usc saiedian vitzileos aff umkc round1

8/11/2019 USC Saiedian Vitzileos Aff UMKC Round1

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Advantage 1

Advantage 1 is the War on Drugs

Prohibition failslegalization creates domestic demand which shores up the black

marketdevastates cartels because of the reliability, accessibility, and profitability of

marijuanaeven if we dont eliminate all cartel profits, view the risk as linear

Beckley Foundation, 11scientific programme initiates, designs and conducts research into the effects ofpsychoactive substances on the brain, the foundation supports research into both science and policy of drugs., The

Beckley Foundation policy programme is dedicated to improving national and global drug policies, through

research that increases understanding of the health, social and fiscal implications of drug policy, Legalizing

Marijuana: An Exit Strategy from the War on Drugs,http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/2011/04/legalizing-

marijuana-an-exit-strategy-from-the-war-on-drugs/,Vitz

There are a few unknowns when it comes to the marijuana industryits effects on

productivity and drug-related violence,for example. Experts need to examine these effects, and policymakers must opentheir ears to these experts. A government-sponsored marijuana commission is not a new idea; in fact, Nixon established one in 1972 when he

formed the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. When the commission opposed Nixon by supporting decriminalization, heignored their recommendations and instead intensified his efforts on the War on Drugs campaign. This tradition of adhering to popular and

personal beliefs instead of scientific facts is still common today. With the U.S. federal debt sky-high and drug-

related violence in Mexico mounting, legalization is more relevant than everand the topic is ripe fordebate. Here we explore the domestic costs and benefits that the legalization of marijuana would incur, how it might affect the marijuana

industry in the Americas (particularly in Mexico), and aims to debunk the multitude of popular falsehoods that surround marijuana. Why

Current Policies Are Not Working Despite assurances from theDrug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that the current

drug policy is making headway, there are clear signs that prohibition has not succeeded in

diminishing drug supply or demand. Lowering demand for illegal drugs is the most effective way to lower illegal drug

productionwhile vendors may not respond to the threat of legal repercussions, they certainly

respond to market forces. As the largest consumer of Mexican drugs, it is the responsibility of

the U.S. to address its own demand for marijuana. But American demand and accessibility to

marijuana are not decreasing. In fact, marijuana use is currently on the rise and, although usage hasoscillated in the past decades, the proportion of use among 12th graders is only a few percentage points below what it was in 1974. Eighty-one

percent of American 12th graders said marijuana was fairly easy or very easy to acquire in 2010.2 In a 2009 survey, 16.7 million Americans

over 12 years of age had used marijuana in the past monththats 6.6 percent of the total population.3 While the U.S. may be

unable to control its own demand for marijuana, it could stop its contribution to drug cartel

revenues by allowing a domestic marijuana industry to thrive , shifting profits from cartels to

U.S. growers .While figures on marijuana smuggling into the U.S. fail to provide conclusive evidence of how much of the drug is enteringthe country, marijuana seizures have been steady throughout the Americas in the past decade. However, this says nothing certain about actual

production numbers.4 Domestically, the task of restricting U.S. production is becoming more difficult. Indoor crops that use efficient

hydroponic systems are becoming more popular in the U.S. but pose a challenge to law enforcement agencies for a number of reasons.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), indoor systems: *have+ the benefit of having lower chances of detection,

high yields with several harvests per year with high potency cannabis and elevated selling prices. The equipment, knowledge and seeds for

indoor growing have become very accessible *and+ The costs of building an indoor growing site can be quickly recovered.5 Cultivating high -

quality marijuana is becoming easier, less risky, and more profitable even for the casual grower. The rise of indoor crops will pose a new

obstacle to drug enforcement agencies in stopping marijuana production in the U.S. The UNODC outlines other negative

unintended consequences that have resulted from the illegality of drugs. The first is

obvious; when a good is forbidden, a black market inevitably rises. Black markets inherently

lack safety regulations and often finance other criminal activities. A second consequence is that treatmentprograms are often underfunded when the bulk of any drug policy budget is spent on law enforcement. Two other consequences have been
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greatly debatedMexican and American official figures range from 50-65 percent, but a study bythe RAND Corporation suggests closer to 15-26 percent.13 Even the most conservative of these estimatesroughly a fifth of revenuewould

strike a blow to cartel profits if eliminated. Marijuana is particularly valuable to cartels because they control the

entire production line ; they both grow and distribute it themselves, making it more reliable and less risky. Conversely,

cocaine is imported to Mexico mostly from South America, heightening the risk of smuggling it. More troubling is that cartels

are now even growing marijuana on U.S. public lands, mostly throughout national parks and forests, in order to avoid the task of smuggling

drugs across the U.S.-Mexican border.14 If Mexico were to reach the point of legalizing marijuana, the U.S.

could continue to buy the drug legally from south of the border, like many other consumer goods. But even

if Mexico did not implement its own legalization, recent data indicates that a domestic U.S.

industry could fill the role of the supplier and eliminate the need for Mexican marijuana. The drug isincreasingly grown domestically15 and U.S. growers are already posing a threat to Mexican market share. Exact numbers are impossible to

assess, but figures of American domestic marijuana production range from 30-60 percent of the total consumed in the U.S.16 Additionally, a

report by the RAND Corporation found that legalizing marijuana in California alone (and a subsequent rise in state-wide marijuana production)

could lower Mexican cartel marijuana revenues by 65-85 percent. This could occur if Californian marijuana were smuggled to the rest of the

U.S. where the drug would still be illegal. The marijuanas projected high quality and low price would make it an extremely competitive

product.17 It seems reasonable to assume that if the drug were legalizedin all fifty states, the domestic

market could easily overwhelm the Mexican market share. In terms of tangible effects on Mexican drug violence,the RAND Corporation and UNODC agree that removing U.S. demand for illegal marijuana would increase violence in the short run because

Mexican cartels would be fighting for dominance in a shrinking market.18 But in the long run, once U.S. demand is met by

domestic supply, cartels would be financially debilitated and, most likely, some of the violence quelled. The U.S.

population is by far the largest drug market for Mexico, making our action necessary for any

transnational legalization to be effective. While cocaine, methamphetamines, and heroin are

still funding cartels, drug violence will not be completely eliminated; but any move to starve

their resources is a step forward in weakening them and, ultimately, saving lives.

