The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 9 | Issue 5 | Number 3 | Article ID 3482 | Jan 24, 2011

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Neglected Questions on the “Forgotten War”: South Koreaand the United States on the Eve of the Korean War　　「忘れられた戦争」に関する顧慮されない問題点−−朝鮮戦争前夜の韓国とアメリカ　　

Mark Caprio

Neglected Quest ions on the“Forgotten War”: South Korea andthe United States on the Eve of theKorean War1

Mark E. Caprio

The breakup of the Soviet Union in the early1990s prodded open the archival doors of onceclosed regimes releasing interestinginformation on Soviet-North Korean-Chineserelations during the Cold War. Documentsreleased from these archives contributed newevidence to enrich our understanding of oldquestions.2 One such question concerns theorigins of the Korean War. Documents fromthese archives demonstrate an activecorrespondence between the three communistleaders in Northeast Asia—Josef Stalin, MaoZedong, and Kim Il Sung—regarding theplanning and orchestration of this war foughtprimarily among the two Korean states, theUnited States, and China.3 This new evidencehas encouraged scholars to reformulatefundamental views of this war, particularly itsplace in Cold War history.

The timing of the documents’ release—just asthe Soviet-as-enemy image faded, and the post-Cold War rogue state-as-enemy imageemerged—is intriguing. This new evidence’sapparent support of North Korean culpability inthe war’s origins proved useful to those whoaccused North Korea of once again breachingregional peace by launching nuclear programsand other provocative activities. They

strengthened calls for close vigilance lest thecommunist state launch a second surprise,unprovoked attack against its southernneighbor. The contribution made by thesedocuments, however, is limited to enhancedunderstanding of relations between members ofthe northern triangle (the Soviet Union, China,and North Korea); they contribute little tounderstanding of the southern triangle (theUnited States, Japan, and South Korea). Thiscritical limitation does not enter into theanalyses of many scholars who have used thesedocuments to update understanding of thiswar’s origins. The purpose of this paper is toaddress questions that require attention beforewe can fully understand the causes of theKorean War. These questions demandinformation on the interactions by members ofthe southern triangle prior to the outbreak ofconventional war.

It is well known that South Korean PresidentSyngman Rhee equaled his North Koreancounterpart’s ambitions to use military force toreunite his homeland, and that the UnitedStates was determined to prevent his doing soon his own. Were these ambitions aimed atpreserving the peace, or preserving controlover the war that many perceived as inevitable?If the former, why didn’t the United States(along with the Soviet Union) exert greaterefforts to curtail the increasing outbreaks ofarmed violence that took place between thetwo Korean states? If the latter, did intelligencegathered by agents in North Korea allow theUnited States a window to view Kim Il Sung’s

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intentions? If so, how did it use this informationto form a counter strategy? And, did suchstrategy enter into discussions betweenSyngman Rhee and high-level U.S. officials?

North Korean War Preparations

The greatest impact that this new evidence hashad is in our understanding of the North Korealeadership’s preparation for the war,particularly its efforts to convince Stalin of itsnecessity and the plans it proposed to initiatethe early morning attack on June 25, 1950, thedate that the United States and South Koreamark as the start of the Korean War. Much ofthis new information was contained intelegrams exchanged by the Soviet diplomaticcorps in P’yǒngyang and Stalin in Moscow thatRussian President Boris Yeltsin presented toSouth Korean President Kim Young Sam duringhis state visit to Seoul in June 1994. Contraryto traditional views that charged Stalin withinitiating plans for North Korea’s southernattack, the documents portray Kim Il Sung aseager to initiate war with South Korea andStalin as reluctant to give Kim the green lightto attack. The war’s origins are thus rooted inKorean nationalist sentiment rather than aspart of a Soviet-led global communistrevolution. The documents also suggest thatStalin offered Kim his blessing to attacksometime in late 1949, but cautioned that theSoviet Union would not participate beyondsupplying North Korea with weapons. As aprecautionary step he urged the North Koreanleader to approach Mao for any furtherassistance he needed. Finally, the telegramsdiscuss the North Korean military’s strengthsand weaknesses, and show concern that theUnited States, or even Japan, would offer SouthKorea assistance in fighting the war. KathrynWeathersby, who is responsible for the lion’sshare of the English translations of thesetelegrams, concludes that the documentssupport the “argument that the impetus for thewar came from P’yongyang, not Moscow.” Theydo not, by contrast, sustain the option

(advanced primarily by Bruce Cumings) thatthe attack was “a defensive response toprovocation by the South.”4 But can we refutethis speculation with confidence while so manyquestions regarding the aims and actions of theUnited States and South Korea remainunclear?5

Mao Zedong

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Josef Stalin

Kim Il Sung

A key point is just when Josef Stalin gave Kim Il

Sung the green light to initiate his war with theSouth, and what encouraged the Soviet leaderto support a campaign concerning which heharbored serious doubts of its success.Weathersby and others write that Kim probablyfirst broached the idea in March 1949, duringhis month-long visit to Moscow. Wada Harukinotes mention of such a proposal in a reportauthored by a Russian Foreign Ministry officialon Kim’s meeting with Stalin around thistime.6 Stalin, on this occasion, advisedrestraint; he predicted that the South wouldattack first, thus allowing the North theopportunity to fulfi l l its ambitions bycounterattack.7 Stalin probably anticipated thatthe planned U.S. withdrawal of its troops fromthe peninsula would offer South KoreanPresident Syngman Rhee the opportunity toexpand his frequent incursions at the thirty-eighth parallel into all-out war. Kim’s patience,however, wore thin when the attack did notmaterialize. In August 1949, about six weeksafter the late June withdrawal of U.S. troops, hepresented Soviet Ambassador to North Korea,Terenti Shtykov, a rather modest plan to invadesouth. The North Korean military would occupythe Ongjin Peninsula before moving eastwardacross the 38th parallel toward the ancientcapital of Kaesǒng. Successful operation of thiscampaign would reduce the North Koreanborder along the parallel by 120 kilometers,8 anarea where much of the heavy border conflictsbetween the two Koreas took place.9

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The division of Korea prior to the KoreanWar. Inter-Korean battles took place

primarily toward the far western point ofdivision.

At a later date Kim proposed a second,extended, plan to move south into Seoul beforeeventually making his way down to Korea’straditional southernmost border. North Koreansuccess in this more ambitious plan wascontingent on a number of factors: supportfrom partisan groups embedded in the South;swift completion to ensure that the UnitedStates remained out of the war; and Sovietsupport through the supply of militaryhardware and training of North Korean forces.

Part of Kim’s ambition to initiate a war with theSouth no doubt was driven by nationalistsentiment and the political prize to be gainedby reuniting the peninsula. Yet, his originalplan suggests more, particularly when placedin the context of the heavy fighting thatoccurred along the thirty-eighth parallel. Wecannot overlook the security relief that NorthKorea would gain by successfully eliminatingthe North-South divide that cut through theOngjin peninsula. Developments in late 1949and early 1950 armed Kim with confidence thathe could succeed in a southern attack, and thathe would not have to worry about United States

or Japanese intervention.10

Soviet officials remained skeptical. On August27, 1949, Shtykov submitted to his superiors anegative assessment of Kim’s plan: the UnitedStates would surely assist South Korea byproviding weapons and ammunition; it wouldsurely hurl negative propaganda in thedirection of the Soviet Union; and the NorthKoreans did not hold the decisive militaryadvantage over the South that they needed tosucceed.11 These concerns influenced thecontent of the list of questions that Stalinsubmitted to the North Korean leadershipthrough his embassy on September 11. Heasked Kim to evaluate 1) South Korea’s militarystrength; 2) the ability of the partisan groups inthe South to support the North’s efforts; 3)public opinion in the South regarding aninvasion by the North; 4) the possible reactionby the United States military which remainedin South Korea; 5) the readiness and attitudesof the North Korean military; and 6) thechances for success of his plan.12

Even if the United States did not respond to acrisis on the Korean peninsula with troopdeployment, Soviet leadership believed that itwould help South Korea by supplying ampleweapons, ammunition, and spare parts, whileenlisting help from its allies—most likely theremnants of the war-experienced Japanese—toparticipate in the fighting, as suggested in aMay 1949 warning to Mao Zedong by theSoviet representative to the Chinese CentralParty Meeting, I. V. Kovalev.13

Shtykov, in August 1949, also warned that theUnited States would provide it with weaponsand ammunition in case war broke out on theKorean peninsula. In addition, it would deployJapanese troops to help defend SouthKorea.14 One month later he telegraphedMoscow saying that the United States, feelingthe sting from losing China, would doeverything in its power to support SyngmanR h e e s o a s n o t t o “ l o s e K o r e a ” t o

