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PaperpreparedforEURA-conferenceJune2009

ToolsofgovernmentingovernancethecaseofNorwegianurbangovernment

(Version15.5.2009)

SignyIreneVabo(Dr.polit.,AssociateProfessor)

OsloUniversityCollegeFacultyofSocialSciencesP.O.BOX4St.Olavsplass

0130OsloNorway

Telephone:+4722453516E-mail:[email protected]

AsbjrnRiselandParticipatingandcorrespondingauthor

(Dr.polit.,Professor)BodUniversityCollege

N-8049BodNorway

Telephone:+4775517624E-mail:[email protected]


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AbstractThenotionofgovernanceisoftenunderstoodinrelationtoaclaimedshiftfromgovernmentbytheunitarystatetowardsgovernancebyandthrougharangeofnetworksofvariouskinds.

Theclaimintheliteratureisthattherehasbeenanincreaseinsuchnewgovernancearrangementsorhybridstructureslikepartnershipsandnetworks.Furthermore,governanceisunderstoodasachallengeforurbangovernance,sincepublicleadersareconsideredtobelessabletoinfluenceandgoverninaninstitutionalsettingwhereurbangovernmentisoneamongseveralactorshavingahandonthewheel.Theaimofthispaperistodevelopananalyticalframeworkformeasuringtheuseofpublictoolsinasettingofgovernance,andbasedonanempiricalstudy,toassessthetoolbox,theuseofdifferenttoolsandtheireffects.TheanalyticalframeworkdepartsfromtheclassicNATO-schemeproposedbyChristopherHood,butadistinctionbetweendirectandindirecttoolshasbeenadded.Theanalysisshowsthatpublicleadershavearichtoolboxavailable,andtheassumptionthatpublicleaderscannotgoverninasettingofgovernance,needstobenuanced.Furthermorewefindthat,in

accordancewithourassumptions,thevarioustoolsarerarelyusedinadirectwayinthegoverningofnetworks.Thepaperendsinadiscussionofsomeimplicationforfurtherresearchasregardstheneedtounderstandtheroleoftrustasaprerequisiteforusingtoolsingovernanceandtheimportanceoffacilitatingnetworkmanagement.Keywords:Network,tools,governance,Norway


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1.IntroductionAnyurbangovernmentneedstoolsforgoverning,makingitpossibletoinfluencesocietyincertainwaysandtherebyrealizingpoliticalprogramsorsolvesproblemscallingforsolutions.Toolscanbeseenasapivotalcomponentinalldemocracies(PierreandPeters2000;Salamon

2002;HoodandMargetts2007).Anemptytoolboxwouldmeanthatdemocracyitselffailed.Thisimportanceoftoolsisreflectedinarichliterature,dealingwithtoolsalongvariousconceptualizationsandtypologies(SalamonandLund1987,Hood1983,PetersandVanNispen1998;Eladis,HillandHowlett2005,HoodandMargetts2007).Theliteratureontoolsofgovernmenttypicallyreflectsthebasicideathatnationalandurbangovernments,ininstitutionalterms,areseparatedfromsocietyandthetoolsbridgethegapbetweenthepublicandsociety.Suchanunderstandingisdeeplychallengedbythenotionofgovernance,understoodasashiftfromgovernmentfromtheunitarystatetowardsgovernancebyandthrougharangeofnetworksofvariouskinds(Rhodes1997;Greenaway,SalterandHart2007).Amajorpartofthesenetworksarehighlyrelevantforpublicpolicyandcomprise

government,butofteninsuchawaythatgovernmentshavenodominantpositionorcapabilitytomakecommands.Theyarehybridinstitutionalarrangements,alsocomprisingmarketactorsandcivilsociety.Theliteraturedealingwithdifferentkindsofgovernancearrangements,likepartnershipsandnetworks,commonlyclaimsthattherehasbeenanincreaseinthenumberofsuchhybridstructures(Rhodes1997,Klijn2005).Ininstitutionalterms,governanceseemstomaketheinterfacebetweengovernmentandsocietymoreseamlessandcomplexandtherebypublicgoverningismademorecomplicatedandindefinite.Theclaimintheliteratureis,furthermore,thatsteeringhastotakeonamoreindirectandsoftformintheevolvinggovernancenetworks,thanwithinthemorehierarchicalapproachestogovernance(seeforexampleMilwardandProvan2000;Kettl2002;Salamon2002;Srensen2006;SrensenandTorfing2007a,b).TheaimofthispaperistodiscussthispostulationbasedonempiricalresearchfromNorwegianurbangovernments.OurempiricalanalysiswillbebasedontheclassicalNATO-schemeproposedbyHood(1983;HoodandMargetts2007).Thisisatypologyheldtobegeneric:apparentlyvalidforanalysesofallkindsoforganisationsinrelationtoallkindsofenvironment.HeretheNATO-typologywillbeadaptedtoanalysisofgovernancenetworks.Theschemewill,however,besupplementedbyadistinctionbetweendirectandindirectuseofthefourkindsoftoolsinquestion.Basedonthisanalyticalconcept,wewillshowthatthe

toolsofgovernmentrarelyareusedinadirectwayingovernancenetworks.Butstill,eveninsituationswheregovernancehastobeindirectandsoft,urbangovernmentsdohavearichtoolboxavailable.TheanalysisalsorevealsthattheNATO-typologyhascertainlimitationswhenappliedtogovernancenetworks,anditisdiscussedhowthenotionofgovernmenttoolscanbedevelopedtobettercapturetheimportantelementsinsuccessfulgovernanceofnetworks.Inthefollowing,wewillfirstexplainsomeofthemaincharacteristicsofgovernancenetworks,andtherebydefinethecontextforthekindofsteeringthatmaytakeplace.Thereaftertheanalyticalframeworkwillbeoutlined.Thedataandmethodwillthenbepresented,andtheempiricalfindingsanalysed.Thenfollowsaconcludingdiscussionarguing

thatthewellestablishedNATO-schemegiveausefulcontributiontotheunderstandingofhowurbangovernmentsareabletoinfluenceongovernancenetworks.Butwealsoconclude


