Images, Dehumanization, and South Koreans’ Attitudes

towards Unification

In KINU 통일의식조사 2018: 남북평화 시대의 통일의식. The KINU Unification Survey2018: New Era of Peace in Korean Peninsular and Unification Attitudes. Ed. Sang Sin

Lee. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2019.

Pre-publication version: September 3, 2018

Joshua D. Kertzer

Paul Sack Associate Professor of Political EconomyDepartment of Government, Harvard University.1737 Cambridge St, Cambridge MA, 02138, USA.

Email: jkertzer@gov.harvard.edu.Web: http:/people.fas.harvard.edu/˜jkertzer/

mailto:jkertzer@gov.harvard.eduhttp://people.fas.harvard.edu/~jkertzer/

Introduction

At both the elite and mass level, international politics is driven by the perceptions that

actors have about one another.1 Just as the images leaders have about other countries

shape the types of foreign policies they pursue, the images that citizens have about other

countries affects the types of foreign policies they support.2 One of the key barriers to conflict

resolution, for example, involves changing the images that citizens on each side of the conflict

have of one another; when citizens on one side view their opponents as inferior or less than

human, it legitimizes the use of violence and retaliatory aggression.3 Yet just as images can

shape the likelihood of intergroup conflict, they can also affect the likelihood of cooperation.

For example, the key causal mechanism in classic theories of economic integration — and

central rationale behind economic and cultural exchanges — is that as individuals from

different groups interact with one another, their images of each other change, making future

conflict less likely.4

This chapter borrows from psychological research on images, stereotypes, and dehu-

manization to ask three questions.5 First, what images do South Koreans have about North

Koreans? Second, what demographic factors and political orientations explain variation in

these perceptions? Third, how do these perceptions relate to South Koreans’ attitudes about

unification? These questions have clear substantive importance, but are also of interest for

theoretical reasons, since some of these theoretical frameworks have yet to be systematically

tested in the context of inter-Korean relations.

The discussion below has four parts. It begins by reviewing how political psychologists

1. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1976); Richard K. Herrmann, Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985).

2. Richard K. Herrmann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model:Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 415–50.

3. Ifat Maoz and Clark McCauley, “Threat, dehumanization, and support for retaliatory aggressive poli-cies in asymmetric conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 1 (2008): 93–116; Emile Bruneau andNour Kteily, “The enemy as animal: Symmetric dehumanization during asymmetric warfare,” PLOS ONE12, no. 7 (July 2017): 1–20.

4. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953);Thomas F. Pettigrew, “Intergroup Contact Theory,” Annual Review of Psychology 49 (1998): 65–85.

5. Susan T. Fiske et al., “A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and WarmthRespectively Follow From Perceived Status and Competition,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology82, no. 6 (2002): 878–902; Nick Haslam, “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review,” Personality and SocialPsychology Review 10, no. 3 (2006): 252–64.

1

have studied images in international relations, focusing on two theoretical frameworks in par-

ticular: stereotypes, and dehumanization. It then investigates the content of South Koreans’

images of North Koreans, finding that South Koreans perceive their Northern counterparts

as being not particularly warm, but also not especially cold, and significantly less compe-

tent. It also finds evidence of South Korean dehumanization of North Koreans, specifically

with respect to what the dehumanization literature refers to as “human nature” traits,

rather than “human uniqueness” traits. South Koreans don’t dehumanize North Koreans

by viewing them animalistically, but by viewing them mechanistically instead; in as much

as North Koreans are perceived as somehow less than human, it is that they are perceived

as nonhuman, rather than subhuman.

Third, it investigates the demographic correlates of these perceptions in a multivariate

context, identifying the types of respondents more or less likely to embrace each stereotype.

It finds in particular the existence of stark generational differences, with younger South

Koreans displaying more negative stereotypes about North Koreans than older generations,

as do the less wealthy, and more conservative. Younger South Koreans are also more likely

to dehumanize the North with respect to human nature traits, as do the less educated.

Finally, it explores the political consequences of these perceptions, showing that vari-

ation in perceived warmth and human nature dehumanization is significantly associated

both with attitudes towards reunification, operationalized both in terms of general support

for reunification, and as willingness to personally sacrifice for unification. These effects hold

even when controlling for a variety of demographic and political characteristics, demonstrat-

ing the importance of examining perceptions of outgroups in the context of inter-Korean

relations.

Images and perceptions in international politics

One of the central insights of psychological theories of international politics is their emphasis

on actors’ perceptions.6 In privileging the ideational over the material, these theories can be

6. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore:John Hopkins University Press, 1985); Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence,

2

contrasted with realist theories of international politics that focus more on the structure of

the international system as a whole, and less on the perceptions of the units that populate

it.7 Theories of international politics that emphasize perceptions argue that state behavior

(at the elite level) or policy preferences (at the mass public level) cannot always be strictly

deduced from structural factors like the balance of power, since actors can define situations

in myriad ways, such that actors’ perceptions are not simply reducible to their environment.

