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The Nuclear Power Sector in Japan: Nuclear Materials Management/Fuel Cycles Practices, Plans and Policies 2006 Asian Energy Security Workshop November 6-7, 2006 Beijing, China Tatsujiro Suzuki The University of Tokyo [email protected]

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  • The Nuclear Power Sector in Japan: Nuclear Materials Management/Fuel Cycles Practices, Plans and Policies2006 Asian Energy Security WorkshopNovember 6-7, 2006Beijing, ChinaTatsujiro SuzukiThe University of [email protected]

  • CONTENTSJapans New National Energy Strategy Japans New Nuclear Energy PolicyThree Major IssuesNuclear Power under Liberalized Electricity MarketSpent Fuel, Reprocessing and PlutoniumMultilateral Nuclear Fuel Cycle Approaches and Japans Response

  • Japans New Energy Strategy (2006)Responding to emerging global and regional energy security risksConcern over politicization of global oil market Diversified energy security riskApplying comprehensive energy security approachSet numerical targets for key policy goals by 2030Acceleration of Nuclear Power Programs, including Nuclear Fuel Recycling and Fast Breeder Reactor(FBR) programs

  • Japans New National Energy Strategy (2)Basic Perspectives of Comprehensive Energy Security StrategySource: New National Energy Strategy (May 2006)

  • Japans New National Energy Strategy (3)(1) Target of energy conservationAt least another 30% improvement of efficiency will be attained by 2030.(2) Target of reducing oil dependenceThe ratio will be reduced from current 50% to be lower than 40% by 2030.(3) Target of reducing oil dependence in the transport sectorThe percentage will be reduced from 100% to around 80% by 2030.(4) Target on nuclear power generation.The ratio of nuclear power to all power production will be maintained or increased at the level of 30 to 40% or more up to 2030 or later.(5) Target of overseas natural resources developmentOil volume ratio will be increased from current 18% to around 40% by 2030.

    Source; New National Energy Strategy (May 2006)

  • Maintain Share of Nuclear PowerSource; New National Energy Strategy (May 2006)

  • Japans Resource DiplomacyBBC World News, August 28, 2006

    In the game of regional politics, Japan feels it has a role to play in helping offset growing Russian and Chinese influence Col Christopher Langton International Institute of Strategic Studiessource: BBC News

    Koizumi begins Central Asia visit Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has arrived in Kazakhstan to begin the first visit to Central Asia by a Japanese premier

  • Overview of Japans Nuclear Power Programs and PoliciesTotal of 55 nuclear power plants (49.6 GWe) are now providing roughly 1/3 of total electricity generation in Japan (as of March 2006)While primary energy consumption is not growing much, electricity demand is still growing, but at slower rate, primarily due to stabilized population growth.Nuclear power is expected to maintain its share (30~40%) until 2030, for both energy security and environmental reasons.

  • METIs New Nuclear Energy Policy Nuclear Power Nation Plan(2006)Realization of replacement and new orders under the liberalized marketHigher utilization of existing reactors with enhanced safety performanceSteady progress in nuclear fuel cycleEarly commercialization (2050) of FBRStrengthening industrys technical and human resourcePromotion of international activities of nuclear industryActive contribution to effective international regime in reconciling expansion of nuclear power and non-proliferationStrengthening confidence building between local community and the governmentSteady progress in waste disposal

  • Liberalization of Electricity Market in JapanJapanese electricity market is gradually being liberalized after 1995.1995IPP* was introducedIndependent Power Producer2000. 3~ : >2,000 kWe market (~25%)2004. 3~ : > 500 kWe market (~40%)2005. 3~ : > 50 kWe market (~63%)2007 Full market liberalization will be discussed

  • Future projection of nuclear capacity without any new ordersCapacity(10MW)source: METI, Nuclear Power Nation Plan, Aug.2006 (in Japanese)

  • Measures to promote nuclear power under liberalized marketFinancial mechanismAllow levelized depreciation of capital investmentAllow reserve system for future reprocessing (beyond Rokkasho)Reexamine funding mechanism for decommissioning fundRealize benefits of CO2-free powerPromote extended regional power management to allow maximum use of nuclear power

  • Japans Nuclear Fuel Cycle Program

  • Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant- Owner : JNFL- 800 tHM /yr of capacity- 3,000tHM of spent fuel storage capacity.- Active testing started from March.31, 2006.- Operation year: 2007- Plutonium will be separated and MOX powder will be produced by the end of November for the first time.

