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2/10

ries

v n

gt

INTRODUCTION

he

title of

this guest lecture

is

too ambitious.

It

behooves me

to

apolo-

gize for

that right

away.

Each year

the

President of the United

States

delivers

an

address

to

the members

of Congress,

in

a

joint

session of the

Senate and

the

House of Representatives. This address is traditionally captioned The

State

of the Union . I

seized

that title, slightly adjusting

it, for

my

speech

today.

This

was too

bold a

move

since I cannot speak about the

European Union with as much authority

as

the title

suggests. Let me try

to

present

you with

a

sketch

of current

developments and trends.

1

TH IDE L WITHERS

The European

Union is

not

in

a good shape.

We are

not

faced with

a

crisis, but we are in a deep

malaise.

The

idealism

that prompted

the

project in

the

fifties and pushed it along

thereafter

has faded away.

Few

people

are

still impassioned

by the idea of European

unification.

Even in

The

Netherlands,

once a

pioneer on the

road to

federalism,

the

blazing

fire

has

turned into a flickering flame. At the

time,

shortly

after the

Second World War, it was

an

imaginative and

inspiring

concept to ring

the archenemies France and Germany together, along

with

a

number of

others,

in

a

community

of

states

based on

supranational

principles. That

would

forever obviate war in

our

part

of the world. After

two world

Mr.

Dries van Agt

is

former

Prime Minister

of

the Netherlands. This

article

is

based on a lecture given at the invitation of Cedant Arma

Togae,

student

association for

international and

european

law at Tilburg

University

on 6

March 1996.


3/10

TIL URG FOR IGN

L W

REVIEW

wars

which

both started in

Europe this was

a historic turnabout. And

indeed,

war has now become

unthinkable

in

our

region.

In

the

perspec-

tive of

history

this

is

a

monumental

achievement,

but one that

is hardly

recognised

as

such anymore. Having enjoyed peace for

half

a

century

most people

just

take

it

for granted.

Integration

in Western

Europe has certainly

been

encouraged

and

accelerated

by

the

threatening proximity

of

the

Soviet Union

and

the

communist

empire.

Admittedly,

NATO

was

our

primary

response

to that

threat

but the menace

looming

to our East has stimulated

the

progress

of

ongoing rapprochement

within

the European

Community

as well. That

incentive

is

no

longer working

now.

Does that mean

there

is

no

driving

force towards integration

anymore?

Not

quite: in the last

two decades concern

about competi-

tiveness

has

grown.

A

fragmented

Europe

would

be no match

for

the

economic

superpowers

on the world

market,

notably

the

United

States

and

Japan

(or

East

Asia).

Considerations

of this

kind,

irrefutable

though

they may

be,

are

not

on the

minds of average citizens.

It

is the

captains

of

industry

who have

been

pushing for

the construction

of the borderless

market

in Europe

(Single Market

1992).

And

it

is the elites

of the

business world that

are exerting themselves

for

an economic and

monet-

ary union with

a

single currecny.

The

majority

of the

electorate does not

care

or

as

much

as

it cares

tends

to be hostile to

the latter project.

What

worries

people

first and

foremost

is the alarming

unem-

ployment,

alarming by its

sheer size and

even more by

the structural

nature

of

this

evil The

concerns

mounting apprehensions

about

joblessness

are largely

targeted

at Europe , at

least

by

holding

the

European

Community

liable for

not

fencing

off

this

evil or

not

curtailing

it. It

does not help

a

lot

to argue that the

European countries,

if left to

themselves,

without integration,

would be

much

worse off.

Politicians

in

member states

have been breeding

and

feeding this peevish

mood

by

scapegoating

Brussels time and

again

for

their

own

failures.

Something

similar is

on

display in

the United States:

politicians passing

the buck

and

putting the

blame on

the

federal government.

What

spawns

even

more

resentment

against

integration is

the

rising number

of immigrants.

That is becoming

a major

problem, notably

but not

only

in view of the already

existing unemployment.

The

population explosion

in

neighbouring Africa

and

the countries of the

Middle

East, compounded

by

the impoverishment

there,

are

likely

to

result

in an

exodus to Europe, the lands

of milk

and honey just across

the

Mediterranean.

The

reaction

in Europe

to

this is

no

surprise:

there is

clamouring

for border controls

within

Europe

to

be

maintained

or re-

established.

This

is

not

(at

least

not

at

once)

bound to

entail

a

disastrous

[Vol.5:253


4/10

THE ST TE OF THE

impact on the free

movement

of goods but

still,

the single market, which

is

the flagship

of our

integration,

risks drifting

to rough

seas.