Legalization causes a huge price decrease which creates a more competitive domestic

market

Caulkins et. Al, 12Jonathan, Carnegie Mellon University, Design considerations for legalizing cannabis:lessons inspired by analysis of Californias Proposition 19, http://works.bepress.com/rosalie_pacula/22/, Vitz

The decline in wholesale prices will be dramatic The literature recognizes that legalization will lower

prices, but may underestimate the potential magnitudeof the decline. Current wholesale pricesin the UnitedStates are

$5001500 per poundfor commercial grade,increasing with distance from Mexico, and $20004500per pound for sinsemilla [4].

Legalizing cannabis wouldreducethese pricesbecause there would be a decrease in risk [11],

increasedautomation and economies of scale[12].Indeed, if cannabis could be farmed outdoors likeother crops, we

calculate that production costs wouldbe less than $20 per pound . This is consistent with theNational Organization

for the Reform of MarijuanaLawsclaimthat if cannabis production was unregulated,*T+he price of marijuana wouldpresumably

drop as lowas that of other legal herbs such as tea or tobaccoonthe order of a few dollars

per ouncee . . . orafewcentsperjoint *13+. At that point, production costs become negli-gible compared to distribution, brandingand marketingcosts. The analogy would be to bottled water.Even if production were confined to grow houses, asmall, low-tech business

could produce sinsemilla forabout $400450 per pound [12]. Costs would be driven by,indecreasingorder:(i)materials,(ii)rent,(iii)produc-

ers overhead and profit (iv) electricity and (v) agricul-tural labor (assuming federal enforcement is sufficientlylax that semi-skilled

production workers would be com-pensated as for typical agricultural workers). Factoringin a healthy mark-up for distribution and retailing,

weanticipate untaxed retail prices of about $40 per ounceof unbranded, unbundled sinsemilla [12].

Compared tocurrent prices of $250400 perounce,thisrepresentsan8090% reduction.Legal cannabis productionmay not be a large indus-try. It would only take about 8000 grow houses to meetcurrent US consumption on a 9-D-

tetrahydrocannabinol(THC)-adjusted basis [3,12]. Given modest economies ofscale and mechanization of the sort that could remainhidden


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within the house, each grow house might requireno more than one full-time agricultural labourer, withperhaps one other employee [master

growers, heating,ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) technicians,drivers, bookkeepers, entrepreneurs, etc.] per agricul-

turalworker.Sixteenthousandjobsisminisculeagainstanational labor force of 140 million; it is even small com-pared to current (illegal)

employment in production andsmuggling. Given the high value per unit weight ratiosandlimitednumberof housesrequired,productioncould

locate anywhere, presumably migrating to jurisdictionsoffering the friendliest taxes and regulations and/orlowest labor, housing and

electricity costs. Plausibly,the greater economic opportunities could come fromdistribution and bundling with other services and pro-ducts

(e.g. cannabis cafes, cannabis-infused foods anddrinks [3]). Legalization will increase consumption , but it is unclearby how

muchLegalizations non-price effects on consumption, such asfrom reduced stigma and

increased advertising , are hardto estimate as no jurisdiction has ever fully legalized can-nabis. The Netherlands comes closest to

having legalizedfrom the users perspective. Looking at the Netherlandsand a range of other analogies, MacCoun suggests thatnon-

price effects mightstimulate consumption increasesof5 50% [14]. These non-price effects will also differdepending on the pre-legalization cannabis culture (e.g.does the jurisdiction already have a heavily promotedmedicinal market?).The

uncertainty concerning price effects is evengreater, and stems from two distinct sources: (i) uncer-tainty about how responsive

consumption is to changes inpricewithintherangesthathavebeenobservedand(ii)uncertainty about how to extrapolate that experienceto

prices well below those that have ever obtained in adeveloped country in the modern era.One limitation of current elasticity estimates is

thatthe best evidence concerns how price affects annual or30-dayprevalenceof useamongbroadpopulations,suchas students or those in

the household population. Thesepopulations frequently include large numbers of lightusers or new initiates. Typical price

elasticities of participationrange between-0.002 and- 0.7 , depending onthe population studied, with a narrower

range of-0.3 to-0.5 for youth [15] that is the same as the correspondingrange estimated for cigarette participation elasticities[16].However, consumption is heavily concentratedamong a minority of the heaviest users[17]; theirresponseintermsnotonlyof prevalencebutalsointen-sity of use conditional on participationdominates howa price change will affect the

overall quantity of cannabisconsumed. For tobacco and alcohol the elasticity of thetotal quantity consumed is 1.52.0 times greater than

the general population participation elasticity, but thereis almost no literature on total price elasticity of can-nabis. Based upon what

evidence is available, Paculajudged that the total elasticity of demand for pricechangesaround the current price

might bebetween-0.4and- 1.2 [15].Beyond this parametric uncertainty, there is alsostructuraluncertaintyconcerninghowlinearorconvex the demand curve is as one moves to much lower prices.That is not a question that can

be answered empirically,because there simply are no data on cannabis consump-tion at such low prices. We considered two classic

textbook forms for demand curves (linear and constantelasticity) to demonstrate that the projected increasein consumption will depend

dramatically on implicitassumptions embedded in the choice of functional form. Forexample,underonescenariothelineardemandcurve

suggests price-driven consumption increases would probably be in the neighborhood of 75

100%, whereas thecorresponding range with constant elasticity demandwas 150200% [3, see Fig. 4.1]. Thus, we conclude that

legalization will increase consumptionsubstantially, pos-sibly dramatically , but it is important to recognize thatback in the late 1970s consumption was substantiallyhigher than it is today, so it not certain consumptionwould rise beyond the historical

peak

Federal action is key to large-scale domestic industry and access to basic banking

services

Chemerinsky, 14Erwin, March 14, Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, Legal StudiesResearch Paper Series No. 20 142, UC Irvine, SSRN, Vitz

Perhaps the most profound, and most well-documented, consequence of marijuanas prohibited

status at the federal level is the unavailability of even the most rudimentary banking services

for those engaged in marijuana commerce.54 The threatoften explicitof money launderingprosecutions has made banks unwilling to engage in any transactions with marijuana

businesses.55 As a result, marijuana in the states is largely a cash business, with all of the problems

and negative connotations associated with businesses forced to the periphery of legality.56 The lack ofcommercial banking is more than a dignitary harm for those operating in the marijuana industry; for many it is a sincere safety concern.