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thatadistinctionbetweendirectandindirecttoolsisnecessarywhenapplyingtheanalyticalschemeonnetworks,andfollowingfromthis,theconcludingdiscussionraisessomequestionsandconsiderationsabouttheroleoftrustasagroundfortools.

2.GovernancenetworksthecontextMostoftheliteraturedealingwithpublictoolsdepartsfromthenotionofgovernmentasahierarchicalsystem,wherecertainpositionsandrolesaresuperior,andwherebehavioursandactionscanbeinfluencedbycommand.Asbrieflydiscussedabove,governanceiscommonlyunderstoodassomethingopposite,atypeofsteeringnotleaningonanyclearhierarchy,orallowingsimplecommanding.Toexplainthetypicalcharacteristicsofgovernance,whichisthesettingforouranalysesoftools,wewillpointtosomedimensionsofgovernancenetworks.Thenotionofnetworksitselfhasalonghistoryinpoliticalscienceandthestudyofpublic

administration,andthereisalargeliteraturedealingtheoreticallyandempiricallywithnetworks.Havingnoambitionofenteringthedefinitionaldiscussionofnetworks,wewillbuildonthedefinitionproposedbySrensenandTorfing(2007a:9-11).Theyclaimtotakethenotionofgovernancenetworkstorepresentaparticulartypeofnetworkaswellasaparticulartypeofgovernance.Theyarguethatgovernancebynetworks,i.e.governancenetworks,maybedefinedbyfivebasiccharacteristics:1)Arelativelystablehorizontalstructureofinterdependentactorswithoperationalautonomy.Interdependencereferstothehorizontalrelationshipbetweenactors,butwithoutsayingmuchabouttheallocationofmaterialorimmaterialresourcesbetweentheactors.Thesituationis,however,thatnobodycanusetheirpowertoexerthierarchicalcontroloveranybodywithoutriskingruiningthenetwork.Similarly,theautonomyimpliesthattheactorsinvolvedcannotbecommandedbysuperiorstothinkoractincertainways.2)Therearenegotiationsgoingonbetweenactorstryingtoinfluenceeachother.Theseprocessescantakedifferentforms,likebargainingorsearchfordeliberativesolutions.Consensusisaprerequisiteforactioninagovernancenetwork,butdoesnotmeanthatconflictsareabsent.Proposalsmayhoweverbeaccepteddespitepersistentdisagreement.3)Governancenetworksoperatewithinaninstitutionalizedframework,inthesensethattheyhaveregulative,normative,cognitiveandimaginaryaspects(Scott1994).Assuch,networks

canbestudiedasinstitutions(seforexampleBogason2000;KlijnandKoppenjan2006).4)Networksarerelativelyself-regulatingwithinlimitssetbyexternalagencies.Thismeansthatdecisionsaswellasproceduralquestionsaredealtwithandnegotiatedbythenetworkitself.Theparticularpoliticalandinstitutionalenvironmentwithinwhichthenetworksoperatewill,however,bothfacilitateandconstraintheircapacityforself-regulation.5)Governancenetworkscontribute,bydefinition,totheproductionofpublicpurposesinonewayoranother.Theproductionofpublicpurposesisnotanecessaryelementtotalkaboutnetworks,butnetworkbecomegovernancenetworksonlytotheextenttheydealwithpublicpolicy(sealsoParker2007).


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Themanyobstaclesgovernmentsfacewhentheytrytosteernetworks,isacommonthemeintheliterature.Peters(2006:1)arguesthatnetworksarebasedonselfinterests,andareprobablymoreselfservingthanservingthepublic.John(2003:486)arguesthatnetworksarestaticstructures.Whenpowerrelationsareatstake,theexistenceofanetworkamongorganizationsdoesnotseemtobeaparticularlystronginfluenceorconstraintofhuman

action.Likewise,Rhodes(2000:81)arguesthatnetworksaredifficulttosteer,oftentheyareinefficientbecauseco-operationcausesdelay,andtheymaybecomeimmobilizedbyconflictsofinterests.Onecanalsoimagineothermechanismstroublingcommonactioninnetworks.InastudyofthreeDutchnetworksdealingwithurbandevelopment,forexample,KlijnandTeisman(2003)pointstothreeobstaclesthatkeptnetworksfromreachingapropersolutiontotheproblemstheydealtwith.Thecomplexityitselfmeanttherewasamultitudeofmotivations,andparticipantswerememberofseveralothers,partlycompetingnetworks.Therewerealsocomplexinstitutionalframesfornetworkactors,forexampledifferentpublicagencies(e.g.regionalandurbangovernment)haddifferentrulesaffectingtheirparticipantsinthenetwork.Andfinally,therewasagapinthevaluesmotivatingmemberstojoinnetworks,especiallybetweenpublicandprivateactors.

