the financial crisis and the future of the p/c insurance industry impact & implications...

The Financial Crisis and the Future of the P/C

Insurance IndustryImpact & Implications

Southwest Actuarial ForumSan Antonio, TX

November 30, 2009

Download at: www.iii.org/Presentations/

Robert P. Hartwig, Ph.D., CPCU, President & EconomistInsurance Information Institute 110 William Street New York, NY 10038

Tel: (212) 346-5520 Fax: (212) 732-1916 [email protected] www.iii.org

THE ECONOMIC STORM

What the Financial Crisis and Recession Mean for the Industry’s

Exposure Base, Growth, Profitability and Investments

4

3.7

%

0.8

% 1.6

% 2.5

% 3.6

%

3.1

%

2.9

%

0.1

%

4.8

%

4.8

%

-0.7

%

1.5

%

-2.7

%

2.8

%

2.8

%

2.7

%

2.9

%

2.8

%

3.0

%

-0.7

%

-6.4%

-5.4%

-0.2%

-8%

-6%

-4%

-2%

0%

2%

4%

6%

2

00

0

2

00

1

2

00

2

2

00

3

2

00

4

2

00

5

2

00

6

07

:1Q

07

:2Q

07

:3Q

07

:4Q

08

:1Q

08

:2Q

08

:3Q

08

:4Q

09

:1Q

09

:2Q

09

:3Q

09

:4Q

10

:1Q

10

:2Q

10

:3Q

10

:4Q

Real GDP Growth*

*Blue bars are Estimates/Forecasts from Blue Chip Economic Indicators.Source: US Department of Commerce, Blue Economic Indicators 11/09; Insurance Information Institute.

Recession began in December 2007. Economic toll of credit crunch, housing slump, labor market contraction has been severe but recovery is in sight

The Q1:2009 decline was the steepest since the

Q1:1982 drop of 6.4%

Personal and commercial lines

exposure base have been hit

hard and will be slow to come

back

5

Length of U.S. Business Cycles, 1929-Present*

43

138 11 10 8 10 11

166

168 8

19

50

80

3745

39

24

106

36

58

12

92

120

73

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

Aug.1929

May1937

Feb.1945

Nov.1948

July1953

Aug.1957

Apr.1960

Dec.1969

Nov.1973

Jan.1980

Jul.1981

Jul.1990

Mar.2001

Dec.2007

Contraction Expansion Following

* Through June 2009 (likely the “official end” of recession) **Post-WW II period through end of most recent expansion.

Sources: National Bureau of Economic Research; Insurance Information Institute.

Duration (Months)

Month Recession Started

Average Duration** Recession = 10.4 MonthsExpansion = 60.5 Months

Length of expansions

greatly exceeds

contractions

6

5.2%

-0.9

%-7

.4%

-6.5

%-1

.5%

1.8%

4.3%

18.6

%20

.3%

5.8%

0.3%

-1.6

%-1

.0%

-1.8

%-1

.0%

3.1%

1.1%

0.8%

0.4%

0.6%

-0.4

%-0

.3%

1.6%

5.6%

13.7

%7.

7%1.

2%-2

.9% -0

.5%

-3.8

%-4

.4%

-4.4

%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%7

87

98

08

18

28

38

48

58

68

78

88

99

09

19

29

39

49

59

69

79

89

90

00

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

9

Rea

l N

WP

Gro

wth

-4%

-2%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

Rea

l G

DP

Gro

wth

Real NWP Growth Real GDP

Real GDP Growth vs. Real P/C Premium Growth: Modest Association

P/C insurance industry’s growth is influenced modestly by growth

in the overall economy

Sources: A.M. Best, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Blue Chip Economic Indicators, 11/09; Insurance Information Inst.

Regional Differences Will Significantly

Impact P/C Markets Recovery in Some Areas Will Begin Years Ahead of Others & Speed of Recovery Will Differ By Orders of

Magnitude

8

State Economic Growth Varied Tremendously in 2008

Eastern US growing more slowly than Plains,

Mountains

9

Fastest Growing States in 2008: Plains, Mountain States Lead

7.3%

4.4%

3.5%2.9%

2.0%2.1%2.5%

2.7%

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

ND WY SD CO OK WV IA TX, MN,NM, WA

Natural resource and agricultural states have done

better than most others recently, helping insurance

exposure in those areas

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Insurance Information Institute.

PercentReal State GDP Growth

10

Slowest Growing States in 2008: Diversity of States Suffering

-0.1%

-0.4%-0.6%-0.6%

-1.5%-1.6%-1.6%

-1.7%

-2.0%

-0.9%

-0.6%-0.6%

-2.5%

-2.0%

-1.5%

-1.0%

-0.5%

0.0%KY CT AZ GA IN NV RI MI DE FL OH AK

States in the North, South, East and West all represented among

hardest hit but for differing reasons

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Insurance Information Institute.

PercentReal State GDP Growth

Labor Market Trends

Fast & Furious: Massive Job Losses Sap the Economy and Personal &

Commercial Lines Exposure

12

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

11.0

Ja

n-0

0

Ja

n-0

1

Ja

n-0

2

Ja

n-0

3

Ja

n-0

4

Ja

n-0

5

Ja

n-0

6

Ja

n-0

7

Ja

n-0

8

Ja

n-0

9

January 2000 through October 2009*

Unemployment will likely peak near 10.5 % during this cycle, impacting payroll

sensitive p/c and l/h exposures

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Insurance Information Institute.

Oct. 2009 unemployment was 10.2%, up 0.4% from Sept. and nearing its

highest level since April 1983 (10.8%)

Unemployment Rate:On the Rise

Average unemployment rate 2000-07 was 5.0%

Previous Peak: 6.3% in June 2003

Trough: 4.4% in March 2007

Oct

-09

Unemployment Rates by State, September 2009: Highest 25 States*

10.5

9.8

9.610

.1

10.1

10.5

9.3

9.1

9.2

8.89.

3

8.9

8.99.

5

11.4

11.6

10.7

10.8

10.9

11.011

.5

13.3

13.0

12.2

15.3

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

MI NV RI CA SC OR DC FL KY NC AL IL TN OH GA NJ IN MO WA MA MS AZ NY WV ID

Une

mpl

oym

ent R

ate

(%)

*Provisional figures for September 2009, seasonally adjusted.

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Insurance Information Institute.

The unemployment rate has been rising across the country, but some states are doing much

better than others.

Insurers with heavy footprints in these states will lag behind

6.8

6.7

6.7

6.7

6.76.97.

27.

2

4.8

4.9

6.2

7.07.1

4.2

6.7

8.2

8.3

7.27.3

7.47.

78.38.

5

8.4

8.48.

8

0

2

4

6

8

10

PA ME AK CT WI DE TX NM LA MN HI MD NH AR CO KS WY IA OK VT MT VA UT NE SD ND

Une

mpl

oym

ent R

ate

(%)

Unemployment Rates By State, September 2009: Lowest 25 States*

The unemployment rate has been rising across the country, but some states are doing much

better than others.

*Provisional figures for September 2009, seasonally adjusted.