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communism.15 The possibility of foreign troopsentering the war following an attack by theNorth did not seem to faze Kim. Whenquestioned over the possibility of Japaneseparticipation by Mao in May 1950, heresponded that while he thought the chancesfor this development were low, in the event itdid occur the North Korean military would fightwith even greater ferocity.16

Another key reason for Stalin’s initial hesitancywas the weak state of the North Koreanmilitary. Its successful engagement in even aquick war would require Soviet assistance inthe form of military hardware. The weaponsand munitions that the North Korean militaryhad been using to hold off South Koreanincursions along the parallel were far fromadequate. Earlier, on February 3, 1949,Ambassador Shtykov informed Moscow of thesedifficulties:

The situation at the 38th parallel isone of unrest. South Korean policeand military battalions infringe onthe 38th parallel just about everyday. They also attack North Koreanpatrol sentry posts. There are twobrigades of North Korean patrolbattalions protecting the 38thparallel. These brigades are armedwith just Japanese pistols. As well,these pistols carry but three to tenrounds. They have no automaticweapons. Because North Koreanbrigades face this situation, whenSouth Korean police battalionsattack they cannot counterattack;they can only retreat. They exhaustt h e i r a m m u n i t i o n , w h i c hsometimes falls into the hands oft h e S o u t h K o r e a n p o l i c ebattalions. 1 7

On April 20, 1949 he provided his superiorswith a list of the areas in which the North

Korean military was weak: pilots werereceiving inadequate training; experiencedgenerals were not being appointed; and theSoviet promises to provide equipment remainedunfulfilled.18

From this time, and continuing through June1950, the Soviet Union began increasing theamount of military hardware that they sent toNorth Korea. Yet, even after the war was underway the North Korean government complainedabout inadequate war supplies. On July 3,Shtykov cabled to Moscow a list of militaryneeds that ranged from automatic pistols totrucks.19 The Soviets also promised to enroll anumber of Koreans in their pilot trainingcourse. Unlike the South, which was thebeneficiary of United States gifts of arms, theSoviets required that the North pay for allequipment received.20 This condition theSoviets also levied on the Chinese, as well, byadvancing them credits for future years(1951-2) to pay for the equipment that theSoviet Union provided for them to fight the warin 1950.

The Soviet Union also insisted that the NorthKorean government exhaust all efforts to bringa peaceful solution to the North-South divideprior to initiating war. On June 7, just weeksprior to the outbreak of war, Kim Il Sungadvanced a plan that called for both Koreas toresolve their differences through peacefulmeans. This plan introduced a “DemocraticFront for Attainment of Unification of theFatherland” that called for elections to be heldfrom August 5, and the first session of the“unified supreme legislative organ” to hold itsopening session on Liberation Day, August 15.U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, John Muccio,who cabled this news to the U.S. secretary ofs t a t e , d i s m i s s e d i t a s “ p u r e l ypropaganda.”21 Nonetheless, the two sides didmeet at the 38th parallel with nothingsubstantial resulting from this effort.

Sometime in early 1950 Stalin apparently

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provided Kim with the assurance he needed toadvance south.22 On January 19, 1950 Shtykovreported to Moscow that during a recent visitwith Kim, the intoxicated North Korean leaderhad told him that if Stalin would not receivehim in Moscow to discuss war plans he wouldtry and arrange a meeting with Mao in Beijing.Within two weeks, on January 30, Stalininformed Kim through his ambassador that hewould support his reunification plans, thoughmuch work remained in order to minimizerisk.23 What Kim perhaps did not know was thatMao was in Moscow at the time. Stalin nodoubt used the interval prior to responding toKim’s threat to discuss with the Chinese leaderone way to minimize risk—Chinese militaryassistance. Chen Jian writes, the Chinese“should not have been surprised by the NorthKorean invasion, but they certainly wereshocked by the quick unyielding Americaninvasion.”24

Stalin invited Kim to Moscow and on March 30the Korean leader, along with his vice-premierand foreign minister Pak Hǒnyǒng, traveled tothe Soviet capital where they remained just shyof one month.

North Korean Vice-Premier Pak Hǒnyǒng,1946

The lone document available of the Stalin-Kim

discussions, a summary compiled by the SovietUnion Central Committee’s InternationalDepartment, suggests how changes in theinternational environment, specifically theChinese Communist victory in its civil war,allowed Stalin to consider offering Kim support.It also noted Stalin’s concern, primarily thethreat of the United States coming to SouthKorea’s assistance. Stalin speculated that therecently signed Soviet-Chinese treaty offriendship might keep the United States out ofthe war. He also warned that the NorthKoreans should not expect “direct Sovietparticipation in the war.” They must make“thorough preparation” for the war, and drawup a “detailed plan for the offensive.” It was atthis time that Stalin also stipulated that Kimmake “fresh proposals for peaceful unification.”Their rejection by the South, he reasoned, willopen the door for a just “counterattack.” Kimand Pak reportedly reassured the Soviet leader.The summary paraphrased their responses asfollows:

Kim Il Sung gave a more detailedanalysis of why Americans wouldnot interfere. The attack would beswift and the war would be wonwithin three days; the guerrillamovement in the South has grownstronger and a major uprising canbe expected. Americans won’t havetime to prepare and by the timethey come to their senses, all theK o r e a n p e o p l e w i l l b eenthusiastically supporting thenew government.

Pak Hon-yong elaborated on thethesis of a strong guerri l lamovement in South Korea. Hepredicted that 200,000 partymembers would participate asleaders of the mass uprising.25

One must wonder about the extent to which

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Stalin bought into Kim’s contention that hecould win the war prior to the United Statesentering the battles. Both parties were awareof Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s Januaryspeech that placed the Korean peninsulaoutside of United States interests.26 They werealso, however, aware of the growing influenceof McCarthyism, and the senator’s accusationsagainst those who allegedly “lost China.” CouldTruman afford to watch this war from thesidelines as well? Stalin revealed his doubts byinsisting that Kim and Pak travel to Beijing togain Mao’s consent to come to North Korea’sassistance should the United States enter thewar. Mao could now lend this support as hiscivil war with the Nationalist Chinese (save forthe Taiwan issue) had ended in his favor. Hecould also return to North Korea the battletested soldiers, who later served as shockforces in the Korean War, that Kim had senthim for his war. Finally, the Soviet Union’ssuccessful nuclear test provided evidence of afactor that Stalin thought might deter theUnited States from entering the Koreanbattlefield after the outbreak of war.27

Available documents depict the Soviet leader asstill harboring doubts over North Korea’schances. If so, why then did he endorse Kim’splan? Mao’s success in his war, coupled withKim’s threats in early January, offer room forspeculation over the extent to which the NorthKorean leader’s threat to seek China’s helpmay have influenced Stalin’s calculationsregarding the short-term Korean peninsulaissue, as well as the long-term issue of Asianand global communist leadership. The Sino-Soviet rift is generally dated from the late1950s to early 1960s. But might its seeds havebeen sown earlier? Might Mao’s victory overthe Chinese Nationalists have sent Stalin amessage regarding a future competition forCommunist bloc leadership?

Can we interpret the Soviet leader’s cold

reception toward Mao during his January 1950visit to Moscow as a strategic ploy to remindMao (and possibly others) of his seniorposition?28 Might we see in Kim’s threat to turnto Mao should Stalin refuse to assist him theNorth Korean leader uncovering an opportunityto play the two communist leaders of eachother, as he would successfully do from later inthe decade? And did Stalin’s sudden decision toassist Kim reflect his realization that he could“lose” North Korea to China should he continueto deny Kim support?29

Mao and Stalin: Communist allies?

An Asian Campaign?