If perceptions were completely idiosyncratic, they would be difficult to study systemat-

ically. Image theory, however, argues that even if the specific content of actors’ perceptions

vary, the structure of the perceptions remain the same; even though we have a large number

of perceptions and beliefs about our relationships with other actors, we tend to categorize

them along a small number of common dimensions that work together to form a holistic

judgment of who the target is and what they want. Early work on image theory argued that

actors’ images of others in international politics essentially reduced to a single dimension:

whether the target’s intentions were understood to be hostile or friendly, and thus, whether

it poses a threat, or an opportunity.8

More recent work on images in international politics has gone beyond the simple dis-

tinction between friends and foes to argue that images of other countries are structured

along three dimensions. First, we analyze others based upon the degree of perceived threat

or opportunity they pose, such as whether they pose a threat, a chance for mutual gain,

or an opportunity for exploitation; this is the valence dimension central to earlier work on

images. Importantly, however, we also categorize targets on two additional dimensions: their

relative power, and perceived status. Along the second dimension, a target can be evaluated

as less powerful, equally powerful, or more powerful than the observer; along the third, the

target can be perceived as of lower status, equal status, or higher status.9 Thus, an enemy

and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014);Joshua D. Kertzer, Resolve in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).

7. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979).8. Kenneth E Boulding, “National images and international systems,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 3,

no. 2 (1959): 120–131.9. Herrmann and Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research

After the Cold War”; Richard K. Herrmann, “Perceptions and Image Theory in International Relations,”in Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, 2nd Ed., ed. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy(Oxford University Press, 2013), 334–363.

3

image, for example, is attributed to an actor perceived of being comparable in power, with

threatening intentions, of equal status, whereas a colony image is attributed to an actor

weaker in power, lower in status, and who offers an opportunity for exploitation.

The power of images is that they are linked to behavioral tendencies. If we think of

another group as our enemy (as the Americans did towards the Soviets during the second

half of the twentieth century), we treat it very differently than if we think of it as a colony

(as the Japanese did towards the Koreans in the first half of twentieth century). Images thus

not only shape how we wish the target to be treated, but function as cognitive schema, with

implications for how we process information.10 They also have an affective component: it is

because of the emotions that images generate that they shape behavior.

Stereotypes: warmth and competence

In this sense, how we understand images of others in international politics bears a strong

resemblance to how psychologists understand social stereotypes more generally.11 Whereas

earlier psychological work on person perception argued that we form impressions of others

along a single dimension, current research on stereotype structure, most notably Fiske et

al.’s stereotype content model, argues our perceptions of other actors are clustered along

two dimensions: perceived warmth (a function of perceived intentions, thus corresponding

to image theory’s interest in whether the target poses a threat or an opportunity), and

perceived competence (a function of perceived capabilities, thus corresponding to image

theory’s interest in whether the target is more or less powerful than the observer).12 The

cognitive processes through which we think about other countries is thus similar to those

through which we think about other people.13

10. Richard K. Herrmann et al., “Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of CognitiveSchemata,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (1997): 403–433; Emanuele Castano, Alain Bonacossa,and Peter Gries, “National Images as Integrated Schemas: Subliminal Primes of Image Attributes ShapeForeign Policy Preferences,” Political Psychology 37, no. 3 (2016): 351–366.

11. Gordon W. Allport, The nature of prejudice (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954); Susan T. Fiske,Amy J. C. Cuddy, and Peter Glick, “Universal dimensions of social perception: Warmth and competence,”Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (2007): 77–83.

12. Solomon E. Asch, “Forming impressions of personality,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology41 (1946): 1230–1240; Fiske et al., “A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and WarmthRespectively Follow From Perceived Status and Competition.”

13. Kathleen M. McGraw and Thomas M. Dolan, “Personifying the state: Consequences for attitude for-mation,” Political Psychology 28, no. 3 (2007): 299–327.

4

How do South Koreans perceive North Koreans in this framework? To answer this ques-

tion, the analysis below studies the first two dimensions of South Koreans’ images of North

Koreans based on instrumentation from the stereotype content model, asking respondents

the extent to which they characterize North Korean people as warm, and as competent;

to provide a reference point, respondents were also asked the same questions about South

Koreans, as well as the Japanese. This theoretical model has been tested in Korea before,

most notably as part of a large cross-national study by Cuddy et al., though the approach

here differs both through the use of a nationally representative sample, and in focusing on

stereotypes of citizens in other countries, rather than groups within domestic society.14

Dehumanization: human uniqueness and human nature

A key related construct in intergroup relations is dehumanization, or the tendency for in-

dividuals to deny human characteristics to members of other groups.15 Dehumanization

ranges in severity. Its most extreme form, blatant dehumanization, involves literally com-

paring members of outgroups to animals or insects, thereby weakening moral constraints

against violence by denying the target’s humanity.16 Its more subtle form involves being

relatively less likely to attribute characteristics we associate with humanness to members of

outgroups.17 Dual models of dehumanization argue that there are two broad types of char-

acteristics we tend to associate with human essence.18 The first cluster, human uniqueness,

concerns the attributes we perceive as distinguishing humans from other animals, such as

intelligence, self-control, moral sensibility, and secondary emotions.19 The second cluster,

human nature, involves those traits we perceive as distinguishing humans from machines,

robots and inanimate objects: warmth, agency and individuality, cognitive openness, and

14. Amy JC Cuddy et al., “Stereotype content model across cultures: Towards universal similarities andsome differences,” British Journal of Social Psychology 48, no. 1 (2009): 1–33.

