finance & economic development in korea · 2017-01-31 · 개회사...

지속적경제발전을위한 금융의역할

Korea Institute of Finance

15th Anniversary Symposium on

Finance & Economic Development in Korea

한국금융연구원

개원1 5주년 기념 심포지엄

15주년내지3차 2007.3.14 5:16 PM 페이지1

15th Anniversary 『Finance and Economic Development in Korea』

< 목 차 >

서 문 …………………………………………………………………………………3

Ⅰ.개회사 및 축사( O pening Rema rks and Key note Spe e ch )………………………………61. 개회사…………………………………………………………………………………62. 축사……………………………………………………………………………………7

Ⅱ.S e s s ion 1 : 외국자본과경제발전( Foreign Cap ital and Econom ic Grow t h ) ………………………………1 01. 강연요지 ……………………………………………………………………………1 02. 논문내용 ……………………………………………………………………………1 03. 발표자료 ……………………………………………………………………………2 14. 질의응답 ……………………………………………………………………………2 6

Ⅲ. Session 2 : 금융산업발전을 위한 금융규제·감독의과제와 역할( Cu r rent Challenges in Financial Regulat ion )………………………4 01. 강연요지 ……………………………………………………………………………4 02. 논문내용 ……………………………………………………………………………4 23. 발표자료 ……………………………………………………………………………5 54. 질의응답 ……………………………………………………………………………7 4

Ⅳ. Session 3 : 우리나라금융부문의지배구조(Financial Sect or Governance in Kore a )………………………………8 41. 강연요지 ……………………………………………………………………………8 42. 논문내용 ……………………………………………………………………………8 53. 발표자료……………………………………………………………………………1 1 04. 질의응답 …………………………………………………………………………1 2 9

Ⅴ. Session4 : 산업구조와기업금융( I n du strial Structu re and Cor porate Finance) ……………………1 3 11. 강연요지……………………………………………………………………………1 3 12. 발표자료……………………………………………………………………………1 3 23. 질의응답 …………………………………………………………………………1 4 9

Ⅵ. Session5 : 패널토론( Pa nel Discu s s ion )…………………………………………………………1 5 2

15주년내지3차 2007.3.14 5:16 PM 페이지2

서 문

한국금융연구원의 개원 1 5주년 기념행사의 일환으로 개최했던 심포지엄의 내용을

담은 본고를 발간하게 되어 큰 기쁨입니다.

이 지면을 빌어 한국금융연구원이 지난 2006년 11월 14일‘지속적 경제발전을

위한 금융의 역할’을 주제로 개최한 심포지엄에 참석해 주신 국내외 분들께 깊은

감사의 말씀을 드립니다.

지난 1 5년을 돌이켜 보면, 우리 금융시장과 우리 연구원 모두 위기를 기회로 삼아

성장해 온 것만 같아 감개가 무량합니다. 그러나 이러한 성장에도 불구하고 높아져

가는 금융시장의 개방·경쟁 압력은 지금까지의 양적 성장을 질적 성장으로 전환하

여야 할 필요성을 증대시키고 있습니다.

이러한 시기에 우리나라 금융의 바람직한 미래 모습을 모색하기 위해서 금융이슈

들을 차분히 되돌아보고, 실무자와 학자간의 의견교환을 통해 그 해결의 실마리를

찾는 자리를 마련하는 것이 한국금융연구원이 반드시 해야 할 일이라고 생각하였

습니다.

더구나 심포지엄 내내 저희도놀랄 정도의열기 속에서참석자분들의 토론과 강연이

이어지는 것을 바라보면서‘한국금융의 발전방향 제시’라는 한국금융연구원의

존재 의의를 다시 한 번 겸허하게 돌아보는 기회가 되었습니다.

다시 한번 개원 1 5주년 심포지엄에 참석해 주신 국·내외 여러분께 감사드리며

한국금융연구원은 앞으로도 묵묵히 우리나라 금융 연구에 매진할 것을 약속드립니다.

한국금융연구원장 최 흥 식

3Korea Institute of Finance

서 문

15주년내지3차 2007.3.14 5:16 PM 페이지3

개원1 5주년기념심포지엄: 『지속적경제발전을위한금융의역할』

개회사최흥식 한국금융연구원 원장

축사윤증현 금융감독위원회 위원장 겸 금융감독원 원장

외국자본과 경제발전발표 : Raghuram Rajan (국제통화기금 경제자문관 겸 조사국장)

사회 : 박재하 (한국금융연구원 선임연구위원)

금융산업 발전을 위한 금융규제·감독의 과제와 역할

발표 : Stijn Claessens (세계은행 수석자문역)

사회 : 박재하 (한국금융연구원 선임연구위원)

축사유지창 전국은행연합회 회장

우리나라 금융부문의 지배구조발표 : 이동걸 (한국금융연구원 선임연구위원)

이병윤 (한국금융연구원 연구위원)

사회 : 최공필 (한국금융연구원 선임연구위원)

산업구조와 기업금융발표 : 신현송 (프린스턴대학교 경제학과 교수)

김세직 (서울대학교 경제학과 교수)

사회 : 최공필 (한국금융연구원 선임연구위원)

패널 토론사회 : 박상용 (연세대학교 경영학과 교수)

토론 : Raghuram Rajan (국제통화기금 경제자문관 겸 조사국장)

Stijn Claessens (세계은행 수석자문역)

김홍범 (경상대학교 경제학과 교수)

박재하 (한국금융연구원 선임연구위원)

신현송 (프린스턴대학교 경제학과 교수)

이동걸 (한국금융연구원 선임연구위원)

전성인 (홍익대학교 경제학과 교수)

조원동 (재정경제부 경제정책국 국장)

최공필 (한국금융연구원 선임연구위원)



세션 1

세션 2

오 찬

세션 3

세션 4

세션 5

15주년내지3차 2007.3.14 5:16 PM 페이지4

15th Anniversary Symposium :『Finance and Economic Development in Korea』Opening RemarksHeungsik Choe, President of Korea Institute of Finance

Keynote SpeechJeung-Hyun Yoon, Chairman of FSC and Governor of FSS

Foreign Finance and Economic GrowthRaghuram Rajan, Economic Counsellor and Director, IMFModerator: Jae-Ha Park, Senior Research Fellow, KIF

Current Challenges in Financial RegulationStijn Claessens, Senior Adviser, World BankModerator: Jae-Ha Park, Senior Research Fellow, KIF

Keynote SpeechJichang Yoo, Chairman of the Korea Federation of Banks

Financial Sector Governance in KoreaDong-Gull Lee, Senior Research Fellow, KIFByungyoon Lee, Research Fellow, KIFModerator: Gongpil Choi, Senior Research Fellow, KIF

Industrial Structure and Corporate FinanceHyun Song Shin, Professor, Princeton UniversitySe-Jik Kim, Professor, Seoul National UniversityModerator: Gongpil Choi, Senior Research Fellow, KIF

Panel DiscussionModerator: Sang-Yong Park (Professor, Yon-Sei University)Discussant: Stijn Claessens (Senior Adviser, World Bank)

Raghuram Rajan (Economic Counsellor and Director, IMF)Won-Dong Cho (Director of General Bureau of Economic Policy, MOFE)Gongpil Choi (Senior Research Fellow, KIF)Sung-In Jun (Professor, Hongik University)Hong-Bum Kim (Professor, Gyeongsang National University)Dong-Gull Lee (Senior Research Fellow, KIF)Jae-Ha Park (Senior Research Fellow, KIF)Hyun-Song Shin (Professor, Princeton University)

Session 1

Session 2

L u n c h e o n

Session 3

Session 4

Session 5


식 순

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Ⅰ. 개회사 및 축사

1. 개회사

안녕하십니까? 한국금융연구원 원장 최흥식입니다.

오늘 바쁘신 가운데도 한국금융연구원 개원 15주년 심포지엄에 참석해 주신 여러

분께 먼저 감사의 말씀을 드립니다. 특히 축사를 해주실 금융감독위원회 윤증현

위원장님, 전국은행연합회 유지창 회장님, 발표와 패널 토론을 맡아주실 세계은행

( World Bank)의 C lae s s ens 박사님, IMF의 R ajan 박사님, 프린스턴 대학의

신현송 교수님, 금융연구원의 선임연구위원이신 이동걸 박사님, 재경부 경제정책

국장이신 조원동 국장님, 연세대학교 박상용 교수님, 홍익대학교 전성인 교수님,

경상국립대학교 김홍범 교수님께 이 자리를 빌어 감사의 말씀을 전하고자 합니다.

이번 2 0 0 6년은 한국금융연구원이 개원한 지 벌써 1 5주년이 되는 해입니다. 한국

금융연구원은 우리나라의 금융과 경제 발전에 관한 연구를 목적으로 1991년 건립

되었습니다. 우리는 그 동안 한국금융의 발전 방향 제시라는 목표 하에 거시 통화정책

에서부터 금융시장, 금융회사 그리고 금융규제 및 감독에 이르기까지 다양한 경제

이슈를 포괄하는 광범위한 분야에서 체계적인 연구를 수행해 왔습니다.

특히 우리 금융연구원은 급변하는 한국금융 산업에 실질적인 도움을 주는 뛰어난

연구 성과를 창출하기 위하여 연구원 내부적으로 끊임없는 자기 혁신과 조직의 역량

강화에 노력을 기울여 왔습니다. 또한 연구원은 외환위기 이후 양적인 발전을 거듭한

우리나라의 금융산업에서 질적인 발전 방안을 적극적으로 모색하여 왔습니다.

금번 금융연구원은 개원 1 5주년 기념행사를 기획하는 데 있어, 지금까지 진행되어

온 우리나라 금융의 발전 방향을 검토하고 이를 근본적인 관점에서 논의해 보자는

취지에서‘지속적 경제 성장을 위한 금융의 역할’이라는 주제로 심포지엄을 개최하게

되었습니다.

지난 2 0 0 0년 이래로 경제부문의 부침이 심화되면서 과거 실물경제를 보조하는 데

그쳤던 금융의 역할에서 고부가가치를 창출하는 핵심 서비스 산업 및 실물경제를

선도하는 산업으로서의 금융의 역할에 대해 많은 관심이 집중되고 있습니다.

외환위기 이후 아직까지도, 우리나라의 금융은 우리나라의 사회와 기업에 대해

충분한 투자 기회를 제공하고 적극적으로 성장 잠재력을 이끌어 낼 수 있을 정도로

발전하지 않은 상태에서 국제 금융환경에 노출되어 있습니다.

이에 따라 우리나라 금융산업에 있어 가장 효율적인 지배구조의 형태, 증가하는



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외국자본의 국내 금융시장과 금융산업에서의 역할, 은행과 자본시장의 균형 발전

방안, 금융과 산업의 분리 정책의 적용 등에 대한 논의가 심화되고 있습니다.

그러므로 이제는 지금까지 우리나라가 금융발전을 위해 추진해 왔던 이와 같은

의제들을다시 한 번 면밀히 검토해 볼 필요가 있다고 생각합니다. 이에 본 심포지엄을

통하여 각 분야의 전문가들을 모시고 고견을 듣는 과정을 통해, 국내 금융산업 및

정책에 도움이 되는 실질적인 논의의 장이 제공되고 더불어 저희 스스로도 한국금융

연구원의 존재 의의를 다시 한 번 되새기는 자리가 되기를 희망합니다.

개원 1 5주년을 맞아 그 동안 우리 한국금융연구원이 절박한 심정으로 연구 능력의

획기적 향상을 위해 노력했던 것은 어쩌면 이처럼 질적 도약을 모색하고 있는 한국

금융의 필요에 부응하기 위해서였다고 감히 생각해 봅니다.

우리 한국금융연구원은 우리나라의 금융정책 당국, 금융산업과 시장 그리고

금융업 종사자분들과 전혀 동떨어진 탁상공론을 하는 존재가 아니라, 금융정책 당국

에는 그 지향점을, 금융산업에는 그 발전 방안을, 그리고 금융업 종사자 분들께는

가장 적합한 금융지식을 제공하는 핵심연구기관으로 성장해 왔고, 성장해 나가고자

합니다.

다시 한 번 참석해 주신 여러분께, 감사의 말씀을 드리며 이번 심포지엄을 통해 우리

나라 금융의 발전 방향을 함께 모색하는 시간이 되시길 기원합니다. 감사합니다.

2. 축사

안녕하십니까? 금융감독위원회 위원장 겸 금융감독원 원장 윤증현입니다.

먼저 우리나라금융분야 연구를 선도해온한국금융연구원의 창립 열다섯 돌을 맞아

최흥식 원장님을 비롯한 금융연구원 임직원 여러분께 진심으로 축하의 말씀을

드립니다.

그 동안 국내외 금융제도, 금융정책 및 금융기관 경영 등 금융전반에 걸친 과제들

을 체계적으로 연구, 분석하고 정책을 제시함으로써 우리나라 경제와 금융안정에

지대한 공헌을 하여 오신 임직원 여러분의 노고에 감사의 말씀을 드립니다. 앞으로도

급변하는 환경변화에 맞춰 우리나라 금융산업이 어디로 어떻게 나아가야 할지 시기

적절한 연구와 분석 및 정책 제시를 통해 우리나라 금융산업 선진화를 선도해 주시

기를 바라 마지않습니다.

경제발전은 지구상의 모든 국가가 숙원하는 목표 중 하나입니다. 우리나라에서

이룬 지금까지의 경제발전 과정이나 세계 여러 개발도상국들의 경험을 돌이켜보면


Ⅰ. 개회사및축사

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근본적으로 금융의 심화와 발전이 경제성장에 얼마나 중요한 전제 조건인지 알

수 있습니다. 물론, 노동이나 자본이 경제 발전에 필수적인 기본적인생산요소이지만

금융부문이 제 기능을 수행하지 못한다면 지속적인 경제발전은 기대하기 어렵습

니다. 금융부문의 폭과 깊이가 더해져 경제상황에 맞춰 금융이 적절한 기능을 수행

할 때 경제발전이 더욱 촉진되게 됩니다. 금융회사들은 산업혁명 이후 영국의 경제

발전 속도에 맞추어 발전하면서 영국 경제의 발전을 뒷받침하였고, 이 과정에서

축적된 금융자본과 기술을 다른 나라에 투자하고 전수함으로써 다른 나라 경제의

발전에도 기여하였습니다. 뉴욕도 역시 2 0세기에 들어 런던과 유사한 과정을

거치며 세계금융시장의 중심이 되었습니다. 여러분도 잘 아시다시피 우리나라는

그동안 금융산업 전반에 걸친 대대적인 개혁 조치를 추진해 왔으며, 금융정책 및 감독

체계, 금융회사 내부경영관리제도 등에서 괄목할 만한 성과를 거두고 금융의 폭과

깊이를 더해 왔습니다. 또한 최근에는 자본시장 관계 법률을 통합하여 금융회사들이

자유롭고 창조적으로 영업할 수 있는 환경을 조성해 나가고 있습니다. 금융감독

시스템도 4개 감독기관을 통합하여금융감독원을 설립함으로써 기관별로이루어지던

감독을 기능별로 전환하였으며, 금융부문 및 우리 국가경제의 질적 개선과 경쟁력

강화를 위해 금융 수요자 입장에서 모든 규제를 제로베이스에서 재검토하고, 이러한

금융 규제 개혁이 지속될 수 있도록 자체 규제 DB를 개발하여 상시적으로 금융 규제

개혁을 추진할 수 있는 기반을 마련하였습니다.

그 간의 성과를 토대로 하여 이러한 혁신 노력이 배가됨으로써 우리나라 금융부문

은 경제발전에 따라 다양해지고 복잡해지는 구조 및 거래 방식에 대한 수요를 충족

시켜 나갈 수 있을 것으로 기대하고 있습니다. 그러나 금융부문이 투자 재원을 조달

하는 창구 역할에만 머무르지 않고 스스로 부가가치를 만들어내는 지식·정보 산업

으로 발전시켜 나가기 위해서는 아직도 다 같이 고민하고 해결해 나가야 할 과제들이

많습니다. 먼저 급속히 글로벌화되고 있는 세계 시장의 치열한 경쟁에서, 우리 금융

회사들이 살아남아 선진 금융과 어깨를 나란히 하기 위해 국제 경쟁력을 어떻게 키워

나가야 할 것인지는 바로 코앞에 닥친 과제입니다.

