The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 10 | Issue 2 | Number 2 | Article ID 3674 | Jan 06, 2012

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North Korea after Kim Jong Il: The Kim Jong Un era and itschallenges　　金正日後の北朝鮮−−金正恩時代とその直面する難題

Rüdiger Frank

Ruediger Frank

Topics:

From cheers to jeers: North Korea in themedia

Austria is a great country for many reasons, butwith just 8.4 million citizens and locked in thecenter of the European continent, it is hardly aglobal player. However, even here the death ofKim Jong Il, the details of the mourningprocedure, and the assignment of titles andfunctions to his son Kim Jong Un, werereported by almost all media as top news.

This tells us something about globalization andour own profession. News is being producedand fed by a few globally operating pressagencies that make hundreds of national mediaoutlets look like clones with minor localmutations. It also shows how visually orientedthe consumption of news has become. We havereason to believe that without the particularfeatures of Kim Jong Il’s appearance, andwithout the TV broadcasts of thousands ofecstatic mourners [Erich Weingartner: Thereality of tears], attention in the West wouldhave been much lower. I was asked by onejournalist why our public does not seem to betoo worried about the humanitarian situation inNorth Korea. My answer was: because they

cannot see it on their TV screens.

By now, to most of our fellow countrymen inAustria, in Europe, in the United States orelsewhere, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un havebecome just a distant memory, another blip in aconstant flow of dramatic events. Much moresubstantial issues like the drama in Fukushimahave already faded away and seem like a thingfrom a long bygone past. The public in theneighboring countries like South Korea, Japanand China will be more attentive, but eventhere, the initial excitement is diminishing.

In any case, the media party is over, and so isthe hangover. Countless interviews have beengiven and hasty commentaries written. Publicinterest in the West vanishes, but things do notstop taking shape in North Korea. A new mythis in the making, and we can observe it in realtime. Countless important signals have beensent in just two weeks. They form thefoundation of what might be a short-livedintermezzo between a monolithic state and itstransformation, or a shaping of the NorthKorean system for the next decades. Thesuccessor has been announced, he has madehis first steps and public appearances. Newbuzzwords have emerged in the mass media,new rituals and icons are appearing, and thefirst New Year joint editorial of Kim Jong Un’sNorth Korea has been published.

In other words, we still know too little, but weknow more than on Dec. 19th, the day when KimJong Il’s death was officially announced. It isthus time to take stock of what happened, ofwhat we know, and of what we don’t know. Thisremains a complicated endeavor, and educated

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guessing is often the best we can hope for. Itherefore begin with a short but necessaryexcurse into methodology.

What does it take to be a North Koreaexpert?

This was on the smarter side of questions I wasasked during my own media speed battlearound Dec. 19th. It is no doubt a valid one,given the amazing discrepancies betweenquestions and knowledge, and between actualexpertise and the number of experts. Havingworked on North Korea for over 20 years now,my answer is this: There is no single factor;rather, it is a combination of a few componentsthat makes a good North Korea expert.

(1) Use common sense. After all, North Koreansare human beings and can thus be understoodas such. It takes no rocket science to see thatthey need food, shelter and all the otherelements of the basic levels of Maslow’spyramid of needs [link].

(2) Make use of universal knowledge and meta-theories. Sometimes we become victims of ourown propaganda and forget that despite itsparticularities, North Korea is a state inNortheast Asia. It has a government, aleadership, an economy, a people and a history.No specific expertise is needed to understandthat survival is the regime’s key goal, andhardly any realist would have difficultiesexplaining North Korea’s foreign policy. Butstrangely, these simple facts are often eitherignored or lauded as deep insights. It is notenough to know Korea; knowing your socialscience is imperative to avoid amateurism.American scholars, among others, haveimpressively demonstrated what can be learnedabout North Korea that way.

(3) Know the system. North Korea is not theonly place in the world where state socialismhas been practiced. As a minimum, one shouldbe informed about the functioning and theeffects of a one-party state, systematic

repression, a state-owned economy, a non-convertible currency, central planning, or theabsence of competition and markets. Actualexperience of having lived (in my case oftenfrustrated, but also surprisingly happily) undersuch conditions is even more helpful. It is nocoincidence that Russian names appear so highin the ranks of the most knowledgeable NorthKorea scholars.

(4) Know Korea. Common sense, meta-theoriesand systemic knowledge will get us far, but notfar enough. After all, North Korea is (North)Korea, with a history that has led to a uniqueset of institutions also known as culture,customs, values, and traditions. Uncriticallyapplying our own cultural and moral standardsas a yardstick will often lead to more or lesssignificant misunderstandings. True, culturaldeterminism is an extreme that needs to beavoided; but so should ignorance. This is whySouth Korean scholars, and Chinese experts ofKorean origin, are able to offer particularlydeep insights.

(5) Know your sources. Yes, the amount offoreign language materials on North Korea isincreasing, and one can communicate withNorth Koreans or defectors through aninterpreter. But if you agree that a properunderstanding and appreciation, not to speakof expert knowledge of Shakespeare’s piecesrequires command of English, then you willagree that Korean is indispensable for studyingthe inner workings of the North Korean system.That’s why Koreanists often have a competitiveadvantage in particular in the understanding ofsubtle messages.

(6) Commit yourself. It takes time and a long-term effort to develop experience, the ability tosee what is extraordinary, and to understandthe background and the context of events. Thisis why students of any subject are required toread more than just one book, and why learningis said to be life-long. As dreadful as it often is,only a long-term reading of propaganda will let

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you see what is hidden between the lines (todiscard this as Kremlinology reminds me ofAesop’s tale of the fox and the grapes). Thesame applies to travelling. First-time visitors toNorth Korea often feel like Columbus,discovering “new” things everywhere that havebeen seen and reported dozens of times before.Even if they can avoid that trap, they get just astatic image, a snap-shot. Only going to thesame places again and again will let you noticesignificant developments.