15. Haslam, “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review.”16. Nour Kteily et al., “The ascent of man: Theoretical and empirical evidence for blatant dehumanization,”

Journal of personality and social psychology 109, no. 5 (2015): 901.17. Jacques-Philippe Leyens et al., “Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution of uniquely

human emotions to ingroups and outgroups,” European Journal of Social Psychology 31, no. 4 (2001): 395–411.

18. Nick Haslam and Steve Loughnan, “Dehumanization and Infrahumanization,” Annual Review of Psy-chology 65, no. 1 (2014): 399–423.

19. Whereas we attribute primary emotions like anger and anxiety to both humans and non-human animals,we tend to attribute secondary emotions like embarassment or regret only to humans.

5

emotionality. Denying human uniqueness to an outgroup is an animalistic form of dehuman-

ization — viewing others as subhuman — whereas denying human nature to an outgroup is

a mechanistic form of dehumanization — viewing others as nonhuman.

Since denying human uniqueness traits to outgroups involves perceiving others as low in

competence, and denying human nature traits to outgroups involves perceiving others as low

in warmth, dehumanization and stereotype content models are interrelated.20 Dehumaniza-

tion is related to the relative status dimension of image theory as well; imperial powers often

justified their interventions in their colonies with dehumanizing rhetoric, viewing colonial

inhabitants of being backwards and incapable of governing themselves.21

Do South Koreans dehumanize North Koreans? And if so, does it involve denying human

nature traits, or human uniqueness traits? In the analysis below, we address these questions

by including instrumentation from the dual model of dehumanization.22 Respondents were

presented with a list of eight traits previous research has found to vary in human nature,

human uniqueness (and, to avoid valence effects, desirability), and asked to indicate the

extent to which each trait described the people of South Korea, North Korea, and Japan.

By calculating the respondent-level differences in trait ratings between the ingroup and each

of the two outgroups, and averaging these differences for the traits high in human uniqueness,

versus those high in human nature, we obtain measures of dehumanization along each of

the two dimensions, for each of the two outgroups.

Results

What are South Koreans’ perceptions of North Koreans?

We begin by looking at the structure of South Koreans’ perceptions of North Koreans,

in Figure 1. For purposes of comparability, the left-hand panel displays South Koreans’

perceptions of the South Korean people as a whole, while the right-hand panel displays

20. Lasana T. Harris and Susan T. Fiske, “Dehumanizing the lowest of the low: neuroimaging responsesto extreme out-groups,” Psychological Science 17, no. 10 (2006): 847–853.

21. Herrmann and Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic ResearchAfter the Cold War.”

22. Nick Haslam and Paul Bain, “Humanizing the Self: Moderators of the Attribution of Lesser Humannessto Others,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 33, no. 1 (2007): 57–68.

6

Fig

ure

1:

South

Kore

an

s’im

ages

1. S

outh

Kor

eans

2. N

orth

Kor

eans

3. J

apan

ese

025

5075

100

025

5075

100

025

5075

100

0255075100

Competence

Warmth

Fig

ure

1p

lots

surv

eyre

spon

den

ts’

per

cep

tion

sof

citi

zen

sfr

om

the

Rep

ub

lic

of

Kore

a,

Nort

hK

ore

a,

an

dJap

an

.T

he

y-a

xis

mea

sure

sth

ep

erce

ived

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thof

each

ster

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pe

targ

et,

wh

ile

the

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sure

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ep

erce

ived

com

pet

ence

;ea

chd

ot

dep

icts

the

resp

on

seof

an

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ivid

ual

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eyre

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den

t,ji

tter

edh

ere

top

rod

uce

legib

ilit

y.T

he

solid

blu

elin

esco

rres

pon

dto

the

aver

age

level

of

warm

than

dco

mp

eten

ceatt

rib

ute

dto

agiv

enst

ereo

typ

eta

rget

.T

hu

s,th

efi

rst

pan

elsh

ow

sth

at

most

Kore

an

sh

ave

ap

osi

tive

image

of

thei

rfe

llow

citi

zen

s,ra

tin

gth

emh

igh

inb

oth

warm

than

dco

mp

eten

ce.

