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REPORTDOCUMENTAT IONPAGE formApprovedOMBNo.704-0788PuN'Creportingbu 'oe ntorth,4collectionofinformationuestimated10 a-erage.ourpe response,ncludingthetimeforreviewinginstructionsearchingexitingdatasource,oe nrorm. scc.iriuu u ecollectionofnformation Senacomment!regardingthisburdenestimateoranyotheraspectofthisgatheringand maintainingthedataneededndcompie tingand'"*"]"\,":r;*"^HMOo'ur ierV.cn"DirectorateforinformationOperationsand Reports . 21 5Jeffersont. AGENCYSENLYLeaveWank)4.ITLEANDUBTITLE

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UNITED S T A T E SFOREIGN P O L I C YIN IRAQFROM 1958TO1959:C O M M U N I S T S ,N A S S E R A N D TH EQASIM R E G I M E

by

ROB ERT B R U C EB L A N K E ,B. A.

Accesionor NT1S CRA& lDTIC TAB DUnannounced UJustificationByDistribution/

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TH ESI S

Presentedto th eFacultyof th eGraduateSchoolofThe UniversityofTexasat Austin

in PartialFulfillmentof th eRequirements

fo rth eDegreeof

M A S T E RO FAR TS

TH EUNIVERSITYO FT E X A SA T AUSTIN M ay1995

9 9 5 0 6 0 60 1 1

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UNITED S T A T E SF O R E I G NP O L I C YIN IRAQ F R O M1958TO1959:C O M M U N I S T S ,N A S S E R A N D TH EQASIM R E G I M E

A P P R O V E D :

L > < X ~ & L -lin-**W m.RogerLouis

u ^ e , * RobertA.Fernea

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

IwishtothankD r.RogerLouis,orth eguidancean dadviceneededto forwardm yprogressthroughoutth ecourseofthisproject.isinsightsalwaysprovedvaluable,an dhisfeedbackkeptth eworkfirmlyon course.ealsomadeavailablehisibraryfBritishgovernmentdocuments,roviding eferencesourcehatonewouldordinarilyhaveoetrievero mLondon.r.obertFerneaprovideddirectionan dpointedtourtherourcesthatprovedfruitfulswell.ohnAllgood,inth eCenterfo rBritishStudies,earnsm yappreciationforhishelpnortinghroughheforementioneddocuments,swellsorhispatiencennsweringnterminableuestionsboutormattingndtherminutiae.hegraduatetudentsnD r.Louis'seminarprovidedpointednd detailedfeedback,allofwhichwasuseful,ifno talwayscomfortable.nd ImustextendpecialhanksoimGrehan,orieldingheemainderofth erivialquestions,aswellasservingasan intellectualirritantan dgadflyth elengthof th eproject.

in

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.

TABLEOFCONTENTS

ListofMaps iIntroduction

I.T he FoundationsofAmericanForeignPolicyin th eMiddleEastA.verallAmericanForeignPolicyObjectivesB .ulles,Eisenhoweran dth eStateDepartmentC.he Threatsto U.S.Interestsan dth eEisenhowerDoctrine5D .heRoleofHashemiteIraq 9II .heOpposition to th eMonarchy 3A.heFreeOfficerMovement 4B .he IraqiCommunistParty 3C.he IraqiBa'thParty 9D .he Formationof th eNationalFront 2

III.he Revolution of14 July1958 6A.he Coupof14 July 6B .reliminary Indicationsan dInitialReactions1C.ost-CoupAssessmentsan dRecognitionof th eN ew Regime1

IV

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IV .heArab Nationalistsan dCommunistsFractureth eFreeOfficerMovement 7

A .heNationalistsCometo th eForefront 8 B .ArifsFallFromGrace 3C.heCommunistsStepto th eFront 9

V .he IraqiCommunistPartyPeaksan dFalls 6A .heStateDepartment'sViewofCommunistPower7B .he MosulUprisingLeadsto th eCommunist'sZenith3C.he CommunistsPeakan dBegin to Fall00D .heKirkukUprisingDoom sth eCommunists03Conclusions 09

Bibliography 14

Vita 19

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LISTOFMAPS

I.ra qII .lannedRouteof th e20thInfantry Brigade,14 July19589III.Mosulan dth eSurroundingArea 4

VI

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INTRODUCTION

Beginningin th elattermonthsofmyfirstterman dfo rseveralyearsthereafter,no regionof th eworldreceivedasmuchofm ycloseattentionan dthatofmycolleaguesasdidth eMiddleEast.here,againstabackground ofnew nationsemergingfromcolonialism,in th efaceofconstant thrustsofne wCommunistimperialism...theworldfacedaseriesofcrises.1PresidentEisenhowerintroducedhi sdiscussionsonth eMiddleEastinth e

secondvolumeofhisWhiteHousememoirswiththatquote.ndmongth eeventsdominatingU.S. ttentionnth eatterhalfofth e950'swouldbehe situationnraqollowinghe4ul y958ou p'etat.ro-Western monarchywasremovedfrompower,and th eeventsinth eyearfollowingitsfallwouldgiveth eUnitedStatespause,aswhatwasconsideredalinchpinappearedto beslippingawayfrom th eWest.

Priortoth eeventsofJuly958,th eHashemiteKingdomofIraqwasan unusualcountryby th estandardsofth eArabMiddleEast.hegovernmentwas solidlypro-Western,consistentlysidingwithth eUnitedStatesan dGrea tBritainagainstotherArabnations,suchasG a mel'Abdal-Nasser'sEgypt.urial-Said,th eleadingfigureinpre-revolutionIraqipolitics,wasaloneamongArableadersinhisonvictionthatSovietCommunismrepresentedth egreatestthreattoth e1 DwightD .Eisenhower,The WhiteHouseYears.Waging Peace1956-1961(GardenCity,N Y :Doubleday&CompanyInc.,1965),20 .

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Arabworld.ndwhilesidingwithotherArabnationsduringth eSuezcrisisan dotherissuesnvolvingIsrael,th eIraqigovernmenttood loneonotherissues.IraqwasheonlymajorArabnationthatwelcomedhennouncementofth eEisenhowerDoctrinen957,ndtwaslsoheonlyArabparticipantnWestern-sponsoredregionalalliance,th eBaghdadPact.

Thismadera qnmportantpartofEisenhowerdministrationoreignpolicy.nspiteofthis,th epolicynplacedidnotconcernitselfdirectlywith Iraq.nitedtatespolicyndealingwithheMiddleEastofth eim ewas predicatedon tw ofactors.he firstofthesewas th econtainment ofCommunism,th eoverridingthemeofth eEisenhoweran dJohnFosterDullesera.heSovietUnionwasconsideredth emajorfo eof th eUnitedStatesan dth eWestat th etime,an dth epreventionofth espreadofCommunism wasofth eutmostimportanceto th eadministration.ollowingthatprioritywas th emaintenanceofstabilityin th eMiddleEastasawhole.heregionwasimportanttoAmericaan ditsEuropeanAllies,ndpreventingnstabilitynth eegionwasonsideredvitalonationalinterests.hilethisforeignpolicyframeworkdealtwithth eMiddleEastasawhole,itdidno tdealwithinternalconsiderationsinspecificareasinth eregion.A such,heUnitedStatesgovernmentwouldbehamperedwhendealingwithregionalproblems.

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.36

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Thisbecameapparentimmediatelyafterth eoverthrowof th emonarchyinIraq.heUnitedStatesgovernmentwasslow to ge tahandleonth eeventswithinIraq,ndmmediatelyeganssigningainsoorcesutsidefraq-theNasseriteArabnationalistmovementorSovietCommunism-asopposedtoth eforceswithinIraqthathad beenactinginoppositiontoth eregimesinceth eearlypartfheecade.heraqiommunistartyadeenpposinghegovernmentbeforeWorldW arII ,an dth eothermajorforcesthatwoulddominateth eraqipoliticalandscape,heFreeOfficer'smovementan dth eBa'thparty,werecreatedin th eyearsfollowingth ecreationofIsraelan dth efirstArab-IsraeliWar.WhilethereweresimilargroupsoutsideofIraq,thesegroupsal lhadstrong internaloncerns.utostmportantly,llxistednppositionoheMonarchy,ndereotel lreparedorealingithventsfterhey succeededinbringingth eHashemiteregimedown.

Them anwhoedth eoup,BrigadierAbd l-KarimQasim,wouldbe centralohepowertrugglesbetweenth eBa'thndth eCommunistsnraq.Whileth eUnitedStatespersistedinviewingth estruggleasone betweenwhetherIraqwouldbedominatedbyCommunism an dth eSovietUnionorNasseran dth eUnitedArabRepublic,th eIraqifactionsweredealingwithinternaloncernsin thistruggle. Thessueasirstwhetherraqouldoin ithremain

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independentofth eU AR ,ndthenth enatureofruleonth epartofth eQasim regime.nheirstphaseofth etruggle,heCommunistsprovedusefuloQasim,astheyhelpedhim defeathischief rivalan dkeepIraqoutofth eUnited ArabRepublic,therebyfirminghisow ngriponpower.ndafterwardshewas abletoconsolidatepowerinhisownhands.

B utth eStateDepartment,an dth eUnitedStatesgovernmentasawhole,werenotabletocometotermswithth econditionsinIraq.ntheireyes,itwas no tasimhoieldedower,utatherherabationalistsrheCommunists.nd thiswouldhinderthemindealingwithIraq.heycouldno tcometo termswithth eproblems,an ditwastheirow npolicyframeworkofanti-Communism an d pro-stabilitythat wouldcreatethisproblem.

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THEFOUNDATIONSOFAMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY INTHEMIDDLEEAST

TheEisenhowerdministrationetoreignpolicyegardingheMiddleEastinth esamecontextaswithth erestofth eworld.heoverridingconcernwasheontainmentofCommunism.hileotherconcernslsooccupiedth eStateepartment,heseereecondaryoheontainmentfCommunism.Individualcountriesweredealtwithastheyfitintothisoverallrubric.ra qwas lookeduponbyth eU.S.asapossibleallyintheirstruggleagainstCommunism,an dasastable,pro-Westerncountryinanareathatlargelyseemedtobeturningitsbackon th eUnitedStates.

A .verallAmericanForeignPolicyObjectivesUnderth eTrumanDoctrine,tw oobjectiveshadbeense tfo rU.S.foreign

policynheMediterraneanndMiddleast.heirstfheseashe containmentfSovietommunism.hatontainmentasasednoth political-military an d ideological factors. The second objective was th e

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maintenanceofgeneralstability.2hileJohnFosterDulles,amongothers,ha dcomplainedaboutth eforeignpolicyofth eTrumanadministration,he didlittleto changeitwithregardto th eMiddleEast.rumanan dSecretaryofStateAcheson were llowedoethepolicyobjectives,ndheEisenhowerdministrationfaithfullyarriedhemover.3othDullesndEisenhowerwereertainlynsympathywiththesegoals,astheiroppositionto Communisman d NasseriteArabnationalismindicated.

U.S.nterestsinth eMiddleEastca nbedefinedintermsofthesegoals.A tth etime,therewerefewerspecificallyAmericaninterestsinth eMiddleEast.Mostofthemwereofaninternationalcharacter,withsupportfo rth eWestan dAmerica'sEuropean lliesiguringntohequation.henterestsgenerally derivefromth epositionofth eMiddleEastwithregardtoth eWest,witheventhatspecifictermpointingto thisfact.Whileth eimportanceofsomeof th elinesofcommunicationhroughheMiddleEastwereiminishing,heyemainedimportantto th eWest.nimpeded passagethroughth eSuezCanalan doverflightrightswerepartofth eU.S.interestinth eregion.Maintainingaccesstooilwas alsoavitalinterestofth eU.S. WhileAmericadidnotdependonoi lfromth e

2JohnS.Badeau,T he AmericanApproachto th eArabWorld(NewYork:arper& Row,Publishers, 968), 7-18.3 RichardGoold-Adams,JohnFosterDulles: Reappraisal(NewYork:pple-Century-Crofts, Inc., 962),200.

