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Gunpowder Weaponry and theRise of the Early Modern

StateKelly DeVries

Since the 1988 publication of Geoffrey Parker’s The Military Revol-ution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800, the term

‘Military Revolution’ has become common parlance and acceptedscholarship among military historians.1 Recent books and collectionsof articles by Brian M. Downing, Weston F. Cook Jr, David Eltis, Clif-ford J. Rogers, and Andrew Ayton and J.L. Price have even incorpor-ated the term in their titles.2 All these works agreed that a revolutionin military tactics and strategy had been effected by the innovation ofgunpowder weaponry. And while it is true that the ‘Military Revolution’thesis has had its critics, these, like Jeremy Black, John A. Lynn, BertS. Hall and myself, have specifically targeted Parker’s ideas of techno-logical determinism.3

1 G. Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800 (Cambridge, 1988). The idea of the Military Revolution originated with MichaelRoberts’s 1955 lecture at Queen’s University, which was printed the next year as apamphlet under the title The Military Revolution, 1560–1660 (Belfast, 1956) and laterreprinted in a collection of Roberts’s articles, Essays in Swedish History (London,1967), pp. 195–225. Roberts, however, does not discuss the aspect of the MilitaryRevolution at issue in this article.

2 B.M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change in Early Modern Europe(Princeton, NJ, 1992); W.F. Cook, Jr, The Hundred Years War for Morocco: Gunpowderand the Military Revolution in the Early Modern Muslim World (Boulder, CO, 1994); D.Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe (London, 1995); C.J. Rogers,ed., The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of EarlyModern Europe (Boulder, CO, 1995); and A. Ayton and J.L. Price, eds, The MedievalMilitary Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe(London, 1995). See also C. Storrs and H.M. Scott, ‘The Military Revolution and theEuropean Nobility, c. 1600–1800’, War in History III (1996), pp. 1–41.

3 J. Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800(Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1991); J.A. Lynn, ‘The Trace Italienne and the Growth ofArmies: The French Case’, Journal of Military History LV (1991), pp. 297–330; B.S.Hall, ‘The Changing Face of Siege Warfare: Technology and Tactics in Transition’,in I.A. Corfis and M. Wolfe, eds, The Medieval City Under Siege (Woodbridge, Suffolk,1995), pp. 257–75; and K. DeVries, ‘Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs: Towards aRedefinition of “Effectiveness” in Premodern Military Technology’, War in History IV(1997), pp. 454–70. See also B.S. Hall and K.R. DeVries, ‘Essay Review: The “MilitaryRevolution” Revisited’, Technology and Culture XXX (1990), pp. 147–54.

War in History 1998 5 (2) 127–45 0968-3445(98)WH160OA 1998 Arnold

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One of Parker’s noted changes wrought by the Military Revolutionnot discussed by his critics – in fact one that proves that the MilitaryRevolution was indeed revolutionary – was that the increased use ofgunpowder weaponry in Europe between 1500 and 1800 broughtabout the rise of the modern state. His argument seems quite logical:because gunpowder weapons were expensive to produce, maintain andsupply, only the most wealthy and prosperous political entities wereable to afford a gunpowder train large enough both to defend theirlands and to attack their enemies. Smaller political entities, duchies,counties, earldoms and other smaller baronies, simply were not wealthyenough to compete with the centralized governments of kings andemperors, and thus this led to the rise of the early modern state.4

This is but one of the many points which Parker uses to support histhesis, and yet those adhering to the idea of the Military Revolutionthat he proposed have accepted it without question. Some have evenused it to support their own early modern political paradigms. Note,for example, the following from Bruce D. Porter’s War and the Rise ofthe State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics:

The crux of the matter as far as state formation was concerned wasthis: artillery was generally too expensive for the nobility to pur-chase, and hence tended to become a monopoly of the Crown. Thesuperior military technology of the day both gravitated to andreinforced the political center.5

And Clifford J. Rogers has written:The great cost of artillery, and the larger armies engendered by thegrowing importance of open battle, put a premium on the abilityto produce and manage large amounts of cash. This created a self-reinforcing cycle, which continued to spiral upwards at least untilthe advent of the Artillery Fortress Revolution of the early sixteenthcentury. It went something like this: central governments of largestates could afford artillery trains and large armies. The artillerytrains counter-acted centrifugal forces and enabled the centralgovernments to increase their control over outlying areas of theirrealms, or to expand at the expense of their weaker neighbors. Thisincreased their tax revenues, enabling them to support bigger artil-lery trains and armies, enabling them to increase their centralizationof control and their tax revenues still further, and so on.6

4 Parker, Military Revolution, pp. 67–69.5 B.D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics

(New York, 1994), p. 31.6 C.J. Rogers, ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War’, in Rogers, The

Military Revolution Debate, p. 75. (This essay was originally published in Journal ofMilitary History LVII (1993), pp. 241–78, but was updated for inclusion in The MilitaryRevolution Debate.) The same sentiment is indicated in several of the other articles inThe Military Revolution Debate. See also J. Cornette, ‘La revolution militaire et l’etatmoderne’, Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine XLI (1994), pp. 696–709; L.M.Dudley, The Word and the Sword: How Techniques of Information and Violence Have ShapedOur World (Oxford, 1991), p. 118. It should be noted that this idea is not original to

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Gunpowder Weaponry 129

Indeed, only one historian has disagreed with this technologicallydetermined rise of the early modern state, Sir J.R. Hale. In War andSociety in Renaissance Europe, 1450–1620, he notes:

The case for the suggestion that artillery was an instrument cen-tralizing power is . . . feeble. Governments, as a result of regalianrights over metals and their heavy investment in having guns made,insisted on making the manufacture of artillery a monopoly. Butthough an occasional rebellious magnate may have been broughtto heel by royal cannon (but never just because of cannon) thecomplex shifts towards more effectively centralized forms of govern-ment began before cannon were effective or readily transportableand can be explained without reference to gunpowder weapons.7

In support of Hale’s dissent on this issue, this article will investigatethe political control of gunpowder weaponry in Burgundy, France, andEngland during the last two centuries of the Middle Ages. This is thepoint at which political historians mark the beginning of the declineand eventual demise of feudalism in western Europe, with the rise ofthe central state in its stead.8 During this time, all three of these polit-ical entities fit this ‘feudalistic decline/central state rise’ pattern almostperfectly, with England and France rising at the end of the fifteenthcentury to near-absolutism under the Tudors and Valois respectively,and with Burgundy, despite losing its lord, Charles the Bold, in 1477at the battle of Nancy, becoming part of the inheritance packagepassed on to Charles V at his ascension to the imperial throne in 1519.

To fit Parker’s Military Revolution thesis, then, we should expect tofind each of these states during this time, in terms of gunpowder wea-ponry, transforming from a locally owned and controlled technologyto that of a state-run, state-used and state-restricted technology. Andin fact that is almost precisely what we find in researching the historyof gunpowder weapons in France and Burgundy. Each of these risingstates recognized the effectiveness of gunpowder weapons as used bylocal entities, seized this technology by whatever means they could andthen turned it against these same local entities to force their sub-mission to the increasingly more powerful state. However, this modelis not followed in England, which begins with an extremely effectivestate-controlled gunpowder weaponry arsenal, only to lose both cen-

Parker’s Military Revolution, but can be found earlier in R. Bean, ‘War and the Birthof the Nation State’, Journal of Economic History XXXIII (1973), pp. 203–24; B.Guenee, States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe, trans. J. Vale (Oxford, 1985),p. 144; J.U. Nef, War and Human Progress: An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization(New York, 1950), pp. 23–41; W.H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, ArmedForce, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1982), pp. 65–95; and E.F. Rice, Jr, TheFoundations of Early Modern Europe, 1460–1559 (New York, 1970), p. 16.

