofficials:

President Lee is determined not togive in to North Korean pressure.Our Blue House contacts have toldus on several occasions thatPresident Lee remained quitecomfortable with his North Koreapolicy and that he is prepared

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leave the inter-Korean relationsfrozen until the end of his term inoffice, if necessary. It is also ourassessment that Lee's moreconservat ive adv isors andsupporters see the current standoffas a genuine opportunity to pushand further weaken the North,even i f th i s m igh t invo lveconsiderable brinkmanship.104

On the one hand we have Lee facing up toNorth Korean pressure, but we also get theadmission that the ‘current standoff’ ( this wasin 2009) is seen as ‘ a genuine opportunity topush and further weaken the North, even if thismight involve considerable brinkmanship’.

Lee’s brinkmanship is, in fact, far moreprofound and aggressive than the US diplomatrealised. Both North and South are engaging inbrinkmanship, but the nature of the two is verydifferent. Pyongyang is far poorer and weakerthan its adversaries, which include not merelySouth Korea but the United States, andJapan.105 North Korea’s brinkmanship istherefore inherently defensive. It is designed toprotect the country (or regime) from attack andconquest. That does not mean that it is wise, orwill be successful, that is a matter of debate.But it is important to recognise its essentialcharacteristic of defensiveness.

South Korea’s brinkmanship, on the otherhand, is offensive. It is designed to bring aboutthe collapse of the DPRK and its takeover bythe ROK. Lee Myung-bak does not have to dothis. His immediate predecessors (Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun) had very differentpolicies. Indeed, his aggressive brinkmanship isarguably a new development because even inthe days of the military dictatorship, whilethere was hostility towards the North becausethe balance of forces if anything favoured theNorth at that time, there was not such anaggressive policy.

We discern three factors that may be propellingLee Myung-bak to accelerate the buildup oftension on the peninsula.

• A desire to renew the anti-Northmomentum after the relativefailure of the Cheonan incident.His setback in the May elections,the widespread public scepticismabout the investigation, and thefailure to get the UN SecurityCouncil to condemn North Koreamust rankle. The Yeonpyeongincident is seen as away torek indle ant i -North Koreasentiment.

In his address on 29 November hespecifically made the point: ‘Therewas a split in public opinion overthe torpedoing of the Cheonan.Unlike that time, our people haveunited as one this time.’106

• Despite frequent assertions ofimplosion and crisis, the DPRK isnot facing col lapse. Whilstsanctions must have caused hugedamage, the economy appears tob e r e c o v e r i n g . C e r t a i n l yPyongyang, f rom personalobservation on a visit in November2010, is manifestly economicallyimproved over my last visit threeyears ago, with more motorvehicles, bicycles, and shops. Theelectricity supply is much betterand there is a very noticeableincrease in street lighting. Theseobserva t i ons a re b road l ycorroborated by many recentAmerican visitors.107 If the South isto take over the North thensomething must be done to reversethis recovery.

• Time is not on Lee Myung-bak’s

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side. His term of office comes to anend on 25 February 2013 andunder the present constitution hei s ine l ig ib le to run aga in .Moreover, there are indicationsthat because of demographicchanges the conserva t i veascendancy represented by the Leeadminis trat ion may not besustainable and South Korea mightthen move to more progressiveadministrat ions. The oldergeneration, with chi ldhoodmemories of the Korean Warembel l i shed by decades o findoctrination during the militarydictatorships, is dying off. Theyounger generation is moreeducated and less persuaded bythe notion of a threat from thenorth.108

Since the North’s brinkmanship is defensive, itis reactive and this leaves the initiative in thehands of the South. Seoul has reinforced itsforces on the island at the NLL and hasannounced that there will be artillery exercisesfrom Daecheong Island, and again onYeonpyeong.109 It seems inevitable thatPyongyang will feel compelled to respond. Thenew ROK Defence Minister, Kim Kwan-jin, hasthreatened what he calls ‘self-defense air raids’in the event of another clash; ‘self defense’being used in a euphemistic sense reminiscentof Japanese defence posture.110 It will berecalled that Article 9 of the Japaneseconstitution prohibits the establishment ofarmed forces, so the Japanese army, navy andair forces all have ‘self-defense’ in their titlesthus solving the constitutional problem, whileallowing them over the years to push theboundaries of what is considered defence.

