40644726

8/22/2019 40644726

1/23

Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual HistoryAuthor(s): Nicholas Greenwood OnufReviewed work(s):Source: Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Fall 1991), pp. 425-446Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644726 .

Accessed: 16/03/2013 05:34

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toAlternatives:

Global, Local, Political.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 05:34:19 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sagehttp://www.jstor.org/stable/40644726?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/40644726?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage

8/22/2019 40644726

2/23

Alternatives6 (1991).425-446

Sovereignty:utline faConceptualHistoryNicholasGreenwood nuf

In explaining heconceptofsovereignty,confess must nter ntodealingas itdoes with o importantnd commona concept a fieldwhich s thornynd little-cultivated.-GottfriedWilhelmLeibniz,1677

Sovereignty nd ModernityUntil recently scholars treated the concept of sovereigntywithindifference,heireyesglazing at the verymentionof it.At least thiswas so forscholarsfrom he UnitedStates, s StevenKrasner,himselfa prominent S scholar, as noted,no doubtautobiographically.1imeschange:theconceptofsovereigntyas experienceda burst f attentionin the fieldof international elations.Whya conceptso commonandyetso little ultivated,o use Leibniz's words, hould suddenlyreceivesuch attention,much of it from cholars in theUnitedStates, s itselfa questionworthyfattention.Any nswer, want o argue,must ddressthecondition fmodernity,for t smodernity'sareer towhichtheconceptofsovereigntyas beenineluctably ied. With modernity aken for granted,the conceptualintelligibilitynd normative mplicationsof sovereignty ent largelyunchallenged.Withthe dramaticappearance in the last fewyearsofserious scholarlydebates about modernity'saccomplishmentsandprospects, he concept of sovereignty as come under unaccustomedscrutiny. odernityonfronts differentensibility,nd perhapsa newworldnthemaking a world nwhich overeignty ust igure ifferently,ifat all.What do I mean by "modernity"?Between 1600 and 1800, orthereabouts,hemainfeatures fmodernityecame clear.First nd mostSchool of nternational ervice,AmericanUniversity, ashington, C 20016USA.

425

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

8/22/2019 40644726

3/23

426 Sovereignty:utlinef Conceptualistory

importants an interpretationf theworld theworldofmeaningandthe worldof experience as human-centered. econd is an emphasison individuality,eason, and masteryover circumstance.Third is apreoccupationwithmethod, he differentiationf tasks,and materialprosperity,ll in the name of progress.Liberalism s modernity'soreideology, capitalism its paymaster, nd the state its highest socialrealization,primary gent,and paramountproblem. t is unavoidableredundancy o speak of the modern"state,"for there s no otherkindof state properly nderstood.No less is it redundantto speak of the"sovereign tate," nd no less avoidable. Sovereigntynproblematicallydefinesthe state s unique tomodernity."It is impossibleto have a modern sovereignstate that does notincorporate discursivelyrticulated heoryof the modern sovereignstate."2AnthonyGiddenswrote hesewordsto illustrate generalclaimtowhich subscribe:

The point is that reflection n social processes theories, ndobservationsboutthem) ontinuallynter nto . . theuniverse feventsthattheydescribe Consider, or example, heories fsovereigntyormulatedy seventeenthentury uropeanthinkers.These were he result freflectionpon, nd studyf, ocialtrendsintowhichheynturnwere edback.5

Of course, there is more to the modernconcept of sovereigntyhanthe incorporation f seventeenth-centuryheories nto the practiceofstates' eaders.Whatevermorethere s,however, ecessarilynvolves heplaybetween deas and events.fthehistoryf thestate, nd ofmodernityin general, s typically resented o us in the firstnstance as a matterof events,then sovereignty's istory urelyought to come to us firstas thehistoryf an idea.The standardEnglish anguagetreatmentfthehistoryfsovereigntyas an idea is contained in . Hinsley'sbook, now a quarterof acentury ld, simply nd appropriatelyntitled overeignty.4insley's oalwas clear and uncomplicated.He wantedto show how the conceptofsovereignty eveloped in response to, and in supportof, the state'semergence s a dominant eature fthe modernworld.With tates ameinternational elations s an overarching eatureof that world.To tellthis story,Hinsleyextricatednnumerable trands of politicalthoughtandpractice rom tangledhistorical ecord.He wove hem nto tapestryso intricatend richlyexturedhat tspatterndisappears nto tsdetails.An uncomplicated bjectivecan have ungainlyresults; exturen thisinstancerobs thestory fconceptualcoherence.5If coherence is the goal, historiansof politicalthoughtmight eem


8/22/2019 40644726

4/23

Nicholas reenwoodnuf 427

to offer uidance. Dealing as theydo with nsembles ofconcepts, heysearch forgeneral statements, r theories,that fix meaning for theensemble until the nextsuch statement s forthcoming. successionof these statements rganizes the historian's xposition into chapterssaid to coincidewith pochsdefinedbycontinuities nd commonalitiesin political thought Through repeated invocation, epoch-definingstatements chievecanonicalstatus. he weight fattentionncreasinglyfalls to a short istof theorists,nd specific concepts appear in thehistorian's xposition nly nsofar s particularheoristshampion hem.In the instance of sovereignty,ts historyn political thoughtbegins,and all butends,with eanBodin.In the searchfor oherence, differentind ofhistorys called forone thatavoidsboth theundue texturingf historiesof ideas and theartificialityf histories fpolitical houghtA candidate of recentvintageis "conceptualhistory." onceptualhistorians tartwiththeassumptionthat oncepts ughtnotto be detachedfrom hepoliticaldiscoursewithinwhich theyare embedded. This is because concepts constituteuchdiscourse.Theydo so throughheconduct farguments, hich, lthoughresponsive oevents,wecan see as having een about oncepts. nTerenceBall's words, "political argumentsas linguisticperformances.. areintendedto preserve, xtend, nd/or change the conceptsconstitutiveof political discourse.1*6ntentionsaside, conceptual innovation s afrequentresult as concepts leak across discursive boundaries anddisagreements ersist"Disagreements bout the scope and domain ofthe political' re themselves onstitutiveeatures fpoliticaldiscourse."7Conceptual historians look for arguments and find conceptualchanges the sort of changes modernity'sareerwould seem to havebrought o theconceptofsovereignty.tillwemust sk: Can a conceptualhistory f sovereigntypan modernity'senturies-longareer and endup being anymore coherent han Hinsley*sccount?In practice,mostconceptual historiansare able to cover long periods with only thesketchiest f remarks.They then directmost of their attentionto arelativelyhortperiod duringwhich the conceptat hand undergoesadecisivechange.The briefcompass of mostconceptualhistories eaves little hoice.For example, a recent collection of histories of concepts such asconstitution,epresentation, ublic interest, ublic opinion, and rightsdevotedan averageoftwenty-twoages ofprinted ext o each concept8In thesecircumstances detailedrecapitulationfanybody's rgumentsis impossible. he alternativestoconfine particular onceptualhistoryto the moment conceptchangesdecisively,s identified n argumentsspecific o thatmoment n these nstances,however, oherenceis hardto achieve. As an example, anotherrecent collection of conceptual


