Energy and Climate Change Research and the “DARPA Model”

Dr. Richard Van AttaInstitute for Defense Analyses

Presentation to the Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy

National Press ClubNovember 3, 2005

CLIMATE POLICYCENTER

DARPA’s Key RoleFostering the “emergence” of technology

breakthroughs for the benefit of US security– What is the “DARPA Model”…. Which DARPA?– What was the origins of DARPA and how did it

evolve?– DARPA “success”—why is it so well regarded?– What is the basic “motif” of DARPA success and

what are key factors in achieving success?– What is relevance of DARPA model for other

policy areas—particularly energy and climate research?

• Soviet nuclear weapons—– H-bomb in 1952 just after US

• Korean War distracts resources for R&D and new tech systems

• “Missile Gap” issue concerning Soviet ICBMs

• Soviet Union launches SPUTNIK satellite– Demonstrates global reach– US tech leadership

challenged

DARPA’s origins: Strategic Challenges ~1958

• DDR&E—DoD “chief technologist” established

• ARPA established based on three “Presidential Initiatives”– Space focus—becomes NASA– Nuclear test detection– Missile Defense

• ARPA begins small info tech and materials science programs

• Project AGILE focuses on Vietnam in early 60s— ARPA’s first foray into tactical technology

CHALLENGES INITIAL RESPONSES

What is DARPA?• Agency established under SECDEF

(Office of the Secretary of Defense)– “assure that the US maintains a lead

in applying state-of-the-art technology for military capabilities”

– “prevent technological surprise from her adversaries”• Independent from Service R&D organizations• Agile organization with risk-taking culture

– “High risk; high payoff” research—tolerant of failure and open to learning

– Not driven by defined mil requirements• DARPA does not maintain any of its own labs• Idea-driven and outcome-oriented

– Funds researchers within US defense contractors, private companies and universities

– Honest broker among competing approachesDARPA created to be DoD’s “innovation hub”

Which DARPA?

DARPA’s unique focus: High risk—high payoff

• DARPA is intrinsically malleable and adaptive • DARPA has morphed several times• DARPA has “re-grouped” iteratively—often after

its greatest “successes”• There is not and should not be a singular

answer on “what is DARPA”—and if someone tells you that—they don’t understand DARPA

But… this has not been the ONLY focus…

DARPA

DARPA cannot succeed on its own

WorldUSUSGDOD

Primes

Services

suppliers

OSD

Congress

DDR&E

allies adversaries

SECDEFAgenciesWhite House

CIA, DOE...

academia

DSBIndep.

advisories

“concept houses”

DARPA success depends on its relationships with other organizations and its understanding of the

current and projected security context

Commercialindustry

DARPA roles• Basic science emerging technologies • “Disruptive” military capabilities

– integration– demonstration

• Technology strategy Defense strategy• Foster RMAs?

By 1970 there were two DARPA’s—

• One focused on breakthrough mil applications and systems (Tactical Technology, Strategic Programs)

• Another focused on broad, generic emerging technologies (Information Processing, Microsystems, Advanced Materials)

• Both these elements have had “transformational” effects—but they are fundamentally different in their focus and approach.

DARPA Refocused—Early 70s• By 1970 ARPA had succeeded in its inaugural

assignments—Its “Presidential Initiatives” had “matured”—– Space NASA– Missile Defense (Defender) Army– Nuclear Test Detection Operational activity

• John S. Foster (DDR&E) concerned about what ARPA’s focus should be– Concern—“ARPA becoming DoD’s NSF”– Emphasis on military application—including Viet Nam—and transition

vice general science (Mansfield Amendment ) – Enhanced linkages with operating commands, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff

• DARPA/DNA “Long Range R&D Planning Program” (LR2DP2) articulates options to address Soviet threat– “New Alternatives Panel” links strategies, tactics & technologies– Advanced Technology Panel emphasized the value of precision in

variety of scenarios

Long Range Planning and Precision Strike• Key idea: There is an alternative to primarily

nuclear response to Soviet threat• Precision strike involves

– “integration of a wide range of technologies: target detection, recognition and location; delivery vehicles and munitions; and weapon navigation and guidance.

– “A unified approach to development...and the establishment of operational procedures for effective integration and employment...”

• Ideas promoted throughout DOD by well-connected defense analysts– Albert Wholstetter, Andrew Marshall, Henry Rowen,

Donald Hicks, Fred Wikner, Joseph Braddock...

