The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 10 | Issue 21 | Number 1 | Article ID 3754 | May 19, 2012

1

Can Japan Respond Better to its Next Large Disaster?　　次に大災害の起こるとき、日本はより良く対処できるだろうか

Leo Bosner

Can Japan Respond Better to itsNext Large Disaster?

Leo Bosner

From January 9 until February 23, 2012, I wasin Japan on an invitational fellowship from theJapan Society for the Promotion of Science(JSPS). My host institution was KanagawaUniversity and my host researcher was Prof.Mutai Shunsuke.

Having worked for the U.S. Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) for nearly thirtyyears, the subject of my fellowship was Japan’sresponse to a large-scale disaster, and whetherit could be improved. Under it, I interviewedindividuals who were involved in or werefamiliar with the response to the March 11,2011 earthquake/tsunami disaster in easternJapan and lectured on local-level disasterresponse planning.

My experience is mainly in the area of disasterresponse planning, not nuclear safety, so I didnot attempt to analyze issues pertaining to thedamaged nuclear power plant at Fukushima.Instead, I focused on the overall response tothe earthquake/tsunami.

In the course of this project, I conducted 28interviews, gave 20 lectures, and attended twonational disaster conferences. I traveled acrossJapan from Tohoku in the northeast to Kyushuin the southwest and many points in between. Ialso visited disaster sites in Iwate and MiyagiPrefectures, and spoke with numerous

responders who had served on the front line inthe disaster.

The author at annual conference of JapaneseAssociation for Disaster Medicine, Kanazawa,Japan, February, 2012.

From everything I saw and heard, the tragicevents of March 11 brought out the very best inthe Japanese people’s willingness to helpothers. Neighbors rescued neighbors,government agencies mobilized quickly, andvolunteers came forward in record numbers. Even today, more than a year later, countlessindividuals are working to help alleviate thesuffering of the disaster survivors.

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 1

2

Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) providingrelief for disaster survivors, Miyagi Prefecture,Japan, July, 2012

But in the course of my visit and interviews, itwas impossible to avoid noting numerousshortfalls in the disaster response.

First and foremost, it was clear to me thatthe Government of Japan simply does nothave a comprehensive, realistic plan forresponding to large disasters. Rather, theJapan Government’s disaster response planseems to consist of numerous governmentagency plans that are unrelated to each other.In many cases these plans failed to address oreven acknowledge problems that wereoccurring in the field. In part, this is becausethe government lacks trained, experienceddisaster response professionals. As a result, thegovernment’s response to the March 11disaster was poorly managed and coordinated,and many people suffered needlessly. I was toldof numerous problems in this regard, forexample:

Valuable commodities such as food andmedicine were often delivered tolocations where they were not needed,while survivors at other locationssuffered shortages.In some cases, much-needed donationsw e r e t u r n e d a w a y d u e t o t h e

government’s inability to receive andmanage donations.Requests from medical staff in the fieldfor urgent ly needed he lp wentunanswered.

Second, the Japan Government’s lack ofeffective disaster response planningextends to many Japanese cities andprefectures. Prefectural and municipalofficials in Japan are expected to be the firstline of defense in dealing with disasters, butthey receive almost no training in disasterresponse from the Japan Government. Prefectural staff were often described byresponders as “doing their best,” but not beingvery effective due to their lack of disasterknowledge or training.

Third, the lack of a uniform incidentmanagement system added to theconfusion and poor use of resources. Large-scale disaster response is a complex endeavorthat requires extensive management. Many ofthe responders I spoke with told of having toinvent their own management systems in themidst of the disaster to try to coordinate theactivities of multiple jurisdictions that weredelivering services to a huge and diverse groupof survivors who were themselves widelyscattered in shelters across the disaster-stricken area. The responders are to becommended for devising management systemsin the midst of disaster, but this is not the bestway to run a disaster response.

Fourth, the government did not fullyutilize the potential of volunteers,donations, and Non-Profit Organizations(NPOs). The government did not appear tohave a plan for incorporating NPOs ordonations management into the disasterresponse. As a result, NPOs received little or noadvice from the government as to what wasneeded or where, and were left to their owndevices (and personal connections) to send aidinto the disaster area. Donations of critical

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 1

3

items such as food were turned away by thegovernment at the very time when manysurvivors were desperately in need. On theother hand, unneeded donations poured intosome areas, resulting in oversupplies of foodand medicine in some locales while othersfaced severe shortages.