Kim Kwan-jin’s air strike policy is all part ofwhat the New York Times rather approvingly,and with a professional use of euphemism,

called a new ‘muscular military posture’.111 Theimplications of this new policy are obvious. Notmerely has the South great superiority inaircraft, but the new rules allow great flexibilityfor escalation.

However, there are limits to the ROK military’sfreedom of action. There is the legal issue ofoperational control – when would war bedeemed a war and thus trigger US control ofthe ROK military? Even before that stage isreached, the ROK air force is dependent on USintelligence to operate. Thus any seriousescalation of the situation on the Koreanpeninsula would require US endorsement.

Would this be forthcoming? Unfortunately,there is evidence to suggest that it would. TheObama administration has termed its policytowards Korea as one o f ‘ s t ra teg icpatience’.112 It might be better described as‘strategic paralysis’. It appears to haveeffectively relinquished control of events to LeeMyung-bak while thus far ruling out bilateral ormultilateral negotiations with North Korea.113 Itmight be said that ‘strategic paralysis’ is notconfined to US Korea policy, and rather is thedefining characteristic of Obama foreign policy.But perhaps nowhere is this more perilous thanin Korea.

Because ultimately Korea is China. A secondKorean war would, like the first, soon become aSino-American war.114

This is a revised version of an article thatappeared at Pyongyang Report Vol 12 No 1,December 2010 posted here.

Tim Beal is the author of North Korea: TheStruggle Against American Power, SeniorLecturer at Victoria University of Wellingtonand the editor of The Pyongyang Report.

Recommended citation: Tim Beal, KoreanBrinkmanship, American Provocation, and the

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Road to War: the manufacturing of a crisis, TheAsia-Pacific Journal Vol 8, Issue 51 No 1,December 20, 2010.

This article is part of a seriescommemorating the sixtiethanniversary of the Korean War.Other articles on the sixtieth anniversary ofthe US-Korean War outbreak are:• Mark Caprio, Neglected Questions on the“Forgotten War”: South Korea and theUnited States on the Eve of the KoreanWar.• Steven Lee, The United States, the UnitedNations, and the Second Occupation ofKorea, 1950-1951.• Heonik Kwon, Korean War Traumas.• Han Kyung-koo, Legacies of War: TheKorean War – 60 Years On. Additional articles on the US-Korean Warinclude:• Mel Gurtov, From Korea to Vietnam: TheOrigins and Mindset of Postwar U.S.Interventionism.• Kim Dong-choon, The Truth andReconciliation Commission of Korea:Uncovering the Hidden Korean War• Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Remembering theUnfinished Conflict: Museums and theContested Memory of the Korean War.• Sheila Miyoshi Jager, Cycles of History:China, North Korea, and the End of theKorean War.• Wada Haruki, From the Firing atYeonpyeong Island to a ComprehensiveSolution to the Problems of Division andWar in Korea.• Nan Kim with an introduction by JohnMcGlynn, Factsheet: West Sea Crisis inKorea.• Tanaka Sakai, Rekindling China-JapanConflict: The Senkaku/Diaoyutai IslandsClash

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Notes

1 I am very grateful for comments andcorrections from Don Borrie, Steve Gowans,Ankie Hoogvelt, and Peter Wilson. This revisedversion owes much to the comments of MarkSelden and John McGlynn All mistakes, ofcourse, remain my responsibility.

2 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America and China’sfirst big test," Financial Times, 23 November2010.

3 Siegfried S. Hecker, "Lessons Learned fromthe North Korean Nuclear Crises," NautilusPolicy Forum Online 10-055 (2010), ———, "AReturn Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon NuclearComplex," Center for International Securityand Cooperation, Stanford University 2010,Siegfried S. Hecker, "Return trip to NorthKorea (presentation)" in Korea EconomicInstitute (Washington, DC: 2010).

