mont fleur scenarios

8/10/2019 Mont Fleur Scenarios

1/26

DEEPER

NEWS

DEEPER

NEWS

The Mont Fleur ScenarioWhat wi ll South Africa be like in the year 200

with a new introducti on by Mont Fleur facili tator, Adam Kah

VOLUME7NUMBER1

VOLUME7NUMBER1


2/26

DEEPERNEWS EDITORSJenny Beery

Esther Eidinow

Nancy Murphy

ART DIRECTOR

Pete Allen Cocke

ADDRESS

Global Business Network5900-X Hollis Street

Emeryville CA 94608

PHONE

510.547.6822

FAX

510.547.8510

URL

http: //www.gbn.o rg

COMMENTSAND SUGGESTIONS

Nancy Murphy

nmurphy@ gbn.org

The Mont Fleur Scenarios

DEEPER NEWS (formerly pub-

lished as THE DEEPER

NEWS ) is a series of articles

published by Global Business

Network

DEEPER NEWS and THE DEEPER

NEWS are registered trade-marks of Global Business

Network


3/26


4/26

important figures delivering the messages, and howthis group worked together to arrive at these messages.The approach was indirect and the results subtle:

Mont Fleur did not resolve the crisis inSouth Africa. The project, along with other,

non-scenario forum processes, contributedto the establishment of a common vocabu-lary and mutual understanding. The sharedlanguage of Mont Fleur extended beyondthe negotiating elite, and was thus able toinclude such dialogues as an exhortation toFlamingos in a Sunday church sermon and aconcern raised about Lame Duckon a ruralradio phone-in. This kind of commonunderstanding, together with many otherfactors, promoted agreement upon a settle-

ment to the crisis.

The participants did not agree upon a con-crete solution to the countrys problems.They reached a consensus on some aspectsof how South Africa worked, on the com-plex nature of the crisis, and on some of thepossible outcomes of the current conditions.More specifically, they agreed that, given theprevailing circumstances, certain stronglyadvocated solutions could not work, includ-ing armed revolution, continued minority

rule (Ostrich), tightly circumscribed majorityrule (Lame Duck), and socialism (Icarus). Asa result of this process of elimination, thebroad outline of a feasible and desirable out-come emerged (Flamingos).

The process was not a formal, mandatednegotiation. Rather, it was an informal,open conversation. At the first workshop,some of the participants expected toencounter difficulties in agreeing on any-thing. Over the course of the meetings,

they talked until they found areas of sharedunderstanding and agreement, several ofwhich were relevant to the formal negotia-tions which were occurring simultaneously.

It did not deal with the differences amongthe participants. Negotiation tends to focuson identifying the positions and interests of

the parties and then finding a way to narrowor reconcile these differences. The MontFleur process, in contrast, only discussed thedomain that all of the participants had incommon: the future of South Africa. Theteam then summarized this shared under-

standing in the scenarios. The aim of suchnon-negotiating processes is, as MarvinWeisbord, an organizational consultant, hasstated, to find and enlarge the commonground.

Results from the Project

The Mont Fleur project produced several differenttypes of results: substantive messages, informal net-works and understandings, and changed ways of

thinking. The primary public output of the projectwas the group of scenarios, each of which had a mes-sage that was important to South Africans in 1992:

The message ofOstrichwas that a non-nego-tiated resolution of the crisis would not besustainable. This was important because ele-ments of the National Party (NP) govern-ment and the business community wishedto believe that a deal with their allies,instead of a negotiation with their oppo-nents, could be sufficient. After hearing

about the teams work, NP leader F.W. deKlerk was quoted as saying, I am not anOstrich.

Lame Ducksmessage was that a weak coali-tion government would not be able to deliv-er and therefore could not last. This wasimportant because the nature, composition,and rules governing the Government ofNational Unity (GNU) were a central issuein the pre-election negotiations. The NPwanted the GNU to operate subject tovetoes and other restrictions, and the ANCwanted unfettered winner takes all rules.Lame Duckexplored the boundary in aGNU between compromise and incapacita-tion.

Icaruswarned of the dangers of a new gov-ernment implementing populist economic

DEEPERNEWS

2


5/26

policy. This messagecoming from a teamwhich included several of the lefts mostinfluential economistswas very challeng-ing to the left, which had assumed that gov-ernment money could be used to eradicatepoverty quickly. The business community,

which was worried about Icaruspolicies,found the teams articulation reassuring. Thefiscal conservatism of the GNU was one ofthe important surprises of the post-electionperiod.

The simple message of Flight of the Flamingoswas that the team believed in the potentialfor a positive outcome. In a country in themidst of turbulence and uncertainty, a credi-ble and optimistic story makes a strong

impact. One participant said recently thatthe main result of the project was that Wemapped out in very broad terms the outlineof a successful outcome, which is now beingfilled in. We captured the way forward ofthose committed to finding a way forward.