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MiddleEastatth etime,th eEuropeanallieswereheavilydependentonMiddleEasternoil.4

Maintainingcertainconditionsinth eMiddleEastalsoiguredintoU.S.interests.hefirstofthesewasthatgovernmentsnth eMiddleEastmaintain theirindependence.nunfriendlygovernmentthatwas lsounfriendlytohe SovietUnionwaspreferableo Communist-controlledountrynth eMiddleEast.heecondonditionhatheU.S.ookedomaintainwasheoverallstabilitynheegion,nccordancewithheecondoverallobjectiveofth eforeignpolicy.hilesocialchangewasnotresistible,th elackofstabilitythatthischangebroughtoncouldbemoredetrimentalthanth eoriginalituation,in thatshort-term destruction m ay outweighlong-termgains.5

B.ulles,EisenhowerandtheStateDepartmentJohnFosterDulles,heecretaryfState,asheeadingiguren

formingAmericanpolicyinth e 950's.ewasth edescendentoftw oormerSecretariesofState,ndhadpentth egreaterpartofhisifeoncernedwith internationalaffairs.ehadbeenth eprincipalforeignaffairsadvisortoD eweyinhe94 8 lectionampaign,ndhadwrittenheRepublicanPartyoreign'Badeau,T he AmericanApproach .20-22.5ibid,24-25.

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policyplatformin1952. WhenEisenhowerwonth epresidency,Dulleswashis choicefo rSecretaryofState.WhilehewasnotEisenhower'sfirstchoiceduring th ecampaign,6Eisenhowerhimselfwrotethat

WhenIwaselectedto th ePresidencythat November,Ipromptlynamedhim asSecretaryofState-designate.osteran dIhadm et fouryearsearlier,butIhad known him beforem yelection to th ePresidency throughreadinghisarticlesan dspeeches....From1952onwardourrelationshipripenedintoon eofdeeppersonalfriendshipan dclosecollaborationin th eworkofconductingth eforeignrelationsofth eUnitedStates.7Thiselationship endedplacing areatea l ofheesponsibility fo rdevelopingforeignpolicyinth ehandsofDulles.

Dulleswasno tunfamiliarwithth eStateDepartment,an datth eoutsethe triedto maintain amoredetachedmannerindealingwithth eDepartment.yth een dofhisirstyear,hebecamemorentimatelynvolvedwithth eday-to-day workingsofth eDepartment.hi swasaresultofhisrealizationthatth ecrisisor emergencyofth emomentdictatesong-termpolicies,ndanimitprogresstowardlong-termgoals.8 H ealsowasdistrustfulofth ecareerstaffatth eSateDepartment,viewingthemsth eproductoftwentyyearsofDemocraticPartyforeignpolicy.9he result,though,wasthathe tightlycontrolledth eworkingsof6Goold-Adams,Dulles: Reappraisal.53 .7Eisenhower,WagingPeace .362.8EleanorLansingDulles,AmericanForeignPolicyinth eMaking(NewYork:arper& Row,Publishers, 968),2.9 BarryRubin,SecretsofState:heStateDepartmentan dth eStruggleOverU.S.Foreign Policy(NewYork:xfordUniversityPress,Inc., 985),76 .

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th eepartment.dditionally,epposedntroducingndditionaloreignpolicyinformationcenterat th eWhiteHouse,attemptingto makehimselfth esolesourceofadviceduringhisenure.ithinheDepartment,heargelymadepolicyonhisown,an dreliedon hissubordinatesasexecutorsofhispolicy.he resultwasalackofcoordinationan dastateofconfusionwithinth eDepartment.10

Dullesbroughtwithhim ase tofbeliefs,an dtheywouldshapeth epolicieshean dth ePresidentcreatedan dimplemented.hilosophically,atleastuntilth een d ofhiscareer,hebelievedthatth ecoldwar wasazero-sum game,an dthatth esituationwasfullofdangerinth eshortrun.ealsoaw powerasth eke yto successfulealingsithommunistations,ndhatuildingnitynfoundation offearwaseasierthanbasingunityon hope.11isprimaryconcernin internationalffairs,hough,ashexpansionfheovietnionnd Communism.hilewodeologies,ommunismndasseritera bNationalism,ouldom eoominate.S .oncernsnraq,ommunism remainedDulles'sprimaryconcern.nd th eStateDepartmentitselfwouldcometo reflectthatviewaswell.l thoughSecretaryDullesdiedinAprilof1959,hismindsetwasstillvisiblein th ereportsan danalysescomingfrom Iraq.

'GulshanDietl,The DullesEr a(NewDelhi:ancerInternational,1986),9-20.1 1ibid, 3-15.

1 0

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WhilePresidentEisenhowerha sbeencharacterizedasapassivefigurein termsforeignolicy,eviewfheituationhowsha thisasnexaggeration.tistruethatheleftth eformulationan dimplementationofforeignpolicyoSecretaryDulles;heonth eotherhanddidpproveDulles'soreignpolicyinitiatives.ulleswasloyaltoth ePresidentinallofhisactions.edi dno tailolearnypolicyctionshroughEisenhower,ndhe lsokepthe Presidentinformedofeveryworldeventthathethoughtth ePresidentshouldbe awareof.12he Presidentwasnot,however,totallyunderth einfluenceofDulleswithegardooreignffairs.heecretary'snflexiblettitudeowardheSovietUnionan dothersfrustratedevenEisenhowerat times,an dhewasableto beamoderatinginfluenceonDulles.13

WhileDulleswasertainlyhedominantctornhapingU.S.oreignpolicys whole,otherofficialsndStateDepartmentbureaushapedpolicyspecificallydealingwithraq.heBureauofNearEasternndSouthAsianAffairswasresponsiblefo rissuespertainingtoIraqatth etime.hegeographicbureausofth eStateDepartmenttitularlyar eresponsiblefo rpolicy,but inth erealworldthisdependsmoreonth erelationshipth eAssistantSecretaryhaswithth ehigherechelons. Thebureauwouldlsobemorenfluentialonquestionshat 12Goold-Adams,Dulles: Reappraisal.61 .1 3 Rubin,SecretsofState.77 .

1 1

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arosewithinth eestablishedpolicyframework,ratherthanactuallycreatingan dsettingpolicy.14hisasspeciallyru enheullesra .heAssistantSecretaryinchargeof th ebureau fromJuly1956untilJuly1959wasWilliamM.Rountree.ewasacareercivilservant,havingstartedoffinth eTreasuryan dhad cometo th eStateDepartmentafterwards.ehad servedeitherinth eMiddleEastorwithth eMiddleEasterndesksfo rmostofhiscareer,ndhadbeenth eCounselorohembassynranriorossumingheostfAssistantSecretary.lmostallofhisxperience,hough,wasndealingwithIrannd Turkey,ratherthanth eArabStates.15herewassomecriticism ofRountreeto th eeffectthathedidnotrisethroughth eranksthroughcompetencesomuchas throughth eappearanceofcompetencebyavoidingerror.16hilethatcriticism maybeoverlyharsh,twasunlikelythatheofferedpolicyinitiativesdivergentfrom thoseof th eSecretary.

TheEmbassyinIraqwasth elocusofU.S.foreignpolicyinthatcountry,an dalsooneofth eprimarysourcesofinformationtobothth eStateDepartmentan dth eintelligencecommunity.he AmbassadorinIraquntilDecem berof1958wasWaldemarGallman. Dulleshaddispatchedhim toIraqinSeptember954,14 BurtonM.Sapin,The MakingofUnitedStatesForeignPolicy(Washington,D.C.:he BrookingsInstitution,1966),19 .15 U.S.DepartmentofState,BiographicRegister1958(Washington,D.C.:epartmentofState,1958),3. 16WilburCraneEveland,RopesofSand:America'sFailureinth eMiddleEast(NewYork:W .W .Norton&Company, 980),95 .

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an dhad givenhim th ebriefofdevelopingaregionalalliancenetwork.17allmanhimselfwas veteranofheoreignervice,avingervedn varietyfcapacitiesnbothWashingtonndoverseasduringhisareer.riorobeingselectedfo rth eAmbassadorshipinIraq,Gallmanhadservedasth eCounselorto th eEmbassynLondon.nlikeRountree,whohadxperiencenth eMiddleEast,Gallmanhad no priorpostingstoth eregion,servingprimarilyinEurope.18Thisdidnothinderhim inhi smission,though.ewasabletodevelopagoodworkingrelationshipwith th eIraqigovernmentpriorto th eJuly1958Revolution,an dcameto identifyhimselfwithth eregimeofNurial-Said.econsidered Nurial-SaidagenuineIraqipatriot,aswellasIraq'sbesthopefo rfutureprosperity.19

In Decem berof1958,GallmanwassucceededasAmbassadorby JohnD .Jernegan.isbackgroundwas losertoRountree'sthanGallman's,shehad considerablexperiencendealingwithheMiddleEast.ikeountreend Gallman,hewasaveteranof th eForeignService.owever,ikeRountree,hisexperiencewasprimarilywithTurkeyndIran,sopposedtoheArabtates,althoughhedidervesounsuleneralnTunis.riorossuminghe AmbassadorshipnBaghdad,eadbeenheounselorohembassyn17TownsendHoopes,The Devilan dJohnFosterDulles(Boston:ittle,Brownan dCompany,1973),321.,8Dept.ofState,BiographicRegister1958 .241.19 WaldemarGallman,IraqUnderGeneralNuri:M yRecollectionsofNurial-Said. 954-1958 (Baltimore:he JohnsHopkinsPress, 964),220-31.

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Rome.20othAmbassadorshadhortcomingsndealingwithRevolutionary Iraq.allmanwasunabletocopewithth efallofth eal-Saidgovernment,whichhe hadsupportedan didentifiedwithtoacertaindegree.ndalthoughJerneganwouldroveoiveoreredenceoventsnhetreetsndheou dproclamationsof th eIraqiCommunistPartythannecessary,hewouldalsohavealo tofcompanyin that.

Anotheragencyinth eStateDepartment,th eBureauofIntelligencendResearch,ouldontributeoraqiolicytheime,fonlyorovideinformationonventsnountry.ntelligencendResearchshargedwith preparingreportsan dtudiesorwiderdistributionthroughth eDepartment.talsoparticipatesinth eactivitiesofth eintelligence communityasawhole.21he Bureaualsooordinatesth epreparationofNationalntelligencestimateswith otheragencies,withth eCentralIntelligenceAgencyassumingaleadingrolein theirpreparation.22heWristonreformsofth emid-fiftiesbroughtaboutsomepersonnelchangesinIntelligencean dResearch,sendingexperiencedintelligencespecialistsverseasndeplacinghem ithForeignervicefficershoseexpertisewasmoregeneralized. 23 Whilehiswasbeneficialnheon gun ,20 U.S.DepartmentofState,BiographicRegister1959(Washington,D.C.:epartmentofState,1959),362.21Sapin,United StatesForeignPolicy .22 .22ibid,306-07.23ibid, 27-29.

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IntelligencendResearchdidexperienceom eproblemsnth eDullesraasresult.

HughCummingwasappointedth eDirectorofIntelligencean dResearch inOctoberof1957.nothercareerForeignServiceofficer,he waslikeGallmaninhathehad greatdealofexperiencenheEuropeanrena,butnoea linvolvementnMiddleasternssuesrioroorkingnheDepartment'sintelligencearm.isEuropeanexperiencewasconcentratedinth eScandinavian nationsaswell,withsomeworkina N A T O posting,an dalsoatourasCounseloratth eEmbassyinMoscow.24WhileCummingdi dinfactspecifically addressth eIraqirisisnorrespondencewithheecretary,tsikelyhatheteastcoordinatedwith th especialiston th esubjectinhisbureau.

C.heThreatstoU.S.InterestsandtheEisenhowerDoctrineThereisnodoubtthatbothEisenhoweran dDullesviewedth epossibility

ofCommunistdominationto beth egreatestthreatth eUnitedStatesfacedinIraq,or th eMiddleEastasa whole.isenhowerwrotethat

...leadersofth eSovietUnion,liketh eCzarsbeforethem,hadtheireyeson th eMiddleEast.he Sovietgoalwas by no meansmerelyto moveshipsthroughth eSuezCanal...Neitherwas th egoalMiddleEasternoil....TheSovietobjective,was,inplainfact,powerpolitics:oseizeth e

24 Dept .ofState,BiographicRegister1958.4 .15

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wholecomplex ofactionsorlackofactionswhich th egovernmenttakesinitsinternationalan ddomesticaffairs.28 Theinabilitytodistinguishbetweenth elocalagendaofan Arabgovernmentan daoviet-Communistgendaouldinder.S .overnmentnalysisfhesituationinIraqafterth eRevolution.he ywerepredisposedtoseeaCommunist influenceinstancesopposingth eUnitedStates.

