division b, volume ii: the history of the jewish people / חטיבה ב, כרך שני: תולדות...

World Union of Jewish Studies / האיגוד העולמי למדעי היהדות

/ תגובות הציבור הגרמני לשואה: ההתייחסות ל"טלאי הצהוב" GERMAN PUBLIC RESPONSES TO THE HOLOCAUST: THE REACTIONS TO THE YELLOW BADGEAuthor(s): DAVID BANKIER and דוד בנקירSource: Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies / דברי הקונגרס העולמי למדעיחטיבה ב, / DIVISION B, VOLUME II: THE HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE ,היהדות, כרך יכרך שני: תולדות עם ישראלpp. 395-402 תשמ"ט / 1989Published by: World Union of Jewish Studies / האיגוד העולמי למדעי היהדותStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23535659 .

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GERMAN PUBLIC RESPONSES TO THE HOLOCAUST:

THE REACTIONS TO THE YELLOW BADGE

DAVID BANKIER

The most important documents used by historians who have examined German popular reactions to nazi antisemitism are the Meldungen aus dem Reich. These secret periodic reports on public mood were

prepared by the German security services, particularly the

Sicherheitsdienst (SD) of the SS. However, the attempt to evaluate the German public* s responses, as reflected in these surveys, meets with serious difficulties. When one compares the existing small

number of reports from Gestapo or local SD stations, for instance, with the pertinent national abstract, it becomes clear that certain

information conveyed by the local stations was deliberately deleted

and suppressed; while other aspects were especially highlighted by the composer of the national digest. The subjective component of the

reports is thus soon exposed, unvealing how the whole process was determined by the perceptions and personal views of the reporters at

the various levels. Distortions and omissions occurred especially when

the reporter disregarded details marginal to his main theme. In

addition, we can see how generalizations and exaggerations of local

events were made to fit the Nazi world view and its own evaluation of

public mood. The aim of this paper is to focus on the responses to

the introduction of the yellow badge in Germany , as a test case in

examining public reactions to nazi antisemitic policy.

To begin with, we ought to bear in mind that when the yellow star was

introduced in September 1941, there were still some 150.000 Jews in

Germany, 70-80.000 of them living in Berlin and, in certain areas, their presence could not pass unnoticed. Therefore, although it is

true that by this time social links with Jews had been almost totally severed, it is reasonable to assume that the marking of Jews lent

antisemitism concrete expression. The stigm attached to them was

clearly evident and could no longer be ignored.

The introduction of the yellow badge was favourably received,

according to the SD national summaries which were based on reports from different cities of the Reich. People were surprised at how many Jews still lived in Germany and praised the labelling which brought Jews out into the open. When criticism was voiced, it was anchored not

in a rejection on principle of the measure itself but in its

395



DAVID BANKIER

partial nature or practical effect. Thus, the SD reports reveal that

the public was not fully satisfied with the labelling and asked for

stricter measures. It viewed the labelling not as a final measure

but as an intermediate step toward the elimination of the Jewish

problem in Germany, with the disappearance of all German Jews. Only

marginally do the reports cite negative reactions to the yellow badge,

grounded in frank disapproval. There is objection to the labelling of

a specific "good" Jew who sells products cheaply or had distinguished himself in war. There are incidents of Germans buying food for Jews

and merchants bringing products to Jewish homes. But mostly, the

reccuring theme of the dissent is the consequence the labelling could

have for Germans abroad. Catholics and bourgeois circles, in

particular, complained of the introduction of medieval practices,

adding that Germans abroad would be marked with a swastika in

retaliation. Such reactions were not necessarily grounded in remorse; in most cases they could well have been a transference of aggression blended with residues of human concern. י

How does this picture, based entirely on an intrinsically problematic nazi source, compare with other documents? The new material basis of

this paper, like the SD reports, is unquantifiable and of an

subjective character, a fact that limits the possibility of drawing definitive conclusions. Nontheless, some tentative hypothesis can

still be advanced. Post-war recollections of German Jews maintain

almost unanimously that the predominant public response to the

labelling was a display of sympathy. Ernst Bukofzer, Klaus

Scheurenberg, Leo Baeck, Jacob Jacobson and Inge Deutschkorn, for

example, maintain that the typical German reaction in Berlin was a

mixture of sympathy and shame. 2 We can not, however, draw conclusions

solely on the basis of one type of source, particularly of

recollections which hardly constitute firm historical evidence. Many of these post-war accounts are marred by distortion. Their accuracy is

hindered not only by the passage of time but sometimes also by a

process of reinterpretation which makes for exaggeration. Nevertheless, the memoirs before us appear to be reliable as the same

picture evolves from a second array of documents which do not suffer

from the limitations of retrospection: the eyewitness accounts of Jews

rendered at the time of labelling or immediately thereafter.