DARPA Refocused—Mid-70s• DDR&E Malcolm Currie emphasized need for

“technological initiative” to address Soviets – “Basic research and big projects that could make a

difference”– Emphasized technology pull with links to real customers– Sought to counter Soviet conventional buildup with US

technology

• Dr. George Heilmeier appointed DARPA Director with imprimatur to:– Lay out a 10-year investment strategy– Employed “new” management model– Develop focused DARPA efforts to demonstrate “game

changing” concepts These were major departures from prior approach and caused dissonance in research community

Push for Implementation: Late 1970sThe Offset Strategy: • SECDEF Brown and DDR&E Perry elevate

selected DARPA thrusts to overall defense strategy: – Apply the US advantage in technology to make up for

the Soviets' advantage in weapons and men– Synergistic application of improved technologies for

C4I, defense suppression (stealth), and precision guided munitions to overcome Soviet defenses and destroy Soviet tank legions

• Perry actively enlists Service leadership and personally involved in oversight of key programs

• 1980s—Continued scale up of thrusts• 1990s—Maturation and implementation

Summary: Challenges & responses

1970 1975 1980

Strategic problem

recognized

New approaches articulated & organizations

refocused

Technology strategy elevated to defense

strategy & broad support built

Implementation of disruptive capabilities

This took well over a decade to achieve—what are lessons from this?

DARPA’s Role in Fostering an Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

Dr. Richard Van Atta (rvanatta@ida.org)Dr. Michael J. Lippitz (mlippitz@attbi.com)

Institute for Defense Analyses

Final ReportPresentation to Dr. Anthony J. Tether

DirectorDARPA

December 4, 2002

stealthstandoff

precision strike

real-time tactical ISR

What is the emerging RMA(s)?• Desert Storm demonstrated

interrelated, synergistic capabilities (“system of systems”) that undermine warfighting approaches built around large platforms– DARPA’s key roles were inventing

capabilities, demonstrating integrated concepts (system of systems), and working with OSD leadership on transition

• Today, RMA is encompassing IT revolution – DARPA played key early role in interactive computing and

internet as overall enabling technologies — which now are being integrated into defense capabilities

• Tomorrow: Nanotechnology? Biotechnology? Counter terrorism? Homeland Defense?

Case studies

stealthstandoff precision

strike

real-time tactical ISR

Stealth origins and development• Strategic challenge: Soviet anti-aircraft systems

(Vietnam and Yom Kippur War)

• 1974-6: “Harvey” concept (Chuck Meyers)

leads to contractor studies (Robert Moore)

leads to HAVE BLUE– Quarter-scale demonstration– Design for stealth, then aerodynamics

• Currie used “handshakes and strong arms” to persuade Air Force leadership to help fund and participate in HAVE BLUE– Slow, unmaneuverable plane that only flies at night– Perceived threat to existing and planned AF programs

Stealth implementation

• 1979: Based on HAVE BLUE success, Perry decides to build F-117A with 4-year IOC– No prototype– “Technology limited, not funding limited”– Executive reviews chaired by Perry

• 1983: Air Force set up secret F-117A wing

• DARPA funds stealth on several platforms– Umbrella program office under AF Colonel Kaminski– TACIT BLUE keeps Northrop in stealth business,

leading to the B-2 and other airborne stealth– SEA SHADOW applies stealth to surface navy– Counter-stealth research

Case studies

stealthstandoff precision

strike

real-time tactical ISR

Development of precision strike

1975 1978 1982

AirLandBattle

Follow-on Forces Attack

JSTARS

JTACMS

ATACMS

PUSDRE Wade “J Programs” Memo

TSSAMJASSAM

SLAM-ER

ASSAULT BREAKER

Sensor Fuzed Weapon CBU-97/B)

BAT—Brilliant Anti-Tank Monition

Fossum/Perry approve Assault Breaker

ITASS

Braddock DNA Warsaw Pact Threat Analyses

• LPI radar Radar

•Pave Mover

•Martin Marietta Concept on Standoff Strike

DNA / DARPA—Precision Strike Concepts

•Grumman / NordenRadar Guided Weapon Concept

Precision Submunitions•CLGP•TLGP•TGSM•SKEET

•MTI radar

DSB ’76 Study

Service Missile ProgramsPatriot (T-16)

LANCE (T-22)Navy missile (classified)

ASSAULT BREAKER concept

PAVE MOVERMissile with bus

Terminally guided submunitions

Data processing and fusion center

Surface launcher

Multiple enemy tanks

In one of the most complex and integrated DARPA demonstrations ever attempted, a radar-guided missile dispensed five terminally-guided submunitions above a field with five tanks. Result: five direct hits.