The archives demonstrate Stalin, Mao, andKim’s apparent belief that viewed the battlesfor the Korean peninsula should be fought byAsians, be it the Chinese assisting the North orthe Japanese aiding the South. The twosuperpowers would support, but not directlyengage in, the battles. Allen S. Whiting’s ChinaCrosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter theKorean War, long considered the defining workon China’s participation in this war, providesinconclusive evidence regarding China’s role inthe war’s planning, a task Whiting argued wasperformed by the Soviet Union. At the time,

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China was more preoccupied with Tibet andTaiwan than the Korean peninsula. Its primaryinterest in the war lay in the ramifications of aNorth Korean victory that would, Mao claimed,keep a resurgent Japan from returning to theAsian continent and weaken United Statesinfluence in the region.30

Chen Jian’s China’s Road to the Korean War,published over three decades later, exploitsnew archival material to argue that China’s rolein the war’s planning may have been morecritical than previously believed. The turningpoint came after Mao’s October 1949 victoryover the Nationalists, which allowed theChinese leader greater flexibility in assistinghis communist ally. As suggested above, Kim IlSung may also have exploited this turn ofevents in dealing with the Soviets from January1950. Stalin encouraged Mao, perhaps duringhis visit to Moscow, to support North Koreanefforts to liberate the South by providingsoldiers to fight on the peninsula. Stalin did notwant to engage Soviet forces directly in thebattles primarily because of the harm suchparticipation would have on the global image ofthe Soviet Union. Even if Soviet assistancemight help the North Korean military carry theday, i t would cost them more in theirideological war with the United States.31 Stalinfurther claimed that the Soviet Union wasbound by an agreement that it had signed withthe United States to honor the 38th parallel; hedid not want to face accusations of havingbroken this agreement. The Chinese, too, letStalin off the hook by agreeing that this battlewas not one for the Soviets: Stalin could bestsupport the North Korean cause by providingmilitary advice and hardware without having toworry as much about United States propagandaafter the fighting commenced.32

Mao (right) and Zhou Enlai flank Kim inBeijing

The Chinese, however, were free of suchconstraints and thus could join in the fighting ifnecessary.33 Mao believed the likelihood of U.S.participation was slim as, he reasoned, theUnited States would not risk triggering WorldW a r I I I b y c o m i n g t o t h e S o u t h ’ sassistance.34 His confidence was furtherbolstered by the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance,and Mutual Assistance that the two communistgiants signed on January 20, the day that Stalinreceived notice of Kim’s threat to seek Mao’sassistance. The agreements allowed China topurchase a large cache of military hardwarewith the $300 million loan that the SovietUnion provided.35

From the beginning it was understood that theChinese would only join the battle if the UnitedStates intervened. Otherwise, the war was toremain a “Korean war.” Stalin explained this toKim Il Sung during the North Korean leader’svisit to Moscow in March 1950. Kim reportedlyretorted that China’s assistance would beunnecessary as the war would be over withinthree days.36 Mao repeated his promise toprovide military assistance during Kim and PakHǒnyǒng’s visit to Beijing in May 1950. He

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further inquired as to whether it was necessaryfor Chinese troops to amass at the Koreanborder just in case, an offer that Kim politelydeclined as not necessary.37

Chinese troops cross the Yalu River intoKorea

The timing of the Chinese entrance into thewar suggests their motivations to be as muchabout state security as they were to assist theirKorean ally. They did not cross into NorthKorean territory until October 19, 1950, a fullthree months after the United States joined thebattle in early July 1950. This was close to twomonths after the United States first bombedChinese territory on August 27,38 and almosttwo weeks after the United States crossed the38th parallel on October 7. Three weeks later,on October 27, they engaged American troops,but then disappeared for nearly a month. BruceCumings suggests that this strategy wasdesigned to “stop the American march to theYalu.”39 The UN and South Korean militariescontinued to advance. (Cumings’ most recentbook caries a picture of U.S. troops enjoyingThanksgiving dinner on the banks of the YaluRiver.) On November 27, Chinese troops finallybegan the assault that forced enemy forces toretreat. Thus, in spite of the subsequentChinese and North Korean rhetoric of the close

teeth-lips relations that the two peoples haveforged over their long histories, it appears thatthe Chinese entered the fighting only after itbecame apparent that their communist ally waslosing and that the United States might act onit pledge to rollback communism beyond NorthKorean territory, and threaten theirsovereignty as well.

“Long live the Victory of the KoreanPeople’s Army and the Chinese Volunteer

Army!”

The Chinese and Soviets both considered thepossibility that the United States would enlistassistance from its Asian partner, Japan, if itbecame necessary to assist South Korea in thewar. While attending the Chinese Central PartyMeeting in May 1949, Soviet representative I.V. Kovalev transmitted to Moscow the followingmessage from Mao Zedong:

Our Korean comrades think thatthe United States wil l soonwithdraw its troops from theKorean peninsula. However, whatconcerns our Korean comrades isthat Japanese troops will beintermixed among the UnitedStates troops and the South willattack the North…. We feel that

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whether or not Japanese troops areintermixed with South Koreantroops is something that has to beconsidered. And if they do in factjoin then caution must be shown….Even if the US military doesretreat, and the Japanese do notcross over, the North should nothasten to advance south, but waituntil the conditions are moreappropriate. For if it does advancesouth MacArthur would surelysend Japanese military forces andJapanese weapons to Korea.40

Why might the Chinese and Soviets anticipatethe United States, in clear violation of the letterand spirit of Allied wartime and postwaragreements, enlist Japanese participation in awar on the Korean peninsula? Despite theirdefeat, Japan had experienced soldiers whocould conceal their identity should they bei n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o S o u t h K o r e a nbattalions.41 Both communist and nationalistChinese had made use of Japanese militaryskills in their civil war.42 Mao and Stalin nodoubt were also privy to U.S. efforts toremilitarize Japan following the 1948 “reversecourse” in its occupation policy. South KoreanPresident Syngman Rhee’s trip to Tokyo in1948 may also have signaled to North Korea’scommunist allies attempts by the United Statesto coordinate its policies with South Korea andJapan. Rumors had been circulating throughsouthern Korea from early into its post-liberation military occupation that the UnitedStates was “building Japan as a militarypower.” During the 1948 Cheju Island rebellionsome believed that Japanese were actually“participating in the restoration of peace.”43

Following the start of the war the Sovietgovernment, apparently convinced that theUnited States had employed Japanese to fight,directed Andrei Vyshinsky at the UnitedNations in New York to “support the protest of

the government of [North Korea] against theuse by the Americans of Japanese servicemenin the war in Korea.” It further informed theSoviet Ambassador to the United States inWashington that

Japanese servicemen participatedin battles in the area of Seoultogether with American troops,that one Japanese companyparticipated in battles in the areaof Chkholvon (In’chǒn) and that asignificant number of Japanese arefound in the 7th and 8th divisionsof the Rhee Syngman troops.

This constituted “a gross violation of thePotsdam declaration, and also of section III ofthe resolution of the Far Eastern CommissionBasic Policy in relation to Japan afterCapitulation of June 19, 1947, and theresolution adopted on the basis of thisdocument on Prohibition of Military Activity inJapan and Use of Japanese Military Equipmentof February 12, 1948.”44

The social and economic effects of the KoreanWar on Japan are well recorded.45 Much lessresearched is Japan’s military cooperation,which hedged on violation of internationalagreements stipulating Japan’s demilitarizationand of Japan’s postwar constitution that hadjust recently been promulgated. Ōnuma Hisao’sedited volume provides the best summary ofJapan’s participation in this war. In terms ofmilitary-related activities, it is well know thatJapan contributed 25 minesweepers to clearIn’chǒn Harbor just ahead of DouglasMacArthur’s invasion forces in September1950, as well as another 21 such vessels toclear other North Korean ports.46 Less knownare the 21 Japanese who perished during theseoperations. Dozens of other war-deaths werereported among Japanese who providedlogistical support, including civilians who weredispatched with Japan-based American units to

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work as translators and laborers. WhetherJapanese actually engaged in combat remainsunclear. In November 1950, Japan’s Mainichishinbun reported that the North Koreans wereholding one Japanese prisoner but it is notcertain whether this person was a soldier orcivilian. Ōnuma suggests that North Koreanclaims of Japanese in combat might have comefrom their mistaking U.S. Nisei soldiers for“Japanese” soldiers.47 There is also thepossibility that Japan-based Korean volunteerswho were intermixed in American combat unitsmay have been mistaken for Japanesenationals.48 Japanese citizens did volunteer tofight in the war, but it is unclear whether theywere actually accepted. Ōnuma concludes that,although not impossible, to date documentationhas not surfaced which demonstrates thatJapanese served in a military capacity duringthe Korean War.49

The South Korea-United States-JapanTriangle

In 1997 the prominent Cold War historian, JohnLewis Gaddis, concluded that the evidencefrom Soviet and Chinese sources “pin down achain of causation for the Korean War thatrequires neither speculation about ‘hidden’histories nor the insistence that there cannever be unintended consequences.” Noconvincing evidence exists, he held, to supportan argument that “North Koreans, the Soviets,and the Chinese [were] somehow ‘maneuvered’into attacking South Korea,” or that eitherTruman administration officials or GeneralMacArthur were colluding with [Syngman]R h e e t o g e t h i m t o a t t a c k N o r t hKorea.”50 Gaddis, along with others who haveused the evidence gleaned from Russian andChinese archives to confirm North Korean’sunqualified guilt in starting the Korean Warand combat “revisionist” histories of the war,may indeed be correct in drawing thisconclusion. On the other hand, the lack ofrecords does not necessarily absolve the U.S.and South Korea from playing any role in the

outbreak of war. Lack of sufficient informationon a number of important discussions heldamong officials leave a number of unansweredquestions critical to understanding the KoreanWar’s origins.51