개인적으로 저는‘개방과 경쟁’을 자유민주주의와 시장 경제를 위해 지켜야 할

두 원칙이라고 생각합니다. 이 두 원칙만이 국가와 기업의 경쟁력 향상에 가장 좋은

방법이라 생각하며 금융회사와 금융시장에도 동일한 원칙이 적용된다고 생각하고

있습니다. 감독당국도 국내·외 금융회사들이 자유롭고 공정하게 영업할 수 있는

환경을 조성하기 위하여 노력하고 있습니다. 두 번째로, 아직도 금융 서비스를 받지

못하는 소외된 가계나 기업들이 많은데, 좋은 투자계획을 가진 기업이 투자자금을

쉽게 얻을 수 있고, 금융서비스로부터 소외된 가계에 힘을 보태줄 수 있는 금융시스



15주년내지3차 2007.3.14 5:16 PM 페이지8

템을 구축해 나가야 할 것입니다. 해결에 시간이 많이 걸린다면혁신을 촉진하기위해,

중간 단계에서는정책과 감독체계 그리고 시장구조에 어떠한 구조적 변화가 필요한지

방향 제시가 필요합니다. 세 번째로 체계적인 금융 교육도 금융산업의 선진화를

위해 소홀히 할 수 없는 과제입니다. 금융소비자 한 사람 한 사람이 다양한 금융상품과

서비스에 대해 충분한 정보를 가지고 자기에게 가장 적합한 상품과 서비스를 합리적

으로 선택할 때, 시장규율이 확립되고 우리 금융산업의 성장기반이 더욱 튼튼해질

것입니다. 끝으로 금융 부문이 막힘없이 성장해 나갈 수 있는 거시경제 환경과 사회

인식, 법·제도적 사회 인프라의 개선도 필요합니다. 관치금융이니 하는 구습은 이미

과거 일이 되었습니다만, 채권자 및 채무자 권리에 대한 인식이나 금융산업의 발전을

가로막는 여러 제도적 애로의 해결이 없이는 금융이 제 역할을 다하기 어렵다고

판단하고 있습니다.

이런 과제 하나하나가 예부터 고민해오던 어려운 정책과제들임을 생각할 때, 오늘

많은 전문가들이 모여“지속적인 경제발전을 위한 금융의 역할”을 토의하는 이 심포

지엄은 매우 뜻 깊은 자리라 생각하며 많은 결실이 있기를 기대합니다. 이 자리에

모이신 여러분께서 우리나라 금융산업과 금융시장의 발전을 위하여 더욱 노력하여

주시기를 당부드립니다. 특히, 금융연구원도 우리나라 금융산업과 금융시장의

발전을 위해 귀중한 정보와 유용한 정책 제안을 변함없이 계속 제공하여 주시기를

부탁드립니다. 창립 1 5주년을 다시 한 번 축하드리며 금융연구원 여러분의 건승을

빕니다. 경청해 주셔서 감사합니다.


Ⅰ. 개회사및 축사

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Ⅱ. Session 1 : 외국자본과경제발전( Foreign Cap ital and Econom ic Grow t h )

발표 : Raghuram Rajan (국제통화기금 경제자문관 겸 조사국장)

1. 강연요지

본 강연은 외국자본이 경제성장에 어떠한 역할을 하는지에 관한 내용이다. 우선

신고전학파 등 전통적인 경제이론이 국제적으로 자본이 많은 나라에서 적은 나라로

이동한다고 예측하는 데 반해, 현실에서는 자본이 가난한 국가로 유입되지 않는다고

알려져 있는 루카스 역설이 존재한다.

이를 검증하기 위해서 외국자본이 경제성장에 어떠한 역할을 하는지에 대해서

선진국과 개도국·후진국을 구분하여 실증 분석한 결과를 소개하였다. 그 결과

루카스 역설처럼 단순히 가난한 국가로 자본이 유입되지 않을 뿐만 아니라 전통적인

이론과는 정반대로, 자본은 부유한 국가로 유입되는 경향이 있음을 발견하였다.

더욱이 실증분석 결과에 따르면 빠르게 성장하고 있는 개도국에서조차 많은 외국

자본이 유입되지 않고 있음을 확인할 수 있다. 또한 개도국·후진국들의 경우 외국

자본의 확대와 경제성장 사이에 정(正)의 상관관계를 발견하지 못하였으나 선진국의

경우 외국자본의 확대와 경제성장 사이에 뚜렷한 정의 상관관계가 나타나고 있다는

사실을 발견하였다.

이와 같은 실증분석 결과는 개도국·후진국들의 경우 환율절상에 대한 두려움이나

미성숙한 금융시스템 등에 따라 외국자본을 받아들여 경제성장을 하기에는 능력의

한계가 있기 때문으로 설명하고 있다.

2. 논문내용1 )

I. Introduction

Does foreign capital play a helpful, benign, or malign role in the processof economic growth? This question has fuelled passionate debates amongst

1 0Korea Institute of Finance


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economists, policy makers, and in civil society. It has gained importance inrecent years because of the curious, even seemingly perverse, pattern ofglobal imbalances, whereby capital seems to be flowing“u p h i l l”f r o mpoorer to richer countries. But this question has economic relevancebecause it goes to the heart of the process of development and the role thatforeign capital plays. It also has enduring policy relevance as developingcountries try to decide whether to open themselves up more to the processof financial globalization and, if so, in what form and to what degree.

1. Puzzle: Low Growth and Foreign Finance

The central puzzle we seek to explain in this paper is that, contrary to thepredictions of standard theoretical models, there isn’t a negative correlationbetween current account balances and growth for non-industrial countries.Indeed, for the sample of non-industrial countries and most sub-samples,the correlation is significantly positive. In other words, developing countriesthat have relied more on foreign finance have not grown faster in the longrun, and have typically grown more slowly. By contrast, we find thatamong industrial countries, those that rely more on foreign finance doappear to grow faster.

We discuss two possible explanations for the observed relationships.First, the positive correlation between current account balances and growthis stronger among less financially developed countries. In these countries,the range of profitable investment opportunities, as well as privateconsumption, for those that experience growth episodes, may beconstrained by financial sector impediments, so investment can be financedl a rgely through domestically-generated savings. Second, a developingcountry may actively choose not to absorb too much foreign capital inorder to avoid exchange rate overvaluation. In turn, this ensures that the


Ⅱ. Session 1 : 외국자본과 경제발전

1) The original paper of this abridged version is “Patterns of International Capital Flows and TheirImplications for Economic Development”(the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, JacksonHole, Wyoming, August 25, 2006). Readers can get the original paper at www.kansascityfed.org/Publicat/sympos/2006/pdf/Rajan.paper.0927.pdf.

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country’s manufacturing/tradable goods sector is competitive, thus allowing itto play its customary role in fostering growth.

A logical implication of our analysis is that, once one accounts for thefinancial and other structural impediments that limit a poor country’sa b i l i t y to absorb foreign capital, the seemingly perverse flow of capitalfrom poor to rich countries today is not necessarily an artifact of a distortedinternational financial architecture. Indeed, it may merely be an accentuationof an historical pattern, whereby fast-growing poor countries have nowturned to financing others, including the rich, as opposed to simply relyinglittle on foreign finance as in the past.

Indeed, in this century, the relative income of surplus countries has fallenbelow that of deficit countries. Not only is capital not flowing from rich topoor countries in quantities the neoclassical model would predict—a paradoxpointed out by Lucas (1990)—but, in the last few years, it has been flowingfrom poor to rich countries. However, this is not a new phenomenon. Evenin the late 1980s, the weighted average relative income of surplus countrieswas below that of deficit countries.

Capital flows between developed and developing economies mayincreasingly be dominated by official flows (aid flows, accumulation ofinternational reserves), which may be driven by factors other than the basicrate-of-return equalization motive considered in benchmark neoclassicalmodels. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows by themselves do behavemore in accordance with the models—the weighted-average relativeincome of countries experiencing net FDI inflows is generally lower thanthat of FDI-exporting countries, though the relative income of senders hasbeen trending down while the relative income of recipients has been movingup since the mid-1990s.

The apparent perversity of overall foreign financing is even more dramaticwhen one examines the allocation of capital across developing countries.Within this group, capital should flow in greater amounts to countries thathave grown the fastest, that is, countries that are likely to have the bestinvestment opportunities. Does it? We divide non-industrial countries intothree equally sized (by aggregate population) groups, with China and Indiahandled separately, and compute cumulative current account deficits foreach group, deflating the computed flows in dollars. It shows that, over the



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period 1970-2004, as well as over sub periods, the net amount of foreigncapital flowing to relatively high-growth developing countries has beensmaller than that flowing to the medium- and low-growth groups. In fact,China, the fastest growing country, runs a surplus in every period. During2000-2004, the pattern is truly perverse, with China, India, high-g r o w t hand medium growth countries, all exporting significant amounts of capital,while low growth countries receive significant amounts. That capitaldoes not follow growth has been dubbed the“allocation puzzle”b yGourinchas and Jeanne (2006).

The puzzle deepens when we examine net FDI flows. Even though duringthe most recent period (2000-2004) net FDI flows do not follow growth,by and large they do, with the fastest growing group of non-industrialc o u n t r i e s receiving the most FDI over the period 1970-2004, and Chinareceiving substantial amounts. This suggests that fast growing countries dohave better investment opportunities, which is why they attract more FDI.Yet they do not utilize more foreign capital overall, and in the case ofChina, export capital on net.

Explanations of the Lucas paradox have relied on the notion that therisk-adjusted returns to capital investment may not be as high in poorc o u n t r i e s as suggested by their low capital-labor ratios because they haveweak institutions. Yet the figures here suggest a deeper paradox: Why doesmore foreign capital not flow to poor countries that are growing morerapidly and where, by extension, the revealed marginal productivity of capital(and probably creditworthiness) is indeed high?

To get at the possible answers, we first show that for non-industrialc o u n t r i e s , traditional measures of financial integration (such as stocks off o r e i g n liabilities, sum of stocks of assets and liabilities, private capitalinflows, FDI inflows, or measures of the extent to which capital flows areconstrained by regulations) are not correlated with growth.

It does turn out, though, that when we separately estimate the effects of acountry’s stock of foreign assets and foreign liabilities, they have oppositesigns, with foreign assets being positively correlated with growth andliabilities having a coefficient with similar magnitude but opposite sign.This suggests that net asset positions, or on a flow basis, the currentaccount balance, is likely to be positively correlated with growth. Indeed,



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even controlling for the standard determinants of growth in a regressionframework, we find a positive association between average current accountbalances and average growth rates in our sample of non-industrial countriesover the period 1970-2000. The correlation appears to be largely drivenby the savings component of the current account, not by the investmentcomponent. Non-industrial countries that have higher savings for a givenlevel of investment experience higher growth.

None of this is to say that there are no episodes where non-industrialcountries grow fast and run large current account deficits. East Asia beforethe crisis is a clear counter example. Our attempt is to look beyond short-runforeign-funded booms (and possibly busts), to whether, on average, and i nthe long run, non-industrial countries that grow the fastest have dependedmost on foreign finance. They have not. These findings build upon existingwork. Houthakker (1961), Modigliani (1970), and Carroll and Weil (1994)have shown there is a large positive correlation between savings andgrowth in the cross-section of countries. Of course, investment in high-savingcountries could also be higher, so high domestic savings does not implylow reliance on foreign savings. Indeed Aghion, Comin and Howitt (2006)see high domestic savings as a pre-requisite for attracting foreign savings.Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006b) conclude that poorer countries have lowerper capita income because they have lower productivity or more distortionsthan richer countries, not because they are capital scarce-the implicationbeing that access to foreign capital by itself would not generate muchadditional growth in these countries.

In addition to Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006a), our paper is closely relatedto that of Aizenman, Pinto, and Radziwill (2004), who construct a“self-f i n a n c i n g”ratio for countries in the 1990s and find that countries with higherself-financing ratios grew faster than countries with lower ratios. However,the connection of capital flows to growth seems to be more than justthrough financing. If that were all that were important (for example, f o r e i g nfinancing is good for growth because it expands the resource envelope or isbad because it is excessively volatile), then only inflows or net foreignliability positions should matter. The fact that positive net foreign assetpositions are positively associated with growth, and that even whilefast-growing countries absorb some forms of capital inflows like FDI, on



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net they rely little on foreign capital, suggests our explanations have to gobeyond financing.

The first candidate explanation is that the factors that drive the investmentopportunities that in turn lead to growth, such as exogenous increases inproductivity or demographic changes, also produce the domestic savingsneeded to finance those opportunities, at least the fraction that is accessiblegiven institutional constraints. For example, in industrial countries unexpectedbut sustained increases in productivity will produce higher current andfuture incomes, as well as higher investment as corporations borrow tofinance investment. In anticipation of higher future incomes, consumerswill not just spend out of income but also borrow to consume more, andthus reduce savings. Therefore, higher growth should be correlated withl a rg e r current account deficits, a pattern we do see for industrial countries.

2. Benign Explanations

But what if the financial sector in a country is underdeveloped anddomestic and foreign finance cannot be easily intermediated to firms orconsumers? Then, corporate investment could be limited to the funds firmsgenerate internally from past investment, while consumers save much ofthe increased income stemming from the increase in productivity. It is wellpossible that an increase in productivity could be accompanied by someincrease in investment but an even greater increase in savings, thus resultingin a positive correlation between growth and current accounts, as well asgrowth and savings. Savings, in this view, carries substantial informationabout a developing country’s productivity.

Indeed, we do find such a correlation in the data, with periods of bothhigh productivity growth in a developing country and high savings.M o r e o v e r, at the macroeconomic level, we find that the negative correlationbetween growth and the current account balance is particularly strong incountries with less developed financial systems. It is difficult, however, todisentangle some of these effects (especially the relationship between financialdevelopment and capital inflows) in macroeconomic data, so we complementour analysis by using industry-level data. The analysis using industry-level



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data confirms that, in countries with weaker financial systems, foreign capitaldoes not contribute to the growth of financially dependent industries (thosethat rely more on external finance rather than internally-generated cashflows), suggesting that foreign capital is not effectively intermediated.

This is, in many ways, a benign view of the pattern of global currentaccount imbalances. The fastest growing developing countries generatemore savings than they can use, in part because their financial system maybe underdeveloped. The surpluses (or the lower deficits) they run are bothgood news because they reflect the fact that investment is very productive,but also bad news because they reflect the need to develop the financialsystem (so as to permit more resources to be productively invested, as wellas to permit more borrowing for consumption). Foreign capital could wellbe beneficial in this view, but development of the domestic financial systemis a necessary pre-condition.

There are other, less benign, explanations. Recent analyses of growthepisodes suggest that a dynamic manufacturing sector is a key to long-rungrowth. Substantial inflows of foreign capital could lead to currencyappreciation, and even overvaluation in some circumstances. In turn, thiscould hurt competitiveness and exports in key sectors like manufacturing,which could be a substantial impediment to growth. Thus, the reducedreliance on foreign capital may have the benefit of avoiding overvaluation, ac o n j e c t u r e supported by the data. Interestingly, we do not find evidence of asimilar effect of capital inflows on overvaluation in industrial countries. Wealso find that the ability to avoid overvaluation is helped by favorabledemographics (that is, a rapidly growing labor force relative to the population),which provides a relatively elastic supply of labor. Favorable demographicsthus play a key role in generating savings, but also in providing themicroeconomic basis for sustaining competitive exchange rates, thusreducing any cost of foreign capital inflows on competitiveness.

The critics of capital account openness point to yet another reason countriesmay actively avoid foreign capital — the broader risks associated withopening up, including the risks of inducing greater economic volatility. Wehave little to say on this issue, except to note there is little evidence thatcapital mobility by itself can precipitate crises.

What does all this mean for policies toward capital account openness?



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Any discussion of the merits of capital account openness is likely to bevery specific to a country. Our results suggest, however, that insofar as theneed to avoid overvaluation is important and the domestic financial sectoris underdeveloped, greater caution towards certain forms of foreign capitalinflows might be warranted. At the same time, financial openness mayitself be needed to spur domestic financial development. This suggests that,even though reformers in developing countries might want to wait toachieve a certain level of financial development before pushing for financialintegration, the prospect of financial integration and ensuing competitionmay be needed to spur domestic financial development. One approachworth considering might be a firm commitment to integrate financial marketsat a definite future date, thus giving time for the domestic financial systemto develop without possible adverse effects from capital inflows, evenwhile giving participants the incentive to press for it by suspending thesword of future foreign competition over their heads.

II. Thoughts on Global Imbalances

The now standard view is that there were three distinct phases in theevolution of global current account imbalances. In the first stage in the late1990s, a variety of crises in the emerging markets and Japan led to acollapse in investment opportunities there, freeing up savings, while strongproductivity growth made the United States an attractive place to invest. Inthe second stage in the early 2000s, the bursting of the IT bubble was metwith very accommodative policies in developed countries, particularly theUnited States. Consumption increased and savings fell, especially in countrieswith robust mortgage markets, where rising house prices and the associatedwealth effects provided good support. In the third stage, strong growth andthe associated oil and commodity price shock widened but also shifted thecurrent account imbalances.