7 J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450–1620 (London, 1985), pp. 248–51. See also Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, pp. 63–64, n. 26.

8 See e.g. Guenee, States and Rulers; J.R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the ModernState (Princeton, NJ, 1970).


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tralized control and technological expertise after failing to use the wea-pons against warring ‘local’ entities in the course of the Wars of theRoses, thus effecting a virtual ‘dark ages’ of military technology whichwould last for more than a century.

The Earliest Gunpowder WeaponsThe history of fourteenth-century gunpowder weaponry in continentalEurope is one of almost complete local control. Nearly all the earliest‘trustworthy’ references to gunpowder weapons, such as those men-tioning guns at the siege of Metz in 1324, in a Florentine armoury in1326, and at the siege of Cividale (Friuli) in 1331, and even the ‘lesstrustworthy’ references to guns appearing at the defence of Forli in1284 and in the armoury of Ghent in 1313, indicate use by local enti-ties, in this case urban militias, and not by royal armies.9 Local owner-ship is also evident in the earliest extant gunpowder weapons, fourItalian bombardellas, all of which were founded for local use.10 Thiswould continue to be the case throughout the century, especially inFrance and in the Low Countries, the latter area forming by 1400 thegreatest part of the Burgundian lands, bringing both wealth and anartillery arsenal to its dukes.

FranceDespite the need for more research on this, and without explainingmore fully the reasons for these conclusions, it seems from an investi-gation already undertaken that France’s use of gunpowder weaponryduring the fourteenth century was far less than that of both Englandand the Low Countries. Nevertheless, references to France’s use ofguns in this century almost always refer to a local use. For example,gunpowder weapons appear in accounts of arsenal holdings in Rouenin 1338, in Bioule Castle in 1347, in Paris in 1351, in Tours in 1358–9, and in Harfleur in 1369.11 And when used in military actions, French

9 P. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. M. Jones (London, 1984), p. 139; R.C.Clephan, ‘The Ordnance of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries’, ArchaeologicalJournal LXVIII (1911), pp. 56–57; J.R. Partington, A History of Greek Fire andGunpowder (Cambridge, 1960), p. 100; and W.Y. Carman, A History of Firearms fromEarliest Times to 1914 (London, 1955), pp. 18–19.

10 D.C. Nicolle, Arms and Armour of the Crusading Period, 1050–1350 (White Plains, NY,1988), pp. 1342–5. These were founded in Verrua Savoia, Morro, Val di Susa andIssogne.

11 For Rouen, see V. Gay, Glossaire archeologique du moyen age et de la renaissance (3 vols,Paris, 1887) i, p. 76; for Bioule, see ‘Reglement pour la defense du chateau deBioule, 18 mars 1347’, Bulletin Archeologique IV (1846–7), pp. 490–95; for Paris, see P.Contamine, Guerre, etat et societe a la fin du moyen age: etudes sur les armees des rois deFrance, 1337–1494 ((Paris, 1972), p. 123 n. 185; for Tours, see J. Delaville le Roulx,ed., Registres des comptes municipaux de la ville de Tours (2 vols, Tours, 1878) i, p. 55;and for Harfleur, see A. Merlin-Chazelas, ed., Documents relatifs au clos des galees deRouen: collection de documents inedits sur l’histoire de France, section de philologie et d’histoirejusqu’a 1610 (2 vols, Paris, 1977) i, p. 205.



gunpowder weapons continue to retain their almost sole local usage;for example, at the attack of Southampton in 1338, the employmentof gunpowder weapons comes in a raid of Norman ‘pirates’ on theEnglish coastal town; at Poitiers in 1369, the fortress was defended bylocal militias using gunpowder and non-gunpowder artillery; and atthe battle of La Rochelle, guns were used on board Spanish ships hiredby the French.12

Further evidence for the local possession of gunpowder weaponryduring the fourteenth century is found in the construction of gunportsin the town wall of Mont-Saint-Michel and at the castles of Blanquefortand St Malo,13 in the almost continual trade in gunpowder weaponsby merchants and garrison masters seemingly without royal restric-tions,14 in the appointment of local ‘masters of cannons’ (as they aremost often called) at Rouen in 1369 and at Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomtein 1370–75,15 and in the fact that the Duke of Brittany, defending hisduchy against the English after 1375, was almost always forced to relyon his own gunpowder artillery resources.16

All of this is not to say that the fourteenth-century French kings werecompletely unaware of the new gunpowder technology, or that theydid not desire its use in military conflict. Although there seem to beno references to Philip VI’s or John II’s interest in gunpowder wea-ponry, it is clear from numerous documents that Charles V (1364–80)and Charles VI (1380–1422) were well aware of the military capabilitiesof gunpowder weapons and wished to incorporate them into theirarsenals. But it should also be noted that in almost all the referencesto French royal use of gunpowder weapons before the beginning ofthe fifteenth century, these kings worked with the local owners toacquire these weapons, and seemed unwilling either to construct or to

12 On the attack on Southampton, see K. DeVries, ‘A 1445 Reference to ShipboardArtillery’, Technology and Culture XXXI (1990), pp. 819–20; and L. Lacabane, ‘De lapoudre a canon et de son introduction en France’, Bibliotheque de l’Ecole de Chartes,2nd ser., I (1844), pp. 36–38. On the defence of Poitiers, see Jean Froissart,Chroniques, ed. S. Luce (15 vols, Paris, 1869–1975) vii, pp. 160–61. And on the battleof La Rochelle, see op. cit. viii, pp. 36–43.

13 On the gunports at Mont-Saint-Michel, see Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 202.On those at St Malo, see M. Jones, ‘The Defence of Medieval Brittany: A Survey ofthe Establishment of Fortified Towns, Castles and Frontiers from the Gallo-RomanPeriod to the End of the Middle Ages’, Archaeological Journal CXXXVIII (1981),p. 174. And on gunports at Blanquefort Castle, see M.G.A. Vale, ‘SeigneurialFortification and Private War in Late Medieval Gascony’, in M. Jones, ed., Gentry andLesser Nobility in Late Medieval Europe (Gloucester, 1986), p. 141. See also K. DeVries,‘The Impact of Gunpowder Weaponry on Siege Warfare in the Hundred Years War’,in Corfis and Wolfe, Medieval City Under Siege, p. 234.

14 See Merlin-Chazelas, Documents relatifs au clos, pp. 132, 256, 273, 288, 293, 295, 308,329.

15 See op. cit., p. 205; L. Delisle, Histoire du chateau et des sires de Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte(2 vols, Paris, 1867) i, p. 185. Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte had both a ‘master ofcannons’ and a ‘master of large cannons’.

16 See M. Jones, Ducal Brittany, 1364–1369 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 35 n. 2 and 159–60.


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obtain their own gunpowder weaponry holdings.17 Even the gunsbrought to the royal siege of Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte in 1374–5, whichwere used to bring down the walls of the English-controlled castle, weresupplied by the local baillis and operated under the direction of thelocal ‘master of artillery’.18

Even as late as the composition of Christine de Pizan’s Le livre desfais d’armes et de chevalerie, written (it is believed) c. 1410, there is noconcerted royal effort towards the acquisition of gunpowder weapons,for it is one of Christine’s purposes to convince Charles VI and hisministers and generals in charge of military acquisitions that theyshould direct their efforts towards this goal.19

But if Charles VI was unable to recognize the value of gunpowderweaponry, his son, who would become Charles VII (1422–61), did, anddeveloped a strong programme of gunpowder weapon acquisition anddevelopment. Charles increased the royal budget to procure a largernumber of new guns, and he added heavier new taxes to his kingdom’sinhabitants to pay for this increase. He also took a special interest inthe construction of new and often unworkable inventions related tohis gunpowder weapons.20