The second result of Mont Fleur was the creation ofinformal networks and understandings among theparticipantsan influential group from across thepolitical spectrumthrough the time they spenttogether. These connections were standard for this

forum period, and cumulatively provided the basis forthe subsequent critical, formal agreements.

The third resultthe least tangible yet most funda-mentalwas the change in the language and thoughtof the team members and those with whom they dis-cussed their work. The Mont Fleur team gave vivid,concise names to important phenomena that were notwidely known, and previously could be neither dis-cussed nor addressed. At least one political partyreconsidered its approach to the constitutional negoti-ations in light of the scenarios.

Why the Project Produced These Results

How can such a simple story-telling process producethese kinds of results?A scenario conversation has sev-eral characteristics that make it powerful:

The scenario process is logical. There is noplace in the core of a scenario conversationfor positions or values. Instead the discus-sion is about facts and logic: can you con-vince your fellow team members that thestory you are putting forward is plausible?

In the first Mont Fleur workshop, a storyabout the Chinese Red Army helping to lib-erate South Africa fell away on thesegrounds, rather than on the basis of prefer-ences.

The process is open and informal. Buildingscenarios can be creative because the processis only about telling stories, not aboutmaking commitments. This allows people todiscuss almost anything, even taboo sub-

jects. Early in the Mont Fleur process, oneof the ANC members proposed a storycalled The Chilean Option: Growththrough Repression (a play on the ANCslogan, Growth through Redistribution).This precipitated an important discussionwhich would not have had a place in a nor-mal left-wing party political debate.

The process is inclusive and holistic. A storyabout the future has to be able to encom-pass all aspects of the world: social, political,

economic, cultural, ecological, etc.Moreover, the process of telling several sto-ries encourages people to surface and listento multiple perspectives. In discussing a fun-damentally unpredictable future, there is noone truth; this accords respect for the pointsof view of all of the participants (in a con-flict, one or more parties is usually not beingheard) and it allows everyone to see more ofthe world. Poet Betty Sue Flowers says thatworking with a set of scenarios is like havingthree or four different pairs of glasses, andthat practicing putting them on and offmakes it easier for an individual also to seethe world a fifth and sixth way.

The process elicits choices. One of thepremises of scenario thinking is that thefuture is not predetermined and cannot bepredicted, which means, therefore, that the

DEEPERNEWS

3


6/26

choices we make can influence what hap-pens. In a situation where people feel sweptalong by overwhelming, inevitable currents,this is an empowering world view. Duringits transition, South Africa was haunted byapocalyptic visions; the scenario stories

helped people rationally think through theiroptions.

The process is constructive. A scenario con-versation turns the attention of a groupaway from the past and presentwhere thedebate is often miredtoward the future. Itshifts from looking for The Solution toexploring different possibilities, and fromthe separate interests of the parties (as innegotiation) to their common ground (the

future in which they all will live).

Pierre Wack, who pioneered scenario planning atRoyal Dutch/Shell, said that scenario work involvesthe gentle art of reperceiving. These characteristicsmean that a scenario process can facilitate shifts inlanguage, thinking, and action. Each of these refram-ings provides for a more constructive basis for work-ing on difficult issues.

Conditions Necessary for a SuccessfulScenario Effort

The most important element required for the successof this type of scenario project is proper timing: arepublic leaders ready to talk together about the future?If there is readiness, then two other things becomecritical: how the process is led and how the team iscomposed.

The process must be:

Credible. The people who convene and leadthe project must be broadly respected. Theymust be seen as advocates of the process andnot of any particular position or outcome.

Informal and reflective. A scenario exercise isa Track Two process, which must be sepa-rate from (parallel or prior to) Track Oneformal negotiations. The power of scenariowork comes from its status as an exercise in

reflection and imagination, which is notdirectly linked to action. Therefore,although it is possible to follow on fromconstructing scenarios (what might happen)to creating a vision (what we want to hap-pen), and then to planning action (what we

will do), these processes must be carefullyinsulated from one another.

Inclusive. The value of these projects is thatthey build the common ground among dif-ferent perspectives and parties. It is thereforeimportant to be as inclusive as possible. TheMont Fleur project was unfortunatelydiminished by its failure to include theInkatha Freedom Party, which has been animportant dissenter in South African poli-

tics.

The team needs to be:

Respectedcomposed of leaders who areinfluential in their own communities orconstituencies. They need not hold officialpositions.

Open-minded (in particular, not fundamen-talist) and able to listen to and work withothers.

Representative of all the important perspec-tives on the issues at hand. Any stakeholdermust be able to see their point of view rep-resented by someone on the team, thoughthey need not be formal representatives ofthese groups or positions.

Conclusion

The Mont Fleur exercise demonstrated the informal,indirect scenario approach to be an innovative andproductive method for a society in conflict toapproach the future. This approach is different fromand complementary to negotiation. As this projectdemonstrates, it is a promising tool for futureattempts to reach public consensus.