In addition to these six points, one could thinkof other factors such as the command ofRussian, Chinese or Japanese to have access tovaluable secondary sources. Being as free aspossible of positive or negative emotions is alsohelpful to minimize biases.

It is admittedly very difficult to find all thesecriteria combined in one person. The list abovelooks more like an outline of the variousapproaches taken to North Korea. Maybe thatis why none of us can seriously claim to possesssuperior knowledge or full understanding. But Iwould nevertheless argue that the above is theideal that we should strive to get as close to aspossible.

With this in mind, what do we know about therecent events in North Korea, and what can besaid about its future? I will structure myremarks according to questions I received, andstatements that I encountered. The six pointsabove shall serve as an implicit guideline. Yourtopic of interest is not included? Drop us acomment!

Q&A on Kim Jong Un’s North Korea

Does Kim Jong Un have the power, and will hekeep it?

Common sense is a bit at a loss here. He is theson of Kim Jong Il, but only the third son. NorthKorea is not a monarchy, but we neverthelesswitness a third-generation succession. Kim JongUn has been announced as the successor and

assigned a leading role, but he is very youngand inexperienced. This list of contradictorystatements can be continued, so it is better toturn to a more structured analysis.

Gregory Henderson’s study of Korean politicssuggests that the emergence of alternativecenters of power is relatively unlikely [GregoryHenderson (1968): Korea. The Politics of theVortex. Harvard University Press]. Rather, wecan expect various individuals and groups tocompete for control of the center, which isformed by or around Kim Jong Un. At his youngage and with only a short grooming period, hewill have to rely on others to maintain andexpand his power. Before Kim Jong Il’s death,Karoly Fendler, an insightful veteranHungarian diplomat with decades of experiencein North Korea, in a private conversation withthe author suggested a triumvirate: Kim Jong Iland his son responsible for army and ideology,Kim Yong Nam for protocol, and Choe YongRim for the economy. This makes sense inmany ways. Yoram Barzel in his study ondictatorships points out that any dictator “mustform long-term relations with at least some ofhis subjects to secure their cooperation”.[Barzel, Yoram (1968): The State and theDiversity of Third Party Enforcers. mimeo,University of Washington, p. 8]

So Kim Jong Un will share power, but he is alsoneeded by the system as a single leader. BrianMyers shows that Koreans seem to have acertain preference for a parental leader and,most importantly, that the state as such showsno signs of undergoing a legitimacy crisis[Myers, Brian R.: North Korea’s State-LoyaltyAdvantage. Journal of International Affairs,Fall/Winter 2011, Vol. 65, No. 1., pp. 115-129].Along the same line, Cheong Seong-changargues that instead of a collective leadership,we will see the emergence of another single-person leadership system under Kim Jong Un.[정성장: 2012년 북한 정세 전망, 정세와 정책 2012년1월호, link]

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My own assessment is slightly different. True:now that the power vacuum left after the deathof Kim Jong Il has been so quickly andmassively filled with Kim Jong Un, he will bethe man in the spotlight. But at least for thenext few years, he will not have the capacity tocontrol the country without having to relyheavily on support by powerful individuals.This, however, is risky. I agree with AndreiLankov who expects a power struggle in NK,one level below KJU: “...we might soon witnessadvisors and officials jockeying for powerbehind the throne and their struggle maybecome quite violent”. [link]

In fact, I believe that the hasty efforts atelevating Kim Jong Il posthumously to the samestatus as his father Kim Il Sung might come toolate. They are the only choice the leadershipthought it had after the sudden death of its topman, but it is only the second best option. KimJong Il knew very well why he avoided a realtake-over during his lifetime. His legitimacywas built almost exclusively on being the soleprophet of his towering father Kim Il Sung. Assuch, he was accepted and untouchable. KimJong Il had very good reasons not to erect anystatues of himself, and not to give his name tostreets, plazas etc.

The country of Kim Il Sung - this is what mostNorth Koreans, as defectors confirm - subscribeto with little hesitation. Kim Il Sung hasliberated the country from the Japanese andwon a shining victory against Americanaggression in the Korean War. This is whatpeople have been told, this is what they believe,this is what in their view granted Kim Il Sungevery right to govern the country that hesinglehandedly created and protected. Notleast, he had his old guard of loyal followersaround him, and I mean really loyal as they hadgone through all kinds of ordeals together eversince the days of the Minsaengdan incident, amassive purge of Koreans in the Chineserevolutionary forces in the early 1930s whenthey were suspected of being agents of the

Japanese [Hongkoo Han (1999): Woundednationalism: The Minsaengdan incident andKim Il Sung in Eastern Manchuria, Seattle:University of Washington]. Parts of this oldguard were alive and in control in 1994. Buttime took its toll. Their places have meanwhilebeen taken by the next, much better educatedgeneration that grew up under more regularconditions. Now even the third generation isready , career -or iented ch i ldren o fapparatchiks. Can they replicate the Kapsanfaction’s unconditional, grim personal loyalty?Or is their primary concern the preservation ofthe system that has formed them and that theybenefit from? Make no mistake, both forms ofloyalty can have the same result, i.e. support ofthe leader. But the latter form is open toalternatives.

For two decades since the mid 1970s, Kim JongIl was promoted as the only person in the worldwho could fully grasp the wisdom of Kim IlSung, who joined him on his numerous journeysthrough the country, who learned from him (orshould it be Him?), who assisted him, and whothen humbly continued his work. Kim Jong Il’sposition after 1994 was weaker than that of hisfather, but he could convincingly claim to bethe only logical choice for the continuation of apath and leadership that was largelyundisputed and beyond any doubt. And hecould count on the old guard to support him.