Marijuana businesses present an easy target for thieves who are aware that these businesses

often have no choice but to keep large quantities of cash on hand


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Federal legalization is the only means to attract investors and scale-up the industry

Mitchell, 12Dan, What would a legal American marijuana industry look like?,http://fortune.com/2012/11/19/what-would-a-legal-american-marijuana-industry-look-like/,Vitz

But that doesnt mean that a real marijuana industry will grow out of the countrys changing

sentiments toward potwith large-scale distribution, marketing, and retail sales any time soon . For that to

happen, the federal government would have to do a lot more than merely back offand

recognize states rights. It would have to repeal the federal laws banning the possession,

use, and distribution of marijuana.And that might take a long while yet, given that the politics in, for example, Georgia, are alot different from the politics in Washington, Colorado, and California (even Oregon isnt quite there yet its ballot measure failed on Election

Day). There needs to be a national consensus, and the nation isnt there yet. And until full federal repeal of prohibition , a

multitude of insurmountable barriers will remain in place . The chief one is simple economics: the

industry simply cantscale to a degree that would attract investors (who would be scared of

investinganyway). One of the many reasons that pot costs so much about $300 an ounce on

average is that growers must keep their operations relatively small and, usually, hidden.

Forget for the moment the direct impact that pots illegality (meaning, risk) has on prices: the costs of production alone areenormous just because economies of scale arentachievable . Even if the state police are no longer coming after

growers, the feds might be.

That staves off Mexican instability

Carpenter, 9Ted, senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Dr. Carpenterserved as Cato's director of foreign policy studies, Cracks in the Drug War Fortress, http://www.cato-

unbound.org/2009/08/26/ted-galen-carpenter/cracks-drug-war-fortress, Vitz

In his last essay, Mr. Roberts stresses that the Mexican cartels will notsimply go awayif legalization were

adopted. Again, I know of no credible analyst who has made that argument. But greatly reducing the amount of

revenue available to those criminal enterprises would undermine their power .Mexicos cartels

now exploit a $30 billion to $60 billion-a-year industry. Eliminating the black-market profit that

results from prohibition would change that into a $3 billionto $6 billion-a-year industry. That means far fewer enforcers

they can hire and far fewer bribes they can offer to officials. While trafficking gangs might attempt to replace part

of that lost revenue with intensified activitiesin such areas as kidnapping and prostitution, those sources are

not nearly as lucrative . Some of the cartels would remain in business as criminal enterprises,

but they would be substantially weakened , thereby posing far less of a threat to Mexicos

stability.

Indeed, the United States could strike a major blow against the cartels just by legalizing

marijuana, while postponing a policy decision regarding harder drugs. The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates

that Mexican trafficking organizations derive two-thirds of their income from marijuana sales .

Other estimates are slightly lower (around 55 percent), but marijuana is clearly the primary source of revenue.

Under a legalized regime, who would bother buying that product from the Mexican cartels

when legitimate domestic producers could provide an ample supply and probably at lower

cost, given the transportation advantages? In fact, many consumers would likely just grow their own supply.
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Legalization creates a reverse gateway effectsolves other drugs

Herrington, 12Luke, Editor-At-Large for E-IR and Assistant Reviews Editor for Special Operations Journal. He isa graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas where he previously earned

an MA in Global and International Studies, Marijuana Legalization: Panacea in the War on Drugs or Stoners

Blowing Smoke?,http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/24/marijuana-lagalization-panacea-in-the-war-on-drugs-or-

stoners-blowing-smoke/,Vitz

Legalization Will Hurt the Cartels A chorus of Latin American leaders think legalization will undermine the

cartels, and they advocate it as a new strategy in the war on drugs. In March, Otto Perez Molina, the president of Guatemala, announced his

interest in legalizing drugs in an effort to fight the cartels, including the Zetas, who were allegedly behind a May 2011

attack that left 27 dismembered workers on a farm in northern Guatemala. Molina, however, is not the only leader to suggest that drug

legalization could help stem the rising tide of drug-related violence in Latin America. In fact, former

Mexican President Vicente Foxalso supports the legalization of marijuana, [7] as do Csar Gaviria, Ernesto Zedillo,Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Ricardo Lagos, former presidents of Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile respectively. [8] The government of

Uruguay is also agitating for legalization. There, officials announced that marijuana legalization and regulation may be

used to help fight cocaine use and abuse . The government also says it would sell the drug

directly, tracking buyers in the process and limiting the black markets ability to usurp this

new supply. [9] Grillo agrees. He suggests that mass-burnings of marijuana in Mexico, for instance, a hallmark in source control, do moreto illustrate exactly how hulking the narco-economic edifice of the cartels drug industry really is, than it does to elucidate how Mexico

constantly hammers their organizations. It also demonstrates that U.S. demand for product will continue to

encourage the flow of marijuanaand, by extension, other drugs over the border. Citing a narrowly defeated attempt byCalifornia voters to legalize marijuana, and petitioners in Colorado promoting a referendum to do the same, Grillo highlights the fact that

campaigns for legalization view the Mexican Drug War as a reason to change U.S. drug laws. Moreover, these campaigners argue that

American ganja smokers are giving billions of dollars to psychotic Mexican drug cartels, *+ and legalization is the only way to

stop the war . *10+ Grillo concedes that the cartels have morphed into diversified, 21st century firms

with entrenched profit sources well beyondthe scope of the marijuanaindustry. Nevertheless, he concludes, legalization as a

strategy in the war on drugs could still do more in the effort to undermine cartel profits than the

U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Mexican army ever have. Legalization might not kill the Mexicancartels,he says, however it certainly could inflict a deep wound upon their organizations.Armstrong accuses the U.S. of failure in its war on drugs, and asserts that the violence in Mexico is only one consequence. Despite the

tightening of post-9/11 border regulations, tons of cocaine and marijuana continue to pass into the U.S. and billions of dollars in illicit money

and weapons are passing into Mexico. Traditional policies hardly curb this two-way flow of illicit traffic, in essence, because secondary and

tertiary criminal lieutenants are prepared to fill the void when their leaders are arrested or killed. Indeed, General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., the

leader of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), testified before the U.S. Senate, stating that the decapitation strategy may su cceed in killing

key drug figures, but it has not had an appreciable effect in thwarting the drug trade. *11+ The Mexican government has even started

rethinking its approach. Instead of focusing on the interdiction of drugs bound for U.S. markets, Mexican authorities are starting to focus more

on their citizens safety. Obama Administration officials, for their part, have chastised Latin American leaders for debating the legalization

strategy, whilst also stressing the importance of shared responsibility to the Mexican government. In spite of this, the U.S. has done little on its

end to stem the actual demand for illicit drugs. Armstrong believes U.S. policymakers must launch a serious dialogue here [in America] on

legalizing, or at least decriminalizing, the drugs. Its not a perfect solution, but its better than no solution at all. *+ The United States needs a

strategy to win the war or to settle it. [12] Indeed, if shared responsibility means anything, it means that the U.S. must do its part not to enable

the continuation of the drug wars. That means that in addition to the possible legalization or decriminalization of marijuana (and other drugs

for that matter), the U.S. must slow the flood of weapons and cash, the cartels raison detre. *13+ Most importantly, legalization couldundermine Latin American cartels by removing from marijuana, the so-called gateway

effect . As has happened in other countries, such as Portugal, where decriminalization has been experimented with on a large scale,

isolating marijuana from the black market makes it more difficult for drug dealers to push

hardernarcotics on individuals using marijuana. More will be said on this subject below, but for now, suffice it to
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say that this has the potential to undermine the cartels perhaps the foundations of the black

market itselfacross the board, from the ground up . [14]