8/22/2019 40644726

5/23


histories sed thedraftingnd adoptionof theConstitutionf theUnitedStates s a self-evidentlyecisivemoment fchangefor hostofpoliticalconcepts.9Althoughmost of the essays attendedto arguments uitespecifically,heconceptsabout which these argumentswere conductedhave a fleeting, lmostdisembodiedcharacter wherethey ame from,what inally appenedtothem, nd howtheymight ave been connectedare questionsthat the collection'sformat nhibits ts contributorsromtryingo answer.The first f these collectionsdoes not include sovereigntymong tsfourteen oncepts.Closest is Quentin Skinner's The State," n whichhe concluded thatthe statehad become the "masternoun of politicalargument"y hemid-eighteenthentury.hereupon a number fotherconceptsbearingon the analysisof sovereigntyad to be reorganizedor nsomecases givenup."10 his is an exceptionally erceptiveudgment,but not one that Skinner pursued. The other collection offerstwoconceptualhistories fsovereigntynthe ate-eighteenth-centuryontextofthefounding f theUnited States historyhatnecessarily urnsonthe arguments ver the distribution f powers n a federalrepublic.11While this is an important trand n the story,o render t coherentlyhardly sufficesfor the larger need to put sovereignty'selation tomodernityn conceptualperspective.I suspect that doing justice to a full-scaleconceptual historyofsovereigntywould yield results that differfromHinsley's only inemphasizing hemutabilityfpoliticaldiscourse.The complexityfthatdiscoursewouldstandreaffirmed,ndwewould still ack theperspectivenecessary olookback acrossseveralcenturies fmodernity. hatthoseof us in the field of internationalrelationsneed is the sketchier ortof conceptual history an outline hat imposes coherenceat sacrificeto detailwhilemarkingmoreclosely hemoments fconceptual hange.Such n outline ollows.tpresents hehistoryf he oncept f overeigntyin three ections, hefirst f whichmakesconceptual tabilityts theme.Byexamining he standard efinition fsovereignty,his ection ketchesthepolitical rganization fmodernitynthemostgeneralterms.The tworemaining ectionsturn othemoments fconceptual hangebounding sovereignty'song historyas "an essentiallyuncontestedconcept."12More precisely,the next section depicts sovereignty'sconceptualantecedentsand theirfusion n the crucibleof modernity.This it does byreference o fourdistinctivedioms ofpolitical hought,twoofwhichfell nto a distincdyecondaryposition s modernityameinto its own.13 he last section suggeststhatmodernity's roblematiccondition oday s matchedbythedeclining ntelligibilityftheconceptofsovereignty.n some measure,thatdecline corresponds o a renewalof politicaldiscoursein idioms long reduced in significance. erhaps


8/22/2019 40644726

6/23


latter-dayersions f the four dioms dentifiedn the context fsovereignty'sonceptual usionwill uperintendtsdecompositionndtake ack ts onceptualonstituents.One ofthefour dioms, iberalism,s farmore hanan idiom.AsI havealready uggested,t is modernity'sore deologyan ideologysystematicallyonnectinghe ndividualndsocietyhroughhemedium,andinthe diom, frights.tates ecomerights-holdingndividualsyanalogy;hepower f his nalogyffectivelyrantsnearnedredibilityto theconcept f state overeignty.fthe anguage frightsccountedformuch ftheconcept'svident tabilityver he asttwo enturies,the hree emainingdioms rovidedts onceptualntecedents.Two of themhavea classicalprovenience:herepublicandiomof"civic ife" ofvirtues a publicdispositionandthe mperialdiomofpower nd prerogative.he last s an earlymodern approchementofrepublicanismndProtestantismhat trengthensheformer'slreadysubstantialthical rientationy urningirtuento vocationnd civiclife nto religiouslynspiredalling. he classicaldiom fpower ndprerogativeecamethemodern diom fstatecraft.t also cametobeinseparableromiberalism.ong n iberalism'shadow,diomsfvirtueandvocationonethelessontributedomodernity'sistinctiveharacter.They eem ikelyoreturnoprominencensofarsmodernity'sonditioncalls ncreasingttentiono tself.Given heremarkablevents fthe ast wo rthree ears, speciallyin Europe nd the SovietUnion, might aveconcluded hisoutlinewith discussion f the impact f thoseevents n the conceptofsovereignty.et such a discussionwould inevitablye superficial,speculative,nd one-sided.14t would specially ave been one-sidedinthat he earch ormeaningnevents nderestimateshe mportanceofchangesn themeaning fmodernitytself changeswith arge foccluded ffects n Giddens'suniverse fevents."f I write ooone-sidedly f ideas,others re sureto write f the events hat ll butmonopolize urattentionn theshort erm. s conceptual istoriansnote, onceptsakeon theirmeaningnly s theyrebroughtobearinargumentike arthquakes,rgumentsrethemselvesvents. nlikeearthquakes, olitical ventsneverusthappen;events nd conceptsdepend n eachother. ogetherheyredeeds, ndthroughurdeedswemake heworldwe know.15

The Standard efinitionfSovereigntyI start ith insley'sefinitionf overeignty:final nd bsoluteoliticalauthorityn thepolitical ommunity."16is addendum,andnofinal


8/22/2019 40644726

7/23


and absolute authority exists elsewhere" (his emphasis), is logicallyunavoidable and thus superfluous, xceptto confirm hatsovereigntyimpliesthe independence of the communityn question. If authorityis final and absolute for thatcommunity,henbydefinitionno other,moreencompassing uthorityan also have thosesameproperties. thercommunitiesmay, ut need not,be organizedthe sameway.Empiricallyspeaking, overeigntyscontagious: nce anycommunityecomesa state,neighboring ommunities espond nkind.Mostdefinitions f sovereigntyefernot to a politicalcommunityssuch,but to the territoryver which thatcommunityxercisescontrol.They do so because states again speakingempirically are territorialconfigurations.n HansJ.Morgenthau'swords, bythe end of theThirtyYears' War[1648],sovereigntys supremepowerover a certainterritorywas a politicalfact"17 etsovereigntys notsimply matter fphysicallycontrolled erritory.insley pokeof"final and absoluteauthority,"ndMorgenthau, fternotingthatpoliticalfactgave rise to legal theory,definedsovereigntys "supreme uthority" ithin certainterritory.18Evidently,overeignty epends on authority,nd authoritys somethingmore than physical ontrol verterritory.n Hinsley's anguage, tmustbe a propertyof the political community o which that territorycorresponds.The term authority"s considerablymoredifficulto deal with hanis theterm sovereignty."19onetheless,n thiscontext hesense is clear.Physical ontrolmustbe matchedbya convictionwithin hecommunitythat his ontrol sappropriatelyxercised. vensupreme uthoritympliesthe existenceof rulesauthorizing heexerciseofphysical ontrol. uchrulesconstitute hecommunitys a political rrangementIndicatively, lanJameshas suggested hat overeigntys a conditionof "constitutional ndependence."80 ameswould seem to think thatconstitutionsre internal o statesbut with onsequences, summarizedbytheterm independence,"whichare external. ust s plausibly, ulescollectively onstitutingtatesas independent, erritoriallyonfigured,and supremely authoritative ntities simultaneouslyconstitutethecommunityfstates s a political rrangementfstates aveconstitutions,so must he worldof states.So stated, he atter osition ounds egalistic nd anachronistic. amesdismissed t with the suggestion hat nternationalaw not be confusedwithconstitutionalaw.21 aw is notthepoint Hans Kelsen's strenuouseffort o show thatthe internationalegal order ogically ubordinatesdomestic egal orders s as misleading s James's asydismissal.22ameshimself aid that "there s no necessaryreasonwhy overeigntyhouldbe based on law."23Instead, sovereignty s a "constitutiveprinciple."24 t summarily