Douglas MacArthur with Syngman Rhee

Douglas MacArthur with Yoshida Shigeru

Most important, this research often fails to

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mention, much less critically examine,Syngman Rhee’s aspirations. Nor does itconsider the possible effect that South Korea’sbelligerent actions along the 38th parallel mayhave had on North Korean actions. Documentsdemonstrating Rhee’s interest in engaging theNorth in war predate the earliest record ofKim’s military ambitions by at least one month.On February 8, 1949, the South Koreanpresident met with Ambassador John Muccioand Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall inSeoul. Here the Korean president listed thefollowing as justifications for initiating a warwith the North: the South Korean military couldeasily be increased by 100,000 if it drew fromthe 150,000 to 200,000 Koreans who hadrecently fought with the Japanese or theNationalist Chinese.52

Moreover, the morale of the South Koreanmilitary was greater than that of the NorthKoreans. If war broke out he expected massdefections from the enemy. Finally, the UnitedNations’ recognition of South Korea legitimizedits rule over the entire peninsula (as stipulatedin its constitution). Thus, he concluded, therewas “nothing [to be] gained by waiting.”Muccio replied by advising, as Stalin wouldKim, that Rhee first explore peaceful options.The ambassador also warned that “no invasionof North Korea could in any event take placewhile the United States had combat troops inKorea.”53 With U.S. combat troops initiallyscheduled to leave the peninsula in May (thisdeparture was later pushed back to the end ofJune), did Muccio’s reply leave room for thepossibility of a South Korean invasion after theUnited States military withdrew as Stalinpredicted during his discussions with Kim thefollowing month? Perhaps. Around this timeNorth Korea began to lay mines along its sideof the 38th parallel.54

The United States Commitment to SouthKorea

Ambassador Muccio (right) meeting withPresident Rhee

Key to Rhee’s military policies—be theyoffensive or defensive—was the United States’commitment to the Korean peninsula after itwithdrew its troops. Would it return thesetroops should the peninsula erupt in war?Publicly U.S. government officials, most notablySecretary of State Dean Acheson, issuedstatements that placed Korea outside of theircountry’s defense perimeter in Asia.

The South Korean president voiced his concernover the U.S. commitment in May 1949, duringa discussion with Muccio, noting that theKorean people never thought that the UnitedStates would abandon China. Yet they did.Rhee then offered the ambassador a historylesson on U.S.-Korean relations, informing himthat in the past 45 years the United States hadtwice “abandoned Korea.”

Theodore Roosevelt had done sothe first time and Franklin D.Roosevelt had done so the secondtime at Yalta. These matters…arein the minds of the Korean people.The Americans liberated Korea,and they give us aid, but if theUnited States has to be involved inwar to save Korea, how much can

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Korea count on the Uni tedStates? 5 5

The U.S. ambassador apparently also harboredconcern. In the aftermath of the Achesonspeech, that was followed by other publicstatements by Americans of influence thatplaced the Korean peninsula outside of U.S.national interests, Muccio requested that“those persons particularly charged withdrafting speeches and statements…have thisproblem brought to their attention, so that…Korea may always be included.56 Privately,officials reassured Rhee that the U.S. would notlet his country fall to communism. MacArthur,for example, informed the president at hisinauguration that the United States woulddefend his country as if it were California.Rhee, however, wanted more tangibleassurance. To ensure U.S. assistance, hepushed the United States (unsuccessfully) tonegotiate a defense pact that provided him withoffensive weapons, before finally settling for aMutual-Defense Assistance Act, which the twostates signed in July 1949. Upon withdrawal theU.S. military left South Korea $110 million inmilitary equipment and supplies useful todefend the country should it face attack fromthe north.57

But Rhee wanted offensive weapons, primarilyfighter jets and tanks. He used his Americancontacts to gain U.S. support for his ambitionto unify the peninsula by force. A September30, 1949 letter posted to his biographer andtrusted adviser, Dr. Robert Oliver, withinstructions to forward its contents to PresidentTruman, argued that the time was ripe for anorthern campaign. Quoting Winston Churchill,Rhee implored the U.S. to “give us the toolsand we’ll take care of the rest.” He warned theUnited States not to make Koreans sit tightwith our “arms folded.” If the goal is to “burycommunism once and for all,” then there is nobetter time than the present.”58 His latersignals, as Philip C. Jessup reported after the

ambassador-at-large’s mid-January 1950meeting with Rhee, sent mixed messagesregarding the South Korean president’smilitary aspirations vis-à-vis the North:

[Rhee’s] primary emphasis wasupon the communist menace inKorea and the world. So far as theKorean situation is concerned…they are fighting the guerrillabands throughout South Korea aswell as meeting border foraysalong the 38th Parallel, Severaltimes he made the statement thatthey were prepared to fight to thedeath. With obvious reference tohis pleas for further military aidand probably in defense of hisdomestic security measures, hekept stressing the fact that theinfiltrating communists werekilling large numbers of people inthe area all of the time…. In one ofhis first talks he explained thatthey would have a much betterstrategic defense line if theirforces moved into North Korea andhe expressed confidence that theycould defeat northern opposition.Subsequently, he was careful toadd that they were not planning toembark on any conquest. Thegeneral tone of his statements,however, lends credence to thebelief that he has not objectedwhen the Southern Korean forcesalong the 38th Parallel have fromtime to time taken the initiative.59

The United States may have wished to keepPresident Rhee guessing as to the extent itwould come to South Korean assistance. A plancompleted by the Department of the Army justafter the U.S. military withdrew from thepeninsula, however, suggested the decision tointervene on South Korea’s behalf already

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made. Though rejected by the Joint Chief ofStaffs, the scenario it presented outlined thechain of events that the United States wouldeventually set in motion one year later. Afterthe evacuation of U.S. nationals from thepeninsula, the U.S. would introduce theproblem to the United Nations Security Councilas a “threat to the general peace.” It wouldthen receive UN sanction to form a militarytask force comprised of a consortium of UNmembers to be led by the United States torestore “law and order and restoration of the38th parallel boundary inviolability.” Followingthe successful completion of these steps, theUnited States would establish a joint force inSouth Korea “in view of the emergencysituation.” Finally it would apply the TrumanDoctrine to Korea, which would allow the U.S.to offer assistance to South Koreans as they “oftheir own volition actively oppose Communistencroachment and are threatened by [its]tyranny.”60 This plan’s creation, the reportcont inued, was st imulated based oninformation regarding the Soviet-North Koreanagreement of March 17, 1949 that committedthe Soviet Union to provide North Korea with“necessary arms and equipment to equip eightbattalions of ‘mobile’ border constabulary.”This agreement also committed the Soviets toprovide aircraft for the North Korean air forceonce sufficient personnel had been trained.61

Like Moscow, Washington also advised thatSouth Korea gain the upper hand in thepropaganda war by encouraging peacefulunification by offering to negotiate directlywith the North Korean regime. The authors ofthe contingency plan included one suchencouragement in their report. For SouthKoreans a peace proposal would, in addition toforestalling “military aggression by NorthKorea,” serve as a “psychological weaponplacing national interests, independence, andsovereignty above alleged big power politics,and would lend credence to their truenationalist aspirations.” It would also“represent an effort to settle differences by

pacific means.” North Korea’s anticipatedrefusal to cooperate (noted as an advantage)“would further illustrate North Koreanintransigence and subservience to the USSR.”A North Korean acceptance (listed as adisadvantage) would “introduce Communistelements into the Korean government andmight lead eventually to its subversion bypolitical means.”

This latter concern underlined one pointemphasized by the United States since thebeginning of its occupation of the southern halfof the peninsula: any attempt to implement atrue democracy in Korea would force theUnited States to choose between accepting acoalition (with the very real possibility of anorthern majority government), or finding away to discredit the results. Neither alternativewas attractive to a state that had promised todeliver democracy to the recently liberatedterritory.62 A third option, establishing aseparate political administration in the South,proved to be the more practical alternativeeven though this decision solidified the North-South division.63 The victory by South Korea’sconservative forces, headed by Syngman Rhee,benefited from a left-wing election boycott andapparent election-day fraud.64 In the end, theelection succeeded in excluding radicalelements from participating in the “Koreanstate” government, a development that wouldhave been, according to the above outlined“Memorandum,” “very harmful to U.S.interests.”65 Its support for elections limited tosouthern Korea, and its virtually eliminatingthe powerful leftist force from these elections,raised the potential for war.

U.S. Intelligence: Clues to the War’sOrigins?