DEEPERNEWS

4


7/26

Adam KahaneCentre for Generative Leadership L.L.C.205 Willow StreetHamilton, MA 01982 [email protected]

Adam Kahane is a founding partner of the

Centre for Generati ve Leadership (Boston), an

associate of the Centre for Innovative

Leadership (Johannesburg), and a member of

Global Business Network. An expert i n the

design and facil i tat ion of processes that help

people work together to ant icipate and effect

change, Adam served as the facili tator for the

Mont Fleur scenario project. He has worked as

a strategy consultant to publi c and pri vate

organizati ons and governments, companies,

poli ti cal organizations, NGOs, and mult i-stakeholder forums in more than thi rty coun-

tr ies around the world. He has held planni ng

and research positi ons in private companies,

academic insti tuti ons, and international agen-

cies, in Cape Town, Tokyo, London, Pari s,

Vienna, San Francisco, Vancouver, and

Toronto.

DEEPERNEWS

5


8/26


9/26

What will South Africa be like in the year2002?In this supplement to The WeeklyMail& The Guardi an Weekly, the Mont

Fleur Team identifies four possible pathways intoSouth Africas future. The idea is not to present defini-tive truths but stimulate debate about how to shapethe next 10 years.

Plotting Pathways into the Future

A successful outcome for South Africa is still possi-blethough there is no quick fix or panacea, con-cluded the Mont Fleur scenario team.

They also concluded that

muddling through is dan-gerous. A decisive democra-tic settlement is imperative.For South Africa to reverseits decline and take off,government policies willhave to be sustainable andsupport socio-economicgrowth and development.

These are the findings ofprobably the first scenarioexercise in the world of thisbroad scope undertaken bya left-of-center group.

Scenarios have generally been the planning preserve ofbig business. Political scenarios are far less common.

The Mont Fleur scenario exercise was sparked in mid-1991 by a request to economist Pieter le Roux toorganize (yet another) major conference on SouthAfricas economic future.

Le Roux, director of the Institute for SocialDevelopment at the University of the Western Cape(UWC), felt it was time for a different approach.

He put together a multi-disciplinary team of 22 peo-ple to work on possible scenarios for South Africa. Todo this he worked with Vincent Maphai, UWC polit-

ical science head, and consulted members of the ANCand PAC.

The team included political office bearers, academics,trade unionists, and business people. It met for thefirst time at Mont Fleur near Stellenbosch inSeptember 1991. Adam Kahane of Shell Internationalin London, a recognized expert on scenario planning,acted as facilitator and the exercise was funded by theFriedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Swiss DevelopmentAgency.

After two further meetings at Mont Fleur (inNovember 1991 and March 1992) and a lot of work

in between, the team

reached consensus on theessential elements of fourcore scenarios South Africamight follow between19922002.

After further refinement,the scenarios were launchedin August 1992. They havesince been presented to awide range of audiences,including the national exec-utive committees of theANC and PAC, theNational Party, key govern-ment departments, major

corporations, and financial institutions.

The team analyzed South Africas social, political, andeconomic crises and compiled 30 possible storiesabout the course of events during the next decade.These included stories of revolution, economic growththrough repression, right-wing revolts, and free-mar-

ket utopias. The 30 stories were carefully scrutinizedand sifted in terms of criteria such as plausibility andinternal consistency. Nine stories survived and thesewere pared down to four by the end of the secondmeeting.

The scenarios describe what might happen to SouthAfrica. They are not blue-prints, but possible futurespresented to stimulate debate and to emphasize that

DEEPERNEWS

7

Based on my experience in str ate-gic planning, this is one of t he mostmeaningful and exciting scenarioplann ing exercises ever undertaken.The project has shown that a groupof experts and leaders wit h very dif-ferent perspectives and back-grounds can develop a commonunderstanding of what is going onnow in South Africa and m ight (andshould) go into the future. Thisseems to m e to be a very positi vesign for the futu re of t he country.

Adam Kahane,Mont Fleur Facilit ator

The Mont Fleur Scenarios by Pieter le Roux, Vincent Maphai, et al.


10/26

South Africas future will be shaped by the decisionsand actions of the major players.

The name Mont Fleur scenarios was selected toindicate that the scenarios belong to the group thatmet at Mont Fleur and not to a specific institution or

organization. Team members participated in their per-sonal capacities.

The word scenario is often misused to mean eventor situation.

In fact, scenarios describe alternative pathways intothe future. They project a range of possible outcomesand enable people to think about the future in differ-ent ways. They do not predict what will happen butidentify what may happen.