8/22/2019 40644726

8/23

Nicholasreenwoodnuf 431

acknowledgeswhatpeopleotherwise eed not even be awareof:namely,that theexistenceof states s a particularkind of politicalcommunityand oftheworld fstates s a different, orepermissive indofpoliticalcommunityre joint consequences of the verysame acts. Preeminentamongsuch acts of coconstitutionre assertionsof independence onbehalf of states.No less important s the reception accorded suchassertions effectively,fnot explicitly,n behalf of the communityfstates. Coconstitutions an ongoing process, informal, usceptibletochange,but, learly nough, ittle hangedoverthe asttwo enturies.Elsewhere I have called this a "constructivist"view of socialarrangements.25t closely resembles the view underlying onceptualhistory,s conveyed n Ball's remarks uoted above, despitethe latter'sevidentpreoccupationwithchange. Constructivismcknowledges hatsomesocial arrangements,ike thecommunityfsovereign tates, rovethemselves obe highly urable.Constructivismlso acknowledges hatideas can changequicklynd social arrangementsnce markedbytheirdurability an transform. onceptual historians choose to emphasizechange for reasons that are extrinsicto their concern for politicalargument nd itsconstitutiveffects.After ll, arguments an supportgivenarrangementss wellas undermine hem.Perhaps conceptual historiansare promptedto emphasize changebecause so many cholars eem biased in favor fstabilitynd continuityand because thepresence fchangeoften eems moredifficultoexplainthanitsabsence. Ball expresslycknowledged n interestn conceptualchangebecause ofhis sense that we are living hroughnd participatingin a periodofprofound,xhilarating,nd in somewaysdeeplydisturbingconceptual hifts."26ndeed,thesame sense ofchangeafter wo enturiesof stasis motivates hisoutlineof sovereignty'sonceptualhistory.t iscommonplace oconceiveofmodernitys change.Change is a constant,and progresssmodernity's ost mportant roductAltogetherifferentis the sense of modernitytself n change; the constantsconstitutingthe conditionsforchange have lost their constancy.The sense thatmodernitys finally hanging n itself, erhaps even coming o an end,is a late-modernphenomenon contributing o the reconstitutionfmodernitys,for ackof a better erm,ate-modern.In the late-modern erspective, he ground is shifting eneath theedificeof modernity,ut at least thereis ground.Social constructionalways roceeds, ikebricolage,ith he inguisticmaterials thand.Others,with a more radical sensibility, old that any claim of grounding smodernity's randest onceit Such a position is much in evidence inthese timesof change; the term"postmodern"has come generally odescribe t Ifadherents fthepostmodern ositionsuspect ate-modernclaims, ncluding heclaim to a distinctive osition,thenthosewhose


8/22/2019 40644726

9/23


convictionsre merelymodernare equally suspiciousofthedistinctionbetween ate- nd postmodern ositions.In presentinghe case forconceptual history, all felt ompelledtoacknowledge he resemblancebetween his approach and postmodernones in order to show that"the resemblance is on thewhole a fairlysuperficial ne."27The same maybe said forconstructivismn generaland this ate-modern onstruction f sovereignty'sistoryn particular.It bears emphasis: this outline is not a conventionally modernconstruction f sovereigntys something some "thing" permanentlyfixed in law and politics.Nor is it a postmoderndeconstruction fsovereigntys a text or,more ineffably,n "intertext"- roundlesslyinscribed y sovereignman" upon theartifacts fmodernity.28James nd mostotherwriters ee sovereigntys a protectivehell forthe state.29 his is the standard, modern" view.It supports s muchas it follows from the practice, already evident with Hinsley, ofconceptualizing overeigntyn two dimensions,the internal and theexternal,whicheffectivelyemarcate the world withinthe statefromtheworld fstates.n thisview, internal overeignty"nablesmodernityto fulfill ts many possibilitieswithin states. Meanwhile, "externalsovereignty"enies the possibility f any such change in therelationsofstates.Anarchy revails, ith tsuglypropensities nd deadlypotential.One maythink t a paradox thatsovereigntyo conceivedexpeditesmodernity'sevelopmentwithin tatesbyfixing he relations f statesin an earlymodernpattern.RichardAshleycertainly hought o whenhe first dentified hisphenomenon, f n slightly ifferenterms.30orour purposes, it is no less a paradox that the standardconceptionproclaims overeigntyo be indivisible, ven as it divides sovereigntyalong internal nd externaldimensions.51t mightbetterbe said thatsovereignty akesthe state ndivisible.f a particular tateweredivided,in the sense ofbeing territoriallyeconfigured,hen itwould cease tobe a state. nstead,two or more stateswould exist,each with ts ownterritorialntegritynd each sovereignn itsownrightThat statesmustbe sovereign o be statesunderlies the categoricaldistinction etweena confederationf tates nda federal tate.n thepresenceof overeignty,anysegmented erritorialonfigurationmustbe one or the other. herecan be nothingn between.Withmpeccable ogic, amuelPufendorfmade this imple, horoughlymodernpointlate in the seventeenth entury.52y doing so, he gavea timeless, economical description of sovereignty's operationalimplications. o claim that if authority s supreme then it mustbeindivisibles a different atter. here is no reasonwhythemany asksconstitutinguthorityannotbe undertaken eparately. or s there nyreason why those charged with tasks cannot be fullyand finally


8/22/2019 40644726

10/23


responsibleor heir erformance.n this ituation,erritorysrenderednotdivisible,ut rrelevantor oliticalurposes. onsequently,he tateisunneeded nd the onceptf overeigntysunintelligible.The situationf the West efore he riseofthe modern tatemaybe thoughtf in theseterms. he so-calledfunctionalistheory finternationalelations, hich roseattheturn fthe astcenturyndflourishedfterWorldWar I, projected gradual, argely nsuspectedtransformationfmodernity'soliticalrchitecturelongthese ines."Technically ompetent ersonnelorganized in narrowly efinedfunctionalnitswouldbe finally esponsible otto states, uttotheirown internalizedtandards f professionalonductand technicalaccomplishmenttateswouldbecome mptyhells nd sovereignsomore han eremonialigures.Functionalistheorys historicallynd conceptuallyffiliated ithmodernismnWesterniterature,rt,nd rchitecture.*4singnynumberof techniques,modernistseekto getbelow the surfacepatterns fmodernityo ts nnerworkings.monghosepatternsrestates, hichwe think f as coveringhesurface fEarth, utwhichmay ndeedbeinthe rocessfbecomingvast,nterlockingongeriesffunctionallyspecialized ntities,otso muchbefore ureyesas beneath hem.am sympatheticith he modernisterspective.thinktmayfit nwith nd evenreinforce y wn ate-modernoint fview. heproblemwith hemodernisteadingfmodernity'secent olitical istorys thatit imitstself oomuch o thefunctionalubversionfmodern tatesand,ofcourse, tates' omplicityn thatprocess, nd then tdoes soin terms hat re themselvesoo narrowly odern. echnical xpertsandfunctionalctivitiesreonly art fthepictureperhaps hepartthat etrospectivelyill eem losestnspiritomodernitytselfs statesbecomewhateverhey ill ndthe arlymodern atternf heir elationsbegins ochange.