The U .S . Depar tment o f A rmy p l andemonstrates a keen awareness of thepossibility of war on the Korean peninsula.Rather than work to pacify the aggression thatplagued the peninsula, it prepared to enter the

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fray. This begs a third question concerning theextent to which U.S. intelligence was able tomonitor North Korean actions and ambitions.How might information regarding NorthKorean intentions have influenced U.S. strategyby, for example, cautioning Rhee to (as Stalinonce cautioned Kim) wait for the other Korea toinitiate the battles? Matthew M. Aid, in a studythat examined U.S. information gathering inKorea prior to the outbreak of war, describesthe efforts as a total failure. This intelligence,he contends, was “able to bui ld up acomprehensive and detailed picture of NorthKorean military organization and capacities.Reams of intelligence data made its way toSeoul from [South Korean] agents and guerillateams operating in North Korea.” However,“Tokyo and Washington placed little credencein what the Korean Military Advisory Group(KMAG) and the American military attaches inSeoul were passing on.”6 6 He notes the“prolific” amount of information accumulatedby the Korean Liaison Offices (KLO), which hadsixteen operatives reporting from North Korea(as opposed to four by the CIA).

Between 1 June 1949 and 25 June1950, KLO filed a total of 1,195reports , 417 of which weresubmitted in the six monthsimmediately preceding the NorthKorean invasion. According to[General Charles A.] Willoughby,these reports covered all aspects ofthe North Korean mil i tary,including preparations for theinvas ion o f the South , theformation of new combat units,military movements, militarytraining and preparedness, thedevelopment of the North Koreanair force, as well as Soviet andChinese military assistance to theNorth Korean People’s Army.67

We are still left in the dark as to why the U.S.

apparently did not exploit this information tobetter prepare itself for a war whose arrivalwas hardly as “sudden” as U.S. officialsdescribe it. Was the U.S. “failure” to act on thisintelligence truly a result of problems ofcommunication or outright incompetence, orwas it a planned “failure” consistent with acalculated strategy?

Much of this information is found in thebiweekly Intelligence Summary North Koreaput out by the United States Armed Forces inKorea (USAFIK). In addition, from early 1948these reports began a section titled “signs ofwar” that reported rumors of imminent all-outattack by the North. These rumors intensifiedas U.S. forces prepared to withdraw from thepeninsula. One such “rumor,” that came fromthe wife of the director of a Soviet hospital inWǒnsan in January 1950, accurately informedthat the a t tack wou ld come in June1950.68 However, this prediction was but one ofmany that, coupled with warnings issued bySyngman Rhee to enlist U.S. military support,no doubt came to be written off by theAmerican government as “wolf calls.” But thereality was that, as documented in G-2 PeriodicReports, just about every week prior to whatSecretary of State Dean Acheson anticipated tobe a “weekend of comparative rest”69 witnessedsome kind of military confrontation by forcessituated along the 38th parallel.70

Acheson does not offer reasons as to why theweekend of June 24-25 would have been anydifferent from other weekends that witnessedfighting along the 38th parallel. He also makesno mention of what was behind the efforts of aState Department consultant, John FosterDulles, who travelled to Seoul less than a weekbefore the war’s outbreak to advise the SouthKorean National Assembly that they “were notalone.”

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John Foster Dulles at the 38th parallel inJune 1950

We also do not know what Dulles and Rheediscussed during this visit, as documentationfor yet another secret meeting between thepresident and a key U.S. official remainsunavailable.71 We learn through Russiansources that South Korea began to assemblemilitary forces in greater numbers at this verytime, a move that (as Terenti Shtykov reveals) afrantic Kim Il Sung interpreted as the Southhaving learned of his invasion plans. The NorthKorean leader informs Stalin through hisambassador that he wishes to extend the attackacross the entire 38th parallel.

The Southerners have learned thedetails of the forthcoming advanceof the [Korean People’s Army]. As aresult, they are taking measures tostrengthen the combat of theirt roops . De fense l i nes a rereinforced and additional units areconcentrated in the Ongj indirection…. Instead of a localoperation at Ongjin peninsula as aprelude to a general offensive, KimIl Sung suggests an overall attackon 25 June along the whole frontline.

Stalin promptly responded positively to thischange of plans.72

Assuming this information to be accurate, butacknowledging the possibil ity of Kimfabricating a threat to justify extending theattack, raises the question of how and whenSouth Korea (and the United States) learned ofNorth Korea’s plans. The United States securedinformation on North Korea from a wide varietyof sources. The reports often provided generalinformation on the kinds of people whoprovided this intelligence. The informantsincluded North Korean and Soviet deserters,anti-Japanese guerrillas, Japanese laborers, anda former interpreter for the North KoreanPeople’s committee. Occasionally they offerednames and information on how the informantsgathered information. Former batterycommander Kim Kwan Suk, for example,traveled throughout Hwanghae Province beforecrossing into South Korea to provideinformation gleaned from his observations andfrom former classmates in artillery units.73

Having information on the North’s plans wouldhave placed the United States in a betterposition to control Rhee’s desires to initiate anorthern campaign simply by cautioning him towait until the enemy made its move.74 As wasthe case with the Soviet Union, the UnitedStates also wanted to avoid being seen as partyto the Korean force that initiated a war on thepeninsula; thus it refused Rhee the weapons hedesired and warned him against attackingnorth. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, theUnited States did not have to concern itselfwi th South Korea jumping to a r iva lsuperpower should it refuse to assent to itsattack plans. If war came South Korea would bedependent on the United States not only forassistance and strategy, but also for theoffensive weapons that the U.S. rather thanSouth Korea would control. To the U.S. credit itdid not provide Rhee with these weapons.However, without further information wecannot determine whether its intentions were

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to maintain a prayer for peace, or to maintaincontrol over the weapons (and thus the war)after this peace was broken. The Soviet Union,to the contrary, informed Kim quite early that itwould provide North Korea with weapons, butwould not fight his battles, regardless of whoinitiated the war. The North Korean leader thushad nothing to gain by waiting, and everythingto lose should (as he expected) the South attackfirst. The telegrams from the Russian archivesprovide clues as to North Korea’s intentions,particularly as Kim discussed with Stalin inMoscow. Was the United States privy to thecontent of these intentions? Might they haveentered into the discussions between Rhee andU.S. officials? A fuller, more comprehensive,understanding of the origins of the Korean Waris prevented by our inability to answer thesequestions.

Dr. Rhee Goes to Tokyo. But Why?

One such discussion might possibly have takenplace on February 16-17, 1950, right afterStalin informed his ambassador in P’yǒngyangto tell Kim that he would help him, and just onemonth before Kim traveled to Moscow to conferwith Stalin. On these days Syngman Rhee madehis second visit to Tokyo as president, the firstcoming in October 1948 when he paidMacArthur a courtesy call in return for thegeneral’s attendance at his inauguration theprevious August. Rhee would make a third visitin January 1953, after MacArthur had beenrecalled to the United States. The SouthKorean president and MacArthur spent muchtime together during these two visits. Theydrove in together from the airport, and Rheewas MacArthur’s guest at U.S. occupationheadquarters during his stay. Rhee’s facility inEnglish eliminated the need for interpretation,and thus one potential resource for informationon the content of their discussions. No doubtthe two men (perhaps when joined by JapanesePrime Minister Yoshida Shigeru) discussedJapan-Korea relations. Given the circumstanceson the Korean peninsula at the time of their

meetings we might also suspect that theyexchanged ideas on the very real possibility ofall out war on the Korean peninsula.