Inco

ntr

ast

,th

en

ext

two

pan

els

show

that

Kore

an

sh

ave

more

neg

ati

ve

images

of

citi

zen

sfr

om

Nort

hK

ore

aan

dJap

an

.N

ort

hK

ore

an

sare

per

ceiv

edas

bei

ng

neu

tral

inw

arm

th,

an

dsl

ightl

yb

elow

the

scale

mid

poin

tin

com

pet

ence

;th

eJap

an

ese

are

per

ceiv

edas

bei

ng

alm

ost

as

com

pet

ent

as

the

Kore

an

s,b

ut

less

warm

.

7

South Koreans’ perceptions of the Japanese. The y-axis on each plot measures the perceived

warmth of each stereotype target, while the x-axis measures the perceived competence. Each

grey dot depicts the response of each individual survey respondent, while the solid blue lines

correspond to the average values attributed to a given target on each dimension. The left-

hand panel shows that most Koreans have a positive image of their fellow citizens, perceiving

them as being relatively high in both warmth and competence — as is expected given that

respondents were being asked to evaluate their ingroup. In the stereotype content model, the

emotion elicited by this particular combination of warmth and competence is admiration.23

In contrast, the other two panels show that South Koreans have more negative images of

both North Koreans and Japanese, with a much higher variance. The right-hand panel shows

that South Koreans perceive the Japanese to be almost as competent as the South Koreans

are, but significantly less warm. In the stereotype content model, this particular combination

is associated with envy, the result of competition with a high-status outgroup. The middle

panel shows that South Koreans perceive the North Koreans to be similarly cold as the

Japanese, but to be significantly less competent, indicative of a perception of lower status.

While the emotion this particular combination is associated with is contempt, on the whole

the averages on each dimension are relatively close to the midpoint of each scale, such that

the stereotype is not particularly extreme. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the dispersion

of responses is greater for North Korea than for the other stereotype targets; this indicates

a relative degree of dissensus amongst the respondents in their images of North Koreans

compared to South Koreans or Japanese. This raises the question of which types of South

Korean respondents — younger or older, richer or poorer, more liberal or more conservative

— espouse which types of stereotypes, a question we return to in the following section.

Figure 2 displays the results of the dehumanization measures. Here, since the measures

are all calculated relative to the ingroup, there are two panels; the left-hand panel depicts

South Koreans’ dehumanization scores for the Japanese, and the right-hand panel shows

South Koreans’ dehumanization scores for North Koreans. The x-axis measures human

uniqueness dehumanization: the extent to which outgroup members are attributed rela-

23. Fiske et al., “A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth RespectivelyFollow From Perceived Status and Competition.”

8

Fig

ure

2:

Dis

trib

uti

on

of

deh

um

an

izati

on

score

s

Japanese

Nor

th K

orea

ns

-25

025

50-25

025

50-40

-20020406080

Deh

uman

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ion:

hum

an u

niqu

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s

Dehumanization: human nature

Fig

ure

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lots

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9

tively fewer traits that distinguish humans from animals. In contrast, the y-axis measures

human nature dehumanization — the extent to which outgroup members are attributed

relatively fewer traits that distinguish humans from machines. As before, each dot repre-

sents the scores of a different respondent. Interestingly, we find similar patterns for both

outgroups. Neither the Japanese nor the North Koreans are dehumanized animalistically,

and are attributed human uniqueness traits like conscientiousness and politeness at roughly

the same rate as South Koreans attribute to their fellow citizens. However, South Korean

respondents dehumanize both the Japanese and the North Koreans with respect to human

nature traits, the characteristics that distinguish humans from robots or machines, such as

curiosity or friendliness. As was the case with the stereotype content results in Figure 1,

however, there is considerable variation in dehumanization scores in Figure 2: some South

Koreans dehumanize North Koreans significantly more than others. It is explaining this type

of variation that we turn to next.

What shapes South Koreans’ perceptions of North Koreans?

The analysis has thus far shown that South Koreans have relatively neutral stereotypes

of North Koreans, while viewing them as significantly less competent than either South

Koreans or Japanese, and significantly colder than South Koreans. We have also shown that

South Koreans dehumanize North Koreans mechanistically, denying them in relative terms

some of the traits that we associate with human nature. At the same time, we found evidence

of significant variation across both respondents’ stereotype and dehumanization scores.

Table 1 attempts to explain this variation systematically, presenting the results of a se-

ries of linear regression models that examine respondents’ warmth and competence scores for

North Koreans as a function of a series of demographic variables and political orientations.

Models 1-3 present results for the warmth scores, while models 4-6 present the results for the

competence scores. For purposes of comparability, all variables are scaled from 0-1 except

for age (where a one-unit increase corresponds to one additional year of age). The first three

models show that male respondents perceive North Koreans as significantly colder than fe-

male North Koreans; depending on the other covariates in the model, the effect of gender

10

Tab

le1:

Pre

dic

tors

of

ster

eoty

pe

conte

nt

Warm

thC

om

pet

ence

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Mal

e−

2.168∗

−1.9

48∗

−1.8

90∗

−0.9

19

−0.7

66

−0.7

88

(1.1

32)

(1.1

36)

(1.1

35)

(1.1

06)

(1.1

11)

(1.1

12)

Age

0.088∗

∗0.0

90∗∗

0.0

75∗

0.1

10∗∗

∗0.1

09∗

∗∗0.1

10∗∗

∗

(0.0

41)

(0.0

41)

(0.0

42)

(0.0

40)

(0.0

40)

(0.0

41)

Ed

uca

tion

−0.