2 TowARDs

EMU

This leads

me

to the Economic

and Monetary

Union

EMU).

No later

than on

the first

day of

1999

as has been

agreed

on

in

Maas-tricht

we

will enter

the final

stage. Exchange

rates of national

currencies

will

be

irrevocably

fixed

which

is

to culminate

in

the

introduction

of

a

single

currency replacing

the national

ones. Be

it noted that

participation

in the

third

and final

stage of

EMU

will only open

for

countries

meeting

the

criteria of the

Maastricht

Treaty.

Will this

really happen?

Is EMU

about

to

be fully

realised? Vital

interests are

at stake here.

EMU is indispens-

able

for the consolidation

of the single

market.

It is, moreover,

necessary

to ensure

monetary

stability.

Obviously,

it

would save

costs. And it

would

put Europe

on a par,

as a co-manager

of the

world

economy,

with

the

giants of the

dollar

and the

yen.

Anyway,

the most

import nt feature of EMU

is

its intern l

political dimension.

In terms

of indepth

integration

full realisation

of

EMU would be

a

quantum leap

foreward.

The flipside

of

the coin

is,

however, that

in

the

event of this

project running

aground,

the

political

damage

will not remain

confined to the viability

of

the market-without-

borders

but go

far beyond. Wolfgang Schauble,

a leading member

of

CDU

Christian

Democratic

Union)

in

the

German

Bundestag

and

pros-

pective

successor to

Chancellor Kohl,

foresees a political

crisis

in

that

event

which

would, inter

alia, have

an adverse

effect

on the ability

of

the

European

Union to

expand eastward.

The

Chancellor

himself

has cau-

tioned in serious terms for

far

reaching implications in case

EMU

would

meet

with

rebuff.

The discussion

on

EMU

rages

now

like a storm over Europe.

Which

countries will qualify

for

participation

in 1999?

What could

and

should

be done

to rescue the

project

in

case too

few

countries

would pass

the

test?

Presently, Luxemburg

is

the only one,

out of fifteen

members

states,

that meets the

criteria

beyond any doubt.

Time

is

running out.

What

moves could

be made

to avert political

disaster?

A flexible inter-

pretation of

the criteria could

bring

relief, Giscard

d Estaing

argues, but

the German Bundesbank

is adamantly

opposed

to any

tinkering

with the

texts in

question. What

about postponement

for

a

few years? The prob-

lem is that

moving

the

deadline runs

counter to

the robust

language of

the Maastricht

Treaty.

I venture

to predict that

in the end the

European Council

will

shy

996]


5/10

T LBURG FOR IGN

LAW

R V W

away from

scuttling

the

EMU

project. Magic

formulas

will be

invented,

I

guess,

to divert

a

catastrophe.

So

EMU

will

make it, though under one

proviso. The

proviso

is

that

the German Chancellor,

who

as

a proponent

of

European

Integration

towers over

his colleagues, does

not

lose his

grip

on political developments

in

his

own

country.

Mind that the German

rank-and-file

is enamoured of its

D-mark. The

opposition

party SPD

(Social

Democratic Party), in a desperate

search for

support,

is

trying

to

exploit the popular reluctance

against

relinquishing

the

prestigious

national currency. The

1998

national elections

in Germany are already

casting in

shadow

over

this debate. Let

me

put

it this

way: if

Germany

sticks unreservedly

to

EMU in its entiretly,

that project will

reach

its

final

destination.

If

not, it

will

be lost.

3 INTER

GOVERNMENTAL

CONFERENCE 1996 MAA

cIHT II

Recently

the

Inter

Governmental Conference

1996, also

known

as

Maastricht

II, has

started.

Unfortunately,

the

skies are

dark.

The confer-

ence

could

have

engendered

a visionary

recreation

of

the

European

Union

or at least a thorough reconstruction.

The Union

of

fifteen

still has,

basically,

the

structure put in

place forty years ago for

the founding

group of six member

states.

The deficiencies of

this institutional

structure

are

conspicuous.

Decision

making

is in too

many

instances a slowly

grinding process, even

cumbersome

for minor

issues All too often unanimity

is

required

enabling

one single

country to

halt

progress. This is

a

major

problem

already

now.

But

how

will

this

work out

after

enlargement

when the

Union will comprise

for the Council of Ministers to

be enabled to

make

its

decisions (with, perhaps,

a

few

exeptions)

by

majority

voting, also

in

foreign policy

and

security matters

as

well

as

related to the

administra-

tion of justice

and so-calles home

affairs.