  • Overview of Rokkasho Project(as of 2006.4)*200 litter eachSource:

  • Source: Report of Study Group on Cost Estimate for Nuclear Fuel Cycle (METI, 2004)Estimated Total Life Cycle Cost of Rokkasho Project

  • Debate at JAECs LTP - Recycling vs Direct Disposal - (1)JAEC established technical-subcommittee on economic comparison of fuel cycle options.Four scenarios until 2060Reprocessing all spent fuels (Rokkasho+2nd Plant)Reprocessing at Rokkasho, and direct disposalDirect disposal of all spent fuelsInterim storage of all spent fuels (decisions to reprocess or direct disposal will be deferred)

  • Debate at JAECs LTP - Economic Comparison (\/kWh, 2% DR) - (2)

  • Debate at JAECs LTP - Recycling vs Direct Disposal - (3)

  • Debate at JAECs LTP - Recycling vs Direct Disposal - (4)JAEC LTP committee decided that maintaining all reprocessing/recycling policy is appropriate2nd reprocessing plant will be needed after 2040, and FBR should follow.JAEC now included R&D on direct disposal as a future option.

  • Cost Sharing SchemePPS CustomersGeneral Power UsersBack end cost not covered by the existing scheme(about \12.7 trillion)Transmission cost chargeNewly Created Back End FundElectricity RateSource: Denki Shimbun, May 12, 2004

  • Need to cover future reprocessing and SF Storage costs

  • Back-End of Fuel CycleSpent Fuel Management IssuesLegal ConstraintsReactor and Radioactive Material regulation requires reactor operators to specify final disposal method of spent fuelreprocessing is the only method for utilities since JAECs LTP does not allow direct disposalAmendment made in 1998 to allow interim storage (outside reactor and reprocessing sites)Law for HLW Disposal (1999)Law defines HLW as vitrified waste from reprocessing (spent fuel is not included as HLW and cannot be disposed by Nuclear Waste Management Organization [NUMO])

  • Back-End of Fuel CycleSpent Fuel Management IssuesPhysical and Political constraintsUtilities promised reactor site communities to remove SF to reprocessing facilityPhysical storage capacity has been limited by political opposition to:Expansion of storage capacity on siteAcceptance of SF from other reactors/sitesSpent fuel handling tax is being raised at reactor sitesNow, some utilities plan to build first Away-from-Reactor (AFR) interim storage facility (5000 tons) at Mutsu city (Aomori)But the condition is to continue reprocessing policy

  • Cumulative inventory and management of spent fuel in the future

  • Additional storage capacity needed beyond NPP sites Start of Mutsu interim storage Rokkasho pool onlyAssumption:Rokkasho storage pool: 1,500tHM for BWR and1,500tHM for PWR(1,096tHM for BWR and 680tHM for PWR was already filled by the end of April 2006.)201920142016

  • Japans Pu Balance(as of April 2004)Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Answers to the questions raised by Inami Tetsuo (The House of Representatives member) for the Pu management in Japan(August 2004). The number is rounded off to one decimal.