But perhaps the most important feature of Charles VII’s gunpowderartillery train was its intricate organization and superior leadership.Under masters of artillery Jean and Gaspard Bureau, the French artil-lery holdings grew in number and efficiency. Duties of cannoneerswere established, officers were appointed, competence was improvedand pay was increased. This allowed Charles’s military leaders to takehis artillery on every military expedition – which led to numerous vic-tories including those at the sieges of Orleans, Jargeau, Meung, andBeaugency in 1429, at the sieges of Creil, Pontoise, and Harfleur in1449, at the battle of Formigny and the siege of Caen in 1450, and at

17 See Merlin-Chazelas, Documents relatifs au clos, pp. 246, 256, 288, 289, 290, 299, 300,308; L. Delisle, ed., Mandements et actes divers de Charles V (1364–1380) (Paris, 1874),nos. 199, 276, 277, 278, 453, 471, 494, 642, 788, 797, 850, 1009, 1057, 1423, 1784,1862, 1972; D.F. Secousse, ed., Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisieme race (21vols, Paris, 1723–1849) v, pp. 14–18, 111–12, vi, pp. 182–83; and C. Devic and J.Vaissette, Histoire generale de Languedoc (6 vols, Toulouse, 1885) x, pp. 967–68.

18 C.T. Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War, c. 1300–c. 1450(Cambridge, 1988), p. 79; E. Perroy, The Hundred Years War, trans. W.B. Wells(London, 1959), p. 166.

19 C. de Pizan, The Book of Fayettes of Armes and of Chyvalrye, trans. W. Caxton, ed. A.T.P.Byles (London, 1932). That Charles VI was not completely ignorant of the value ofgunpowder weaponry can be seen in his interest in building new anti-artilleryfortifications for Paris and Limoges in 1420 (see Secousse, Ordonnances des rois deFrance xi, pp. 79–80, 84–85), the placement of cannoneers under the control of theMarshals of France in 1411 (see op. cit. v, pp. 589–90), and the successful use ofgunpowder artillery by royal forces at the sieges of Fontenay and Dun-le-Roi in 1412(see L. Bellaguet, ed., Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denis (6 vols, Paris, 1839–52) iv,pp. 652–54).

20 An example of this is recorded in 1449/50, when Charles requested the design of anew carriage for his artillery, the object of which ‘was to create a gun-carriage whichwas not drawn by horses’. See M.G.A. Vale, Charles VII (Berkeley, CA, 1974),pp. 127, 141.



the battle of Castillon in 1452 – and ultimately contributed to theeventual French victory over the English in the Hundred Years War.21

Moreover, after Charles VII’s death the French artillery holdings grewconsistently larger, improving both under Louis XI, who used themeffectively against rebellious lords in the War of the Public Weal (1465–69) and the Franco-Burgundian Wars (1465–77) and against a futileinvasion of France by Edward IV of England in 1475,22 and underCharles VIII, who used them to invade and easily conquer Italy in1494.23

BurgundyThe numbers of gunpowder weapons in the Low Countries during thefourteenth century were far larger than in France, and they were usedfar more frequently, but they too were locally controlled. Gunpowderweaponry can be found in arsenals in St Omer in 1342, in Bruges in1346 and 1362, in Lille in 1347/48, 1358, and 1365, in Mons in 1349and 1378, in Binche in 1362–64, 1394 and 1396, in Valenciennes in1363, in Ponthieu in 1368–69, in Arras in 1369, in Malines in 1372/82,in Ghent in 1380, in Ypres in 1383 and in Avesnes-le-Comte in 1384.24

21 On the organization of Charles VII’s gunpowder artillery, see H. Dubled, ‘L’artillerieroyale francaise a l’epoque de Charles VII et au debut du regne de Louis XI (1437–1469): les freres Bureau’, Memorial de l’Artillerie Francaise L (1976), pp. 555–637;Contamine, Guerre, etat et societe, pp. 230, 238–39, 311–17, 534. See also theassessment by Jean Chartier in ‘La chronique latine de Jean Chartier (1422–1450)’,ed. C. Samaran, Annuaire-Bulletin de la Societe de l’Histoire de France (1926), p. 272. OnCharles’s victories using gunpowder weapons, see A.H. Burne, The Agincourt War(London, 1956), pp. 229–32, 235, 293–94, 301–303, 313, 319, 324–25, 333–34, 340–41; K. DeVries, ‘The Use of Gunpowder Weaponry By and Against Joan of ArcDuring the Hundred Years War’, War and Society XIV (1996), pp. 1–16.

22 Louis XI’s interest in gunpowder weaponry is evidenced by the numerous ordonnanceswhich he passed concerning gunpowder artillery (see Secousse, Ordonnances des roisde France XV–XVII) and the even more numerous letters in which he referred to thenew technology (see J. Vaesen and E. Charavay, eds, Lettres de Louis XI roi de France(12 vols, Paris, 1883–1909). See also E. Perroy, ‘L’artillerie de Louis XI dans lacampagne d’Artois’, Revue du Nord XXVI (1943), pp. 171–96, 293–315, and‘L’artillerie royale a la bataille de Montlhery (10 juillet 1465)’, Revue HistoriqueCXLIX (1925), pp. 187–89; R. Fawtier, ed., ‘Documents inedits sur l’organisation del’artillerie royale au temps de Louis XI’, in A.G. Little and F.M. Powicke, eds, Essaysin Medieval History Presented to Thomas Frederick Tout (Manchester, 1925), pp. 367–78.On the War of the Public Weal, see P.M. Kendall, Louis XI (London, 1974), pp. 179–233. On the Franco-Burgundian Wars, see op. cit., pp. 388–410; R. Vaughan, Charlesthe Bold: The Last Valois Duke of Burgundy (London, 1973), pp. 41–83, 399–431. OnEdward IV’s invasion, see F.P. Barnard, ed., Edward IV’s French Expedition of 1475: TheLeaders and Their Badges, being MS. 2. M. 16. College of Arms (1925; repr. Gloucester,1975).

23 On the French artillery train taken by Charles VIII to Italy in 1494, see P.Contamine, ‘L’artillerie royale francaise a la veille des guerres d’Italie’, Annales deBretagne lxxi (1964), pp. 221–61.

24 On St Omer, see Partington, History of Greek Fire, p. 100; on Bruges, see Clephan,‘The Ordnance’, pp. 61, 65; on Lille, see Gay, Glossaire i, pp. 272–3; Clephan, ‘TheOrdnance’, p. 65; C. Gaier, L’industrie et le commerce des armes dans les anciennesprincipautes belges du XIIIe a la fin du XVe siecle (Paris, 1963), p. 92; on Mons, see G.Decamps, L’artillerie montoise: ses origines (Mons, 1906), pp. 2–3, 8–9; on Binche, seeC. Roland, ‘L’artillerie de la ville de Binche, 1362–1420’, Bulletin de la Societe Royale


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Local ‘masters of cannons’ can be found at Lille in 1341 and at Malinesin 1365.25 And guns were used by local Low Countries militias at thesieges of Quesnoy, Mortague, Saint-Amand, Marchiennes and Tournaiin 1340 (in conjunction with English gunpowder artillery), in defenceof Ghent in 1380, at the siege of Oudenaarde in 1382 and Damme in1385, and at the battles of Bevershoutsveld and Rosebeke in 1382.26

As well, although Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy (1363–1404),began acquiring parts of the Low Countries in 1384, it is clear that he,like Charles V and Charles VI of France, also at least initially treatedthe local ownership of gunpowder weapons with respect. It is also clearthat he allowed the local Low Countries owners to retain their controlof these weapons at least until the end of the fourteenth century andperhaps into the fifteenth century and the reign of Philip’s son, Johnthe Fearless (1404–19).27 However, somewhere during these decadesa subtle ownership transformation was effected from local to ducal con-trol. As Claude Gaier notes: ‘To all intents and purposes the dukeswere able, in time of need, to requisition the machines of war andcannons from the towns.’28