While the collapse in investment in Asian emerging markets during thefirst phase is well documented and understood, the significant increase inprivate savings in a number of emerging markets since the late 1990s,



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including those that did not experience crisis, has not been commentedupon. Indeed, in models of the first phase, like Caballero, Farhi, andGourinchas (2006), savers in emerging markets would not increase savingswhen faced with a loss of local investment opportunities, and falling worldwideinterest rates. One could invoke an enormous increase in the precautionarydemand for savings by citizens who have experienced crisis to explain therise in savings, but it is hard to explain why private savings also increased somuch in non-crisis countries, and why they continue to be high.

Our paper offers an alternative view. Perhaps it was not just the U.S. thatexperienced a surge in productivity (in part because of the ICT revolution).Partly because of the reorganization of global production, and partlybecause the surge was transmitted through global supply chains and trade,so did emerging markets, including China.

It is not surprising that the United States, a flexible economy with astrong financial sector, was well-poised to take advantage of the productivityshock. It increased its current account deficit, in the manner predicted bythe standard intertemporal open economy model. In the emerging marketsthat experienced strong productivity growth, the rise in productivity mayhave generated an initial boom in investment in some, as weak financialsystems lent indiscriminately, followed by a bust, after which the financialsystems, imbued with caution that comes from crisis, understood their limitedability to intermediate savings into domestic investment. Thus, the post-crisisincrease in savings and reduction in investment in a number of emerg i n gmarkets may have been the more normal response of countries with weakfinancial systems in response to productivity shocks. In sum, the asymmetricresponses to a productivity shock that may have originated in the UnitedStates, but that got transmitted to its poorer trading partners, may well havecreated savings and investment patterns that led to the observed pattern ofcurrent account imbalances.

Our paper thus suggests why despite both experiencing significantincreases in productivity over the last 10 years, the current accounts of theUnited States and China have moved very differently. Over this time, Chinahas averaged a current account surplus of 2.8 percent of GDP, significantamounts of it invested in the United States, while the United States hasaveraged a current account deficit of 3.7 percent of GDP. This pattern



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appears perverse and clearly runs counter to the benchmark model ofgrowth theory. Our results, by contrast, suggest that, while China and theUnited States may be extreme observations in the groups of developing andindustrial countries respectively, they reflect a more general and historicpattern within their respective groups.

F i n a l l y, let us end on a note of caution. Even if imbalances are equilibriumresponses to a particular set of circumstances, this does not mean that theycan be sustained at this level into the medium term. When a large countryruns a trade deficit of 6 percent of GDP for a long time, it will eventuallyfind financing harder to come by. One should not confuse the words

“equilibrium”and“stability”.

III. Conclusion

What is clear from our analysis is that non-industrial countries that haverelied on foreign capital have not grown faster than those that have not.Indeed, taken at face value, there is a growth premium associated withthese countries not relying on foreign finance. Though we do not havestrong evidence to suggest this association is causal. Equally clearly,though, the reliance of these countries on domestic savings to financeinvestment comes at a cost. There is less investment and consumption thanthere would be if these countries could draw in foreign capital on the sameterms as industrial countries.

It does not seem to us that these non-industrial countries are buildingforeign assets just to serve as collateral, which can then draw in beneficialforms of foreign financing such as FDI. Rather, it seems to us that successfuldeveloping countries have limited absorptive capacity for foreignresources, whether it be because their financial markets are underdevelopedor because their economies are prone to overvaluation caused by rapidcapital inflows.

As countries develop, absorptive capacity grows. The strong recentgrowth of Emerging Europe, accompanied by growing current accountdeficits, probably has a lot to do with the strengthening of their financialsectors, in part through the entry of foreign banks. Only time will tell


Ⅱ. Session 1 : 외국자본과경제발전

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whether there are any effects on the exchange rate and on competitiveness,as well as whether this phenomenon is sustainable, so all conclusions wedraw from this episode have to be tentative.

A bleak read of the message in this paper is that, because developmentitself may be the antidote to any of the deleterious effects of foreign capital,or to the ability of poor countries to absorb more capital, only some formsof foreign capital may play a direct role in the development process.C e r t a i n l y, the role of foreign capital in expanding a country’s resourceconstraints may be limited. A more optimistic read would qualify this withtwo important caveats: First, a better understanding of how to increase ac o u n t r y’s absorptive capacity would allow developing countries to benefitfrom foreign finance even during the process of development. Second, itmay be that some attributes of foreign capital, such as its volatility,contribute to the limited absorptive capacity of the recipients. There maywell be ways for countries that send capital to non-industrial countries ofreducing the volatility of the capital they send out. More research wouldclearly elevate the level of optimism.



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3. 발표자료

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4. 질의응답

질문 1우리나라는 정부의 정책이 발달한 나라 중 하나로, 정부가 규제를 푼다든가 해야

외국의직접투자를받아들일수있는것같습니다. 박사님께서생각하시기에외국자본이

금융 부분에서 역할을 제대로 수행할 수 있도록 하는 비금융 부분(즉 정부나 제도 등)

의 역할은 무엇이 되어야 한다고 생각하시는지, 그리고 비금융 부문이 어떠한 역할을

통해서 외국자본의 효과를 극대화할 수 있다고 생각하시는지 궁금합니다.

답변 1 On the issue of what precisely Korea needs to reform the financial sector,

we’ll hear today from people who are more expert than I am. So let me notventure into that territory because the details of what needs to be done arebetter enunciated by people who are close observers of the Korean system.Broadly speaking and I’m not speaking of Korea specifically here, it seemsto me that one of the biggest factors in underdevelopment is, in a sense, asort of protectionism by elite groups in a country. The kind of elite groupsvary from country to country. In some countries, it is large industrialgroups. In some countries it is large trade unions which are trying to protectjobs in their particular sector. The problem, however, is that in this globalizedworld it is very hard for them to continue that protectionism without subjectingthe country to severe problems in terms of growth. That is, in one sense,good news, because it puts pressure on all these groups to stop standing inthe way of reform and get behind reform. The problem, I think, is whenthere is a lot of inequality in a county, what the right reforms are and howone should back them is very unclear. What is the right reform for onegroup, is the wrong reform for another group. They want a second set ofreforms and it is quite possible you get paralysis. As you know, there is afair amount of literature about the correlation between inequality and lowergrowth. And certainly some countries have gotten stuck in that. So whatdoes all this amount to? It is suggesting that there are some deep problemsin countries that are underdeveloped; problems that no amount of preachingabout right reforms are going to get them out of. They have to, in a sense,

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manage the process internally so as to get the right conditions for reform. Seems to me Korea doesn’t have those problems, at least not at the level

that some of the other countries have had. Korean growth, in part, has beenbased on the fact that Korea started with a fairly egalitarian base. Thespread of education has been very important in Korea and has helpedt r e m e n d o u s l y. I think over time, though, the areas where Korea has beensuccessful have been areas open to foreign competition. Manufacturingproductivity growth has been tremendous. Where it has been less successfulis in areas like services, areas like the financial sector where foreigncompetition has been less effective. Now there are various forms of foreigncompetition. One is simply foreign capital serving as competition todomestic capital. A second form is foreign financial institutions serving ascompetition to domestic financial institutions. A third is foreign institutionbeing able to take over domestic institutions. As you increase the level towhich foreigners come in, the level of apprehension increases, not just inKorea but in countries around the world. For example, the idea that foreignbanks can take over domestic banks, an idea to which Korea has been openover the past few years, is still something which is resisted very, verystrongly in number of industrial countries. And clearly in Korea it is not anissue that is without debate. I think there is some debate about that. Thebottom line is that it seems to me that managing the process of foreigncompetition and making sure that you can get the competitive benefits fromit to push the domestic elites into reforming is a very important aspect ofthe development process. It is what will spur the productivity growth andthe opportunities which are very important. I think figuring out how to dothat well is really critical.

질문 2 최근 한국의 론스타에 대한 정책을 바라보는 미국의 시각을 알고 싶습니다. 또한

이 문제와 관련하여 박사님께서는 한국 사회를 어떻게 평가하시는지 궁금합니다.

그리고 현재 우리나라 원화의 고평가가 외국자본의 유입과 관련된 것으로 생각하시

는지 의견을 여쭤보고 싶습니다.



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답변 2 The first question is, “Is Lone Star right?”I don’t know what Lone Star

has been saying specifically. I will say that the process of allowing a foreignfirm like Lone Star to buy domestic institutions was a good one. And I thinkover time finding a way to make that experience more widespread will beuseful to Korea. Now again, I have to say that it is a not easy for a country toallow major institutions to be taken over by foreigners, especially bankinginstitutions because banking and finance are at the center of economic activityin a country and so there is often a concern, a fear, a worry. But this is wherecompetition really comes in. Clearly you don’t want to be at the mercy ofone foreign institution, but if there are many foreign institutions that arecompeting with domestic institutions, then you are getting the best of bothworlds. You are getting foreign know-how, foreign savvy. But you also havea number of domestic institutions which are competing with them and gettingb e t t e r. I think examples like Mexico suggest you need to have a mix. Yo uneed to have domestic institutions. You need to have foreign institutions.Giving too much in one side may create problems down the line and a lackof control that sometimes domestic politicians worry about. But creating acompetitive situation where foreigners and domestics fight it out and no oneis dominant I think is an appropriate strategy and getting there is veryimportant. It is not easy, of course, but it is important to go towards that. Interms of the exchange rate appreciation, it is not a given that every timef o r e i g n capital comes in you are going to get an overvalued exchange rate.A lot of it depends on how you use foreign capital. If the foreign capital isused effectively in creating a lot of productive capacity that is efficient, it isnot necessary that you would get an overvalued exchange rate. To this extentcountries can take in a lot of FDI. If that FDI goes to appropriate sectors itcan enhance the growth rate in that country without any offsetting exchangerate overvaluation. In terms of Korea, we have seen in the last few years thatwhile the exchange rate has appreciated, productivity growth has alsoincreased quite a bit, so in that sense Korea hasn’t lost competitiveness. Itd o e s n’t make any sense to hold your exchange rate way below where itshould be, because in a sense you are making yourself poorer, you are holdingback the consumption opportunities for your citizens. You don’t want to let



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it go beyond where it should be, because then you are losing competitiveness.The best thing to do is to have a exchange rate which is appropriately valuedand it seems to me that Korea is pretty much doing that.

질문 3I wanted to thank you very much for a very nice presentation. I have two

questions. One is, we have the micro evidence of what you said, but theproblem is on the macro level where you don’t find those benefits that easily.So would you please tell us your opinion and show some examples aboutthat? Second is, do you think investment opportunities in emerging marketsmainly depend on a financial system which is driven by foreign capital?

답변 3You make two very good points. One, of course, is the micro evidence

which is to some extent what I was relying on in my suggestion that itw a s n’t obvious that you should ban foreign capital. Foreign capital certainlyhas been correlated with things like improvements in reductions in firms’costs of capital, sometimes improvements in banking efficiency and thingslike that. So allowing foreign capital in does seem to have some microimprovements. However, the problem is on the macro level you don’t findthose benefits that easily. So the natural suspect is that what you may beseeing is sort of what economists call“spillover eff e c t s”. Effects that noindividual firm sees but they do work at the macro level. Now, amongst thetwo explanations I gave you for that correlation, one was a benign one,which is just the way things are. When countries grow very fast, becausethey can’t redeploy money into investments very easily, they tend to havefrom that growth enough savings to make all the investments that they needand as a result, very fast growing countries don’t really rely on foreign capital.T h a t’s a very benign explanation and in that explanation foreign capital isnot necessarily a bad thing. So that wouldn’t contradict Stijn’s point thatmicro evidence might be good but there is really no macro evidence ofstrong growth effects. But there is another macro story where foreignc a p i t a l is actually bad, and this is the exchange rate overvaluation story,



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where foreign capital coming in could appreciate the exchange rate. Now,again, that is not as simple a story as what I proposed. Why is the exchangerate appreciating? In many African countries, the reason that the exchangerate has been appreciated is in part because the strong middle class in t h o s ecountries has welcomed consumption opportunities from having anovervalued exchange rate and not worried about the costs to productionwhich will fall on manufacturing or on the agricultural sector. The point hereis that there is a deeper reason for why the exchange rate has been allowedto appreciate along with the capital coming in which may have to do withthe attitudes of the urban middle class in those countries which have, in asense, been protected. In terms of prescription for the developing countries,certainly I wouldn’t put financial sector development as the first and foremostthing there are many other actions that these countries have to take. I think ifthey have a magic wand and could set their initial conditions, I wouldsuggest the increasing evidence from the development literature is if theycould reduce inequality to begin with, that might set them much more firmlyon the process of growth. If they could make a more level playing field inthe country, that might, regardless of where the country is in terms of percapita income, as long as it is relatively equal, it may have a better chance.At least, that seems to be an emerging finding. But I would say there aremany other factors, other than finance, though, finance can be a contributor.And certainly for emerging markets, especially when you move beyonde m e rging markets almost to the ranks of developed countries, it seems to methat finance plays a more and more important part. Put another way, for acountry like Korea, close to the frontier and in some cases is the frontier interms of technology, in terms of development, it becomes much harder tomake choices between where to invest. Do I invest here, or do I invest there?When you are far from the frontier, when it is clear that roads have to bebuilt, bridges have to be built, it is very clear what has to be done so youd o n’t have to make much of a choice. Whether you build a road or whetheryou build a bridge, both are going to be very valuable. As you get closer tothe frontier, do I invest in Technology A or do I invest in Technology B?Those questions become much more difficult to answer and you need avibrant financial system to help you answer them. Similarly, when you areinvesting in human capital you need a vibrant financial system to help you.



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Financing, for example, the development of drugs is a complicated processfor which you need a good financial system. So I think a county that is muchfurther along in the scale of development, like Korea, proportionately muchgreater of an emphasis needs to be put on financial sector development thanthe poor country.

질문 4Thank you for your informative answer. I’d like to ask something about

population ageing. I wonder to what extent, in what direction, rapid populationageing in this region will affect the perverse relationship between the levelof income and the level of capital exports. It seems to me that rapid ageingmight strengthen the past tendency, because rapid ageing could induce highhousehold savings. Unless that household savings could be invested moreefficiently in the domestic financial system, then it has to go outside. So, ifpopulation ageing could strengthen this perverse relationship you found,then the so-called global imbalance between the US and East Asian countrieswith very rapid population ageing might not be readily resolved in theshort-run.

답변 4I t’s a brilliant question. I think you are exactly right. In the sense that

with rapid population ageing, if you think, and this is a very big if becausewe haven’t fully confronted the consequences, if you think the labor forceis going to shrink rapidly, then clearly there is too much capital alreadyembedded in the country, so in a sense you’ll have to reduce the amount ofinvestment. But even as you are reducing the amount of investment, as yousaid, the savings rate could potentially rise given peoples’fears about ageingso the savings-investment balance could become much wider. You havemuch more savings than you are investing, of course the effect would be toexport those savings outside, and Korea could be running large currentaccount surpluses, much larger than it’s running right now. Now I wouldsay though we don’t yet know the consequences of population ageingbecause, Japan is now turning down that path, but we haven’t had fullexamples. It seems to me that population ageing will create much greater



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pressure for greater participation in the labor force. So it may not be, givencurrent trends we see a decline in the labor force, but if the pressure forgreater participation comes in and more women join the labor force, forexample, and more elderly citizens stay in the labor force without leavingit, there might period over which things sort of plateau for a time. I thinkthat working on policies to make that possible is very important for countries.Making policies such that the labor force can continue strong, and certainlyI am sure this is an issue which is preoccupying Korea right now.

질문 5My question is a little separate from the topic you did today. Right now

there is a heated debate in Korea whether or not the Korea housing marketis a bubble. If my memory serves correctly, you mentioned in an FT interviewthat there are common factors in the worldwide housing market boom suchas low interest rates and productivity growth. Would you suggest that raisinginterest rates is necessary to slow the Korean housing market? Actually, theside effects of raising interest rates are worrisome. What do you think aboutgovernment intervention policy? What do you think about limiting thenumber of mortgage loans to households?