B utinternationalCommunismwasno tth eonlythreattoU.S.interestsin th eMiddleEast.amelAbd l-Nasser'siseopowernEgyptbroughtcompetingideology,thatofanon-alignedArabnationalism,toth eArabMiddleEast.ra bnationalisminan dofitselfwasno tconsideredtobeathreat.he StateDepartmenthadnac tbeenonsideringts possibleoundationor buildingMiddleasterndefensesgainstommunistntrusion.29heWestinitiallyviewedth eNasserregimewithhope,thinkingthatitmightbecomea pro-Western,nti-Communistegime.30owever,heisenhowerdministrationdevelopedth eviewpointthatthosehopeshadbeeninvain.olllowingNasser's1955purchaseofSovietmilitaryequipmentan dth eAswanD am problem,theyfelt that

...Nasserwasno tonlytryingtoimprovehisownpositionby working withth eKremlin,he wasstrivingtoge thimselfrecognizedinth eArabworld asitspoliticalleader~thevirtualheadofanenormousMoslem

28 ibid,28 .29 Rubin,SecretsofState.88 .30 Eisenhower,WagingPeace.23-24.17

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with th estrategicposition thatIraqoccupiedin th eMiddleEast.heseconddealtwith th eHashemiteMonarchyan dth egovernmentofNurial-Said.

Eisenhoweran dDullessa wIraqason eofth eNorthernTierpowersthatwereimportantindefendingth eregionagainstRussianattack.37snotedearlier,DulleshaddispatchedWaldemarGallmantoraqorth epurposeofcreatingamilitaryallianceinth eregion.n955,th ealliancethatDulleshadsoughtwas finallyarrivedat ,asIraq,th eNorthernTiercountries,an dGreatBritainenteredintoth eBaghdadPact.heUnitedStates,however,di dno tenterintoth ePact.Dullesel tthatitwouldunderminerelationswithth eemainingArabtatesftheyid,ndeompromisedyamingallmansnobserver"oheBaghdadPact.38utth eac temainedha tra qwasheonlyArabnationto committselfton lliancewithth eWest,ncurringhehostilityofth eArabLeaguean dotherArabstates.isenhowerwouldgoontostatethatIraqwasin factheountryhatheUnitedStatesha dbeenountingonomaintainhe securityan dstabilityof th eregion.39

Whileraq'socationmadeheountrynmportant emberfth eBaghdadPact,th egovernmentofIraqwasof equal,ifno tgreater,importancein 37 AmilitaryattackthroughTurkeyan dintoMosul,an dthento th esouth,wa sseenasmorefeasiblethananattackthroughIranatth etime.Whileitislogisticallyeasierto attackth eArabianpeninsula throughTurkeyan dIraqthanitwouldbe throughIran,itwouldstillbe anextremely difficultexercise.38Hoopes,T he Devilan dDulles.322.39 Eisenhower,WagingPeace .269.

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U.S.eyes.heHashemitesan dNurihad madeacommitmentto th eWest.he U.S.government'sassessmentofIraqwasspelledou tinaNationalIntelligenceEstimateofJune957.heEstimate'spurposewasossessprospectsor stabilityan ddevelopmentinIraq,an ditsroleinMiddleEasternan dArabaffairsoverafe wyears.he ysa wth egovernmentastable,ndthatitwouldlikelyremainsoaslongasNurial-Saidremainedactivein politics.Whiletheysa wIraqcontinuingto remainalignedwith th eWest,theyrealized thattheywouldno tveertofa rfromotherArabpositionsastheydidno twishtobecomeisolatedinth eArabworld.he ydid,however,eeraqmaintainingieswithth eWestnd remainingaloofofth eSovietUnionan dCommunistBloc.he yalsonotedthatIraq'stieswithBritainha dbeenweakenedinth ewakeofth eSuezcrisis.saresult,th etrengthofhertieswithAmericahadinfactincreased.hegeneralconclusionwas thatwhileIraqwouldretainsomecontactwithth eAraban dThirdWorld,asawholeIraqiforeignpolicywouldbeth emostfavorableto th eWestofan yArabstate.4 0

Inhort,heoreignolicyfhenitedtatesegardingra qas dictatedbyconcernsexternaltoIraq.ecretaryDullesan dPresidentEisenhowerestablishedpolicyobjectivesndinterestsorth eregion,ndpecificountries40NationalIntelligenceEstimate36.2-57,"TheOutlookfo rIraq," June1957,ForeignRelationsof th eUnitedStates1955-1957VolumeXII.NearEastRegion:Iran Iraq(Hereafterreferredto asFRUS1955-571 .p1048-58 .

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wereviewedfromthiscontext.ndth eofficialsinth eStateDepartmentwerepartof thisprocess.ullesexpectedth eDepartmentto implementhispolicies,as opposedtosuggestingpolicyto him.ssuch,theywereviewingth eMiddleEastthroughth eDullesmindset.Whenth esituationinIraqchangeddramatically,thatmindsetwouldstillserveastheirfilterfo revaluatingeventsinIraq.

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IITHEOPPOSITION TOTHEMONARCHY

Thereere varietyfoppositionroupsnraqpriorohe95 8Revolution.ldergroups,uc hshestiqlalIndependence)PartyndheNationalDemocratsformedpartofth epatchworkoppositionscene.heUnitedSatesgovernmentwoulden dupconcernedwiththreeopposition groupsafterth erevolution,though.he ywereth eIraqiCommunistParty,th eIraqibranchofth eBa'thparty,ndheFreeOfficermovementwithinhemilitary.llofthesegroupsouldlay majorolenraqinternaloliticsndnxercisinginfluenceonUnitedStatesforeignpolicy.utth elevelofinfluencethesethreegroupswieldedinth eoverallm ixofgroupsan dmovementsarrayedagainstth eregimevaried,an dtheirabilityto combineinoppositionagainstth eregimewouldalsoproveobe riticalactorollowingheoverthrowofth eHashemites.Interestingly,ideologywasafactorwithonlytw oofth ethreemovements.Whileth eCommunistsand th eBa'thistsha dan ideologicalbasefo rtheirmovement,th eFreeOfficerswereorientedsolelytowardopposition toth emonarchyan d Nurial -Said.

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of ,an dunknownto ,al-Sirri's.tthispointal-Sirribeganactivelycanvassingfo rsupportinth eofficercorps.l-Majid,onth eotherhand,waslowertoee ksupportan dhiscellgrewataslower pace.44

Whileth eFreeOfficermovementwasgrowinginth eIraqimilitary,th eUnitedStateshad examinedth epossibilityofmilitarycoupinIraq,amongotherthings,inaDecember1955reportfromth eOperationsCoordinatingBoard.he Boardtookadetailedlookatth einternalsituationinIraq,an dconcludedthatth emilitaryasoyaloheonarchy.herimaryoncern,hough,as Communistinfiltrationintohemilitaryrankssopposedtoubversiveofficergroupsexistingwithinth emilitary.heydi dno tconsiderth eArm yathreatto internalsecurity,butratheraforcethatwasadequateto maintainit. 45

Al-Sirriontinuedonjoyecruitinguccess,butpartofthatuccesscameatth eexpenseofprudence.ewasla xinexercisingpropersecurity,andpeoplewereabletogainaccesstohisgroupwithoutsufficientscrutiny.ewas summonedtoth eMinistryofDefenseinth esummerof1956,an dwastoldthatth eexistenceofhisgroupwasknown,ndwasshownproofofthis.hileal-Sirriprotestedan dseeminglyconvincedLieutenantGeneralRafiq'Aref,hewas subsequentlyransferredoheutrovincesecruitingfficer. Before44 Batatu,The O ldSocialClasses.772-773.45 OperationsCoordinatingBoardReport,"AnalysisofInternalSecuritySituationinIraqan dRecommendedAction,"FRUS1955-57.982.

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Thereisno evidenceofarevolutionary-minded militarycliqueamongIraqiofficers-suchasthatwhichoverthrew KingFaroukinEgypt~andIraq'srulingfamilyisinan ycasemorepopularthanFarouk.owever,suchagroupislikelytoemerge-probablywithEgyptianan dSaudiencouragementif th egovernment'svigilanceshouldbe relaxed. 4 9

Whileno tdiscountingth efuturepossibilityofgroupssuchasth eFreeOfficersforming,hentelligenceommunityidno tav enformationhatheraqigovernmentwasawareof. Moreimportantly,apossibleconnectionwithEgyptwas beingestablishedaspartofanIraqimilitaryopposition.

Evaluationsof th eIraqiArmycontinuedinto957.heMilitaryAttacheat th eBritishembassyinBaghdad,BrigadierN .F.B .Shaw,preparedareporton Iraqimilitaryactivityin1956,an dth eembassyforwardedittoLondoninMarchof1957. Inth eetterprefacingheeport,S irMichaelWrightnotedhathemaintenanceofinternalstabilitywasamajorroleofth eIraqiArmy.50 BrigadierShaw notedthatwithth edecliningBritishinfluenceamongth eIraqimilitary,thatth eUnitedStates,Nasser,an dth eIraqiCommunistPartyweremovingtofillth evoid.isevaluation wasthatth eIraqiArmywasfreeofth einternalpolitics,an danimportantpartofth einternalsecurityapparatusofth egovernment. Whilehe

49 ibid,1001.50FO371/128067,CoverLetterfo raReportonth eIraqiArmedForcesfo rth eYear1956,!6 March1957,2.

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notedthatth eattackonSuezdistressedsomeofth ejuniorofficers,th echief ofstaffwasableto keepmattersin hand.51

Thatyearth eU.S.intelligencecommunityreiteratedth ethemethattherewasnothingtofearfromth eIraqiArmy. InaJune957NationalIntelligenceEstimate,heyam eomanyofth eam eonclusionsofth estimatenhepreviousyear.hey notedthattherewasoppositionto th eregimeamongmilitaryofficer,uthatherm ys wholeidotnterferenolitics.52 they concluded that

Althoughpro-Nasser,pro-Communist,an danti-Nurisentimentsexist,especially amongyoungerofficers,dissidentelementsar enotebelievedto be organizedor politicallycapableofseizingth einitiativeagainst th epresentregime.53 The UnitedStatesdidno tbelievethatmilitaryactionagainstth eNuriregimewas possible.hiswouldcomplicatemattersinJulyof1958.A sJuly1958approached,th eFreeOfficermovementhadassumedseveralcharacteristics. T heovementadontentionf ligningonefhe dominantdeologies. Theywerewidespreadswell-therewereellsofth emovementhroughoutheraqirmy. Theiroa lastraightforward-theoverthrowoftheMonarchyndNuri l-Said.B ythistime,Qasiman dthirteen

51FO 371/128067,Reporton th eIraqiArmedForcesfo rth eYear1956,26 February1957, -4 .52NationalIntelligenceEstimate36.2-57,"TheOutlookfo rIraq,"FRUS1955-57. 048-1057.53ibid, 057-58.

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otherofficersrepresentedth eCentralOrganization of th emovement.Whiletheydi dplantooverthrowth emonarchybyforce,theyhad nospecificplansfo rwhatformofgovernmentwouldollow.nact,heonlyhingherewasgeneralagreementonwasthatth ene wgovernmentwouldbearepublic.54heirviewsspreadacrossawideportionofth eideologicalspectrum.hey wereallfromth elowerorlower-middle lassoriginally,ndhadnovestednterestinth etatusquo.llbu ton eofthem ha dattendedth eMilitary Academyafter1934,an dnonebefore932.oteworthyheresth eac tthatdirectBritishupervisionofth eMilitaryAcademyhad endedin1932.55

Thepecificgoalsweresetdowninwhattheycalledth eNationalPact.Onceheyhadidraqofth emonarchy,heywouldtepsidend llowcivilianovernmentoenstalled,hiletherser eorenterestednparticipatingnth ene wgovernment.ivilian,knownfo rhispatriotisman dintegrity,wouldbeelectedbyheFreefficersobeheheadofth enew government.he headofstatewouldbereplacedbyathree-memberCouncilofSovereignty,ndheCentralOrganizationwouldre-formnt o Revolutionary Councilfollowingasuccessfulcoup.sfa rasth equestionofIraqjoiningth eUnitedra bepublicasoncerned,hereefficersad eoecision,54Khadduri,RepublicanIraq .20 .55 Batatu,The O ldSocialClasses.788.nterestingly,th eloneofficerinquestionwa sA bd al- KarimQasim.

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schoolteacher. Whenmembersofhissocialstratabecameeligibletoattendth eMilitaryAcademyin1932hedidso,graduatingasaSecondLieutenantin1934,achievingth erankofBrigadierby955.esa wserviceinth e94 1waragainstBritain,ndhroughoutheraqictionnPalestine. From956-57ewas stationedwithhisrigadenMafraq,ordan.58 H ettendedheraqitaffCollegefrom94 0to941,an dwenttoth eSeniorOfficer'sSchoolinDevizes,Englandn950.59 H ehadbecomehemajorparticipantnheFreeOfficermovementasearlyas1955.60 Personallyhewasdescribedas jumpy,moodyan dunpredictablebutcapableofexercisingagooddealofpersonalcharm.61 Upon firstmeetinghim,U.S.ambassadorGallman

...foundhim affablean dobviouslyanxioustoge trevolutionaryregimeofftoasgoodastartaspossiblewithUS.rigadierQasimreceivedmein friendlybutsomewhatdiffidentmanner.He'squitefluentinEnglish.W ehad ourexchange withoutth ebenefitofan interpreter. 62

A nduris-Saidegardedimighly. H eelieved Qasimncapableftreachery,eventhoughheha dbeengivenatleaston ewarningofit.63 Qasim was th ecommanderofth e19thInfantry BrigadeatMansuratth etimeof th ecoup.