Outside the Low Countries before the end of the fourteenth century,and the total Burgundian ‘kingdom’ after this, there is no question asto the interest of Philip the Bold and his successors in gunpowdertechnology. In many ways because of this interest it is the Burgundiandukes who can be credited with causing the rapid evolution of gun-powder weaponry during the last half of the Hundred Years War. TheBurgundian dukes amassed large quantities of gunpowder weapons,and they used them on almost all their numerous expeditions, duringwhich they were almost always successful. They also refused to allowtheir gunpowder technology to remain stagnant, and they experi-mented with different sizes of weapons, methods of manufacture,modes of transportation, metallurgy and powder chemistry. In some

Paleontologique et Archeologique de l’Arrondissement Judiciaire de Charleroi XXIII (1954),pp. 30–32; on Valenciennes, see Gay, Glossaire i, p. 171; on Ponthieu, see Contamine,War in the Middle Ages, p. 146; on Arras, see Clephan, ‘The Ordnance’, p. 63; onMalines, Ghent, Ypres, and Avesnes-le-Comte, see Gaier, L’industrie, p. 92. Onfourteenth-century Low Countries gunpowder artillery in general, see B. Rathgen,‘Feuer- und fernwaffen des 14. Jahrhunderts in Flandern’, Zeitschrift fur historischesWaffenkunde VII (1915–17), pp. 275–306; P. Henrard, Histoire de l’artillerie en Belgique(Brussels, 1865).

25 On Lille’s ‘master of cannon’, see Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 139; on thatof Malines, see Clephan, ‘The Ordnance’, p. 62.

26 On these actions, see Froissart, Chroniques ii, pp. 14, 64, iv, pp. 166, 194–195, v,p. 11, viii, p. 244, xi, pp. 61, 248–49, xii, pp. 13, 238, xiii, p. 139. On the use ofgunpowder weapons by the Ghentenaars during their 1379–85 rebellion, see alsoRathgen, ‘Feuer- en fernwaffen’, pp. 297–300; R. Vaughan, Philip the Bold: TheFormation of the Burgundian State (London, 1962), p. 21.

27 See Gaier, L’industrie, pp. 92–93; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, p. 170. Local holdings ofgunpowder weapons after the beginning of the fifteenth century are detailed in J.Garnier, L’artillerie des ducs de Bourgogne d’apres les documents conserves aux archives de laCote-d’Or (Paris, 1895).

28 Gaier, L’industrie, p. 93.



instances, Burgundian guns were even painted different colours,although the reason for this is unclear.

It was also during the reign of these dukes that gunpowder artillerybecame an official part of the military organization. They accompaniednearly every ducal conquest. Philip the Bold used his gunpowder wea-pons at the sieges of Rochefort-sur-le-Doubs in 1372 and of Odruik in1377, the walls of the latter being successfully breached by cannon-fire.29 He also supervised the construction and testing of guns, andorganized their use in war under the leadership of an artilleur.30 Inparticular, in 1377 Philip brought into his employ two ‘fondeurs decanon reputes’, Jacques and Rolant Mayorque, commissioning themto build seven new cannons for use at the siege of Ardre. One was avery large weapon, which could discharge a stone cannonball of 450 lb,although this gun eventually and without explanation failed to work.The Mayorques were later commissioned to build six more cannonsfor use against the invasion of the Bishop of Norwich in 1383 and stillmore, this time an indeterminate number, for use against the Duke ofBerry in 1386.31

John the Fearless further increased the number and quality of theBurgundian gunpowder weapons which he constantly used in militaryengagements: at Calais in 1406, at Tongres, Othee and Maastricht in1408, at Rougemont and Ham in 1411, at Bourges in 1412, at Arrasin 1414 and at Paris in 1417 and 1418.32 Moreover, John appointedGermain de Givery as the first ducal master of artillery, and orderedhim to bring all the gunpowder weapons of the duchy ‘which were notactually in use in his castles’ together at a special arsenal in Dijon, theduchy’s capital. Also during John’s reign artillery operators were evengiven separate and distinctive ‘uniforms’, including a blue hat, for usein ducal processions.33

Philip the Good (1419–67) continued the artillery programmes ofhis father and grandfather, adding even more gunpowder weapons to

29 On Rochefort-sur-le-Doubs, see Garnier, L’artillerie, pp. 6–7. On Odruik, see Froissart,Chroniques viii, pp. 248–50.

30 Vaughan, Philip the Bold, pp. 124, 204. On Philip’s interest in gunpowder weapons,see Garnier, L’artillerie, pp. 6–15.

31 Op. cit., p. 15.32 For Calais, see Jehan de Waurin, Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant

Bretaigne, ed. W. and E.L.C.P. Hardy (5 vols, London, 1864–91) ii, pp. 105–106;Euguerran de Monstrelet, Chronique, ed. L. Douet-d’Arcq (6 vols, Paris, 1857–62) i,p. 136. For Tongres, Othee and Maastricht, see Waurin, Recueil des croniques ii, p. 119;Monstrelet, Chronique ii, pp. 351–59; E. Fairon, ed., Regestes de la cite de Liege (4 vols,Liege, 1933–40) i, p. 108. See also E. Wille, Die Schlacht von Othee, 23 September 1408(Berlin, 1908). For Rougemont and Ham, see Monstrelet, Chronique ii, pp. 172–75; Lelivre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne, in K. de Lettenhove, ed.,Chroniques relatives a l’histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne(textes francais) (Brussels, 1873), p. 96. For Bourges, see Bellaquet, Chronique dureligieux iv, p. 652. For Arras, see op. cit., v, p. 372. And for Paris, see op. cit., vi,pp. 85, 127–29; Monstrelet, Chronique iii, p. 216.

33 R. Vaughan, John the Fearless: The Growth of Burgundian Power (London, 1966),pp. 151, 168; C. Brusten, L’armee bourguignonne de 1465 a 1468 (Brussels, 1953),p. 108. On John’s gunpowder weaponry holdings, see Garnier, L’artillerie, pp. 16–33.


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the Burgundian artillery stores.34 Philip fought against the French,English and Germans, and he was also involved in putting down severalinsurrections in his ducal holdings, principally in the southern LowCountries. Philip in 1420, in the company of Henry V and the Englisharmy, ‘with a great number of bombards, powder and otherimplements of war’, besieged Melun, where the French dauphin wasthen living.35 In 1421 Philip bombarded and then took the town ofSaint-Riquier.36 In 1423 his artillery appeared on the battlefield ofCravant.37 In 1424, using several large bombards including Griette,Katherine, Cambray and l’Ecluse, he recaptured the Burgundian holdingsin the Maconnais which had been lost to the Armagnac supporters ofthe dauphin by his father.38 In 1425 he besieged the castle of Braine-le-Comte, assailing the walls with artillery ‘without number’.39 And in1426 his bombardment of the town of Zevenbergen caused itssurrender.40

The 1430s also were years of constant battles and sieges as Philip’sconquests added substantial holdings to the duchy of Burgundy.Among the large number of battles fought by the Burgundian Dukea few are particularly noteworthy for his use of gunpowder weapons.In 1430 Philip, allied with Jean, the Duke of Luxemburg, used fivelarge bombards, two veuglaires, one large and one small, and two‘engins’ to take the town of Compiegne.41 The following year hebesieged Sancenay in Auxerre using the large bombard Prusse amongother cannons, and he also won the battle of Bulgneville making useof his guns on the battlefield.42 As well, in 1433, the castle of Mussy-l’Eveque fell to Philip, who used only his smaller weapons to bringabout its submission, while that same year the castle of Fortepice alsofell to the Burgundians, flattened, it is said, by only a single large bom-bard, the Bourgoigne.43 Finally, in 1434 Philip besieged the town ofBelleville, a town whose walls he breached easily.44

34 On Philip’s artillery holdings, see op. cit., pp. 34–177, and the numerous referencesin M. Mollat, ed., Comptes generaux de l’etat bourguignon entre 1416 et 1420 (3 vols,Paris, 1965–69).