답변 5Now, I have to be very careful about saying anything about government

p o l i c y. The reason is actually a very simple one, it is not that I have a problemsaying it. It’s because we have a team talking to the government at thispoint. Just a regular visit by an IMF team and I don’t want say anything thatprejudges their position. I have to let them have their freedom. Most peoplethink of the IMF as a hierarchy, with everything being decided at the top.No. It is a decentralized organization and part of the decentralization is wehave country teams. They have a responsibility and I don’t want to takeaway that responsibility from them. However, I will talk more obliquelyabout the issue of housing in a more general way. I do think that most peoplesee the housing price increases as only a function of the interest and verybenign financing conditions. I do think there is a role played in countries bystrong growth which has created anticipation of higher incomes down the



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line and as a result of those anticipated higher incomes there has been agreater desire for real estate investment, especially in areas where housingsupply is limited. If prices go up too rapidly, any central bank should bethinking, “Is this too fast? Am I in the process of creating a bubble?”Andmy view is central banks have a duty to lean against the wind, a little bit.When things are moving too fast, they should to some extent, lean againstthe wind. Even though I know the well-known arguments that “you can’tidentify a bubble until it has burst.”How do you know if it is a bubble? Canyou really do anything? When credit growth is excessively rapid, our sensefrom work at the BIS, is that problems tend to have higher probability.Central bankers are always working in a probabilistic setting, and so itmakes sense when things are moving too rapidly to, in a sense, slow down.This is not to say we move so fast as to kill everything, but to say whenthings are getting uncomfortably exuberant, there is a role for the centralbank to slow things down. This includes, for example, as the FederalReserve recently did in the US, when you find certain kinds of mortgagesare being made without due attention to creditors, etc, that you can cautionthe banks and ask them not to make that kind of mortgage. So it all dependson the environment. But I would say that in an environment with veryrapid credit growth, where you feel the credit conditions are excessivelyaccommodative, the central bank does have a role caution against makingtoo many not-well supported loans and sometimes to raise the interest rateto slow things down. To make sure the pace of growth is not excessivelyfast in order to avoid the troubles that might come down the line. Now allthis, of course, is in general, without speaking specifically about the Koreansituation.

질문 6The main problem for Korean financial companies is that they do not

possess the knowledgeable and sufficiently trained staff to develop, sell,and distribute myriad financial products in which foreign institutionsspecialize. What would you recommend to CEOs of Korean financialcompanies to improve their human capital as soon as possible?



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답변 6It is a very practical question and I can offer practical answers off of the

top of my head. The obvious answer has to be, three things. One, try toimport the capital. I’ve taught a huge number of Korean MBA studentswhile at Chicago. I’m sure if not back in Korea, they are somewhere inNew York or London, practicing. I mean they were extremely smartstudents, so they are doing very well there. Attracting them back, as thesame way as Korea did in manufacturing, attracting them back into thefinancial services is one way. Getting foreigners to come in, either viaforeign companies or recruiting directly is a second. But ultimately, there isno substitute for training. Now some of this training can be given in houseby financial institutions, some of it can be given by relying on foreign trainers.Many universities are training and so on. Those are possibilities out there.Third is by developing domestic universities. This is another aspect ofimproving services growth. This is certainly an issue in India, more competi-tion amongst universities, more entry into the area, could in a sense fertilizemuch stronger growth and much more job oriented training.

질문 7금융주권과 관련해서 외국자본이 가난한 국가에서 좋은 성과를 내지 못하는 것이

금융산업이 발전하지 못했기 때문이라고 말씀하셨는데, 예컨대 경쟁력 있는 외국

기관이 낙후된 국가의 금융기관을 모두 다 흡수했을 때가 경제에 더 좋다고 생각하

시는 것인가요?

답변 7The sad answer is“not necessarily”. Some of my colleagues have done

work on very poor countries and have looked at the role of foreign banks inthose very poor countries and have determined that the foreign banks arenot particularly helpful because they tend to cherry pick. I don’t know thatthey’ve found the precise mechanism, but they find that in terms of growtht h e y’re not very helpful and I think the answer might be that they tend tocherry pick the best clients, leaving the domestic banks with worse clients.



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The domestic banks aren’t really able to compete and as a result it is notthat great for the financial system in these very poor countries. I wouldn’tsay, and this is the point I was trying to make earlier, you don’t want to giveup your financial system to the foreigners. In a sense, that is a little bit ofwhat was tried in Mexico, and I think in Mexico, while the financial systemis quite stable, there have been some concerns about whether lending hasgone to all the sectors of the economy that require it or whether the foreignbanks are happier staying up there taking the cream and not pushing muchf u r t h e r. In fact, it is in Mexico some of the non-bank financial institutionsare making greater strides than the foreign banks. So I think the watch wordis not so much to give it up to the foreign banks or to give it up to thedomestic banks, I think it is important to get a balance, to get both inthere competing because that is when the customer wins. When the bankscompete with each other, the domestic citizen, the customer wins. Butwhen it is monopolized by one group or the other, I tend to think it shutsout true competition. So what is important is to have both.

질문 8Thank you for a great presentation Dr. Rajan. In your book with Zingales,

you propose a type of a safety net to alleviate parties distressed by freetrade and capital flows. This seems to imply, for example, refraining fromimposing tariffs on imported beef to protect local ranchers. Instead, thegovernment should commit, in advance, to provide lump-sum reliefpayment to displaced workers. Theoretically, this provides the out-of-workindividual incentive to look for another job. Further, you argue that, if peopleare insured directly from the government rather than through their employer,any situational advantage to the incumbents would be avoided. However, itis unclear how this lump-sum relief payment works in practice and in whatways it would be better. Could you explain more about how this proposalwould function if implemented?



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답변 8That is a very good question. It has been some time since I wrote that book,

so I don’t remember that precise proposal, but I think it was something of theorder of, if somebody gets out of work, they get a lump sum, which is notbased on the amount of time they spend out of work and gives them moreof an incentive to look for work. It was something of that sort, right? To tryand preserve the incentives. The idea was really to protect people againstbeing out of work but at the same time retain some incentives to find workquickly, rather than living off the dole for a long time. I have to rememberthe precise details of that mechanism to sort of explain how it works, if youremember I’d be happy, but I don’t remember the precise details right now.But it was about pushing people, giving them an incentive and there arevarious ways of doing that.

For example, a cruder way of doing that is giving some limited supportin terms of weeks of unemployment insurance. That is fairly crude. But thebroader point that was sought to be made in that book is that it is veryimportant to have a flexible labor force, but a strong safety net. Those aretwo key elements. A flexible labor force in the sense that companies shouldbe allowed to hire or fire as need be, with egregious violations of workerrights being taken up through the courts rather than by a prohibition off i r i n g . So if you fire a worker for no appropriate cause, that should be takenup by the courts and if that is ruled as being unfair, etc, that could be dealtwith. But it shouldn’t be a blanket ban on firing employees. That is a veryimportant need in this global economy because the ability to, in a sense, layo ff workers gives you a much greater incentive to hire them in the firstplace. With so much volatility in revenues for companies, if in fact theyhave to get locked in to a labor force that they can’t adjust at all if in factorders fall, they’ll be very reluctant to go there. So that is very important,the ability to fire. But if you have the ability to fire, it’s very important forthe workers to have a safety net, a good safety net that they can rely on ifthey are laid off, so that they don’t have to resort to extra-constitutionalneeds in order to protect their jobs. And for the companies t h e m s e l v e s ,politicians don’t have the incentive to protect companies which are doingbadly because they fear these workers when they lose their jobs and go on



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the street will riot, the fact that they have a safety net protects the workers,but doesn’t protect the company. So it is important to have a safety net,separate from the company, which is a universal safety net which canp r o t e c t the workers. That was the main point that was sought to be made.The details on how you create a safety net which doesn’t serve as a permanentsort of net for people and make them happy sort of living off the safety net,clearly there are many proposals which could be put forth there and clearlyours was just one of them.

질문 9I would like to ask the last question, actually. If you look at the recent

East Asian countries, we have an abundance of capital. It is ironic that thecapital is flowing from the overall less developed countries to the developedcountries. For example, China has more than 1 trillion US dollars ofreserves, Japan has close to 1 trillion and we have 200 billion dollars. Butbecause our businessmen are overcautious in new investments, it is notinvested sufficiently and efficiently in the region. So right now, people arecomplaining and we don’t have to resort to foreign advanced countriesfinancial markets, why don’t we directly utilize the huge capital directlyinside the Asian countries. So my question is two-fold. First, if we reallysucceed in circulating this capital directly into our region, what happens tothe fiscal deficit in the US? Second, do you believe we have too manyredundant foreign reserves? And for you think so, what is the best remedyfor holding too many reserves?

답변 9Again, very good question. Let me try one more way of explaining the

point I should have made earlier, which is getting exactly to your question.Part of what is going on in Asia, to my mind, is not so much that savingshave increased tremendously. I don’t buy the “savings glut”view of thingsthat Chairman Bernanke has put forth. Instead, investment has come downdramatically. By some count, in 2004, investment was 10% below where itwas before the crisis. That is what we calculated. It has come back a little



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bit, but certainly not to prior levels. Also, if in fact Asia is experiencingvery strong productivity growth, you would expect investment to go up, butyou would also expect as in the Unites States, consumption to go up,because people now expect higher wages over time are willing to consumemore. Neither has happened. Investment has not gone up, consumption alsohas not gone up on the strength of future wage expectations. And I thinkthis is where it must be the financial system to some extent. Because even ifexisting businesses do not want to invest in their own industries becausethey think there is enough capital investment and they would rather focuson improving productivity, why doesn’t the money flow to new businesses?Why aren’t new businesses started? It must be that the financial systemcan’t deliver that to the new areas. Similarly, why can’t people consume?

Part of the reason, certainly in China, is that the financial system is notable to provide enough retail finance or enough finance against housing,and so people have to save in order to consume rather than borrow in orderto consume as in the United States. So the financial system is at the centerof, in a sense, this different response. In the US the same productivitygrowth led to greater investment and much lower savings, therefore a currentaccount deficit. In emerging Asia, it has led to less investment and moresavings and therefore surpluses. Is this necessarily a bad thing? I would s a y,not really given the kind of investment that can be made. If, for example, thefinancial sector improved and could allocate these better, that would be agood thing and therefore greater investment would be a good thing. Butgiven the current state of the financial system, to force business men tobecome less cautious, I’m not sure given past given past experience isnecessarily a good thing. I’m not sure how profitably the investment willtake place, so I would be cautious upon urging businessmen at the currentjuncture to invest more. I would think that there is more scope for increasingconsumption, but again, as Korea’s experience with the credit cards goes oras recent concerns about housing go, you want to be careful about movingit too fast, also, because you don’t want excessive growth in retail financewithout appropriate cautions.

Are the reserves too much? I think the answer is yes. Reserves are toomuch. My sense is that if you think the overall well-being comes fromgreater consumption, it is time that countries focused on how to enhance



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consumption domestically. Thinking of how to do that is an importantaspect. Doing that would reduce the savings and allow for lower surpluses.Of course, again, this varies country by country. For countries with ageingpopulations maybe more consumption is not necessarily the most immediateanswer. Finding some way to deal with that, with a flow of savings which isappropriate would be important.

The second question is,“For Asian Economies, what are the effects ofrebalancing reserves?”First, it really depends on how the Asian economiesreduce the built-up reserves. If the way they reduce it is by greater c o n-s u m p t i o n , then that naturally will provide more demand for the exports ofthe deficit countries, like the US, and that could provide a reasonable rolein the rebalancing. If, however, the reserve reduction takes place by investingin other foreign assets other than T-bills and so on, my sense is it may notmake that much of a difference because there is a global pool for financialassets and it will come back somehow into that global pool. I do think thatit is important over time to try and find ways to bring down these globalimbalances to adequate levels. Some of the forces are very deep and hardfor government policy to control. Some of the forces are much easier forgovernment policy to control, such as excessive fiscal deficits or a fixedexchange rate. So those would be important aspects.



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Ⅲ. Session 2 : 금융산업발전을 위한 금융규제·감독의 과제와 역할( Cu r rent Challenges in Financial Regulat ion )

발표 : Stijn Claessens (세계은행 수석자문역)

1. 강연요지

금융산업은 탈규제( dere g u lat ion), 세계화( g lob a l i z at ion), 그리고 기술진보

( t e ch nolo g ical adva nces) 등에 힘입어 그 동안 많은 변화를 겪어 왔다. 이 중 금융

자유화를 의미하는 탈규제는 금융기관, 금융상품, 시장뿐 아니라 국가간의 규제완화

및 진입장벽 등의 해소를 의미하는 포괄적인 개념이다. 최근 이와 같은 탈규제가 진행

되면서 시장이 확대되고 시장구조 변화가 가속화되어 M&A 및 동종·이종 부문간

겸업화 현상이 심화되고 있다.

한편 기술의 발전은 금융비용의 하락뿐 아니라 새로운 형태의 금융상품의 출현

및 감독효율성을 제고시키는 결과를 가져 왔다. 특히 전자증권거래와 같은 새로운

거래시스템, 그리고 hou s e - p r ice indexed mor t g age lo a n s와 같은 새로운

형식의 금융상품의 출현은 기술 발전에 힘입은 바가 크다. 기술의 발전은 감독측면

에도 영향을 주고 있는데, 기술발전을 통해 감독의 효율성이 제고됨에 따라 감독의

편의성을 위해 필요로 하였던 시장경쟁 제한 정책 등이 더 이상 불필요하게 되어 결과

적으로 금융시장의 경쟁이 촉진되는 결과를 가져오게 되었다.

그러나 탈규제와기술의 진보는 이러한 편익을 발생시키는동시에 다른 한편으로는

금융서비스를 보다 복잡하게 만들고 새로운 위험요인을 야기하는 결과를 초래하였

다. 즉 탈규제와 기술진보로 은행, 증권, 보험업 등 각 금융영역을 아우르는 대형금융

기관( c on g lomerat e s )이 출현함으로써 소비자에게 다양한 금융서비스를 쉽게 제공

할 수 있게 되었다.

하지만 한편으로는, 금융거래 및 금융상품의 복잡성을 증가시킴으로써 감독상

어려움을 낳고 있으며, 이에 따라 금융시스템의 안정을 훼손시킬 가능성도 증대되고

있다. 즉 대형화와 다양한 금융상품의 등장은 대마불사(too-large-to-fail)문제,

지급결제시스템의 안전성, 도덕적 해이문제, 예금보험 및 안전망문제 등에 영향을



15주년내지3차 2007.3.14 5:16 PM 페이지40

미침으로써 금융시스템의 위험을 증가시킬 가능성이 커지고 있는 것이다.

이러한 가운데, 금융규제와 관련한 주요 이슈 가운데 하나는 은행의 역할과 기능

에 관한 사항이다. 은행은 과거에 비해 점차 덜 특별해지고 있으며( g etting le s s

special) 그 이유는 금융중개에 있어서 은행의 전통적인 역할 즉, 지급결제서비스,

예금, 대출의 역할이 감소하고 있기 때문이다.

이러한 변화에 따라 상업은행과 투자은행 간, 상업은행과 보험사 간 업무결합

( c on g r uenc e )이 높아지고 있으며, 이는 개별 금융위기가 시스템 차원의 위기로 발전

할 수 있는 가능성을 증대시키고 있다. 따라서 탈규제 시대의 위험관리방식은 기존과

같은 은행, 증권, 보험에 대한 부문별 방식이 아니라 부문간 업무결합을 고려하는

통합된 위험관리 방식(integrated risk management approach)을 채택할 필요

가 있다.

또한 경쟁정책, 소비자 보호, 규제비용의 평가, 규제감독의 조화( h a r mon i z at ion )

등이 금융규제에 있어서 주요한 이슈로 떠오르고 있다. 탈규제 및 기술 발전은 경쟁을

제고함으로써 상품 다양성, 거래비용 하락, 접근성 제고 등의 바람직한 결과를 실현

할 수 있게 되었다. 그러나 한편으로는 금융기관의 대형화를 초래함으로써 경쟁이

오히려 낮아질 수 있는 역설을 발생시키는 측면도 있다. 또한 소비자 보호 문제에

있어 기업윤리 제고( bu s i ness con duct), 소비자 교육 등이 필요하며 감독당국은

규제·감독의조화를 통해 은행, 증권, 보험 등 상이한 업종 및 상품 간에 감독의 규제

차익(regulatory arbitrage)이 발생하지 않도록 하고, 감독의 일관성을 유지할 수

있도록 주의를 기울일 필요가 있다. 다만, 금융기관의 건전성감독( p r udent ia l

supervision)과 시장규율감독(market conduct)은 서로 다른 기관으로 분리하는

사례도 있으며, 규제·감독의 조화를 위하여 반드시 하나의 기관으로 통합하는 것이

일반적 추세는 아니다.

한편, 개발도상국들은 금융규제와 관련하여 다양한 과제들에 직면하고 있다.