58 UrielDann,IraqUnderOassem: PoliticalHistory. 958-1963(NewYork:rederickA.Praeger,Inc.,969),22 .59Batatu,The O ldSocialClasses.778-779.60 ibid,786.Dann,IraqUnderOassem .22 .62 Telegram fromth eEmbassyinIraqto th eDepartmentofState,5July1958,FRUS .318-319.63 Dann,IraqUnderOassem.23 .3 2

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1955,heCommunistPartydidno tppearoposehaterious threat.he OperationsCoordinatingBoardReportstatedthatth eIraqiCommunistPartydidno trepresentanimmediatedangertoth eregime,posingprimarilyth ethreatofinfiltratingvariousprofessionsnd rganizations.venundermoreelaxedconditions,heyawarge-scaleommunistnfiltrationfke yovernmentpositionsasunlikely.he yalsoidentifiedth eKurdishpopulationasaprimary source ofrecruitsfo r th eParty.utth econclusionwas thatth esecurityapparatusofNuri'sgovernmentcoulddealwithth ethreatposedby th eCommunistsat thattime.66

B uthe iddlefheecadeasee ransformationnheraqiCommunistParty.nheirstpartofth e950's,heCommunistspursuedpolicyofdirectonfrontationwithhegovernmentnhetreets,eekinghedefeatofth eBaghdadPact.hisapproachcametonothing,an ditresultedinth esackingofHamidUthman,th epartychief.majorityofth emembersofth eparty'sCentralCommitteeevoltedgainsthim,bringinghepartyundertheircontrol.he new leadershipalsoreversedth eschismatictrendthatth epartyhad beenufferinghrough,ursuing usionfheariousactionshathe Communistpartyhad splitinto.Negotiationswerestarted,an dth eactualsettling66 OperationsCoordinating BoardReport,"AnalysisofInternalSecuritySituationinIraqan dRecommendedAction,"FRUS1955-57.979-982.

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ofdoctrinaldifferenceswasrelativelyeastwith'Uthmanoutofth eway.yth een dof June,956,th eCommunistpartyhadreintegrated67ndbecometh emostpowerfulsingleoppositionfactioninIraq.

T wom enwereoiseoheor eofth epartynheatterhalfofth edecade.hefirstof thesewasHusainAhm adal-Sayyid'Alial-Radi,whowouldbeth esecretary-generalofth ePartyfrom95 5untilhisdeathin963.ewas anArabhi'i,ornn924nheityfNajaf,homefmanyprominentCommunists.isfather,althoughasayyid 6 8,workedasaclerkataflourmill,an dhisfamilywas lwaysnpoverty.eepresentedth eparty tth eSecondLondonConferencefth eommunistParties,utwasexiled"ohemid-Euphratesareain1954fo rhisoppositionto'Uthman'spolicies.ewasrecalled to th eleadershipin1955,an dremainedthereuntilhisdeath.Theotherindividualmovingto th efrontat th etimewas'Amer'Abdallah'Umaral-'Amiri.Al-'Amiriwastobecometh eideologicalleaderofth epartyatth etimeofth eRevolution.H ewasborninAnah,th eoldesttowninIraq,n924.isfatherwasalsosayyid,acallertoprayeratamosquein'Anah.ebecameth ehighbrowofth epartywhenhiscloseassociateal-Radicameto power,takingth eideologicallead.Afterth erevolution,hecameto th eforefrontthroughbothhisforceofpersonality

67 Batatu,T he O ldSocialClasses.709-711.68 ibid,712. sayyidison ewho claimskinshipwithth eProphet.35

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an dresourcefulness.ewasth eCommunistwhohad th egreatestinfluencewith'Abdal-KarimQasim,whowastobecometh eheadofstate;hiswas majorfactorinhisrisetopreeminence.69

TheCommunistthreatinIraqwasevaluatedagainbyth eUnitedStatesin1956.heNationalntelligenceEstimateofJuly956oncegainnotedhe government'sepressionfheommunistarty,sel lstherpoliticalmovements.hilehe yotedgainhatfressureer eelaxed,he Communistswouldhaveth eabilitytocreatedifficulties,theydiscounted themasathreattoth eregime.heydidnote,however,thatth eCommunistsmightseekto"createanationalfrontofoppositionparties"ifgiventh eopportunity 70,clearlyforeshadowingth eestablishmentofthatsame NationalFrontwithina year.

Whileth eleadershipofth eCommunistpartychangedinth emiddleofth edecade,thatwasno tth emostprofoundchangethatth epartywastogothroughpriorto theRevolution.heKurdsha dbeenth eascendantethnicfactionamongth eommunistshroughUthman'senuresecretary-general,utwithhis ousterwas to cometh een d of their power.he IraqiCommunistPartybecamean ArabCommunistpartyinth elatterhalfofth e1950'san dbeganto viewconceptslikeArabnationalisminamorefavoredlight. O neofth eprimarycatalystswas

69 ibid,712-719. 70NationalIntelligenceEstimate36.2-56,"TheOutlookforIraq'sStabilityan dForeignPolicies," FRUS1955-57.002.

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Oppositionoheaghdadact-allroupser enitednhis.heew leadershipwasArab,an dtheyweredissatisfiedwith th eattitudethatth epartyhad takenithegardsora btruggles,onsideringtoenegative"nd"isolationist."tthisim eheraqishadnode athatNasserwasnegotiating throughChouEn-Laiwithth eRussianstopurchaseweapons.hileth epartywashostileto Nasserpriortoth eannouncementofth esale,alltracesofhostilitydisappearro mheirublicationsfterwards. 71hetageasetorheintegrationofsomeArabideologicalbasesinth eIraqiCommunistParty.

TheCommunistsbegantoworkfromamoreArabplatformatthispoint.Instructionsro mth eCentralCommitteenmid-November955hadth epartywagingitsstruggleunderth eslogan"ForaNationalArabPolicy."fterNassernationalizedth eSuezcanal,th epartyidentifiedwith this"battleofArabdom." ttheirSecondPartyConference,heldnSeptember956,heraqiCommunistsadoptedapositionsimilartoth eon eadoptedby theirSyriancounterparts.hey recognizedth eArabNationalmovementasprogressivean ddemocratic,an dthatIraqwas partofanArabhomeland.hey alsorecognizedthatth eArabsformedasinglenation,withlinguistic,historicalndculturalties.hiswasinlinewitheventsnth eSovietUnion,whereheTwentiethCongressofth eCommunist Party ofhe Sovietnioneappraisedheole ofational revolutionary

'Batatu,The O ldSocialClasses.749.37

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movementsndheoleofth enationalbourgeoisie"nhenewlyiberatedcountries. 72heen dresultwasth edominationofth eIraqiCommunistPartybySunniMuslimArabs.hileth eproportionofKurdsndShi'itesnth epartydroppednth eatterhalfofth edecade,heSunnisssumed pluralitynth eparty.73

T he NationalIntelligenceEstimateof1957providedanotherlookat whatth eUnitedStatesconsideredtobeon eofth eprimarythreatstointernalstabilityinraq.heonclusionser eimilarohosef956.SongsNuriremainednpower,heituationwasikelytoemaintable.heCommunistPartyitselfhadbeendemoralizedbyth erepressivemeasuresofth eregime,an dtheywouldbe unableto significantly threatenth eregime.74mbassadorGallmanattributedth eoutbreaksofviolencenNovemberof956nom eparttoheCommunists,houghelsoreditedheropagandafotherroupsithresponsibilityorheevoltsswell.75nummary,whileheUnitedStatesremainedconcernedwithth eactivitiesofth eIraqiCommunistParty,theydidnotconsiderthemtobeasignificantthreattoNurial-Saidan dth emonarchy.uttheydidrecognizetheirpotentialpowershouldNuridisappearfrom th escene.

72 ibid,750-751.73ibid,9 9 5 -9 9 8 .74NationalIntelligenceEstimate36.2-57,"TheOutlookfo rIraq,"FRUS 955-57.052.75 Gallman,IraqUnderGeneralNuri.78 .3 8

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Religiousminoritieswereproportionallyover-representedamongth eBa'th,an dtheirembershipasouthful.tslsoorthotinghatheiras proportionallygreaterower-classepresentationmongheraqiBa'thishanwithinth enationalcommandasawhole.80hiletheyrepresentedaregionalas opposedtonternationalmovement,heBa'thiswouldcomeobeheprimarysupportersofth eU A Rinth edaysfollowing th eRevolution.

Whileno theirsteaderofth eraqiBa'th,uad l-Rikabiashe primaryeadernth eiseofth emovementtonationalprominence.l-Rikabiwasan ArabShi'itebornin Nasiriyyahin1931.Whilehisfatherwasalow-levelgovernmentofficial,hismothercamefromamiddle-classfamily.hileinhisteens,hebecameinterestedinpoliticsan dbeganleaningtowardth eIstiqlalparty.H ehad hangeofheartftereeingheCommunistsnction,bothnhi shometownan dafterhisadmissiontoth eCollegeofEngineeringinBaghdadin 1949.hileno tbandoninghestiqlalisdeologically,hedidnotehathe Communistserearuperioractically,rganizationally,ndnheoreticalresources.ebelievedhathenationalistauseneededtimulationndne w direction;ndheoundthesethingswithth eBa'this,joiningth eraqiwingn1950.yearater,hewasnontrolofth eraqiBa'th,l thoughhowhis 80 ibid,743-748.

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happenedisunclear.81 Underhisleadership,th eIraqiBa'thbecameon eofth emajorplayersinth eoppositionto th eMonarchy.

D.TheFormationoftheNationalFrontInheecondhalfofth eecade,hesehreeactionser ehemost

preparedtoctivelyopposeth eregime.oneofthemwere itherreadytoor capableofoverthrowingth eregimepriortoJuly958,though.hisdidno truleoutactionagainstth eregime.Whileth eCommunistsrecognizedthattheywouldbeunableohallengeheegimedirectlynBaghdad,heyweremorehan preparedtoarryouttheirprogramoutsideofth eapital.ctionwasnac ttakengainstheegime,purredonprimarilybydisaffectionoverhe956invasionof Egypt.82nNovemberan dDecemberof1956,CommunistsprotestsinNajafan dHayyignaledhebeginningofth eunificationofth eopposition factions.

Inatectoberf956,heommunistpartyasresentedwithquandary.heattackonth eSuezwasth eprimaryproblem.twasombinedwithtw ootherfactors.hefirstofthesewereth eintriguesofth egovernmentsofIraq,th eUnitedStates,an dBritainagainstSyria,whichwerean attempttoisolate

81ibid,742.82 MarionFarouk-Sluglettan dPeterSluglett,IraqSince1958:romRevolution to Dictatorship(London:P ILimited,987),4 4 .

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B yth eeveningofth eeighteenth,though,th epoliceha dreturnedordertoHayy.TheCommunistshadlearnedavaluablelesson.he ywouldbe unabletostrikeadecisiveblowagainstth eregimeoutsideofBaghdad.84

TheCommunistsha ddemonstratedtheirpower,though.sth eUnited Stateshadforeseen,theyam eorwardfterth euprisingsnd joinedth eotheroppositionfactionsinwhatbecameknownasth eFrontofNationalUnion.he newttitudesfheommunistpartyegardinghetheractions,ndhepragmaticonsiderationshatam eoightthendof956,roughthecivilianpoliticalfactionstogether.Whilethereha dbeenplanningfo rthistypeofconfederationsarlys955,twasdefinitelyhehainofeventsndingn1956thatgaveth efinalimpetus.heCommunistsconsideredth eformationofanationalronttobe necessitynSeptember956,butothergroupstillhad reservations.heegimecceleratedhe ovementowards unitedront,however,bydeclaringmartiallawan dtakingotherauthoritarianmeasures.85

A tth eendofFebruary957,th eFrontofNationalUnionwascreated.thad ive-pointprogramallingorheemovalfth el-Saidgovernment, withdrawalfromth eBaghdadPactan dbringingIraqipoliciesinlinewiththoseofotheriberatedArabtates,ombatingmperialismnddvocatingpositive84 ibid,752-57.85ibid,758-62

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declinedoolongwithheommittee.87he ydeterminedhatwohingswouldbe requiredfo rasuccessfulcoup.hefirstof thesewas thatitwouldhavetobecarriedou tusingunitsthatwereunderorderstomarchthroughBaghdad.Thesecondwasthattheseunitswouldhavetoentrainatatimewhenal lthreeofth eprincipleiguresofth eegime-theKing,CrownPrinceAbd l-Illah,nd Nurial-SaidwerepresentinBaghdad.dditionally,ctivedutyunitswereno tissuedmmunition,norderopreventjustuc h plan.heFreefficersmanagedtoobtainammunitionbystealthymeansan dsecureditfo rth eeventualcoup.