One does not need to be a North Korea expertto understand that the same degree oflegitimacy simply cannot be passed on to KimJong Un. Kim Jong Il did not fight againstJapan, but he was at least (allegedly) born atMt. Paektu. Kim Jong Il for a long time in hiscareer was a moon, not a sun. He shonebecause Kim Il Sung was shining on him, andhe reflected his light. This was part of the“text”, as Brian Myers calls it. But how can amoon illuminate the next generation as brightlyas a sun could?

The trouble is that even dictators need

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legitimacy. The logical choice would have beento enshrine the two eternal leaders, father KimIl Sung and son Kim Jong Il, forever and createa system that would claim to fulfill their legacyin the most perfect way. This would require acollective of trustees with a primus inter paresat their helm, very much like China’s CentralCommittee and the Party’s General Secretary,or the Catholic Church and the Pope. God andJesus, Allah and Mohammed, Lenin and Stalin -religion and history know many relativelysuccessful cases where after only onesuccessor, a new collective mode of leadershipwas chosen.

However, Kim Jong Il’s untimely death meansthat a backup plan is now being implemented -hastily, massively, too quickly. Suddenly wehear about Kim Jong Il country, about the needto erect statues to his honor, about Kim JongUn being Kim Jong Il, about Kim Jong Un beingthe supreme leader of the Party, the state, andthe military. But will this be enough? The NorthKorean population does not consist of mindlessrobots. They are well educated, and they aretough. The elite have acquired self-confidenceand power in the last years. They know theircountry has problems. They desperately want asolution. And so far they have little reason tobelieve that Kim Jong Un is the right man forthe job.

How is Kim Jong Un’s legitimacy being built?

Any leader, in any political system, needslegitimacy to maintain his claim to power. Notincidentally did Max Weber [Weber, Max(1972): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tübingen:Mohr Siebeck, p. 122] suggest use of the claimto legitimacy as the sole criterion forclassifying various types of rule. It would beoutright naive to expect that all it takes inNorth Korea is an article in the RodongSinmun, and everyone will stop askingquestions and just follow the new top man.

Legitimacy in autocratic systems is a trickyissue. It is hard to acquire, and it lacks a

mechanism of permanent renewal (likeelections in democracies). Merkel [WolfgangMerkel (1999). Systemtransformation. Opladen,Germany: Leske+Budrich, pp. 25-28]associates North Korea with the Communist-totalitarian subtype, not with a monarchy.Bursens and Sinardet [Peter Bursens and DaveSinardet, Democratic Legitimacy in MultilevelPolitical Systems: The European Union andBelgium in Comparative Perspective. Paperpresented at the European Union StudiesAssociation 11th Biennial InternationalConference, May 23-25, 2007, Los Angeles]show that there are two interrelated sides tolegitimacy. In addition to the expectedoutcomes, an important source of legitimacyseems to be that the decision-making processincluding the selection of the leadership followsapproved rules.

My own research confirms that legitimacy inNorth Korea is performance-based, and thatthis includes a certain compliance with rulesand formalities. This is why Kim Jong Un is stilladdressed with the title Vice Chairman of theWPK Central Military Commission. This is whythe eldest son Kim Jong Nam is so obviouslyunqualified for the post: he does not behave ina way that would be regarded as sufficientlydignified. On a side note, my suspicion is thathe did so purposefully: what is better thanbeing the offspring of a rich and powerfulfamily , without the burden of actualgovernment and the permanent power strugglebehind the scenes? What a smart decision.

As indicated above, Kim Il Sung based his claimto power on his feats including the liberation ofKorea from the Japanese, and the victory in awar of defense of Korea against an invasion bythe United States. As so often, what matters isnot the actual truth of such claims, but theirperception by the target group, i.e. the NorthKorean population. Kim Jong Il, too, had to earnthe right to rule. He was given a number oftasks to prove that he was capable. Thisincluded most prominently work in the film

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studios and the development of the chuch’eideology as the country’s guiding principle. Hewent through a rather long period of trainingand grooming before he was designated assuccessor at the 6th Party Congress in 1980.Ever since, he was portrayed as a tirelessworker on behalf of the people. Take forexample a 1980 painting shown at the NorthKorean art exhibition in Vienna in 2010, titled:The endlessly burning light of the Party Center(a codeword for Kim Jong Il at that time).

Another example shows him caring for thelivelihood of soldiers:

But what about Kim Jong Un? He had little timeto accomplish any major feat, or claim to havedone so, although there are unproven rumorsthat he was involved in a number of militaryoperations vis-à-vis South Korea. We could thus

in the days after the announcement of Kim JongIl’s death observe a massive, multi-layeredstrategy to build at least a provisionallegitimacy for Kim Jong Un. I can only agreewith Ken Gause’s assesment: “the regimeappears to have launched a blitz campaign toportray him as the legitimate successor to hisfather, removing any doubt within the mind ofthe public and elite alike over who is in charge“[link].

It started with the inclusion of him as the“great successor” in the official obituary. Thevery moment North Koreans learned that KimJong Il was dead, they were also told who wasgoing to be his heir. Note that Kim Jong Un hadnot been announced to be in that positionduring Kim Jong Il’s lifetime; it was the Partywho acted as the Kingmaker [link]. Even theintroduction of Kim Jong Un to the public wasdone in the context of a Party Conference[link].

Then, a sense of guilt was instilled in thepeople. The very circumstances of Kim Jong Il’sdemise on the way to another on-the-spotguidance suggested that he worked himself todeath for the people. The appropriate reactionis reported by none other than the AssociatedPress, which was told by the Vice Minister ofMining Industry Pak Thae Gu: "We lost thegreat Kim Jong Il because we did not do ourwork well. How can we have a rest?" [TheGuardian, 01.01.2012, link]. This theme - whichis Korean, not North Korean - was repeated acouple of times in KCNA and Rodong Sinmunreporting. Particularly noteworthy was theregret expressed by citizens about having failedto erect a statue of Kim Jong Il during hislifetime. We can expect Kim Jong Un to take upthis task very soon.