963

−0.4

24

−0.2

92

0.1

72

0.6

87

0.2

19

(3.6

23)

(3.6

43)

(3.6

24)

(3.5

39)

(3.5

62)

(3.5

52)

Inco

me

28.8

97∗∗

28.5

33∗∗

29.2

36∗

∗11.9

15

11.7

40

12.0

41

(14.

524)

(14.5

10)

(14.4

95)

(14.

185)

(14.1

86)

(14.2

08)

Ideo

logy

−8.

140∗

∗∗−

8.1

32∗

∗∗−

8.3

85∗∗

∗−

5.7

01∗

−5.7

55∗∗

−5.6

75∗

(2.9

81)

(2.9

79)

(2.9

76)

(2.9

11)

(2.9

13)

(2.9

17)

Cla

ss0.

912

1.5

87

0.6

87

4.387

4.8

61

4.5

63

(3.1

47)

(3.1

63)

(3.1

78)

(3.0

74)

(3.0

92)

(3.1

15)

Seo

ul

3.75

2∗∗

∗3.7

72∗∗

∗3.4

05∗∗

4.0

30∗∗

∗4.0

21∗

∗∗3.9

96∗∗

∗

(1.4

17)

(1.4

16)

(1.4

26)

(1.3

84)

(1.3

84)

(1.3

98)

Soci

ald

omin

ance

orie

nta

tion

−6.2

92∗

−4.7

69

−3.4

66

−3.6

78

(3.2

40)

(3.3

18)

(3.1

67)

(3.2

52)

Rig

ht

win

gau

thor

itar

ian

ism

2.2

93

3.3

89

(3.7

52)

(3.6

68)

Nat

ion

alat

tach

men

t6.5

77∗

∗−

0.8

45

(3.1

54)

(3.0

91)

Nat

ion

alch

auvin

ism

0.6

91

1.9

61

(2.8

45)

(2.7

88)

Inte

rcep

t48

.374∗∗

∗48.9

43∗

∗∗46.7

06∗

∗∗41.2

46∗

∗∗40.3

13∗

∗∗41.9

75∗∗

∗

(4.0

13)

(4.6

76)

(4.4

49)

(3.9

19)

(4.5

71)

(4.3

61)

N1,

001

1,0

01

1,0

01

1,0

01

1,0

01

1,0

01

R2

0.025

0.0

29

0.0

34

0.0

23

0.0

25

0.0

25

∗ p<

.1;∗∗

p<

.05;

∗∗∗ p

<.0

1.A

llco

effici

ents

an

dst

an

dard

erro

rsre

port

edfr

om

OL

Sm

od

els.

11

ranges from −1.9 to −2.2 percentage points. In contrast, the next three sets of models show

that gender has no statistically significant association with perceptions of competence. Age

is significantly related with perceptions of both warmth and competence. Since potential

generational effects may be nonlinear, we test for potential nonlinearities by estimating a

generalized additive model with a nonparametric smoothing spline on the effects of age, the

results for which are shown in Figure 3.24 Despite modeling the effects of age more flexibly,

it nonetheless depicts a straightforward linear effect: younger respondents perceive North

Koreans as relatively colder than respondents from older generations, as well as relatively

less competent. On the whole, then, the relatively neutral average stereotypes shown in Fig-

ure 2 are partially a function of generational divides, with younger respondents displaying

more negative stereotypes about North Koreans than older respondents.

Figure 3: Effects of age on stereotypes about North Koreans

20 30 40 50 60 70 80

-15

-10

-50

510

15

Age

Warmth

20 30 40 50 60 70 80

-15

-10

-50

510

15

Age

Competence

Figure 3 plots the effects of respondents’ age on their perceptions of North Koreans’ warmth and compe-tence; to account for potential nonlinear effects, the results here come from a generalized additive modelwith a nonparametric smoothing spline on the effects of age. Nonetheless, age displays a straightforwardlinear effect. Younger respondents perceive North Koreans as relatively colder and less competent, whileolder respondents perceive North Koreans as relatively warmer and more competent.

Interestingly, education is not significantly associated with stereotypes about North

Koreans, but income is. The wealthiest category of respondents are significantly more likely

24. Luke Keele, Semiparametric Regression for the Social Sciences (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons,2008).