먼저, 국가간 금융통합의 추세 속에서 이에 대응하기 위해 제도적 장치들이 신속히

마련되어야 하는데 개발도상국의 경우 아직까지는 이를 위한 역량이 부족한 것으로

여긴다. 둘째, 이러한 금융산업의 글로벌화로 인한 국경간 금융서비스 거래가 빈번

해지고 있는 상황에서, 선진국에 비해 역량 및 경험 등이 부족한 개발도상국의 경우

다양한 거래 대상국의 규제, 제도에 부합해야 하는 부담이 개발도상국이 직면하는

또 다른 과제이다. 셋째, 대형 외국계 금융회사의 경우 진출국의 대기업과의 거래

또는 소매금융에 치중하는 경향이 있는데, 이로 인해 중소기업들의 경우 이러한 대형

외국계 금융회사와 거래할 수 있는 기회가 상대적으로 적어진다. 넷째, 국가간 금융

통합으로 인한 외국계 금융회사의 진출 증가 및 이로 인한 글로벌 스탠다드의 중요성


Ⅲ.Session 2:금융산업발전을위한금융규제·감독의과제와역할

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증대 등은 개발도상국 고유의 금융산업 발전 전략과 때때로 상충하는 문제를 일으

킨다. 마지막으로, 개발도상국의 경우 다른 부문의 개혁과 달리 금융개혁에 있어 정치

경제적 요소 및 영향이 그 어떠한 것보다 중요한 변수로 작용한다.

향후, 금융산업의 규제와 관련, 소비자보호, 규제의 조화(국내시장 및 글로벌시장) ,

규제의 국제적 정합성, 개발도상국과 관련된 이슈 등에 대한 연구 및 논의가 보다 많이

이루어질 필요가 있을 것으로 생각한다.

2. 논문내용2 )

1. The triggers and the changes within the financial services industries

The combination of deregulation and technological changes is leading tomany institutional changes, besides changes in market structures. Thee m e rgence of financial conglomerates in many countries, for example, isin part the result of deregulation and the increased possibility of usingtechnology to combine multiple financial services and delivering theseusing the same or similar distribution channels. Thanks to technologicaladvances, new forms of financial services providers have emerged, such ase-brokers and aggregators. The breadth of financial services available forfirms, households, and specialized groups such as lower net-wealthinvestors has increased.

1.1 Deregulation

The financial landscape has been changing rapidly in the last twodecades. These changes have in large part been triggered by financialderegulation. The most important deregulation has been the removal of



2) This abridged version is based on the “Current Challenges in Financial Regulation”which waspresented at the 15th Anniversary Symposium of the Korea Institute of Finance, Finance andEconomic Development in Korea , on November 14, 2007. Readers who are interested in thispaper, visit KIF’s homepage.(http://www.kif.re.kr)

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barriers between products, markets and countries, and sometimes evenwithin countries, such as the U.S. with the removal of intra and inter-statebranching restrictions. The deregulation has broadened markets, withincountries and across borders. Inter-industry changes have been large aswell. Most important has been the progressive abolishment of legal separationsbetween commercial banking, insurance and investment banking activities.It has also led to a blurring of lines between types of financial services andfinancial services providers.

1.2 Technology

Changes are not due to deregulation alone. Much of change has been dueto rapid information, communication and technological innovation withinfinancial services industries, with deregulation catching up. Finance bynature is very technology intensive and the large cost reductions in ICTover the past two decades have had large impacts on financial servicesindustries. In turn, these cost advantages have been passed to consumers inthe form of lower margins and better quality services. It is not just thattechnology today provides an increased ability to engage in high-levelfinance (e.g., credit derivatives), but it also allows cheaper production andbetter mainstream financial services for households and smaller size firms.The direct effects are many, such as the entry of many new financialservices providers, e.g., those providing aggregation services putting multipleaccount information and transaction capacity in one place. Indirect eff e c t sof technology are many, although sometimes complex. Before the removalof inter- and intrastate restrictions, commercial banks were facing competitionfrom non-bank financial institutions as these non-banks had alreadyexpanded nationwide. Technological advances have also affected the abilityof supervisors to monitor banks and allowed them to be more comfortablewith greater competition.



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2. The challenges for financial regulation

The (global) developments in financial services industries have generallyled to improved outcomes in terms of more efficient financial servicesprovision, greater diversity of financial services, and greater access tofinancial services. Economies, consumers and firms alike, have greatlybenefited. Yet, these developments are also leading to new challenges facingfinancial sector regulators and other policy makers. These challenges relatein large part to financial stability as new, possibly systemic risks arise.Stability is, however, not the only concern of policy makers and new issuesalso have come up in terms of making financial markets function properly,in the sense of delivering the best possible financial services at the lowestcost to large swaths of consumers.

For both stability and efficiency purposes, there has consequently been aparallel trend to adapt regulations and adopt new regulations in some areas(“re-regulation”) to assure well-functioning financial systems and markets.The design and applicability of these new regulations have been subject tomany discussions. Issues arising have been various, but include: the overallapproach to financial sector regulation and supervision in light of changesin the special nature of banks; competition policy in financial intermediation;consumer protection; the costs of regulation; and further harmonization ofrules and practices.

2.1 Overall approach and the (special) role of banks

Liberalization has meant that banks and other financial institutions havemoved from being under close control with little competition to having tosatisfy minimum prudential standards with more general supervisoryo v e r s i g h t and enforcement of good internal risk management practices. Inmost countries and circumstances, these approaches have led to greaterstability. In most developed countries banks and other financial institutionshave been able to withstand several large shocks over the last decade (e.g.,the late 1990s’global financial crises, the bursting of the internet bubble)relatively unscathed. Yet, in the earlier phases of liberalization and in both



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developed and developing countries, liberalization has contributed tovulnerabilities and even led to financial crises

As such, each crisis has taught policy makers new lessons and triggeredadaptations to regulations. Thinking ahead of what new risks may arise andhow to prevent large impacts remains nevertheless a challenge for financialsector policy makers.

The role of banks has expanded in recent decades while at the same timebanks have shed some of their more traditional forms of financiali n t e r m e d i a t i o n . Banks, especially in developed countries, have becomerisk managers rather than straightforward intermediaries. Financialinstitutions most often organized around“b a n k s”are now engaged in abroad range of complex financial transactions and operate in variousmarkets - banking, insurance, and capital markets - to take on and lay offrisks on behalf of their costumers. The size and complexity of financialconglomerates can make the banking part of the business, the part that is ofmost concern for systemic reasons, more difficult to monitor for privateand official parties.

In terms of the systemic aspects of risks, conclusions are unclear. Givenhow difficult it is to anticipate the ways in which risks will get transmitted,it is hard to determine how to make systems more robust and how to prioritizeinterventions. It is probably the case that there will be a greater need to protectthe basic elements of a financial system: payments system, clearing andsettlement, and the basic provision of liquidity. And indeed, much eff o r thas been invested in strengthening these basic elements of the institutionalinfrastructure, also at the international level. Scenarios and financial crisisgames can help identify general financial vulnerabilities and possible gapsin decision-making processes.

2.2 Competition policy

Competition has been an important driver of recent financial sectorimprovements. Making financial systems more open and contestable hasgenerally led to greater product differentiation, lower cost of financialintermediation, more access to financial services, and enhanced stability.



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The evidence for these effects is fairly universal, from the U.S., EU andother developed countries to most developing countries. As globalization,technology and de-regulation further progress, the gains of competition canbe expected to become even more wide-spread across countries. At thesame time, the rapid competitive gains due to liberalization over the pastfew decades will be harder to sustain. Importantly, new regulatory andcompetition policy issues will arise as financial markets and productsbecome more complex and globalized.

Assuring that all the potential gains from competition are achieved isdifficult. The Cruickshank report in the UK (2001) showed that barriers forconsumers and SMEs are often subtle, and not easy to correct. Mored i s c l o s u r e to consumers on the costs of various financial services can help,but experiences show that this remains of limited effectiveness when doneby government fiat alone. Strong policy intervention can at times be necessaryto force adjustments, create standardization and remove barriers.

Financial services provision also involves the use of a great number ofnetworks, such as payments, distribution and information systems. Thismeans barriers to entry can arise due to a lack of access for financialservices providers to some essential services. In banking, access to essentialservice is closely related to who has access to the payments system, typicallylimited to banks. ATM and other distribution networks can be further limitedto banks.

2.3 Consumer protection

The increased diversity of financial instruments and larger number offinancial institutions active in many markets has led to many gains. At thesame time, the more diverse and complex products and changing marketshave made it more complicated to assure that consumers gain all the benefitsfrom this diversity.

In banking, while product innovations for consumers have been more limited,delivery channels have changed and many new players have emerged, makingit harder for consumers to choose on a well-informed basis.

In financial markets, many new products have become available to



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consumers, making for complex choices, even for sophisticated investors.Policy responses motivated by concerns over consumer treatment h a v enot been aimed at what is traditionally called consumer protection.

Since the dividing lines between consumer protection, competition policyand assuring properly and functioning financial markets that allocateresources efficiently can be somewhat arbitrary, we divide the issues hereinto: assuring markets work better for all final consumers - what is sometimesc a l l e d“assuring a proper business conduct”; protecting individual c o n s u m e r s ;and assuring consumers obtain the greatest benefits from financial servicesprovision through proper information and education. Still, these eff o r t salone do not necessarily make for well-informed decisions.

This is not an issue of consumer protection in a narrow sense, as theproducts offered may satisfy all fair and equal requirements. But more anissue of getting greater welfare benefits from financial services provisionand financial liberalization.

2.4 Evaluating the costs of regulation

As in other areas of economic activity, a perennial issue is assuring theright balance between the private costs and the public benefits of regulationand supervision. While there has been much financial deregulation, therehas also been much re-regulation to make markets function more effectively,efficiently and soundly.

It has been argued, indeed, by some that the costs and forms of regulationhave increased beyond what is reasonably justified and that it is time to takestock, limit new regulation and consolidate and streamline existing rules.

As in other industries, governments need to avoid over-regulation andassure that they do not impose too high compliance costs on financial servicesindustries. To achieve this goal requires continued impact assessmentsof new or modified regulations and performing consistently rigorouscosts-benefits tradeoffs. Also, governments can create greater consultationand transparency in their rule-making processes so as to allow a betterreflection of financial services industries’views.

Yet, greater consultation also invites regulatory capture, a problem



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especially severe in emerging markets (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006),where it can happen in quite blatant ways (e.g., the“buying”of a license fora bank). But it is also prevalent in more subtle ways in developed countries:the rules of Basel II, for example, have been argued to be heavilyinfluenced by large international banks.

2.5 Achieving greater harmonization

Associated with the need to evaluate the costs and benefits of regulation,is a need for greater harmonization of regulatory approaches across sectorsand products and the elimination or reduction of barriers impeding thee fficient production and provision of financial services. Harmonization isneeded both across financial services providers (banks, insurance companies,pension funds, asset management, etc.) and between different, but functionallyequivalent types of products-whether called banking, insurance, or capitalmarkets products. Harmonization across sectors and products is needed toavoid regulatory arbitrage, level the playing field, increase competition,and to reduce differences in the overall regulatory burden of products. Aquestion associated with the harmonization across financial servicesproviders is the costs and benefits of single versus multiple supervisoryagencies. No simple answers here exist either, from the point of view offinancial stability or from the perspective of efficiency of financial servicesprovision. Although there is a move towards single supervisory authoritiesacross the world, which presumably could help with reducing diff e r e n c e sarising from multiple regulatory regimes, this is not a general trend.

Harmonization is not just regional these days, but largely depends oninternational standards, of which the ones developed by the BCBS,I O S C O , IAIS and CPSS are the most visible. This has become a larg ebody of “soft law”.

Adapting the many broad-based, global principles to individual countryc i r c u m s t a n c e s , while maintaining a common framework, has provendifficult.

Adapting the model to capture the risks in various markets appropriatelywould be necessary, but would negate some of the gains of uniformity.



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3. Special challenges facing developing countries in financial regulation

There are some special challenges facing financial sector regulators andpolicy makers in developing countries. In the application of (international)regulations and best practice supervision, as also reflected in theI M F / World Bank FSAP program, it is clear that for developing countriesthe globally common approaches can be difficult. Many of the diff i c u l t i e shave to do with capacity constraints, making approaches adopted elsewherenot easily implemented in these countries’weaker institutional environments.But, issues of overall approach and sequencing have also come up. Weo rganize these challenges as they relate to cross-border financial servicesactivities and other international dimensions, volatility and access,sequencing and development strategies, adaptation of standards to the localcircumstances, and political economy. We first document though thereasons why developing countries perhaps more than other countries needto adapt as they are more financially integrated.

3.1 International financial integration

Gross capital flows and other forms of cross-border financial servicesprovision, such as equity listing and trading on international stock markets,have increased sharply for many developing countries in recent decades.Entry into banking systems has been very large in some emerging marketsin the last decade, with current market shares of foreign banks in manye m e rging markets exceeding 50%. These forms of financial integrationhave all been very rapid.

At the same time, many developing countries face great diff i c u l t i e s .While they need rapid institutional capacity building, they lack financialand human resources. This means there are some issues facing developingcountries in which they may need some special policy approaches.


Ⅲ.Session 2:금융산업발전을위한 금융규제·감독의과제와역할

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3.2 Cross-border activities

There are many regulatory issues associated with cross-border financialservices provision that are especially challenging for developing countries.One example is regarding the regulation and supervision of foreign bankbranches/subsidiaries as more important in emerging markets. The risk of as i n g l e banking failure or a systemic banking crisis is typically larger in ad e v e l o p i n g than in a developed country, making cross-border arrange-ments for the resolution of failed banks more important for developingcountries. The responses of countries can create further costs and distortions.The common requirement, for example, to establish subsidiaries instead ofbranches reflects in part the lack of certainty among supervisors on how todeal with branches in the absence of a solid international framework.

3.3 Volatility and access

The large foreign bank presence in some emerging markets has raisedconcerns of introducing volatility as well as having adverse impact ofaccess to financial services by some classes of local borrowers andconsumers. On both, the evidence is largely reassuring: cross-border financialservices provision does not seem to lead to increased volatility or reducedaccess by SMEs or consumers in developing countries. First, cross-borderbanking has also been found to lead to more stability and more eff i c i e n tfinancial systems (Claessens 2006 reviews). Second, not all of the accesswas likely efficient as often-especially in closed financial systems-domesticbanks extend financial services on a preferential basis to some groups. Thefact that a large share of the banking system is owned by foreign banks canhinder local information generation and information availability, which inturn can affect supervisory quality.

Market discipline may work differently as well. This may reduce notonly local capital markets liquidity directly, but can also mean a lack ofmarket signals (financial performance, price and ratings) regarding theperformance of local banks and related of the local economy more generally.



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Similar effects can occur in capital markets. The rapid international financialintegration of emerging markets has led to many gains, in the form of lowercosts of capital, increased liquidity, better price discovery and improveddiversification of risk. Yet, some still nascent capital markets in emerg i n gmarkets have also suffered from internationalization, in the form ofdeclines in local liquidity, in turn negatively affecting the prospects of localcapital market development. This has happened particularly in LatinAmerica. While not unique as there has been a consolidation of stock marketactivities globally, these effects are of particular importance for manyemerging markets.

Development issues in emerging capital markets can be complex as well.On one hand, harmonizing rules and regulations with those in internationalmarkets may reduce the incentives to divert trading and capital raisingfrom emerging to international markets. Full harmonization-includingenforcement-could, for example, preclude firms from listing in internationalfinancial centers to bind themselves to higher corporate governance ordisclosure standards. On the other hand, as liquidity attracts liquidity, morecommon standards may just facilitate the agglomeration of trading in oneplace, as has been found in, say, the derivatives markets where most tradingin (near) identical contracts is typically concentrated in one place. Rather,the presence of some differentiation in listing rules, say, and other

“f r i c t i o n s”, combined with home bias and the tendency for markets to bemost active near the center of information production, may lead to moreactive local markets.

This would suggest that local regulations in emerging markets ought toaim at (some) differentiation from international markets to maintain activity.Again, the best regulatory responses are not clear and will differ by thesize, location and other aspects of the local emerging markets. It may be,for example, that smaller markets with close geographic or time-zonep r o x i m i t y to large markets may be best off fully integrating, whereas largermarkets further removed from financial centers may be able to pursue amore differentiated strategy.



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3.4 Development strategies

The large foreign entry, the increased general financial integration andthe greater importance of global standards are raising some fundamentalissues of sovereignty and compatibility of foreign financial institutionswith local financial sector development objectives. While financial integrationand foreign financial institutions bring much value added, they restrict thedegrees of freedom of local policy makers. To a large extent, the reduceddegree of sovereign freedom is part of globalization and has had manyb e n e f i t s , not least acting as a disciplining factor, since the role of the statein the financial sector has not always been beneficial in most developingc o u n t r i e s . At the same time, many developed economies have endured a larg erole of the state in the past. Whether there is still scope for diff e r e n t i a t e dnational development strategies, given the current degree of financialintegration and the global financial, economic and political pressures isunclear.