Conceptual ntecendentsThe concept fsovereigntyas no direct recursorn thetwopoliticalidioms f lassical ntiquity.snoted,ne sthe diom frepublicanism,with ts concernforthe commongood,civicvirtue,nd forms fgovernmenthe other s the diom fempire,with tsemphasis npower ndprerogative.he Renaissanceawtherevivalfboth dioms,butthree losely elated etsofcircumstancesavoredepublicanism'searlypreeminence.irstwasthedeclineoftheRomanChurchn itstemporalphere,orcingnaccommodationithheHolyRoman mpireas muchneeded as itwasresented ybothparties. econdwas the


8/22/2019 40644726

11/23

434 SoOereignty:utlinef Conceptualistory

shiftingalance betweenan increasinglyominal mpire nda multitudeof thriving epublics and principalities.And thirdwas the suddenappearance of the Reformationnd itsembraceby many f theempire'sconstituentolities.In thefirst et of circumstanceswe see theology's etreatn thefaceofpoliticaldiscourse,the increasing rrelevance ftheheavenly ity sa model forearthly ffairs,nd deterioration fthe Church'sprivilegedposition nthepolitical rganization fLatinChristendom.he medievalworld as an overarching ocial construction ad ended. In the secondset of circumstanceswe see politicaldiscoursecoming nto its owna republicandiscourseabout theorganization nd ethicalrequirementsofpublic ife n a variety f novelsettings. he third etofcircumstancesalso promoted republicanism.More specifically, rotestantpoliticaldiscourse harpenedrepublicanism'sthical hrusty nsistinghat eopleand their welfare are the points of politics.The political idiom ofProtestantisms republicanand then some. The Protestantthicfindsa vocation in workdone well, including politicalworkdone well forothers.Once revived, epublicanism cquired anotherelement, medievalendowment, bout which its classical elementswere organized andthroughwhich lingering heologicalconcernsfoundexpression.Thisis the idea that all human associationsform n ascendingseries.Eachassociation has itsowncorporate dentity,rpersonality,nd an organicrelationto corporateentities n the ranksdirectlybove and below it*5Families,neighborhoods, ities,provinces, ingdoms,nd empireseachoccupy their own level, and each level has its own, best form oforganization. "The philosopher" himself anticipated this scheme:Aristode's olitics utsfamilies, illages, nd thepolis n ascendingorder,with thepolis to guarantee the good life forall within ts reach.36nturn,the ascending series of human associationsfits nto "the greatchain of being,"which extends from he lowliest ivingthing upwardto God. For Leibniz, the greatchain of being anchored an elaboratephilosophicalsystem; ormosteducated Westernersfthe seventeenthand eighteenth enturies, tprovided n unquestioned osmology.37As a conceptualinnovation, overeigntynlybecame possible whenthe three sets of circumstancesust alluded to gave way to another,distinctively odern development the emergenceof substantial ndcontinuousrelations among republicsand principalities.Unmediatedeitherby churchor empire,these relationsacknowledge he primacyofterritoryorpoliticalorganizationon anyscale.Obviously, heidiomof power and prerogative uited this development arbetter than itsclassical rival did. From emperorsto princes to kingsand finallytopresidents nd primeministers, changing astofcharacters as voiced


8/22/2019 40644726

12/23


theperennialconcernof all thosewhomust onfrontheir ounterparts.Who has morepower?What are mypowers?The constructionfa newworld a worldof states did not require a new language of politics.It called onlyforan adapted language the idiomof statecraft- hichsoon combinedwith n unrelated anguage the liberalpolitical diomof rights to providemodernity he politicalmeans for its planetaryextension.The modern concept of sovereigntyhas three antecedents,eachreflectinghe priorities f different olitical idioms,and all of themfusingn thecrucibleofWesternEurope's transformationntoa worldof states.The first f these antecedents followsfromthe republicanembrace of the greatchain of being. It is conveyed n the Latin wordmajestas, hich, s ithappens, is moreoftentranslated s "sovereignty"than anyotherLatinword.*8More obviously,majestasmeans "majesty,"and itclearly efers o the awe-inspiring ormalitynd dignity f somepoliticalarrangement,r person in a corporatesense. Majesty s nottobe confusedwith charisma," s used byMax Weberto describeoneway that rule (in Weber's German, Herrschaft)cquires legitimacy.59Charismarefers o awe-inspiringualities some individualmustdisplayto become or remain ruler.When those qualities are imputedto theconditionsof rule,and then accorded to any individualwho happenstorule,Weberheld that harismabecomesroutinized.tmay venbecome"thecharismaf ffice.**40o putthematter ifferently,henawe survivesthe ndividual nspiringt,majesty esults nd ceremony eigns.In principle,majestys not ust divisible, t s divided butonlyamongcorporatepersons.The greatchain of being insuresas much,becauseit s the ascendingseries tself hat follows divine, we-inspiringlan.Furthermore,corporate persons each must perfect the form oforganizationmost uitedto theirown level,which uggests hatmajestywouldhave a distinctiveharacter t each level in the series.Althoughthemajesty fthehighest evelwouldsurely xceed thatof lower evels,perhapsto a great nd impressive egree, tnonetheless annotbe saidto be final or absolute, thereby xcludingthe possibility f majesty,howevermodest, t other evels.Sovereignty'second conceptualantecedent s conveyedbytheLatinword mperium.ypicalEnglishtranslations re "supreme dministrativepower," rule,"and "dominion."41 ote also that mperiums the Latintermforempire,meaningspecifically he Roman Empire.Because theRoman Empiregrewout of the republic, racesofthe latter emained,including he idea thatrule was a constitutionalmatter, owevergreatthepowersof the emperoror capricioushis conduct42mperium,hen,is rulebyrules, nd notdominationbybruteforce. o understood, uleis neverthelessoercive, or herules n questionare neverdiscretionary


8/22/2019 40644726

13/23


on the partof thosewho are ruled or dependenton theirconsent AsJohnAustin aid,suchrulesas these are "a species fcommand,"generalrather hanoccasional,and coercively acked.43Anotherway osaythis s that herulerhas responsibilityor nforcingthose rules. n principle, omeone individualor corporatepersonmust,under the rules,be able to give ordersthat otherscarryout but canneverbe givenorders y nyoneelse.This person, s ruler,may mpowerothers o issue orders nd,bythe same token,mayrescind hosepowers.AsWebermadeclear, heresultmust e a hierarchicaltructure,oercivelymaintainedfromthe top down. Responsibility uns fromthe bottomup,and residesfinally tthetop,or with heruler,n the sense requiredbythemodernconceptofsovereignty.Evenif heruler sfinally esponsible or nforcingules, hedelegationof powers and thus of directcontrolover the content and scope ofmost rules is a practicalnecessity. his leads to functionalistheory'sdeepest insightRule is an abstraction, mbracingboth the idea of acoercivelymaintained rganization, esponsive o the ruler'snecessarilylimitednumberoforders, nd an administrativepparatus,responsiblein the name of the rulerfora muchlargernumberof ordersappliedtoan evenlargernumber fsituations.n relativelyimple ircumstances,thecoercivelymaintained rganization nd theadministrativepparatusare one and the same. As the business of rule expands, however,administration lso expands; eventually arbeyondthe possibilities fmeaningful rganizational upervision. unctionalistheory uggestshatin these circumstancesuthoritys not ust dividedbutdispersed,finalresponsibilitys a fiction, nd the notion of "supremeadministrativepower" (which, tmaybe recalled, s our first ranslation f impenum)is an absurdcontradiction.The third nd lastofsovereignty'sonceptualantecedents annotbecapturedin a singleLatin word.We find evidence of it in the claimoftenheard in the medieval hurch hat hepeople are superior otheirsecular leaders: "the populus is major,superior,potior,dominus."44Leaders then are ministers o the people. The doctrineof "popularsovereignty,"s it is nowknown,had nothingto say of majestas, ntilJohannesAlthusius,Calvinist nd Aristotelian epublicanof the earlyseventeenthcentury, laimed it specificallyfor the people. In hisformulation f therelations f rule, mperiums but a conditionalgrantofauthority,nd majestas o longer n incident foffice.45The doctrine fpopular sovereigntys a particular heme ofreligiousradicals; it s also implicitn the broad tradition frepublicanism. hatthe people providetheultimate ationale forany politicalarrangementis embedded in thevery dea of a respublica. n Latin,publiais is anadjectiveforanything elongingto the people corporately; espublica