  • Figure 4. Future plutonium stockpile until 202037tPu74tPu48tPuAssumptionBefore 2004: actual dataAfter 2005 : Demand MOX fuel: From 2012, 9.3 tPu/year/plants x18 plants Monju: re-start from 2010, 0.47tPU/year Supply Rokkasho reprocessing plant: start from 2006 (2 -6tPu/year from 2006-2009, 8tPu/year from 2010)6tPu81tPu81tPu

  • Progress of MOX fuel programas of September 2006

    Electric companyStartLocal Govt ConsentLicensing ApplicatinLicenseApprovedNoteHokkaidoTomari2010TohokuOnagawa2010TokyoFukushima I-3?(OK)OKOKLocal consent cancelledKasiwazaki-kariwa-3?(OK)OKOKSame as aboveChubuHamaoka-42010OKNo local consent systemHokurikuShika2010KansaiTakahama-32007OKOKOKPlan suspendedTakahama-42007OKOKOKPlan suspendedChugokuShimane-22010Negotiation underway with local governmentShikokuIkata-32010OKOKKyusyuGenkai-32010OKOKOKJAPCTsuruga-22008Tokai-22010J-PowerOma2010

  • Plutonium IssuesJapans plutonium stockpile could increase up to 150 tons by 2020. If Rokksho plant start its operation as planned without any progress in MOX recycling programs

    Even with full MOX recycling programs as planned, Japanese plutonium stockpile will be around 80 tons in 2011.In order to consume such large stockpile of plutonium, Japanese utilities must speed up and scale up its MOX recycling programs substantially.

  • Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Fuel Cycle(1)Need for tighter control on enrichment and reprocessing facilities/technologiesIAEA Elbaradei Proposal and MNA (multilateral nuclear fuel cycle approach)Assurance of fuel supplyEnrichment and reprocessing facilities under multinational ownership or multilateral controlMultinational management of spent fuel and HLW

  • Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Fuel Cycle(2)US Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) US, Russia, France, Japan, UK, ChinaFuel supply guarantee to those who give up enrichment/reprocessing facilitiesAccept spent fuel/HLW from those who give up enrichment/reprocessing facilities (cf. Fuel Leasing scheme proposed by Russia)Develop Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR) and proliferation resistant fuel recycling technologiesDevelop a small reactor for developing countryDevelop advanced safeguards technologies

  • Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Fuel Cycle(3)Uncertainties about GNEPDouble standards for enrichment/reprocessing facilities (separate have and have not)Under development of advanced fuel recycling and ABR technologiesNo firm prospect for accepting foreign spent fuel and HLWNot clear how these approaches are effective for current non-proliferation issues

  • Multilateral Approach over Nuclear Fuel CycleClosing nuclear fuel cycle is one of the corner stones of Japans energy securityConsidered as semi-domestic energy sourceAt first, reluctant to support multilateral approaches as it may conflict with Japans nuclear fuel cycle strategyNew energy strategy has adopted more positive policy toward multilateral approachesContributing to enhanced global non-proliferation regimeJapan can be a supplier nation of nuclear fuel cycle in the future

  • Japans response to GNEP Feb.7: Japan's viewPositive statement and will discuss what Japan can do to contribute to the proposal (PM office, METI/MOFA/MEXT)Aug.8: "Nuclear power nation plan" METI Nuclear Policy Committee and Japans New Energy Strategy published in JuneReaffirm commitment to FBR and closed fuel cycleSep.8: Proposal for Expression of Interest (EOI)JAEA, JNFL, Fuji electric group, Mitsubishi heavy industries ltd., etc.Sept.: Japans proposal for Nuclear Fuel Assurance (METI, JAEC)

  • Japans ProposalIAEA Standby Arrangements System for Nuclear Fuel Supply (1)Japans strategic thinkingMake Japan's presence in the GNEPSecure the position as a supplier of enriched uranium service in the future (do not want to limit future suppliers to only six nations)Basic conceptsSupplementary to six country proposalIntend to reduce possibility of supply disruption in addition to preparation for possible disruption- need to enhance transparency of the marketSix country proposal separate countries into have and have not. This proposal is intended to cover as many countries as possible as future suppliers.