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Insurance Information Institute.

15

U.S. Unemployment Rate,(2007:Q1 to 2010:Q4F)*

4.5%

4.5% 4.6% 4.

8% 4.9%

5.4%

6.1%

6.9%

8.1%

9.3% 9.

6% 9.9% 10

.1%

10.0

%

9.8%

9.6%

4.0%

4.5%

5.0%

5.5%

6.0%

6.5%

7.0%

7.5%

8.0%

8.5%

9.0%

9.5%

10.0%

10.5%

11.0%

07:Q1 07:Q2 07:Q3 07:Q4 08:Q1 08:Q2 08:Q3 08:Q4 09:Q1 09:Q2 09:Q3 09:Q4 10:Q1 10:Q2 10:Q3 10:Q4

* Blue bars are actual; Yellow bars are forecasts

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Blue Chip Economic Indicators (11/09); Insurance Info. Inst.

Rising unemployment is eroding payrolls and

workers comp’s exposure base.

Unemployment is expected to peak above

10% in early 2010.

17

Labor Underutilization: Broader than Just

Unemployment

11.2%

16.4% 16.5% 16.3%

17.5%17.0%16.8%

10%

11%

12%

13%

14%

15%

16%

17%

18%

Sep-08 May-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09

Marginally attached and unemployed persons account for 17.5% of the labor

force in Oct. 2009 (1 out every 5.7 people). Unemployment rate alone was 10.2%.

Underutilization shows a broader impact on WC and other commercial exposures.

NOTE: Marginally attached workers are persons who currently are neither working nor looking for work but indicate that they want and are availableFor a job and have looked for work sometime in the recent past. Discouraged workers, a subset of the marginally attached, have given a job-marketrelated reason for not looking currently for a job. Persons employed part time for economic reasons are those who want and are available for full-time work but have had to settle for a part-time schedule.

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Insurance Information Institute.

Percent % of Labor Force

19

Monthly Change Employment*(Thousands)

-72

-144-122-160-137-161

-128-175

-321-380

-597

-681-741

-681-652

-519

-303

-463

-304

-154-219

-190

-800

-700

-600

-500

-400

-300

-200

-100

0

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Job losses since the recession began in Dec. 2007 total 8.2 mill; 15.7 million people are now

defined as unemployed.

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/ces/home.htm; Insurance Info. Institute

Monthly losses in Dec. – May were the largest in the post-WW II period

but pace of loss is diminishing

January 2008 through October 2009

Will the “Job Recession” End Soon?Feb.-Nov. 2009 Initial Jobless Claims*

620

640

643

647

650

650 65

865

965

164

863

862

5 632

630

627 63

262

361

761

861

660

758

556

756

055

7 566 57

156

7 573

570

564

554

549

541

533

532

527

524

520

500

520

540

560

580

600

620

640

660

Feb

14

Feb

21

Feb

28

Mar

7M

ar 1

4M

ar 2

1M

ar 2

8A

pr

4A

pr

11A

pr

18A

pr

25M

ay 2

May

9M

ay 1

6M

ay 2

3M

ay 3

0Ju

n 6

Jun

13

Jun

20

Jun

27

Jul 4

Jul 1

1Ju

l 18

Jul 2

5A

ug

1A

ug

8A

ug

15A

ug

22A

ug

29S

ep 5

Sep

12

Sep

19

Sep

26

Oct

3O

ct 1

0O

ct 1

7O

ct 2

4O

ct 3

1N

ov 7

4-week moving avg (000)

*seasonally adjusted; state programs only Source: http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/eta/ui/current.htm

Continued drop in initial unemployment claims is a good news.

Portends gradual slowdown in the loss of worker comp exposure

$0

$1,000

$2,000

$3,000

$4,000

$5,000

$6,000

$7,000

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09*

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

$30

$35

$40

$45Wage & SalaryDisbursementsWC NPW

*Average Wage and Salary data as of 7/1/2009.Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/WASCUR; I.I.I. Fact Books

Wage & Salary Disbursements (Payroll Base) vs. Workers Comp

Net Written Premiums

7/90-3/91

Shaded areas indicate recessions

3/01-11/01

Wage & Salary Disbursement (Private Employment) vs. WC NWP$ Billions $ Billions

12/07-?

Weakening payrolls have

eroded $2B+ in workers comp

premiums

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

'26

'28

'30

'32

'34

'36

'39

'41

'43

'45

'47

'49

'52

'54

'56

'58

'60

'62

'65

'67

'69

'71

'73

'75

'78

'80

'82

'84

'86

'88

'91

'93

'95

'97

'99

'01

'04

'06

Frequency: 1926-2008A Long-Term Drift Downward

Manufacturing—Total Recordable CasesRate of Injury and Illness Cases per 100 Full-Time Workers

Note: Recessions indicated by gray bar

Note: Recessions indicated by gray bar.

Sources: NCCI from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; National Bureau of Economic Research

Crisis-Driven Exposure

DriversEconomic Obstacles

to Growth in P/C Insurance

26

New Private Housing Starts,1990-2010F (Millions of Units)

2.07

1.80

1.36

0.90

0.57

0.79

1.48

1.351.

46

1.29

1.20

1.01

1.19

1.47

1.62 1.64

1.57 1.60 1.

71

1.85 1.

960.50.60.70.80.91.01.11.21.31.41.51.61.71.81.92.02.1

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09F 10F

Exposure growth due to home construction forecast for HO insurers is dim for 2009

with some improvement in 2010.

Impacts also for comml. insurers with construction risk exposure

New home starts plunged 34%

from 2005-2007; Drop through 2009 is 72% (est.)—a net

annual decline of 1.5 million units,

lowest since record began in

1959

I.I.I. estimates that each incremental 100,000 decline in housing starts costs

home insurers $87.5 million in new exposure (gross premium). The net

exposure loss in 2009 vs. 2005 is estimated at about $1.3 billion.

Source: US Department of Commerce; Blue Chip Economic Indicators (11/09); Insurance Information Inst.

27

16.916.916.6

17.117.5

17.817.4

16.516.1

13.1

10.3

11.7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09F 10F

Weak economy, credit crunch are hurting auto sales; Gas prices

have been a factor too.

New auto/light truck sales are expected to experience a net drop of 6.6 million units annually by 2009 compared with 2005, a decline of 39%

and the lowest level since the late 1960s

Impacts of falling auto sales will have a less pronounced effect on auto insurance exposure growth

than problems in the housing market will on home insurers

Auto/Light Truck Sales,1999-2010F (Millions of Units)

Source: US Department of Commerce; Blue Chip Economic Indicators (11/09); Insurance Information Inst.

“Cash for Clunkers” netted about $300M in net new personal auto

premiums

28

Total Industrial Production,(2007:Q1 to 2010:Q4F)

1.5%3.2% 3.6%

0.3% 0.2%

-4.6%

-9.0%

-13.0%

-19.0%

-10.3%

4.5%4.3%4.3%4.5%5.2%5.5%

-25.0%

-20.0%

-15.0%

-10.0%

-5.0%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

07

:Q1

07

:Q2

07

:Q3

07

:Q4

08

:Q1

08

:Q2

08

:Q3

08

:Q4

09

:Q1

09

:Q2

09

:Q3

09

:Q4

10

:Q1

10

:Q2

10

:Q3

10

:Q4

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Blue Chip Economic Indicators (1109); Insurance Info. Inst.