Theseargumentsandobservationsleavetheimpressionthatsuccessfulpublicsteeringofnetworksismuchofawonder.Inordertounderstandhownetworksaregoverned,andunderwhatcircumstancesnetworkscanbegoverned,wewillmovetothediscussionontoolsofgovernment.Thereareseveralwaystothinkabouthowgovernmentscansteersociety(PierreandPeters2000:37-47;HoodsandMargetts2007:1,2).Theadvantagewiththetoolsapproach,however,isthatitdoesnotaddressthequestionabouttherelationshipbetweenstateandsocietyreferredtointheintroductiontothispaper.Focusissimplyonthecapacityofgovernmentstomakeandimplementpolicy(PierreandPeters2000:42).Althoughlimitedinscope,thetoolsperspectiveshouldthereforecontributetoenhancedunderstandingofoneofthevariablesessentialforpolicysuccess.

3.AnalyticalframeworktoolsofgovernmentforgoverningnetworksTherearemanyapproachesthatmaybefruitfultoanalyseandunderstandtheoptionsgovernmentshavetoshapesocietyingeneral.Relatedtothegoverningofnetworksinparticular,thereisagrowingliteratureconceptualizingsuchsteeringasmeta-governance.Thistypeofsuperiorgovernanceinvolvesconsciousanddeliberateattemptsbypublicauthoritiestoregulateself-governingnetworks(Kelly2006).Centraltothemeta-governance

approachistherealisationthattodealwithsensitivenetworkactivities,publicauthoritiesarereconfiguredtoadapttothechangingenvironmentthroughnewsteeringarrangementsandtheexerciseofavarietyofsoftandhardgovernancetools(Jessop2004;Srensen2007).OneexampleoftheseframeworksispresentedbySrensen(2006),suggestingfourkindsofmeta-governancetools:policyandresourceframing,institutionaldesign,networkfacilitationandnetworkparticipation.However,theapproachesreferringtometa-governancebasicallydepartfromtheliteratureongovernanceitself,inourview,havingsomeanalyticallyshortcomings,likethemixingofdifferentanalyticallevels.Seenfromadistance,oneistemptedtoarguethereisakindofgapinthisfieldstheoreticaldevelopment,sincetherichliteratureontools,thoughdepartingfrom

agovernmentposition,onlyseldomisreferredtoamongwritersarguingthatnetworkscanandshouldbeinfluencedandgovernedbythepublic.Ouraimhereisthereforetoenterthis


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discussion;notbyreferringtometa-governance,butratherfromanoppositeangle,buildingononeoftheclassicframeworksofgovernmenttools.TheframeworklayingthegroundforouranalysishasbecomeknownastheNATO-typologynamedafterthefourgenericandsystemictypesofinstrumentsoutlinedbyHood(1983):

Nodality,Authority,TreasureandOrganisation.Thefourkindsoftoolsareregardedbothasdetectorsusedbygovernmentstogetinformedandaseffectorstoinfluenceonsociety.Theschemewasintroducedin1983already,buthaslaterbeenrevisedandadaptedtothedigitalage(HoodandMargetts2007).Introducedasgenerictools,HoodandMargetts(2007)applytheconcepttoexploreandexplaintheinterfacebetweengovernmentandsociety.Inmostsocieties,governmentsarelargeinstitutionsinvolvedinawiderangeofactivitiesandhavethereforemoreexpertiseandinformationthanmostothersocietalactors(DeBruijnandHeuvelhof1997:134,OTooleandMeier1999:511,Sbragia2000,OTool2007:218-221).ThispropertyofbeinginthecentregivesrisetoNodality.Nodalityequipsgovernmentswithastrategicpositionfromwhichtospreadinformationtosocietyaswellastodetect

information.Furthermore,Authorityisstronglyassociatedwithgovernmentsandformsoftenpartofthedefiningcharacteristicforgovernments.Authoritygivesgovernmenttheabilitytoforcesocietalactors,andtodetermineinalegalsense,likegovernmentsdoine.g.theirtaxpoliciesorlegislationagainstcrime.Authorityimpliesthelegitimacyoflegalorofficialpower,andbecomesmanifestbydemanding,forbidding,guaranteeingandjudging.Authoritymaybeusedalsotogatherinformation.Treasureisrelatedtothemanyanddifferenteconomictoolsmostgovernmentshaveattheirdisposal.Treasuregivesgovernmenttheabilitytoexchange,andtobuycertainactionsandbehaviours.Moneymaybeexchangedforgoods,services,loyaltyandpoliticalsupport.Thesetoolsencompassanythingthatcanbefreelyexchanged,andmaymaterializeasrewardsaswellasfines.Finally,Organisationpointstothechoicegovernmentssometimehavetoactdirectlyratherthantodependonthird

parties.Referenceismadetoknowledge,properties,equipmentandotherkindsofmaterialpowerheldbygovernments.However,applyingthisanalyticaltoolonnetworks,doesnotnecessarilygivesense,sincetheschemehasbeendevelopedtoexplaintheinterfacebetweengovernmentandsociety,understandinggovernmentinlinewiththenotionofaunitarystate.Whendiscussingtoolsofgovernmentthereisaneedtodistinguishbetweendifferentlevelsofgoverningorsteering(Salamon2002:20).Asillustratedinfigure1wefindthatgovernmentsfirstneedtoolstoinfluenceinandonnetworks;andsecondnetworksneedtoolstoinfluencesociety.Themainaimofthispaperistodiscussthetoolsgovernmentsusetoinfluenceonnetworks(xinfigure1)andmakethewillofgovernmentscomethroughevenifgovernmentisnotinadominantposition.