A Jewish school teacher, who was in Berlin until the end of October

1942 and wrote her account immediately after leaving Germany to

Palestine, notes that initially the labelling caused quite a stir. In

time, however, people got used to it, though reactions varied. There

were antisemitic remarks especially from children who showed

contempt for Jews. But adults turned away ostensibly in shame. In the

public transport system, she emphasizes, there were comments such as

"I wish you would remove this rubbish".3 Equally revealing is the

testimony of two other refugees who made their way to Switzerland in

February 1942. They stated that after the yellow badge had been

introduced, many Jews committed suicide fearing insults and physical

396




violence in the streets. 1־This was corroborated by Carl B. Peters, a

journalist for "The New York Times" in Berlin . One week after the

yellow badge was ordered, he stated, 16 Jews took their lives in

Charlottenburg alone. The suicides, he added, had an unsettling effect on decent Germans, eliciting criticism of the measure.5 The same

refugees added, however, that Jewish fears had proved to be

completely unjustified. There had been only isolated instances of

aggression and offensiveness. In some cases, they attested, the

introduction of the yellow star had invited spiteful stares; in

others, pity and sympathy, but on the whole there had been no jeering in public. On the contrary, people often were demonstratively kind.

Many offered Jews cigars and cigarettes, gave children candies, or

stood up for Jews on street-cars and subways. Another first-hand

witness, a Jewish mechanic who was employed in a large Hamburg plant,

supports this picture. One of his fellow workers had reacted to the

yellow star saying: " We'd like to put one of those things on too and

then it would be clear to everyone that we are decent fellows!". The

mechanic also said that in his building, where most of the residents

were businessmen and civil servants, hardly a night had passed without

his finding a parcel of food in front of his door.5

Some rare responses went beyond ordinary sympathy. Such is the

notable story of a Viennese Jewess who ended up in Stockholm. As she

had arrived at a German railway station at 2 a. m. wearing the yellow star, she could not go to a hotel, and the station was closed. One of

the porters told her to remove the badge, took her home with him,

gave her a clean bed and food, and refused to accept any payment.6"" How are we to evaluate these testimonies? if we were to object that

Jewish refugees have a tendency to highlight positive experiences and magnify them in the background of general suffering, let us

consider a third group of documents: the impressions of non-Jews,

mainly foreigners, who would have no reason to distort reality

overstating expressions of sympathy and non-conformist behaviour.

To be sure, many antinazis found the labelling morally abhorrent, as

comes to light from letters and personal diaries.7 What is

interesting, is that not only opponents of nazism seem to have

disavowed the labelling. A realistic observer such as Ruth Andreas

Friedrich estimated that the majority of Germans were not pleased with the new decree. Almost everyone she met was as ashamed as she

was.8 Much the same was the impression of foreign journalists. Let

us look at a few of their comments. The Swedish correspondent Advin

Fredborg, concluded that the labelling was a huge failure, provoking

negative reactions: Many Germans hung their heads when encountering a

Jew in the streets. In addition, since offering a seat on a tram to a

Jew was punishable, some Germans let Jews get on first so they could

have the seats without them being offered. In Germany as in France,

the star was a subject of ridicule. It was popularly called "yellow star of honour", or "pour le Semite". Fredborg also said that even

people associated with the Nazis considered it counter-productive. A

397



DAVID BANKIER

clandestine pamphlet, which probably stemmed from national

conservative circles, was distributed among foreign correspondents in

Berlin, asking them to understand that the measure had not received

Hitler's authorization. It was the act of irresponsible people, the

pamphlet claimed, not of the real leaders who were fighting on the

front. It concluded by condemning the order as treason to the German

people and accused the Ministry of Propaganda of playing into the

enemy hands. 9 Ivar Andersson, chief editor of the Svenska Dagbladet

was similarly impressed by what he saw in Berlin in October 1941. "A

quite remarkable thing which was very noticeable", he commented, "was

the treatment of the Jews. Apart from certain exceptions, Jews were

treated with consideration." Twice he saw young Germans give their

seats to old Jews in a crowded tramcar, to the general approval of

the other passengers. ,0

Lastly, the Züricher Tages-Anzeiger

correspondent concluded that labelling the Jews, had elicited

sympathy and condolence from most Germans: people averted their eyes and were decent to old Jews travelling by public transport.