3.5 Application and adaptation of international standards

As has become clear, adopting international financial sector standardscan be challenging for developing countries. While standards should adapt,there is a bias towards the circumstances of (current) developed countries,including a more liberal institutional environment, and these countries’regulation and supervision structures. Developing countries are furtherfrom the paradigm reflected in the standards and have greater implementationchallenges. Standards are too sophisticated for many developing countriesand assume, often, too much in terms of the supporting institutionalinfrastructure.

To a large extent, overcoming or alleviating these problems requiresactions in developing countries: better regulations and institutional capacitybuilding supported by technical assistance, etc. This will take much time,h o w e v e r, and in the meantime inefficiencies from using the wrong

“s t a n d a r d s”may be considerable and (new) risks even may arise. A broaderissue is how to adapt (some of) the standards over time. Governments and



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politicians in all countries can have difficulty making the case domesticallyfor adopting these standards and joining FTAs. In case, of developing countries,the large gap between local and international rules can make it more evend i fficult for policy makers to convince the general public and special interestsof the need to adopt these new rules. In this sense, some overrepresentationin standard setting bodies and tilting the bargaining positions towardsdeveloping countries in trade negotiations rather than the opposite can helpovercome these barriers.

3.6 Political economy

Financial sector reform, maybe more so than other reform, needs to considerthe political economy of the country in question. One clear aspect ise n f o r c e m e n t , which, as noted above, is an issue in many developing countries.Often some of the constraints regarding enforcement run much deeper thanjust lack of capacity and low pay of supervisors, but refer to the lack ofp o l i t i c a l will, lack of accountability, and plain corruption. Without consideringthe political economy, reforms may not only be missing the real constraints,they may even aggravate the problems. For example, granting too muchpower to banking supervisors in an environment with limited accountabilityrisks misuse. While standards relying on government actions may not be thesolution, a fully liberalized private sector approach may neither be the best.R a t h e r, there may be an argument to introduce some restraints on private sectoractions. Yet, neither the private sector monitoring nor the quantity restraintapproaches are fully compatible with the international standards and theirimplied financial sector development approach. Somewhat similarly, thequantity restraint approach could imply that the country maintains someb a r r i e r s on capital account movements or between financial servicesproviders, restricts competition geographically or across products, regulatesba n k s’portfolio allocations, or controls the type of products financiali n s t i t u t i o n s can off e r. While these actions do not necessarily violate standardsin a narrow sense, a deviation from the general reform model is neverthelessimplied. As such, it can be a negative signal to the international financialmarkets.



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4. Conclusions

There have been many changes in financial sectors around the world overthe past two decades. Regulators and policy makers have both led andreacted to these changes. Many lessons, sometimes costly, have beenlearned as to what regulatory approaches work in terms of promoting soundand efficient financial intermediation. Nevertheless, there are also manyareas on which there is still much debate and lessons still need to be drawn.And, as the financial services industries are undergoing continuouschanges, new issues keep coming up. Some of the areas on which there stillis much debate include the following:

The level playing field. How to assure that financial services are beingprovided most eff i c i e n t l y, regardless of the specific form chosen or of thecharacteristics of the specific financial services provider-location, institutionalform or charter chosen, etc.

Competition policy. This is still a missing part of the financial sectordevelopment agenda in many countries. This is especially so for developingcountries that often have more entrenched systems, including through linksbetween the financial and real sectors and often relationships with the politicalsector as well.

Consumer pro t e c t i o n. With the increased diversity of financial servicesand providers, there is a need to shift more of the responsibility for choicesto consumers. Yet, policy makers can not abrogate their responsibilities aseasily-as consumers are still learning the new world and still living underthe old paradigm.

The role of standard s. The adaptation of the regulations in practice tocountry circumstances, and the associated adjustment of the FSAP andROSCs processes, will remain a continuous learning process. This is especiallyso for developing countries that can have very different systems andc h a l l e n g e s , but that to date have had little participation in the formulationof the standards, their evolution, and how they are being assessed.

Developing countries’c h a l l e n g e s. Developing countries face some specificchallenges in adapting to the rapid financial integration they experience.

Answers to these issues will require some adaptation to current financialsector development approaches.



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3. 발표자료


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4. 질의응답

질문 1발표 말미에 민영화가필요하고 투자 이익을 극대화하기 위해서 투자자에게 은행을

매각하는 것이 바람직하다고 말씀하셨는데, 아무래도 우리은행( Wo or ib a n k )을 지칭

하시는 것 같습니다. 그렇다면 이 때 유의해야 할 점은 어떤 것인지 여쭤보고 싶습

니다. 또한 은행 감독 시스템에 대해서 말씀하셨는데, 우리 금감원의 기능적 통합에

대한 평가를 어떻게 생각하시는지요?

답변 1On your first question, my point was, I don’t know specifically about the

bank you mentioned, but in general my proposition would be as follows:you would want to think of the privatization as a way to recover theresources you spent during your nationalization. If you can sell it to thehighest bidder, the data suggests that gives you a lot of good developmentproperties in terms of access, stability, performance and the like. So there isnothing wrong with going for the highest bidder. Are there some specificconcerns you would want to address? Maybe there are some, but you cando that through the regulatory means that you already have at your disposal.In terms of,“How do I evaluate the FSS?”I think that is a very diff i c u l tquestion for me to address, partly as a World Bank representative.Obviously they have made great strides in the post-crisis, in terms of developinga more integrated financial supervisory framework and the capacity forthat. For all I know the people who work there, their integrity and theirquality are very high. Are there nevertheless still challenges? Yes, I thinkthere are, obviously, some of those challenges as the world is going forward,as we are moving toward more risk-based supervisory approaches andtowards compliance-based approaches, you are going to have to adapt ourregulators and supervisor as well. Is that easy? No, it’s not so easy. It’s noteasy in developed countries. If you go to the financial supervisory authorityof the UK, which is a benchmark one can always strive towards, they willadmit privately, at least, that internally they still have a great diff i c u l t yintegrating banking supervision, insurance supervision, investment bankingsupervision in one overall framework to comply with what is happening

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out there in the market, which is the integrated supervision of financialservices. I’m sure that FSS and FSC have those challenges as well. But Isuspect I will be addressing them going forward.

질문 2You said the result is that there does not seem to be a relationship.

Relations may affect the overall level of risk. The effect of reducing risk ingeneral. Probably the result may have a tendency to underestimate theeffects of regulation.

답변 2Well, this is not a finding that is only exclusively on corporate gover-

nance. When we do cross country work and look at the supervisory andregulatory framework, it has been extensively documented in terms of thedifference of what kind of rules you have in place for the deposit insurance,what kind of rules you have for bank intervention, what kind of rules youhave in place for other aspects of bank supervision. And we compare that tobanking performance. At the aggregate country level, we don’t tend to findvery strong relationships, and part of that reason, I think, in some cases, atleast, the bank regulatory system is captured by the banking system itself.So you might actually develop strong rules, but if you don’t have independenceon the regulatory supervisor itself, then of course, strong rules don’t necessarilydeliver you good results. In fact, there is a case to be made that there can beperverse results. If you get a very strong regulatory framework, and I’m nottalking about Korea, but I’m talking about countries that are not well-developed and may have a lot of problems with corruption. That kind ofregulatory system is very bad for performance because you are givingpower to those that are corrupt and, in the end, you get a worse outcome forthe overall supervisory framework. Most of that does not apply to Korea,but what does apply is the overall premise on which we have now Basel II,the Pillar 1, 2, 3 approach, which is really moving away from the complianceapproaches to putting much more emphasis on the banks’own internal riskmanagement. And also putting other actors in charge of the banks, thedisclosure, the transparency that we want. All that leads us away from the


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supervisor as being the first port-of-call for bank risk and bank oversight. Ithink that is a good development because we are not going to be able totreat these banks as special anymore because they are just too complex tosupervise. Also, because they are not so special anymore as an entity. Thereare many other financial institutions, that are not banks, that also providevery similar services that we do not regulate and oversee in the same way.If I think of mutual funds, they also deliver liquidity services. If I think ofleasing companies, they also deliver access to finance. We have manymore, today, different kind of financial products out there that are notoffered by banks that you do not need treat the banking system that specialanymore. You need to think of a more level playing field across all kinds offinancial services and regulation has to adapt in that context as well.

질문 3Are you aware of any cases, successful or unsuccessful, where public

institutions, which would be subject to potential political or bureaucraticinfluence, are acting as controlling owners as institutional investors?

답변 3Not as controlling owners, but there would be large block holders. So

there could be 2%-3% or more block holders in financial institutions. If Iinclude insurance companies, it is clearly the case in some continentalEuropean countries, including in the Netherlands, that insurance companiesare actually the largest owners of the banking system. They, I don’t thinkyet, exercise sufficient corporate governance over the banks, but theycould, if properly governed themselves, become active oversight mechanisms.We have the case of Japan, of course, where insurance companies, at leastused to be, quite significant owners of the banking system, again they wererelatively passive and they end up with management being in control.Which is, of course, the worst outcome. I think we need to go, nevertheless,towards that. Unfortunately, we only have the bad examples for themoment, and some of those I mentioned already. But the worst examples, Ican go towards Argentina, where pension systems were set up followingthe model of Chile, in the last ten years or so, in which a mandatory



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pension regime was developed, which gave a lot of resources to pensionfunds. But those pension funds ended up actually being jointly controlledby business groups because of the economy in that country. And then youd o n’t get any governance out of it. You actually get worse allocation ofresources out of it. How to design it effectively is not so easy. I like to thinkof it, if one doesn’t have within the country the political independence,that one can come up with some joint venture approaches to achieve thatindependence. One model that I came across that was particularly useful, Ithought, was in Poland, in which they said as part of the privatization ofboth the banking as well as the corporate sector. We are going to createsome mutual funds that will be held by the citizens of the country, but aregoverned by both foreign and domestic management companies. So therewere joint ventures that were competing for about 15 mutual funds. Those15 mutual funds got the ownership structures of large set-up state enterprises,both banks and non-financial corporations, and they, in some sense,enhanced the corporate governance regime while getting around the politicalconstraints that otherwise would have led to a worse outcome. I think thoseare models one can pursue, in the intermediate stage, moving towards thesepension systems being the more independent oversight agencies. A fewcountries have it so far, I think the UK is probably the furthest along. TheUS really has not developed it yet.

질문 4한국에서는 금융당국이 은행들의 부동산 가격을 급등시켰다고 보고 주택담보

대출에 대한 규제정책을 실시하고 있습니다. 이런 규제정책에 대한 의견을 말씀

주시고, 세계적인 추세에 대해서도 얘기해주셨으면 좋겠습니다.

답변 4While some of this was addressed and discussed by Mr. Ragu Rajan, I

think if you were to apply more stringent requirements at the micro-level interms of loan-to-value ratios, or principles for assessment for collateral,and the like, I think that would be a very prudent measure and to the extentyou haven’t done that already, I think it would be wise to do so. That willalso maybe mitigate some of the lending bubble, or whatever you want to


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call it, in your country. Globally, lending for households has been verystrong and it could well be that this is a phenomenon related to mored e v e lopment in general. After all, housing is the non-tradable good that wecannot trade across borders. And we know from our Economics 101 thatnon-tradeable goods will increase in price as we get greater development.Now we have seen, maybe, excessive growth in some countries, so we aremitigating the excesses, rather than thinking about whether or not realestate prices should come down a great deal. Many countries are dealingwith that same issue. If you look at Europe, where the bubble has peakedand prices have declined, it has been managed relatively well. Therehaven’t been any financial crises; there has not been a great negative effecton consumption in those markets. I think the United States will still have towait to see what the effects will be and see how strong the negative effectsmight be.

질문 5I’d like to ask a question regarding consumer protection development.

Banks in Korea have just started to sell non-bank products such as insuranceand investment funds. Some banks sell these risky products without fullyexplaining the underlying risks to customers, possibly because they do nothave staff trained to do so. What is your opinion on banks serving as a vendorfor various financial products? What policies would you recommend toregulatory authorities implement in order to protect these customers?

답변 5I think I see universal banks as the model most countries will go towards.

You don’t have that model yet here. You have a holding company or asubsidiary model. In some sense, that is a more costly model to providedelivery of services. I think going forward I can see you moving towardmore integrated banking delivery, because that seems to be the modelaround the world. If you do so, obviously, you have to have all the regulatoryissues in place, including consumer protection. I have here some issues asto what you need to think about when you think about consumer protection.I think most of it is fairly standard. I think it has increased in importance.



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As we are going to give more responsibility to the consumer to make hisown choices, we need to give him more information as to what these choicesare. The information that the provider delivers to the consumer has toincrease and we also have to give him more tools to redress in case ofnegligence on the part of the financial services provider. So if the product isnot what it claims to be, then we need to have a way for the consumer tofile a suit, to have an easy legal redress against the financial servicesp r o v i d e r. I think, also, we need to improve consumer education. Wi t h o u teducation, in the new world, we are not going to get all the benefits of thesenew financial products, that in the end, are useful, but only if used properly.The OECD has done an extensive research project on this. It has to start at avery early level. You almost have to start at high school or elementaryschool to get the people have the best benefits of the financial products.

질문 6Thank you for your impressive presentation. This is a simple question.

You said that banks are special. If you blame the problems on the origin, itis clear to understand why banks are special. I wonder if you have any otherpoints to contend? Do you have any other points for the specialness ofbanks? Let me give you another question. Some people mention the propertiesof banks are deposit taking and lending services. And others say paymentservices and private banking. And some other people suggest lendingservices and payment services are the only dealings of banks. What is youropinion?

답변 6I think it is difficult to address the specialness of banks without thinking

of the current regulatory regime that we know in most countries around theworld. I almost invite you to go back 150 years or so when we didn’t havecentral banks, we only had private banks. Private Banks were deliveringfinancial services without having the benefit of government regulation.There may have been a charter, given to the Bank of England. The BOEused to be a private bank, before the 1900’s. And banks around the worldwere not treated special by the government, offering services that were in


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demand by the private sector. Keep that model in mind, otherwise we tendto think of banks as regulated by the government, and that is only becausewe introduced that regulation. I think in theory, and really Mr. Rajan andM r. Diamond have developed some very nice models, most especiallyabout banks, the liquidity service provision combined with the way theyfinance themselves, makes them unique. You have a highly leveragedfinancial institution that is funding itself with short-term deposits and thenprovides liquidity services, and also monitoring services to the knownfinancial sector. It is that combination, in some sense, that makes the bankspeculate liquidity, the short-term funding and the monitoring are theinstitutions. I think the payment services, the deposit taking per se, are notas unique anymore today. There are many other ways in which we cantransact payments. Eventually we may go to a fully clear and settlementsystem in which we have instantaneous, barter-type payment systems, thatact instantaneously for which we don’t need banks anymore. I think wemay also see many more substitutions for the deposit services, as wealready have with mutual funds. I think what will remain unique aboutbanks is their ability to be a risk management agency. To uniquely puttogether risks, organize them, manage them and that way deliver addedvalue for the economy at large. To what extent that it still requires a regulatoryspecialist, I’m not so sure anymore. I could see in the long-run goingback to the situation before we had central banks, before we had regulatedcommercial banks, in which we decide to make banks no longer so special.I’m not talking about ten years from now. I’m not talking about 20 yearsfrom now. Maybe 50 years from now, in which we see banks as simplyanother financial institution that doesn’t require any special treatment.

질문 7I would to ask a question for many issues. It was my thesis. Which I’m

sure you know. They mention the data even the financial integration or thetraditional large financial institutions are pretty much value added to theircountries. Sometimes they restrict the freedom of the policy makers. Pleasemake a specific example of your known cases and what would be the bestway of harmonizing that situation?



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답변 7The point which I made later in the presentation, is that if you look

historically at successful cases, and I would include in many ways Korea,in those, but also other East Asian countries, Japan, continental Europe,those are typically not based on a model in which we had full, liberalized,open financial systems. The typical model following the second World Warin most currently developed countries was a very strong control of thegovernment over the financial sector, in terms of the lending rates, allocationof credit, etc., and the entry of those. That was largely because there weresocial returns to allocating capital that were above the private returns. Andthat in many ways justified the intervention. The problem has been that aswe see that model being exported to other countries, it has not delivered thesame result. So when we think of state owned banks in less-developedcountries, that typically has not been a very good model. If you think ofRoman credit controls, that typically has not been a very good model. Wehave moved to a more fully liberalized financial system. I think that, however,has gone too far, and not delivered us all the results we want. So what I amadvocating is a much more balanced approach. I think it comes towards theapproach Dr. Rajan also mentioned, of having the commitments to openingup, having the commitments to financial sector reform. The commitmentcan come through WTO or GATT negotiations, free trade agreements tointernal OECD commitments. At the same time, keeping in mind that thesocial returns to some forms of investment can be above the private returnsand the private sector is not going to deliver you all of the benefits. Yo umay have some quality constraints, some financial repression of sorts, inthe interim that delivers you that beneficial outcome. I think in many waysyour own country’s short history has shown us what the benefits can be. Itis the transition, however, at the middle income level, where you are partiallyliberalized, but not fully liberalized; where you are partially institutionallydeveloped, but not fully, when we have these risks emerging - as we haveseen in the Asian crises, as we have seen in Latin America. I think, asfinancial economists, we don’t know yet how to address most of these. ButI think some of it has to be simple quantity controls where you restrict foreigncurrency exposure, where you restrict certain forms of lending, while youare moving towards greater institutional development.