Plausible scenarios must be internally consistent andbased on credible interpretations of present trends.Scenarios are a strategic planning tool. They identifywhat has to be done to secure a desired outcome.Scenarios imply the future is not fixed but can beshaped by decisions andactions of individuals, organi-

zations, and insti tutions.Scenarios are used to:

Avoid being caught offguard

Challenge conventionalmental maps about thefuture

Recognize signs ofchange

Test strategies for sustain-ability in different cir-

cumstances

There is no standard methodof developing scenarios. It is acreative process that harnessesthe expertise of the peopleinvolved (see above). For a

successful scenario planning exercise it is important toset up a skilled team who can:

Understand the present

Identify the predictable elements about thefuture

Identify plausible possible pathways into thefuture

Take cognizance of divergent views

DEEPERNEWS

8 8

What Scenarios Mean

Scenari os encou rage di sci-plin ed, systematic t hinkingabout the fut ure. A criticalro le of scenarios is to p re-

sent dif ferent possibl e path-ways into the futur e to chal-lenge conventional thinki ngand to encourage debate ina process of l earni ng.

Koosum Kalyan, Shel l

The Scenario Process

First team workshopSeptember 1991

Second team workshop November 1991

Third team workshop March 1992

Team members ideas

Brainstorming 30initial ideas

9 preliminary stories

Assessment

Consultation Consultation

Research Research

4 draftscenarios

4 finalscenarios

Refinement

Dissemination, debate, and use


11/26


12/26

The political, economic, and social elements of thecurrent crisis are locked in a downward spiral ofmutual cause and effect. Simultaneous intervention atall three levels is needed to reverse it.

The team argued that if the trends of the past 10 to

15 years cannot be reversed, South Africas problemsare likely to be insoluble before the end of the decade.A political settlement and a new growth path are pre-requisites for progress.

The Mont Fleur teams point of departure was thecurrent negotiation process.

Underlying these scenarios is the assumption that themajor parties are engaged in negotiations partlybecause they understand the dangers of irreversibledecline, and partly because the international climatestrongly favors a negotiated settlement in SouthAfrica.

The team foresaw four possible outcomes (see graph-ic) depending on the answers to three crucial ques-tions.

Will negotiations result in

a settlement?If not, anon-representative gov-ernment (Ostrich)willemerge.

Will the transition berapid and decisive?Ifnot, there will be anincapacitated govern-ment (Lame Duck).

Will the democratic gov-ernments policies be sus-tainable?If not, collapseis inevitable (Icarus); ifthe new governmentadopts sustainable poli-cies, South Africa can

achieve inclusive democracy and growth(Flight of the Flamingos).

The images were chosen to make fairly abstract politi-cal and economic concepts accessible.

DEEPERNEWS

10

Possible Future Paths

Negotiatio

ns

Lame Duck

Flight of the Flamingos

Settlement

NoSettlement

Incapacitatedgovernment

Macro-economicpopulism

Inclusive democracyand growth

Icarus

Non-representati vegovernment

Ostrich

It is understandable thatbusiness would p refer a longtransition. However, theunintended consequence ofthis is that it p rolo ngs uncer-tainty of what a futur e gov-ernment wil l do. For theeconomy to t ake off a deci-sive polit ical settlement f ol-lowed by good government isimperative.

Johann Liebenberg,Chamber of M ines

Four Possible Pathways


13/26

As a result of the steps taken by the De KlerkGovernment and the outcome of the white referen-dum, the international community becomes moretolerant towards white South Africa, and theNational Party in particular.

In light of this, the Government hardens its negotia-tion position. At the same time the liberation move-ment is perceived to be too radical and loses supportinternationally. The liberation movements maintaintheir bottom line. A stand-off results and constitu-tional negotiations break down.

The government decides to form a new moderatealliance government which is unacceptable to the lib-eration movements. This results in mass resistancewhich the State suppresses by force.

Although large-scale sanctions are not reimposed, theeconomy remains in the doldrums because of massiveresistance to the new constitutions. This resistanceleads to escalating repression and violence, and thebusiness climate worsens. This in turn leads to eco-nomic stagnation and decline, accompanied by aflight of capital and skills.

The government also fails to deliver on the socialfront. Resistance and unrest render effective socialspending impossible and large outlays are requiredmerely to maintain the status quo. Because societysmajor inequalities are not addressed, the vicious cyclecontinues. Eventually the various parties are probablyforced back to the negotiation table, but under worsesocial, political, and economic conditions than before.

Possible outcomes ofOstrichinclude a Lebanonization of

South Africa, with differentwarlords controlling variousregions; or, eventually, a suc-cessful insurrection. But thesepossibilities were given lessweight than a return to nego-tiations under conditionswhere the downward cyclemight have rendered manyproblems insoluble.

Any observer will immediate-ly recognize elements of thisscenario in South Africascourse of events since May1992.

However,Ostrichwas piecedtogether a mere 10 days afterthe overwhelming yes-vote in

DEEPERNEWS

11

Stuck in the Past

Ostrich Scenario

Non-representative Government

STANDOFF

International communitytoo radical

Liberation movementmaintains the bottom line

Negotiations break down

Moderate alliance government

Resistance

Repressionand violence

Negativebusiness climate

Economicstagnation

The crisis worsens

Back to negotiations

No socialdelivery

International communitytolerant

Government inflexible

The first scenario, Ostrich, depicts a government that

does not want to face realities. An ostrich supposedly

hides its head in the sand when danger threatens. The

ostrich does not want to see, cannot fly, but has to lift

its head in the end.