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Government

Actor B

Actor C

Actor D

Actor F

Network/Governance

Decisions andactionsaffecting individuals

andsociety

x y

X=tools toinfluence on networksY=tools toinfluence on indiduals/society

Figure1:TwolevelsoftoolsintheinterfaceofgovernmentsocietyTobeabletodescribethenuancesinthepossibilitiesurbangovernmentshavetoinfluenceonnetworks,wewilltesttheassumptionthatitisfruitfultomakeadistinctionbetweenindirectanddirectuseofthefourtypesoftools.TheterminologyusedhereisinspiredbySalamon(2002)whodistinguishbetweendirectgovernmentasthedeliveryofservicesandgoodsbygovernmentbureaucrats,andindirectgovernmentthatrelyheavilyonawideassortment

ofthirdpartiestodeliverpubliclyfinancedservicesandpursuepubliclyauthorizedpurposes(Salamon2002:2).Thebasicideaisthatthepublicadministrationchallengehasleapedbeyondthebordersofthepublicagencyandcallsfornewgovernance.Newgovernanceinvolvescollaborationbetweenpublicaswellasbetweenpublicandprivateactors.Salamon(2002)definecertaintoolsofgovernmentasindirect,likesocialregulation,contracting,loanguarantees,grants,insurance,vouchersetc.TheNATO-schemeis,however,basedonthelogicofcontrolmechanismsnotspecifictools.AndthefourcategoriesoftoolsdefinedbytheNATO-schemearetoobroadtoallowforvariationsofdirectnessintheuseoftools.Inordertomakeourtypologymoreprecise,inaccordancewiththemainstream

literatureinthefield,wehavechosentodistinguishbetweenvarioustoolsaccordingtothedegreeofcoerciontheyinvolve(Salamon2002).Animportantreasonforthischoiceisalsothatoneoftheparadoxesinnetworkgovernanceisthattheuseofauthority,inthesenseoflawandcoercion,mayreducethechanceofadesiredoutcome(MilwardogProvan2000,Kettl2002,Srensen2006,SrensenandTorfing2007b).Thereforeitispivotalinwhichwaythedifferenttoolsactuallyareusedbyurbangovernments.Directuseofpolicytoolsresemblestheuseofcoercion,whileindirectusehastobebasedonvariousothersourcesofauthority.Thus,theindirectwaysofusingtoolsofgovernmentincludediscussion,negotiationsandcompetitionbetweensourcesofinformation;resourcesetc.,whilesuchrelativismisnotallowedwhentoolsareusedinadirectandcoerciveway.ThisdistinctionbetweendirectandindirectuseofthedifferentkindsofpolicyinstrumentsintheNATO-schemeisillustratedinfigure2.Whiletheuseofcoercionobviouslywillbea


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questionofdegree(acontinuousvariable)andprobablyshouldbeapproachedassuchempirically,forthepurposeofsimplificationthefigureonlyreferstothedichotomydirectandindirectuseofthetoolsforthepurposeofsimplification.

Kindsoftools TheuseoftoolsDirect Indirect

Nodality Manipulativeinformation(includingpropaganda)

Competingsourcesforinformationanddialog

Authority Ordersandlegislativedecreesfollowedupbycontrol

Requestsorappealswithnocontrol,andnohiddenthreat

Treasure Moneyofvaluablesinasituationwhenurbangovernmentistheonlysponsor(highdegreeofdependenceeconomically)

Moneyofvaluablesinasituationwhenurbangovernmentformpartofamarketofsponsors(highdegreeofindependenceeconomically)

Organisation Action,includingtheactualpresencebyurbangovernmentingovernancenetworks

Indirectaction,includingdifferentkindsofformalisedarrangementsforcollaboration

Figure2:DirectandindirectuseofthedifferenttoolsofgovernmentTogiveoutmanipulativeinformationorpropagandatoconvincethereceiversisregardedascoerciveandadirectwaytoutilisethenodalityasresourceheldbygovernments.Asshowninfigure2,thistoolmaybeusedinanindirectwaywhensourcesofinformationarecompetingwhenthereismorethanonetruthanddialogisneededbothtogiveandgetinformation.Indemocraticcountriesthelatterobviouslywillmostoftenbethesituation,butthedegreeofcoercioninherentintheuseofthistoolmaystillvary.Thepointhereisthatpublicauthoritieswillhaveanauthoritativepowerandbeanatural

centrewhenengagingincollaborations,andtherebypossessnodality.However,althoughthisistruefornationalgovernmentsitmaybetrueforurbangovernmentsonlytothedegreethesehaveacertaincapacitytoact.Havingtheresponsibilityforabroadrangeofwelfareservicesaswellasfortheindustrialandcommercialdevelopmentlocally,urbangovernmentsinallNordiccountriesareinvolvedinalonglistofprocessesandprojectsofdevelopment,ofspatialandotherplanningactivitiesetc.(SellersandLidstrm2007).Throughsuchconnectionstopivotaldecisionmakingprocesses,urbangovernmentsinNorwaymaythereforebecrucialnodesincities.Therelevanceofthispositionaswellashowthecentralpositionisusedwhencollaboratingingovernancenetworkdecideshowimportantnodalityisasaresourceortoolofgovernmentforurbangovernments.