4 This is the Northern spelling; for simplicity Ihave used the Southern spelling throughout.

5 Praveen Swami, "Analysis: Why apocalypsewon't be now," Global News, 23 November2010.

6 Editorial, "China must exert influence onKorea," Evening Standard, 23 November 2010.

7 The usually meticulous Gregory Elich writesof the live fire exercise from Yeonpyeong that’this was not the first time that such drills hadbeen conducted’ but previous drills may nothave used live shells, and in any case did takenot take place in tandem with a major militaryexercise. Gregory Elich, "Spiralling out ofControl: The Risk of a New Korean War,"Global Research, 4 December 2010.

8 John Pike, "US Forces Korea - Exercises,"GlobalSecurity.org.

9 "KPA Supreme Command Issues Communique", KCNA, 23 November 2010.

10 Hyuk-chul Kwon, "Joint drills will be far fromNLL, military reports," Hankyoreh, 27November 2010.

11 "N.Korea Cites S.Korean Drill as Excuse forAttack," Chosun Ilbo, 24 November 2010.

12 Tania Branigan, "North Korea shells SouthKorean island," Guardian 2010.

13 "S. Korean authorities' intensified militaryprovocations," KCNA, 28 February 2000.

14 "Report of KPA Navy Command," KCNA, 9June 2004.

15 "Spokesman for KPA Navy Command IssuesStatement," KCNA, 28 March 2008.

16 "Statement Released by Spokesman of DPRKForeign Ministry ", KCNA, 24 November 2010.

17 Nan Kim and John McGlynn, "Factsheet:WEST SEA CRISIS IN KOREA," The Asia-Pacific Journal 49-1-10 (2010).

18 Jae-hoon Lee, "Clinton announces newsanctions against N.Korea," Hankyoreh, 22 July2010.

19 Ha-won Jung, "Minister: Transfer of wartimecontrol may be delayed," JoongAng Ilbo, 25June 2010, "DPRK criticizes U.S. delay intransferring OPCON to South Korea," Xinhua, 1July 2010.

20 Min-seok Kim and Myo-ja Ser, "U.S. willcommand military exercise," JoongAng Ilbo, 17June 2010, Sung-ki Jung, "USFK to retakecontrol over drill with ROK," Korea Times, 17June 2010.

21 Dick K. Nanto, Mark E. Manyin, and KerryDumbaugh, "China-North Korea Relations,"Congressional Research Service, 22 January2010.

22 Rick Rozoff, "U.S. Tightens Missile Shield

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Encirclement Of China And Russia," GlobalResearch, 4 March 2010.

23 Kwon, "Joint drills will be far from NLL,military reports."

24 "Construction of USS George Washington,"US Navy.

25 David Guttenfelder and Jean E. Lee, "US,SKorea launch war games," Washington Post,28 November 2010.

26 "War Maniacs Warned Not to Run Amuck,"KCNA, 15 March 2009.

27 Jung-eon Park, "N.Korea fires artillery shellstoward Yeonpyeong Island, killing twomarines," Hankyoreh, 23 November 2010.

28 There have been suggestions that the USwithdrew from Hoguk after the clash

29 "31st Marine Expeditionary Unit," Wikipedia,"31st Marine Expeditionary Unit home page,"(link), "31st MEU reflects on 2009," US MarineCorps News, 11 December 2009, Rebekka SCpl.. Heite, "31st MEU's long-range raidcapabilities tested," US Air Force (Andersen AirForce Base), 15 April 2010.

30 Tetsuo Kotani, "Tip of the Spear: the 13Missions for US Marines in Okinawa," PacNet43 (2010).

31 Ji-sook Bae, "Seoul not safe from artilleryattacks," Korea Times, 26 November 2010.

32 Alexander Frolov, "Iraq War from a HistoricalPerspective," International Affairs (2010).

33 "U.S. to blame for derailing process ofdenuclearisation on Korean Peninsula," KCNA,12 May 2003.

34 Tim Lister, "North Korea's military aging butsizable," CNN, 25 November 2010.

35 It is difficult to gauge the KPA capacity. The

North has a motive for boasting about it , butthere is also an incentive for the South toexaggerate; "N.Korea 'Has 180,000 SpecialForces Ready to Cross into South'," ChosunIlbo, 16 June 2010.

36 "South Korea-U.S. "Combined ForcesCommand" Should Be Disbanded Forthwith,"KCNA, 10 November 2008.