12

to perceive North Koreans as warmer than South Koreans are; a shift from the lowest to

highest income category in the survey is associated with a 29 percentage point increase

in perceptions of warmth. Political ideology is significantly associated with stereotypes of

North Koreans, for both warmth and competence: more conservative respondents display

significantly more negative stereotypes about North Koreans than more liberal respondents,

with the effects being larger for warmth (roughly an 8.0 percentage point difference) than for

competence (roughly a 5.7 percentage point difference). Once income is controlled for, social

class is not significantly associated with stereotypes of North Koreans, while respondents

living in Seoul display 3.7−4.0 percentage point increase in positive stereotypes with respect

to both warmth and competence.

The next set of predictor variables estimate the effects of a variety of political orienta-

tions. Social dominance orientation is a psychological trait that measures beliefs in social

and economic inequality.25 Individuals high in social dominance believe in the inevitability

of hierarchies, and of the powerful dominating the weak, and thus tend to be economically

conservative and opposed to social welfare programs.26 As one might expect, respondents

high in social dominance orientation demonstrate more negative stereotypes about North

Koreans, particularly with respect to perceptions of warmth. In contrast, right wing author-

itarianism — a psychological construct measuring beliefs in respect for authority, tradition,

and social control — is not significantly associated with respondents’ stereotypes.27 The final

two covariates refer to two different facets of national identity. National attachment refers to

the extent to which respondents identify with their nation, whereas national superiority or

chauvinism refers to the extent to which they view it as superior to others.28 Interestingly,

national superiority is never significantly associated with stereotypes about North Kore-

ans, but national attachment is: the more being South Korean forms an important part of

25. Felicia Pratto et al., “Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Po-litical Attitudes,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67, no. 4 (1994): 741–763; Jim Sidanius andFelicia Pratto, Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2001).

26. John Duckitt and Chris G. Sibley, “A Dual-Process Motivational Model of Ideology, Politics, andPrejudice,” Psychological Inquiry 20 (2009): 98–109.

27. Bob Altemeyer, Right-wing Authoritarianism (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1981).28. Richard K. Herrmann, Pierangelo Isernia, and Paolo Segatti, “Attachment to the Nation and Interna-

tional Relations: Probing the Dimensions of Identity and their Relationship to War and Peace,” PoliticalPsychology 30, no. 5 (2009): 721–754.

13

respondents’ identities, the less warm they perceive North Koreans to be.

Figure 4: Effects of age on dehumanization of North Koreans

20 30 40 50 60 70 80

-15

-10

-50

510

15

Age

Hum

an u

niqu

enes

s

20 30 40 50 60 70 80

-15

-10

-50

510

15

AgeH

uman

nat

ure

Figure 4 plots the effects of respondents’ age on human uniqueness and human nature dehumanization ofNorth Koreans. As in Figure 3, to account for potential nonlinear effects, the results here come from ageneralized additive model with a nonparametric smoothing spline on the effects of age. The left-hand panelshows no significant effect of age on human uniqueness dehumanization, while the right-hand panel displaysa straightforward linear effect for human nature dehumanization. Just as younger respondents in Figure 3perceived North Koreans as relatively colder, here we find that younger respondents deny human naturetraits like warmth and curiosity to North Koreans at relatively greater rates, whereas older respondentsdehumanize North Koreans less.

Table 2 conducts a similar analysis as Table 1, but regressing dehumanization scores

on demographic variables and political orientations. Models 1-3 focus on the effects of these

covariates on human uniqueness judgments, while models 4-6 turn to human nature de-

humanization. The results show that although stereotype content and dehumanization are

related concepts, they have different patterns of relationships with the covariates. The only

significant predictors of human uniqueness dehumanization in models 1-3 are social dom-

inance orientation and national attachment. Respondents with the highest levels of social

dominance orientation are 4.0−5.5 points higher in human uniqueness dehumanization than

respondents with the lowest levels of social dominance orientation. And, respondents higher

in national attachment dehumanize along the human uniqueness dimension significantly less.

In contrast, we find more significant results in models 4-6 that examine the predictors of

human nature dehumanization, the dimension we saw the greatest levels of dehumanization

14

Tab

le2:

Pre

dic

tors

of

deh

um

an

izati

on

Hu

man

un

iqu

enes

sH

um

an

natu

re

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Mal

e0.

865

0.7

52

0.6

69

0.9

35

0.9

30

1.0

72

(0.7

11)

(0.7

12)

(0.7

09)

(0.9

34)

(0.9

38)

(0.9

36)

Age

−0.

008

−0.0

14

−0.0

01

−0.0

77∗∗

−0.0

73∗∗

−0.0

92∗

∗∗

(0.0

26)

(0.0

26)

(0.0

26)

(0.0

34)

(0.0

34)

(0.0

34)

Ed

uca

tion

2.55

22.6

11

1.8

33

−10.4

22∗

∗∗−

10.6

73∗

∗∗−

9.9

95∗

∗∗

(2.2

76)

(2.2

83)

(2.2

66)

(2.9

88)

(3.0

08)

(2.9

90)

Inco

me

−12

.795

−12.4

14

−12.5

81

−3.9

84

−4.1

13

−3.3

43

(9.1

24)

(9.0

92)

(9.0

64)

(11.9

76)

(11.9

81)

(11.9

61)

Ideo

logy

−2.