יי

The predominantly negative reaction to the badge was also the

assessment of visitors, diplomats and Germans interviewed abroad. For

example, both the Dutch charge d'affaires in Stockholm, who met mostly with people from the industrial sectors, and a Swedish woman who

returned from Bavaria, received the impression that the German public did not approve of the measure. "Everybody hated the idea of the star

and tried to show how ashamed he was". 12 People were so bewildered by

the positive attitudes towards Jews that a theory was put forth at the

time, that the deportations had been accelerated because Germans

persisted in acting humanely towards the Jews, in spite of the

propaganda and threatened penalties.

Which of the opposing reports of the public reaction to the yellow

badge are we to believe? The SD version or the eyewitness accounts?

If we juxtapose the available evidence in an interpretative framework

with the SD reports, the scale appears to tip in favour of the former.

The negative reaction to the labelling seems to have been the more

typical public response to the antisemitic measure. Indeed the

negative reactions arrested Goebbels' attention to the extent that the

nazi propaganda apparatus deemed it necessary to come to grips with

the situation. Goebbels, realised that the truth was the opposite of

what the SD digests conveyed. Albert Speer tells of an incident at a

lunch he attended at the chancellery. The incident is particularly worth looking at, for it casts interesting light on the issue at hand.

During the conversation, Goebbels began to complain about Berliners.

"-The introduction of the Jewish star has had the opposite effect from

what we intended, ... People everywhere are showing sympathy for them

[the Jews!. This nation is simply not yet mature; it's full of all

kinds of idiotic sentimentality". י3

These attitudes also underlay the initiatives taken at this time to

discourage expressions of pity or sympathy towards Jews. The decree of

398




24 October 1941, which called for three months incarceration in a

concentration camp for Germans who publicly displayed sympathy towards Jews, was undoubtedly meant to intimidate anyone who took

issue with the labelling. Goebbels also handled the matter in a most

unusual manner. An undeniable indication of the need he felt to

address the issue was the leaflet he had printed and sent to German

families together with their monthly rationing card. The black

leaflet, sought to convince the public that the war was part of the

Jewish conspiracy and that German Jews, spiritually connected to the

Jewish complot, should be destroyed. Complementing this, came his

caustic editorial in Das Reich, castigating those who out of a "false

sentimentalism" felt pity for German Jews. To involve the public in

the persecution, the editorial sought to persuade Germans of the nazi

views. '* A subsequent vitriolic onslaught published by the NS

Kurrier aknowledged that expressions of compassion for Jews were not

unusual. 5י Continuing with this systematic effort to eradicate all

criticism of the badge Goebbels enclosed the above diatribe in the

following month's rationing cards. Finally, it is reasonabble to

surmise that it was probably Goebbels who had the rumours circulated, that the US government secretly required all Americans of German

origin to carry a black swastika on their left side. As if the yellow star had been forced upon Germany as a quid pro quo. As a justified count ermeasure to compel Jews in the USA to stop persecuting Germans.'6 This tale presumably soothed the conscience of many

ordinary Germans, who were not necessarily nazis and sought an escape route from guilt. Thus, we learn from a repatriated American.

"Whenever he expressed sympathy for the Jews who were singled out for

humiliation, his German acquaintances invariably replied in self

justification that the measure was not at all unusual. It was merely in keeping with the treatment given by the American authorities to

German nationals in the United States, compelling them to wear a large swastika, sewn onto their coats". 17

A measured and balanced analysis of the available documents would thus

cast doubt on the SD reports of the issue. This conclusion, however, raises another problem, since such a display of sympathy for Jews and

manifest disapproval of nazi policy is a conspicuous exception to the

general German conduct. We must therefore, consider what underlay this

unexpected shift in the public's attitude towards Jews. A shift from

indifference to persecution to overt kindness, before, as we shall see

below, coming back full circle to indifference?