8/22/2019 40644726

14/23


refersbstractlyowhateverelongso thepeople.46n thefirstnstancethismustbe theircorporate dentitynd, by extension, oliticalarrangementsor he ommon ood.Thus, s theOxfordatin idionaryreports,es ublicasvirtuallyynonymousithbody olitic."47If political rrangementselongto thepeople and existfortheircommon ood, hen herepublicanreoccupationith ivic irtuendformsfgovernmentakes erfectense. odo some fpoliticalheory'sperennial uestions: o thepeopleknowwhat s goodfor hem? anthepeopledeposebad rulers? owcanpeople express heir orporateexistence,xcept through olitical rrangements,hich take on acorporateife ftheir wn? f thepeople re"sovereign,"ananyrulerbe finallyesponsible?owever hesequestions re answered,hey llpresupposehat ulersule s agents f hepeople.Thisconceptionfagency trikinglyesemblesheCalvinist otionofstewardshipofgovernances an awesome uty nd stern alling.Howeverttenuated,uch view inds ontinuingesonancenmodernpolitics.Wehear t learlyoiced n liberal allsfor eformndLeninistrhetoricbout the vanguard.Agentsare responsible,ven finallyresponsible,ut lwaysnbehalf f hebody olitic, hose eing efinestheirurpose.When gencyuch sthisscombined ith largemeasureofmajestynd an uncontestedlaimto rulewithin certainerritory,they usenotustas the tate'shellbut s itsprimaryrchitecture.hestate sthe and, hepeople, he rganizationfcoercion nda majesticidea, achsupportingnd evendefiningheother,o that hey ecomeindivisible.overeigntyescribes hisconceptual usion nd thustheterritorialrganizationfearlymodern urope. implyy dding tatesto itsmargins,heearlymodernworldrresistiblyrew o itspresentproportions.Sovereignty'secliningCoherence

JeanBodin sgenerallyaken obe thefirst riteroachieve modernunderstandingf sovereignty.is greatwork, ixBooks ftheRepublic(1576), s, as its tidesuggests,ituatedn a republican raditionfdiscourse.48t construesolitical rrangementss an ascendingeriesofcorporations,et onfinesovereigntyo republicss the exclusivesitesofrule.Althoughheemphasis s on rule,effectuatedhroughsupreme ower,mpenums clearlyonceptuallynsuitable ecause itlocatesruleat the eveloftheempire nd not therepublic.WritinginFrench,odinuses he ermouverainet,ot nly osolve he emanticproblem resentedythetermmpenumnd itscognates, utalso tosuggesthemajestyf rule.Whenhe translated is book intoLatin,


8/22/2019 40644726

15/23


he was obliged to revert o the Latin termmajestas, hich neverthelessinsufficientlyccountsforthe investment f a supremepowerto rulein republics ttheexpense of othercorporate evels.49We should note thatthe twoothergreattextsmarking he transitionto politicalmodernitywere also written n vernacular anguages.ThefirstsMachiavelli's hePrince1513),which ffectivelynitiateshegenericuse ofthe term ostato, hestate, nd thusan appreciation fstatecraft,whileholdingto a republicanconceptionof agencyeven forprinces.50The second isHobbes'sLeviathan1651),whichprovided n intellectuallypowerful ationale forgranting upremepowerto the commonwealth(commonwealths synonymous ithrepublic)as theagentof themanyautonomous, elf-interestedndividualsotherwisereducedto a war ofall against all. Writingn the vernacular allowed Machiavelli,Bodin,and Hobbes toexpresswhat stablishedLatincategoriesmake mpossibletoconceive.Those whocontinued o writen Latin somedid for notherhundredyears fterHobbes) were ncapable ofseeingthatmajesty,ule,and agencyhad come together t the levelonce identifiedwithprincesand republicsnot ust to create the sovereign tate as somethingnewbutto eliminate ll otherpolitical rrangements,twhateverevel,fromserious ompetition ith he tate.51he sovereigntate's nly ompetitioncould be other, quallysovereign tates.The abandonment of Latin as the universal anguage of learningmatched he declineof therepublicanbeliefthatpolitical rrangementsforman ascendingseries of corporations.To fillthevoid,the idiomsof iberalismndthe raditionf statecraftormed heremarkable lliancenoted bove, eaving epublicanisms a procedural ndrhetoricaldjunctto thepolitics fstatemaking.oday sovereigntys a conceptualuniversal,transliterated romBodin's French into any number of languages.Although they are alien traditions, iberalismand statecraft emainconjoined n separating oliticsfrom ociety nd subsuming ll politicalarrangements o the state.The political vocabularyof modernity scomplete nd sufficient he only question is whethermodernitytselfis unchangedand itspolitical arrangements till as we imagine them.Indeed,with hevocabulary thand,howcan we imagineotherwise?We hearoften noughthatmodernityn all itsmanifestationssgivingway o a new, uitedifferenttateof affairs. s a measureofmodernity'sholdoverourimaginations,we are reducedtocalling hisnewcondition"postmodern."Anothermeasure is the inventionof a new,allegedlypostmodernanguage self-consciouslylanguageofphilosophical ndliterary riticism nd a political idiom whichnevertheless eems ill-suited othe taskof magining,nd thusofconstituting,hatever ollowsmodernity.nstead, this new language would dismantlemodernity yrescindingts erms freference. etmodernitys not o easilydispatched.


8/22/2019 40644726

16/23


Postmodern critique becomes a modern fashion, its vocabularyvulgarized,tspromisebetrayed,nd its maginative overtyonfirmed.Something lse is needed: a late-modernntercession,whichabjurescritique and, for that matter, elf-congratulatoryncantations of awondrousnewage.52 his something lse would ookforward y ookingback to idioms alreadyknownto us from he momentof modernity'semergence. orting hroughnd adapting hem o ourown, atemomentin the course of modernitywould produce a syncreticdiom of late-modernpoliticaldiscourse.Such an idiom would revise,not rescind,modernity'sermsof reference to accord withmodernity's hangingcharacter s it absorbs criticism nd adapts to circumstancesmostly fits meaningour)ownmaking.Speakingpolitically,hangesmostworthyfdiscussion n thecontextofmodernitynd itsprospectswould havetobe changes nthe characterof the state and of the relationsof states.Obviouslythe state is notabout todisappearnortheconceptofsovereigntyo becomecompletelyunintelligible. evertheless, e can see that tates odayroutinelyufferchallengesto theirsupreme authority,nd not ust fromotherstates.Perhapsstateshave always uffereduchchallenges, nd we forgethemas soon as they ass.53 erhapsnot Withoutn appropriate ocabularyone that ssignsthesechallenges oconceptualhomes we cannotknow.Challengestothestate re notthepointAs noted, nymarked hangein the characterof the state,whateverthe particularcauses, wouldchallengethe conceptualcoherence of sovereignty.et incoherenceisnotalwaysor necessarily nexplicable. suggest hatwhen sovereigntyis sufficientlyhallenged,twilldecomposeintothe elements romwhichitfused centuries go. In otherwords,we can read modernity'secentpolitical rajectory,nd perhaps even read into a postmodernpoliticalfuture,y asking f,how, nd to whatdegreemajesty, ule,and agencyhave dissociatedfromeach otherand the state. We mustask furtherif these three elements, which were once sovereignty's eparateantecedents, re settlingn otherpolitical rrangementshathave cometo characterizemodernityf ate.The firstlementnsovereignty'squation smajesty.he consolidationof majesty n the apparatus of the state is dramaticallyllustrated ythegrowth f nationalism n the nineteenth entury. ationalismgaveriseto theprinciple hateverynationneeds and deserves heprotectiveshell of a sovereign tate in orderto fulfill tspotential. n turn, heprinciple fnational elf-determination,s it ame tobe called,harnessedtheenormousaffective owerof national identification or use by thestate pparatus.The nation-states a solidary ntity ecame theprimaryobjectofpopularawe.Recent experience suggests that national self-determinationnd