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질문 8 한국의 기업지배구조에 대해서 말씀을 드리자면, 천문학적인 배임 횡령을 한 분들

이 사법적으로 제제를 받지 않는 경우가 있습니다. 즉 한국에서는 위법 사항에 대해

사법적인 처리가 제대로 안 되기 때문에, 행정부에서는 어쩔 수 없이 각종 규제를

부과합니다. 예를 들어 출자 제한, 지분율 제한 등이 있습니다. 이런 사례가 다른 나라

에도 예가 있는지, 있었다면 어떻게 해결했는지 여쭤보고 싶습니다. 그리고 사법부가

문제가 있을 때, 선진국에서 도입했던 방법이 효과가 있을지? 혹은 전제조건으로

사법부 개혁 같은 것이 있어야 하는 것인지 박사님의 의견을 듣고 싶습니다.

답변 8In terms of corporate governance, the model that you followed in Korea

and in many other countries, enhancing the corporate governance framework,as it is in the laws and in the regulations, only gets you so far. I think thatwhat you are pointing towards, in the end, you still need a judiciary toenforce those rules and laws. That is a difficult challenge because thejudiciary may not be specialized enough, may need some time to learn. Id o n’t think that is the case in Korea. It may not be independent enough. Ithink that is not a problem in Korea. I think what we have seen across theworld, and it really echoes what I have said about bank supervision andregulation, we should not expect to rely only on the government regulatorto enforce these rules. We should look much more towards private sectoractions to enforce corporate governance regimes. There have been verynice studies on making a distinction between private enforcement of corporategovernance rules and public enforcement, and balancing the two, and seeingwhat works best. It is clear that private enforcement, including class-actionsuits are much more effective in terms of enhancing corporate governance,improving valuation, getting a greater number of firms to get into the market.In the case of Korea, yes, I would also say class action suits enhance theframework, give more degrees of freedom for individuals to litigate, to takeaction. Give them information. I think information is key on corporategoverned actions. Corporations are required to disclose if there a relatedparty transaction. Might there be a conflict here? What exactly are wedoing in terms of financial disclosure? If you give the tools to the privatesector, to actually take action, and then take it to the court, and don’t rely as



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much on the public sector, the public enforcement, to enforce these rules,has worked. What also has worked in some countries is to give the corpo-rations an option to really show their commitment to corporate governanceby having a second or first tier board where they can commit themselves tohigher corporate governance standards. They can do that already by goingabroad, sometimes to the US or to London, and list in those countries. Andthis is a signal that they can do a private sector action. You can sometimesalso create within your own country a higher corporate governance standardat the Korean stock exchange and the KOSDAQ. I think you are alreadythere, but nevertheless you could have better listing requirements, highergoals that allow the corporations also to improve themselves.


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Ⅳ. Session 3 : 우리나라 금융부문의 지배구조(Financial Sect or Governance in Kore a )

발표 : 이동걸 (한국금융연구원 선임연구위원)

이병윤 (한국금융연구원 연구위원)

1. 강연요지

일국 경제에서 금융부문이 발전하면 자원배분의 효율성이 개선되고 저소득층 및

중소기업의 자금접근성이 높아져 경제성장과 소득분배가 모두 개선되는 것으로

알려져 있다. 즉 금융부문의 발전은 곧 경제발전으로 이어지기 때문에 각국은 이를

위한 제도 및 환경개선을 위해 노력하고 있다. 금융부문이 발전하기 위해서는 금융

부문의 지배구조가 개선되어야 한다. 금융부문의 지배구조 개선은 금융부문을 구성

하고 있는 은행, 증권회사 등 민간 금융기관 및 감독기구 등 공적기관의 소유·지배

구조 개선을 통해 달성 가능하다.

우리 정부는 외환위기 이후 여러 가지 새로운 제도도입 및 기존 제도 개선을 통해

민간 및 공적기관의 소유·지배구조를 개선하기 위해 노력해 왔다. 민간 금융기관

의 지배구조 개선을 위해 국제기준을 많이 도입하였으며 소유구조 개선을 위해서는

은·산분리를 강화하고 산업자본의 비은행금융기관 소유에 따른 부작용 방지 대책도

내놓았다. 공적기관의 지배구조 개선을 위해서는 여러 곳에 흩어져 있던 감독기구를

통합하고 독립적이고 중립적인 금융감독을 위한 제도를 도입하였으며 예금보험기구

도 통합하였다.

그러나 정부의 이러한 노력에도 불구하고 민간 금융기관 및 감독기구 등의 지배

구조가 실제로는 크게 개선되지 못하고 있는 실정이다. 여기에는 여러 가지 이유가

있을 수 있다. 금융기관 지배구조의 경우 자격미달인 사외이사들이 많은데다 이들

에게 기업경영에 대한 충분한 정보도 제대로 제공되지 않아 이들이 실제로 일할

수 있는 환경이 조성되지 못하는 문제가 있다. 은·산분리 및 산업의 비은행 소유에

따른 부작용 방지 정책의 경우에는 은행과 비은행 간 업무차이 축소, 재계 및 우리

사회 보수 엘리트들의 지속적인 저항 등이 걸림돌로 작용하기도 한다. 또한 정치·

경제권력 및 경기부양 정책 등이 독립적인금융감독을저해하는 요인으로 떠오르기도



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Ⅳ. Session 3 : 우리나라금융부문의지배구조

한다. 본고에서는 먼저 금융부문의 지배구조 개선을 위한 제도를 살펴보고, 이러한

제도들의 도입에도 불구하고 실제로 지배구조가 잘 개선되지 않는 이유에 대해

검토해 본 후 향후 정책방안을 제시해 보았다.

2. 논문내용3 )

I. Introduction

Before the 1997 financial crisis, the Korean financial sector was merelysupporting the industrial firms in the real sector. Under the directions of thegovernment, it passively allocated resources to the growth promotingindustrial firms. However, the financial crisis revealed the critical role astable and efficient financial sector should play in continuous developmentof the economy. In addition, according to the existing literature, it is wellknown that financial sector development positively contributes to economicdevelopment by improving both economic growth and income distribution.Realizing this importance, the Korean government positioned financial sectordevelopment at the core of post-crises economic policy.

Since then, many polices have been introduced to develop the financialsector. Among them were policies for the improvement of financial sectorgovernance. In the financial sector, there are two basic types of institutions- the private and the public. The examples of the private institutions in thefinancial sector are commercial banks, securities companies, insurancecompanies, etc. Public institutions include the regulators such as the financialsupervisory authorities and government-owned financial companies suchas the Korea Development Bank, etc. We may say that improving thegovernance at financial institutions, public and private alike, meansimproving financial sector governance.

3) This is not a complete paper but a collection of ideas or a reader friendly version of our presenta-tion material. The complete paper including literature survey, empirical evidence and detailedpolicy suggestions will be provided later.(see www.kif.re.kr)

4) Since government or government-related institution owns the public financial institutions, theirownership structure does not matter for their governance.

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The governance of a financial institution should be affected by theo w n e r s h i p4 ) and internal governance structure. Therefore, the Koreangovernment introduced various laws and regulations for both the ownershipand internal governance of financial institutions. Various bodies of financialsupervisory authorities were integrated to a single agency, and new lawsand regulations were introduced to improve the independence, transparencyand accountability of financial supervision. To improve internal governanceat the private financial institutions, international best practices were introduced.For the improvement of the ownership structure at the private financialinstitutions, the separation of banking and commerce was strengthened andpolicies preventing negative side effects caused by the industrial capital’sownership of non-bank financial institutions were enacted. Much foreigncapital penetrated into the Korean financial sector after the crisis, whichchanged the ownership structure of Korean financial institutions, too. Thispaper deals with all of these issues. It first reviews and evaluates the currentsituation affecting the developing financial services sector and then providespolicy suggestions.

Interaction between the private and the public institutions deserves specialattention. It is natural for public institutions such as the financial supervisoryauthorities to dictate the governance structure for the private institution.E s s e n t i a l l y, this is one of duties of these public institutions. However,recently the private institutions also influence the governance of the publicinstitutions. Large business groups have accumulated clout which theywield to alter the regulatory environment to their advantage. Moreover,political powers, media and academia may affect the financial sectorg o v e r n a n c e , too. This paper tackles all of these issues.

In Chaper II, the paper explains the relationship between financial sectorgovernance, financial sector development and economic development.Here, I discuss special problems, unique to Korea. Chapter III describes thecurrent situations of financial sector governance in Korea, addressing inp a r t i c u l a r, current laws and regulations on corporate governance of financialinstitutions, the separation of banking and commerce and financial supervision.This section includes thoughts on the penetration of foreign capital into theKorean financial sector. Chapter IV evaluates existing policies and suggestsnew ideas for future policy.



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II. Financial sector governance and economic development

1. Financial sector governance, financial sector development and economic development

Since it improves both economic growth and income or wealth distribution,developing the financial sector is key for economic development.A v i b r a n t ,“w e l l - o i l e d”financial sector promotes economic growth bymitigating various kinds of frictions in the financial market. In a world ofperfect competition, perfect information, and no market frictions, therewould be no role for financial institutions. In this perfect world, the financialsector plays a passive role because prices reflect all available informationand any real economic decisions are independent of the financing method.However, the real world is not perfect and there exist frictions in markets.Financial institutions contribute to mitigate these frictions.

The fundamental frictions in the financial market can be classified intotwo categories, technological and incentive. Technological frictions originatein the particular properties of transactions and security issuance. Financialinstitutions can promote economic growth by easing and sometimeseliminating these technological frictions. For instance, by pooling fundsfrom many small savers, financial institutions take advantage of scaleeconomies and overcome problems inherent in the indivisibility of securitiesissued by firms. Also, by lending to many firms, financial institutionsdiversify risks. Sometimes individual lenders avoid funding highly productivelong-term projects because such investments are illiquid. Financial institu-tions provide liquidity for these projects by pooling funds from savers withvarying liquidity requirements. Financial institutions serving as intermediariescan therefore mitigate technological frictions, and efficiently allocate capitalthereby encouraging economic growth by funding investment projects.5)

The second and more important market friction is associated with incentives.Interests conflict between lenders and borrowers. Ty p i c a l l y, a borrower

5) The growth promoting role of the financial sector development was shown in much of theliterature. See Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), and King andLevine (1993) as for a references.

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knows more about his characteristics, actions, and outcomes than a lender.To receive credit, it is not always in the borrowers best interest to truthfullyreveal all his information. Due to this asymmetric information betweenlenders and borrowers, an adverse selection and/or moral hazard problemoccurs in credit markets. As is well known, both asymmetric informationand the incompleteness of contracts impair the ability of an economy toachieve an efficient allocation of resources and risk. As a result, somepromising projects are not financed and, therefore, not undertaken. Thus,how efficiently financial institutions allocate funds and risks depends onthe extent to which they are able to overcome incentive frictions. Financialinstitutions can partially overcome incentive frictions by evaluatingborrowers ex-ante and monitoring them ex-post. As the financial sectord e v e l o p s , financial institutions can more efficiently evaluate and monitorborrowers, which should be helpful for them to mitigate incentive frictions.As financial institutions increasingly mitigate incentive frictions, they canallocate resources more eff i c i e n t l y, which should generate greater economicgrowth.

A developed financial sector may also more equally distribute income orwealth in society6). If a financial sector is underdeveloped, it is difficult forthe people with low initial wealth to invest in highly profitable projects, asituation which widens income inequality. However, as the financial sectordevelops, low-income or low-wealth classes can have greater access tofinancial services, especially credit markets. This enables them to invest incapital intensive, highly-profitable projects, which should improve society’sincome or wealth distribution.

C l e a r l y, a well developed and fully functioning financial services sectoris crucial to robust economic growth. Yet another integral component informing this sophisticated financial sector is good governance. There aretwo kinds of institutions in the financial sector, private and public. Most ofthe private institutions in the financial sector are financial companies suchas banks, securities companies, insurance companies, etc. The publicinstitutions in the financial sector are either regulators (financial supervisory



6) For a reference, see Holden and Prokopenko (2001), Honohan (2003) and Beck, Demirguc-Kuntand Levine (2004)

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authorities, deposit insurance companies, central banks etc.) or govern-ment-owned and sponsored financial institutions7 ). The governance andownership structures of these private and public financial institutions determinea country’s financial sector governance overall. Thus, to improve financialsector governance, it is necessary to improve the governance and ownershipstructure of the private and public financial institutions. Financial policymakers introduce various regulations to control financial institutions’governance and ownership structures, ultimately contributing positively toeconomic development.

<Figure 1> Financial sector governance, financial sector development and economic development

7) Examples are the Korea Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of Korea, etc. in Korea.

Economic Development

Economic Development

Economic Growth Income Distribution

Governance ofprivate financial institutions

Governance ofpublic financial institutions

Financial Sector Governance

interaction

⇧

⇧

⇔

⇧

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Meanwhile, there is an interaction between private and public sectors inshaping the governance environment. To achieve stability and high performance,regulators in the public sector try to imbue private financial companieswith good governance. Similarly, large business groups in the private sectorcan influence governance in the public sector. This interaction between privateand public sectors shapes the overall governance environment. Also, socialinstitutions such as the media, academia, political power groups, etc. affectthe governance structure of private and public institutions. Thus, it isimportant to analyze how these various interested parties can have influencein shaping financial sector governance.

<Figure 1> shows the relationship between financial sector governance,financial sector development and economic development.

2. Difficulties in Korea

In general, proper financial sector governance enhances financial sectorperformance, which subsequently raises economic development. We maycall this a “desirable link”. After the financial crisis in 1997, the Koreangovernment eagerly tried to modernize the governance structure at privateand public financial institutions, importing international best practices toimprove both ownership structure and internal governance of those institutions.The government unified financial supervisory authorities and introduced avariety of new laws and regulations to improve governance. However, inKorea, there exist obstacles to achieving the so called “desirable link”.Despite the addition of international best practices, corporate behavior haschanged very little. Therefore, it becomes necessary to understand whatobstacles block this “desirable link”in Korea.

First, the Korean economy may maintain a conservative bias. That is,there may be a conservative network of Chaebols, media, and academiain Korea (Morck 2005) impeding institutional change. Pyramiding andcross-holdings are quite widespread corporate practices. Complicatingfurther governance reform, controlling-minority structures concentrateownership. These controlling minorities (wealthy families and Chaebols)try to benefit themselves at the expense of others’benefit and often



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economic growth potential. In some cases, Korean Chaebols discourage oreven block the innovation efforts in the subcontractors (i.e., parts suppliers)fearing that their parts suppliers may gain bargaining power in pricingn e g o t i a t i o n s .8 ) Bidirectional (two-way) interplay between the private andpublic sectors can cause problems. There is an all-too-cozy relationshipbetween wealthy business elites and bureaucratic/political elites, which canhave influence in shaping legal and business environment in favor ofwealthy business groups. The hoped-for jobs after retirement (“r e v o l v i n gd o o r”in the United States and Canada, “a m a k u d a r i”in Japan, “p a r a c h u t e”in Korea) can be used as a compensation for bureaucratic/political elites,which is like winning a million dollar lottery for them (Caprio and Levine2002). While we purport this conservative bias and the undesirable connectionbetween the private and public sectors obstructs changes in financial sectorgovernance, retarding economic development, evidence should be providedto support this hypothesis.

III. Financial sector governance in Korea : Current issues

1. Corporate governance of financial institutions

Using recommendations from the IMF, the IBRD, and the OECD, theKorean government overhauled the corporate governance framework. As aresult, Korean laws and regulations concerning the corporate governanceframework for financial institutions are quite sophisticated. Namely,shareholder rights are more prominent, management monitoring systemsare more effective, and the bank management is now more accountable.

Lessons from the 1997 financial crisis revealed the dire need for moretransparency and more accountability in corporate management. To makethese structural enhancements, the Korean government actively recommendedan advanced corporate governance framework to financial institutions.