The most promising framework for understanding the issue seems to be a

socio-psychological, analytical framework, adjusted to the specific historical context. If we take the pogrom of 1938 as a point of

reference, we may find a certain correspondence with the reasons for

the criticism vented at that time. In both instances the negative

public reaction seems to have derived from the overt signs of

suffering. Their personal confrontation with a sight they had no wish

to see prompted the Germans to change their everyday ethic. As in

399



DAVID BANKIER

November 1938, now, too, they were suddenly made aware of the full

implication of supporting the Nazi regime. It is true that the

acceptance of antisemitism as a social norm undermined the resistance

to the persecution to come in the Third Reich. It is equally true, that the public gradually grew accustomed to an antisemitic reality and took no notice of it. And it is certainly true that its acceptance of "mild" persecution paved the way for harsher measures. On the other

hand, however, ordinary Germans clearly could not tolerate actions

which outraged their sense of decency even towards stigmatized Jews.

For as long as the Jews were "merely" segregated and in most cases not

plainly perceived, the public could deny the reality created by the

antisemitic policy, letting itself be seduced by ignorance. As long as

the Germans indulged themselves in the abstractions of a mythical Jewish power, they could hide behind their private lives and show no

empathy for the victim's tribulations. As long as anonymous Jews were

persecuted, the population could remain free of emotional involvement, removed from the moral consequences of the affliction they had helped to cause. They could come to terms with persecution and avoid shame

and guilt. Labelling the victim, however, brought the accusing witness

out into the open as a symbolic reminder of what it meant to adjust to and conform with a murderous system. Suddenly, the average German

in Hamburg, for example, was forced to see 3,000 marked old men and

women queuing in front of a single shop to buy food. Suddenly, the

road of escape into inner emigration was blocked off and the ordinary German had to still his conscience by finding some moral assurance to

evade guilt.

These disturbing feelings obviously did not last long. As had happened with other measures, in the course of time the combination of the

penalties attached to sympathy for Jews and the mounting insensitivity to what had become a common sight brought about increasing apathy and

insensitivity. Eventually most Germans slid into getting accustomed to

the labelliing. They adapted to it in order to justify and leave

intact their value system. The above mentioned acts of charity towards Jews, recorded by eyewitnesses show that the labelling aroused dormant moral habits in certain -

probably small - segments

of the population. The majority, however, seem to have encapsulated and segregated the information in a process of defensive dissociation,

hardening their attitudes and adapting. Given that inner integration is an important component of an untroubled mind, it was certainly easier to adjust to a criminal normality than to continue manifesting

non-conformity, especially when this adjustment was accompanied by social gratification and a positive pay-off for supporting the measure

involved.

People try to avoid being torn between different loyalties and

permanent dilemmas. Moreover, long-term exposure to unpleasant stimuli

causes people to become inured to them. They become just another fact

of life and stop being talked about, enabling denial of reality on the

affective-cognitive levels. This mental process is well illustrated by

400




two cases which epitomize the nature of everyday attitudes in the

Third Reich, just one year after the introduction of the yellow star:

A foreigner who visited Germany in 1942 left with the depressing image of the lews. They looked undernourished and walked miles since they were not allowed to use public transport. And although people sometimes gave up their seats to Jews, ( who beyond a certain distance

were allowed to use public transport ) he witnessed a young Nazi girl order an elderly Jewess to stand up in the subway. The old lady got

up, but nobody paid any attention to the incident. The passivity of

the public was for him disheartening. Another first hand account is ®י

by Anna Haag. A glimpse into her diary unveils the metamorphosis that

the attitudes towards the yellow badge had undergone within a year of

its introduction. She sketches in graphic detail a personal

experience which took place in Stuttgart on 5 October 1942, exactly one year after the publication of the NS Kurier-Sttutgart article

which complained of philosemitic attitudes evinced in that city's

public transport: "I travelled on the tram. It was overcrowded. An old

lady got on. Her feet were so swollen that they bulged out of the top of her shoes. She carried the David star on her dress. I stood up to

allow the lady to sit. Then I got - how else - the "popular fury".

"Out!" shouted a whole choir. From the voices I heard the angry words

"Jew slave!", "person without dignity!". The tram stopped. The

driver ordered: "Both of you get out!". י®

This trivial incident, portrayed by Anna Haag, so vividly captures the extent to which vicious antisemitism was interwoven in everyday life in the Third Reich. It shows how the German public not only came

to terms with nazi antisemitic policy and adjusted to the new social

ethics, but how entangled it was in injustice through active

participation and the adoption of violence as a way of life. The

attitude displayed by the passengers can be seen as their "modest"

contribution to the Holocaust. Incidents of this sort, I believe, substantiate the contention that day-to-day contact with a virulent, antisemitic atmosphere and the seemingly normal adaptation to it

conspired to dull the individual's sensitivity to the plight of his

Jewish neighbours. On the collective level in nazi Germany the process of repression created indifference and apathy. In my judgement,