8/22/2019 40644726

17/23


sovereigntyrenotalwaysmutuallyupporting remises.On thecontrary,the historic failure to establish states coextensivewith nations hasproduceda contemporaryendency o use the national idea againstthestate.Effectively,hese effortsdentifymajestywith the nation so astoundercut he state's upreme uthority.urthermore,hereas hestateonce benefited rom hedepersonalization fmajesty, enow ncreasinglysee states' eaders attemptingo garner majestyfor themselves t theexpenseoftheir tates,hrough ersonalityults. inally,here s a markedtendency or eaders topersonalizerelations mongtheir tates hroughhighly ceremonial visits, summits, nd plenary meetings of majorinternational rganizations.Although eremonialfeatures fpublic lifeat the UnitedNations werenoticed some timeago, scholarshave paidremarkablyittle attention o state visits and major-power ummits sawe-inspiringccasions.54 he institutionalizationfpersonal relationsamong states' leaders effectively onstitutesa corporate level incontemporary political arrangements,which transcends states andpossesses a considerable,distinctivemajesty f tsown.Othertendencies nthe ate-modernworld omplementhesepoliticaldevelopments. he revivalmovementsfgreat eligions ikeChristianityand Islam are less challenges to the supremeauthority f states,aseffectuatedhrough ule, hanthey re assertions fmajesty n thebehalfof institutions hat long ago lost the contestforrule and then, n thecircumstances of modernity,found their ability to inspire aweprogressively dwindle. Majesty regained by organized religiousmovementss majesty ost to thestate,unless,of course,the movementcaptures he state as well.Secularmovements an have the same effectMiddle-class oncernwith nvironmentalegradation, pecies depletion,and manyother"qualityof ife" ssuesfosters n awe forthebiosphereas a majesticwholeor,one might ven say, heultimate orporate ntity.Only in this lightcan we understandPatriciaMische'sclaim that"theEarthdoes notrecognizesovereigntys we nowknow t The sovereigntyoftheEarthprecededand still upersedeshumansovereignties."55None of these tendenciesmeans thatstatesmustnecessarily ose allof theirhard-wonmajesty.Ratherthey uggestthat the decouplingofmajestyfrom he otherelementsof sovereigntyestores o majesty tsdivisible haracter. nce majesty ivides ndthen akes nfeaturesuitingitsnew circumstances, orporatepoliticalarrangementsmergenot somuch in competitionwith the stateas in a stable patternof mutualaccommodation.That these newarrangements ear some resemblanceto the ascending levelsofcorporateexistencethatmodernityong agosupplanted uggests certain ymmetryn modernity'sise and decline.Whetheran ascending series of corporate entitieswill become theorganizingfeature of postmodernpoliticalarrangements epends on


8/22/2019 40644726

18/23

Nicholasreenwoodnuf 441

manyotherdevelopments, ot the least being the smoothnessof thetransitiontself.Rule is the secondelement n themodernconceptionofsovereignty.Once decoupled frommajesty, ule is subject not to division,but tobounding.Rule remains upreme utwithin more imited copedefinedbythepresumptionhatstatesdo onlythose tasks bestdone bystates.Indisputably,wotaskscontinue to fit this description:Statesare stillneeded to make and maintainsecurity s a public service, nd statesremain hemost ffectiveehiclefor xtractingnd distributingevenuesgenerally equired or heprovision fpublicgoods and services.More than any others, hese two taskswere decisive forthe state'sascendancy n the first lace, because they re inextricablyinked toeach other nd to territory.56othingn late-modern xperiencepointsto a practical lternative,or ll theperilsofarrangementshatpromoteperpetual nsecuritymong tates s security roviders. sRobert acksonhas contended, tmaywell be thatmanystates xisttodayonlybecauseofthemajesty onferred n themthrough herecognition nd supportofother tates.57evertheless,odenymajesty o thesestates n groundsthat hey annotrule ffectivelyould ventuate nly ntheir eplacementbystateswithmore uitable erritorialonfigurations.If states re likely o persist s coerciveorganizationsbecause of thecoupled need forsecurity nd revenue,nothingprevents he complexof other tasks for which the modern state has assumed primaryresponsibilityobe discharged yorganizations hathaveonly nominalrelationto the state.The modernistwould argue thatthis is preciselywhat has happened. Large bureaucratic rganizationsgain access torevenues n the nameofthestatebut disburse hem ntheperformanceof tasksthat, lthoughauthorizedforor by the state, re without hestate's ffectiveontrol. urthermore,heseorganizations re tied ogetherinnetworkshat verride heconventionallymoderndistinctionetweenpublic ndprivatepheres f ctivity,ot omention ubnational, ational,andtrans- r nternationalevels f administrativectivity.ormodernists,the point is thatadministrativeersonnel,whatever he formalities ftheiremployment, ctuallywork forand identifywiththe functionaldomainsforwhich hey rovide echnical xpertise.States rovide n important,utnolonger xclusive mbrella f upportfor ast dministrativepparatusesproviding widerangeoffunctionallydemarcatedgoods and services. t has become unhelpfulto considerthesegoods and services public" if that term s takento refer o the

stateas finallyresponsiblefor theirproduction nd distribution. oris it helpfulto considerthese goods public in the formal sense thatthey reuniformlyvailabletothepublic, or hey re selectively rovidedto particular onstituencieswith the help of elaborate formulas.They


8/22/2019 40644726

19/23


arepublic nlyn the ensethat he dministrativeersonnelrovidingthem hare heconvictionhat heyct on behalf fthepublic s theyperformheirpecializedasks.With nlymodest xaggeration,e might all thesemany dminis-trators class,perhaps vena ruling lass, fglobalproportions.heyare theproductfbourgeois rosperitynd protracted,rofessionallyorientedducations,hichndow hemwithosmopolitaniberal alues,an abstractppreciationfthe common ood,and a strongenseoftherelationetween ocationalommitmentndpersonalworth.heysee themselvess thevirtuousgents f a lessvirtuousublic a publictoo ready o squander he benefits f modernityr succumb o itsafflictions.58n short,hey onstitutehemselvess planetarytewardsin a timeofneed that hey lone are capableofrecognizing, uchless ddressing.In thecircumstancesf latemodernity,overeignty'shird lement,once severed romheother wo,has become propertyessofstatesthan f classwhose xistencehe tatemadepossible. gencyemainswithinhe icinityf he tate beneathtates,bove hem,nd llaroundthem. gentsfthe ommon oodpride hemselvesntheirnonymity;majestys for thers. heyrulewith ules o numerousnd connectedthat hey equire dministration,otenforcement,o work.n MichelFoucault'smore hilling,ostmodernendition fthese ircumstances,disciplinaryrofessionalsroducehe ame ffectsydefiningormalityandcorrectingeviance hroughervasiveupervisionnd ntervention-ary techniques.59hey, oo,conceiveof themselvess agents f thecommonood, ndneverhe tate'snstrumentsfbodily arm. erhapsthey,oo, hould e counted s stewardsn thenewrepublicfvirtue.