Rhee and MacArthur meet at HanedaAirport (Lafayette College Libraries)

Rhee verified to his host country’s media thatthe former, but not the latter, topic was indeeddiscussed. The Japan Times quoted thepresident as follows:

No special problem, e i thereconomic or military, is connectedwith my present visit. However,one of the questions in my mind iswhether there is any possibility ofimproving the relations betweenKorea and Japan. I shall be glad todiscuss this with Gen. MacArthuras well as some high officials of theJapanese government.75

Statements that the president made uponreturning to Seoul suggest that military issuesindeed entered into his discussions with U.S.officials. The Stars and Stripes quoted him aspromising “to recover North Korea even though‘some of our friends across the sea tell us thatwe must not cherish thoughts of attacking the

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foreign puppet who stifles the liberties of ourpeople in the north.”76 His more privatecorrespondence with Robert Oliver revealsRhee’s broaching the weapons issue as well.The theme of Rhee’s three-page letter to Oliverwas South Korea’s “military problem.” Here heoutlined the defensive reasons for South Koreaneeding a more advanced air force and navy,and petitioned the United States StateDepar tmen t t o r ev i se i t s “p resen tinterpretation of the American perimeter sothat it includes Korea.”:

When I was in Tokyo I made thestatement that Russia is supplyingthe Northern forces and thatRussia is pressing them to invadethe South as soon as “the dustsettles in China”. You know thatthere was nothing new in thatstatement because the Sovietshave continually supplied theNorth. However, at the presentmoment the Soviets do not wish tobe accused of this complicity, andthis is exactly why I made thestatement. As a result, the orderhas been given from Moscow towithdraw all Soviet forces from theNorth dur ing the next twomonths. 7 7

This letter demonstrates Rhee’s knowledge ofNorth Korean-Soviet interactions and, possibly,the Stalin-Kim discussions, although Rheenoted that at this point Moscow had yet to give“North Koreans the ‘green light’ to invade theSouth.” He argued that Moscow had equippedits Korean partner far better than the UnitedStates had equipped his army, thus limiting theSouth Korean military’s ability to withstand aprobable North Korean advance.78 From mediareportage and Rhee’s correspondence we canguess that the president’s discussions in Tokyocentered most prominently on the growingtension between the two Koreas. They further

suggest that his attempt to gain the militaryequipment and blessing he needed to advancenorth to have been rebuked.79 But for whatreasons? While the few documents available onKim’s meeting with Stalin offer summaries ofboth leaders’ thoughts, we are left totally in thedark as to how MacArthur addressed Rhee’smilitary requests. Did Stalin’s decision to assistKim enter their conversations? And if so, didthe two men discuss strategy to counter thispotential? Did MacArthur repeat his promise todefend South Korea, as he would California, if(when?) the North did indeed attack? Moredefinitive answers for such questions regardingthese prewar meetings are required before wecan close the book on our understanding of theKorean War. Indeed, they constitute coreunanswered questions regarding the origins ofthis war.

Examination of the documents released fromthe Russian archives since 1994 instruct us onthe ambitions harbored by North Koreanpremier Kim Il Sung to unify the Koreanpeninsula by war. Those who deem thisevidence sufficient to find the North Koreangovernment alone responsible for initiating thebattles that left millions dead may indeed proveto be correct. I have argued here thatunanswered questions prevent us from drawingthis conclusion. First, the telegrams that havedrawn so much attention offer little in the wayof the context in which they were sent. Werehis ambitions to attack the South, for example,motivated simply by the goal of reunifying thepeninsula? Eliminating a security hazard? Orboth? Second, they also tell us very little aboutdevelopments in South Korea. We know thatSyngman Rhee equally had ambitions to unifythe peninsula by force. What did he hope togain by conducting limited attacks (as opposedto initiating an all out attack) to the north? Howdid these attacks enter into Rhee’s discussionswith U.S. officials?

Sixty years later fighting and death returned tothe vicinity of the Ongjin peninsula, the region

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where most of the border insurrectionsoccurred prior to the outbreak of conventionalwar in June 1950. This aggression reminds usthat the Korean War has yet to pass intohistory. It has survived the past six decades asa limited war quite capable of provokingtension, occasional violent and deadlyaltercations, and erupting again into a majorwar. Treatment of the most recent examples,the sinking of the Chǒnan corvette and theshelling of Yǒnpyǒng Island, have rejuvenatedCold War geopolitical divisions as members ofthe northern triangle question interpretationsby the southern triangle on North Koreanculpability. The geographic context of bothincidents is their location in highly contestedwaters around islands that are above theSouth-North division line. It is the waterwayleading to these is lands in the WestSea—determined by the Northern Limit Line(NLL) drawn by the United States withoutNorth Korean input, rather than the islandsthemselves, that the North Koreans contest.

The NLL (depicted in green) and the DMZ(map in insert)

The political context is a state ostracized bymuch of the international community, partly byits own doing but more so by its adversarialrelations with the United States. Theseconflictual relations contribute to the economic

context that prevents North Korea fromparticipating in the economic institutions thatcould (as South Korea experienced) lift it fromdesperate poverty. Like the origins of theKorean War, answers to questions regardingorigins and (here) prevention of futurealtercations are products of a multi-dimensionalcontext that extends beyond views of NorthKorea as sole culprit, that considers thepresent from its historical context of post-liberation division, war, and oppression. Theshort-term tragedy of the Korean War, found inthe millions of victims it claimed, is dwarfed bythe long-term tragedy wrought by the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union’s failure to acceptresponsibility for their role in dividing theKorean peninsula over the five years thatpreceded this war, and the six decades thathave transpired since its eruption.

Mark E. Caprio is a professor of Korean historyat Rikkyo University in Tokyo and a JapanFocus associate. He is the author of JapaneseAssimilation Policy in Colonial Korea,1 9 1 0 - 1 9 4 5(http://www.amazon.com/dp/0295989017/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20). He can be reached atcaprio@rikko.ac.jp. He wrote this article forThe Asia-Pacific Journal.

R e c o m m e n d e d c i t a t i o n : M a r k E .Caprio, Neglected Questions on the “ForgottenWar”: South Korea and the United States onthe Eve of the Korean War, The Asia-PacificJournal Vol 9, Issue 5 No 3, January 31, 2011.

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This article is part of a seriescommemorating the sixtieth anniversary ofthe Korean War.Other articles on the sixtieth anniversary of theUS-Korean War outbreak are:• Steven Lee(http://japanfocus.org/-Steven-Lee/3457), TheUnited States, the United Nations, and the SecondOccupation of Korea, 1950-1951.• Heonik Kwon(http://japanfocus.org/-Heonik-Kwon/3413),Korean War Traumas.• Han Kyung-koo(http://japanfocus.org/-Han-Kyung_Koo/3414),Legacies of War: The Korean War – 60 Years On. Additional articles on the US-Korean War include:• Mel Gurtov(http://japanfocus.org/-Mel-Gurtov/3428), FromKorea to Vietnam: The Origins and Mindset ofPostwar U.S. Interventionism.• Kim Dong-choon(http://japanfocus.org/-Kim-Dong_choon/3314),The Truth and Reconciliation Commission ofKorea: Uncovering the Hidden Korean War• Tessa Morris-Suzuki(http://japanfocus.org/-Tessa-Morris_Suzuki/3193),Remembering the Unfinished Conflict: Museumsand the Contested Memory of the Korean War.• Sheila Miyoshi Jager(http://japanfocus.org/-Sheila_Miyoshi-Jager/3477),Cycles of History: China, North Korea, and theEnd of the Korean War.• Tim Beal (http://japanfocus.org/-Tim-Beal/3459),Korean Brinkmanship, American Provocation, andthe Road to War: The Manufacturing of a Crisis.• Wada Haruki(http://japanfocus.org/-Wada-Haruki/3458), Fromthe Firing at Yeonpyeong Island to aComprehensive Solution to the Problems ofDivision and War in Korea.• Nan Kim(http://japanfocus.org/-John-McGlynn/3452) withan introduction by John McGlynn, Factsheet: WestSea Crisis in Korea.

Notes

1 The quality of an earlier version of this paperwas enhanced by generous comments providedby Mark Selden, and from questions anddiscussion following my presentation of thismaterial at a seminar sponsored by the

Institute of Asian Research at the University ofBritish Columbia in February 2005. Its revisionhas benefited from painfully critical, butthought provoking, observations provided bytwo anonymous readers from an earliersubmission for publication.

2 In addition to research that exploitsdocuments related to the origins of the KoreanWar (the topic of this paper), Soviet archiveshave also encouraged studies on Kim Il Sung’spost-Korean War consolidation of power,including Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea:The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005)and Balázs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in theKhrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations andthe Roots of North Korean Despotism,1953-1964 (Stanford, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, 2005). In addition, Aleksandr Fursenkoand Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War:The Inside Story of an American Adversary(New York: W. W Norton, 2006), is ofperipheral interest to this history.

3 The most important studies that considerthese documents include Sergei N. Goncharov,John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, UncertainPartners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993);Jian Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War:T h e M a k i n g o f t h e S i n o - A m e r i c a nConfrontation (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1994); William Stueck, The Korean War:An International History (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1995); WilliamStueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A NewDiplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); KathrynWeathersby, Soviet Aims in Korea and theOrigins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: NewEvidence from the Russian Archives(Washington, D. C.: Woodrow WilsonInternational Center for Scholars, 1993); Kathryn Weathersby, “‘Should We Fear This?’:Stalin and the Danger of War With America,”Working Paper #39, Cold War International

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History Project (July 2002); KathrynWeathersby, “The Soviet Role in the KoreanWar: The State of Historical Knowledge,” inThe Korean War in World History, edited byWilliam Stueck (Lexington: The UniversityPress of Kentucky, 2004); A. V. Torcov, Chōsensensō no nazo to shinjitsu (Truth and riddles ofthe Korean war), trans. Shimatomai Nobuo andKim Sǒngho (Tokyo: Soshinsha 2001); andWada Haruki, Chōsen sensō zenshi (Thecomplete history of the Korean War) (Tokyo:Iwanami shoten, 2002); Pak Myǒngrim, Hangukchǒnjaeng ǔi palpar kwa kiwon (The Outbreakand Origins of the Korean War), 2. vols. (Seoul:Nanam, 2003); So Chinchǒl, Hanguk chǒnjaengǔi kiwon: “Kukje kongsanchuǔi” ǔi ǔmmo (TheOrigins of the Korean War: A Plot Conspiracy of“International Communism”) (Seoul: WongwanTaehakkyo, 1997).