14/26

the white referendum, when most observers were con-vinced an interim government was only months away.

If it had been presented as a possible outcome at thatstate, it would probably have been rejected by mostaudiences as implausible and inconsistent with the

facts. That the team felt Ostrich was still plausiblepoints to one of the major advantages of the scenarioplanning method. Instead of trying to forecast thefuture (usually within a particular ideological para-digm or mindset) the scenario method points to anevaluation of all significant possibilities even if itrequires what might seem to be counter-intuitivethinking.

DEEPERNEWS

12

Political compromises areneeded to arri ve at the polit -ical settlement which is a

precondition for economictake off. However a settle-ment which seriously inca-pacitates the democraticgovernment wil l lead to thelame duck.

Tito Mboweni, ANC

There is an ur gent need fo ra comprehensive politicalsettl ement and for sustain-able economic policies inSouth Africa, otherwise wewil l add South Afri ca to thealready dismal economicdevelopment record ofAfrica.Mosebyane Malatsi, PAC


15/26

Various forces and considerations drive the major par-ties towards a negotiated settlement. The present gov-ernment, for example, recognizes the necessity orinevitability of extending full political rights to thedisenfranchised but fears irresponsible government.This fear is shared by some of the major internationalactors.

On the other hand, the liberation movements fear thereturn to repressive minority rule if they do not makesignificant compromises. Such considerations lead to atransitional arrangement with a variety of sunsetclauses, slowly phasing out elements of the presentsystem, as well as minority vetoes and other checksand balances aimed at preventing irresponsible gov-ernment.

Such a long transition of enforced coalition is likelyto incapacitate government because of the probabilityof lowest common denominator decision-making,resulting in indecisive policies. It purports to respondto all, but satisfies none. In consequence, the socialand economic crisis is inadequately addressed.

Even if the transitional government succeeds in beinggoal-directed and effective, it will still be incapacitatedbecause of the logic of a long transition. Uncertaintywill grow on the nature of the government to emergeafter the transition. Regardless of how moderate thedeclarations of the majority parties in the coalitionmay be, fears of radical economic policies after theperiod of long transition will remain. Investors willhold back, and there will be insufficient growth anddevelopment.

Ironically, the unintended

consequence of a long transi-tion is to create uncertaintyrather than to enhance confi-dence in the future.

DEEPERNEWS

13

Lame Duck Scenario

Insufficientgrowth

The vicious cir cle of poli ti cal, economic and social cri ses worsens

Lowest common denominator decision-making Indecisive policies Purports to respond to all, satisfies none

Uncertantity because of long transitionInvestors hold back

Social crisisinadequatelyaddressed

Long transition Poli tical sett lement All party coalition Sunset clauses

The second scenario, Lame Duck, envisages a formal, protracted transi-

tion lasting for most of the coming decade. The image is that of a bird

with a broken wing. No matter how hard it tries, it cannot get off the

ground, and thus has an extremely uncertain future.

The Lame Duck of a Long Transition


16/26

Icarus was the son o f Daedalus, an Atheni an craft s-

man of nob le ancestr y, renowned for his ingenui ty.

King Minos of Crete asked Daedalus to build a

Labyri nth fr om which no exit could be found. When

their f ri endship turned to enmity, King Minos imp ris-

oned Daedalus and Icarus in the Labyrint h. Hoping to

escape, Daedalus crafted tw o pairs of feathered wings

and he attached them to their shoulders wi th wax.Daedalus warned h is son not t o fl y too close to t he sun,

bu t Icarus, exhilarated by his flight to fr eedom , flew

higher and higher. The wax melted and he pl ummeted

to h is death in to the sea.

Fly Now, Crash Later

The government embarks on a massive spending spreeto meet all the backlogs inherited from the past. Itimplements food subsidies, price and exchange con-trols, and institutes other quick fix policies.

The initial results are spectacular growth, increasedliving standards, improved social conditions, little or

no increase in inflation, and increased political sup-port.

But after a year or two the program runs into bud-getary, monetary, and balance of payments con-straints. The budget deficit well exceeds 10 percent.Depreciations, inflation, economic uncertainty, andcollapse follow. The country experiences an economic

crisis of hitherto unknown proportions which resultsin social collapse and political chaos.

Either the government does a 180-degree about-turn(while appealing to the International Monetary Fundand the World Bank for assistance) or it is removedfrom office. The likely result is a return to authoritari-anism and an abandonment of the noble intentionsthat originally prevailed.

Perhaps the most sobering aspect of this scenario ofspectacular boom and bust is that the very peoplewho were supposed to benefit from the program endup being worse off than before.