37 "Former S Korean leader 'rowed' withClinton," BBC, 17 January 2003.

38 Jong-goo Lee, "Interpreter Works 27 Yearsfor Korea-US Summits," Korea Times, 23 June2005.

39 "Seoul Simulated Bombing of N.KoreanNuclear Plant," Chosun Ilbo, 6 June 2005.

40 Bill Gertz, "U.S. speeds attack plans forNorth Korea," Washington Times, 3 November2006.

41 Jae-yun Shim and Jin Ryu, "Roh Tries to CurbHawkish US Policy," Korea Times, 14November 2004, Dong-ho Yoo, "`US MayLaunch Surgical Strikes on NK'," Korea Times,5 October 2004.

42 Niall Ferguson, "America, the fragileempire," Los Angeles Times, 28 February 2010.

43 "Protests across U.S. to demand: "No NewKorean War!"," ANSWER Coalition, 27November 2010.

44 For a good analysis of the NLL in the contextof the Yeonpyeong clash see Stephen Gowans,"US Ultimately to Blame for Korean Skirmishesin Yellow Sea," What's Left, 5 December 2010.

45 Jon M. Van Dykea, Mark J. Valencia, andJenny Miller Garmendia, "The North/SouthKorea Boundary Dispute in the Yellow (West)Sea," Marine Policy 27, no. 2 (2003).

46 "DPRK Takes Merciless Action to Defend

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MDL ", KCNA, 13 November 2009, Sang-hunChoe, "Korean Navies Skirmish in DisputedWaters," New York Times, 10 November 2009.

47 "South Korea deviated from previous rules ofengagement in West Sea clash," Hankyoreh, 11November 2009.

48 Nicole Finnemann, "The Sinking of theCheonan," Korea Insight, 1 April 2010.

49 Van Dykea, Valencia, and Garmendia, "TheNorth/South Korea Boundary Dispute in theYellow (West) Sea."

50 John Barry Kotch and Michael Abbey,"Ending naval clashes on the Northern LimitLine and the quest for a West Sea peaceregime," Asian Perspectives 27, no. 2 (2003).

5 1 "KPA navy command ' s impor tan tcommunique," KCNA, 23 March 2000,"Northern Limit Line rejected," KCNA, 2August 2002.

52 "DPRK Foreign Ministry's Spokesman BlastsU.S. Delaying Tactics in Solution of NuclearIssue," KCNA, 28 March 2008.

5 3 "KPA Panmunjom Mission Clarif iesRevolutionary Armed Forces' Principled Stand,"KCNA, 27 May 2009.

54 Mark Thompson, "There's No Business Likethe Arms Business," Time, 14 September 2010,Richard F. Grimmett, "Conventional ArmsTransfers to Developing Nations, 2002-2009,"Congressional Research Service, 10 September2010, Roula Khalaf and James Drummond,"Gulf states in $123bn US arms spree,"Financial Times, 20 September 2010.

55 Hazel Smith, "North Korea Shipping: APotential for WMD Proliferation?," East-WestCenter: AsiaPacific Issues, no. 87 (2009).

56 "Russia’s Cheonan investigation suspects thatthe sinking Cheonan ship was caused by a mine

in water," Hankyoreh, 28 July 2010.

57 There is an extensive, and growing, literatureon this theme. See, for example: John McGlynn,"Politics in Command: The "International"Investigation into the Sinking of the Cheonanand the Risk of a New Korean War," The Asia-Pacific Journal 24-1-10 (2010), Sakai Tanaka,"Who Sank the South Korean WarshipCheonan? A New Stage in the US-Korean Warand US-China Relations " Asia-Pacific Journal(2010), Seunghun Lee and J.J. Suh, "Rush toJudgment: Inconsistencies in South Korea’sCheonan Report," The Asia-Pacific Journal28-1-10 (2010), Mark E. Caprio, "PlausibleDenial? Reviewing the Evidence of DPRKCulpability for the Cheonan Warship Incident,"The Asia-Pacific Journal 30-4-10 (2010),"Russia’s Cheonan investigation suspects thatthe sinking Cheonan ship was caused by a minein water.", Tae-ho Kwon, "South Koreangovernment impeded Russian team's Cheonaninvestigation: Donald Gregg," Hankyoreh, 4September 2010.