Next came portrayals of Kim Jong Un’s caringlove for the people. Two examples stood out:the provision of fresh fish to the citizens ofPyongyang, and the provision of hot drinks formourners [장군님께서 오시였다!, link] (some

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interesting details regarding North Korea’smiddle class that emerged in related reportingwill be discussed below). This was mixed withreferences to Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Unbeing one inseparable entity. In principle, thisis very much the procedure followed through ageneration earlier, when the transfer oflegitimacy from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il tookplace.

Over the next days, Kim Jong Un was assignedvarious titles and functions. The functionsincluded: successor to the revolutionary causeof Juche (주체혁명위업의 계승자), standing atthe helm of the Korean revolution, the head (수반) of the WPK Central Committee, the GreatSun of the 21st Century (21세기의 태양),reputable leader of our Party, State and Army(우리 당과 국가, 군대의 영명한 령도자), supremeleader (최고령도자) of Party, state and army,and supreme commander of the KoreanPeople's Army. The latter, interestingly, wasannounced to have happened before Kim JongIl’s death on Oct. 8th, 2011.

However, the only formal title he holds and thatis repeated constantly is that of Vice Chairmanof the WPK Central Military Commission (조선로동당 중앙군사위원회 부위원장). By earlyJanuary 2012, the title “Dear respectedComrade Kim Jong Un“ (경애하는 김정은동지)has become a standard form of address.

All this was an ad hoc reaction. A look at thefrequency of KCNA reporting about Kim Jong Iland Kim Jong Un in the table below reveals thatthe departure of the leader was unexpected forthe North Korean propaganda machine. Withthe exception of July, the average monthlynumber of articles with Kim Jong Un’s namewas less than 10 until November 2011, asopposed to over 300 for Kim Jong Il. The totalnumber of such appearances in 2011 untilNovember was 141 for Kim Jong Un and 3471for Kim Jong Il. This suggests that thecampaign to promote Kim Jong Un has not evenremotely been in full swing.

Number of KCNA articles with the namesof Kim Jong Un and Kim Jong Il, Jan.-Dec.2011 (not weighted)

We have other indications that the successionwas unexpected and ill-prepared. It seemsthere weren’t even enough of the classic father-and-son pictures taken, a motive we haveknown from Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Takethe stamps issued on Dec. 30th, 2011. One ofthem shows an image of Kim Jong Un with hisfather during a field inspection against thebackdrop of the revolution’s sacred Mt. Paektu.The Korea Times writes that this image is anattempt at justifying the third-generationhereditary transfer of power [Korea Times,31.12.2011, link]. It is hard to object; what Ifind remarkable, however, is the obvious andhasty editing that has taken place (others areerased, Kim Jong Un is moved closer to hisfather, shadows remain intact). If this is such acentral element in building Kim Jong Un’slegitimacy, why hasn’t the propaganda machineproduced dozens of father-and-son pictures intime?

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Do the Party and the military compete forpower in North Korea?

This is one of the most commonly madeassumptions about power in North Korea: thatthe military and the party compete. Our mindsseem to have a general inclination towardssimple dichotomies: good and evil, black andwhite, civilians and military, yin and yang,sweet and sour, man and woman and so forth. Iam afraid that this predisposition is responsiblefor a great deal of the popularity of the“military versus party” theory. To put it verybluntly: I disagree.

The reasons for this are manifold. To beginwith, it is hard to imagine that a reasonabledictator would allow the military to become apolitical force in his country. He will use themilitary as a tool, he will stress military valueslike hierarchy, obedience of orders, and self-sacrifice. All socialist societies that we haveknown used militant language (the economicfront, shock brigade, fresh advance, speed-battle, struggle etc.). They all had largemilitaries, huge budgets (alas, this is whateventually broke their economies’ backs), para-military training, a preference for uniforms,mass rallies and marches. Leonid Brezhnevoften wore a military uniform, and he wassurrounded by Generals.

I spent five years as a child in his Soviet Unionin the 1970s. Despite my German parents’disapproval, I grew up there playing militarygames, reading military stories, watchingmilitary movies, and wearing a school uniform.Each year, the Red Square in Moscow hostedmilitary parades of a scale that easily letanything we have seen in Pyongyang pale incomparison. Tanks, artillery, gigantic missilesand goose-stepping soldiers were passing by anembalmed Lenin. Still, few observers wouldhave characterized the Soviet Union as acountry ruled by the military. Ruled throughthe military, maybe, but not a militarydictatorship.

North Korea is admittedly an extreme case; butit iw not unique. Part of our perception problemis that since 1991, it is the only such systemthat is left. Many of those who today watchparades on Kim Il Sung square have no memoryof any similar case and easily think that nothinglike this has existed on earth before. Well,wrong. Extreme, North-Koreanized: yes. Butunique: no.

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Most seasoned observers of North Korea agreethat the country is ruled by a kleptocracy. Itconsists of a few families, including the one ofKim Il Sung and of those 50 comrades whoentered the country with him in late 1945. Thistop elite has had seven decades to settle in. Itassumed control of all positions of power, be itthe Party, the military, the security organs, thestate, or the parliament. They intermarried,they produced offspring, they expanded. This isin no way unique. In medieval Europe, it wascommon to marry within the aristocracy, tohave at least one son becoming a knight, andanother a cleric. In North Korea, it is the samefamilies that control the Party and the military.If there is any rivalry, and we have no reason tobelieve that there is none, it will be betweenthe families, not between the institutions. It willbe army units against army units, Party leadersagainst Party leaders, ministries againstministries; not army against Party.