4 Kathryn Weathersby, “New Findings on theKorean War,” CWIHP Bulletin #3 (Fall 1993) 1,14-18.

5 Indeed, most scholarly works on the KoreanWar’s origins stop short of answering thequestion of which Korea fired the first shot inthe war. Cumings, The Origins of the KoreanWar: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990),766; John Merrill, The Peninsular Origins of theKorean War (Newark: University of DelawarePress, 1989), 13; Stueck, The Korean War, 10.

6 Kathryn Weathersby, “To Attack, or Not toAttack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude toWar,” CWIHP Bulletin #5 (Spring 1995) 1, 2-9;Wada Haruki, Chōsen sensō zenshi, 82, fn 36.

7 Weathersby, “Should we Fear This?,” 4.

8 Torcov, Chōsen sensō no nazo to shinjitsu, 61. Kim Il Sung met with the Russian Ambassadoron August 12 and 14. A message sent byShtykov to Moscow began by acknowledgingthat the peaceful unification option is clearlydead due to Seoul’s unwillingness to accept itsterms. Thus, he continued, there is no other

option than to unify the peninsula by force.

9 Bruce Cumings (Origins of the Korean War,388-98) details the border fighting.

10 These developments include the SovietUnion’s successful test of an atomic weapon,the Communist Chinese victory over theNationalist Chinese army, and finally a positiveresponse from the Soviet Union and Chinaregarding its plan.

11 Torcov, Chōsen sensō no nazo to shinjitsu,61.

12 Ibid. 63-64. See also Weathersby, “To Attack,or Not to Attack?” Kim responded to Stalin’sconcerns on September 12-13 in a meeting withG. I . Tonk in , the Sov ie t d ip lomat icrepresentative to P’yongyang.

13 Torcov, Chōsen sensō no nazo to shinjitsu,104-105.

14 Ibid., 61. The Soviet ambassador offered thiswarning on August 27.

15 Ibid., 69.

16 Ibid., 112.

17 Ibid., 30.

18 Ibid., 36.

19 Ibid., 124.

20 Wada, Chōsen sensō zenshi, 98; Cumings,The Origins of the Korean War, 446.

21 Ambassador Muccio to the Secretary of State,June 9, 1950 in Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates (FRUS)VII (Korea) (Washington, D.C.:United States Government Printing Office,1976), 98-99. North Korea’s track record forpeace initiatives was not good. One effort inApril 1948 that was attended by two southernconservative leaders, Kim Ku and Kim Kyusik,was able to agree on a platform for peaceful

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unification. However, it cut off southern powersoon after the two Kims returned and thusraised doubt over the North’s sincerity. Thefailure of this last minute effort to preventsouthern Korean elections smoothed the pathfor Syngman Rhee’s rise to power. See Merrill,The Peninsular Origins of the Korean War,75-77.

22 Weathersby writes that Stalin initiallyaccepted Kim’s limited offensive to capture theOngjin peninsula, but later changed his mindafter realizing the impossibility that thisincursion would remain limited. North Koreanactions would surely initiate fighting across thepeninsula. Weathersby “Should We Fear This?,”7.

23 Torcov, Chōsen sensō no nazo to shinjitsu,88-89, 92.

24 Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 126.

25 Weathersby “Should We Fear This?,” 10. PakHǒnyǒng, a leader of the southern KoreanWorkers’ Party who had fled north in October1946 on the heels of General John R. Hodge’ssuppression of the party, paid with his life inthe postwar purges of 1955 that allowed Kim IlSung to strengthen his totalitarian rule. Kimblamed him for the war’s ultimate failure whensouthern partisans did not rally following theNorth’s push south.

26 For discussion of Dean Acheson’s speech seeCumings, Origins of the Korean War, chapter13. Weathersby notes that the British spy,Donald McLean, had convinced the Soviets thatthe time was ripe for a northern attack onSouth Korea. Weathersby “Should We FearThis?,” 11.

27 Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History(New York: The Modern Library, 2010), 111.

28 For an interesting account of the initialStalin-Mao meeting in January 1950 seeGoncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain

Partners, chapter 3.

29 Chin O. Chung provides a history of thistriangular relationship from the 1960s in hisP’yongyang Between Peking and Moscow(University: University of Alabama Press,1978). Robert P. Simmons considers the pre-Korean War strains that characterized Soviet-Chinese relations in his The Strained Alliance:Peking, P’yǒngyang, Moscow and the Politics ofthe Korean Civil War (New York: The FreePress, 1975), chapters 3 and 4.

30 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: TheDecision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1960), 45-46.

31 In the end, however, Soviet pilots, outfitted inChinese military uniforms, did participate inthe Korean War.

3 2 O Ch’unggun argues that the Sovietsboycotted the Security Council at the time ofthe outbreak of war out of fear of such criticismby the United States should they veto theresolution to come to South Korea’s assistance.O Ch’unggun, “Han’guk chǒnjaeng kwa Soryǒnǔi yuen anjǒn pojangi sahǒe kyǒlsǒk: hosarokkutnan ‘sut’allin ǔi silli oekyo’” [The KoreanWar and the Soviet Union’s boycott of theUnited Nations Security Council: A vainattempt resulting in Stalin’s ‘loss’ diplomacy],Han’guk chǒngchi hakhǒe boje 35, no. 1(Spring 2001): 105-23.

33 This opinion was part of a discussion thattook place between the North Korean andChinese leaders on May 15, 1950 in Beijing, asrecounted by Pak Hǒnyǒng in Torcov, Chōsensensō no nazo to shinjitsu, 113.

34 Mao made this assumption as part of anexchange of letters between Kim Il Sung andChinese officials in May 1950, as reported byShtykov to Soviet officials. Ibid., 108-109.

35 Ibid., 83-84. It was during this visit that Kimsent Kim Kwang-hyop to Moscow to meet with

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Mao to request that the Chinese leader releaseKorean soldiers who had fought in China’s civilwar (ibid., 88).

36 Wada Haruki, Chōsen sensō zenshi, 111.

37 Ibid., 112.

38 On this day the United States Air forcestrafed Antung. See Stone, The Hidden Historyof the Korean War, 90-92. Stone contends thatthe first Chinese mission of 5,000 Chinesetroops was primarily to protect the dams alongthe Yalu River from U.S. attacks (Ibid., 154-55).Alan Whiting adds that the United Statesoffered compensation for this “mistake,” buttwo days later Beijing again accused it of firingon Chinese fishing boats in the Yalu River.Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, 97.

39 Cumings, The Korean War, 25. By this timeSouth Korean troops had pushed to withinthirty miles, and the United Nations forces towithin sixty miles, of the Chinese border.Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War,154.

40 Torcov, Chōsen sensō no nazo to shinjitsu,pp. 104-5.

4 1 The racial factor entered into Mao’sreasoning that Chinese sharing the same haircolor as Koreans made their participation moreappropriate than the Soviet military. Wada,Chōsen sensō zenshi, 47.

42 Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, “Occupation Policyand Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations: SeveringEconomic Ties,” in Democracy in OccupiedJapan: The U.S. Occupation and JapanesePolitics and Society, edited by Mark E. Caprioand Yoneyuki Sugita (London; Routledge,2007), 202-204. Peter Lowe notes thatMacArthur sent Japanese “volunteers” toTaiwan to assist the Kuomintang in his Originsof the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986),114-15.

4 3 Commanding off icer John R. Hodgeaddressed both of these rumors in “Jacobs toSecretary of State: Press Release by GeneralJohn R. Hodge” (June 16, 1948), Internal Affairsof Korea, 1945-1949, vol. 9 (Seoul: Arǔm,1995), 493.

4 4 Kathryn Weathersby, “New RussianDocuments on the Korean War,” CWIHPBulletin 6, 7 (Winter 1995/6), 48.