A volunteer holds up a flag found in the rubbleof Kamaishi City. Photograph © 2011 by VinceNg

Fifth, communication between thegovernment and the field respondersseemed to go in one direction only, fromthe top down. Field responders such asmedical doctors, pharmacists, and public healthspecialists at the disaster sites had no effectivemeans to notify the government of theirrequirements. Instead, the government appearsto have relied in large part on the news mediafor information regarding the disasterconditions. This result was that the governmentwas often completely unaware and/ormisinformed as to what was needed in the field,leading to a misallocation of resources such asfood and medicine as cited above.

Sixth, shelter management in the disaster-stricken areas was weak and inconsistent,and in some cases appeared to be nearlynonexistent. Many shelters were described aseither being “self-managed” or having “no

management.” Local residents did their best tomanage local shelters in the absence of anygovernment presence or any guidance onshelter management. The result was a veryuneven level of management where someshelters very well run and others were not.

Volunteer response teams enter a small town inIwate Prefecture (Photo © 2011 by Vince Ng)

Seventh, nutritional needs of the disastersurvivors were met very poorly, oftenconsisting only of some rice, bread, andwater daily in the early stages followingthe disasters. This poor nutrition, whencombined with the already-weakened conditionof many of the survivors, resulted in additionalillnesses and medical needs among thesurvivors that in all likelihood could have beenavoided by simple nutritional planning. Somedoctors feel that this nutritional deficit mayhave contributed to fatalities among thesurvivors, especially the elderly. There did notappear to be any effective plan for meeting thenutritional needs of the disaster survivors.

Eighth, the government may be overlyrelying on the Self Defense Force (SDF) fordisaster relief. The SDF was quickly mobilizedand dispatched in large numbers on March 11and in the days that followed. This willingnessto utilize SDF, and SDF’s ability to respondquickly, is an enormous benefit to Japan’s

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 1

4

disaster response capability. However, it alsocarries the risk of over-reliance on SDF to thedetriment of broader government-wide disasterresponse planning. It is also questionable as towhether the SDF itself has sufficient resourcesto address the full range of disaster responseplanning in such areas as nutritional planning,shel ter management , publ ic heal th,communications, and others listed in therecommendations below.

Ninth, as a result of the above issues, manyindividual groups in Japan are nowdeveloping their own disaster responsep lans independent o f the JapanGovernment. Many of the responders andorganizations I spoke with are tired of waitingfor the government to address their concerns,and are beginning to develop their ownindependent plans for future disasters. Whilethis is fully understandable given the problemsthat occurred in last year’s disaster response, itwould also seem likely that a proliferation ofseparate and unrelated disaster response planswill add to the confusion in future disasters. Onthe other hand, if the government can reachout and include these groups in developing acomprehensive response plan, the result couldbe a greatly strengthened disaster responsesystem.

Tenth, Japan has a wealth of skilleddisaster response professionals, but nearlyall of this skill lies outside of either theCabinet Secretariat or the Cabinet Officefor Disaster Management, the two JapanGovernment offices nominally in charge ofmanaging the response to large disasters.Staff who I met from the Cabinet Secretariatand the Cabinet Of f ice for DisasterManagement were uniformly bright, dedicated,and hard-working people, but rarely did eitherthey or their leaders appear to have muchexperience with disasters, and those staffmembers who gained experience in last year’sdisaster will soon rotate away to other jobs.

Prime Minister Kan Naoto speaks to anemployee of TEPCO at Naraha town, FukushimaPrefecture, Saturday, April 2, 2011. (AP)

One box on the Cabinet Secretariat’sorganization chart is labeled “ExpertCommittee for Responses to Situations.” Infact, however, it appears to consist not of“experts” but just high-ranking politicalofficials. Most true disaster experts I met wereeither in the SDF, the fire service, the healthand medical professions, or non-profitorganizations, but the Japanese Governmentdid not appear to be drawing upon thisexpertise to strengthen its disaster responseplans.