Industrial production began

to contracted sharply in late

2008 and plunged in Q1 2009

End of recession in mid-2009, Obama stimulus program are benefiting industrial production, but insurance exposure lags as most gains are productivity driven

Figures for H2 2009 and 2010 revised

upwards to reflect expected impact of Obama stimulus

program and a gradual economic recovery

29

Private Sector Business Starts,1993:Q2-2008:Q4*

175

186

174

180

186

192

188

187 18

918

6 190 19

419

119

9 204

202

195

196

196

206

206

201

192

198

206

206

203

211

205

212

200 20

520

420

419

720

320

9

203

192

192

193

201 20

420

221

0 212

209

216 22

0 223

220

220

210

221

212

204

218

210

209

195

187 18

9

201

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

220

230

93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

Business starts are down 15% in the current downturn, holding back most types of commercial

insurance exposure

*Latest available as of Oct. 2009.Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cewbd.t07.htm

Thousands189,000 business starts

were recorded 2008:Q4, the lowest

level since 1995

30

Business Bankruptcy Filings,1980-2009*

43

,69

44

8,1

25

69

,30

06

2,4

36

64

,00

47

1,2

77

81

,23

58

2,4

46

63

,85

36

3,2

35

64

,85

37

1,5

49

70

,64

36

2,3

04

52

,37

45

1,9

59

53

,54

95

4,0

27

44

,36

73

7,8

84

35

,47

24

0,0

99

38

,54

03

5,0

37

34

,31

73

9,2

01

19

,69

52

8,3

22 4

3,5

46

60

,00

0

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

% Change Surrounding Recessions

1980-82: 58.6%1980-87: 88.7%1990-91: 10.3%2000-01: 13.0%

2006-09: 204.6%*

*Based estimate of 60,000 business bankruptcies in 2009; actual first half total was 30,333.Source: American Bankruptcy Institute; Insurance Information Institute

There were 30,333 business bankruptcies during the first half of 2009, up 64% from 2008: H1 and on track for about 60,000 for all of 2009, the most since 1993. Current

recession will generate 200%+ surge.

Business bankruptcies contribute to litigation

Year-Over-Year Change in Quarterly U.S. State Tax Revenues, Inflation Adjusted

2.4% 4.

7% 5.6%

9.9%

9.5%

4.4%

1.8%

0.4%

-1.3

%-1

.7%

-3.0

%-7

.6%

-10.

7%0.

0% 1.6%

-0.6

%0.

1%4.

0% 4.7% 5.

7%8.

2%3.

4%6.

0% 7.0%

12.4

%6.

6%4.

2%3.

7%6.

3%2.

6%1.

3% 1.9%

2.3%

0.4% 0.8%

0.4%

3.0%

0.2%

-5.8

%

-17.

8%-1

3.4%

2.4%

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

1Q99

2Q99

3Q99

4Q99

1Q00

2Q00

3Q00

4Q00

1Q01

2Q01

3Q01

4Q01

1Q02

2Q02

3Q02

4Q02

1Q03

2Q03

3Q03

4Q03

1Q04

2Q04

3Q04

4Q04

1Q05

2Q05

3Q05

4Q05

1Q06

2Q06

3Q06

4Q06

1Q07

2Q07

3Q07

4Q07

1Q08

2Q08

3Q08

4Q08

1Q09

2Q09

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government: http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/government_finance/state_revenue_report/2009-10-15-SRR_77.pdf

Nationwide, state-tax collections for fiscal year 2009 declined by a record $63 billion, or 8.2 percent from the previous year. That loss

is roughly twice the amount states gained in fiscal relief from

the federal stimulus package.

States revenues were down 17.8% in Q2 2009, the second consecutive quarter of record revenue decline. This will impact public infrastructure spending significantly.

GREEN SHOOTS

Is the Recession Nearing an End?

48

Hopeful Signs that theEconomic Recovery Is Underway

• Recession Appears to be Bottoming Out, Freefall Has Ended• GDP shrinkage has ended; Economy is expanding

• Pace of job losses is slowing

• Major stock market indices well off record lows, anticipating recovery

• Some signs of retail sales stabilization are evident

• Financial Sector is Stabilizing• Banks are reporting quarterly profits

• Many banks expanding lending to very credit worthy people & businesses

• Housing Sector Seems To Be Bottoming Out• Home are much more affordable (attracting buyers)

• Mortgage rates are still low relative to pre-crisis levels (attracting buyers)

• Freefall in housing starts and existing home sales is ending in many areas

• Inflation & Energy Prices Are Under Control

• Consumer & Business Debt Loads Are Shrinking

Source: Ins. Info. Inst.

49

11 Industries for the Next 10 Years: Insurance Solutions Needed

GovernmentEducation

Health CareEnergy (Traditional)Alternative Energy

AgricultureNatural Resources

EnvironmentalTechnology

Light ManufacturingExport Oriented Industries

Inflation Trends: Concerns Over

Stimulus Spending and Monetary Policy

Mounting Pressure on Claim Cost Severities?

51

Annual Inflation Rates(CPI-U, %), 1990-2010F

4.9 5.1

3.0 3.2

2.6

1.51.9

3.3 3.4

1.3

2.5 2.3

3.0

3.8

2.8

3.8

(0.4)

2.0

2.82.92.4

(1.0)

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09F10F

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Blue Chip Economic Indicators, 11/09.

Inflation peaked at 5.6% in August 2008 on high energy and commodity crisis. The

recession and the collapse of the commodity bubble have produced temporary deflation.

There is so much slack in the US economy that inflation should not be a concern through 2011, but depreciation of dollar is concern longer run.

54

Top Concerns/Risks for Insurers if Inflation is Reignited

CONCERNS: The Federal Reserve Has Flooded Financial System with Cash (Turned on the Printing Presses), the Federal Govt. Has Approved a $787B Stimulus and the Deficit is Expected to Mushroom to $1.8 Trillion. All Are Potentially Inflationary. What are the potential impacts for insurers? What can/should insurers do to protect themselves from the risks of inflation?

KEY RISKS FROM SUSTAINED/ACCELERATING INFLATION• Rising Claim Severities

Cost of claims settlement rises across the board (property and liability)• Rate Inadequacy

Rates inadequate due to low trend assumptions arising from use of historical data • Reserve Inadequacy

Reserves may develop adversely and become inadequate (deficient)• Burn Through on Retentions

Retentions, deductibles burned through more quickly• Reinsurance Penetration/Exhaustion

Higher costsrisks burn through their retentions more quickly, tapping into re-insurance more quickly and potential exhausting their reinsurance more quickly

Source: Ins. Info. Inst.

Key Threats Facing Insurers Amid

Financial Crisis

Challenges for theNext 5-8 Years

56

Important Issues & Threats Facing Insurers: 2009 - 2015

Source: Insurance Information Inst.