Equally

urgent is the need for

a thorough

restructuring

of the

institutions

of the Community. The

European

Commission

has

twenty

members

at

present far

too many Is that number to soar

to twenty-

five

or thirty

after enlargement? Already

it

is a

hell

of

a

job for the

president of the Commission

to parcel out the workload in

suck

a

way as

to assign

a

rewarding

portfolio

to

each

of

the

members.

Imagine

what

would

happen

in

the future. The

smaller the

fiefdoms within

the

Com-

mission, the

fiercer

and more numerous the turf battles

would grow.

Also

the

Council of

Ministers

is

swelling

into unwieldy propor

tions whereas the European

Parliament

has

already close

to

six

hundred

membbers. Should

new

members

the

size

of Malta,

Cyprus

and

Slovenia

[Vol.5:253


6/10

THE

ST TE

OF

THE

EU

be given

a separate portofolio

in

the

European

Commussion and a full

say in the council?

This

is a

minefield. The smaller

countries

are

afraid of being

dominated

by

Bonn and Paris coalescing with each

other

and

incidentally

with

London.

The

bigger countries

are fretting that the Treaty of Rome

lends their vote much less

weight than the size of their populations seems

to require or justify.

As enlargement

it would

bring in

many more

smaller countries,

the bigger

ones would

feel even

more disadvantaged.

Both

categories of countries,

big

and

small, have some strong points on

their

repertoire

of wishes and complaints.

Furthermore, there is the democratic

deficit. The powers of

the

European Parliament

to exercise control and

partake

in

decision-making

are still

insufficient.

And there

is little

in

the way of transparent

and

controlable decision-making

with the Council of Ministers doing

business

behind closed

doors and disclosure of documents remaining

limited. The

German

Government wants to tackle

this matter but London and

Paris do

not feel like

giving in the least bit.

The

British Prime Minister has stated repeatedly

that his govern-

ments's main objective is to gag the

IGC:

the

UK will

block any import-

ant change

in existing institutional structures.

The

Gaulist,

currently

residing

in

the Elysee,

is

most unlikely

to

come

foreward

with

bold

initiatives in

favour

of

integration. Elsewhere in Europe

there is no

fervour either.

In short, the

prospects

for

the

IGC

look

rather

gloomy.

Key

questions will be

left virtually

untouched.

How

federal may

or must

Europe become

or

remain)?

Which strategic concept should

we

adopt?

Should

we

stick

to

the

rule

of

only

moving

ahead

together which

means

that

the entire

convoy

cannot proceed

faster

than

its slowest

boat?

In actual fact,

that

doctrine

has already been

jettisoned

in

Maastricht

(where the UK

and

Denmark

were allowed

to

opt out

of

some deci-

sions

such as

on

the Social

Charter

and EMU).

But even with that doctrine being discarded

there are still

tw o

options

left. One is that a core

group of states accelerates

the

speed

of

integration at

their

own discretion but only across the

board i

covering all

subject matters.

The

other is the

pick-and-choose

option,

Europe

a la

carte. That

is what the British advocate.

Realisation

of the

first

option

would

turn Europe

into a single

club with different

classes of

members; alternatively

Europe

would

become a conglomerate

of

several

different clubs. The difference

between

the two options is

fundamental.

If the Conference

would

fail as is feared to produce

any-

thing substantial,

then the common foreign and security

policy announced

at the

time with much

fanfare will come

to

nothing.

As yet

this policy

99


7/10

TILBURG FOR IGNL W

R V W

has not taken

off.

Political

consultations yield piles

of paper but few

initiatives

and

even less results.

Look

and behold

how we

failed in

former

Yugoslavia and,

more recently,

when

Greece

and

Turkey

nearly

flew at

each

other

over

a rocky islet

in the

Aegean Sea.

Our compatriot

Hans van den

Broek is

like a giant

locked

up in a

cage, unable

to

put his

talents

and

expertise

to

full use.

A

common

foreign

policy:

we are still

miles

away

from

that

goal.

Just

think

of the discussion

now unfolding

on the

composition

of

the

UN

Security

Council.

Since

1945

both the

UK

and France

occupy

a

perma-

nent seat

in the

Council.

Germany

has

no

place

at the table

but

wants

to

be recognised

as

a key

power

in

Europe.

Just adding

Germany

is,

obviously,

not on

the cards

since

Europe

is already

overrepresented

in

the

power

center

of

the United

Nations.