Eleventh , Final ly, and perhaps mostdiscouraging of all, there does not seem to beany feedback mechanism to use lessons learnedfrom this disaster to improve preparedness forfuture such events, which unfortunately arelikely to occur given Japan’s level of risk todisaster. While the Japanese Government maytinker with some of the details, I neither sawnor heard of any effort to comprehensivelyaddress the issues outlined above.

Based on my research, I would make sevenrecommendations to the JapaneseGovernment:

1. Learn from the experience of the disasterresponders and experts. During my 46-day visit

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 1

5

to Japan under the JSPS Fellowship, I spokewith numerous disaster responders anddisaster experts and heard many stories of thes u c c e s s e s a n d f a i l u r e s o f t h eearthquake/tsunami response. However, in thecourse of 20 lectures and 28 interviews, Icannot recall anyone telling me that theJapanese Government had asked for theiropinions or inputs as to how to strengthen theresponse for future disasters.

I strongly recommend that the JapaneseGovernment make an intensive effort to reachout to the many disaster responders andexperts and learn from them what needs to bedone to strengthen Japan’s ability to respondeffectively to future disasters.

2. Put someone in charge of disaster responseplanning and the response itself. As it nowstands, no one person or agency in theJapanese Government is really in charge ofdisaster response planning. Responsibility isdispersed among numerous staff and officialswho continuously come and go. With no oneperson in charge of disaster response planning,no one person is credibly in charge of disasterresponse either, and we are left with the PrimeMinister of Japan himself shouting orders into aphone during the disaster. Whatever qualitiesthe Prime Minister may have, it is unlikely thathe will be a professional disaster responsemanager, nor should he be. The governmentneeds to have a full-time disaster manager(with staff) who is knowledgeable in the field ofdisaster management and who is empowered todevelop a strong national disaster responsesystem.

3. Move away from hazard-specific planningtoward all-hazard planning. The JapaneseGovernment uses “hazard-specific” disasterplanning, that is, one plan for an earthquake,another for a tsunami, another for a terroristincident, and so forth. From my experience,that approach is badly outmoded and leads toconfusing and impractical plans as well as

numerous gaps in response.

I recommend the “all-hazard” approach,whereby plans are categorized not by type ofdisaster but by mechanism of the disasterresponse, for example*:

Transportation 1.Communications 2.Public Works and Engineering 3.Firefighting 4.Emergency Management 5.Mass Care, Emergency Assistance,6.Housing, and Human Services Logistics Management and Resource7.Support Public Health and Medical Services 8.Search and Rescue 9.Oil and Hazardous Materials Response 10.Agriculture and Natural Resources 11.Energy 12.Public Safety and Security 13.Long-Term Community Recovery 14.External Affairs15.

* Source: National Response Framework, USDept. of Homeland Security/FEMA

Each of these 15 categories (called “emergencysupport functions”) is then assigned to thegovernment agency or NPO most suited to thatparticular function.

Take #8 “Public Health and Medical Services”as an example of the difference.

Using the “hazard-specific” approach, theGovernment several years ago developed JapanDisaster Medical Assistance Teams (JDMAT’s)to train and prepare exclusively for a scenariosimilar to the 1995 Hanshin Earthquake. Thisoverly-narrow training focus left the JDMAT’sready to treat trauma injuries from anearthquake but poorly prepared and equippedfor the many health and medical problems thatoccurred after the tsunami.

In contrast, an “all-hazard” approach would

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 1

6

place the Health Ministry in charge ofdeveloping a comprehensive approach todealing with health and medical problems thatcould arise in a full range of disaster scenarios,including, for example:

traumatic injury,hypothermia,public health,environmental health,mental health,pharmaceutical needs,special needs/disabilities.

This same all-hazard approach could be appliedto each of the 15 disaster response categoriesshown above. No planning approach is perfect,but the all-hazard approach would go a longway toward ensuring that a full range ofdisaster-related problems are planned forahead of time.

4. Develop a comprehensive and realisticnational disaster response plan. As notedabove, the Japanese Government’s disasterresponse plan seems to consist of numerousgovernment agency plans that are unrelated toeach other. In many cases these plans fail badlyto address the actual problems that occur indisasters.