1. Erosion of Capital Losses were larger and occurred more rapidly than is commonly

understood or presumed Max surplus loss at 3/31/09 was 16%=$85B from 9/30/07 peak P/C policyholder surplus loss could have been much larger Decline in PHS of 1999-2002 was 15% over 3 years and was

entirely made up and them some in 2003. Current decline was ~16% in 5 qtrs.

During the opening years of the Great Depression (1929-1933) PHS fell 37%, Assets fell 28% and Net Written Premiums fell by 35%. It took until 1939-40 before these key measures returned to their 1929 peaks.

BOTTOM LINE: Capital and assets fell farther and faster than many believed possible. It will take years to return to the 2007 peaks—likely 2011 (without market relapse).

57



2. Reloading Capital After “Capital Event” Continued asset price erosion coupled with major “capital

event” would have led to shortage of capital among some companies

Possible Consequences: Insolvencies, forced mergers, calls for govt. aid, requests to relax capital requirements

P/C insurers have come to assume that large amounts of capital can be raised quickly and cheaply after major events (post-9/11, Katrina). This assumption may be incorrect in the current environment

Cost of capital is much higher today (relative “risk-free” rates), reflecting both scarcity & risk

Implications: P/C (re)insurers need to protect capital today and develop detailed contingency plans to raise fresh capital & generate internally. Already a reality for some life insurers.

58



3. Long-Term Reduction in Investment Earnings Low interest rates, risk aversion toward equities and many

categories of fixed income securities lock in a multi-year trajectory toward ever lower investment gains

Fed actions in Treasury markets keep yields low Many insurers have not adjusted to this new investment

paradigm of a sustained period of low investment gains Regulators will not readily accept it; Many will reject it Implication 1: Industry must be prepared to operate in

environment with investment earnings accounting for a smaller fraction of profits

Implication 2: Implies underwriting discipline of a magnitude not witnessed in this industry in more than 30 years. Yet to manifest itself.

Lessons from the period 1920-1975 need to be relearned

59Source: Insurance Information Inst.

4. Regulatory Overreach Principle danger is that P/C insurers get swept into vast

federal regulatory overhaul and subjected to inappropriate, duplicative and costly regulation (Dual Regulation)

Strong arguments for Optional Federal Charter, but… Pushing for major change is not without risk in the

current highly charged political environment Dangers exist if feds get their nose under the tent Status Quo is viewed as unacceptable by all Disunity within the insurance industry Insurance & systemic risk—Who is important? Other: Less Independent Fed = Less Credible Fed Impact of regulatory changes will be felt for decades Bottom Line: Regulatory outcome is uncertain and risk

of adverse outcome exists

Important Issues & Threats Facing Insurers: 2009 – 2???

60

Health Insurance Reform Debate—Potential Spillover Impacts on P/C Insurers

• 24-Hour Coverage Proposal Would roll WC and med components of auto into natl. health care plan

• Rollback of McCarran-Ferguson Act Would repeal or restrict for health and medical malpractice insurers Slippery slope—Med Mal is a p/c line; Congress will not hesitate to breach M-F for other p/c lines in the

future to show its ire over an issue (e.g., after major cat)

• Exclusion of Med Mal Reform from Health Care Bill Shows powerful influence of trial bar with Congress/Administration

• FTC granted authority to conduct studies “related to insurance” –All Lines!• Reporting of Claims• Adjustments to Medicare Fee Schedules• Patient “Bill of Rights” or Vague Standards of Care• Cost Shifting into WC, Auto from Health System

WC/Auto Medical: more lucrative from provider perspective

• “Windfall” Profit Taxes? Additional Premium Taxes?• Executive Compensation Restrictions?• Public “Option” in P/C Lines—Nat Cat/Wind?• Perception that Feds Regulate Insurance Industry Taking Root

The Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962) includes the following benefit to the trial bar:

Section 2531, entitled “Medical Liability Alternatives,” establishes an incentive program for states to adopt and implement alternatives to medical liability litigation. [BUT]…… “a state is not eligible for the incentive payments if that state puts a law on the books that limits attorneys’ fees or imposes caps on damages.”

Jeopardizes some $54 billion in savings in medical care costs that Congressional Budget Office (CBO) says litigation reform would bring.

Source: Andrew Breitbart, http://biggovernment.com; Congressional Budget Office (CBO)

Healthcare Reform Bill is a Trial Lawyer Dream Come True


Creeping Restrictions on Underwriting Attacks on underwriting criteria such as credit,

education, occupation, territory increasing View that use of numerous criteria are discriminatory

and create an adverse impact on certain populations Impact will be to degrade the accuracy of rating systems

to increase subsidies Catastrophe and Predictive modeling also at risk Current social and economic environment could

accelerate these efforts Danger that bans could be codified at federal level

during regulatory overhaul Bottom Line: Industry must be prepared to defend

existing and new criteria indefinitely



Creeping Socialization and Partial Nationalization of Insurance System

CAT risk is, on net, being socialized directly via state-run insurance and reinsurance mechanisms or via elaborate subsidy schemes involving assessments, premium tax credits, etc.

Some insurers sought/received TARP money Efforts to expand flood program to include wind Health insurance may be substantively socialized Terrorism risk—already a major federal role backed by insurers Eventually impacts for other lines such as personal auto, WC? Feds, states may open to more socialization of private insurance risk Ownership stakes in some insurers could be a slippery slope States like FL will lean heavily on Washington in the event of a mega-

cat that threatens state finance Bottom Line: Additional socialization likely. Can insurers/will

insurers draw the line—and where?

Important Issues & Threats Facing Insurers: 2009 -2015


Exploitation of Insurance as a Wealth Redistribution Mechanism

There is a longstanding history of attempts to use insurance to advance wealth redistribution/economic agendas

Urban subsidies; Coastal subsidies are old; Could be extended to workers comp in variety of ways

Insurer focus on underwriting profitability (resulting in higher rates) coupled with poor economic conditions could raise profile of affordability issue

Calls for “excess profits tax” on insurers Increased government involvement in insurance (including

ownership stakes) make this more likely Federal regulation could impose such redistribution schemes Bottom Line: Expect efforts to address social and economic

inequities through insurance



Emerging Tort Threat No tort reform (or protection of recent reforms) is

forthcoming from the current Congress or Administration

Erosion of recent reforms is a certainty (already happening)

Innumerable legislative initiatives will create opportunities to undermine existing reforms and develop new theories and channels of liability

Torts twice the overall rate of inflation Influence personal and commercial lines, esp. auto liab. Historically extremely costly to p/c insurance industry Leads to reserve deficiency, rate pressure Bottom Line: Tort “crisis” is on the horizon and will be

recognized as such by 2012-2014

Important Issues & Threats Facing Insurers: 2009 -2015

Over the Last Three Decades, Total Tort Costs* as a % of GDP Appear Somewhat Cyclical