Turningtothetoolslabelledauthority,lawsandregulationforcedbygovernmentsaretypicallyadirectwayofusingthistoolwhileexpressinggoals;givepoliticalsignalsetc.areregardedastheindirectway.Initially,theabilitytouseauthorityisofcourserestrictedbecausemanyareasinaliberaldemocracycannotberegulatedlegally.AlthoughurbangovernmentsinNorwaylacklegislativepower,theycanmakebindingdecisionsonabroadrangeofmattersandtheymaycontrolthefollowingupoftheirdecisions.However,tobeinthepositiontomakeandfollowupformaldecisionsisonething,anothermatteristheauthoritativepowerheldbyurbangovernments.Evenweakpoliticalsignalsmaygivegreatinfluenceonagovernancenetwork.Itis,therefore,importanttodistinguishbetweentheauthorityfoundedintheformalrighturbangovernmentshavetoforcedecisionsonpeople

andtheauthoritygainedbecauseurbangovernmentactorsareconsideredaslegitimateandcentralactorincollaborations.Asatoolofgovernmenttherefore,thepossibilityforurban


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governmentstorelyonauthoritywilldependonlocalconditionsandhowurbangovernmentsareperceivedbytheparticipatingactors.Asfortreasureasatoolofgovernment,toorganizeeconomicincentivesinasituationwherethereceiverisfullydependentonthefunding,maymakethedegreeofcoercionhigh.When

collaborationshavetorelayonnumeroussourcesforfinancingtheiractivity,theeconomicsituationmaybeharderandunstable,butindependencywillbesubstantial.Insuchsituations,treasurewillonlytoalimiteddegreeequipurbangovernmentswithpowertogovernnetworks.Thedegreeofcoercionwilldiminish,andtreasurewillhavetobeusedinamoreindirectwayasatoolofgovernment.Finally,thecoercivewaytouseorganizationasatoolofgovernmentwouldbetoincorporatetheactionsofthegovernancenetworksintoapublicagency.Forcollaboratingrelationshipssuchadirectuseoforganisationisobviouslyirrelevant.Togovernnetworks,organizationisrelevanttothedegreethaturbangovernmentsengageincollaborationsdirectly.However,thedegreeofdirectnessorcoercionisalsodeterminedbytheinfluenceheldbyurban

governmentsontheorganisationaldesignchosen,thatis;theorganisationalframework,processesandactorsallowedasparticipantsinthegovernancenetworks(Srensen2006).

4.DataandmethodTheempiricalstudygroundingthefollowinganalysestooknetworkasalabelfordifferentkindsofcollaborationsinvolvingurbangovernment.Networkwaswidelydefined,inaccordancewiththedefinitionabove,andincludedvariouspossibleformsregardinge.g.formality,duration,etc.Thestudywasmadein2007-2008,involvingthreemediumsized

Norwegiancities.Inthefirstpartoftheproject,theresearchteamidentifiedasmanygovernancenetworksaspossibleinvolvingthecitygovernment.Thismapping,basedoninterviewswiththecitygovernmentleadershipandthestudyingofthelastfouryearsofcouncilminutes,revealedalargenumberofnetworksrangingfrominter-municipalcooperation,limitedcompaniesinvolvingthecitygovernmentasapartlyowner,collaborativeprojectswithcivilsocietyorbusinesssectortoinformalcollaborations(Kristiansen2007;Vabo2007;Riseland2007).Theteamthenselectedninenetworksfordeeperstudy.Atotalof70qualitativeinterviewswerecompletedinordertomaptheactivitiesreportedinthewhole,typically5-10interviewsforeachnetwork.Inaddition,writtenmaterialwascollectedandhasbeenanalysed.

ThethreecitiesinvolvedinthestudyareNarvik,SteinkjerandDrammen,allwithapopulationrangingfrom20.000and60.000,whichaccordingtoaNorwegianstandard,makesthemmedium-sized.SteinkjerandDrammenareregionalcentres,andincontrasttoNarviktheyhostthecountryadministrationandseveralregionalstateagencies.Thelegalframework,includingthefunctionstheyareexpectedtotakecareof,ishoweverexactlythesameforallthreecities.Thepurposeandaimoftheninenetworksarelistedinthefigurebelow.


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Network/(city)/

timespan

Aim

TheSevenPartCooperation(D)1998

Sharedpolicyportactivites:AnagreementoncoordinationofplanningprocessesfortheseashoreinthemunicipalityofDrammenandLier.In20072008concernedprimarilywithwheretoplacethefreightdepotforthe

reailwayconnection.TheaimforthemunicipalityofDrammenistowinsupportformovingthedepotfromthecitycentretoallowurbanrenewalthere.Atthesametimetheyaimtoconnecttherailwayfreightdepottotheportactivitiestoconnectinlandtransport(bothbyrailwayandtrailers)totransportbysea.

OurcityDrammenLtd.(D)1992

Production:DevelopingandproducingservicesforthetradeandindustryaswellasthelocalcouncilofDrammentoattractbusinessandpeopletothecitycentre.TheaimismaintaintheappreciatedvitalityofthecitycentreofDrammen.