35 Waurin, Recueil des croniques ii, p. 327; Monstrelet, Chronique iii, p. 410; and GeorgesChastellain, Œuvres, ed. K. de Lettenhove (8 vols, 1863; repr. Brussels, 1971) i,pp. 153–56.

36 Waurin, Recueil des croniques ii, p. 371; Chastellain, Œuvres i, pp. 250–51.37 Waurin, Recueil des croniques iii, p. 55; Le livre des trahisons, pp. 169–70.38 Garnier, L’artillerie, p. 93.39 Waurin, Recueil des croniques iii, p. 165.40 Op. cit., p. 210.41 Op. cit., p. 362; Monstrelet, Chronique iv, pp. 418–19; Chastellain, Œuvres ii, p. 53; and

Antonio Morosini, Chronique: extraits relatifs a l’histoire de France, ed. G. Lefevre-Pontalis and L. Dorez (3 vols, Paris, 1898–99) iii, pp. 319–23. See also Gaier,L’industrie, p. 111; DeVries, ‘The Use of Gunpowder Weaponry’, pp. 13–14.

42 Garnier, L’artillerie, p. 52; R. Vaughan, Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy(London, 1970), p. 26.

43 Garnier, L’artillerie, pp. 98–99.44 Liber de virtutibus sui genitoris Philippi Burgundiae ducis in Kervyn de Letetenhove, ed.,

Chroniques relatives a l’histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne (textslatins) (Brussels, 1876), pp. 35–36.



In 1435 Philip changed sides in the Hundred Years War, abandoningthe English and allying with the French king, Charles VII, the manwhom he had so often attacked in the past. Initially, this policy broughtsome defeats. For example, Philip failed to captured Calais in 1435–36 despite having a large number of guns present at the siege,45 andin 1437, at the siege of Crotoy, he lost not only the conflict but alsomost of his artillery to Lord John Talbot of England.46 In 1443, how-ever, Philip rebounded from these defeats, attacking the pretenders tothe throne of Luxemburg, the King of Bohemia and the Duke ofSaxony, by besieging and eventually capturing the castle of Villy. Herehe took as booty more than 10 000 lb of bronze which served to foundnew gunpowder weapons.47

Finally, there were several years of external peace for the duchy.Although some internal fighting continued, and Philip always used hisartillery in these affairs,48 it was not until 1465 and the War of thePublic Weal that Philip, together with his son and heir, Charles theBold, again began to attack fortresses outside his duchy. In May 1465,allied with Louis, the count of St Pol, Philip’s artillery assembled out-side the walls of Honnecourt, for ‘236 carts loaded with bombards,mortars, veuglaires, serpentines and other cannon’ had been broughtfrom the Low Countries for this engagement.49 In July, Philip’s artillerywas used unsuccessfully at the battle of Montlhery where, although hisguns were positioned strongly on the battlefield, he was unable to firemore than ten salvos at the French army.50 However, a few weeks laterhis guns were again used, this time to defeat the same French armyby bombarding them across the Seine near Paris.51 From August toSeptember of that same year Philip besieged Paris itself, but the gunsof the French defenders eventually caused him to retreat after whatmay have been the most fearsome artillery duel of the century. As eye-

45 Waurin, Recueil des croniques iv, pp. 160–89; Monstrelet, Chronique v, pp. 240–45; JeanChartier, Chronique de Charles VII, ed. V. de Viriville (3 vols, Paris, 1858) i, p. 242;Thomas Basin, Histoire de Charles VII, ed. C. Samaran (2 vols, Paris, 1933) i, pp. 241–43; F.W.D. Brie, ed., The Brut, or the Chronicles of England (2 vols, London, 1906–1908) ii, pp. 469, 505, 573–83; Oliver van Dixmude, Merkwaerdige gebeurtenissen vooralin Vlaenderen en Brabant van 1377 tot 1443, ed. J.J. Lambin (Ypres, 1835), pp. 150–55;R.A. Klinefelter, ed., ‘“The Siege of Calais”: A New Text’, Publications of the ModernLanguage Association LXVII (1952), pp. 888–95.

46 Waurin, Recueil des croniques iv, pp. 227–30. See Garnier, L’artillerie, pp. 139–40, for aninventory of the artillery pieces lost by Philip at the siege of Crotoy.

47 Op. cit., pp. 123–24.48 These were primarily protracted fights against his rebellious subjects in Flanders and

Liege.49 Jacques de Clercq, Memoires, ed. J.A.C. Buchon (Paris, 1875), p. 263. See also Waurin,

Recueil des croniques v, p. 473.50 Op. cit., pp. 482–83; Jean de Haynin, Memoires, ed. R. Chalon (2 vols, Mons, 1842) i,

pp. 29–37; and B. de Mandrot and C. Samaran, eds, Depeches des ambassadeurs milanaisen France sous Louis XI et Francois Sforza (4 vols, Paris, 1916–34) iii, pp. 236–56.

51 Vaughan, Philip the Good, pp. 387–89.


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witness Philippe de Commynes wrote: ‘I have never seen so muchshooting in such a few days.’52

Nor did Philip stop in 1465. Two years later, at the age of 71, hesuccessfully besieged Bouvignes, Brusthem and Dinant using his gun-powder weapons.53 In all these conquests he used a large and elaborateartillery train. He also recognized the threat of an enemy’s artillery,and is reported to have kept a spy in England solely for the purposeof assessing the strength of the English gunpowder artillery holdings.54

During his reign, Philip also formed an army of crusade around hisgunpowder artillery train. In January 1456, with relative peace in theduchy, the Duke planned to avenge the conquest made by the Otto-man Turks against the Byzantines. In this army he included 500–600gunners, carpenters, masons, smiths, pioneers, miners and workmen,all under the command of his master of artillery.55

Philip’s son, Charles the Bold (1467–77), could not follow in thefootsteps of his ducal ancestors, for he possessed none of their militaryor diplomatic skills, nor was he able to defend successfully the landswhich he inherited. Yet he was still interested in continuing the nowtraditional Burgundian gunpowder artillery plan.56 Philippe de Com-mynes describes Charles’s artillery as ‘very large and powerful’ and‘good and beautiful’,57 and Oliver de la Marche reports that the Dukehad more than 300 carts of guns, not counting his culverins or ‘haque-busses’ which were ‘without number’.58 Charles also continued to usethese weapons in many conquests. At the siege of Neuss, for example,one eyewitness recounted: ‘It was pitiful how culverins were fired at[the people of Neuss] thicker than rain . . .’59

52 Philippe de Commynes, Memoires, ed. J. Calmette and G. Durville (3 vols, Paris, 1924)i, p. 62. See also Jean de Roye, Chroniques, in M. Petitot, ed., Collection complete desmemoires relatifs a l’histoire de France, 13–14 (Paris, 1820) xiii, pp. 302–12.

53 Commynes, Memoires i, p. 94; Waurin, Recueil de croniques v, pp. 526–31; Haynin,Memoires i, p. 69; Fairon, Regestes de la cite de Liege iv, pp. 234–41; Thomas Basin,Histoire de Louis XI, ed. C. Samaran (3 vols, Paris, 1963–72) i, pp. 274–6; Oliver de laMarche, Memoires, in Petitot, Collection complete x, pp. 257–58.

54 M.-R. Thielemans, Bourgogne et Angleterre: relations politiques et economiques entre les Pays-Bas bourguignonnes et l’Angleterre, 1435–1467 (Brussels, 1966), p. 17.