Afortuitousmoveonth epartofth egovernmentgaveth eFreeOfficerstheirchance.he20thInfantryBrigade,whose3rdBattalion'Arifcommanded,wasorderedtoleavegarrisonatJalawla,movethroughBaghdadan dproceedto th eborderwithJordan,tartingonth ethirdofJuly.hisdatewasventuallymovedbacktoth eeveningof th e3thofJuly.nth ethirdorfourthofJuly,ameetingaseldtQasim'souse,thichllutnefheupremeCommitteefhereefficersasnttendance.nocktheoo rinterruptedth emeeting,ndQasimansweredit.po nhisreturnheannounced thatMilitaryIntelligencehadapparentlygottenwindofth emeeting,an dwould

87 HannaBatatu,T heO ldSocialClasses.797.tisnoteworthy thatthisofficerwa sColA bd ar-Rahman'Arif,th ebrotherofeventualcoupleaderA bd as-Salam 'Arifan dafuturePresidentofIraq.

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bemakingarrestsshortly.heothersdispersed,no trealizinguntilafterth ecoupthattheyhadbeenduped.asimand'Arifhadse ttheirplansdownearlier,an dwereabletoetthemnmotion.88heplanswerentirelyonceivedbyIraqiofficerswithinIraq.hileotheragencies,notablyth eIraqiCommunistParty,hadadvancewarningof th ecoup,therewasnoparticipationinitotherthanth edesignatedraqi ilitarynits.8 9heresvidencehatNasserwasnac tinformedof th eimpendingcoupbyQasim,butNasserinformedhim thatitwas unwiseodisclosedetailsofth eou pooutsiders,ndhatraqishouldbe entirelyresponsiblefo rth eundertaking.90

O nth eeveningofth e13th,th eTwentiethBrigadeentrainedan dse tofffo rBaghdad.Arifcontrivedtoen dth ebrigadeommanderaheadto l-Fallujah,an dthenhean dth ecommanderofth efirstbattalion,whowasaco-conspirator,attemptedtopersuadeth ecommanderofth esecondbattaliontotakepart.hey failedtoconvincehim,soth esecondbattalioncommanderwasarrested.t4:30A M th efirstunitsofth ebrigaderolledintoBaghdad,takingoverth eMinistryofDefense,th ePoliceHeadquarters,an dotherpotentialsitesofresistance.hortlyafter :0 0A Mtheyapturedth epalace,ndth eKingndCrownPrincewerekilled there.ut'Arifwason th eradioat6:30A M ,proclaimingth esuccessof8bid,799.89 ibid,803.90Dann,IraqUnderOassem .25-26.

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th ecouptoth epeopleofIraq.91 Therewasnoarmedresistanceto th ecoup,an dth eMonarchycrumbledveryquickly.

ThelansfasimndArifraduallyookor mn eriesfproclamationsheardon th eBaghdadRadioStation.hemostimportantofthesewasroclamationumberne ,nhichasimndArifsim sorhe revolutionwerepresentedtoth enation.oteworthyinth eaddresswasth efactthatQasimndArifdeclaredhegovernmentobe epublic,pecificallypeople'sepublic.dditionally,heytressedraqiunitynheProclamation,makingitclearthatth erevolutionaryregimewasno tatransitionalstagepriorto unionwithth eUAR.92spreviouslystated,th egovernmentformedbyQasim consistedofbothciviliansndmilitary,ndtheylsooveredawiderangeofideologies.asimheldth eportfoliosofPrimean dDefenseMinister,with'Arifasth eInteriorMinister.notherFreeOfficer,NajiTalib,wasappointedMinisterofSocialAffairs.womembersofth eNationalDemocraticParty,MuhammadHadidan dHudaiyabal-HajjHumud,wereappointedtoFinancean dAgriculture.Thesecretary-generalofth eIraqiBa'thparty,Fuadal-Rikabi,wasappointedto th eMinistryofDevelopment,ndhisounterpartinth eIstiqlal(Independence)party,SiddiqSanshal,becameheMinisterofGuidance.93nlyon epersonof91Batatu,Th eOldSocialClasses.800-801.92Khadduri,RepublicanIraq.47-48.93Farouk-Sluglettan dSluglett,IraqSince1958.49-50.

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Marxisteanings,r.brahimubbah,asppointedoheabinet.omembersofth eIraqiCommunistPartywereincluded.94eliableFreeOfficerswereappointedtocommandth eservices.95nc eagain,whileth epersonstakingchargeofIraqcertainlyhadnogreatlovefo rth eWesternPowers,th eevidenceindicateshateitherheovietnionrheasseriteovementereoimmediatelygainanythingfromth eIraqiRevolution.

B.reliminaryIndicationsandInitialReactionsThereisnoevidencetodateofaneffectivecoordinationbetween th eoppositionan dth eArmy.hu swhileth eoppositioniscapableofcausingdisturbances,itlacksth eimmediatecapacitytooverthrowth egovernment.96 Thispieceofinformationwaspartofalargermemorandum dated3July

1958. Sentro mheeputyirectororlans ofhe CIAohe StateDepartment'sDirectorofIntelligencendResearch,toffered moredetailed analysisofth esituationinIraqatth etime,inrelationtoth esituationinLebanon.Precisely levendaysater,heFreefficersedbyBrigadierA bdl-Karim Qasimoverthrew th eHashemiteMonarchyinIraq.hi suprisingdeliveredarude94 Batata,T heO ldSocialClasses.12-813.95Farouk-Sluglettan dSluglett,IraqSince95 8.49-50.96 Memorandum fromth eDeputyDirectorfo rPlansof th eCentralIntelligenceAgency(Wisner) to th eDirectorofIntelligencean dResearch(Cumming),July3,958,ForeignRe lationsof th eUnitedStates 958-1960VolumeXII.NearEastRegion:Iraq:Iran:ArabianPeninsula(Hereafter referredto asFRUS 958-60 1 .p305.

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movementinBaghdadasanti-Westernan dNasserite?heanswerliesinth efactthatU.S.foreignpolicywithregardtoIraqwasdominatedbyconcernsinvolvingth eregionas whole,ndth eac tthatth einformationusedinpreparingIraqipolicywashighlynaccurate. ThisnaccuratenformationpreventedheU.S.governmentro mrealizingheweaknessofth emonarchy,hexistenceofth eFreeOfficermovement,an dth eactualnatureofth ene wgovernment.

Thatth eU.S.governmentassessmentof th estabilityofth emonarchyan dth epotentialortsoverthrowwereoptimisticpriortoth eoupsertainlynunderstatement. Whileheresencefommunist,a'thistndasseriteinfluencesnra qwasnotedpriorohe4 thofJuly,heashemiteswerecertainlyno tviewedasbeinginimminentdangerofcollapse. Aweekafterth eestablishmentfheashemitera bnion,hembassadornaghdad,WaldemarGallman,cabledth eStateDepartmentsaying:

...populardislikefo r presentregimeissufficientlystrongsothatitishardfo ritto doanythingwhichwillincurpublicapprovalrather than suspicion.W eno tinclinedattachto omuchsignificancemildflurrieswhichhavesofaroccurredan dwhichhaveinvolvedprincipallystudentsshoutingsloganshostiletoG O Ian dinsupportofNasser...Union has notinsofaraspublicresponseconcernedaffectedgovernmentadverselythoughmarginofreactionfavorabletogovernmentcannotbe thoughtofasverylarge."

"TelegramfromtheEmbassyinIraqtotheDepartmentofState,21February1958,FRUS 958-60,293.

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ThisperceptionofeventsinIraqcontinuedtoholdswayduringth emonthspriorto th ecoup.nothertelegramfromth eembassyindicates:A finalcommenton th epositionofth eregimehere:ofarIraqiarmyan dpolicehaveshownnosignsofdisaffection an dthereisno well-organized politicalleadershipamongIraqi'sdiversean dratherweakpoliticalopposition.Whileth eIraqismay befacingsomedifficultdaysastheyundergopropagandatreatmentsimilartothatadministeredto Jordanlastfall,IbelieveNurian dCrownPrinceca nbecounteduponto keeptheir

nerve.'00 Whileth embassynBaghdadwaswarehatth eegimewasno tpopular,tcertainly didno tforeseeth emonarchyfallingwithinafewshortmonths.

Thememorandum of3ul y95 8betweenth eDeputyDirectorfo rPlansofth eCIAndth eDirectorofState'sntelligencendResearchhedsurtherlightonth eU.S.government'sknowledgeofeventsinIraq.heoverallpurposeofth eeportwasoostulateraqieactiono .S . ilitarynterventionnLebanon.heycameto th econclusionthatth eIraqiswouldno thinderAmerican intervention. Thiswas,ofcourse,ubstantiallycorrect-butno tfo rth ereasonsstatedinth ereport.hereportunder-emphasized th ehatredwithwhichth eIraqisgenerallyviewedheegime,ndgenerallycceptedheacthatheegimewouldbeabletokeepth epeopleof Iraqundercontrol.nd th eU.S.estimation

100 Telegram fromth eEmbassyinIraqtoth eDepartmentofState,2March958,FRUS1958-60,297.

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TheembassyinBaghdadwasfulfillingitsmissionaswellinreportingon th eventsranspiringhroughouthe4th.elegramro mhembassyprovidedmorevidencehatheou pnraqwasdeologicallyninewithNasserndheUAR.teportedhatherewasonsiderablenthusiasmnBaghdadorheoup,ndhattouldrobablyrovequallyopularthroughoutheountry.heylsonformedhetateepartmenthathe"Characterofcoupstronglynti-Western,pro-Nasser.Crowdshavebeenshoutingpro-NasserlogansndarryingNasser'sictures.)."104henitialreportsfrom Baghdadaddedcredencetoth eworriesofmanyinWashington thatyetanotherArabstateha dfallenunderth eswayofNasser.

T heinitialinterpretationofeventswasbestsummarizedbyAllenDullesinth eearlyafternoonofth efourteenth.sth eDirectorofth eCIA,hewasabletoccessllvailablenformation.emadenoteofth eac thatestrictionsplacednheovementfmbassyersonnelinderedeportingutfBaghdad.isbriefingevaluatedno tonlyth eactualeventsinIraq,bu talsotheireffectonotherMiddleEasterncountries.hecoupwasevaluatedasamilitarymovementsupportedbypro-Nassercivilianelements.105hecoupan dth ene w governmentweredescribedas:

104Telegramfromth eEmbassyinIraqtoth eDepartmentof State,4July958,FRUS1958-60.314-315.105 BriefingNotesbyDirectorofCentralIntelligenceDulles,4July1958,FRUS1958-60.308.

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...pro-Nasirelementsledby youngarmyofficersan dbackedby th emob. "Republican"governmentofIraqha sbeen proclaimedwithacabinetlargelyofjuniorarmyofficersan dleftistcivilians.Membersofth eso-calledBaathparty,whichinth eareaha sspearheadedth epro-Nasircause,particularly inSyria,predominateinth eciviliangroup.Republicinth eplaceofth eKing.neofthese,GeneralRubai,ha slong beensuspectedofcomplicitywithth eEgyptians... 106

Thebriefingwentontodescribeth eituationinBaghdad,gaindiscussingth ecrowdsheeringasserndarryingisicture,ndrieflyiscussinghedispositionofArmyunitsnearth ePalacean dNuri'sresidence.talsodiscussedth ebroadcastshailingth ecoupon RadioCairoan dRadioDamascus.107

Theeffecton othercountriesthatDullesdescribedappearedno lessbleak.PresidentChamounofLebanonmmediatelyrequestedmilitaryssistancero m th eU.S.,Britainan dFrance,andregisteredhissurprisethatNasserhad notfirstsubsumedLebanon,butratherha dstartedbydeposingth emonarchyinIraqan dwasowookingowardordan.elsoriefedhatordan'sositionssomewhatprecarious,sheraqiou phortlyollowedhediscoveryofan Egyptian-Syrianplotwithinherm ygainstKingHussein.heSaudiKingemphasized throughanAmbassadorthatifth eU.S.an dBritainfailedtoac twith regardto th eeventsinIraq,itwouldmeantheirdownfallaspowersinth eMiddleEast.ndDullesbriefedthatsomeofth eleadersofth ecoupwereknowntobe 106 ibid,308-309. 107 ibid,309.