Implementation of precision strike: A continuing story

• Precision strike is now a core military idea, intrinsic to most tactical concepts

• Important individual systems fielded

• USSR reacted to ASSAULT BREAKER demo –impending ”reconnaissance-strike complex”

• Despite DARPA demonstrations & operational concept development, Services focus development on their particular platforms– Air Force: air-delivered munitions– Army: ground and helicopter delivery

• Truly “smart” weapons still seeking acceptance

Case studies

stealthstandoff precision

strike

real-timetactical ISR

DARPA & UAVs • DARPA experimental programs in Vietnam for

ISR, communications and strike

• Heilmeier to Congress (1977): “We are successfully completing and transitioning these technologies to the Services”

• UAV development and deployment would prove long and difficult– Army Aquila killed by mission creep and bureaucratic

infighting (Knox: Of Gladiators and Spectators)

– 1984-90: Amber undermined by DARPA-NAVY impasse (but eventually became Predator)

– Pioneer bought from Israel

• DARPA focus shifts to next generation High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE)

OSD Leadership Took on UAV Implementation and Deployment

• Gulf War highlighted serious deficiencies in airborne ISR, particularly wide-area coverage

• DSB and OSD/Intelligence reviews– Lack of transition—UAV development requires central

leadership (DARO)– Push medium-altitude endurance UAVs (Predator)– Initiate high-altitude endurance UAV program with

$10 million flyaway cost (Global Hawk)• Predator delivered in 6 months

using ACTD process• DARPA develops Global Hawk • Air Force forms operational

UAV squadron– Deployed in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq,

and Afghanistan

3rd Generation Info Tech—From computers to Interactive Information

• DARPA and Info Tech—“Toward Man-machine Symbiosis”

• Making computers interactive • Internetted computing• Virtual reality • Intelligent systems

J. C. R. Licklider and the Revolution that Made Computing Personal

JCR Licklider and DARPA’s IPTO

• The revolution that made computers personal…– ARPA “got into computer research backward….”

• White elephant surplus Q-32s from SAGE• SDC—spin-off from RAND• Command and Control research

– Outside ARPA study—Take on computer research rather than just what industry offers

– ’62- Licklider’s “name came up”…. Computers and behavior…• Command and control were essentially problems of man-computer

interaction…• Interactive computing had potential to transform human life…• 1962—Lick named Director of Information Processing Techniques

Office• ARPA Director Ruina: “I stumbled on a visionary by accident…”

JCR Licklider: “…Man-Computer Symbiosis”– From augmented human to Artificial Intelligence?– Bring computers to formulative parts of problems…. – “Real-time” computing… to support real-time thinking

• Too much time spent doing housekeeping.. • What does man do well; what could computers do well for him?

– Prerequisites—focused on the underpinnings• Data-processing equipment…and programs…• Speed mismatch… .. Computer must divide its time • Thinking center … Network of libraries and info storage connected

by wideband communications…to individual users• Memory and memory organization… search and retrieval• Language—goal oriented? • I/O—least advanced aspect… Displays and controls..• Speech recognition

Licklider-Taylor: Computer as a Communications Device

– Computer as collaborative tool—cooperative modeling for creative intellectual activity

• Problem—because we can’t communicate interactively effectively • Computer as “dynamic, moldable medium that can revolutionize the

art of modeling…” not just a switch—an interaction facilitator

– Distributed intellectual resources– Computer networks—interactive multiaccess computer

communities– Processing hardware—nodes to process multiple users

access to remote computers– On-line interactive communities—will “to be on-line” be a

privilege or a right?

DARPA’s IT Thrusts • Networking—Building the “Intergalactic

Network”– Lick memos—establishing the Intergalactic Network of

researchers• To net the researcher requires building the computer

network• Need basic tools to net computers

– Interactive time shared computers—DEC’s PDP-8– Need to use something other than telephone lines– Packet switching—Communications and processing methods

and protocols– Concept of Interface Message Processor (IMPs)

• ARPANET– Bob Taylor—new IPTO director—suggest network concerns to

Charles Herzfeld (Director of DARPA)--$1M in 25 minutes!– Larry Roberts—asked to leave MIT to head project– First nodes at universities– Explosion of university linkages

DARPA’s IT Thrusts

• Artificial Intelligence • VLSI • “Strategic Computing”

– Fostering larger scale investment to bring tech to fruition

Making computers personal…. DARPA’s legacy was implementing

a change-state vision…

…which had fundamental impact in fostering a transformational concept and the creation of an entire industry

Two aspects of success: Vision and Leadership

VISION (DARPA focus)- Risk-taking, committed PMs - Seeking and developing disruptive

concepts - Fighting against internal & external

resistance

LEADERSHIP (OSD focus)- Top-down interest and

involvement crucial for implementing disruptive capabilities

If transformational capabilities are the objective, it is insufficient for DARPA to create an example

and then rely upon the ordinary Service acquisition system

ScienceTechnology

Product/systemrealization

Production

Deployment

Successful use

Create surprise, don’t just seek to avoid it

• Pursue technologies with potential to create disruptive capabilities

• Make sustained investments, building from initial science into progressively more integrated systems