That allows the US to focus the war on drugs on more illicit crimes

Herrington, 12Luke, Editor-At-Large for E-IR and Assistant Reviews Editor for Special Operations Journal. He isa graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas where he previously earnedan MA in Global and International Studies, Marijuana Legalization: Panacea in the War on Drugs or Stoners

Blowing Smoke?,http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/24/marijuana-lagalization-panacea-in-the-war-on-drugs-or-

stoners-blowing-smoke/,VitzFourth, legalization may violate treaty obligations under international law, and necessitate the formation of a new anti-narcotics regime. As

hegemon though, the U.S. could lead the way in both the legalizationor decriminalization of marijuana,

and the structuring of a reformed war on drugs based on these considerations. Finally, reflecting those that a more

conservative approach than that of Portugal, policymakers should shy away from legalizing harder drugs, like

heroin, meth, and cocaine. These are proven to be far more dangerous than marijuana, but also,

isolating marijuana from the black market will reduce demand for those drugs by eliminating

the gateway effect.Taken together, these considerations really could become the basis of a

new strategy in the war on Latin Americascartels.

Drug war drives Mexican instability---theyre not a failed state yet, but theyre on the

path to getting there

Pedigo, 12David, Senior Director of Technology at CEDIA Technology Council , The Drug War and State Failurein Mexico, http://research.monm.edu/mjur/files/2012/2012-7.pdf, Vitz

Few topics are more relevant to the national securityof the United States today than the crisis in

Mexico, which threatens to create a failed state on the southern border. In 2009, noted international

relations scholar John Mearsheimer listed the ongoing drug war in Mexico as the number one issue that

had been overlooked byPresident Obama, saying that, There is the very real possibility that Mexico will

implode on Obama's watch and become a failed state, which would surely cause serious problems north of the Rio

Grande.1 This claim has been echoed by Steven David, another eminent scholar in the field of international relations,

who states in his book, Cata- strophic Consequences, that, there is no question that if violent instability engulfs

Mexico, American vital interests would be threatened .2

While no single definition of a failed state currently exists, one of the most widely accepted indicators of state

failure is what Max Weber re- ferred to as the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical forcewithin a

states territory. In other words, failed states emerge when the ultimate authority to provide securityand

enforce the rule of law comes from a power other than the state.3 By this qualification, Mexico certainly is

not a failed state today, butit does exhibit many characteristics of a capturedstate, wherein

the state itself is manipulated byother actors -- in this case drug cartels. There are also some regions throughout

Mexicos territory where drug cartels have more influence over the rule of law than the state, and can

therefore be considered failed provinces or failed cities. In these regions, cartels freely murder mayors,

police officers, and journaliststhat challenge their authority, some- times within feet of police posts. Not only is the Mexican

state unable to provide security for its population, but cartels have increasingly influenced government policy

through intimidating, killing, or buying off state actors. As both Mearsheimer and David suggest, state

failure in Mexico would have devastating effects for the United States. Some of the violence

and lawlessness of the drug war in Mexico have already begun to leak across the border. In
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2005, the governors of Arizona and New Mexico declared their border regions with Mexico to be a disaster area on the grounds t hat they

were devastated by human smuggling, drug smuggling, kidnapping, murder, and destruction of property.4 There have also been recent

concerns over southern Arizona becoming a no-go zone controlled by drug traffickers.5 These instances lend credibility to the

presupposition that failed cities like the ones in Mexico may begin to emerge in the United States as well if Mexicos recent trends are not

reversed.

Mexican instability destabilize Latin America and the Caribbean region

Shirk, 11David, PhD. Associate Professor, Political Science and International Relations Director, The Drug Warin Mexico Confronting a Shared Threat, Council of Foreign Relations, Vitz

Third, Mexican stability serves as an important anchor for the region. With networks stretching

into Central America, the Carib- bean,and the Andean countries, Mexican DTOs undermine the

security and reliability ofother U.S. partners in the hemisphere, corrupting high-level officials,

military operatives, and law enforcement personnel; undermining due process and human

rights ; reducing public support for counter-drug efforts; andeven provoking hostility toward

the United States. Given the fragility of some Central American and Caribbean states,

expansion of DTO operations and violence into the region would have a gravely destabilizing

effect .

Causes prolif, disease, war and creates a domino effect in the region --- these all

escalate

Manwaring 5Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at DickinsonCollege, venezuelas hugo chvez, bolivarian socialism, and asymmetric warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf

President Chvez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerouslong-term security

challenge facing the global communitytoday. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status

is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism.These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host evil networks of all kinds, whether they

involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these

conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of

infrastructure. Thesemeans of coercion and persuasion can spawnfurther human rights violations, torture,poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and

proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism,

and criminal anarchy. At the same time, theseactions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional

syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Perus Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructiveactivities that facilitate the processes of state failure armed propaganda. Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South

America and elsewhere call these activities business incentives. Chvez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring

about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide

wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors strategic efforts are aimed at progressively

lessening a targeted regimes credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its na tional territory and

society. Chvezs intent is to focus his primary attackpolitically and psychologically on selected Latin

American governmentsability and right to govern.In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of

corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct thebusiness of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political,

economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instabilityand the threat of subverting or destroying such a

government are real.64

But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an

unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a

consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new peoples

democracies. In connection with the creation of new peoples democracies, one can rest assured that Chvez and his Bolivarian populist

allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer


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dysfunctional,rogue, criminal, and narco-statesand peoples democracies persist, the more they and their

associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

Instability in the Caribbean region causes bioterror attacks

Flynn and Bryan, 1Bryan, director of the North-South Centers Caribbean Program, and Stephen E. Flynn,

senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a commander in the U.S. Coast Guard are co-directors of aproject on adapting border controls to support Caribbean trade and development, Terrorism, Porous Borders, and

Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation, http://www.cfr.org/border-and-port-

security/terrorism-porous-borders-homeland-security-case-us-caribbean-cooperation/p4844, Vitz

Terrorist acts can take placeanywhere. [in] The Caribbeanis no exception. Already the linkages between

drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have

similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean

countries is vital . Petroleum refineries and major industrial estatesin Trinidad, which host more than 100companies that produce the majority of the worlds methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas

(LNG), are vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America,

terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries.

Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean

countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States. An airliner hijacked after

departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can

sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port.Moreover,

terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily

through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries havesuspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again,

Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and

deployment of biological weapons within national borders

Extinction

Matheny 7Jason is a research associate at Oxford Universitys Future of Humanity Institute. He previouslyworked at the Center for Biosecurity and holds an MBA from Duke University. Reducing the Risk of Human

Extinction, Risk Analysis Vol. 27, No. 5,

http://users.physics.harvard.edu/~wilson/pmpmta/Mahoney_extinction.pdf

Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism.The knowledge needed to

engineer a virus is modestcompared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary equipment and

materials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating, a

weapon can have an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5 Current U.S. biodefense efforts arefunded at $5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological agents a nd emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of

local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006).

Independently, escalating instability in Latin America causes global warRochlin 94 Francis Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Okanagan University CollegeJames Francis Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America, p. 130-

131)While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an

interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S.

influence inthe regionwhich had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin

America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to


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U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on were linked to the prospect ofexplosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the

Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic processthroughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that

in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and

spreading elsewherein Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United

States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international

arenaa concern expressed by the director of research for Canadas Standing Committee Report on Centra l America. It was feared that such a

predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one ofthe motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Mexico drug violence causes oil shocks

Moran, 9Michael, executive editor and policy analyst, Council on Foreign Relations, Six Crises, 2009: A Half-Dozen Ways Geopolitics Could Upset Global Recovery, http://fbkfinanzwirtschaft.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/six-

crises-2009-a-half-dozen-ways-geopolitics-could-upset-global-recovery/, Vitz

Risk 2: Mexico Drug Violence: At Stake: Oil prices , refugee flows , NAFTA , U.S. economic stabilityA

story receiving more attention in the American media than Iraq these days is the horrific drug-related violence across the

northern states of Mexico, whereFelipe Calderonhas deployed the national army to combat two

thriving drug cartels, which have compromised the national police beyond redemption. The talesof carnage are horrific, to be sure: 30 people were killed in a 48 hour period last week in Cuidad Juarez alone, a city located directly across the

Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas. So far, the impact on the United States and beyond has been minimal. But there also isnt muc h sign that the

army is winning, either, and that raises a disturbing question: What if Calderon loses?The CIAs worst nightmare during the Cold War (outside

of an administration which forced transparency on it, of course) was the radicalization or collapse of Mexico. The template then was

communism, but narco-capitalism doesnt look much better.The prospect of a wholesale collapse

that sent millions upon millions of Mexican refugees fleeing across thenorthern borderso far seemsremote. But Mexicos army has its own problems with corruption, and a sizeable number of Mexicans regard Calderons razor -thin 2006

electoral victory over a leftist rival as illegitimate. With Mexicos economy reelingand the traditional safety

valve of illegal immigration to America dwindling, the potential for serious trouble exists.Meanwhile, Mexico

ranks with Saudi Arabia and Canada as the three suppliers of oil the United States could not

do without. Should things come unglued there and Pemex production shut down even

temporarily , the shock on oil markets could be profound , again, sendingits waves throughout the

global economy .Long-term, PEMEX production has been sliding anyway, thanks to oil fields well-beyond their peak and restrictions onforeign investment.Domestically in the U.S., any trouble involving Mexico invariably will cause a bipartisan demand for more security on the

southern border, inflame anti-immigrant sentiment and possibly force Obama to remember his campaign promise to renegotiate NAFTA, a

pledge he deftly sidestepped once in office.

Oil shocks cause energy wars that escalate

Qasem 7 Islam Yasin, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and Social Sciences at the University ofPompeu Fabra (UPF) in Barcelona, MA in International Affairs from Columbia, July 9, 2007, The Coming Warfare of

Oil Shortage, online: http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_islam_ya_070709_the_coming_warfare_o.htm

Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests, superpowers will not

hesitate to unleashtheir economic and military power to ensure secure access to oilresources,

triggering worldwide tension, if not armed conflict. And whilesuperpowers like the United States

maintain superior conventional military power,in addition to their nuclear power, some weaker states are

already nuclearly armed, others are seeking nuclear weapons . In an anarchic world with many nuclear-

weapon states feeling insecure, and a global economy in downward spiral, the chances of

using nuclear weapons in pursues of national interests are high .


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Advantage 2

Advantage 2 is Cooperative Federalism

Federal prohibition on marijuana threatens cooperative federalism and spills over to

erode the broader doctrine of federalism itself

Grabarsky, 13Todd, Law Clerk, United States Court, Northern District of California. J.D., Benjamin N. CardozoSchool of Law, 2012; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, CONFLICTING FEDERAL AND STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA

POLICIES: A THREAT TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, Vitz

This Article now turns to the situation on the ground, exploring the ways in which the federal executive - through

efforts of the DEA and DOJ- has sought to enforce the federal drugs ban onmedical marijuana

despite its limited legalization in California since the passage of the CUA in 1996. This Part then argues that these changes in

federal enforcement policy threaten state autonomy and federalism itselfbecause they unfairly

subject the states to the whims of the federal government. This is especially true in an area -

drug enforcement - with extremely limited federal resources, and which, arguably, was

envisioned as a joint state-federal cooperative enforcement scheme.In other words, these federal

executive fluctuations are a threat to cooperative federalism .

Marijuana is the most pressing and complex federalism issue of our time --- this

affects the entire doctrine

Schwartz, prof of law @ UW, 13David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University ofWisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate

States 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, Lexis, Vitz

Marijuana legalization by the states presents the most pressing and complex federalism issue of

our time. Congress has undisputed power to regulate individuals within a s tate, even if it creates rights or duties contrary to that s tate's laws. The

power of Congress under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the manufacture, distribution, andeven simple possession of marijuana, whether or not the offending conduct crosses state

lines, is clearly established.n1 In the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) n2, Congress exercised that regulatory power directly on the people of

the states. But since 1996, several states have legalized medical or even "recreational" marijuana.