55 Vaughan, Philip the Good, p. 361. The entire plan for this crusade is translated andprinted on pp. 360–65.

56 On Charles’s extensive gunpowder holdings, see Garnier, L’artillerie, pp. 177–89; J.Finot, ed., Inventaire sommaire des archives departementales anterieures a 1790. Nord:Archives civiles, serie B (Lille, 1895) viii, pp. 228–301; C. Brusten, L’armee; Brusten,‘Les compagnies d’ordonnance dans l’armee bourguignonne’, Revue Internationaled’Histoire Militaire XL (1978), pp. 112–69; C. Brusten, ‘La fin des compagniesd’ordonnance de Charles le Temeraire’, in Cinq-centieme anniversaire de la bataille deNancy (1477) (Nancy, 1979), pp. 363–75; and E. Heer, ‘Armes et armures au tempsdes guerres de Bourgogne’, in Grandson 1476, Centre d’Histoire et de ProspectivesMilitaires, Serie Recherches de Sciences Comparees, II (Lausanne, 1976).

57 Commynes, Memoires i, p. 16 and ii, p. 10.58 La Marche, Memoires x, pp. 553–54.59 Quoted from a letter sent by Jehan Baugey to the mayors and echevins of Dijon on

16 Sept. 1475. See Vaughan, Charles the Bold, pp. 322–3. See also Chastellain, Œuvresviii, pp. 262–3; Haynin, Memoires i, p. 251; La Marche, Memoires x, pp. 295–6; Roye,Chroniques ii, p. 7; de Mandrot and Samaran, Depeches des ambassadeurs i, p. 107; andJean de Margny, L’aventurier, ed. J.R. de Chevanne (Paris, 1938), pp. 59, 83–84. Foran inventory of Charles’s gunpowder weapons at this siege, see Garnier, L’artillerie,



But Charles’s enemies, the Germans, Swiss, French and Liegeois,had also increased the numbers of their artillery pieces, equalling thequality and quantity of the Burgundian gunpowder weapons. Eventu-ally, they used these weapons to aid in their defeat of the Burgundianforces and to end Burgundian power.60

EnglandWhile France and the Low Countries both had local control over four-teenth-century gunpowder artillery holdings, England’s gunpowderweaponry never fell under local control, but was always exclusively aroyal possession. It is perhaps fitting, although undoubtedly only acoincidence, that the first ‘trustworthy’ source for an English gun-powder weapon, a manuscript illumination painted in London c. 1326,is found in Walter de Milemete’s De notabilibus, sapientiis et prudentiisregum (Concerning the majesty, wisdom and prudence of kings).61 Butit is really to King Edward III (1328–77) that credit for the royal domi-nation of gunpowder weapons in England should be given, for it is hewho, it appears, was the first sovereign to see the future uses of guns,stockpiling a number of the relatively new weapons at the Tower ofLondon, at Dover, and at the recently constructed castle of Queenbor-ough.62 Edward also used these weapons in his frequent conquests ofthe Low Countries and France during the early part of the HundredYears War. They appeared at the sieges of Cambrai in 1338, of Tournai,Quesnoy, Mortague, Saint-Amand and Marchiennes in 1340, of Rennesand Hennebout in 1342, of Calais in 1346–47, of Carcassonne in 1355,of Saint-Valery in 1359, and of Bourdeilles in 1369;63 they also

pp. 178–87.60 On Charles’s wars in general, see J.R. de Chevanne, Les guerres en Bourgogne de 1470 a

1475 (Paris, 1934). On the wars against Germany, see Vaughan, Charles the Bold,pp. 312–58. On the wars against Switzerland, see op. cit., pp. 359–98; and A. Schnegg,ed., Entreprises du duc de Bourgogne contre les suisses (Basel, 1948). On the wars againstLiege, see Vaughan, Charles the Bold, pp. 1–40; A. Lallemand, La lutte des etats de Liegecontre la maison de Bourgogne, 1390–1492 (Brussels, 1910); C. Brusten, ‘Les campagnesliegeoises de Charles le Temeraire’, in Liege et Bourgogne: actes de colloque tenu a Liegeles 28, 29 et 30 octobre 1968 (Liege, 1972), pp. 81–99; C. Gaier, ‘Le role des armes afeu dans les batailles liegeoises au XVe siecle’, Le musee d’Armes LI(1986), pp. 1–12and Publications du Centre Europeen d’Etudes Bourguignonnes (XIVe–XVIe s.) XXVI(1986), pp. 31–37.

61 M.R. James, ed., The Treatise of Walter de Milemete: De notabilibus, sapientiis, et prudentiisregum (London, 1913), p. 140. See also Nicolle, Arms and Armour, no. 976;Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 139; Clephan, ‘The Ordnance’, p. 57;Partington, History of Greek Fire, pp. 98–100; Carman, History of Firearms, pp. 17–18;and K. DeVries, ‘A Reassessment of the Gun Illustrated in the Walter de MilemeteManuscript’ (forthcoming).

62 Clephan, ‘The Ordnance’, p. 66; T.F. Tout, ‘Firearms in England in the FourteenthCentury’, English Historical Review XXVI (1911), pp. 666–702.

63 On the sieges of Cambrai, Tournai, Quesnoy, Mortague, Saint-Amand, andMarchiennes, see Froissart, Chroniques ii, pp. 14, 64. On Rennes and Hennebout, seeop. cit., p. 144. On Calais, see Tout, ‘Firearms in England’, pp. 673–74, 688–89. OnCarcassonne, see Froissart, Chroniques iv, p. 168. On St Valery, see op. cit., v, p. 356.And on Bourdeilles, see op. cit., vi, p. 338.


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undoubtedly were used by Edward at the battle of Crecy in 1340.64

Edward also felt that it was important to keep his possessions on theContinent, once obtained, well outfitted with gunpowder weapons. Heeven appointed a royal receiver for the duchy of Brittany to oversee theprocurement and placement of guns throughout the duchy.65 Finally,Edward also set about converting several vulnerable fortifications ofEngland to more effective defence against gunshot by piercing themwith gunports, a practice continued by his grandson, Richard II; QuarrAbbey on the Isle of Wight, Queenborough Castle, Asseton’s Tower atPortchester, Carisbrooke Castle, Canterbury town wall, Cooling Castle,Southampton Castle and town wall, Saltwood Castle, Norwich townwall, Dover Castle, Bodiam Castle and Winchester town wall had allreceived gunports by 1390.66

Richard II (1377–99), despite a reputed dislike for the military arts,also carried on other gunpowder weaponry programmes begun by hisgrandfather, continuing to increase the stores of gunpowder weaponsavailable in England and in English possessions on the Continent.67

Richard is also credited with the first royal appointment of a ‘masterof cannons’ in England in 1386, although Edward III, unknown to us,may have preceded him with such an appointment.68 Finally, it is Rich-ard who may have outfitted his army with the first handguns.69

Richard’s overthrow by his cousin, Henry IV (1399–1413), broughtabout the initial phase of the Wars of the Roses, and yet surprisinglyHenry seems not to have used his gunpowder artillery stores, whichstill appear to have remained intact after Richard II’s demise, on rebelEnglishmen. Only in the campaign against York, Warworth, andBerwick in 1405–1406 did Henry take gunpowder weapons, and thenthey were not numerous or particularly decisive.70 Instead, records ofHenry’s guns show that he was only interested in using these weaponsto protect his marches in England, both Scottish and Welsh, and inensuring the continued guardianship of English possessions in France.He also seems to have been unable to increase his gunpowder weapon

64 On the disputed reports of cannons at Crecy, see A.H. Burne, The Crecy War(London, 1955), pp. 192–202.

65 See Jones, ‘The Defence of Medieval Brittany’, pp. 151 n. 1, 154–55, 163.66 See DeVries, ‘The Impact of Gunpowder Weaponry’, pp. 233–6.67 Tout, ‘Firearms in England’, pp. 676–8, 681–3; Thomas Rymer, ed., Foedera,

conventiones, litterae, et cujuscunque generis acta publica inter reges Angliae et alios quosvisimperatores, reges, pontifices, principes, vel communitates (1101–1654) (20 vols, London,1704–35) vii, p. 622.