For example, one physician in Tohoku told meof his attempts to deal with a serious healthproblem involving disaster survivors who mayhave ingested dangerous chemicals from thetsunami waters. But when the physician tried toget help or advice from the government, helearned that three separate offices of theHealth Ministry (in Tokyo) had jurisdiction overthe problem…and that it would be up to him totry to get an answer out of the three separateoffices in the midst of his own disaster reliefwork!

A comprehensive and realistic plan wouldimplement all of the disaster-related issueslisted in Recommendation #3, above in allrelevant government agencies and NPO’s. It

would address the types of problems that occurin disasters and propose realistic solutions.

5 . Implement a national incidentmanagement system such as the NationalIncident Management System (NIMS) thatis used in the U.S. “Incident management”sounds like an abstract concept, but it is a veryreal problem in a disaster. Large-scale disasterresponse is a complex endeavor that requiresextensive management capability. A lack ofsystematic management can mean, forexample, that some stricken towns will bedeluged with food supplies while others areneglected. March 11 responders told of havingto invent their own management systems in themidst of the disaster to try to coordinate theactivities of multiple jurisdictions who weredelivering multiple services to a huge anddiverse group of survivors who werethemselves widely scattered in shelters acrossthe disaster-stricken area. How to prioritizeneeds? How to ensure that all geographiclocations have been reached? How to avoidduplication of effort and misallocation ofresources? The middle of a disaster is not thetime and place to try to invent a system toaddress these and other crucial questions. Ibelieve that a nationally-accepted incidentmanagement system is badly needed in Japan,and I suggest as a starting point to considerexisting systems such as the U.S. NIMS.

6. Train and professionalize emergencymanagers at all levels in Japan. Under thecurrent system, many Japanese “emergencymanagers” have little or no experience ortraining in emergency management! They areassigned to emergency management officesonly temporarily, rotating in and out of theirjobs every two years or so.

It is baffling to me that a modern country likeJapan would fail to develop professionalism andtraining in such a crucial area. If I were goingto a hospital for life-saving surgery, I would notwant the surgeons to be a group of individuals

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 1

7

with no training or experience in surgery, sowhy should such a lack of training andexperience be applied to a critical field likedisaster management?

Given the high risk that Japan faces fromearthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, and a host ofother hazards, it seems to me that Japan needsto build a cadre of trained, experiencedemergency managers at the national,prefectural, and municipal levels, as well as inthe non-government sectors, to face the nextcrisis. As noted above, Japan actually has alarge body of disaster experts that couldprovide the leadership and knowledge requiredto accomplish this goal.

7. Plan for the role of NPOs, volunteers, anddonations in disaster response. Voluntarysupport and donations for disaster survivorscan be a major contribution to disaster relief ifplanned for ahead of time. But if not plannedfor, then volunteers and donations are insteadoften seen by government agencies as a burdenor a distraction to be turned away, as so oftenhappened in 2011.

In the wake of the March 11 disaster, NPOsreceived l i t t le or no advice from thegovernment as to what was needed or where,and were left to their own devices (andpersonal connections) to send aid into thedisaster area. Donations of critical items suchas food were turned away by the government atthe very time when many of the survivors weredesperately in need. On the other hand,unneeded donations poured into some areas,resulting in oversupplies in some areas whileother areas faced shortages.

Instead of turning away these importantresources, or using them haphazardly with noplan, I recommend that government agencies atall levels begin now to plan how to incorporateand utilize NPOs, volunteers, and donationsmore effectively in future disasters.

I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s e f i n d i n g s a n d

recommendations, two large questions loom:

First, why should an American like myself try totell the Japanese how to run things in their owncountry?

And second, given FEMA’s catastrophic failurein Hurricane Katrina, should FEMA’s disasterresponse system be promoted?

I fully appreciate the fine line I walk as aforeign consultant visiting Japan andinvestigating disaster operations. I would notpresume to recommend acceptance of acarbon-copy of any American managementmodel. But neither would I hold back onoffering advice if I thought it could do somegood. The observations in this report are basedon interviews I conducted in Japan, held upagainst the mirror of our successes and failuresin disaster response in the United States. Myhope is that the Japanese can learn from ourAmerican experience, including our mistakes,and choose whatever elements or ideas theythink will work best in Japan.