The obligation of those states' legislatures, executive officials, and courts to cooperate with

the federal marijuana prohibition is extremely unclear . Internal state governmental processes

have been thrown into confusion byapparent conflictsbetween their state's legalization laws and

the CSA. State governorshave refused to implementduly enacted state laws for fear that their

subordinates will be prosecuted by federal authorities . n3 County bureaucrats are suing their

states for injunctions to block enforcement of state laws that they deem to conflict with federal policy .n4 State courts are uncertain whether to revoke state law probationers or parolees for [*570]

engaging in conduct that is affirmatively legal under state law. n5 Local police officers are concerned that they may be

committing federal crimes by returning seized property to individuals who have committed no

state law offense- and wonder whether they are obligated by federal law to make arrests for

conduct expressly legalized by their state. n6 Rarely in our history have the obligations of officials of all branches

of state government to conform to federal law been more uncertain - and rarely has federal


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law so sweepingly intruded into state policy choices . It is not an exaggeration to say that state

marijuana legalization presents a federalism crisis . n7Current federalism doctrine offersthree

possible resolutionsto this crisis, all of them unsatisfactory . To see this, we can boil the marijuana

federalism problem down to a single question. Suppose a state or local police officer

encounters a person who is in possession of marijuana in conformance with the state'slegalization law. Must the officer arrest the person and seize the marijuana, or let the person

go and keep the marijuana? This question is the most fundamental and commonplace of all the

scenarios presenting conflicting duties of state officials in the marijuana federalism crisis . Any

doctrinal solution that cannot answer this basic "arrest and seizure" question in a satisfactory

manner- one that is consistent both internally and with the broader fabric of federalism

doctrines - necessarily fails to resolve the crisis.

Providing an opt-out clause in the CSA solves tensions and provides a cooperative

framework

Grabarsky, 13Todd, Law Clerk, United States Court, Northern District of California. J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo

School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, CONFLICTING FEDERAL AND STATE MEDICALMARIJUANA

POLICIES: A THREAT TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, Vitz

B. A Congressional Exemption forMedical Marijuana in Compliance with State Law

Because it appears that the federal executive could not viably preserve the federalism balance, this Article turns to Congress. This Article

proposes that Congress act to reconcile the state-federal conflict of laws regardingmedical

marijuana by creating an exemption from the CSAfor medical marijuana usage and distribution in

compliance with approved state laws and regulatory schemes.At the most, Congress could

amend the CSA to expressly provide the exemption, or, at the very least, pass an act prohibiting the Executive from

enforcing the CSA's medical marijuana proscription in states that permit it. Such an exemption would allow states to

proceed with theirmedical marijuana programs while at the same time keeping the drug illegal

at the federal level .The result would be that medical marijuana would be presumptively

prohibited nationwide, except in states that take affirmative legislative and administrative

steps(as some have already done) to legalize it.It is extremely important to note that this proposal does not call for a federal exemption to the CSA for medical marijuana. On one hand, in

states like California that elect to legalize medical marijuana, the proposed exemption would allow those states'

legislation and regulation to operate unimpeded by federal disruption.This will also allow

these states to work with the federal authorities in focusing on the state-federal unity of

interests in drug enforcement;for example California state agents will still be able and encouraged to

work with their federal counterparts to curb the distribution and possession of drugs that remain

illegal on both the federal and state level. On the other hand, in states that wish to keep medical marijuana

prohibited, state authorities will continue to cooperate with the federal government to

execute the CSA and its state law counterpart.

The reason why this compromise is necessary stems from the so-called "laboratories of

experimentation" n137 notion of federalism that a one-size-fits-all fix is not a viable or

practicable solutionto address an issue that affects over 300 million people with hundreds if

not thousands of diverse values, principles, and beliefs. As mentioned, this Article does not purport to opine on

the policy values of the legalization of medical marijuana. Rather, this Article argues that if the people or legislature of a


14/19


15/19

matter) to global warming would cripple the economy. n112 Those concerns featured prominently in the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) EPA

issued in July 2008, n113 belatedly responding to Massachusetts v. EPA. In a n unusual personal preface, the EPA Administrator revealed both a s triking general

hostility to the Clean Air Act and a commitment to avoiding its use to deal with GHG emissions, writing: I believe the ANPR demonstrates the Clean Air Act, an

outdated law originally enacted to control regional pollutants that cause direct health eff ects, is ill-suited for the task of regulating global greenhouse gases... .

Pursuing this course of action would inevitably result in a very complicated, time-consuming and, likely, convoluted set of regulations. These rules would largely pre-

empt or overlay existing programs that help control greenhouse gas emissions and would be relatively ineffective at reducing greenhouse ga s concentrations given

the potentially damaging effect on jobs and the U.S. economy. n114 We agree that it would be difficult to apply the current Clean Air Act directly to GHG emissions.

Nonetheless , we believe that many aspects of the Clean Air Act, notably including its division of

responsibilities between state and federal authorities, would serve the nation well in tackling global

warming . The combination of federal [*821] minimum standards for both stationary and mobile

sources with state obligations to meet emission targets that characterizes the Clean Air Act

could address many of the gaps that emission trading will inevitably leave.1. Air Quality Standards The

one conspicuous misfit between the present Clean Air Act and the global warming problem is

the Act's reliance on national air quality standards. EPA's 2003 determination that it lacked the authority to regulate carbondioxide emissions rested in large part on its conclusion that the NAAQS were not a useful way to address global warming. The general counsel wrote: Unique and

basic aspects of the presence of key GHGs in the atmosphere make the NAAQS system fundamentally ill-suited to addressing global climate change. Many GHGs

reside in the earth's atmosphere for very long periods of time. CO in particular has a residence time of roughly 50 -200 years. This long lifetime along with

atmospheric dynamics means that CO is well mixed throughout the atmosphere, up to approximately the lower stratosphere. The result is a vast global

atmospheric pool of CO that is fairly consistent in concentration everywhere along the surface of the earth and vertically throughout this area of mixing. ... Any

CO standard that might be established would in effect be a worldwide ambient air quality standard, not a national standard - the entire world would be either in

compliance or out of compliance. Such a situation would be inconsistent with a basic underlying premise ofthe CAA [Clean Air Act] regime for implementation of a NAAQS - that actions taken by

individual states and by EPA can generally bring all areas of the U.S. into attainment of a

NAAQS... . The globally pervasive nature of CO emissions and atmospheric concentrations

presents a unique problem that fundamentally differs from the kind of environmental

problem that the NAAQS system was intended to address and is capable of solving. n116 It is

true that no state could on its own assure compliance with an air quality standard for CO.