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

19

80

19

82

19

84

19

86

19

88

19

90

19

92

19

94

19

96

19

98

20

00

20

02

20

04

20

06

20

08

E

20

10

E

Tor

t S

yste

m C

osts

1.50%

1.75%

2.00%

2.25%

2.50%

Tor

t C

osts

as

% o

f G

DP

Tort Sytem Costs Tort Costs as % of GDP

Sources: Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2008 Update on US Tort Cost Trends, Appendix 1A; I.I.I. calculations/estimates for 2009 and 2010

Billions

*Excludes the tobacco settlement, medical malpractice

2009-2010 Growth in Tort Costs as % of GDP is due in part to shrinking GDP

FINANCIAL STRENGTH &

RATINGS Industry Has Weathered

the Storms Well

70

P/C Insurer Impairments,1969-2008

815

12

711

934

913

12

19

916

14

13

36

49

31 3

450

48

55

60

58

41

29

16

12

31

18 19

49 50

47

35

18

14 15

75

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

The number of impairments varies significantly over the p/c insurance cycle,

with peaks occurring well into hard markets

Source: A.M. Best; Insurance Information Institute

71

P/C Insurer Impairment Frequency vs. Combined Ratio, 1969-2008

90

95

100

105

110

115

120

69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

Co

mb

ined

Rat

io

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

Imp

airm

ent R

ate

Combined Ratio after DivP/C Impairment Frequency

Impairment rates are highly

correlated with underwriting

performance and reached record lows in 2007/08


2008 impairment rate was a record low 0.23%, second only to the 0.17% record low in 2007 and barely one-fourth the 0.82% average since 1969

P/C Impairment Frequency vs. Catastrophe Points in Combined Ratio, 1977-2008

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

Cat

astr

op

he

Po

ints

on

Co

mb

ined

Rat

io

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

Imp

airm

ent R

ate

Catastrophe Points in Combined RatioP/C Impairment Frequency

Impairment rates are highly

correlated with underwriting

performance and reached record lows in 2007/08

Source: A.M. Best, PCS; Insurance Information Institute

2008 impairment rate was a record low 0.23%, second only to the 0.17% record low in 2007 and barely one-fourth the 0.82% average since 1969

Number of Impairments by State, 1969-2008

22 22 21 20 17 15 15 15 15 14 14 13 11 10 9 9 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 0

4166

22242533

63

9691

73

140

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

TX FL CA IL NY

PA LA MO

OK

OH AZ IN NJ

GA NE

WI

DE

MA

MD

SC

CO TN PR RI

HI

KY MI

NC

WV AL

DC UT

VA

WA IA KS

MN

MS

MT

NM OR

SD VI

WY

AR CT

VT

AK

ME

NH

NV

GU ID ND

No.

of I

mpa

irmen

ts

TX, FL and CA have the largest number of impairments.

Catastrophe risk plays a big role. Other factors influencing

impairments include the political environment and business mix


More TX insurers have become impaired over the past 40 years

than in any other state

17 insurers impaired

insurers in WI since

1969

74

Summary of A.M. Best’s P/C Insurer Ratings Actions in 2008*

Under Review, 63 , 4.3%

Upgraded, 59 , 4.0%

Initial, 41 , 2.8%

Other, 59 , 4.0%

Affirm, 1,183 , 81.0%

Downgraded, 55 , 3.8%

*Through December 19.Source: A.M. Best.

74

Despite financial market turmoil, high cat losses and a soft market in 2008, 81% of ratings actions by A.M. Best

were affirmations; just 3.8% were downgrades

and 4.0% upgrades

P/C insurance is by design a resilient in business. The dual threat of financial

disasters and catastrophic losses are

anticipated in the industry’s risk

management strategy.

76

Reasons for US P/C Insurer Impairments, 1969-2008

Source: A.M. Best: 1969-2008 Impairment Review, Special Report, Apr. 6, 2008

Deficient loss reserves and inadequate

pricing are the leading cause of

insurer impairments,

underscoring the importance of

discipline. Investment

catastrophe losses play a much smaller role.

Reinsurance Failure3.7%

Rapid Growth14.3%

Misc.9.1%

Affiliate Impairment

7.9%

Sig. Change in Business

4.2%

Deficient Loss

Reserves/In-adequate Pricing38.1%

Investment Problems

7.0%

Alleged Fraud8.1%

Catastrophe Losses7.6%

Critical Differences Between P/C

Insurers and BanksSuperior Risk Management Model

& Low Leverage Makea Big Difference

78

How Insurance Industry Stability Has Benefitted Consumers

BOTTOM LINE:• Insurance Markets—Unlike Banking—Are Operating

Normally• The Basic Function of Insurance—the Orderly Transfer

of Risk from Client to Insurer—Continues Uninterrupted• This Means that Insurers Continue to:

Pay claims (whereas 146 banks have gone under as of 11/20/09) The Promise is Being Fulfilled

Renew existing policies (banks are reducing and eliminating lines of credit) Write new policies (banks are turning away people and businesses who

want or need to borrow) Develop new products (banks are scaling back the products they offer) Compete Intensively (banks are consolidating, reducing consumer choice)

Source: Insurance Information Institute78

79

• Emphasis on Underwriting Matching of risk to price (via experience and modeling) Limiting of potential loss exposure Some banks sought to maximize volume and fees and disregarded risk

• Strong Relationship Between Underwriting and Risk Bearing Insurers always maintain a stake in the business they underwrite, keeping “skin in the game”

at all times Banks and investment banks package up and securitize, severing the link between risk

underwriting and risk bearing, with (predictably) disastrous consequences—straightforward moral hazard problem from Econ 101

• Low Leverage Insurers do not rely on borrowed money to underwrite insurance or pay claimsThere is no

credit or liquidity crisis in the insurance industry• Conservative Investment Philosophy

High quality portfolio that is relatively less volatile and more liquid• Comprehensive Regulation of Insurance Operations

The business of insurance remained comprehensively regulated whereas a separate banking system had evolved largely outside the auspices and understanding of regulators (e.g., hedge funds, private equity, complex securitized instruments, credit derivatives—CDS’s)

• Greater Transparency Insurance companies are an open book to regulators and the public

Source: Insurance Information Institute79

Reasons Why P/C Insurers Have Fewer Problems Than Banks:

A Superior Risk Management Model

P/C INSURANCE FINANCIAL

PERFORMANCE

A Resilient Industry in Challenging Times

Profitability

Historically Volatile

85

P/C Net Income After Taxes1991-2009:H1 ($ Millions)*

$14,

178

$5,8

40

$19,

316

$10,

870

$20,

598

$24,

404 $3

6,81

9

$30,

773

$21,

865

$3,0

46

$30,

029

$62,

496

$2,3

79

$5,7

57

-$6,970

$65,

777

$44,

155

$20,

559 $3

8,50

1

-$10,000

$0

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

$50,000

$60,000

$70,000

$80,00091 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

09:H

1

*ROE figures are GAAP; 1Return on avg. surplus. Excluding Mortgage & Financial Guaranty insurers yields an 4.5% ROAS for 2008 and 2.2%. 2009:Q1 net income was $10.0 billion excl. M&FG.Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Inst.