45 See Roger Dingman, “The Dagger and theGift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan,”Journal of East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1993):29-55; Reinhard Drifte, “Japan’s Involvement inthe Korean War,” in The Korean War in History,edited by James Cotton and Ian Neary (AtlanticHigh lands , N . J . : Humani t i es PressInternational, 1989), 120-34; and MichaelSchaller, “The Korean War: The Economic andStrategic Impact on Japan, 1950-1953,” in TheKorean War in World History, edited by Stueck,145-76.

46 Drifte, “Japan’s Involvement in the KoreanWar,” 130. North Korea sunk two of thesevessels, another one struck a mine, and yetanother ran aground.

47 Japanese-Americans accounted for about 200deaths, with about 5,000 participating in theKorean War. David Halberstam writes of oneJapanese American, Gene Takahashi, who wastaken prisoner. When asked to shout out tobring in other prisoners he shouted out inJapanese an opposite message—don’t come in.Halberstam offers that his actions perhaps sentNorth Koreans the false message that Japanesewere fighting among the UN forces. DavidHalberstam, The Coldest War: America and theKorean War (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 415.

48 Soon after the war broke out, the Japan-based Mindan group issued a cal l forvolunteers to fight in the United Nations forces.Four Japanese were among the 3,000 Koreanswho answered this call. According to ReinhardDrifte “thousands of Japanese young people

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attempted to enlist in the American forces.”Drifte, “Japanese Involvement in the KoreanWar,” 129.

49 Ōnuma Hisao, “Chōsen sensō e no Nihon nokyōryoku” (Japanese cooperation in the KoreanWar), in Chōsen sensō to Nihon, edited byŌnuma Hisao (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2006),73-119.

5 0 John Lewis Gaddis , We Now Know:Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1997), 76-77.

51 These include discussions held betweenSyngman Rhee and Douglas MacArthur inOctober 1948 and February 1950, and betweenRhee and John Foster Dulles days before theoutbreak of conventional war in June 1950.

52 Rhee acknowledged that the proposal to useJapanese-trained Koreans in the South Koreanmilitary had drawn criticism from a MajorGeneral John B. Coulter, who voiced concernsover the moral problems this might cause. TheSouth Korean president, however, did not seethis as a factor of significance. “Memorandumof Conversation by the Secretary of the Army(Royall)” (February 8, 1949), FRUS VII (FarEast and Australia), 956.

53 Ibid., 956-58. This is just one of many timesin which the South Korean president openlyvoiced an interest in attacking North Korea. Healso broached the idea in February 1950 whilein Tokyo, and in a March 1, 1950 speech givenbefore United Nations Commission on Korea(UNCOK). Cumings, The Origins of the KoreanWar, 481.

54 See Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War,392.

55 “Memorandum of Conversation, by theAmbassador in Korea (Muccio)” (May 2, 1949),FRUS VII (Far East and Australia), 1003-1005. Rhee’s reference to Theodore Roosevelt recallsthe American president’s inaction (and

encouragement) of Japan’s colonial subjugationof the Korean peninsula from 1905. FranklinRoosevelt “betrayed” Korea by pushing for atrusteeship administration over the Koreanpeninsula at his 1945 meeting with the Sovietsin Yalta.

56 “The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to theAssistant Secretary of East Asian Affairs (Rusk)(May 25, 1950), FRUS VII (Korea), 88-89.

57 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War,473.

58 Torcov, Chōsen sensō no nazo to shinjitsu,53-56 provides a Japanese translation of thisletter.

59 “Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large,Philip C. Jessup” (January 15, 1950), FRUS VII(Korea), 1.

60 “Memorandum by the Department of theArmy to the Department of State” (June 27,1949), FRUS VII (Far East and Australia),1047-1048. The Joint Chiefs of Staff deemedpoints three and four to be impractical. Ibid.,1055-1057.

61 Ibid., 1049. Here the terms of the March1949 Soviet-North Korean agreement appear tobe exaggerated. Bruce Cumings cites CIAreports claiming that the equipment that theSoviets sold to the North Koreans was dated,and not useful once the United States enteredthe war. Cumings, The Origins of the KoreanWar, 445-46.

62 “Memorandum by the Department of theArmy to the Department of State,” 1050. Anumber of studies suggest that had peninsulaelections been held politicians of leftist suasionwould have carried the day. The Sovietambassador in P’yǒngyang quoted a NorthKorean statement that South Korea waspreparing to invade because it could notsurvive a peaceful unification. As many as 80percent of Koreans supported the North Korean

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system. Torcov, Chōsen sensō no nazo toshinjitsu, 40. Though the North Koreanestimate may have been exaggerated, even theUnited States apparently recognized thatconservatives would lose a general election.

63 The southern Koreans held elections on May10, 1948 and initiated the South Korean stateon August 15, 1948. The northern Koreansdeclared the birth of North Korea onSeptember 9, 1948.

64 According to Kong Imsun, Syngman Rhee hadto resort to forgery to get his list of supportersaccepted by the United Nations’ Commissionafter he missed the deadline. See her “Suk’aendŭl Pankong: Yoryu myǒngsa MoYunsuk ŭi ch’inil kwa pankong ŭi ichungchu”(Scandal and Anticommunism: The Duplicity ofMo Yunsuk as ‘Female Intellectual,’ Pro-Japanese, and Anti-Communist), Han’gukkundae munhak yǒngu 17 (2008): 184.

65 “Memorandum (UNCOK and U.S. Policy atthe Fourth General [UN] Assembly)” (August20, 1949) FRUS (Far East and Australia), 1073.We must also note that John Hodge had bannedthe Southern Korean Communist Party from1946, thus exiling communists such as PakHǒnyǒng to the North.

66 Matthew M. Aid, “US Humint and Comint inthe Korean War: From the Approach of War tothe Chinese Intervention,” in Richard J. Aldrich,Gary D. Rawnsley, and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley,eds., The Clandestine Cold War in Asia,1945-1965: Western Intelligence, Propaganda,and Special Operations (London: Frank Cass,2000), 32. Wada Haruki reports that SouthKorean agents were organized in everynorthern province (Wada, Chōsen sensō zenshi,49).

67 Aid, “US Humint and Comint in the KoreanWar,” 34.

68 The same informant also stated that therailroad connecting North Korea and Russia

would be completed by April of this year. G-2Periodic Report (February 10, 1950), HQ,USMAGIK G-2 Periodic Report (1949. 11.23-1950. 6. 15) (Chunchon: Institute of CultureStudies, Hallym University, 1989), 293.

69 Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York:W.W. Norton, 171), 14.

70 These reports began listing the number ofcasualties suffered by the two militaries, aswell as by civilians, from April 1950. BetweenApril 13-20, 1950, for example, it listed as KIA(killed in action) and (MIA) missing in action17/106 South Korean forces, 130/20 NorthKorean forces, and 55/3 civilians. HQ,USMAGIK G-2 Periodic Report, (April 20,1950), 472.

71 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War,503.

72 Shtykov to Stalin, June 21, 1950, Torcov,Chōsen sensō no nazo to shinjitsu, 119.Translation from Weathersby, “Should We FearThis?,” 15. Apparently others were aware ofSouth Korean troop movements around thistime, as recalled by former Australian PrimeMinister E. Gough Whitlam. See Cumings,Origins of the Korean War, 547.

73 HQ, USAFIK Intelligence Summary, NorthernKorea (1947. 4.1-1948. 1. 9) (Chunchon:Institute of Culture Studies, Hallym University,1989), 31.

74 North Korea predicted that the South Koreanmilitary would invade on August 15, 1949, andin early 1950. The Soviet Union and Chineseboth cautioned the North to wait for thisinvasion rather than initiate combat on its ownuntil it became clear that the South would notattack.

75 “Rhee calls on Japanese to Join Anti-RedBattle,” Nippon Times (February 17, 1950), inMigun CIC chǒngbo pogosǒ, vol. 1: Inmul chosapogǒ [US Military CIC Information Reports:

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Investigations on People], (Seoul: Chongangilbo, Hyǒndaesa Yǒnguso, 1996), 242.

76 “Rhee Vows to Recover North Korea,” Starsand Stripes (March 1, 1950), in ibid., 238.

77 “Rhee to Oliver” (March 8, 1950). TheSyngman Rhee Presidential Papers (YonseiUniversity), File 83, #01260015. These papersare also a part of the Robert J. Oliver Papers.

78 Ibid.

79 John Merrill writes that North Korea believedthat while in Tokyo Rhee had successfullygained the military assistance he desired. Italso accused South Korea of moving toward amilitary alliance with Japan to use Korea as a“springboard” for attacking the Soviet Union.Merrill, The Peninsular Origins of the KoreanWar, 173. See also Cumings, The Origins of theKorean War, 459-61. Cumings notes that anumber of South Korean officials made trips toTokyo to meet with MacArthur. Ibid., 459.

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