In that sense, the Clean Air Act is a poor fit for any global, or even regional, problem.

Furthermore, the impacts of greenhouse gases on health and welfare are significantly

different than those of the current criteria pollutants. Instead of direct effects on human life

and ecosystems, carbon dioxide's impacts are largely indirect, mediated through changes in

air and water temperatures due to increased retention of solar energy. That so many people have looked tothe Clean Air Act's acid rain program as a model for dealing with greenhouse gases is no surprise. The effects of CO in the atmosphere are even less direct and

more independent of the geographic location of emission than the acid rain effects of SO. Surely the sense that the Clean Air Act cannot deal with such a

delocalized pollution problem, together with the desire to solve the problem as painlessly as possible, has contributed signi ficantly to the enthusiasm for cap-and-

trade approaches. We believe that Congress should identify the goals of GHG regulation outside the

strictures of the air quality provisions of the Clean Air Act . Those provisions require that EPA

set NAAQS at levels requisite to protect public health and welfare, without regard to costs.

Given the difficulty of deciding what level of global warming is acceptable, the likelihood that

we are already committed to a level of warming that will significantly affect public health and

welfare, and the potentially high costs of reaching our GHG goals, it is probably essential that

Congress take the lead in setting those goals. We also believe that an emission target makes

more sense in this case than an atmospheric level target. As EPA has noted, the level of COin the atmosphere is essentially independent of the decisions of any individual state, and

indeed it is at least somewhat independent of the decisions of all the U.S. states together. Statesshould not face sanctions, as they might under the NAAQS framework, for atmospheric CO [*823] levels that are beyond their control. n123 Nonetheless, that

domestic emission reductions cannot assure attainment of the atmospheric goal need not be a barrier to regulation. The fight against global warming must proceed

on a number of fronts. The 1970 Clean Air Act set emission limits for automobiles based on back-of-the-envelope calculations of the level of reduction in automobile

emissions necessary, in concert with other reductions to be pursued under the NAAQS provisions, to achieve desired air quality levels. n124 In much the same way,

targets could be set for domestic emission reductions with the understanding that vigorous pursuit of an international successor to the Kyoto Protocol will also be

necessary to ensure that climate goals are realized. The Clean Air Act, then, is not quite the right too l for setting regulatory goals and determining acceptable

emission levels for greenhouse gases. But the fact that the initial step under the NAAQS provisions does not


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seem to work for CO should not blind us to the fact that in many ways the state planning

and implementation framework used to achieve the NAAQS is an excellent fit for addressing

global warming. It can engage the states as full partners in addressing the problem, leverage

the work they are already doing, provide info rmation needed to tackle aspects of the

problem that are not well suited to markets, recognize local variation in challenges and

opportunities, take advantage of the special political and practical abilities of the states to deal

with behavioral emissions, and help states learn from one another's successes and failures.

Federal climate legislation should adopt emission reduction goals applicable to the states and

require that states prepare and implement "climate implementation plans" modeled on the

SIPs to achieve those goals. Global warming is a daunting problem, one that will be far more difficult to solve than the "standard" pollution

problems that gave rise to the Clean Air Act. Stabilizing the climate at an acceptable CO level will take the concerted efforts of many nations, all levels of

domestic government, and a committed citizenry. Others have argued - quite correctly - that

federal GHG legislation should protect the ability [*824] of states to engage in their own

climate change efforts. We would go further. For this problem, it is not enough to allow

states to participate to the extent they choose to do so. Because global warming provides

textbook temptations for a race to the bottom, emission goals should be set at the national

level. States should be free to adopt more stringent goals should they choose to do so, just as

they are currently free to impose air quality standards tougher than the federal NAAQS on

themselves. Once the federal government sets minimum emission reduction goals, the states

should be required to play a primary role in implementing those goals. Federal legislation can

and should affirmatively confer upon states the authority and the responsibility to play that

role. Surprisingly, none of the current crop of GHG bills deals with the role of the states in any

depth. None would assign the states an important role, or even provide them with incentives

to voluntarily assume such a role. There may be other models that would work, but the Clean

Air Act's SIP program, while it surely could use some tweaking, provides a useful and readily

available starting model for an appropriate state role.

Even if we pass the tipping point, cooperative federalism is crucial to adaptation

measures to solve the impact to warming

Glicksman 11(Robert, J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law, The George Washington University Law School,CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: A COLLECTIVE ACTION PERSPECTIVE ON FEDERALISM CONSIDERATIONS, 2/1/11,

http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/7584-404glicksman)

The uncertainty about the magnitude and distribution of the effects of climate change makes it

impossible to predict exactly what kinds of adaptive measures will be needed in different parts of thecountry and when they will be needed. There seems to be a consensus among those who have focused on climate change adaptation policy

that the effort will necessarily involve federal, state, and local government participation . In an optimal

world, policymakers at different levels would coordinate their responses so that adaptationproceeds as efficiently and effectively as possible, the burdens resulting from climate change are minimized, and theunavoidable burdens are distributed as equitably as possible, even though climate change is likely to affect some areas of the country, such as

coastal areas vulnerable to flooding and severe storm activity, more than others. It is inevitable, however, that clashes of

interest will develop between jurisdictions when desired goods, such as potable water, are scarce or efforts by one state

or locality to avoid the undesirable aspects of climate change shift the burden of those changes to other jurisdictions. Collective action

analysis can help avoid or resolve such conflicts by assigning the authority to control the

development of climate change adaptation policy to the level of government best situated to


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address a problem without exacerbating the adverse consequences of climate change for others. The conflicts are likely to arise bothwhen states and localities fail to do enough to anticipate and react to climate change and when they do too much. As the an alysis above

indicates, collective action analysis supports the exercise of federal power to create minimal

protections against the ravages of climate change in the face of state or local reluctance to

react to its consequences. The federal role, which would exist concurrently with the exercise of state and local power to

respond to climate change, could involve providing technical and financial assistance to state and localgovernments or the creation of the kinds of cooperative federalism regulatory programs that have

become entrenched in U.S. environmental law over the last forty years. In limited contexts, collectiveaction analysis also supports displacement of the aggressive exercise of state and local authority to adapt to climate change in favor of exclusive

federal control. These situations are most likely to involve state and local efforts that result in interstate externalities.