2005 ROE= 9.4%2006 ROE = 12.2%2007 ROAS1 = 12.4%2008 ROAS = 0.5%*2009:H1 ROAS = 2.5%*

Insurer profits peaked in 2006 and 2007, but fell 96.2% during the economic

crisis in 2008

85

86

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 0809:H1

US P/C Insurers All US Industries

ROE: P/C vs. All Industries 1987–2009: H1*

*Excludes Mortgage & Financial Guarantee in 2008 and 2009Sources: ISO, Fortune; Insurance Information Institute.

Andrew Northridge

Hugo Lowest CAT losses in 15 years

Sept. 11

4 Hurricanes

Katrina, Rita, Wilma

P/C profitability is cyclical and volatile

Financial Crisis*

-4%

-2%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08* 09Q1*

ROE Cost of Capital

ROE vs. Equity Cost of Capital:US P/C Insurance:1991-2009:H1*

*Excludes mortgage and financial guarantee insurers.Source: The Geneva Association, Ins. Information Inst.

The p/c insurance industry fell well short of is cost of capital in 2008

-13.

2 p

ts

US P/C insurers missed their cost of capital by an average 6.7 points from

1991 to 2002, but on target or better 2003-07, but

falling well short in 2008/09

-1.7

pts

+2.

3 p

ts

-9.0

pts

The cost of capital is the rate of return

insurers need to attract and retain

capital to the business

-7.1

pts

87

-6.0

pts

88

97.5

100.6 100.1 100.7

92.6

99.5101.0

8.9%4.2%

12.7%

14.3% 15.9%

9.6%

4.5%

80

85

90

95

100

105

110

1978 1979 2003 2005 2006 2008* 2009:H1*

Co

mb

ined

Ratio

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

Retr

un

on

Eq

uity*

Combined Ratio ROE*

* 2008/9 figures are return on average statutory surplus. Excludes mortgage and financial guarantee insurers.Source: Insurance Information Institute from A.M. Best and ISO data.

A 100 Combined Ratio Isn’t What it Used to Be: 95 is Where It’s At

Combined ratios must me must lower in today’s depressed

investment environment to generate risk

appropriate ROEs

Underwriting Trends

Financial Crisis Does Not Directly Impact Underwriting

Performance: Cycle, Catastrophes Were 2008’s Drivers

90

115.8

107.5

100.198.4

100.8

92.6

99.5101.0

95.7

90

100

110

120

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009:H1*

P/C Insurance Industry Combined Ratio, 2001-2009:H1*

*Excludes Mortgage & Financial Guaranty insurers in 2008. Including M&FG, 2008=105.1, 2009=100.9 Sources: A.M. Best, ISO.

Best combined ratio since 1949

(87.6)

As recently as 2001, insurers paid out nearly $1.16 for every

$1 in earned premiums

Relatively low CAT

losses, reserve releases

Cyclical Deterioration

90

2005 ratio benefited from heavy use of reinsurance which lowered net losses

91

P/C Reserve Development, 1992-2011E

-6.6

-9.8

13.7

9.9

7.3

-6.7

-9.5

-14.

6

-16 -15

-5

23.2

11.7

1

-4.1

-9.9

-2.1

-8.3

-2.6

2.3

($20)

($15)

($10)

($5)

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

$30

92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10E 11E

Pri

or Y

r. R

eser

ve R

elea

se ($

Bill

)

(6)

(4)

(2)

0

2

4

6

8

Impa

ct o

n C

ombi

ned

Rat

io (P

oint

s)

Prior Yr Reserve Development ($ Bill) Impact on Combined Ratio (Points)

.

Note: 2005 reserve development excludes a $6 billion loss portfolio transfer between American Re and Munich Re. Including this transaction, total prior year adverse development in 2005 was $7 billion. The data from 2000 and subsequent years excludes development from financial guaranty and mortgage insurance. Source: Barclay’s Capital; A.M. Best.

2009 off to a stronger start with AIG unit sales and

Bermuda consolidation

$ Value of deal up 20% in 2009,

volume down 12%

92

Calendar Year vs. Accident Year P/C Combined Ratio:1992- 2010E1

115.

7

106.

9

108.

4

106.

4

107.

8 110.

1

115.

9

107.

3

100.

1

98.3 10

0.9

92.4

95.5

105.

1

101.

9

105.

9

115.

7

106.

9

108.

4

106.

4

105.

8

101.

6

105.

6 107.

8 110.

0 112.

3

100.

8

96.6

96.0

100.

6

93.9

97.4

105.

5

105.

7 109.

4

105.

6

101.

6

105.

8

80

85

90

95

100

105

110

115

120

92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05* 06 07 08 09E 10E

Calendar Year Accident YearAccident year results show a

more significant deterioration in underwriting performance.

Calendar year results are helped by reserve releases

92

.

Note: 2005 reserve development excludes a $6 billion loss portfolio transfer between American Re and Munich Re. Including this transaction, total prior year adverse development in 2005 was $7 billion. The data from 2000 and subsequent years excludes development from financial guaranty and mortgage insurance. Source: Barclay’s Capital; A.M. Best.

93

-55-50-45-40-35-30-25-20-15-10-505

101520253035

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09:Q

1

Source: A.M. Best, ISO; Insurance Information Institute * Includes mortgage & finl. guarantee insurers

$ B

illi

ons

Insurers earned a record underwriting profit of $31.7B in 2006 and $19.3B in 2007, the largest ever but only the 2nd and 3rd since 1978. Cumulative underwriting deficit from

1975 through 2008 is $442B.

Underwriting Gain (Loss)1975-2009:H1*

$19.8 Bill underwriting loss in 2008

incl. mort. & FG insurers, -$2.2B in H1:09

93

Large underwriting losses are NOT

sustainable in current investment environment

94

Number of Years With Underwriting Profits by Decade, 1920s –2000s

67

10

8

45

0 0

3

0

2

4

6

8

10

1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s*

Note: Data for 1920 – 1934 based on stock companies only.Sources: Insurance Information Institute research from A.M. Best Data. *2000 through 2008.

Number of Years with Underwriting ProfitsUnderwriting profits were common before the 1980s (40 of the 60 years

before 1980 had combined ratios below 100)—but then they vanished. Not a single underwriting profit was recorded in the 25 years from 1979

through 2003.