538

−2.6

87

−2.3

65

−0.5

88−

0.4

86

−0.8

83

(1.8

72)

(1.8

67)

(1.8

61)

(2.4

58)

(2.4

60)

(2.4

55)

Cla

ss2.

208

1.8

65

2.1

63

−1.6

98

−1.7

17

−2.3

48

(1.9

77)

(1.9

82)

(1.9

87)

(2.5

95)

(2.6

12)

(2.6

22)

Seo

ul

0.558

0.4

90

0.7

54

−3.1

55∗∗

∗−

3.1

15∗∗

∗−

3.5

31∗

∗∗

(0.8

90)

(0.8

87)

(0.8

92)

(1.1

68)

(1.1

69)

(1.1

77)

Soci

ald

omin

ance

orie

nta

tion

5.5

21∗∗

∗4.0

27∗

−1.4

65

0.0

06

(2.0

30)

(2.0

75)

(2.6

75)

(2.7

38)

Rig

ht

win

gau

thor

itar

ian

ism

3.1

69

−3.1

36

(2.3

51)

(3.0

98)

Nat

ion

alat

tach

men

t−

6.3

64∗∗

∗6.4

39∗∗

(1.9

72)

(2.6

02)

Nat

ion

alch

auvin

ism

2.0

48

0.7

66

(1.7

79)

(2.3

47)

Inte

rcep

t0.

304

−3.2

32

1.0

50

24.6

06∗∗

∗26.8

90∗

∗∗21.5

17∗

∗∗

(2.5

21)

(2.9

30)

(2.7

82)

(3.3

09)

(3.8

61)

(3.6

71)

N1,

001

1,0

01

1,0

01

1,0

01

1,0

01

1,0

01

R2

0.009

0.0

18

0.0

27

0.0

290.0

30

0.0

36

∗ p<

.1;∗∗

p<

.05;

∗∗∗ p

<.0

1.A

llco

effici

ents

an

dst

an

dard

erro

rsre

port

edfr

om

OL

Sm

od

els.

15

in Figure 2. Here, older respondents dehumanize North Koreans less than their younger

counterparts. To test for nonlinear generational effects, we estimate the effects of age flexibly

using a nonparametric smoothing spline in Figure 4, which finds, as before, a relatively

straightforward linear effect. Interestingly, the pattern here corresponds with the effect of age

on perceived warmth: younger respondents dehumanize North Koreans more with respect to

human nature traits — traits like curiosity, emotion and agency that are typically associated

with warmth. Younger South Koreans thus are less likely to perceive North Koreans as

fellow humans, and more likely to perceive them as machine or robot-like. Similar patterns

are shown in models 4-6 of Table 2 with respect to education: the most educated South

Koreans attribute human nature traits to North Koreans 10−10.5 points less than the least

educated respondents; residents of Seoul dehumanize North Koreans 3.2 − 3.5 points less.

Finally, respondents high in national attachment dehumanized North Koreans significantly

more than their less nationalist counterparts.

How do South Koreans’ perceptions of North Koreans shape their

attitudes towards unification?

While understanding South Koreans’ perceptions of North Koreans is important in its own

right, it is particularly important if these stereotypes influence South Koreans’ policy pref-

erences. Table 3 explores the relationship between perceptions and policy attitudes towards

reunification. Survey respondents were asked a series of twelve items measuring their sup-

port for unification (including statements such as “It is my sincere wish that the two Koreas

be unified”, and “Even if we couldn’t witness the unification in our life time, we must endure

through all means to achieve the grand goal of unification.”); parallel axis factoring with

varimax rotation finds that that 10 of the items load neatly on a two-factor solution, where

one factor refers to respondents’ general levels of support for reunification (e.g. disagreeing

with statements like “It is better to stay divided than to unify two Koreas.”), and the other

to respondents’ self-described willingness to personally sacrifice in order to achieve reunifi-

cation (e.g. agreeing with statements like “I am in favor of raising taxes to cover the costs

16

of reunification.”)29

Table 3: Predictors of attitudes towards unification

Support for reunification Personal sacrifice for unification

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Male −0.023∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)

Age 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗

(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)Education 0.080∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.072∗∗

(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)Income 0.151 0.130 0.151 0.339∗∗ 0.296∗∗ 0.327∗∗

(0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.144) (0.142) (0.144)Ideology −0.068∗∗ −0.061∗∗ −0.068∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗

(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)Class −0.056∗ −0.057∗ −0.058∗ 0.005 0.001 0.005

(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)Seoul 0.007 0.004 0.004 −0.010 −0.017 −0.012

(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)Warmth 0.075∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗

(0.037) (0.038)Competence 0.0003 0.058

(0.038) (0.038)Human uniqueness 0.015 −0.080

(0.053) (0.055)Human nature −0.104∗∗ −0.089∗∗

(0.041) (0.042)Intercept 0.422∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗

(0.039) (0.042) (0.049) (0.040) (0.042) (0.050)N 995 995 995 995 995 995R2 0.046 0.052 0.052 0.094 0.121 0.101

∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. All coefficients and standard errors reported from OLS models.