ProjectforImprovedCityStanding(D)20052011

Production:ImplementvariousmeanstoimprovethestandingofDrammenmunicipality.Theaimistoincreasethenumberofinhabitants,encouragebusinesssettlementandimprovethecitystandinginthemunicipalityofDrammenandsurroundingareas.

NEW(N)1998

Sharedpolicyportactivites:NEWisanabbreviationforNorthEastWestFrightCorridor.Itisaconcepttoconnectinlandtransport(bothbyrailwayand

trailers)totransportbysea.TheaimistoestablishatransportcorridorbetweenUSA/CanadaandCentralAsia,viaNarvikinNorway.

FuturumLtd.(N)1995

Development:IndustrialandcommercialdevelopmentinthemunicipalityofNarvikandtheOfot-region.Offercounselling,assistanceandserviceaswellassystematicworkwiththeaimtoimproveindustrialandcommercialdevelopmentandattractbusinesstoNarvik.

Travelbusinessandindustrialhistory(N)20062010

Development:Generatetourismbasedonthehistoryoflocalindustry.ThisistheaimfortheprogrammeSustainablemunicipalities,whereNarvikisapilotparticipant.

CitiesinMid-Norway(S)2003

Sharedpolicyportactivites:AlliancetopromotetheinterestsofMid-Norwaybyinitiatingcommonindustrialandcommercialdevelopmentprojectsforthecitiesintheregion.Inparticular,effortshavebeenmadetomaketheportactivitiesinthedifferentharboursintheregionmoreefficienttoattractmoretransport.

TheJubileeinSteinkjerLtd.(S)20042008

Production:CarrythroughtheCityJubileeinJanuary2008.Thegoalwaspartlytocelebrate,partlytoutilisetheopportunitytostrengthenthetourismindustry.

Travelbusinessandculturalmonumentsonfarmland(S)20052008

Production:Helptofarmersthathaveculturalmonumentsontheirfarmlandtogetthemregistered,removevegetationandorganiseandmakethemvisibleasabasistoapplyfornationalfundingtodevelopthemonumentsintosomekindofbusiness.Theaimistosecurediversityinculturalmonuments,promoteprotectionofthevaluetheyrepresentandincreasevaluecreationintheurbanarea.

Figur3Theninegovernancenetworkspurposeandaim

5.EmpiricalanalysisWenowturntotheanalysisofthegovernanceprocesseswehavestudiedinninegovernancenetworkswithinthreeurbangovernmentsinNorway.Thequestioniswhatkindofgovernancetoolsurbangovernmentusewhentheyaimtogovernthenetworkstheyparticipatein.Dowefindsomekindsoftoolstobemoreinusethanothers?Andwhatcharacterisethespecificpolicyinstrumentsinuse?Furthermore,howdourbangovernmentsactuallyapplythevarioustools?Dowefindthattheprocessofgoverningistypicallyindirect

andsoft?Ordowealsofinddirectuseofdifferenttools?


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Asabasisforthenumberspresentedintable1wehaveanalysedtheinvolvedrespondentsviewsonvariouswaysthenetworkstheyareparticipatinginareinfluencedorsteeredfromtheurbangovernmentsinvolved.Whatwefocusonis,inaccordancetotheNATO-framework,thegovernancemechanismsinuse.Theanalysisis,forexample,notconcernedwithwhichactorsareinvolved,whetheritisthepoliticalleadershiportheadministrativepart

ofurbangovernments.InTable1fourvaluesareusedtodescribethedegreeofcoercioninthetoolsofgovernmentusedbytheurbangovernments:limited,moderate,considerableanddecisive.Incaseswheretheroleoftheurbangovernmentisdecisive,thetoolofgovernmentisperdefinitionusedinadirectway.Thethreeothervalueslimited,moderateandconsiderableareusedtodistinguishbetweendifferentdegreesofcoercionintheindirectuseofthefourtoolsofgovernment.Toolsnotregisteredempiricallyaremarkedby.

Network/(city)/timespan

Nodality

Authority Treasure Organisation

TheSevenPartCooperation(D)1998

Direct

Indirect 2 1 1

OurcityDrammenLtd.(D)1992

Direct 4

Indirect 3 3 3

ProjectforImprovedCityStanding(D)20052011

Direct

Indirect 3 1 3 3

NEW(N)1998

Direct

Indirect 2 1 1

FuturumLtd.(N)1995

Direct 4 4

Indirect 2 2

Travelbusinessandindustrialhistory(N)20062010

Direct

Indirect 1 2 1

CitiesinMid-Norway(S)2003

Direct

Indirect 2 1 3

TheJubileeinSteinkjerLtd.(S)20042008

Direct 4

Indirect 3 1 3

Travelbusinessand

culturalmonumentsonfarmland(S)20052008

Direct

Indirect 2 1 2

20/36 9/36 21/36 19/36

Table1Theuseoftoolsofgovernmentbyurbangovernmentsinninenetworksquantifiedexpressionsforqualitativedata