As in the case of Lame Duck, the Icarus(fly now, crashlater) scenario is bedeviled by unintended conse-

DEEPERNEWS

14

Icarus: A Myth with a Message

The third scenario is one of macro-economic populism. The team called it Icarus, after the

Greek mythical figure. This is the scenario of a popularly elected democratic government

which tr ies to achieve too much too quickly. It has noble origins and good intentions but

pays insufficient attent ion to economic forces.


17/26

quences. The governments inten-tion is to provide rapidly for thesocial and economic needs of thepeople. However, because macro-economic discipline is not main-tained, this strategy leads to eco-

nomic collapse, and in the endthe government is able to give farless social support than wouldhave been possible had it notattempted to fly so high so fast.

As in the case of many LatinAmerican countries, it is quitepossible that some form ofauthoritarian regime couldemerge from this conflict. Right-

wing armies often stage coupsunder such conditions, claiming aneed to restore law and order. Thedemocratic government itselfcould become more authoritarianonce its ability to buy supportthrough populist policies is eroded, or it could bereplaced at the next election by a more conservativegovernment. The group did not attempt to predictthe composition of the government which would fol-low in the wake of Icarus policies, except to speculatethat it will be authoritarian.

Icarus Crashes

When governments spend more money than theyreceive, huge deficits induce an exhilarating spurt ofhigh economic growth.

This artificially-induced growth rate is not sustainable.More goods are demanded than are produced andmore imports are bought than the country can affordto pay for out of the money earned by exports.

Price controls and strict foreign exchange controls,brought into being to put a lid on these pressures, fail.Soon prices explode, the value of the currency fallsdramatically, and the economy slumps.

The most dramatic illustration of the catastrophicconsequences of such populist macro-economic poli-cies are provided by some Latin American countries.

The steeper the initial artificial growth spurt, thesteeper the eventual economic collapse seems to be.Inflation skyrockets to as much as 100 percent amonth.

Learning from Nicaragua

Progressive regimes often try too enthusiastically tochange everything overnight.

Quite aside from macro-economic problems, theyattempt more than they can accomplish.

DEEPERNEWS

15

Icarus Scenario

Macro-economic populism (fly now, crash later)

Populargovernment

Capacity constraints and imbalances

Some form ofauthoritarian rule?

Massive socialspending spree

Economic and social collapse


18/26

In an interview in 1986, Dora Maria Tellez, Ministerof Health in the Sandinista government, admitted theNicaraguan government had tried to move too fast.

Perhaps our greatest err or, if it canbe called an error...is that we

believed we could do mor e than waspossibl e in this period ...We thoughtwe could bui ld more hospit als andschools than we have buil t, and pr o-duce more t han we have prod uced.

There was a little romanticism...Later we realized that things taketime, and that in a countr y which hasbeen squeezed for decades likeNi caragua, you cannot fix everythingin seven years.

Michael Manley, former Jamaican president, com-

mented:

There are a lot of things we seemuch more clearly now. Numberone, in determi ning how much youcan try to accomp li sh, you just haveto l ook at what your capacity is, yourmanageri al capacity, your capacity toorganize. And we were frankly over-enthusiasti c. We just tr ied to do toomany things and we stretched thewhol e system fur ther than it couldgo.

DEEPERNEWS

16


19/26

A decisive political settlement, followed by good gov-ernment, creates conditions in which an initially slowbut sustainable economic and social take-off becomespossible. The key to the governments success is itsability to combine strategies that lead to significantimprovements in social delivery with policies that cre-ate confidence in the economy.

Access to world markets and relative regional stabilityfacilitates the flamingos, but South Africa does notreceive massive overseas investments or aid on thescale of a Marshall Plan.

The government adopts sound social and economicpolicies and observes macro-economic constraints. Itsucceeds in curbing corruption in government andraises efficiency levels.

It makes well-targeted socialinvestments which lead to adecrease in violence and givepeople confidence that many of the social needs willbe met in the longer term.

Once business is convinced that policies will remainconsistent in the years ahead, investment grows andemployment increases. Initially this growth is slow,because confidence does not return overnight, butover the years higher rates of growth are attained, andan average rate of growth of close to five percent isrealized over the period.

The overall income of the upper income groups growsbetween one and three percent a year, and that of thepoorer classes by an average of between six and ninepercent a year, mainly because of the increase in for-mal sector employment.

Although the growth rates areslower at the outset than that

of Icarus, the Flamingos soondeliver more.

From the outset processes aredeveloped which facilitatebroad participation. Theseprocesses create the condi-tions under which it is possi-ble to find a sound balancebetween social reconstructionand sustained economicgrowth. In spite of conflict

between different groups andclasses there is substantialagreement on broad objec-tives.

The team agreed to differ onthe ultimate destiny of Flightof the Flamingos. Some

DEEPERNEWS

17

Flight of the Flamingos

Political Settlement

Inclusive Democracy and Growth

Regional stability Access to world markets

Facilitating internationalenvironment

Clear and consistent policies Efficient not corrupt Observes macro-economic constraints

Good government

People have a sayBroad participation

More social investment Decrease in violence

Social reconstruction Business is confident Investment is high Employment increases

Sustained economic growth

The Flight of the Flamingos

This is the scenario of inclusive democracy and growth.