Absent cuts in emissions, warming causes extinction

Mazo, 10Jeffrey Mazo PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow forEnvironmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010,

Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it, pg. 122

The best estimates for global warmingto the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~Cabove pre-

industrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is

1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--

7.1C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still

be expected to reach 1.2C (O'9""1.5C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe

reductions in emissions , the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first

century are likely to be catastrophic for the stability and security of countriesin the developing world -

not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and

stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of

widespread state failure and collapse in developing countries.'And although they have been condemned as

melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond

the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation ."What is certain is that there is noprecedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes

would mean profound social, cultural and political changes

Warming is real and anthropogenic --- we need to cut emissions in the short-term and

status quo adaptation cant solve --- our method of determining this is correct and

cites a consensus

Harvey, citing IPCC climate reports, 13Fiona, Guardian Environment Reporter, IPCC climate report:human impact is 'unequivocal', September 27 2013,

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/27/ipcc-climate-report-un-secretary-generalWorld leaders must now respond to an "unequivocal" message from climate scientists and act with policies to cut greenhouse gas emissions,

the United Nations secretary-general urged on Friday. Introducing a major report from a high level UN panel of climate scientists, Ban Ki-moon

said, "The heat is on. We must act." The world's leading climate scientists , who have been meeting in all-night sessions this

week in the Swedish capital, said there was no longer room for doubt that climate change was

occurring, and the dominant cause has been human actionsin pouring greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.

In their starkest warning yet, following nearly seven years of new researchon the climate, theIntergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said it was "unequivocal" and that even if the world begins to moderate greenhouse gas

emissions, warming is likely to cross the critical threshold of 2C by the end of this century. That would have

serious consequences, including sea level rises, heatwaves and changes to rainfall meaning dry regionsget less and already wet areas receive more. In response to the report, the US secretary of state, John Kerry, said in a statement: "This is yet


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another wakeup call: those who deny the science or choose excuses over action are playing with fire." "Once again, the science grows

clearer, the case grows more compelling, and the costs of inaction grow beyond anything that

anyone with conscience or commonsense should be willing to even contemplate," he said. He saidthat livelihoods around the world would be impacted. "With those stakes, the response must be all hands on deck. It's not about one country

making a demand of another. It's the science itself, demanding action from all of us. The United States is deeply committed to leading on

climate change." In a crucial reinforcement of their messageincluded starkly in this report for the first timethe IPCC warned that

the world cannot afford to keep emitting carbon dioxide as it has been doingin recent years. To

avoid dangerous levels of climate change, beyond 2C, the world can only emit a total of

between 800 and 880 gigatonnes ofcarbon. Of this, about 530 gigatonnes had already been emitted by 2011. That

has a clear implication for our fossil fuel consumption, meaning that humans cannot burn all

of the coal, oil and gas reserves that countries and companies possess. As the former UN commissionerMary Robinson told the Guardian last week, that will have "huge implications for social and economic development." It will also be difficult for

business interests to accept. The central estimate is that warming is likely to exceed 2C, the threshold beyond which scientists think global

warming will start to wreak serious changes to the planet. That threshold is likely to be reached even if we begin to cut global greenhouse gas

emissions, which so far has not happened, according to the report. Other key points from the report are: Atmospheric concentrations of

carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide are now at levels "unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years." Since the 1 950's it's

"extremely likely" that human activities have been the dominant cause of the temperature rise. Concentrations of CO2 and other greenhouse

gases in the atmosphere have increased to levels that are unprecedented in at least 800,000 years. The burning of fossil fuels is the main reason

behind a 40% increase in C02 concentrations since the industrial revolution. Global temperatures are likely to rise by 0.3Cto 4.8C, by the end

of the century depending on how much governments control carbon emissions. S ea levels are expected to rise a further 26-82cm by the endof the century. The oceans have acidified as they have absorbed about a third of the carbon dioxide emitted. Thomas Stocker, co-chair of the

working group on physical science, said the message that greenhouse gases must be reduced was clear. "Wegive very relevant guidance on the total amount of carbon that can't be emitted to stay to 1.5 or 2C. We are not on the path that would lead us

to respect that warming target [which has been agreed by world governments]." He said: "Continued emissions of

greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all components of the climate

system. Limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained reductions of

greenhouse gas emissions." Though governments around the world have agreed to curb emissions, and at numerous internationalmeetings have reaffirmed their commitment to holding warming to below 2C by the end of the century, greenhouse gas concentrations are still

rising at record rates. Rajendra Pachauri, chair of the IPCC, said it was for governments to take action based on the science produced by the

panel, consisting of thousands of pages of detail, drawing on the work of more than 800 scientists and hundreds of scientific papers. The

scientists also put paid to claims that global warming has "stopped" because global temperatures in the past 15 years have not continued the

strong upward march of the preceding years, which is a key argument put forward by sceptics to cast doubt on climate science. But the IPCC

said the longer term trends were clear: "Each of the last three decades has been successivelywarmer at the Earth's surface than any preceding decadesince 1850 in the northern hemisphere [the earliestdate for reliable temperature records for the whole hemisphere]." The past 15 years were not such an unusual case, said Stocker. "People

always pick 1998 but [that was] a very special year, because a strong El Nio made it unusually hot, and since then there have been some

medium-sized volcanic eruptions that have cooled the climate." But he said that further research was needed on the role of the oceans, which

are thought to have absorbed more than 90% of the warming so far. The scientists have faced sustained attacks from

so-called sceptics, often funded by "vested interests"according to the UN, who try to pick holes in

each item of evidence for climate change. The experts have always known they must make their work watertight against

such an onslaught, and every conclusion made by the IPCC must pass scrutiny by all of the world's

governments before it can be published. Their warning on Friday was sent out to governments around the globe, who

convene and fund the IPCC. It was 1988 when scientists were first convened for this task, and in the five landmark reports since then the

research has become ever clearer.Now, scientistssay they are certain that "warming in the climatesystem is unequivocal and since 1950 many changes have been observed throughout the

climate system that are unprecedentedover decades to millennia." That warning, from such a sober body,

hemmed in by the need to submit every statement to extraordinary levels of scrutiny, is the

starkest yet. "Heatwaves are very likely to occur more frequently and last longer. As the earth warms, we expect to see currently wetregions receiving more rainfall, and dry regions receiving less, although there will be exceptions," Stocker said. Qin Dahe, also co-chair of the

working group, said: "As the ocean warm, and glaciers and ice sheets reduce, global mean sea level will continue to rise, but at a faster rate

than we have experienced over the past 40 years." Prof David Mackay, chief scientific adviser to the Department of Energy and Climate Change,

said: "The far-reaching consequences of this warming are becoming understood, although some uncertainties remain. The most


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