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Fornodalitythedecisivefactortoclassifytheindirectuseofthepolicyinstrumentsaccordingtothethreecategorieshasbeenhowcentraltheroleoftheurbangovernmentwasassourceforinformation(whethertheyhadallcrucialinformationorpartsofit);andthedegreeofcommunicationbetweentheurbangovernmentandthenetwork.Assessingauthority,thepremiseslaiddownbytheurbangovernmentininitialformulationofobjectivesaswellasin

contractshavedeterminedtheclassification.Likewise,thelevelofcompulsoryreportinghasbeenevaluated.Potentialauthorityasresponsiblecityplannerhasnotbeentakenintoaccount,becauseurbangovernmentsuseofsuchatoolobviouslywouldbedestructivefortheworkwithinthenetworksanalysedandhavethereforenotbeenused.Whenanalysingtreasure,themainquestionhasbeenwhetherthenetworkhasbeendependentontheurbangovernmenttofinanceitsbusiness(throughgrantsorcommissions).Alternativelytheurbangovernmentmaycontributewithseedmoneyonly,oreachnetworksparticipantcountfortheirpartofthecosts.Finallyfororganisation,theassessmentofdegreeofcoercionhasbeendependentontwoindicators.First,thequestionhasbeenwhichroleurbangovernmenthasplayedindecisionsonhowtoorganisethenetwork.Thesecondcriteriahasbeenwhethertheurbangovernmentsisparticipatingdirectorindirect(throughaboardofdirectors,for

example)inthenetwork.WhatcanbeobservedinTable1isthatallthefourkindsoftoolsnodality,authority,treasureandorganisationareusedbyurbangovernmentstosteergovernancenetworks.Wefindthatauthorityisthekindsoftoolsleastused,whilethethreeothersarealmostequallypopular.Anexplanationtothispatternmaybethattheabilitytouseauthorityasasourceofinfluenceingovernancenetworksperdefinitionisrestricted.Tothedegreethattheactorsinvolvedareinterdependentandtheaimistofacilitatethenetworkscapacitytoself-regulation,theuseofordersandcontroltomakedecisiononbehalfofthenetworkshouldobviouslybeavoided.Theparadox,thatextensiveuseofauthoritymayruinthecollaboration,becomesvisiblehere.Theverylimiteduseofauthorityisprobablyalsoaverygoodindicatoronhownetworkgovernanceisperceivedbyurbangovernments:itseemstobefullyacceptabletosteerthenetworks,butnotthetraditionalway,byregulationsorordersandcontrol.Althoughauthorityisconsiderablylesscommoninusethantheothertools,thisimpliesthatgovernmentsneedanduseabroadvarietyoftoolsalsowhengoverningnetworks.Thus,itishardtosaythatsomekindsofgovernancetoolsareirrelevantforthegovernanceofnetworks.Onthecontrary,wefinditstrikingthatallthedifferentkindsoftoolsaresoactivelyinuse.Asfornodality,forexample,itisveryclearinmostnetworksthatthewaytheyareorganisednotsomuchunderlinetheauthorityheldbyurbangovernmentsbutthat

representationfromthelocalauthorityisessentialfortheworkcarriedoutbythenetwork.Interestingly,theinterviewsshowthatthissourceofinfluenceoftenisunderestimatedbyurbangovernmentsthemselves.Theotherimportantfindingrevealedintable1isthatadirectuseofthevariousgovernancetoolsisveryrare,aspresumedinthetheoreticaldiscussionabove.Onlyonfouroccasionsweobservegovernanceprocesseswherethedegreeofcoercionpursuedthroughthetoolusedmakestheurbangovernmentdecisive.Allthesenetworksareorganisedaslimitedcompanieswiththeurbangovernmentasaminorityowner,butwhichstillmayexplaintheuseofmorehierarchicalandcoercivetools.Moreover,thevariationsobservedbetweenthesefourcasesareinteresting.Wefinddecisiveuseoftreasureincombinationwithmoreorlessindirectuse

ofothertoolsbutalsodecisiveusebothofauthorityandtreasure.ThelatteristhecaseinFuturum,alimitedcompanygovernedverymuchinthesamewayasanordinaryagency.


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AlsoforthecaseofOurcityDrammenLtd.,itseemsthatacombinationofadominantpositionassponsorandanarrangementwherethenetworkismoreorlessdependentonsellingitsservicestotheurbangovernmentinvolveconsiderablecoercionintheuseofthegovernancetools.Aninterestingcombination,however,isthedominantroleoftheurbangovernmentassponsorforTheJubileeinSteinkjerLtd.,butwherethepolicyhasbeentotrust

theorganisedandinclusivenetworkandlimittheuseofothertoolsofgovernmentavailable.Intotal,weseethaturbangovernmentsuseofcoercionwasquitemoderateinthiscaseandindeedregardedassuchamongtheparticipantsweinterviewed.Thus,tocharacterisetheprocessofgoverningnetworkstheverycombinationoftoolsneedstobetakenintoconsiderationtodecidewhatdegreeofcoercionisfoundtobeacceptable.