Table 3 thus estimates the effect of stereotypes and dehumanization on both general

support for reunification and willingness to sacrifice for reunification (operationalized using

factor scores for more precise estimates),30 controlling for a set of demographic character-

istics. Models 1-3 focus on support for reunification more generally, while models 4-6 turn

29. The two factor solution produces a good fit according to standard model fit criteria: RMSEA: 0.042,TLI=0.976. Two items were dropped due to cross-loading. See Kristopher J. Preacher et al., “Choosing theOptimal Number of Factors in Exploratory Factor Analysis: A Model Selection Perspective,” MultivariateBehavioral Research 48, no. 1 (2013): 28–56

30. Joshua D. Kertzer et al., “Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes,” Journalof Politics 76, no. 3 (2014): 825–840.

17

to a willingness to personally sacrifice for unification. For ease of interpretability, all covari-

ates except for age have been rescaled from 0-1. Model 1 estimates the effects of a set of

basic demographic covariates on support for reunification, showing that male respondents,

younger respondents, the less educated, the upper-class, and the more conservative are less

supportive of unification. Model 2 adds covariates for our two stereotype content measures.

Importantly, the warmer the image South Korean respondents have towards North Korea,

the more supportive they are of unification: respondents with the warmest images of North

Koreans are 7.5 percentage points more supportive of reunification than respondents with

the coolest images, even when controlling for all of the demographic covariates listed above.

Perceived competence has no significant effect. Model 3 adds the dehumanization measures

instead, showing a significant effect for human nature dehumanization. Respondents who

deny human nature traits to the North Koreans are significantly less supportive of reunifi-

cation; in a multivariate regression context, the respondents who dehumanize the most are

10.4 percentage points less supportive than those who dehumanize the least.

Model 4 replicates model 1, but this time estimating the effects of the demographic

covariates on respondents’ willingness to personally sacrifice for unification. Similar to the

results in model 1, male respondents, younger respondents, the less educated, the lower-

income, and the more conservative are less willing to sacrifice for unification. Adding the

stereotype measures in model 5 yields similar results as in model 2, although stronger in

magnitude: respondents who perceive the North Korean people to be warmer express sig-

nificantly more willingness to sacrifice for unification; controlling for the other demographic

covariates, the respondents with the warmest images of North Koreans display a 13.0 per-

centage point increase in reported willingness to sacrifice than the respondents with the

coolest images. As before, images of competence are not significantly associated with ex-

pressed willingness to sacrifice. Turning to the dehumanization measures in model 6, we

gain find evidence of significant negative effects of human nature dehumanization: the more

respondents dehumanize North Korean respondents mechanistically, the less willing they

are to sacrifice for unification. Respondents who dehumanized the North Korean people

the most expressed 8.9 percentage points less willingness to sacrifice for unification than

18

respondents who dehumanized the North Korean people the least.

Conclusion

This chapter borrowed from a range of theoretical frameworks from political psychology —

including image theory, stereotypes, and dehumanization — to explore the nature, origins,

and consequences of South Korean perceptions about North Koreans. First, it looked at

the images that South Koreans have of North Koreans, showing that South Koreans have

a neutral image of North Koreans overall, but nonetheless perceive North Korean citizens

to be significantly less competent and significantly less warm than South Koreans. This is

somewhat different than how the South Koreans perceive the Japanese people, who are per-

ceived as being similarly competent as South Koreans, but less warm. In contrast, both the

North Koreans and the Japanese are dehumanized by South Koreans in similar ways, with

respect to human nature traits, rather than human uniqueness traits: they are dehumanized

mechanistically, rather than animalistically. With both stereotypes and dehumanization,

however, there is considerable variation in respondents’ perceptions, raising the question of

how this variation should be best explained theoretically.

Thus, the second set of analyses turned to the demographic and dispositional correlates

of respondents’ perceptions, finding evidence of stark generational divides, with younger

Koreans displaying more negative stereotypes and greater levels of dehumanization than

older Koreans. With stereotypes, similar patterns are also displayed by male respondents,

ideologically conservative respondents, and Korean residents outside of Seoul, while human

nature dehumanization is highest amongst the less educated, and respondents who do not

live in Seoul. The third set of analyses shows that these patterns are politically consequential:

even when controlling for a range of demographic variables, South Koreans who perceived

North Koreans as less warm, or who dehumanized them with respect to human nature traits,

were significantly less supportive of reunification, and expressed significantly less willingness

to make personal sacrifices in order for unification to occur. Taken together, these findings

highlight the applicability of these theoretical frameworks to the study of inter-Korean

19

relations, and showcase the importance of the study of perceptions in international relations

more broadly.

20