58 "The Best Weapons Are Useless if Strategy IsInept," Chosun Ilbo, 1 December 2010.

59 Keith B. Richburg and William Branigin,"North Korea fires artillery at South Koreanisland of Yeongpyeong," Washington Post, 23November 2010.

60 "Spokesman for KPA Navy Command IssuesStatement."

61 Ibid.

62 "N.Korea Cites S.Korean Drill as Excuse forAttack."

6 3 "S . Korean Accused of DangerousProvocations ", KCNA, 4 June 2010.

64 "KPA Command Vows to Counter S. KoreanDrill by Physical Retaliation," KCNA, 3 August2010.

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65 "Yeonpyeong Island: A history," Telegraph,23 November 2010.

66 "Seoul Warns of 'Severe Punishment' OverN.Korean Attack," Chosun Ilbo, 24 November2010.

67 Richburg and Branigin, "North Korea firesar t i l l e ry a t South Korean i s l and o fYeongpyeong."

68 "N.Korea Cites S.Korean Drill as Excuse forAttack."

69 "Statement Released by Spokesman of DPRKForeign Ministry ".

70 "Panmunjom Mission of KPA Sends Notice toU.S. Forces Side," KCNA, 25 November 2010.

71 Sang-ho Song, "N.K. artillery strikes S.Korean island," Korea Herald, 23 November2010.

72 "Military Knew of N.Korean Artillery MoveBefore Attack," Chosun Ilbo, 26 November2010.

73 "Spies Intercepted Plans for YeonpyeongAttack in August ", Chosun Ilbo, 2 December2010.

74 "Kim Jong-un 'Ordered Attack in EarlyNovember'," Chosun Ilbo 2010.

75 On 3 December it ran a story about aninterview Russian Prime Minister Putin gave inthe United States in which it was reported that‘Putin said that he finds the situation in theKorean Peninsula "very acute and disturbing"’.The headline was ‘N.Korean Attack 'Acute andDisturbing,' Says Putin’.

76 Song, "N.K. artillery strikes S. Koreanisland."

77 Tim Shorrock, "Obama's Only Choice onNorth Korea," The Daily Beast, 24 November

2010.

78 "Lee Blasts N.Korea's 'Inhumane' Attack onYeonpyeong Island," Chosun Ilbo, 30 November2010.

79 Song, "N.K. artillery strikes S. Koreanisland."

80 Min-soon Song, "Back to the basics onnational security," Hankyoreh, 26 November2010.

81 John Feffer, "Transparency Fundamentalists,"World Beat, 30 November 2010.

82 "Seoul Warns of 'Severe Punishment' OverN.Korean Attack."

83 Hyung-jin Kim and Kwang-tae Kim, "SKoreaboost security after NKorea attack," Wistv, 24November (updated 25 November) 2010.

84 "Seoul Warns of 'Severe Punishment' OverN.Korean Attack."

85 Richburg and Branigin, "North Korea firesar t i l l e ry a t South Korean i s l and o fYeongpyeong."

86 Keith B. Richburg, "U.S., South Korea beginmilitary exercises, as China calls for emergencytalks on North Korea," Washington Post, 28November 2010.

87 Mark McDonald, "‘Crisis Status’ in SouthKorea After North Shells Island," New YorkTimes, 23 November 2010.

88 Ian Johnson and Martin Fackler, "ChinaAddresses Rising Korean Tensions," New YorkTimes, 26 November 2010.

89 "Satellite Imagery: Tactical Details of theKorean Artillery Exchange ", Stratfor, 30November 2010.

90 "Hwacha," Link.

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91 "The Devastating Power of N.Korea's MLRSArtillery," Chosun Ilbo, 26 November 2010.

92 "S.Korea to Stage Fresh Firing Drill onYeonpyeong Island," Chosun Ilbo, 30 November2010.

93 "Satellite Imagery: Tactical Details of theKorean Artillery Exchange ".

94 "Spies Intercepted Plans for YeonpyeongAttack in August ".