68 Calendar of Close Rolls, Richard II 1385–89 (London, 1921), pp. 162–63. On Edward’sartillerymen, see Tout, ‘Firearms in England’, pp. 679–80.

69 PRO Enrolled Accounts E101/400/23. This document would bear more study. Seealso Tout, ‘Firearms in England’, pp. 678, 684–86.

70 On the campaign against York, Warworth and Berwick in 1405–6, see J.H. Wylie, TheHistory of England under Henry IV (4 vols, 1894–1929; repr. New York, 1969) ii,pp. 246–73.



holdings in the manner of Richard II and Edward III, although whythis was so for the moment remains a mystery.71

Henry V (1413–22) made up for his father’s gunpowder weaponryshortcomings almost immediately after his ascension to the throne.Preparing for two years for an invasion of France, the new Englishking constructed and gathered together an impressive artillery train.72

There is no extant account of how many guns actually accompaniedHenry on his attack on France in 1415, but their presence was certainlyfelt at Harfleur, as that fortified town fell with relative ease to theEnglish King;73 other gunpowder weapons accompanied Henry to thebattlefield of Agincourt, although their presence was less decisivethere.74 Henry continued to construct and use gunpowder weaponseven after the victory at Agincourt, and this undoubtedly made a differ-ence in the victories against Boulogne in 1416, Caen in 1417, Falaise,Domfort, Cherbourg, Louviers and Rouen in 1418, Montereau andMelun in 1420, Alencon, Chartres and Saint-Riquier in 1422, andMeaux and Saint-Valery-sur-Somme in 1422.75

During the early part of Henry VI’s reign (1422–61), the gunpowderartillery policies of Henry V were continued. Evidence of the construc-tion of gunpowder weapons in England and their transportation to theContinent, as well as an extensive English artillery organization inFrance, affirms the continued belief of Henry VI’s court that gun-powder weaponry was needed to preserve the foreign holdings of thecrown.76 But soon this royal interest in gunpowder technology began

71 See op. cit., ii, pp. 7, 101; iii, pp. 57–58, 64, 106–7, 112; iv, p. 254; Richard Brooke,Visits to Fields of Battle, in England of the Fifteenth Century (London, 1857), pp. 221–23.

72 Burne, The Agincourt War, p. 34; Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, pp. 223–24; Rymer,Foedera ix, p. 160; Calendar of Patent Rolls, Henry V 1413–16 (London, n.d.), pp. 92,292; J.H. Wylie, The Reign of Henry the Fifth (3 vols, Cambridge, 1914–29) i, pp. 447–8,480; C.T. Allmand, Henry V (Berkeley, CA, 1992), p. 216.

73 Burne, The Agincourt War, pp. 42–46; Wylie, Reign of Henry V ii, pp. 33–38; Allmand,Henry V, p. 216; Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, pp. 224–25; M.G.A. Vale, EnglishGascony, 1399–1453: A Study of War, Government and Politics during the Later Stages of theHundred Years War (Oxford, 1970), p. 75 n. 3; C.T. Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy,1415–1450: The History of a Medieval Occupation (Oxford, 1983), p. 9.

74 Wylie, Reign of Henry V ii, pp. 159–60; Allmand, Henry V, p. 212.75 On Henry’s conquest of Normandy in 1416–22, see R.A. Newhall, The English

Conquest of Normandy, 1416–1424: A Study in Fifteenth-Century Warfare (New Haven, CT,1924); Burne, The Agincourt War, pp. 107–74; Wylie, Reign of Henry V ii, pp. 329–30;iii, pp. 58–59, 70–71, 107–10, 113, 119–35, 209, 212, 313, 317, 334, 340–50, 412;Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, pp. 226–7. Allmand (Henry V, p. 215) writes about theuse of the gun by Henry: ‘Apart from the bow at Agincourt, the weapon which madethe biggest impact on the war was the cannon . . . Henry, as the aggressor, had thefull weight of cannon behind him, and both he and his brother, Gloucester, were touse it to good effect.’

76 Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, pp. 228–32; Calendar of Patent Rolls, Henry VI, 1422–9,pp. 493–94; Henry VI, 1429–36, p. 44; C.T. Allmand, ‘L’artillerie de l’armee anglaiseet son organisation a l’epoque de Jeanne d’Arc’, in Jeanne d’Arc: une epoque, unrayonnement (Paris, 1982), pp. 73–83; P. Le Cacheux, ed., Rouen au temps de Jeanned’Arc et pendant l’occupation anglaise (1419–1449) Rouen, 1931), pp. 132–46, 347–48; A.Goodman, The Wars of the Roses: Military Activity and English Society, 1452–97 (London,1981), pp. 164–65. Two recently discovered documents should assist inunderstanding the artillery programme in the early years of Henry VI’s reign. One,


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to wane. For the most part this can be attributed to the losses ofEnglish lands in France and with them the losses of gunpowder wea-pons. After 1435, too, when Philip the Good of Burgundy broke hisalliance with England and started to support the French in the war, itwas to be expected that the English could not hold on to their conti-nental possessions for too much longer. In fact, they were effectivelyoff the Continent by 1453 (although they hung on to Calais foranother 100 years).

But England would not be at peace for more than 30 years after theloss of the Hundred Years War, for even before they had left France,the next phase of the Wars of the Roses had begun with the revolt ofRichard, Duke of York and cousin to Henry VI. And before these warswere completed, two dynastic families, the Lancasters and the Yorks,had given way to the Tudors. What is so interesting about these warsfrom a military technology perspective is how few gunpowder weaponswere used during them – a fact which has been remarked by severalhistorians77 – especially when compared to the almost early modernuse of gunpowder weapons on the Continent during the War of PublicWeal and the Swiss–Burgundian Wars being fought at the same time.

Historically this is certainly a problem, but one which lies outsidethe scope of this article and must await further study. Suffice it to saythat, after nearly a century and a half of strong royal control over gun-powder weaponry in England, such weaponry had almost completelydisappeared by the middle of the fifteenth century and would notreappear until the middle of the sixteenth century.

This is not to say that the English kings during the Wars of the Roseshad no gunpowder weapons. In fact these kings, whether Lancastrian,such as Henry VI, Yorkist, such as Edward IV (1461–83) or Richard III(1483–85), or Tudor, such as Henry VII (1485–1509), tried diligentlyto strengthen their gunpowder weaponry stores and administration.But they simply never had strong royal control over these weaponssimilar to that held by their continental counterparts.

For example, on several occasions during his reign, Henry VIordered gunpowder artillery to be constructed at his own expense, andall during the first period of the Wars of the Roses he continued theroyal ordnance department and constantly named individuals to theoffice of chief cannoneer.78 In 1450 guns were even used effectively to

PRO Enrolled Accounts E101/51/27, dated 6 May 1428, instructs John Parker ofCheshunt to construct cannons and gather stone, iron and other materials for therepair of cannons ‘beyond the sea’, and the second, PRO Enrolled AccountsE101/52/3, dated 1429, is written from France by the same John Parker, indicatingwhere he had taken these weapons.

77 This lack of gunpowder weaponry use is commented on by Goodman, Wars of theRoses, pp. 173–5; C. Ross, The Wars of the Roses (London, 1976), p. 112; and J.Gillingham, The Wars of the Roses (Baton Rouge, LA, 1981), pp. 27–28.