Ideally,

a

seat

should

be assigned

to

the European

Union

in order

for

it to represent

Germany

as

well as Brittain

and

France (and

many

others).

But

there is

no glimmer

of

a

prospect

for

that

to happen. This

has the

potential

of

developing

into

a nasty

controversy among

Europeans

in the

long run.

As

far as the

common security

policy

is

concerned,

the IGC

was

supposed

to redefine the

relationship

between

the

EU and

the

West

European Union

(WEU),

a

dormant

defence

organisation

dating

back

to

the

late forties that

is to be revived

as the EU's

defence

affiliate and

the

European

pillar under

a

revamped

NATO.

For the

time

being

this

will

not

materialise

though.

The

Brittish

are

averse

to extending

the

EU's remit

to the

domain

of

defence and

they

are

not alone

in thier

opposition.

Moreover,

there

is the complication

that

Denmark,

Sweden,

Finland,

Austria

and

Ireland

(all

EU

members)

do not

want

to jo n

the West

European

Union

and

that none

of

the countries

just

mentioned

except

Denmark

is

in

NATO.

This makes

it

even more interesting

that

Chancellor

Kohl there

he

is

again ) expressed

the

view

the other

day that the

EU and

the West

European

Union

should merge,

albeit not

at

short notice,

and that

the

fifteen EU

member

states in

anticipation of

that merger

should

commit

themselves

to

defend each other

in

case

any of them

might

be attacked:

a

solidarity

clause

analogous

to the

ones included

in

the

NATO Treaty

and

in the

WEU Charter.

That proposition

at once got

support

from

the

French.

But

to

EU member states that do not belong

to NATO

nor

do

consider

joining

it,

this

proposal

is rather

unsavoury.

8

[Vol.5:253


8/10

THE ST TE

OF TH

U

4

NL RG M NT

Success

or failure

of the IGC

does not

matter

for its participants

only.

It

is

crucially

important for the candidate members

of

the

EU.

On

top

of

the

already

seasoned

applications for

membership

from

Turkey,

Cyprus

and

Malta, a

number

of

applications from

Central and Eatern

Europe

have been

submitted

and

others

from

that

region are forthcoming

Attention

is focused

to

date

on

Poland, the

Czech

Republic and

Hungary.

But Slovakia

is about

to ring

our door

bell

as well

as

Slovenia,

Romania,

Bulgaria. And let us

not overlook

the

three

Baltic

Republics.

Altogether

some thirteen

actual

or

potential candidates

Promises

have been

made

to a

number

of

applicants (Poland

is

the most

important of

them)

that

negotiations on accession will

start

shortly after

completion of

the

IGC,

say

early

1998.

But

what if our

internal debate

on

institutional

reform would

get

stuck?

What

if we cannot

agree on

any basic reform

of decision-making

procedures

or

of our institutional

structure?

There

are

commentators

Jacques

Delors

is among

them who

hammer

home that

the Maastricht

Treaty

needs a

radical review.

The Treaty

of

1991, he says,

makes

Europe

schizophrenic.

Let us

demolish the

three pillars

on which

"Maastricht"

was

built.

Let us replace them with one solid column,

Delors

argues.

A

prophetic

voicein

the desert

but, alas, his

message will

not be heeded. So

the question

remains

whather Europe

will invest

itself

with

the institutional

capability

to absorb

host of new members.

Enlargement

meets more

obstacles, though.

A major

problem is

our high-priced

common

agricultural policy

(CAP).

It needs a

good

amount

of pruning in order

for it to

remain

affordable

after countries

like

Poland

and

Hungary have

joined

Unfortunately,

the CAP is for

France

and quite

a

few

others almost sacrosanct.

Then

there is the

nettlesome

problem of how

to allocate

the

budget

of

our

structural funds

such

as

the European

Regional

Fund. The

relatively poor

countries of

Central and

Eastern Europe

are going to

make

huge claims

on these funds,

to

the

detriment

necessarily

of

the

present beneficiaries

such as

Ireland Portugal

Italy

and

Greece.

Retranchements

will

be inevitable.

It remains

to be

seen

furthermore,

whether

eastward

enlargement

is from a

political

viewpoint

an endearing

prospect

to

all

concerned.

When the Union

shifts

to the east, Germany

will

become like

a spider in

the web while

France

and Spain

(not

to mention

the British

and Irish

islands)

become

marginalised, maybe

not only

in

geographical

terms.

The

issue

of NATO-expansion

to

Central and

Eastern

Europes

interferes

in

a

way

with

EU enlargement.