Another fact that seems hard to grasp forWesterners is that the glue that holds NorthKorea together is not direct repression, butideology. This is not to say that North Korea isnot a highly repressive system; of course it is.This repression is systemic, and it isomnipresent. But it is not the only and probablynot even the most powerful element of regimestability. It is no coincidence that Kim Jong Ilidentified ideological weakness as the reasonfor the collapse of socialism in Europe [link].And indeed, North Korea is particularly strongin this respect. It has successfully merged anti-Japanese and anti-American nationalism, thefear to again lose independence, a crude typeof Leninism, xenophobia (Myers calls thisracism) and traditional familism into one.

Use of key ideological terms in KCNAarticles, 1997-2010 (weighted androunded)

Source: author’s own calculations, based onwww.kcna.co.jp

As the graph above shows, the use of typicalNorth Korean orthodox and conservativeterminology, exemplified by the words“socialism” and “juche”, has declined after2000 but picked up since 2005. The new term“songun” was added in 2003 and developed inline with the other terms. All three havedeveloped more or less in parallel throughoutmost of the observation period, with correlationcoefficients [We use Pearson’s Product MomentCorrelation, also known as Person’s r. Valuesfor r range from +1 to -1. A correlation of +1means that there is a perfect positive linearrelationship between variables, 0 indicates nocorrelation, and -1 implies a perfect negativelinear relationship.] ranging from r=0.7 to asmuch as r=0.9 for socialism/songun in the2004-2010 period. In 2010, however, we see aslight drop year-on-year of the use of“socialism” and “songun”, but an increase inthe nationalist term “juche”.

For the ordinary North Korean, the leader andsoc ia l i sm are the same as na t iona lindependence and the nation. The latter arebeyond any doubt, and so are automatically theformer. And the owner of ideology is the Party.For reasons that are subject to speculation, the

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Party was pushed into the background for awhile, but not by the military. Rather, it wasthe leader himself who after having solidifiedhis position decided to put a check on thispowerful institution. The graph below showsthis; in 2000, Kim Jong Il almost stopped usinghis Party title for a few years, which coincidewith a period of unfinished economic reform.

Use of key titles for Kim Jong Il in KCNAarticles, 1997-2010 (weighted androunded)

Source: author’s own calculations, based onwww.kcna.co.jp

For the period 1997-2010, we see a stronglynegative correlation (r = -0.72) in the use ofwhat we could c lass i fy as a world ly ,management-oriented title (Great Leader, 위대한 령도자) and a spiritual, ideologically orientedtitle (Secretary General, 총비서). Two pointsstand out: the clear identification of the reformperiod 2001-2006, when the negativecorrelation gets close to perfect at r = -0.90,and the new heights the mentioning of KimJong Il in his function as the Party’s GeneralSecretary has reached since 2008, the year ofhis alleged stroke.

My interpretation in 2003 of the Military FirstPolicy was not that of a radical turn towardsmilitarism; how much more militaristic couldNorth Korea become anyway? Rather, Isuggested seeing it as the ideological

component of a market-oriented economicreform drive that the Party obviously opposed[The End of Socialism and a Wedding Gift forthe Groom? The True Meaning of the MilitaryFirst Policy, NAPSNET Special Report andDPRK Briefing Book, Dec. 11th, 2003]. Then, in2008, I noticed unusually enthusiasticreporting about the Party FoundationMonument [Has the Next North Korean LeaderBeen Announced?, Japan Focus, No. 43,27.10.2008] and interpreted this as theexpression of a decision on a new, collectiveleadership model . In 2010, the WPKexperienced another significant formalupgrading of its role with the Party Conference,where its power organs were rejuvenated andits status was reconfirmed. Very recently, theWPK Central Committee even managed tosqueeze itself into a slogan that for yearsexisted without it: “Let’s protect the CentralCommittee of the Party with Kim Jong Il as itshead with our lives”. The last time theformulation “the WPK Central Committeeheaded by Secretary Kim Jong Il” was used wasin autumn 1997. It only reemerged on Sept. 29,2010 in connection with the WPK Conference.In the 13 years in between, this and similarslogans were used without reference to theCentral Committee.

Picture published by KCNA on the occasionof a troop visit by Kim Jong Il on Dec. 13th,2011

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After Dec. 19th, the state media picked up thisslogan and substituted Kim Jong Il by Kim JongUn. On a side note, however, it seems that partof the country was lagging behind in theimplementation of that change. On the picturebelow, published by KCNA on the occasion ofone of the first troop visits by the new leader,Kim Jong Il’s name was still there.

A strong signal regarding power in North Koreawas sent through the very funeral held on Dec.28th. Based on our stereotypical knowledge,what would we expect? Kim Jong Il, GreatGeneral, the man of the Military First Era era,would get a military ceremony with soldierscarrying his coffin, or would it be mounted on agun carriage or even a tank? Well, none of thishappened, as we know. The whole ceremonywas largely civilian, except the salute shots.

Most important, however, is this. If a country’sleader dies, wouldn’t his body usually bewrapped in the national flag? Not in this case.Kim Jong Il’s coffin was covered by the flag ofmother Party. How much more do we need tounderstand where power resides in NorthKorea?

The Worker’s Party controls the governmentalinstitutions including economic and foreignpolicy, and it controls the military. This, too, isnot at all an exception. Ever since Lenin tookover power in the middle of the World War andthus could not afford disbanding the Tsarist

army and killing its officers, political officersaka Commissars were put alongside militarymen down to the lower levels of militaryhierarchy in the Red Army. Each and everyofficer in East Germany’s National People’sArmy was also a Party member who had twolines of command to follow. North Korea is nodifferent.