NotesThis is a greatlyevisedversion f a paperentitled Sovereigntynd Modernity,"presented to the Symposiumon Japanese-AmericanRelations,RitsumeikanUniversity,yoto, apan,November 7, 990, ndsoon to be published nJapanese.The authorhas profited rom andra Keowen's critical ssistance and a numberof conversationswithMasaruTamamoto.1. StevenKrasner, Sovereignty: n Institutional erspective," omparativePoliticaltudies,1 (April1988):86.2. AnthonyUiddens, lhe Umstitutionj Society: utune of the ineory ofStructurationBerkeley nd Los Angeles: Universityf CaliforniaPress,1984),p. xxxiii.3. Ibid. See also AnthonyGiddens, TheNation-Statend Violence: olume woofa Contemporaryntique fHistoricalMaterialismBerkeley nd Los Angeles:Universityf CaliforniaPress,1985), n whichGiddenscorrelated heemergenceof the modern statewith"major concepts associated withpoliticaltheory,s


8/22/2019 40644726

20/23


developed from the sixteenthcenturyonwards" (p. 20), but confined hisdiscussion argely o events.4. . Hinsley, overeigntyNewYork:Basic Books,1966).5. To say that Hinsley's account of sovereigntys an idea is "largelyatheoretical,"s Walkerhas, perhapsunfairlymputes o Hinsleya theoreticalobjective.R. B. J.Walker, Security,overeignty,nd the Challenge of WorldPolitics," lternatives,5 Winter 990):25 (n. 5).6. Terence Ball, Transformingolitical iscourse: oliticalTheorynd CriticalConceptual istoryOxford:Basil Blackwll, 988),pp. 8-9. See also JamesFan;"UnderstandingConceptual Change Politically,"n Ball et al., eds., PoliticalInnovationndConceptual hange Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityress,1989),p.29: "when weacknowledge hatpractices re constitutedy oncepts,we remindourselveshowverymuch of anguageis in' thepoliticalworld nd howdecisivethis s for urunderstandingf t" Farr's mphasis).7. Ball, note6,p. 13.8. Ball etal.,note6,p. 10.9. Terence Ball andJ.G.A. Pocock, ds.,Conceptual hangend theConstitution(Lawrence:Universityress ofKansas, 1988).10. QuentinSkinner,The State, in Ball et al.,note6,p. 123.11. See Peter . Onuf,"StateSovereigntynd theMakingof theConstitution,"in Ball and Pocock,note 9, pp. 78-98, in which"state" refers o the severalstatesconstitutinghe United States after1776. See also GarryWills,"JamesWilson's New Meaning forSovereignty,"n Ball and Pocock,note 9, pp. 99-106.12. This felicitous ormulations fromR B.J.Walker,Sovereignty,dentity,Community:Reflections n theHorizons ofContemporary oliticalPractice,"inR. B.J.Walker nd Saul H. Mendlovitz, ds.,Contendingovereignties:edefiningPoliticalCommunityBoulder: LynneRienner,1990),p. 159. See also Ball, note6,p. 15, nwhichBall states, Not all conceptshavebeen, or couldbe, contestedat all times. onceptual ontestation emains permanent ossibility,venthoughit s, n practice, ctualizedonly ntermittently."13. Isaac Kramnickdentified hese idiomsas such in the contextof "The'GreatNationalDiscussion': The Discourse ofPoliticsn 1787,"William ndMaryQuarterly,rd series,45 (January 988): 3-32, while demonstratingheir moregeneralrelevance othepoliticaldiscourseof theearlymodernworld.

14. The firstversionof this paper ended with a discussion of the UnitedStates and Japan,the former mblematicallymodern and the latterobliquelychallengingovereignty'sonceptual oherencewithoutresentingn immediate,substantivechallenge to the United States as modernity's uarantor.Thatdiscussionwasrelativelyuperficial,peculative,nd,conceptually peaking, ne-sided.15. NicholasGreenwoodOnuf,WorldfOurMaking:Rules and Rule in SocialTheorynd InternationalelationsColumbia:Universityf South Carolina Press,1989).16. Hinsley, ote4,p. 26.17. Hans J. Morgenthau,PoliticsAmongNations:The StruggleorPower ndPeace, thed. (NewYork:AlfredA. Knopf, 967), . 299.18. Ibid., p. 302.19. N. G. Onuf,note15,pp. 197-200.20. AlanJames, overeigntatehood:he Basisof nternationalocietyLondon:Allen and Unwin,1986),pp. 37-45.


8/22/2019 40644726

21/23

444 Sovereignly:utlineof Conceptual istory

21. Ibid.,p. 40. _ _ ......_.__.22. Hans Kelsen,in Principlesf nternationalaw,Robertw. lucker, a, ^naed. (NewYork:Holt,Rinehart nd Winston, 966),pp.551-588.23. Tames, ote20,p. 45. _ _ 24. Indeed, sovereigntys "the constitutiverinciple_ ofmodernpoliticalUteaccordingto Walker,note 12,pp. 159-160 his emphasis).See also RobertH.Jackson, Quasi-states,Dual Regimes,and NeoclassicalTheory: InternationalJurisprudencend theThirdWorld/1nternationalrganization,1 Autumn 987):519, in whichJackson claims that "sovereignstatehood[is] the constitutiveprinciple f nternational ociety."25 N. G. Onuf,note 15,pp. 35-65. In reference o sovereignty,ee also AlexWendt, Sovereigntynd theSocial ConstructionfPowerPolitics," npublishedpaper,Department fPolitical cience,YaleUniversity,p. 25-32.26. Ball, note6,p. 10.27. Ibid., p. 7. _28. Forthe latter iew, ee RichardK.Ashley,Livingon borderUnes: Man,Poststructuralism,nd War," n JamesDer Derian and Michael Shapiro,eds.,International/Intertextualelations:ostmoderneadings fWorldoliticsLexington,Mass.: LexingtonBooks, 1989),pp. 284-309; and RichardK. Ashley nd R. B.J.Walker, Reading Dissidence/Writinghe Discipline:Crisis and the Questionof Sovereigntyn International Studies," InternationaltudiesQuarterly,4(September 990):367-416.29. Tames, ote20,p. 39. __ _ _ _ . ... ,30. RichardK.Ashley,The Geopolitics f _Geopolitical_ _Space:_Towarda CriticalSocial Theoryof InternationalPolitics,"Alternatives,2 (1987):pp. 413-415; eealso N.G.Onuf,note 15,p. 241.31. See, for xample,Morgenthau,note17, p.u-u.32 SamuelPufendorf,e urenaturaet entiumonoao, voi. i,memuiMauuuoftheeditionof1688byC. H. OldfatherndW A.OldfatherOxford:ClarendonPress. 1934).dd. 1023-1054. .33. David Mitrany, WorkingeaceSystemChicago:QuadrangleBooks, 19bb)is tunctionalism'socus lassicus.34. On culturalmovementspawnedbymodernity,ncludingmodernism,eeMateiCalinescu,FiveFacesofModernity:odernism,vant-Garde,ecadence,itsch,PostmodernismDurham,N.C.: Duke Universityress, 987).