Countries

of the former

Sovjet

996]

59


9/10

TMBURG

FOR IGN

L W

R V W

bloc

seek

support

and

resort,

even military

protection,

in

the

West.

Russia

is resolutely

opposed

to

NATO

gobbling

up

much

of the

former

Warsaw

Pact area

and

that

opposition

is understandable,

anyway it

is

relevant. Would the

process

of

NATO-expansion come to a

halt (it

is

progressing

at

a

turtle s

pace),

pressure

on the

EU

will mount

to open

the

door

for

the

Central

and

East Europeans

without

delay.

By itself

EU

membership

has

no

defence implications.

However,

further

down

the

road

the question

will

arise

whether

and

why Poland

and

others

after

their

accession

to

the

EU could

be denied

access

to the

West European

Union

(our

prospective

defence

affiliate).

The

point

is

that

within

the

latter

organisation

mutual

defence

is mandated.

Further

enlargement

provides,

for

the rest,

the pressing

question

where

are

Europe s

boundaries.

Are

the

Baltics

part of

the

European

family?

Few would

dismiss

them.

But what

about Ukraine

and,

yes,

what

about Russia?

The

most

fundamental

problem

concomitant

to ongoing

enlarge-

ment

is

that

it

becomes

ever and

ever

harder

to

attain deepened

integra-

tion

or

even to

maintain

integration

previously

achieved.

The

EU stands

to

lose,

little

by little,

its supranational

features

which constitute

its

uniqueness.

The

gold

leaf

on

the shining temple

of

Monnet and Schuman

battered bu the

trials

of time

is

gradually

fading.

Over

time

EU will

come

to

look more and

more

like

a dressed-up

free

trade

area.

5

EXTERNAL

RELATIONS

A

final word

on external

relations.

Both

in

Tokyo and

in Washington

noted

how much respect

there

is

for

Europe

as an

economic colossus:

370

million

consumers

with

high

purchasing

power,

a

gross

domestic

product exceeding

th t

of the US

prominent

in

intern tion l

tr de

(responsible

for 20

to 25

percent

of world

trade,

both

in terms

of imports

and

exports).

The Union

has,

furthermore,

a common trade

policy

that

works

without

paralysing

internal

squabbles.

Just recall

how Europe

played front

stage

next to the USA

in the Uruguay

Ropund

of

GATT.

In other

respects

Washington

is

disillusioned.

In

spite

of

all

the

rhetoric

in traety

texts

and

political declarations, the

Union

has been

unable

as

yet to

develop

itself

into a

strong and

well-knit

political

grouping

capable

of

doing

effective politival

business

with

the Ameri-

cans.

As

a

result,

the Americans

run

the Middle East

as

they see

fit.

The

same

goes for

NATO and,

by

fits

and starts,

relations

with

the

whimsical

leadership

in

Moscow.

That

is why

the

historic

handshake

between

the

260

[Vol.5:253


10/10

TH

ST TE

OF

TH

late Rabin

and Arafat

could

be

staged

at the lawns

of the

White House

in

Washington.

And

that

is why

the deadly

mortars

of

the

Serbs

were

silenced

not in any

European

city but in

Dayton,

Ohio.

Richard

Holbrooke,

an

official

of

the

US State

Department

got

things

done in Europe's

backyard

that our

own

ministers

of foreign

affairs

could

not accomplish.

The

US Department

of

Justice

and the

FBI

placed

great expecta-

tions

on

cooperation

with the jo nt

EU membership,

particularly

with

regard

to the battle

against

terrorism

and

other

forms

of

international

crime. But

our

indecision, product

of

political impotence

as

well

as

unwillingness,

has

disappointed

them.

Japan

and

other

Asians

are

less

interested in

those

weaknesses.

For

them it

is first and

foremost

our

economic

potential

that

counts.

t

goes

without saying,

by

the way,

that

the

economic

miracle

currently

displayed

in

East

Asia is

of utmost

importance

to us. East

Asia has

become

our

biggest

ecport

market, bigger

even than the US.

In the

years

immediately ahead

East

Asia

will

generate

about half

of the

growth

of

world

trade.

Golden

opportunities

within

our

grasp

Our trade

with Asia had

a slow

and

belated

start but

has

got

going

quite

well.

In

terms of investment

we are

still

lagging

behind.

According

to

the latest data provided

by

Brussels only ten percent

of

all

foreign

investments

in that

booming

region comes

from

EU

countries.

The

morale is: there

is wide

scope

for improvement

and

an

unprece-

dented

potential for

cooperation.

99 ]

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