however, these were not a priori attitudes deriving from the concern

over everyday needs. Rather the erosion of the capacity to identify with other suffering led to these attitudes. Apathy and indifference

were a consequence of conscious decisions. 20

1- In addition to the Meldungen aus dem Reich of 9 October 1941 and 2

February 1942, See also some local reports such as: SD Aussenstelle

Minden, 21 February 1942, National Archives Washington. T 175 R

577 F 679-80; Reichsfrauenführung Lagebericht für September 1941,

Bundesarchiv Koblenz. NS 22/vorl 860, on Gau Hessen-Nassau and Gau

Berlin; The Mayor of Augsburg, 6 January 1942, ibid. NS 6 / vorl

416 fol 1. For interpretations see: Otto D. Kulka ä Aron Rodrigue, The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich, Yad Vasnem

401



DAVID BANKIER

Studies 16 (1984), p. 433; Ian Kershaw, German Popular Opinion and

the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some further Reflections, in,

Arnold Paucker (Ed. ), Die Juden im Nationalsozialistischen

Deutschland. Tübingen 1986, pp. 372-374.

2- Klaus Scheurenberg, Ich will leben: Ein autobiographischer Bericht.

Berlin 1982 pp. 78-81; Ernst Bukofzer, Laws for Jews and

Persecution of Jews under the Nazis. Berlin 1946, p. 11;

Recollections of Jacob Jacobson, in, Monika Richartz (Ed.), Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Selbst Zeugnisse zur

Sozialgeschichte 1918-1945. Stuttgart 1982, p. 402; The

recollections of Leo Baeck in, Eric H. Boehm, We Survived. New

Haven 1949, p. 288; On Inge Deutschkorn's experiences see her, Ich

trug den gelben Fleck. pp. 85-88.

3- Die letzten Tage der deutschen Judentums, p. 33.

4- PRO, FO, 371/ 32681; Inside Germany Reports 23 (November 1942).

5- Report of Carl B. Peters, PRO, FO, 371/26514.

6- Washington Chancery to Foreign Office, 23 November 1941, PRO, FO,

371/26515, reported also in, Inside Germany Reports 21 (February 1942). Cf. the impressions of Elisabeth Freund in December 1941,

in, Monika Richartz, op. cit. . p. 381.

6a- Press Reading Bureau Stockholm (PRBS) to Political Intelligence

Department London (PIDL), 11 September 1942, PRO, FO, 371/30901.

,See, for example, Ingeborg Tafel's letter in, Hans Dollinger (Ed.) ־7

Kain. wo ist dein Bruder?. Munich 1983, p. 7; Lisa de Boor,

Tagebuchblätter aus den Jahren 1935-1945■ Munich 1963, entry of 10

November 1941.

8- Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin. Ein deutsches Tagebuch. Munich 1962, entry of 19 September 1941.

9- Howard K. Smith, The Last Train From Berlin. New York 1943, p. 195

ff. ; Arvid Fredborg, Behind the Steel Wail. A Swedish Journalist

in Berlin 1941-1943■ New York 1944, p. 69; On reactions to the

yellow star in France, see, Michael R. Marrus 4 Robert 0. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews. New York 1981, pp. 234-240.

10- British Ambassador in Stockholm to Foreign Office, 25 October

1941, PRO, F0, 371/26508.

11- Cited in, Jüdische Wochenschau. Buenos Aires, 9 January 1942.

12- British Legation to Holland to Foreign Office, 14 November 1941,

PRO, F0, 371/26514; British Military Attache in Berne, 5

November 1941, ibid; Letter of 14/10/41, PRO, F0, 371/ 26515.

.Albert Speer, Spandau. The Secret Diaries. New York 1976, p. 287 ־13

14- PRBS to PIDL, 22 November 1941, PRO, F0, 371/ 26515.

15- NS Kurier-Sttutgart 4 October 1941, in, Heinz D. Leuner, Wnen

Compassion was a Crime. London 1966, p. 67.

16- Smith, op. cit. , p. 199.

17- British Embassy Washington, 24 July 1942, PRO, F0, 371/30400.

18- Press Reading Bureau Stockholm to Political Intelligence

Department London, 11 September '1942, PRO, F0, 371/30901.

19- Anna Haag, Das Glück zu Leben. Stuttgart 1967, entry of 5/10/42.

20- On psychological processes related to moral issues see Henri

Baruk, Psychiatrie morale experimentaie. Paris 1945.

402



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