95 "Extent of NK damage remains uncertain,"Chosun Ilbo, 26 November 2010, "Militarysuggests counterfire caused 'many casualties'in N. Korea ", Yonhap, 2 December 2010, Sung-ki Jung, "Satellite image shows damages in NKartillery site," 2010, "Military DefendsResponse to N.Korean Attack ", Chosun Ilbo, 3December 2010.

96 "Who Is to Wholly Blame for Armed Clash inWest Sea of Korea," KCNA, 27 November 2010.

97 Kim and McGlynn, "Factsheet: WEST SEACRISIS IN KOREA."

98 "S. Korean Bellicose Forces' MilitaryManeuvers Censured ", KCNA, 20 May 2009.

99 Paul Liem, "Honor the Cheonan Dead withPeace," Korea Policy Institute, 3 June 2010, JonVan Dyke, "The Maritime Boundary betweenNorth & South Korea in the Yellow (West) Sea,"38 North, no. (2010).

1 0 0 "KPA Supreme Command I s suesCommunique ".

101 "Obama On North Korea: North Korea'sattack on the South Korean corvette, theCheonan, is unacceptable. ," Voice of America,1 July 2010.

102 I was told by a NZ official in a discussionabout the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents,and the military exercises, that he thought that

both South Korea and America were behavingwith great restraint.

103 Rodger Baker and Colin Chapman, "Agenda:With Rodger Baker," Stratfor.com, 3 December2010.

104 Cablegate, the WikiLeaks repository ofleaked US cables was down when I tried toverify this, presumably because of a denial ofservice attack, and this extract comes fromPeter Lee, "Dear Leader's designs on UncleSam," Asia Times Online, 4 December 2010.

105 Kyoko Hasegawa, "Japan, US to conductbiggest ever military drill," AFP, 2 December2010, Eric Talmadge, "US, Japan begin wargames; China denounces drills," WashingtonPost, 2 December 2010.

106 Myung-bak Lee, "Address to the Nation byPresident Lee Myung-bak on the Shelling ofYeonpyeongdo by North Korea," Cheong WaDae [ROK presidential office], 29 November2010.

107 Leon V. Sigal, "Can Washington and SeoulTry Dealing With Pyongyang for a Change?,"Arms Control Association, November 2010.;Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis, "Review U.S.policy toward North Korea," Washington Post,22 November 2010.; Hecker, "Lessons Learnedfrom the North Korean Nuclear Crises.", ———,"A Return Trip to North Korea’s YongbyonNuclear Complex.", ———, "Return trip toNorth Korea (presentation)". Jack Pritchard andNicole Finneman, "North Korea RevealsUranium Enrichment Facility and Light WaterReactor," Korea Economic Institute, 2December 2010.

108 Timothy Savage, "Demography is Destiny:Why South Korea Hasn’t Seen the Last of theSunshine," 38 North, 12 August 2010.

109 Sei-young Lee, "S.Korea to resume artilleryexercises on Yeonpyeong," Hankyroreh, 2December 2010.

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110 Se-young Lee, "Defense minister-designatevoices support for self-defense air raids,"Hankyoreh, 4 December 2010.

111 Mark McDonald, "South Korean OutlinesMuscular Military Posture," New York Times, 3December 2010.

112 Glenn Kessler, "Analysis: North Korea testsU.S. policy of 'strategic patience'," WashingtonPost, 27 May 2010, John Pomfret, "U.S., alliesworking on new North Korea strategy,"Washington Post, 16 September 2010, JacksonDiehl, "Obama's foreign policy needs anupdate," Washington Post, 22 November 2010.

113 Joel S. Wit, "Don’t Sink Diplomacy," NewYork Times, 18 May 2010, John Feffer, "NorthKorea: Why Engagement Now?," 38 North, 12August 2010, Christine Ahn and Haeyoung Kim,"Sixty Years of Failed Sanctions," Korea PolicyInstitute (2010), Mike Chinoy, "No HostileIntent: A Look Back at Kim Jong Il’s DramaticOverture to the Clinton Administration," 38North (2009), Sigal, "Can Washington andSeoul Try Dealing With Pyongyang for aChange?.", Carlin and Lewis, "Review U.S.policy toward North Korea."

114 This is a major theme of my forthcomingbook tentatively entitled ‘The CheonanIncident: On the brink of war in East Asia’

Click on the cover to order,