Flamingos characteristically take off slowly, fly high, and

fly together.


20/26

believed it would pave the way for a more radicallyleft-wing program; others saw it creating conditionsfor a more radically free market economy. Othersbelieved that Flight of the Flamingoscould prove to beso successful that South Africans may choose not todeviate from it.

Necessary Conditions for Take-off

There are a number ofdifferent blueprints, someof a more conservativeand some of a more radi-cal nature, that couldpotentially realize Fli ght ofthe Flamingos. The teamdid not attempt to devel-

op its own blueprint, butconsidered the necessaryconditions that need tobe met in the political,economic, and socialspheres by all the poten-tially successful blue-prints.

A culture of justice, abreak from authoritarian-ism, a bill of rights, and proportional representation

were seen as the necessary elements of the politicalsystem. In addition, it was agreed that effective partic-ipation is a basic element, but the group disagreed onhow this was to be brought about. Some favored theSwiss referendum system. Others saw tripartite negoti-ating forums as an essential element.

Although a market-oriented economy (not a freemarket economy) was accepted as a necessary condi-tion during the next decade, more radical memberssaw this as a means of keeping the socialist projectalive in the longer term.

Monetary and fiscal discipline is a prerequisite for suc-cessful economic development.

Foreign exchange earnings must also be increased bygrowth in exports and in tourism.

It was generally agreed that more efficient delivery sys-tems would be the cornerstone of increasingly effec-tive service provision. It would enable a governmentto deliver more at the same cost to the treasury.Further funding for social investments would have tobe provided by economic growth and redistribution.

Some members of the team accepted that, given thehistory of apartheid, some degree of redistribution was

necessary in order toequalize social spendingon whites and blacks, butin the longer run theyfavored free market-ori-ented policies. Othermembers of the teamfavored more radical

forms of redistribution.

It is obvious that thecurbing of violence, bet-ter training and schoolingand, in particular, betterprimary schools, as wellas increases in publichealth and nutrition arebasic elements of arestructured social sys-

tem. The empowerment of women is a prerequisite

for dealing with social problems such as rapid popula-tion growth, educational reconstruction, and thespread of AIDS.

Flamingos Dont Always Have a Smooth Flight

Five general points about Flamingos need emphasis.

The scenario is not a blueprint. In fact, whileteam members generally agreed on thebroad conditions required for success, theydiffered substantially on the detail.

The team recognized that it would be utopi-an to expect all the necessary conditions tobe fully met. Rather, the team believed thatthe outcome would depend on the degree ofprogress towards meeting the conditions.D

EEPERNEWS

18 18

The Flamingo scenario sketches thebare bones of a successful nationaldemocratic project of the kind that isfeasible under prevailin g conditions inSouth Afr ica. The gains impl ied underthi s scenari oredi str ibu ti ve pr ogramsand some empowerment and in volve-ment of working people in decisionmakingcould incrementally changethe balance of for ces in society andthus create favorable condit ions for thekind of broader and deeper t ransfor-mati ons socialists would favor. There isby now enough experience worldwidewhi ch point s to the need to take seri-ously the lessons imp li ed by the otherscenarios.

Rob Davies, UWC


21/26

The third point, therefore, is that the futureis not predetermined. It can be shaped bythe decisions and actions of the major play-ers.

The team was fully aware that various groups

(such as the right wing, alienated youth, a cor-rupt bureaucracy, trade unions, and disinvest-ing businessmen) each have the power to pre-vent the flock from becoming airborne.

Finally, it should be emphasized that eventhe most positive outcome is not a smoothflight.

DEEPERNEWS

19

South Afri ca can attain a decisive poli ti -

cal settl ement and an economi c take-off,

once all significant groups realize that we

wil l either fly together or crash t ogether.

Although many of the recent in ternation-

al examples of economic success were

realized under conditions of political

supp ression , there are a number of cases

where poli tical compromise has led to

socio -econom ic success. The most inter-

esting amongst these are Sweden and

Malaysia.

From 19201970, Sweden (whi ch start-

ed wit h a per capita income and unem-

ployment r ates simi lar to those of pre-

sent-day South Afri ca) experi enced eco-

nom ic grow th second onl y to Japan. The

socio-economic t ransformation w rought

in Sweden duri ng this period is hitherto

unparalleled.

Dur ing each of the past th ree decadesthe average annual rate of grow th of t he

Malaysian economy varied fr om 5.2 per -

cent to 8.3 percent. This was attained i n

spit e of the fact that Malaysia, at the start

of t he period, w as also a pr imar y goods

exporter. In addit ion , there were severe

tensions between the Chinese, who dom-

inated the economy, and the indi genous

population. Political compromise and

economi c restructur ing have led to a dra-

mati c increase in the indi genous popul a-

ti ons share in the economy, to a more

than six-fold i ncrease of real in comes of

all, and to Malaysia developing into a

major exporter of high-tech manufac-

tur ed goods.