94

P/C Premium Growth

Primarily Driven by the Industry’s Underwriting Cycle, Not the Economy

96

-6%

-4%-2%

0%

2%4%

6%

8%10%

12%

14%16%

18%

20%22%

24%

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

09:H

1

Sources: A.M. Best (historical and forecast), ISO, Insurance Information Institute

Strength of Recent Hard Marketsby NWP Growth

1975-78 1984-87 2000-03

96

Net written premiums fell 1.0%

in 2007 (first decline since 1943)

by 1.4% in 2008, and 4.2% in H1 2009, the first 3-

year decline since 1930-33

Shaded areas denote “hard

market” periods

100

0.8

%0

.8%

0.5

%0

.4%

0.3

%0

.3%

0.5

%0

.6%

0.5

%0

.1% 0.5

% 0.9

%1

.1%

1.3

% 1.7

%2

.6%

2.6

%2

.7% 3.0

%3

.1% 3.4

% 3.7

% 4.0

%4

.0% 4.3

%4

.4% 4.7

%4

.4% 4.7

%4

.6%

4.7

%4

.5%

0.2

%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

Ja

n-0

7F

eb

-07

Ma

r-0

7A

pr-

07

Ma

y-0

7J

un

-07

Ju

l-0

7A

ug

-S

ep

-07

Oc

t-0

7N

ov

-07

De

c-0

7J

an

-08

Fe

b-0

8M

ar-

08

Ap

r-0

8M

ay

-08

Ju

n-0

8J

ul-

08

Au

g-

Se

p-0

8O

ct-

08

No

v-0

8D

ec

-08

Ja

n-0

9F

eb

-09

Ma

r-0

9A

pr-

09

Ma

y-0

9J

un

-09

Ju

l-0

9A

ug

-S

ep

-09

Monthly Change in Auto Insurance Prices*

*Percentage change from same month in prior year.Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Auto insurance price increases seem to have leveled off

in recent months at about +4.5%

102

Average Commercial Rate Change,All Lines, (1Q:2004 – 3Q:2009)

-3.2

%

-5.9

%

-7.0

%

-9.4

%

-9.7

% -8.2

%

-4.6

% -2.7

%

-3.0

%

-5.3

%

-9.6

%

-11.

3%

-11.

8%

-13.

3% -12.

0%

-13.

5%

-12.

9% -11.

0%

-6.4

% -5.1

%

-4.9

%-5

.8%

-16%

-14%

-12%

-10%

-8%

-6%

-4%

-2%

0%

1Q04

2Q04

3Q04

4Q04

1Q05

2Q05

3Q05

4Q05

1Q06

2Q06

3Q06

4Q06

1Q07

2Q07

3Q07

4Q07

1Q08

2Q08

3Q08

4Q08

1Q09

2Q09

3Q09

Source: Council of Insurance Agents & Brokers; Insurance Information Institute

KRW Effect

-0.1

% Magnitude of price declines is now

shrinking. Reflects shrinking capital,

reduced investment gains, deteriorating

underwriting performance, higher cat losses and costlier

reinsurance

Capital/Policyholder Surplus (US)

Shrinkage, but Not Enough to

Trigger Hard Market

106

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 0809*

U.S. Policyholder Surplus: 1975-2009:H1*

Source: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute. *As of 6/30/09

$ B

illi

ons

“Surplus” is a measure of underwriting capacity. It is analogous to “Owners Equity” or “Net Worth” in non-insurance organizations

Actual capacity as of 6/30/09 was $463.0B, up from $437.1B as of 3/31/09 Recent peak was $521.8 as of

9/30/07. Surplus as of 6/30/09 is 11.2% below 2007 peak; Crisis trough was as of 3/31/0916.2% below 2007 peak

The premium-to-surplus ratio stood at $0.92:$1 as of

6/30/09, up from near record low of $0.85:$1 at

year-end 2007

106

Global Reinsurance Capacity Shrank in 2008, Mostly Due to Investments

$360

$300

$270

$280

$290

$300

$310

$320

$330

$340

$350

$360

$370

2007 2008

Global Reinsurance Capacity

Global reinsurance

capacity fell by an estimated 17% in 2008

107

Hurricanes14%

Change in Unrealized

Capital Losses55%

Realized Capital Losses31%

Source of Decline

Source: AonBenfield Reinsurance Market Outlook 2009; Insurance Information Institute.

109

Policyholder Surplus, 2006:Q4 – 2009:H1

$ Billions

$487.1$496.6

$512.8$521.8

$478.5

$455.6

$437.1

$463.0

$505.0$515.6

$517.9

$380

$400

$420

$440

$460

$480

$500

$520

$540

06:Q4 07:Q1 07:Q2 07:Q3 07:Q4 08:Q1 08:Q2 08:Q3 08:Q4 09:Q1 09:Q2

Source: ISO, AM Best.

Declines Since 2007:Q3 Peak

08:Q2: -$16.6B (-3.2%) 08:Q3: -$43.3B (-8.3%) 08:Q4: -$66.2B (-12.9%) 09:Q1: -$84.7B (-16.2%)

09:Q2: -$58.8B (-11.2%)

Capacity peaked at $521.8 as of 9/30/07

109

110

Ratio of Insured Loss to Surplus for Largest Capital Events Since 1989*

3.3%

9.6%

6.9%

10.9%

16.2%

13.8%

6.2%

0%2%4%6%8%

10%12%14%16%18%

6/3

0/1

98

9H

urr

ica

ne

Hu

go

6/3

0/1

99

2H

urr

ica

ne

An

dre

w

12

/31

/93

No

rth

rid

ge

Ea

rth

qu

ak

e

6/3

0/0

1S

ep

t. 1

1A

tta

ck

s

6/3

0/0

4F

lori

da

Hu

rric

an

es

6/3

0/0

5H

urr

ica

ne

Ka

trin

a

Fin

an

cia

lC

ris

is a

s o

f3

/31

/09

**

*Ratio is for end-of-quarter surplus immediately prior to event. Date shown is end of quarter prior to event. **Date of maximum capital erosion; As of 6/30/09 (latest available) ratio = 11.2%.Source: PCS; Insurance Information Institute.

The financial crisis now ranks as the largest

“capital event” over the past 20+ years

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

NWP % changeSurplus % change

*2009 NWP and Surplus figures are % changes for H1:09 vs H1:08Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute

Historically, Hard Markets Follow When Surplus “Growth” is Negative*

Sharp decline in capacity is a necessary but not sufficient

condition for a true hard market

Investment Performance

Investments are a Principle Source of Declining

Profitability

113

Property/Casualty Insurance Industry Investment Gain:1994- 2009:H11

$ Billions

$35.4

$42.8$47.2

$52.3

$44.4

$36.0

$45.3$48.9

$59.4$55.7

$64.0

$31.4

$12.4

$56.9$51.9

$57.9

$0

$10

$20

$30

$40

$50

$60

1Investment gains consist primarily of interest, stock dividends and realized capital gains and losses. 2006 figure consists of $52.3B net investment income and $3.4B realized investment gain. *2005 figure includes special one-time dividend of $3.2B.Sources: ISO; Insurance Information Institute.

Investment gains fell by 51% in 2008 due to lower yields, poor equity market

conditions. Falling again in 2009.

113

114

P/C Insurer Net Realized Capital Gains, 1990-2009:H1

$2.88$4.81

$9.89

$1.66

$6.00

$9.24$10.81

$13.02

$16.21

$6.63

-$1.21

$6.61$8.92

-$11.17

-$19.80

$18.02

$3.52

$9.70$9.13$9.82

-$20-$18-$16-$14-$12-$10-$8-$6-$4-$2$0$2$4$6$8

$10$12$14$16$18$20

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

09H

1

Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute.