  • Japans ProposalIAEA Standby Arrangements System for Nuclear Fuel Supply (2)Each country can voluntarily register the following supply capability at IAEANatural uraniumUranium conversionEnrichment serviceUranium fuel fabrication Uranium fuel stockpileRegistration can be categorized into the following three groups.Level 1: Has commercial supply capability, but has not exported to international marketLevel 2: Has already exported to intl marketLevel 3: Has stockpile which can be readily exported

  • Japans ProposalIAEA Standby Arrangements System for Nuclear Fuel Supply (3)Role of IAEAManaging the Standby Arrangements System, including establishing databaseClarifying conditions to receive fuel assuranceSafeguards, safety, PP, export control, etc. Note that giving up supply capability may not be appropriate under the sprit of universal conditionIAEA does not have any legal ownership, but will play important role in making arrangements between supplier and recipient statesReflecting negative response to six country proposal6 country proposal could deny the right (Art. 4) of NPTJapans proposal does not deny such right

  • Possible Multinational Approach involving Japan

  • Possible Multinational Approach involving Japan

  • CONCLUSION (1)Energy Security Strategy has changed significantly More complex, diversified, multi-layered strategyNuclear power is critical component of Japans energy strategyMaintain 30~40% share of electricity generationVarious measures are needed to ensure competitiveness of nuclear power under liberalized energy market

  • CONCLUSION (2)Japans commitment to closed fuel cycle remains strongBut such commitment may create financial, political and social risks to Japanese nuclear programReprocessing is costlyPlutonium stockpile may increase In order to avoid such risks, Japan should explore socio-political solutions, including multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle

    Given those constraints, we have estimated when BWR and PWR sites will run out of storage capacity in the absence of reprocessing. Figure 2 shows the result.

    At PWR sites, storage pools will be filled up by 2014, but Mutsu storage capacity for PWR will still be available.

    BWR sites will be filled up by 2019, since Mutsu storage capacity of 4,000tU will not be built up by then. If we assume high burn-up spent fuel, PWR sites will not fill until 2016 while BWR sites can have capacity beyond 2020.

    Thus, while the need for reprocessing can be significantly reduced by optimum storage capacity management, this analysis illustrates the complicated nature of spent fuel management in Japan.

    Future projection and possible optionsFigure 4 shows a projection of the future plutonium stockpile until 2020 based on current plutonium supply and demand plans.

    Assumption are as follows; 1) Before 2004: actual data, 2) After 2005: Demand: MOX fuel: After 2012, 9.3 tPu/year/plants x18 plants, Monju: re-start after 2010, 0.47tPU/year, Supply: Tokai reprocessing plant: stop in 2004, Rokkasho reprocessing plant: start from 2006 (8 tPu/year). Pu separation ratio of Rokkasho (JNFL) is assumed 1% of spent fuel. Amount of consumed Pu is followed by the MOX plan of FEPC Japan (Jan. 2006).

    This line shows amount of Plutonium supply. This dots line shows the Plutonium demand in the future and this dark blue line is the plutonium stockpile.(a) is obtained for Under the current plan. Japan's total plutonium stockpile would increase to about 81 by 2011, and then will decline to about 65t in 2020. If Japan uses the plutonium stored in Europe first, this plutonium will consumed in 2015. Alternatively, if Japan's utilities use domestic plutonium stocks first, the plutonium stockpile in Japan would not peak at 37 t and decline to about 21 t in 2020 (b).If the Rokksho plant starts its operation as planned but Japan's plans for recycling plutonium in commercial power plants remained stalled, Japan's plutonium stockpile could increase up to 155 t by 2020.To minimize Japan's plutonium stockpiles, it would be best to defer the operation of the Rokkasho plant.If Japan's plutonium recycle plan actually goes ahead as planned, it would take until 2016 to consume Japan's current stockpiles of separated plutonium in Japan and in Europe(c). Deferring operation of Rokkasho until 2015 would not require additional spent fuel storage capacity for Japan.

    When we think about the non-proliferation issue, low plutonium stockpile case (c) is the best.Also, we can deffer Rokkasho full operation until around 2015 because there is no spent fuel storage shortage until this year.