In his analysis of the role of the CentralMil itary Commission (CMC) since itsestablishment in 1962, Cheong Song-changshows not only that the CMC has played aparticular role within the Party structure, butalso that the Party hierarchy has been superiorto the military hierarchy. His analysis of therelationship between the Central Committeeand the CMC, however, implies a powerstruggle within the Party, which makes sense inlight of our above remarks on familism.[Cheong, Seong-chang: The Status and Role ofthe WPK Central Military Commission in theKim Jong-il Era, Vantage Point, 11/2001, pp.48-59]

If you look for a much more typical example ofa military dictatorship, South Korea in 1961would come to mind. A young general namedPark Chung-hee assumed power through acoup, took off the uniform after a while butruled the country with an iron fist while relyingon his army networks. He was assassinated byhis Intelligence Chief in 1979, only to befollowed by two more generals, the last of

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whom ensured a smooth transition to ademocracy after 1987. I believe that thisexperience compels many Korea watchers toapply a similar logic to North Korea. Butdespite the obvious militarism and the ironfisted rule, North Korea is not a militarydictatorship; rather, it is an extreme case of astate-socialist autocracy in a constant state ofemergency and under quasi-martial law.

How will China behave?

China is often portrayed in Western media asNorth Korea’s only ally. This is hard to deny butit is only one side of the coin. History knowsvery few cases where the relationship betweena gigantic and a small neighbor has beenpositive from the perspective of both sides. Thetwo countries have a long tradition of closecooperation, but also of tensions and mistrust.In the 16th century, China was Korea’s ally butonly sent troops after Toyotomi Hideyoshi hadoccupied half of Korea. Elder brother Chinafailed as Korea’s protector in the late 19th

century, which led to colonization by Japan.China came to the rescue of North Korea in theKorean War, but not entirely free of selfishconcerns, and it stayed until the late 1950s. Acoup against Kim Il Sung during a trip toEurope in 1956 was led by pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese Koreans. During the CulturalRevolution, Chinese Red Guards heavilycriticized Kim Il Sung and his leadership style,and even tried to trigger a similar movement inNorth Korea. There were territorial conflictsinvolving, among others, the sacred Mt. Paektu.Beijing’s claim that the ancient Kingdom ofKoguryŏ was actually Chinese promptedoutrage in both Koreas. The reforms in theneighboring country are met with a mix offascination and suspicion, and China’s obvioushyper-presence in today’s North Koreaneconomy worries many Koreans.

Given North Korea’s nationalist ideology and itsfear of external interference, China looks likemore the biggest threat than the best friend.

The massive economic dependence on Chinaonly supports that feeling of malaise. YonhapNews reported on Dec. 29th that in the first tenmonths of 2011, China's trade with NorthKorea jumped 73.5 percent year-on-year toreach a new record high of 4.67 billion US$[link]. In particular, China increased its imports- anthracite coal, alloy and non-alloy steel -from North Korean by a whopping 124.8percent last year. North Korea's trade relianceon China jumped from 25 percent in 1999 to 83percent in 2011. The next largest tradingpartner in 2010 was Russia - with a mere 2.6%of the total! [KOTRA (2011): 2010 북한의 대외무역 동향, KOTRA 자료 11-033, Seoul: KOTRA].

When I first visited North Korea in 1991, mostforeign-made goods, if there were any, camefrom Japan. By contrast, in 2010, the wholecountry seemed to be flooded with Chinesegoods of all types, from textiles to cars, repairshops, and restaurants.

Photo: Rudiger Frank 2010

The Pyongyang International Trade Fair wasdominated by Chinese firms selling computers,home appliances, trucks and all other kinds ofproducts. The few Western companies had onlyvery humble presences. Mutual suspicionprevails. Chinese are still often called by thederogatory term 돼넘 in private conversations,while Chinese businessmen complained aboutthe low willingness of their North Korean

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partners to adhere to contracts.

Officially, it is all friendship; just as it wasbetween the Soviet Union and its satellitestates. If you have a chance, ask a Hungarianor a Czech how they really felt about their BigBrother. I remember how “die Freunde” (thefriends) was used in an openly ironic way whenreferring to Russians in East Germany. In 2010,the mass spectacle Arirang contained a fullchapter only on 조중친성 (North Korea-Chinafriendship). Here, too, the North Koreans couldnot refrain from issuing a side blow by showinga slogan from the Cultural Revolution: If therewere no Communist Party, there would be noNew China. This can be interpreted asindirectly accusing Beijing of having betrayedwhat Mao had fought for.

Photo: Rudiger Frank 2010

Be it true friendship or a rational alliance: Inthe context of its regional and global strategy,China is primarily interested in a stable NorthKorea. A collapse would bring Beijing into acomplicated situation. If it sent in troops, thiswould trigger angry reactions worldwide and,in an instant, would discredit all of the pastdecade’s painstaking attempts at portrayingthe giant’s rise as peaceful. But if it justwatched the existing order disintegrate, Koreawould quickly be reunified under South Koreanleadership, which means an expansion of theU.S. zone of influence right up until China’sNortheastern border. This would be a strategicdisaster. Not least, the thus proven inability to

save a client state would drastically reduce thePRC’s chances to convince any other smallercountry to trade protection by Washingtonagainst protection by Beijing. Dreams tobecome a regional superpower would be setback. We should also not forget that the NorthKorean nuclear program can be used in variousways. Deterrence against China is not the mostpublicized option in our Western media, butthat does not mean that Chinese are notnervous about this dangerous possession in thehands of its unruly neighbor.

It was therefore little surprise that China wasquick to express support for the new leadershipin North Korea. The Korea DevelopmentInstitute on Jan. 1st, 2012, declared that itexpects China to provide economic assistanceto North Korea in the near future to helpstabilize its socialist neighbor. [link]

We can also expect a continuation of the policyof the past years: Invitations to the leader andhigh level North Korean officials; tours ofShenyang, Beijing, and Shanghai; the buildingof personal networks with the North Koreanelite; and patience. Only if Pyongyang is seenas going too far, for example in the nuclearquestion, will Beijing interfere - but as quietlyas possible. Meanwhile, new economic zoneswill be built, old ones rejuvenated. It seemsthat the allegedly Communist Chinese trust thetransformatory power of the market more thanthe capitalist West does. The world is an ironicplace.