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pro-Egyptian. B uthealsobriefedthattherewasnoevidence,ndinfactsomedoubt,astowhetherth eUA Rha dbeendirectlyinvolvedinth eIraqicoup.108

Dulles'ssummaryof th eeventswasstraightforward. H edescribedthem asth eprecursortoendingWesterninfluenceinth eArabworld. H issummationstated:

Ifth eIraqcoupsucceedsitseemsalmostinevitable thatitwillse tup achainreactionwhichwilldoomth epro-WesterngovernmentsofLebanonan dJordanan dSaudiArabia,an draisegraveproblemsfo rTurkeyan dIran.109

While no titing an y direct Egyptian involvement, he certainly gaveheimpressionthatth eIraqicoupwasan extensionofth eNasseritemovement.

AStateDepartmentmemorandumof16ul yprovidedanassessmentofth entelligenceailures ithegardoheou pnraq. Theytartoffbyadmittingthat

N osignificantindicationof th eimpendingactioninIraqappearedinan ysourcesavailabletoD R N ,despiteth efactthataveryclosewatchwas beingkeptfo rpreciselythisdevelopment.nterestinglyenough,informalcontactswithindividualswhohave justreturned,havingleftIraqonlyafewdaysorhoursbeforeth ecoupconfirm th eimpressionthat therewas no outwardsignthatth eeruptionwasimminent.110

1 0 8 ibid,309-311.109ibid,311.11 0Departmentof StateFile(Hereafterreferenced by filenumberonly)787.00/7-1658,Memorandum fromHaroldW.Gliddenofth eDivisionofResearchan dAnalysisfo rNear East,SouthAsia,an dAfricatoth eDirectorofIntelligencean dResearch(Cumming),6July1958.5 8

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IntelligencendResearchgavetsssessmentofth eQasimgovernmentonth eseventeenth.hey statedthatT he natureofth enew Iraqiregimeisprobably no trevealedinth efigures

nowholdingCabinetpostsan dprominentpositions.hereissomeevidencethatseveralof th ecivilianemployeesdidnotknowof theirallottedrolesuntilth emilitarycoupwascomplete.11 4 Theyassessedthatth eregimewoulddevelopalongth eEgyptianmodel,and that

...thetruecenterofpowerha sno tyet revealeditself.hecivilian membersofth egovernment,withtw oexceptions,arethusfa rlargelysilentpartnersan dth eofficermembersareth emorevocalspokesmen.Qasim,himself,likeMuhammadNajibinEgypt,m ay be afigurehead.115They lsowerewaryofth eeaningsofth eCabinetmembers,viewingourofthemashaving"longhistoriesofmarkedleftisttendencies,"evaluatingoneas"acloseParty-lineollowerndteadyellowtraveler"ndnothersanctivesympathizerndpossibly partymember." 116 Theirssessmentofth eutureaffirmedthat:

Thismixedassortment isunlikelytostaytogetherlongonceth eimpetusofinitialsuccesswearsoff.nan ycase,itislikelythatth eEgyptian- directedhardcoreofth emovementintendsto jettisonthem oncepowerisconsolidated...Itislikelytoassociateformallywith th eUA Rat an earlystage,an dtoprofessapostureofnationalism,neutralism,an dwithin thiscontext,displayadistinctwillingnesstoestablishdiplomaticrelationswithth eBlocan dacceptaidfromit. 117

1 1 4 787.00/7-1758,Memorandum fromtheDirectorofIntelligencean dResearch(Cumming)to th eSecretary ofState,7July958.115 'ibid.

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Stateepartmentxploredheossibilityfrmedntervention,tasotviewedaspractical.

A furtherevaluationofth eregime,centeringon th ecabinetitself,wasalsopublishedonhewentieth.etailinghectualmake-upndeaningsofth eCabinetitself,itillustratedhowMinistersoccupiedth eentirepoliticalspectrum,representing

...fromextreme-rightxenophobeswho wereparticipantsinashort-livedNazi-sponsoredanti-Britishcoupin1941,to far-leftists,includingafe w consistentfellow-travellerswho wereregularparticipantsin Communist-sponsoredneutralistconferences. 122 The economic postsinth ecabinetweredescribedasbeingheldby "themostleft-inclinedmembers,"an dtheydetailedth eactivitiesof th eMinisterofEducationat length.tisalsonotedthatmanyof th ememberswerereform-minded,possiblypro-Americanigureswhoha dgrievancesgainstheHashemiteegime.123twasalsonotedthatth ecivilianmembers

...probablyha dnoforeknowledgeofth eimmediatelot,knewon eanothermainlyaspoliticalrivals;th eareno tintimatean dcollaboratedin oppositiononlyduringth eperiodwhengovernmentalsuppressiongavethemimpetustomakecommoncause.124

1 2 2 787.13/7-2058,"CompositionandLeaningsofIraqiRevolutionary Cabinet,"Letterfrom th eDirectorofIntelligencean dResearch(Cumming)toth eCounselor(Reinhardt),20 July1958.123ibid.124 ibid.

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ofStatefo rNearEastern,SouthAsianandAfricanAffairs,toheSecretaryofState,makesth epointthat

Withth econsolidationofth erevolutionaryregimewithinIraqan dth erulingout ofan yattempttooverturnitby forceorotherwise,weseem to befacedwithth equestionno tofwhetherbutofwhenan dunderwhatcircumstancesweshouldrecognizeth ene wgovernment.127 TheAssistantSecretarygoesontopointou tthatth eregimehasrestoredorderan dgivesth eimpressionofdenyingCommunistan dBa'thistinfluences,an dthatdelaying recognition may cause farther difficulties. H e recommended a"dignifiedbutfriendlystance,designedtoleadtoearlybutno tprecipitatede jurerecognition." 128 H isformalrecommendationwas

Thatyo uagreeinprincipletoth eextensionofformalrecognitionto th eIraqGovernmentifwe ca nobtainagreementoracquiescencefromth eMuslimPactmembersduring th eLondonmeeting,an dafterMr.Murphy ha sattemptedtoobtainth esamefromth eGovernmentsofLebanonan dJordan.129

SecretaryDullesapparently heededthatadvice.na30Julymemorandum to th ePresident, heecommended thathe GovernmentecognizeheewraqiGovernmentinshortorder.Whilestatingthatth ecouphad beenbrutal,henotedthatth ene wregimeha dbeenabletostablishcontrolndfacednoignificant internalopposition. H elsonotedhatheraqiofficialswantedomaintain 127 Memorandum fromth eAssistantSecretaryofStatefo rNearEastern,SouthAsianan dAfricanAffairs(Rountree)toSecretaryofStateDulles,FRIIS958-60.331-32.128 ibid,332.129 ibid,333.

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contactwithth eUnitedStates,an dthatheha dconsultedwithth egovernmentsofIran,Pakistan,an dTurkey.hosethreecountriesunderstoodth eadvisabilityofrecognizingheQasimegime,ndLebanonndordanhadxpressedimilarsentimentsin private. 130

Althoughth eQasimregimewasrecognizedby th eUnitedStates,an air ofpessimismlingered.herewasoncernregardinghehapeth eegimewouldevolvent onhemonthsollowinghessumptionofpower.ndhewogreatestearsofth eUnitedStates,hat ither pro-Nasserorpro-Communistgovernmentwouldcomeintobeing,weretw oofth emostlikelyalternativesin th eeyesofth eStateDepartment.ndfo rth eFreeOfficers,th eworkhad justbegun.noverthrowing th eregime,theyattainedtheirgoal.Nowth eopposition,whichhad onlyunitedby virtueofbeinginopposition,wouldhaveto govern.

130FRU S 958-60.334.66

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lookingfo ralliesagainstth epro-unionfaction,heturnedtoth eIraqiCommunist Party.Whileitisno tknownwho firstusedth elabel"SoleLeader" withregard to Qasim,learlyheommunistseizedpo ntndopularizedt.138he experienceofth eSyrianCommunistPartycoloredth eattitudeofth eCoomuniststowardth eU AR .hiletheyhadinitiallywelcomedunionwithEgypt,tsoonbecameclearthattherewasnoplacefo rth eCommunistPartyinth eU AR .saresultth eattitudeofth eIraqiCommunistPartybecamenominallypositive,butwith imitingrovisoha t ad eheirttitudeowardheA Rssentially negative.139asimencouragedth ehugedemonstrationsinearlyAugustthatth eCommunistssponsored hethemebeingfederation"asopposedto"unity." 14 0Hundredsofthousandsof peopletookpartinthesedemonstrations.ndwhileth eCommunistscouldnotclaimcreditfo rth eentireturnout,theyhadmobilized th elion'sshareofth eprotesters.hedirectleadershipofth emarchwasalsoin theirhands.heturnoutwasenoughtoshaketh eBa'thistsan dothernationalistsbadly,141nddemonstratedthatth epro-unionfactiondi dno thavecontrolofth estreets.

138 ibid,808.139Dann,IraqUnderOassem .96. 14 0Farouk-Sluglettan dSluglett,IraqSince95 8 .59 .14 1Batatu,TheO ldSocialClasses.828.

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notedhathewasheonlyon eofth eourhatwasnclinedoppealohecrowdsforsupport.145

Thedevelopmentofasplitinth eregimedidno tcomeasasurpriseto th eStateDepartment. However,tsppearanceooo nfterhessumptionofpowerdid.utth elinesthatitwasdevelopingon cameasno surpriseto them,as didheac tha tot hideserenti-Westernnature. In 2ugustmemorandum toth eSecretary,Mr.HughCummingof th eBureauofIntelligencean dResearchsetth econflictason ebetween

...theNationalDemocrats(primarilyaradicalnationalistgroup,bu theavilyCommunistinfiltrated)an dth eCommunistPartyofIraq...rangedagainstafactionheadedby DeputyPrimeMinisterArif...whofrom th efirstha sbeencloselyalignedwithNasiran dha ssoughtEgyptiansupportforhispersonalposition,isnowopenlypressingfo rfullunionwith th eU AR .heCommunistsan dtheirallies...areadvocatingafederationorlooseassociationshortofactualunion.146 WhileArifwasnotedsbeingheheadofth enationalistaction,Qasimwas seento besupportingth eotherside.hereturnofexilesfromabroadappearedto reinforceheCommunistParty,ndQasimprotectedhemneturnorheirsupportgainst 'Arifndheationalists. T heublicttitude,hileot

14 5787.00/8-658,Telegramfromth eEmbassyinBaghdadtoth eStateDepartment,6August 1958, -2 .14 6787.00/8-2258,Memorandumfromth eBureauofIntelligencean dResearchto th eSecretary ofState,22 August1958,.

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IraqiarmedforcesbyaRepublicandecreeof1 1September.Whileforfeiting hispositionnhe ilitary,eetainedisabinetportfoliosfDep utyrimeMinisteran dMinisterofth eInterior.151 AmbassadorGallmanstated:

It isno tyet clearwhetherthismoverepresentsademotionfo rAriforwhetherherelievedatownrequestinorderconcentrateonmorepressingan dimportantcivilianduties...actionindicativefirstofficialcrackinwhathas beenunitedfront.fthisisth ecase,on th ebasisofour estimates ofth enew regimethusfar,we willbeluckyifArifison th eskidsratherthanQassim.152

Whileeportingnformationndicating oweringfArifstatus,allmancontinues to report that th e nationalist faction appears stronger than th eCommunistone.

'Arifcontinuedoos epowernBaghdad. O n0eptember,asim strippedhim of hiscabinetpostsaswell.15 3 Qasimappointed'ArifAmbassador toWestGermany,ndtthatpointArifsentaletterofresignationtoQasim,stating thathepreferred toremainhomewithoutapost thanto serveoverseas.n1 1October,Qasiminvited'Arifan dtw ootherstohishouse,inordertoconvince'Ariftoacceptth epostinBonn. Qasimsaidthathi sdeparturewasrequired,as hispresencewasausingdissension. H elsopromisedoecallhimnthreeweeks. 'Arifcontinuedtorefuse,ndaton epointmayhaveeithertriedtokill151787.00/9-1358,TelegramfromtheEmbassyinBaghdadtotheSecretaryofState,3September1958,.152153,15 2 ibid,.Batatu,T heOldSocialClasses,831.