– Some investments are impossible to justify in purely accounting terms

VISION

Build communities of change-state advocates

• DARPA is at its best when it instigates cooperation among forward-looking researchers, operational experts, and industry– Research communities,

once established, can draw on industry and Service funds

– DARPA’s success depends on itbeing a leader and catalyst

WorldUSUSGDOD

DARPA

Defensecontractors

Services

suppliers

OSD

Congress

DDR&E

allies adversaries

SECDEFAgenciesWhiteHouse

CIA,DOE...

academia

DSBIndep.

advisories

“concepthouses”Commercial

industry

VISION

VISION

Define challenges, develop solution concepts, and demonstrate them

• Define strategic challenges in detail across multiple scenarios – DARPA research priorities have been informed by

studies (both internal and independent) that provided specific, well-articulated challenges and guidance

• Develop disruptive concepts for assessment– Support development of integrated concepts — not

just individual capabilities — beyond purview of a single service

– Facilitates a “critical mass” of research effort• Test promising concepts in large-scale,

integrated “proof of concept” demonstrations– Maintain a scientific process—open, analytic,

competitive (not acquisition programs)

Tension between DARPA roles

Developer of concept prototypes and demonstrations that address needs (but not defined requirements)

Process of integration: exploring possible application solutions to prove a disruptive concept

Pursuer of new breakthrough technologies independent of defined needs

Process of discovery:open, wide-ranging search for novel, potentially change-state capabilities

DARPA Director needs to mediate these missions and bridge these communities

Pursuit of integrating concepts can be as “high risk” as technology development

VISION

OSD and DARPA leadership needed to launch disruptive concept programs

• Broker deals with Service Leadership– Entails “firm handshakes and strong arms”– OSD may have to “create” a customer

• Create an independent capability either within the Service or in an outside agency– Need an organizational home for acquisition– External organization particularly helpful for joint

capabilities that no single Service feels they own• Work with Congress to protect funding

– Always an uphill battle if disruptive capabilities compete with a large platform or program

• Provide high-level imprimatur for implementing priority programs

LEADERSHIP

SUMMARY: Roles DARPA has played (and should continue to play)

• Searched out and supported development of emerging technologies with the potential to create new defense capabilities

• Defined and addressed strategic challenges• Built communities of change-state advocates• Supported development of integrated concepts

beyond purview of a single service• Took on large-scale, proof-of-concept demos

with a scientific process — willing to fail• Worked with OSD leadership in brokering

Service commitment

“The best way to predict the futureis to help create it”

Increasing technology integration and

participation of the broader defense establishment

DARPA Roles in Transformation

• Instigate radically advanced technologies

• Conceive & demonstrate “disruptive” capabilities– Technology per se is not disruptive– Disruptive capabilities based on

operational, organizational, and cultural adaptation

• Foster RMAs– Translate capabilities into defense strategies– Transition capabilities into application

Energy and Climate Change—DARPA Model?• What is the imperative—DARPA’s is national

security– Is energy security a comparable motif?

• Who provides the leadership—DARPA has had the imprimatur of the SECDEF

• How will its results be brought to fruition? – DARPA established a network of implementation

paths that varied by technology and application• DARPA began as relatively small and highly

focused—it morphed and adapted – Don’t try to invent a full-blown full scale operation

based on DARPA after 30 years….– Can a civilian organization maintain independence of

its technology program from the “vested interests”?

Energy-Climate Research Planning and Strategy—Can Innovation be Managed?

• Setting an emerging tech agenda on energy & climate– What are the government’s interests in identifying and

promoting emerging energy-climate technologies? – How to invest

• What should be the governments role?• How does government “make its bets”?• How has the tech innovation environment changed and

how does this affect government’s role and effect?• Overseeing the emerging energy-climate tech

process• How can government influence results?• Who does the government support and how?• How does government evaluate its efforts?

Some Challenges Facing Energy-Climate Research “ARPA”

• Strategy ambiguity– What are the goals—for whom?– Can “national” research programs appropriately

address global problems—How?– Who should receive the research support and how

should they be selected?

• Globalization and commercialization– How to maintain technological superiority in an

open, networked, global marketplace?– Should the research aim at fostering industrial base

competitiveness for realizing the product of research?

Do approaches that led to DARPA’s successes pertain to the tech & economic environment concerning energy & climate?

A Broader Perspective…..• How do emerging technologies impact on our

definition of security?– Nation-state in a global context—especially in addressing a

“global” problem such as energy and climate– Security and global competition—whose equities are we

championing?– Security dimensions affected by energy-climate technology

• Economic security vs. global imperatives– What are main factors impinging on future of economies?

– Global issues related to technology– Health– Environment– Climate– Energy

• Culture and technology—How does US approach for addressing emerging technologies relate to those of other countries?