78 On Henry VI’s domestic use of gunpowder weapons, see Goodman, Wars of the Roses,pp. 160–61; R.L. Storey, The End of the House of Lancaster (London, 1966), p. 181; andCalendar of Patent Rolls, Henry VI (London, 1910) vi, pp. 342, 605, 659.



put down Jack Cade’s rebellion in Kent.79 But when it came to usingthese weapons in battle against an equally well-gunned Yorkist army,at the battle of Northampton in 1460, poor planning and rain put hisguns out of action, and Henry VI suffered an ignoble loss.80

In a nutshell, this was the problem with gunpowder weapons in fif-teenth-century England. It was not just the King who controlled theirsupply and use. Henry’s loss at Northampton was to Edward, the Earlof March. Edward had inherited his own guns from his well-suppliedfather, Richard, the Duke of York, who in turn had used them innumerous military adventures against English royalist forces: at thebattles of Brent Heath (1452), St Albans (1455), Blore Heath (1459),Ludford Bridge (1459) and Ludlow (1459).81 Edward himself had firedgunpowder weapons into the city of London in 1460, an incidentwhich caused several disturbances among the citizens after he becameKing Edward IV the following year.82

Once king, Edward found that he faced the same problem with theguns of rebellious nobles as Henry VI: he alone did not own or controlthe gunpowder weapons of his kingdom. He faced the guns of thebrothers Neville, Sir John, the Earl of Northumberland and MarquisMontagu, and Richard, the Earl of Warwick, at the sieges of Alnwick,Bamburgh and Dunstanburgh castles in 146483 and again at the battleof Barnet in 1471; at Barnet the two brothers lost their lives.84 Laterin 1471, at the battle of Tewkesbury, Edward also faced the guns ofMargaret of Anjou, the wife of the deposed Henry VI.85 Similar circum-stances were encountered by Edward’s brother, Richard III, at thebattle of Bosworth, in 1485 when, using his own guns, he fought theusurper-victor, Henry Tudor. Henry had not only gathered his owngunpowder weaponry on his march through England to Bosworthfield, but had also brought French artillery with him.86 Two years later,at the battle of Stoke, the now King Henry VII defeated a final Yorkist

79 I.M.W. Harvey, Jack Cade’s Rebellion of 1450 (Oxford, 1991), p. 84.80 R.I. Jack, ‘A Quincentenary: The Battle of Northampton, July 10th, 1460’,

Northamptonshire Past and Present III (1960–65), pp. 21–25.81 On Richard of York’s artillery, see Goodman, Wars of the Roses, pp. 30, 121, 170–71;

Storey, End of the House of Lancaster, p. 189; Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, pp. 233–34. In 1459 Henry VI had tried to order the seizure of all Richard of York’s artillery(Calendar of Patent Rolls, Henry VI vi, p. 527), but this order could not be fulfilled.

82 C.L. Scofield, The Life and Reign of Edward IV (2 vols, 1923; repr. New York, 1967) i,pp. 89–92; R.R. Sharpe, London and the Kingdom (3 vols, London, 1895) iii, p. 384.

83 Goodman, Wars of the Roses, p. 64; Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, p. 236; Ross, Wars ofthe Roses, p. 66.

84 Goodman, Wars of the Rosees, p. 172; Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, p. 239; Ross, Warsof the Roses, p. 123; P.W. Hammond, The Battles of Barnet and Tewkesbury (New York,1990), pp. 72–78.

85 Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, p. 239; Ross, Wars of the Roses, pp. 125–26; Hammond,Battles of Barnet and Tewkesbury, pp. 93–98.

86 Jean Molinet, Chroniques, ed. G. Doutrepont and O. Jodogne (4 vols, Brussels, 1935)i, p. 434; Goodman, Wars of the Roses, p. 93; Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, p. 242;Ross, Wars of the Roses, pp. 131, 135. See also M. Bennett, The Battle of Bosworth (NewYork, 1985).


144 Kelly DeVries

uprising, ending the Wars of the Roses. Again both sides used gun-powder weapons.87

This was thus the nature of gunpowder weaponry control in Englandduring most of the fifteenth century: local ownership of gunpowderweapons almost always equalled if not surpassed that of the central,royal government. Indeed, so pervasive was this local control that thereare even numerous occasions when these smaller political entities usedtheir gunpowder weapons against each other without ever involvingthe king. Such instances include: the 1443 Norwich riots, when thecitizens of the town used guns to attack an abbey, the prior of whichhad, they felt, unjustly arrested two of their number;88 the gunpowderweaponry assault of Sir Robert Wingfield’s house at Letheringham bySir John Mowbray, the Duke of Norfolk, in an attempt by the latter toregain the possession of his manor at Hoo;89 the time when EdmundFitzwilliam, unbeknown to the King, seized the artillery of the earl ofShrewsbury, John Talbot, in 1450 to install it in the unarmed royalcastle of Conisbrough;90 also in 1450, when the Esquire Harry Bruyn,newly appointed lieutenant of the Isle of Wight, was forced to providehis own guns for the poorly defended island;91 the 1455 siege of Pow-derhorn, when the guns of Thomas Courtenay, the Earl of Devon, wereused to conquer the castle of William, Lord Bonville;92 the feudbetween the Berkeley and Talbot families which ended in 1469 withgunpowder weaponry bombardments between the two factions at thebattle of Nibley Green;93 the use of guns again by Sir John Mowbrayagainst Sir John Paston’s castle at Caister, also in 1469;94 and the feudbetween the Stanleys and the Harringtons which ended with the 1471siege of Hornby Castle, taken by Sir Thomas Stanley using, amongother artillery pieces, the cannon Mile End.95

ConclusionHistorical revolutions are complicated things, and the Military Revol-ution is no exception. It is frequently difficult to get all the paradigmsto match exactly, and such certainly is the case in considering the roleof gunpowder weaponry in determining the rise of the early modern

87 M. Bennett, Lambert Simnel and the Battle of Stoke (New York, 1987), pp. 91–92.88 Storey, End of the House of Lancaster, p. 223; P.C. Maddern, Violence and Social Order:

East Anglia, 1422–1442 (Oxford, 1992), p. 198.89 Storey, End of the House of Lancaster, p. 227.90 P.A. Johnson, Duke Richard of York, 1411–1460 (Oxford, 1988), p. 223.91 Brooke, Visits to Fields of Battle, p. 233.92 Storey, End of the House of Lancaster, p. 171.93 See the document ‘The Battle of Nibley Green, 1469’, in A.R. Myers, ed., English

Historical Documents iv: 1327–1485 (London, 1969), pp. 1127–30.94 See J, Gardiner, ed., The Paston Letters (7 vols, London, 1900–1908) ii, pp. 397–99; v,

p. 55. The latter indicates that John Paston was forced to surrender his owngunpowder weapons to the duke of Norfolk once his castle had fallen.

95 Brooke, Visits to the Fields of Battle, p. 238; M.K. Jones, ‘Richard III and the Stanleys’,in R.E. Horrox, ed., Richard III and the North (Hull, 1986), pp. 36–38.



state. In terms of gunpowder technology during the late Middle Ages,France and Burgundy do follow a pattern showing the decline of feu-dalism and the rise of the central state which conforms to that pro-posed by Geoffrey Parker and others. Local control and ownership ofthese weapons was removed by the central state, which would laterreturn to use the weapons against those who had once owned them.But in the case of England, the pattern was not followed. While localcontrol persisted on the Continent, in England the king alone hadcontrol over gunpowder weapons, and he used them in an almostabsolute manner to increase and to protect his kingdom’s holdings inFrance. He did not, however, use them to control his own subjects;and after almost fifty years of civil war not only had he lost control overgunpowder holdings in his kingdom, he had in fact lost his kingdom.

Loyola College