What will happen to North Korea’s nuclearprogram?

Common sense suggests that a change in policywould require a change in conditions. However,we have no reason to believe that any of therationales for the nuclear program’s existencehas changed. North Korea uses its nuclearweapons as a means of deterrence according tothe same logic as it was applied during theCold War between East and West. The programis one of the few major achievements that Kim

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Jong Il could present to his people, and KimJong Un will not be stupid enough to shed it aslong as he builds his legitimacy on the legacy ofhis father. Most importantly, the nuclearprogram keeps the neighbors worried and theworld interested. This attention translates intodiplomatic and economic gains that aredesperately needed. Last but not least, this isabout the only way North Korea can providesome counterbalance to the massive weight ofChina. The South Korean public seems to sharemy pessimism. In a poll conducted in November2011, over 80 percent of respondents believedNorth Korea will not abandon its nuclearweapons. [국민 81%, 북한 핵포기 안할것 ,Hanguk Ilbo, 02.01.2012, l ink]

On the other hand, before Kim Jong Il died, anew round of talks was on the horizon. Theexperience of 1994 shows that despite thedeath of the supreme leader (July 1994), majorprogress can be achieved (FrameworkAgreement in October 1994). None of theofficial announcements since Dec. 19th 2011includes any reference to nuclear weapons;neither directly nor implicitly through usingcode words (invincible might백승의 위력,treasured sword위력한 보검). According to YooHo-yeol, this leaves room for the chance ofimproved ties with the United States. [TheGuardian, 01.01.2012, link]

Last, but not least: the biggest dangerstemming from the North Korean nuclearprogram might not be its military use. As theevents in Japan in March 2011 have shown,even in rich and technologically highlydeveloped economies, accidents cannot beexcluded. We can only hope that maintenancework is done properly, and that the nuclearfacilities do not become the target of anynatural or man-made disaster.

What will Kim Jong Un’s policy be?

Obviously, very little aside from “continuity”can be said at this point. It is also easy to see

that he must find a way to resolve his country’seconomic shortages. From the study of socialistsystems done by Janos Kornai [Kornai, Janos(1992). The Socialist System: The PoliticalEconomy of Communism. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press] and others, weknow that such shortage is chronic andsystemic. In other words, it requires a changeof the system rather than mere copingmeasures. True, North Korea was able tosurvive for a rather long time on a muddle-though strategy. But this does not change thefact that it is unsustainable. The Chineseexample is the obvious solution, but will KimJong Un be willing, able, and allowed to followit?

For the time being, we find a number ofindicators that the economic well-being of hispeople is one of his top priorities. Rememberthat his introduction as successor on Dec. 19thwas soon supplemented by news like this:“Leader Kim Jong Il, who had always beenconcerned for fish supply to Pyongyangcitizens, took a measure for fish supply on theevening of December 16, a day before hisdemise. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un, whohas been overcome with the deepest grief at hisdemise, took all necessary measures to truckfresh fish to the capital city in time and supplythe fish to the citizens even in the mourningperiod.” [link]

This was followed by reports on the provision ofhot water for mourners. On January 3rd, 2012,the third Pyongyang Department Store No. 1goods exhibition was held [제 3차 평양제 1 백화점 상 품 전 시 회 개 막 , R o d o n g S i n m u n ,04.01.2012, p. 3]. In the related article, KimJong Un is quoted with a number of remarks inthe spirit of his father who had the previousexhibition held in July 2011. In other words,this emphasis on consumer goods is relativelyrecent, and it is upheld by Kim Jong Un.

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To add one more hint at the future policy: Atthe mass rally held on Dec. 30th, two sloganswere displayed prominently (and carried in theN o r t h K o r e a n m e d i a ) . T h e y r e a d :“Improvement of People’s Living Conditions”,and “The Principle of Light Industry First”.

Looking at the slogan to the left, have younoted the replacement of “Strong andProsperous Great Country” (강성대국) with“Building an Economically Strong Country” (강

경국가 건설)? Again, we must be careful not tojump to premature conclusions, but as a matterof fact, the central slogan of the past years hasbeen modified in a way that emphasized theeconomy and drops military might.

The emphasis on light industry and agriculture,i.e. consumer goods, is also reflected in a newbuzzword that emerged in close connectionwith the succession: “flames of Hamnam” (함남의 불길). It was first mentioned in RodongSinmun on Oct. 26th [link] and refers to an on-the-spot guidance by Kim Jong Il in October2011. The 2012 New Year Joint Editorial says:“The flames of Hamnam for great innovationshould flare up more fiercely in the sectors oflight industry and agriculture, the leadingsectors for the building of a thriving country”.On Youtube, you can find a song emphasizingthe role of the youth in building the economy[소개편집물 우리도 함남의 불길이 되리 함경남도청년들, link]

This reference to economic policies, theimprovement of the living standard, theproduction of consumer goods and thesatisfaction of the citizen’s material needs is nocoincidence. Kim Jong Un and those behind himknow their country well, and they are aware ofwhat even we outsiders can note with a sharpeye. Among the many examples are two stillimages I generated from official KCNA videofootage on the mourning. Even this carefullyassembled reporting provides interestinginsights into how North Korea’s society ischanging.

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Aside from the regular pictures of orderlylined-up masses, a solemn atmosphere andcitizens overcome with grief, there was a TVinterview with a lady in one of the shops wherefresh fish was distributed. She could hardlyhold back her tears when praising the twoleaders for taking such good care of theirpeople. What struck me, however, was the factthat her haircut was very similar to what wewould expect from a South Korea woman of herage, and the fact that she had obviouslyundergone a form of “enhancement” that isextremely popular in SOUTH Korea: eyelidsurgery. Is this so common now among middle-class women in Pyongyang that the state TV didnot even notice?