35 OttoGierkecalled thisview"thetheory fcorporations"n OttoGierke,NaturalLaw and theTheory fSociety500-1800, rnestBarker, rans. Boston:Beacon Press, 1957),pp. 45, 62-79.NotableadherentswereJohannesAlthusius,Leibniz,and ChristianWolff. ___36. See The oliticsfAristotle,rnestBarker,rans.NewYork:Oxford__University.Press,1962),p. 4. _ _37 ArthurO. Lovejoy,TheGreatChainofBeing_ (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity ress, 1936), pp. 59, 144. On the centralityf "the greatchain ofbeings"for hedeistThomasJeffersonndhisgeneration,ee DanielJ.Boorstin,TheLostWorldfThomasJeffersonBoston:Beacon Press,1960),pp. 30-35.38. See, for xample,Gierke,note35,p. 40 (translator'sote); and ThePoliticsof ohannes lthusius,n abridgedtranslationfthethird dition 1603]ofPolticamethodiceigesta, tqueexemplisacrisetprofanisllustrata, rederick . Carney,trans. Boston: Beacon Press,1964),p. 65.The OxfordatinDictionaryOxford:ClarendonPress, 1968),p. 1065,translatesmajestass "1. The dignity f a godor exalted personage. ... 2. The majesty f the people or state,sovereignty.


8/22/2019 40644726

22/23


... 4. Majesty,randeur."39. MaxWeber, conomyndSociety:nOutline f nterpretiveocwhgy,uentherRothand ClausWittich,ds. (Berkeley nd Los Angeles:UniversityfCaliforniaPress,1978),Vol. pp. 214,241-245;Vol. 2,pp. 1111-1120.40. Ibid..Vol.1. D.248 (Weber's mphasis); see also Vol.2, pp. 1139-1141.41. OxfordatinDictionary,ote38,pp. 843-844.42. Hinsley, ote4,pp. 36-44.43. JohnAustin,TimProvince fJurisprudenceeterminednd theUsesoftheStudy fjurisprudenceLondon:Weidenfeld ndNicolson, 954), p. 13,19 Austin'semphasis). I have argued elsewhere that there are three primary ategoriesof rules.The rules ust describedfall into one of these categoriesand resultin a hierarchical orm frule,which forpresentpurposes perhapstoo simplycall "rule." The two othercategories of rules result n other formsof rule.Practicallypeaking, olitical rrangementslways ombinerulesfrom ll threecategoriesn a mixedform f rule.N. G. Onuf,note15, h.2,6.44. OttoGierke, 7m?evelopmentfPolitical heory,ernardFreyd,rans.NewYork:W W Norton. 939).o. 155.45. Ibid. On popular sovereignty,ee generallypp. 143-240; see also OttoGierke,PoliticalTheories f theMiddleAge,FredericWilliamMaitland,trans.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityress,1968),pp.37-61;and QuentinSkinner,The FoundationsfModern oliticalThought, ol. Two:TheAgeoftheReformation(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityress),pp. 332-348.46. OxfordatinDictionary,ote38,pp. 1512-1513,635.47. Ibid.,pp. 1626, 635.48. Jean Bodin, The Six Booksofa Commonweale,facsimilereprint f theEnglish translation f 1606, supplementedand corrected n lightof a newcomparisonwith heFrench and Latin texts,KennethMcRae, ed. (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityress,1962).49. Ibid.,AppendixB,p.A75.50. We shouldnotconclude,however, hatMachiavelliunderstood he statein a fullymodern sense. See J. H. Hexter,The VinonofPolitics n theEve oftheReformation:ore,Machiavelliand SeysselNewYork:Basic Books, 1973),pp.150-172; kinner, ote10,pp. 102-110; kinner, ote45,pp. 353-354;and HarveyMansfield,Jr., On the Impersonality f the Modern State:A CommentonMachiavelli'sUse of Stato" American olitical cience eview, 7: 4 (1983): 849-857.51. Indicatively,lthusiussee notes 35 and 38) argued nLatinagainstBodin,and for popular sovereignty,n the framework f an ascending series ofcorporations,whichhe developed more systematicallyhan any otherwriterthenor later.His rewardwas three centuriesof oblivion.Leibniz wrotemuchmore n Latin thanGerman.His follower,Wolff, rote nly n Latin, ndWolffsself-proclaimedollower,mmerichde Vattel,wrote n French.WithVattel's edroit esgens 1758), ompeting rrangements isappeared. n Pufendorfs atin(see note 32) they re transmuted nto a discussionof"irregular ystems,"ndin 1787 hey eappear, irtually nrecognizable, s the"compound republic"ofthe UnitedStates.See further, icholas Onuf, "Constitutive remises of theAmericanFounding,"n PeterOnuf,ExtendingheRepublic:ederalRepublicanismand a NewWorld rder,776-1815Madison,Wise: MadisonHouse,forthcoming).52. I am thinking ereofMarilynFerguson,TheAquananConspiracy:ersonalandSocialTransformationn the 980s Los Angeles:J. Tardier,1980);or WilliamIrwinThompson,Padfic hiftSan Francisco:SierraClub,1985).


8/22/2019 40644726

23/23


53. This arguments presented nJaniceE. Thomson and StevenD. Krasner,"Global Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty,"n Ernst-OttoCzempiel andJamesN. Rosenau, eds.,GlobalChangesnd Theoreticalhallenges:Approacheso World oliticsor the 1990s (Lexington,Mass.: LexingtonBooks,1989)pp. 195-219.54. Conor Cruise O'Brien, TheUnited ations: acredDrama,FeliksTopolski,illus. (New York:Simonand Schuster, 968).On summits s ceremonialevents,see NicholasOnuf,"The ParadoxofNonaJignment,"n William C. Olson, ed,The Theorynd Practicef nternationalelations, th ed. (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1987),pp. 342-346.55. PatriciaM. Mische, EcologicalSecuritynd theNeed toReconceptualizeSovereignty,"lternatives,4 October 1989):424.56. Charles Tilly, Reflections n theHistory fEuropean State-Making,"nCharles Tilly, d., The FormationfNational States n Westernurope Princeton,N.J.: rincetonUniversityress, 975), p. 1-83;Giddens,note3,pp.7-121;KarenA. Rasier and William R Thompson,War nd StateMaking:TheShapingoftheGlobalPowersBoston:UnwinHyman,1989).57. Jackson,note 24, p. 529t n Jackson'swords: "African tates are indeedstatesby courtesy, ut the real question is whysuch courtesyhas been soextensively nd uniformly rantedalmostentirely n disregardof empiricalcriteria or tatehood."58. For evidence of this attitude, onsider the opening words of a recentnewspaper editorial: "It's probablytoo much to expect mostpublic officials,includingJohn Sununu,to be guided in all theircomings,goingsand officialacts by a comprehensive ode of the republican small Y) virtues." ee "AirSununu," The Washingtonost,April28, 1991,p. C6. By implication, ununushould have internalized a comprehensiveode," theparticulars fwhich anhave little earingon theconduct fordinary itizens.59. See Michel Foucault,Displineand Punish:The BirthofthePrison NewYork:Vintage Books, 1979); and MichelFoucault,TheHistory f Sexuality, ol.I: An ntroductionNewYork:VintageBooks,1980).

40644726

Documents