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closeelationsithhenitedra bepublicndochievehesenheframeworkof th eArabLeague." 1 5 6

After 'Arifs removal an d exile, th e power structure ofhe Iraqigovernmentbegantohift. TheEmbassyofferedananalysisofth esituationinBaghdadnhehree-monthnniversaryfheoup. Whilettemptingoprovideom eorecastofevents,Gallmannotedthattwouldbehazardoustbest.Attackson th eU.S.throughpressan dradiocontinued,withth eU.S.consistentlylabeledasimperialistic,"withth eterminologyofthese ttacks..increasingly 'Made-in-Moscow.'"157 Theyssessedhetatefgovernmentsirtually nonexistentinth etraditionalense,withindividualministersissuingregulationsonoccasion. Theylsonotedhegovernment'sac kofm enxperiencedngoverning,speciallynheieldofeconomicdevelopment.'58 A ndheylsoexaminedth esplitsdevelopinginth egovernment.he Embassystatedthat

MomentarilyQassimison top.rif,issecondinJuly14 plot,has beendeprivedofmilitaryan dpoliticalpower-positionsan dleftOctober12to becomeIraqiAmbassadorinBonn.he knownBaathistmembersof th ecabinetwereremovedordemotedatth esametimeAriffellfrom grace.ThusmostimportantelementsworkingtowardunionwithUAR,orat th e15 6MemorandumofConversation,1October1958, -2 .15 7787.00/10-1458,Telegramfromth eEmbassyinBaghdadtotheSecretaryofState,4October1958, .15 8 ibid,2.

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accordancewithQasim'spromise.asimexplainedtoArifthatth econditionswhichhadrequiredhisdeparturetillxisted,ndthatheouldnotremainin Iraq.ewouldbeappointedtoth eambassadorshipofth ecountryofhischoice,however.Arifdeclined,ayingthathepreferredtoremaininIraqinan ypost,evenasasoldier. On November,Arifwasarrestedan dimprisonedtoawaittrial.164

'Arifsreturnmuddledth eituationonceagain,givingth enationalistsafigureto rallyaround.Mr.HughCummingofIntelligencean dResearchpreparedanotheroteorecretaryulles,utlininghempactfiseturnnd subsequentarrest.hevent"notonlyprecipitatedth ehowdownstagenth epowertruggleithinraqtselfutaslsoreatednpe nhallengeto...Nasir." 1 65wingothepeedofth ection,therewasnommediatepublicresponsetoArifsarrestnotedinIraqorth eUAR.heQasimregimetriedto maintainheropagandanitiative,roadcastinglogansgainstmperialistconspiraciesan dpossiblylayingth egroundworkfo rchargesagainst'Arif.he yconsideredNasser'sreactiontobeth emostimportantfactor,however.s'Arifhad beenhischiefsupporterinIraq,th earrestwasadirectan dpublicslapat him.A ndth errestof'ArifcouldorceNassernto quandaryro m propaganda16 4Khadduri,Republicanraq .97 .165 MemorandumfromtheDirectorof IntelligenceandResearch(Cumming)toSecretaryofStateDulles,5 November1958,FRUS 958-60.351.

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control,th epointofno returnmay be reachedinafe w monthsshouldth eQasimregimecontinueon itspresentcourse.16 8Additionally,he yorrectlyssessedRashidAli l-Gaylanisbeinghemostlikelyenterofan yUAR-backedplotgainstheQasimegime. A ndhouldQasimhavetomaintainhispoweragainstacoupattemptwithCommunisthelp,hisdebtto themwouldincreasean dtheyviewedhi schancesofbeingableto stepout from undertheirinfluenceasdim.169

O n4December,ntelligencean dResearchre-evaluatedth esituation. In th eoverallpicture,littlehad changed.asimwasreportedto havediscoveredth eRashid'Aliplotagainsthim,ndwas"spendinganinordinateshareofhistimedevisingpersonalecuritymeasuresndhiftingofficerssignments." 170 T he regimes wholewasnotprovidingnykindofleadershiporheountry,rumorswerereportedofapotentialoup. The ffectofthiswastopreoccupy QasimwithcounteringBa'thctions. Inth eprocess,hewasignoringhigh-an dlow-levelCommunistinfiltrationinth egovernment.WhilebelievingthatQasimhad inceredesireorackdownonheCommunistPartyofIraq,hewas preventedfromdoingsountilhereducedth ethreatfrom th eBa'thpartyan dth emajorhareofarmsontractedro mth eSovietBlochad rrivednIraq. A nd 168 ibid,354.16 9 ibid,354.17 0787.00/12-458,Memorandumfromth eDirectorofIntelligenceand Research(Cumming)toSecretaryofStateDulles,4December958,.

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finally,hisobserversviewedhisdecisiononwhetherorno ttoexecutemembersoftheformerregimeasatestofhowobligatedhefelttotheSovietUnionandtheIraqiParty.171

TheStateDepartmentwasorrectnssessingRashidAliasthemostlikelyeaderofanationalistou pplotgainstQasim,ndhehadnactbeenplanning one.Whetherpiquedatno tbeingofferedagovernmentpost,oroutofagenuineonvictionha tQasimwaswrong,heha detboutplanningQasim'soverthrow.heplanwa soaiseebellionnhemiddleEuphrates,andwas unrealistic tth eime.hemateurishnatureofth eonspiratorsompoundedthisproblem.172Wordeachedasimha t potentialebellionwasetorDecembernhe iddleuphrates,ndMilitaryntelligencenfiltratedheconspirators.heQasimegimerrestedRashidAliandhiso-conspiratorsshortlybeforeth etargetdate.173fgreaterimportwasthefactthatRashid'Alihadmadecontactwitheveralofficersbeforehisarrest,includingRi'fatHajjal-Sirri,thefounderof theFreeOfficermovement,an dthattheywereawareofhisplans. Thesefficersouldor mheucleusfheMarch 1959Mosuluprising.174

1 7 1 ibid, -2 .172Farouk-SluglettandSluglett,IraqSince95 8 .61-62.173 Khadduri,Republicanraq .02. 17 4Farouk-SluglettandSluglett,IraqSince95 8.61-62.

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bothanti-UARan danti-Communist,andth epossibilitythatQasimmightturnon theCommunistsasheturnedon th eBa'thistsan dArabnationalists.181

Williamountreessentiallyeinforcedhi sie wrioroheSC meeting. H enotedthatQasimwaseitheraCommunistdupe,orthathewillbe unabletomaintainpowershouldheturnou tth eCommunists. Rountreeviewed theemergenceofapro-UARregimeasth emostlikelyresultofacoup,andthatNasserwoulduseanykindof increasedtietoIraqtoinfluenceth eGulfstates.182 Buthe cautionedthat

Againstthislikelihoodmustbeweighedth elonger-rangeimplicationsofth epossibilityofth eachievementby politicalsubversionof thelong-cherished Soviet goal ofomination ofhe Persian Gulfrea ifCommunist influenceinIraqisno tarrested.18jTheframeworkfo rthepolicywassimplyset: preventingth edominationofIraqbyCommunistswasth emostpressingconcern.

InAugustof958,hortlyfterheevolution,U.S.oreignpolicyhadfocusedonpreventinghexpansionofth epowerofth eNasseran dtheUAR.BetweenAugustndDecemberof1958,heocushifteddramatically. Whiletheperceiveddangerromhenationalistsha dessenedo greatdegree,heCommunistsha dreplacedthemasth emajorideologically motivatedpowergroup

181 ibid,366-67.18 2 MemorandumfromtheAssistantSecretaryofStateforNearEasternandSouthAsianAffairs(Rountree)toActingSecretaryof StateDillon,22December1958,FRUS1958-60.368-70.18 3ibid,370.

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inIraq.heperceptionthatth eIraqiCommunistPartywasth edrivingforceinIraqiinternalpoliticswoulddominateU.S.foreignpolicyfo rth enextyear.orth eStateDepartmentofJohnFosterDulles,th eworstof al lpossiblealternativesseemedto becomingtopass.

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THEIRAQICOMMUNISTPARTYPEAKS ANDFALLS

Inanuary959.herewasnodoubtnhetateDepartmenthathelargestthreattoU.S.nterestsnraqaynth escendancyoftheCommunistParty.heBa'thistsandthepro-unionfaction,whichhad dominatedtheanalysisimmediately fter4uly,ha dvirtuallybecomeanon-factorinFoggyBottom.Theituationha dbecomeoproblematichatth eStateDepartmentconsideredunionwithth eUA RahedgeagainstCommunistdominationofIraq.heStateDepartmentenerallyiewedasimsither up ehoouldervehe interestsofth eIraqiCommunistParty,oron ewho wasrelianton themandwouldbeunableoesisthe mnc ehe yad eheirbi dorpower.nraq,hepossibilityofviolentctionagainsthimbyth enationalistspreoccupiedQasim.Hecertainlydidnot remainunawareofwhatthreatth eCommunistsmightposetohim,hough.eha dlreadyakentepsoimittheirabilityodirectlyorceissuesonhetreet.ndve rhenextewmonths,ewouldeduceheirpoliticalpower.ndthiscameshortlyafterthatpowerreacheditszenith.

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wasatth everyeastfavorablydisposedtoth eIraqiCommunistParty,ndthatth eoptimismofafewmonthsbackthathewouldsteeracoursebetweenunionwith th eU A Ran dCommunismseemedunfounded.1 8 4

AeconddespatchhronicledheraqiCommunistParty'srisetoopenpowerinth emonthsafterth ecoup,fromJulytoDecemberof1958.tcitedth eParty'sbilityoublishnddistributenformationndorganizehevariousunionsndocietiesnheewmonthsfterheevolutionsvidenceofits"cohesiveness,dedicationndorganizationalbility." 1 8 5nxaminingherontorganizationsofth eParty,theystatethat

Cursorychecksofnamesassociatedwithth eestablishment ofafe w ofth ene w"unions"andwithth ePartisansofPeacerevealnumerousindividualslongknowntobeactiveinCommunistorganizations.ersonsformerlyimprisonedforaCommunistactivity...areth eleadingspiritsofth eheadlongrushtoorganize.obesure,Communistsfindawillingmass,readytobeledandrelishingth ene wfreedomtodemonstrate...186

Thereportconcludesha tnon-Communistraqisreunabletoct ,ndthatth eCommunistsndeftistsavehepoliticalieldohemselves.hembassydoubtedwhethertheyevencouldac ttopreventaCommunisttakeoverofIraq.187

18 4 787.00/1-559,DespatchromtheEmbassyinBaghdadtotheDepartment ofState,Subject"Is QassimaCommunist,"5January959,-3. 185 787.00/1-659,DespatchromtheEmbassyinBaghdadtoth eDepartmentofState,Subject"CommunistsandtheRevolution,"6January959,.186 ibid,2.18 7ibid,3.

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A thirddespatchdescribedthepoliticalatmospherethatth eQasimregimewaspromotinginIraq,tconcludedthatQasim,followingth eRashid'Aliplot,hadlaunchedacampaigntoensurethatallIraqiswereawareofth epresenceofanti-regimeplottersaroundthem.heembassynotedthatth eexpressionsoftheIraqipressha dtakenadecidedlyanti-Western,an despeciallyanti-U.S.bent.heBaghdadpresswasdescribedasespeciallyvehement," 1 8 8enouncingtheWestandAmericatveryopportunity.hembassydescribedhenti-imperialist lineofIraqas"itsshrillvoicecrying'wolfwherenowolfexists" 1 8 9whichcould notsimplyear tftsresentommunistrientation." 1 90heinalconclusionwasthatwhilehismaynothavebeenadirectresultofCommunistactivity,itcertainly"dovetailswithCommunisttacticsan dprovidesaprotectivecolorationfo rCommunistswhichalmostdefiesdentification."1 91heembassyhadcertainlygiventh eimpressionthatifCommunistswerenotindirectcontrol,theywerecertainlyth eprimaryinfluenceon th eQasimregimeat th etime.

Twodaysftertheransmissionofth ethirddespatch,Qasimdidpullinthereignsslightlyonth eCommunists.Whilethankingth emembersofthePartyforheir ffortsnbehalfofth eegime,eorderedmembersofthePopular188 787.00/1-1259,DespatchfromtheEmbassyinBaghdadtoth eDepartment ofState,Subject"IraqiGovernmentEncouragesanAtmosphereofIntrigue,"2January959,.18 9ibid,2.19 0ibid,2.19 1ibid,2.