6.ConcludingdiscussionItisoftenclaimedthatanincreaseindifferentkindsofgovernancearrangementslikenetworks,partnershipsandcompanies,havedecreasedthepotentialforpublicsteering,

leavingpoliticalleadersinaweakandpassiveposition.Eveniftheargumentitselfiscontroversial(Goetz2008),itrepresentsafundamentalproblemforanydemocracyifitistrue.However,theanalysisaboveindicatethatafterall,thereisanintacttoolboxavailableforpublicleaders,andurbangovernmenttendtosteermoreandstrongerthanthemostpessimisticobserversargue.Thisvarietyoftoolsandtheirrevealedusewasbuildingonacommonplaceandclassicframeworkforstudyingthetoolsofgovernment.Theanalysesillustratethattheuseofsuchaclassicframeworkmakesense,evenifthecontextofgoverninginourcaseisverydifferentfromthecontextforwhichtheframeworknormallyisused.Seenfromthisperspective,thedominatingdiscourseonmeta-governanceprobablywillbefitfromsomekindofbridgingtotheclassicliteratureontoolsofgovernment.Themainconclusiontobedrawnfromtheempiricalanalysispresentedinthispaperisthaturbangovernments,whengoverningnetworks,rarelyusetheavailabletoolsofgovernmentinadirectorcoerciveway.Thetypicaluseofgovernmenttoolsisindirectandsoft.Theindirecttoolboxseemstobefilledwithmanydifferentvariationsofpolicyinstruments.Nodality,forexample,enablesurbangovernmentstoplayanessentialinformationalroleinnetworks,aroleoftenunderestimatedbyurbangovernmentsthemselves.Theuseofseedmoney,representinganotherexample,isalsocommonlyinuse.Ingeneral,toolsbasedonnodality,treasureandorganisationaremoreofteninusethanthosebasedonauthority.The

useofauthorityis,inmanyways,hardforurbangovernmentstocombinewiththeneedforindirectsteeringandsoftprocessesofgovernance.Wefindexamples,however,wheretreasureandauthorityareusedinahighlycoerciveway.Especiallyincaseswhenbothtreasureandauthorityareinuse,itishardtodistinguishtheobservedgovernanceofnetworkswithnormalhierarchicalsteering.AtthesametimeastheNATO-schemeseemsfruitfulinouranalyses,werealizetheframeworkisnotwithoutlimitations.Thereareatleasttwowaysinwhichthisclassificationofpolicyinstrumentsmaybedevelopedtobettercaptureelementsofgreatimportanceforsuccessfulgovernanceofnetworks.

Thefirstimportantelementistrust.Accordingtoorganisationaltheory,trustrepresentsageneralkindofcontrolmechanisms(BradachandEccles1989),anditisawellestablished


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assumptionthatTrustisanimportantlubricantofasocialsystem.Itisextremelyefficient;itsavespeoplealotoftroubletohaveafairdegreeofrelianceonotherpeoplesword(Arrow1974:23).Trustcontributestoreducethefearforopportunism,andthepossibilitythatactorswillbehaveopportunisticisthereforeapremisefortrusttobeofsignificantimportance.Althoughwemayfindhighdegreeofconsensuswithinnetworks,thereisalsoa

highriskforconflict.Andlackofconflictandtrustbetweentheinvolvedactorsareactuallyseenasthemostseriousthreattonetworkswork(seeforexampleAgranoff2007).InthesamewayasHoodandMargettes(2007:122-125)arguethatthesizeofthepopulationandthedegreeofconsensusinthesocietywherethetoolsareappliedmustbetakenintoaccount,wewillarguethatalsothedegreeoftrustbetweeninvolvedactorsisofoutmostimportance.Althoughtoolsareunlikelytobeutilisedtodeveloptrustonly,policyinstrumentswillpromotetrustindifferentwaysandtheymayevenpromotedistrust.However,itishardtodepicttrustasaninstrument.Firstofalltrusthasaself-fulfillingcharacter:theexistenceoftrustgivesonereasontotrust(forbothsocialandtransactioncostreasons),justasdistrustbegetsdistrust(BradachogEccles1989:107,108).Furthermore,therelation

betweentheuseofpolicyinstrumentsandtrustisnotnecessarilyinherentinthetoolused,buthighlycontextual.Thesecondimportantelementforsuccessfulgoverningofnetworksisnetworkmanagement.Thereisabroadliteraturearguingfortheimportanceoffacilitatingtheprocessesgoingonwithinthenetworks(seeforexampleKickert,KlijnandKoppenjan1997,HuxhamandVangen2000,GoldsmithandEggers2004,Agranoff2007).AccordingtoGoldsmithandEggers(2004)andotherwritersinthefield,themainelementsinnetworkmanagementaretodesigntheprocessessettingupnetworkinteractions;designthenetworksalsotofacilitatetheexistenceofastrongintegrator;establishtiesthatbindandgeneratetrustamongtheparticipants;andtomeettheaccountabilitychallenge.Furthermore,thecapacityfornetworkgovernanceisdependentonadequateandsufficientskillsandcompetencies.Furthermore,HuxhamandVangen(2000)focusespeciallyontheneedforleadershipandemphasizethreekindsofactivitiestakencareofbytheleadership:managingpowerandcontrollingtheagenda;representingandmobilisingmemberorganisationsandenthusingandempoweringthosewhocandelivercollaborationaims.Thesepivotalquestionsfornetworkmanagementarequitedifferentfromthequestionsaddressedbythetools-approachforanalysesofhownetworksaregovernedinthispaper.However,inouropinionthereisaparallelbetweentheimportanceofestablishingtheleadership(settinguptheboardand/orengagethegeneralmanager)inapubliccompanyorotherkindofindependentpublicbodyandingovernancenetworks(seealsoSrensen2006).Wewillarguethatitisessentialforurbangovernmentsto

realisetheimportanceofmanagementinsituationswherenetworksareusedtogovernsociety.Followingfromthis,inonewayoranother,facilitationofnetworkmanagementshouldprobablybeincludedinthetoolkit,aswellasintheanalyticalframework.


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