Concerning the second question, FEMA’ssystem didn’t “fail” during HurricaneKatrina…it didn’t even exist any more! WhenGeorge W. Bush took office in 2001, thedissolution of FEMA began almost immediately. Experienced disaster managers at FEMA werereplaced by political hangers-on. Training wascut back. Emergency teams were eliminated. FEMA staff positions were left empty, theirfunding handed over either to HomelandSecurity or to private contractors. FEMA itselfceased to exist as an independent agency andwas folded into the Department of HomelandSecurity, where the first three priorities wereterrorism, terrorism, and terrorism. Forawhile, even the name “FEMA” was abolishedand the agency was called the “EmergencyPreparedness and Response Directorate” ofHomeland Security.

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 1

8

The author (back row, fifth from left) withmembers of the Japan Task Force forSearch and Rescue, Kobe, Japan, February,2012.

By the time Katrina struck in 2005, FEMA wasa shadow of its former self. The agency thatsent search and rescue teams to Oklahoma Citywithin two hours after the 1995 terroristbombing now could not get its act together forHurricane Katrina despite having two dayswarning before the hurricane hit the GulfCoast. Those of us who were still with theagency did our best, but our leaders from the1990’s were gone, and our orders now camefrom the disaster amateurs at HomelandSecurity. It was like trying to run a foot racewhile wearing a ball and chain.

What can we conclude from all this?

Japan is a country that is at risk from numerousnatural hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis,volcanoes, and others. In addition to naturaldisasters, Japan also faces the risk oftechnological and industrial disasters such aschemical spills, nuclear accidents, largetransportation accidents, and others. And likemany other countries today, Japan faces theconstant risk of terrorist incident or enemyattack.

Fortunately, Japan also has a wide range ofresources to deal with disasters. Specifically:

It is a wealthy, modern industrial countrythat can afford to protect itself fromdisasters, and to respond should adisaster occur.It is a democracy whose government isultimately accountable to the people.It has numerous and highly experienceddisaster experts who could contribute tobuilding a stronger disaster responsesystem.Perhaps most importantly, it is a strongsociety whose members are willing tohelp each other in time of emergency.

The March 2011 disaster was a catastrophicevent that would challenge even the best-planned response system. But saying that adisaster is catastrophic should not be an excuseto neglect disaster response planning; rather, itshould be an incentive to make such planningas realistic and effective as possible to dealwith future disasters.

My hope is that the Japanese can learn fromour American experience, including ourmistakes, and choose whatever elements orideas they think will work best in Japan.

Leo Bosner served with the US Government’sFederal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA) in Washington, DC from 1979 until hisretirement in 2008. In 2000-2001, he lived andworked in Tokyo under the Mike MansfieldFellowship Program studying Japaneseemergency management systems. He has beena frequent lecturer and writer in Japan, and in2011 he was awarded an Invitat ionalFellowship for Research in Japan by the JapanSociety for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). The preceding article expresses the author’spersonal views only. Comments and questionsm a y b e s e n t t o t h e a u t h o r a tLeobosner@hotmail.com.

Recommended citation: Leo Bosner, "Can

APJ | JF 10 | 21 | 1

9

Japan Respond Better to its Next LargeDisaster?" The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10,Issue 21, No 1, May 21, 2012.

Articles on related subjects:

• Makiko SEGAWA, After The Media Has Gone:Fukushima, Suicide and the Legacy of 3.11 -here

• Jennifer Robertson, From Uniqlo to NGOs:The Problematic “Culture of Giving” in Inter-Disaster Japan - here

•Miguel Quintana, Radiation Decontaminationin Fukushima: a critical perspective from theground - here

•Iwata Wataru interviewed by Nadine and

Thierry Ribault, Fukushima: Everything has tob e d o n e a g a i n f o r u s t o s t a y i n t h econtaminated areas - here

•Paul Jobin, BBC and ZDF Documentaries onFukushima - here•Paul Jobin (interview) Fukushima One YearOn: Nuclear workers and citizens at risk - here

•Jeff Kingston, Mismanaging Risk and theFukushima Nuclear Crisis - here

•Koide Hiroaki (interview), Japan's NightmareFight Against Radiation in the Wake of the 3.11Meltdown - here

•Gayle Greene, Science with a Skew: TheNuclear Power Industry After Chernobyl andFukushima - here