This was not the only example. Among themasses standing at the roadside when Kim JongIl’s hearse passed by, one could find images ofwomen with dyed hair and a haircut that in noway complied with “our style”.

Care is advised not to overstate the importanceof such examples, but they provide a starkcontrast to the image produced by the NorthKorean state, and readily accepted by Westernmedia, of uniformity and lack of individuality.As anyone who has been visiting North Koreain the past decades can confirm: this country ischanging rapidly, self-confidence andindividualism are growing, and a middle classhas emerged. The old leadership initiated thisprocess and then struggled to find a way todeal with the phenomenon. The new leadershiphas the task to continue this search for a way tomove forward, to accommodate the demands ofits citizens. All this must be done without beingself-destructive. This is clearly not an easy task.

Conclusion: What should we expect for 2012?

The year 2012 will no doubt be an interestingone for North Korea and its observers. The firstthing in chronological order would be thebirthday of the new leader. In past years, it wasreported that it is on January 8th. Filial pietywould suggest restraint, but no mentioning atall could best be explained by the lack of timefor a proper preparation. Or maybe we got thedate wrong?

Next on the list is February 16th, the 70thbirthday of the late Kim Jong Il. This would be agood occasion to unveil the first statue, and toassign him the title Eternal General (thus also

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having a chance to lay the Military First Policyto an honorable rest). As the benefactor of theKorean people, Kim Jong Un will hand outpresents and extra food rations to his citizensand loyal followers.

We already learned from official publicationsthat the 100th birthdays of the country’sfounder Kim Il Sung on April 15 th will becelebrated despite the demise of his successorand eldest son.

Th is leads us to the quest ion o f theformalization of Kim Jong Un’s rule. If he andhis supporters manage to consolidate hispower, at some point he needs to be givenofficial and formal titles. The two on the list areGeneral Secretary of the KWP, and Chairman ofthe National Defense Commission. On the otherhand, Kim Jong Un must show proper piety tohis father so as to earn the respect by Korea’stradition-oriented citizens. Let’s not forget thatKim Jong Il only became Secretary General ofthe Party in 1997, after a three year mourningperiod for Kim Il Sung was over.

In any case, given the role as Kingmaker playedby the Party so far, the 7th Party Congress ofthe WPK - whenever it takes place - would bean appropriate event to assign Kim Jong Un thetitle of Secretary General. If another mode ischosen, or if he is not assigned this title at all,we will have to ask ourselves why and what thistells us about Party support.

In 1998, the constitution was changed to makeKim Il Sung the Eternal President of thecountry, and to elevate the role of the NationalDefense Commission Chairman. Anotheramendment is not impossible, and a similarhonor could be given to Kim Jong Il. The postheld by Kim Jong Un could be upgraded.

On the policy side, it is fair to say at this pointthat a quick improvement of relations with LeeMyung-bak’s South Korea is not on the top ofthe to-do list of Kim Jong Un. The accusationsof disrespectful behavior have become so

massive that we can only hope this to be theusual bellicose rhetoric, and not the prelude toanother military incident. However, unificationremains a state goal, and South Korea is themost natural cooperation partner for economicexchanges. The latter are crucial for achievingthe promised improvement in the North Koreanpeople’s living standard. I would thus be ratheroptimistic about the prospects of an inter-Korean reconciliation. Whether this will happenunder the current president is, however,questionable.

This means that for the time being, dependenceon China as the only significant economicpartner will remain high or even grow. NeitherSeoul nor Pyongyang will be too happy aboutthis, and alternatives will be actively sought.This opens new opportunities for Russia, theUnited States, and the EU. I would also keep aclose eye on Southeast Asia and the MiddleEast.

However, a President Obama running against aconservative challenger will probably avoidanything that could be interpreted asappeasement and lack of toughness. The EU ismore than ever preoccupied with itself.Another open window of opportunity mightthus end up being closed unused, and NorthKorea could apply its old and proven strategiesto keep us attentive. This includes the nuclearcard in all of its variations.

Looking further into the future, missing thepotential for improvement might turn outparticularly unfortunate. If Kim Jong Unmanages to survive the first years in power, hewill gradually but steadily tighten his grip onthe Party and the families. He will get rid ofopponents, increase his group of loyalists, andthus weaken the institutions that at thismoment seem to enjoy more power than theyhad in North Korea’s history at any time since1956. The quasi-collective leadership we arefaced with right now will over the years turninto another one-person dictatorship as in the

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past. Unless the world seizes this opportunityfor a breakthrough in relations, we might soonfind ourselves in the same situation as it usedto be in the past decades, with the sameproblems - except that, in the meanwhile, theymight have grown in size.

Ruediger Frank is Professor of East AsianEconomy and Society at the University ofVienna, Vice Head of Department, and an Asia-Pacific Journal associate. He is a member of theWorld Economic Forum Global Agenda Councilon Korea and did consultancy work for TheElders in preparation for the visit by PresidentMartti Ahtisaari , Prime Minister GroBrundtland, President Jimmy Carter andPresident Mary Robinson to the KoreanPeninsula and China in 2011. Born in East

Germany and raised there and in the SovietUnion, he spent one semester as a languagestudent at Kim Il Sung University in 1991. Heholds an MA in Korean Studies and a PhD inEconomics. His latest books include (with S.Burghart, eds.): Driving Forces of SocialistTransformation: North Korea and theExperience of Europe and East Asia, Vienna:Praesens 2010; (ed., 2011): Exploring NorthKorean Arts, Nuremberg: Verlag fuer ModerneKunst; and (with James Hoare, Patrick Köllnerand Susan Pares, eds., 2011): Korea 2011:Politics, Economy, and Society, Leiden andBoston: Brill.

Recommended citation: Ruediger Frank, 'NorthKorea after Kim Jong Il: The Kim Jong Un eraand its challenges,' The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol10, Issue 2 No 2, January 9, 2012.