Realized capital losses hit a record $19.8 billion in 2008 due to financial market turmoil, a $27.7 billion swing from 2007, followed by an $11.2B

drop in H1 2009. This is a primary cause of 2008/2009’s large drop in profits and ROE.

$ Billions

114

115

0.06% 0.12% 0.21%0.40%

0.96%

1.48%

2.37%

3.02%3.40%

4.82% 4.96% 5.04% 4.96% 4.82% 4.82% 4.88% 5.00% 4.93% 5.00% 5.19%

4.19%4.14%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

1M 3M 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 20Y 30Y

September 2009 Yield CurvePre-Crisis (July 2007)

Treasury Yield Curves: Pre-Crisis (July 2007) vs. Sept. 2009

Sources: Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve Bank; Insurance Information Institute.

Stock dividend cuts will further pressure investment income

Treasury Yield Curve is at its most depressed level in at least 45 years. Investment

income is falling as a result.

Scale and Scope of the Financial Crisis on

Global (Re) Insurance Markets

Significant but Manageable Impacts

Potential Writedowns by Segmentand Region: 2007-2010*

$1,604

$737

$2,470

$218

$75

$301

$890

$381

$1,283

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

US Europe JapanBanks Insurers Other

Insurers account for 7.5% of potential

securities writedowns globally (8.0% in US,

6.3% in US and 7.4% in Japan)

Billions of US Dollars

$2,712

$1,193

$4,054

* Includes loans and securities. Europe includes euro countries plus United Kingdom. Insurance category includes life and non-life insurers.Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009.

$1,604

$218

$890

$0

$250

$500

$750

$1,000

$1,250

$1,500

$1,750

Banks Insurers Others

US Financial Institutions FacingHuge Losses from the Credit Crunch*

*Estimate of financial sector writedowns, 2007-2010, as of April 2009. Includes loans and securities.Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009.

$ BillionsThe IMF estimates total US financial sector writedowns from soured assets will reach

$2.712 trillion, up 93% from $1.405 trillion from its Sept. 2008 estimate. Insurer losses

account for just 8% of the total.

$218B or 8% of estimated total (bank+insurer) losses will be

sustained by insurers

121

Catastrophic Loss

Catastrophe Losses Trends Are Trending Adversely

123

U.S. Insured Catastrophe Losses$7

.5$2

.7$4

.7$2

2.9

$5.5 $1

6.9

$8.3

$7.4

$2.6 $1

0.1

$8.3

$4.6

$26.

5$5

.9 $12.

9 $27.

5

$6.7

$26.

0$7

.5$1

00.0

$61.

9

$9.2

$0

$20

$40

$60

$80

$100

$120

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09*

20??

*Based on PCS data through June 30 = $7.5 billion.Note: 2001 figure includes $20.3B for 9/11 losses reported through 12/31/01. Includes only business and personal property claims, business interruption and auto claims. Non-prop/BI losses = $12.2B.Source: Property Claims Service/ISO; Insurance Information Institute

$ Billions2008 CAT losses exceeded

2006/07 combined. 2005 was by far the worst year ever for

insured catastrophe losses in the US, but the worst has yet to come.

$100 Billion CAT year is coming

eventually

123

2009 cat losses were down 29% in H1 from $10.6B in H1 2008

Top 12 Most Costly Disasters in US History, (Insured Losses, $2008)

$4.2 $5.2 $6.2 $7.3 $8.1 $8.5$11.3 $11.3 $12.5

$22.8 $23.8

$45.3

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

$30

$35

$40

$45

$50

Jeanne(2004)

Frances(2004)

Rita (2005)

Hugo(1989)

Ivan (2004)

Charley(2004)

Wilma(2005)

Northridge(1994)

Ike(2008)*

9/11Attacks(2001)

Andrew(1992)

Katrina(2005)

$ B

illi

ons

*PCS estimate as of August 1, 2009.Sources: PCS; Insurance Information Institute inflation adjustments.

8 of the 12 most expensive disasters in US history have occurred since 2004;

8 of the top 12 disasters affected FL

In 2008, Ike became the 4th most expensive insurance event and 3rd most

expensive hurricane in US history arising from about 1.35 mill claims

124

Distribution of US Insured CAT Losses: TX, FL, LA vs US, 1980-2008*

Rest of US, $176, 60%

Louisiana, $33.6, 11%

Texas, $31.2,10%

Florida, $57.1,19%

Florida accounted for 19% of all US insured CAT losses from 1980-2008:

$57.1B out of $297.9B

*All figures (except 2006-2008 loss) have been adjusted to 2005 dollars.Source: PCS division of ISO.

$ Billions of Dollars

126

States With Highest Insured Catastrophe Losses in 2008

$ Billions

$10.2

$2.2$1.6 $1.3 $1.0

$0.0

$2.0

$4.0

$6.0

$8.0

$10.0

$12.0

Texas California Minnesota Ohio Georgia

Source: PCS; Insurance Information Institute.

In 2008, insurers paid $26 billion to 3.9 million victims of 37 major

natural catastrophes across 40 states. 64% of the payouts (in $ terms) went

to homeowners, 27% to business owners and 9% to vehicle owners

Total Value of Insured Coastal Exposure (2007, $ Billions)

$2,378.9$895.1

$772.8$635.5

$479.9$224.4

$191.9$158.8$146.9$132.8

$92.5$85.6

$60.6$55.7$51.8$54.1

$14.9

$2,458.6

$0 $500 $1,000 $1,500 $2,000 $2,500 $3,000

FloridaNew York

TexasMassachusetts

New JerseyConnecticut

LouisianaS. Carolina

VirginiaMaine

North CarolinaAlabamaGeorgia

DelawareNew Hampshire

MississippiRhode Island

Maryland

Source: AIR Worldwide

In 2007, Florida still ranked as the #1 most exposed state to hurricane loss,

with $2.459 trillion exposure, an increase of $522B or 27% from $1.937

trillion in 2004.

The insured value of all coastal property was $8.9 trillion in 2007, up

24% from $7.2 trillion in 2004.

$522B increase since 2004, up 27%

127

U.S. Residual Market Property Policies In-ForceExposure

Source: PIPSO; Insurance Information Institute

931.6

1,319.7

1,785.0

1,196.5

1,642.31,741.7

2,209.3

2,840.42,621.32,780.6

1,458.1

2,203.9

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

In the 19-year period between 1990 and 2008, total residual market policy count (FAIR & Beach/Windstorm Plans) has nearly tripled to more than 2.6

million policies

Katrina, Rita and Wilma

4 Florida Hurricanes

U.S. Residual Market Exposure to Loss (Billions of Dollars)

Source: PIPSO; Insurance Information Institute

$54.7

$150.0

$281.8$244.2

$292.0

$372.3$430.5

$771.9

$696.4$656.7

$221.3

$419.5

$0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

$800

$900

1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

In the 19-year period between 1990 and 2008, total exposure to loss in the residual market (FAIR & Beach/Windstorm) Plans has surged from $54.7bn in 1990 to $696.4bn in 2008.

Katrina, Rita and Wilma

4 Florida Hurricanes

Hurricane Andrew

130

Insurance Information Institute On-Line

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND

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