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ResistanceForcendheStudentUniontoefrainro mperformingnypolicedutieswithoutspecificauthorizationfromth egovernment.hisreigninginwas toehort-lived,owever.n ebruary,heegimennounced eathsentencegainstArif,ndwodaysaterllofth eemainingnationalistnd conservativemembersoftheabinet,ncludingSiddiqShanshaloftheIstiqlalparty,resigned.192heresultwasthatth ene wcabinetwasfarthertotheleftthanitspredecessorha dbeen,withmorememberswho couldbeconsideredfriendlytoQasim.he NationalDemocraticPartyan dtheirsupportersha dgainedtheopenseats, ithoommunistartyembersppointedoheabinet.twas consideredagainforth eCommunists,however.ttihadal-Shab,theCommunistPartynewspaper,expressedatisfactionwithth eresults'93ndfurtherreinforced thisimpression.

Shortlyafterth eCabinetreshuffle,th eDirectorofth eOfficeofNearEastAffairsaddressedamemooWilliamRountreeanalyzingth eimplicationsoftheresignations.hessessmentwashatheix inistershadhopedoorceQasim'shand,makinghimtakeananti-Communiststand.heysummarized thereshuffleasasetbackforanti-CommunistforcesinIraq,aswellasfo rNasseran dtheUAR. Needlessoay ,heonclusionwasha tth eCommunistshadmade192 Batatu,TheO ldSocialClasses.858-59 .193Dann,IraqUnderQassem ,52-53.

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furthergainsinIraq.heprospectsforanti-CommunistsinIraqappearedbleak,asthefactionsthatopposedthemwereou tofpower,an dth eNationalDemocratic Party,whichmadegainsfterth eresignations,wasth eonlyremainingrestraintonhenfluenceofth eommunistsoverheegime.hileQasimwasnotidentifiedasaCommunistassuch,histo padvisorswere.194nabriefingtotheNationalecurityounciln2ebruary,llenullestatedhatInhe intelligencecommunity,however,wedothinkthatth etrendrepresentedbythesecabinetchangeswasslightlyinth eCommunistdirection." 1 95

ASpecialNationalntelligenceEstimatewaspublishedon7February,dealingpecificallywithheCommunistthreatnraq.heoverallvaluationwasthattheCommunistsweremaking driveorpowerinBaghdad.tstatedthatNasserappearedtoeeekingacounterrevolutionarymoveinIraq,butthattheSovietswereotoeavilynvestedha the ywouldnterveneagainstanationalistuprisinggainstheasimegime.hilenotindingonclusive evidencethatQasimhimselfwasaCommunist,theydidassesshimtobeeitherunwillingorunableoak ectiongainstheraqiCommunistParty,orheirSovietbackers. ItssessedQasim'smotivessprimarilynoppositiontopro-19 4 MemorandumfromtheDirectorof theOfficeofNearEasternAffairs(Rockwell) tothe AssistantSecretaryforNearEasternandSouthAsianAffairs(Rountree),9February1959 ,FRUS1958-60.378-380.19 5FRUS1958- 60 .381 .

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UARorpro-U.S.nitiativesnraq,sopposedobeingpro-Soviet.heneteffectofhisconduct,however,wastoallowth eCommuniststobecomethemosteffectivepoliticalfactioninIraq.hepublicwasseenassplit,an dtheArmywasconsideredtobethemostlikelysourceofresistancetoaCommunisttakeoverofIraq.tsviewofuturerospectswasdimswell.tawheCommunistsmoving towardsagradualssumptionofpower,asopposedtoan overttakeover.WhiletheyfeltthatQasimmightcometoviewth eCommunistsasathreat,theysawitasmoreikelythatewouldcontinuetoviewth eUA RandtheWestasgreaterhreatsoisower.tlsoiscussedhemplicationsf itherCommunistor ationalistakeovernraqtength.hepossibilityofaCommunist-controlledIraqwasseenasmoredangeroustoWesternintereststhananIraqalignedwithth eUAR.I96

Thetateepartmentssuedoperationaluidanceoncerningraqhenextday.heprimaryobjectivesofU.S.oreignpolicyinIraqwereetoutinsimpleterms.enialofth eareatoth eSovietsandensuringth econtinuingflow ofoi lfromth eMiddleEastwereth eprimarypolicyobjectivesfo rtheareaasawhole, ithecondarybjectivesncompassingtheroliticalndationalsecurityissues.heirviewwasthatth efutureforIraqwasuncertain,withviolent19 6SpecialNationalntelligenceEstimate36.2-59,"TheCommunistThreatto Iraq,"17February1959 .FRUS 958-60.381-385 .

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M A PII IM O S U L A N D TH ES U R R O U N D I N G AREA

TURKEY. . . .

SYRIA \

m*

Tall'AfarMosul

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sidedwithth eArmyfaction.200utth emanwhowastobecomeleaderwasnotstrictlyanationalist.ol .Abdl-Wahhabl-Shawwaf,whosenamewasobecomeassociatedwiththisrevolt,ha dbeenreassignedto Mosulshortlyafterthe coupbyQasim,an dvieweditasexile.fheweretotakeastandagainstQasim hewouldhavetoidewithth eplot.201asserandth eUA Ralsohadahandinevents,withth eUA Rprovidingunstintingsupporttoth eplot.heCommunists,however,tooknoteofeventsndon23FebruaryinformedQasimthatarevoltmightbebrewinginMosul.202

The Communistsdecidedto holdaPartisansofPeaceRallyinMosulon6March,withQasim'support.hegovernmentmadeiteasyforparticipantstotravelbyakingtepsoeduceosts,ncludingcheduling pecialrainor them.203herallywentoffasscheduledwithoutviolence,an dbynightfallmostoftheparticipantsadeftMosul.heex tay ,owever,iolencelaredthroughMosulbetweenCommunistandanti-Communistgroups,204ndCol.al- Shawwafdeclaredhi srevoltagainstQasimat7:00onth emorningof7March.Whileheebelsmoved,heydi dnotnjoygreatuccess.nact,heyweresuccessfulonlyinMosul.205Mostofth efightingwasalongclassandethniclines,20 0Batatu,TheOldSocialClasses.872.20 1Khadduri.RepublicanIraq.06 .20 2Batatu,TheOldSocialClasses.873.203 ibid,879.204 Farouk-SluglettandSluglett,IraqSince95 8.67.205Batatu,TheO ldSocialClasses.881-83.

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aspposedodeologicalnes.heightingontinued,owever,she Communistsan dtheirsupporterscounterattackedan dregainedcontrolofthecityofMosul.ol .al-Shawwafwas killedinth efighting.20 6

Afteravingom eotsefense,heraqiommunistartyeganmakingdemandsofth eQasimregime.he ypressedharderforrecognitionoftheirrolenth eevoltndorepresentationnth egovernmentofIraq.20 7nBaghdad,heoppositionllbutdisappearedro mhetreetsfter March.208Qasimeededittlergingourgeheovernmentfhosehoeresympathetictoaplotsupportedby th eU AR ,an ditappearedthattheCommunistswereactivelypushingfo rpowerinth eregime.

Inth ewakeofth erevolt,th eprospectsappeareddimforU.S.hopesthatIraqwouldno tal lunderhewayofth eCommunists.heParty'solencrushingheMosuluprisinggavetmorepower,ndlsogavettheoolstneededopushorormalepresentationnheegime.elegramromtheembassyinBaghdadtoth eStateDepartmentseeminglyconfirmed theworst.he onlyquestionthatemainedwas...whetherQasimndGOIareooaralong roadtocommunism toturnbackan dwhetherIraqconsequentlyisfatedtobefirst

206Farouk-Sluglett andSluglett.raqSince95 8.68. 207 ibid,68-69.208 Dann,IraqUnderOassem .79.96

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SovietsatelliteinArabworld."209 TheembassyassignednoticeablegainstotheCommunistsan dtheiralliessinceth erevolt,includinganear-totaldominationofthepressinIraq. ThePartywasee ntodominateth eunionsandassociations,academia,ndmostofth eministries. O nheotheride,heynotedhatheCommunistserettemptingoaintainisciplinemongheirupporters.Additionally,th eQasimregimehad no tgrantedmanyofth edemandsofthePartyandtheirfrontorganizations,an dhad not formallyappointedan ymembersoftheCommunistPartynt ohegovernment.21 0 However,heembassy'sassessmentwas that

...seemstousthereisgravedangerthatinshortru nIraqwillcomeunderpreponderantlyCommunistcontrol.urpastestimateshavealwayscenteredaroundquestionwhetherQassimishimselfaCommunistorotherwiseavoluntaryfollowerofCommunistdirection...westillcannotanswerthatquestioncategorically.ecentevents,however,havesteadilyincreasedour doubtsastowhetherQassimcan,even ifhewishedto ,reversethistrend.2"

WhilethequestionofQasim'sloyaltiesan dphilosophywasstillopen,itappeared tohaveevenlessrelevance.

O n5pril,hetateepartmentpreparedurtheruidanceorhe situation. Inapolicypaperofthatdate,theymadeseveralrecommendationsto

209 TelegramfromtheEmbassyinIraqtoth eDepartment of State,26 March 959 ,FRUS1958-m,395.2 10 ibid,395-98.21 1ibid,398.

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th eUAR," 2'3maintaining friendlyattitudewithth eQasimregimean dcloselycooperatingwith th eBritish.214

Thentelligenceommunityreparedwoollow-upsohepecialNationalIntelligenceEstimateonth esituationinIraqinlateApril.hefirstofthesedealtwithth eactualsituationinIraq,acknowledgingth egainsmadebytheCommunistsfollowingth eMosulrevolt-labelingthatasth echiefaftereffectofth erevolt.heestimatereiteratedth ethemesofCommunistcontrolofavarietyofministriesndofallourcesofpublicnformationnraq,swellsheircontrolofth etreets.owever,hestimatelsotatedthatpopularoyaltieswereridingwithQasimsopposedtoheCommunists.215heotherestimatedealtwithothercountries'probableeactionto CommunisttakeoverofIraq.Increasingsupport,oratleastcountenance,fo rNasser'scampaignagainstQasim wasexpectedfromallbu tJordanandIsrael.tviewedth eU A Rasth eonlyArabstatewithanyeffectiveinfluenceoverIraq,withTurkeyan dIranhavinglimitedabilitytoaffectth esituationshortofarmedintervention.heassessmentthatth eSovietsdi dno twanttoopenlyseizepowerinIraqwasreiteratedaswell.utth ecloserth eIraqiCommunistPartycametoseizingpower,th egreaterth erisksth e

21 3ibid,421 .21 4 ibid,421-22 .21 5 SpecialNationalIntelligenceEstimate36.2/1-59,"TheCommunistThreatto Iraq,"21April1959 ,FRUS 958-60.4 3 9 -4 0 .

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Sovietswouldbewillingoake.21 6 Inhort,heStateDepartmentawittlechanceofpreventingaCommunisttakeoverofIraqatth een dofApril.

C.heCommunistsPeak andBegintoFallT hedaysafterth eMosulrevoltha dboostedth eCommuniststothezenith

oftheirinfluencean dpowerinIraq.hey had beengainingsupportintheArmy,andmanyeniorfficersereitherPartymembersrympatheticoheircause.21 7 n28April,th ePartyformallyrequestedrepresentationintheQasimregime.asimebukedhe mwoay sater,otnl yenouncingpartisaninterestsbutquestioningth enecessityofth ePartyinafutureIraqigovernment.Thenon May,th eCommunistsponsoredaprotestinth etreetsofBaghdadcallingfo rrepresentationnth egovernment.hileth enumberofpeoplewho actuallyturnedou twasasourceofdispute,th enumberwasatleast300,000.21 8AthispointQasimonsideredhePartyobe hreatohisuthority,andreactedaccordingly. blanketbanon al lpartyactivitywas th efirststep.21 9nd therefusalofanotherequestormhePopularResistanceForce,ffectively keepingitunderth econtrolofth eregime,wasanother. Interestingly,thelatter21 6SpecialNationalIntelligenceEstimate36.2-2-59,"ProbableReactionsto th eCommunistThreatinIraq,"28 April959,FRUS958-60.4 4 2 -4 3 .21 7Batatu,TheO ldSocialClasses.891-95 .21 8 ibid,899-900.21 9Farouk-Sluglettan dSluglett,Ira qSince95 8.69.

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movewasno tviewedaspartofacrackdownonth eCommunistParty,asfe whadnoticedthatth eForcewasdependenton th eregime.220

A tthispointth eCommunistPartyhadtodecidewhethertoconfronttheregimeopenlyorbackdownan daccommodateQasim.ninternaldiscussionsinlateMay,th ePartydecidedtobackdownandno tforceaconfrontation.actorsthatmayhavecontributedtothisdecisionincludedth efactthattheymightno thavenoughupportithinhermy,heupportershoadoinedhe bandwagonfollowingth erevolutio