South Africa will clearly have to fi nd i ts

own rout e. The point i s, though, that the

histor y of these countr ies teaches us that

a political settlement born from compro-

mi se combi ned wit h the correct econom-

ic and social pol icies could potentially

succeed. Pieter le Roux, UWC

While it is impossible to

meet all peoples demands

immedi ately, once people are

convinced that t here is light at

the end of the tunnel, their

demands become tempered

wit h r eason.

Vincent Maphai, UWC


22/26

DEEPERNEWS

20

The boundaries between Fli ght of Flamingosand LameDuckon the one hand, and Flamingosand Icarusonthe other, may be quite blurred.

Two boundary questions are particularly difficult toanswer. Which compromises and sunset clauses arenecessary to bring about the political settlement need-ed for the Flamingoscenario, and which will entrenchLame Duck?Secondly, when will social spending over-step the level needed for social reconstruction andland us in the Icarus scenario?

No political settlement will emerge if certain compro-mises are not made. However, sunset clauses that pro-long the uncertainty of the nature of the post-transitiongovernment for most of the decade will not get SouthAfrica on to a new growth path. Similarly, constitution-al stipulations that lead to indecisive and incoherent

policies will favor Lame Duck.

TheFli ght of the Flamingoscannot take off withoutsignificant social reconstruction. However, whenattempts are made to deliver far more than the econo-my can sustain such policies will lead to Icarus. Thelevel of budget deficits sustainable over the long rundepends on the specific circumstances of a country. Itis not clear how far South Africa could go before itcrashes disastrously.

Borderline Questions


23/26

DEEPERNEWS

21

DOROTHY BOESAKAdministrative coordinator for MontFleur Scenarios

ROB DAVIESResearch professor and co-director of theCenter for Southern African Studies at theUniversity of the Western Cape

HOWARD GABRIELSProject officer at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung;previously with N.U.M.

ADAM KAHANEA world expert in scenario-based strategic

planning

KOOSUM KALYANManager of social, political, communica-tions, and media department of Shell inCape Town

MICHIEL LE ROUXManaging director of Distillers Companyin Stellenbosch

PIETER LE ROUX

Professor in development studies and direc-tor of the Institute for Social Development,University of the Western Cape

JOHANN LIEBENBERGSenior general manager, external relations,of the Chamber of Mines

SAKI MACOZOMAMember of the National ExecutiveCommittee of the ANC; Head of themedia liaison unit of the Department of

Information and Publicity of the ANC

TITO MBOWENIEconomist in the department of economicplanning of the ANC

GABY MAGOMOLAEx-director of FABCOS and presentlychairman of Inter-Africa Group

MOSEBYANE MALATSIPAC economist; senior policy analyst atthe Development Bank of Southern Africa

in the Center of Policy and StrategicAnalysis

THOBEKA CIKIZWA MANGWANATeaches social planning at the Institute forSocial Development at University of theWestern Cape

TREVOR MANUELMember of the National ExecutiveCommittee and the National Working ofthe ANC Committee; Head of the ANCs

department of economic planning

VINCENT THABANE MAPHAIAssociate professor and head of thedepartment of political studies, Universityof the Western Cape

PHILIP MOHRProfessor of economics and head of theeconomics department, University ofSouth Africa

NICKY MORGANAssociate professor and dean of the facultyof economic and management sciences atthe University of the Western Cape

PATRICK NCUBESenior research fellow at the University ofCape Town and research consultant ineconomics at the University of theWestern Cape

GUGILE NKWINTIDirector of the Eastern CapeDevelopment and Funding Forum inGrahamstown; regional secretary (EasternCape Region) and member of theNational Executive Committee of theANC

Those Who Took Part


24/26

BRIAN OCONNELLDirector of the Peninsula TechnikonSchool of Education in Cape Town

MAHLOMOLA SKOSANAFirst assistant secretary general of

NACTU

VIVIENE TAYLORDirector of the Southern AfricanDevelopment Education Program(SADEP) at the University of the WesternCape

SUE VAN DER MERWEMember of the Black Sash NationalExecutive Committee

DR. WINFRIED VEITDirector of the South African office of the

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) in CapeTown

CHRISTO WIESEMember of the Economic AdvisoryCouncil of the President; executive chair-man of Pepkor

DEEPERNEWS

22

With grateful thanks to the following:

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung for funding the exerciseSwiss Development Agency for funding supportAdam Kahane for facilitating the processShell South Africa for technical support with view graphs

GBN would like to thank

Pieter le Roux for permission to reprint the Mont Fleur Scenarios as a DEEPER NEWS

Acknowledgments


25/26

G L O B A L

B U S I N E S S

N E T W O R K


26/26

mont fleur scenarios

Documents