First, in 1998, a board system was established, which mainly focused onoutside directors. In accordance with these new regulations, over half of thetotal number of directors and no fewer than three board members must be

8) This can be similar to the concept of “Candian disease”in Morck, Stangeland and Yeung (2000).

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outside directors. In 2000, the authority for monitoring of business by outsidedirectors was reinforced and in 2001 the qualifications for outside directorswere reinforced. In 2000, listed companies with assets totaling more than 2trillion Korean won were compelled to establish an audit committee. Outsidedirectors should be more than two thirds of the members of these committeesand the chairman of the committee must be an outside director. In 2000, acompliance officer was introduced and then it became mandatory for everyfinancial institution to have a compliance off i c e r. The rights for minorityshareholders were also improved as conditions for derivative lawsuits wereeased (Feb. 1998) and cumulative voting was introduced (Dec. 1998).

As a result of the improved laws and regulations concerning the corporategovernance framework, Korean financial institutions have become moretransparent and accountable, especially as the system of outside directors hasbeen implemented. For Korean banks in particular, the new managementframework established a powerful role for an outside director, increasinghis influence 60% to 80%. Additionally, various new committees wereestablished under the board and criteria for the evaluation of directors and topmanager were set. Also, the compensation system was improved and lawsgoverning the audit committee were enacted.

By the end of June of 2006, the ratio of outside directors to total board membersat financial institutions was more than 50% (with some exceptions). It isw o r t h y to note the ratio in banks is the highest among all financial institutions.

<Figure 2> Ratio of outside directors in Korean financial institutions (%)

Note: As of the end of June, 2006Source: Financial Supervisory Service



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2. Separation of banking and commerce

In Korea, the separation of banking and commerce instead of the separationof finance and commerce is one of principles of financial policies. Lawsrestrict industrial capital from owning banks while allowing the same capitalto own non-bank financial institutions.

1) The separation of general holding company and financial holding company

The Fair Trade Act of Korea prohibits non-financial holding companiesto hold shares of financial companies and for financial holding companiesto hold shares of non-financial companies (Article 8-2). However, since theholding company is not a primary corporate structure in Korea, this lawdoes not represent the separation of finance and commerce principle .

2) The restriction of ownership of banks by industrial capital

The Banking Act of Korea restricts industrial capital’s ownership to lessthan or equal to 4% of shares of a bank (15% for a regional bank). With thepermission of the Financial Supervisory Committee, industrial capital canown up to 10% of shares of a bank under the condition that it will notexcercise voting rights for the shares exceeding 4%.

3) The restriction of ownership of industry capital by financial capital

Korean law regulates financial capital’s ownership of industrial capital.Banks and insurance companies cannot own more than 15% of shares ofother companies with voting rights (Article 37 of Banking Act and Article109 of Insurance Act). Bank holding companies can own up to 5% ofshares of other companies which are not subsidiary companies (Article 44of Bank Holding Company Act). In addition, according to the Improvementof Financial Industry’s Structure Act, if financial companies in a businessgroup want to own some portion of shares of other companies, they have toget permission from the Financial Supervisory Commission.

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4) Preventing negative side effects caused by industrial capital’s ownership of financial institutions

In Korea, industrial capital can own and control non-bank financialinstitutions. In January of 2004, the Korean government established a policyr o a d - m a p9 ) to prevent negative side effects. It suggests the following :① Broad public announcements and wider decision ranges for boards ofdirectors in transactions with major shareholders or related companies,② Strengthening financial supervision and examination on majors h a r eholders or related companies, ③ Strengthening financial supervisionon unlisted financial companies, ④ Strengthening qualification of financialc o m p a n i e s’major shareholders, ⑤ Gradually reduced loan ceiling for majors h a r e h o l d e r s and related companies, ⑥ Restricted voting rights on shares ofsubsidiary companies which financial institutions hold.

Due to the separation of banking and commerce in Korea, Chaebols cannotown or control banks, while they own many non-bank financial companiessuch as insurance companies, securities companies, investment trusts andcredit card companies. 59 business groups with cumulative assets exceeding2 trillion won own and operate 69 financial institutions.

<Table 1> Number of financial institutions owned by Chaebol (At the end of April, 2006)

(Unit : Numbers)



No. ofbusinessgroups

No. ofF i n a n c i a l

I n s t i t u t i o n sInsurance

Securities,Asset

Management,Future

Credit Card,Capital

SavingsBanks and

OthersBusiness groups(Assets exceed 6 trillion won)

Business groups(Assets exceed 2 trillion won)

14 39 7 11 7 14

59 69 11 16 10 32

9) This road map was prepared by the task force team composed of government officials and special-ists from the private sector.

Source: Fair Trade Commission

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Financial companies owned by Chaebol posess significant market share ineach financial sector. In March of 2006, Chaebol owned 65.9% of the lifeinsurance marketplace, 47.7% of the non-life insurance marketplace, 32.6% ofthe security company marketplace and 45.4% of the credit card marketplace.

<Table 2> Market share of financial companies owned by Chaebol(March, 2006)

In Korea, the difference between ownership and control in businessgroups is large. This disparity owes, in part, to the owners of some businessgroups controlling subsidiary companies using funds from their financialcompanies. As of April 1st, 2006, the difference between ownership sharesand controlling shares for the business groups whose assets exceed 2 trillionw o n1 0 ) is 30.55%, while it is 31.28% for the business groups whose assetsize is over 6 trillion won.11)

<Table 3> Differences between ownership and control in business groups(April 1st. 2006)

(Unit : %)

65.9% 47.7% 32.6% 15.8% 45.4%

Life insurancecompanies

Source: Financial Supervisory Service

Non-life insur-ance companies

Securities companies

Asset manage-ment companies

Credit cardcompanies

ownership share(A) controlling share(B) B-A

Business groups(Asset exceed 2 trillion won)

Business groups(Asset exceed 2 trillion won)

30.5539.72

37.656.36

9.17

31.28

10) Accurately speaking, these are business groups to which the regulation of limitations on cross-shareholding is applied.

11) Accurately speaking, these are business groups to which the regulation of ceiling on total amount of shareholding in other domestic companies is applied.

Source: Fair Trade Commission

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3. Penetration of foreign capital in the Korean financial sector

After the financial crisis in 1997, the penetration of foreign capital intothe Korean financial market sharply increased. In 1996, just prior to thefinancial crisis, the accumulated amount of direct investments by foreignersin Korea’s financial sector was a mere US$ 1.88 billion.

<Figure 3> Foreign Direct Investment in Korean Financial Sector

Note: Accumulated amount basis Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy

H o w e v e r, post-crisis investment dramatically increased to exceed US$ 10billion in 2002, and to reach US$ 18.48 billion in 2005. Direct investmentby foreigners is growing still, albeit at a slower rate.

After the financial crisis in 1997, foreigners invested significantly in theKorean stock market. At the end of July in 2006, foreigners’share of thetotal market was 36.9%, which is relatively high compared with other developedcountries (average 30.7%) and emerging markets (average 26.7%).



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<Figure 4> Foreigners’Share in Korean Stock Market

Note: Compared with market capitalization of listed stocks Source: Financial Supervisory Service

<Figure 5> Foreigners’Share in Stock Market (By Country)

Foreign capital investment into the Korean banking sector increased afterthe financial crisis, as foreign capital spurred the banking sector’s restruc-turing. In Korea, as of November 7th of 2006, Standard Chartered FirstBank, Korea Exchange Bank, and Citibank Korea can be categorized asforeign banks, since foreign capital is the major shareholder of these banksand executes management rights. Foreigners own 100% stake in Standard

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Chartered First Bank, 79.4% of Korea Exchange Bank, and 99.8% ofCitibank Korea. Except for Woori Financial Group and Jeonbuk Bank, foreigninvestors hold more than 55% of the outstanding shares of all commercialbanks in Korea.

<Table 4> Foreigners’Share of Korean Commercial Banks (November 7, 2006)

(Unit : %)

Meanwhile, foreign banks’market share of the Korean banking sectorhas also increased. As of the end of June 2005, foreign banks hold 29.9% ofthe commercial banking market, and 21.5% of the domestic banking market,including specialized banks, which have grown 5-fold since 1998.

<Figure 6> Foreign Banks’Market Share in Domestic Banking Market( Total Assets basis)

(Unit : %)

Notes: 1) Foreign Banks = Branches of Foreign Banks + SC(from 1999) + KEB( from 2003) + Citi( from 2000)

2) Domestic Banks = Commercial Banks(Including Branches of Foreign Banks) + Specialized Banks




KB

82.2 57.7 79.4 8.9 100.0 78.8 99.8 64.0 58.3 24.6

Shinhan Financial Holdings

HanaFinancialHoldings

Woori FinancialHoldings

SC FirstBank KEB Citibank

Korea Daegu Pusan Jeonbuk

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As of fiscal year 2004, the market share of foreign life insurance companiesreached 16.5% with the criterion of premium income, which is 15.5%pgreater than that of 1998 fiscal year. However, for the non-life insurancecompanies and securities companies, foreign-owned companies have notgreatly increased market share since the financial crisis.

<Figure 7> Market Share of Foreign Life Insurance and Securities Companies1)

Notes: 1) On a Premium Revenue (Life Insurance), Brokerage (Securities) Basis

2) As of the end of June, 2006


4. Improvement of the system of financial supervision

After the financial crisis, the Korean government and market participantsrealized that the financial supervision system was very important for thestability and performance of the financial system overall. Therefore, thefinancial supervisory institution was restructured and new laws and regulationswere introduced to strengthen financial supervision. First of all, variousfinancial supervisory bodies were unified into one single agency. At theoutbreak of the 1997 crisis, Korea’s financial supervisory system was madeup of four separate agencies. In January 1999, They were all later integratedinto a single non-government supervisory agency, the FinancialSupervisory Service (hereafter FSS). In April 1998, prior to the FSS, theFinancial Supervisory Commission (hereafter FSC) was created with themandate to oversee and guide the activities of the soon-to-be-establishedFSS. In addition, various deposit insurance bodies were integrated into the

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Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation.After the integration of financial supervisory bodies, new laws and regu-

lations were introduced to create independent and neutral financial supervision.A tenure system for the members of FSC was introduced and unlawfuldismissal during the tenure was legally restricted. In addition, some membersof the FSC were required to be non-standing members, like outside directorsof commercial corporations. They are expected to make decisionsindependently. Ethics and anti-corruption measures were also introduced toprevent supervisors from being affected by various interest groups such asbusiness groups, political powers, etc. Duties of government officials andr e g u l a t i o n s on government off i c i a l’s ethics code were equally applied toemployees of FSS, even though FSS is a non-government agency.

In addition to the restructuring of a financial supervisory institution,financial supervisory regulations were improved. Drastic changes weremade with regard to depositor protection, asset classification, loan lossprovisions, and Prompt Corrective Actions (PCAs) to improve thetransparency of financial institutions.

IV. Evaluations and policy suggestions

1. Corporate governance of financial institutions

The corporate governance of Korean financial institutions has improveddirectly due to new laws and regulations. In addition, serious concernsexpressed by management, shareholders and other interested partiesi n d i r e c t l y initiated reform. That is, the increased incentive for depositorsand creditors in monitoring financial institutions, minority shareholderactivism by citizens groups, and the increased influence by foreign strategicinvestors positively affect the improvement of corporate governance ofKorean financial institutions.

H o w e v e r, even though international best practices were introduced, thechanges in practice have proved insufficient. Board of Directors’m e e t i n g sstill appear superficial because many directors lack professional expertise or

1 0 0Korea Institute of Finance


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specialty in the industry. Though a board is no longer just a rubber-stamp,a fully-functioning working board is still a nebulous concept. Currently,a board cannot sufficiently govern management’s corporate strategyd e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process, new manager appointments, or performanceevaluation and compensation. The compensation structures for CEOs andoutside directors are still inappropriate, in the sense that they do nots u ff i c i e n t l y reflect performances. Internal control systems must be upgraded.E s p e c i a l l y, risk-based audits on business functions are needed. Thoughminority shareholder protections exist, such policies are ineffective due toinadequate incentive schemes.

The legal system for the corporate governance of Korean financiali n s t i t u t i o n s has been well established reflecting current global standards,and the practice of boards of directors should improve concurrently.

Here, we now suggest some policies for more improved corporateg o v e r n a n c e . Executive directors and non-standing board directors shouldbe similarly qualified. These qualifying requirements must be specified inthe company by-laws, specifically noting their professional knowledge andexperiences. It is also important to form a directors’pool with specialties.For this, it is desirable to develop a director training program with the FSSor a federation of financial institutions. We also recommend creating adirector training school, introducing a director authorization system and jobtraining programs for the new outside directors. It is important to reinforcethe board’s oversight responsibilities, especially in monitoring the CEO inorder to improve independence of the board of directors. For this purpose,outside director tenure should be increased to 2 years or more. In addition,if the CEO is the chairman of the board, one of outside directors should beappointed as a lead director for the improvement of the independence ofoutside directors.

To strengthen the role of directors in the management strategies decisionmaking process, we suggest activating supporting teams to the board toprovide necessary and sufficient information to the director in advance ofboard meetings. Moreover, a preliminary management plan should bep r o v i d e d to directors in advance and then thoroughly examined before off i c i a l l ysubmitted to the board of directors. It is also necessary to strengthen the

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responsibility of outside directors in order to make them more than a rubber-stamp for executive directors, especially the CEO.

The compensation structure plays an important role in improving corporategovernance. We suggest evaluating CEOs based on ordinary income or c o s tratios which cannot be arbitrarily adjusted and actively use a qualitativeindex (e.g. results of structural reform). It is also necessary to improve thecompensation system for outside directors. It may be a good strategy too ffer stocks and stock options, in addition to cash, to outside directorsbased on their performance.

The audit committee should be improved, too. It should focus on preventive,preemptive controls and maximum efficiency of internal controls, whilemanagement remains in charge of daily inspection. Auditing professionalsshould be promoted and become members of the audit committee. In orderto reinforce a management monitoring system, it is recommended toappoint all outside directors to the audit committee.

Meanwhile, according to Litan et al. (2002), achieving good corporategovernance generally has been more challenging for emerging marketcountries than for advanced economies. There are several reasons. First, ine m e rging market countries, corporate ownership tends to be highly concentrated,often in a few families with only limited ownership by minority shareholders.This phenomenon is present in the Korean case. In this environment,changes in governance structure are very difficult. In addition, in emerg i n gmarket countries, M&A markets are thin or nonexistent and judicialenforcement is weak, which gives weak incentive to the incumbentmanagement to improve the corporate governance structure. Therefore, inaddition to the introduction of international best practices in laws andr e g u l a t i o n s on corporate governance, it is also important to change themanagement environment. That is, it is more important to activate M&Amarkets and strengthen judicial enforcement to improve corporate governancein the emerging market countries.



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2. Separation of banking and commerce

Banking should be separated from commerce, since downside risks fromthe combination of banking and commerce outweigh the benefits. Banksplay a great role in allocating resources. For the efficient allocation ofresources, they evaluate and monitor industrial firms. If monitors (banks)are owned and controlled by the monitored (industrial firms), monitoringwill be distorted, which will result in the inefficiency of resource allocationand instability in the financial system. The combination of banking andcommerce can be an obstacle to fair competition in the market. It does notstand to reason that firms owning banks fairly compete with firms which donot own banks. The issue of conflict of interests is also raised. Banksowned by non-financial firms may manage funds in favor of their subsidiaryfirms, which raises a conflict of interests between minor shareholders /customers and major shareholders. In addition, if non-financial companiesin large business groups own banks, the concentration of economic powerwill worsen. The ownership will be even more concentrated by pyramiding,cross-holding using financial subsidiaries (i.e., using customers’w e a l t h ,violating the fiduciary duty), which increases the possibility of financialinstability or financial crisis. Due to these reasons, it is desirable to separatebanking and commerce.

H o w e v e r, this separation may restrict economic freedom, which has anegative effect on overall resource allocation. Thus, it is asserted to bedesirable that we allow the industrial capital to own banks and preventn e g a t i v e side effects by thorough financial supervision. However, thismethod is ineffective, since it is very difficult for financial supervisoryauthorities to monitor and detect rapidly changing high-tech financialtechniques, which can allow unfair transactions between banks and theirprincipal shareholders. This method is also inefficient, since it may beexpensive to make financial supervision perfect in detecting unfair transactionscaused by the combination of banking and commerce. Thus, as like inKorea, legal separation of banking and commerce seems the best policy.

Meanwhile, due to the convergence of businesses of banks and non-b a n k i n gfinancial institutions, regulation arbitrage may occur if the ownershiprestrictions are applied only to the banking sector. However, in Korea, since

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industrial firms already own non-banking financial institutions, it is unrealisticto introduce a legal system preventing commerce from owning non-bankingfinancial institutions. Thus, instead of ownership restrictions on non-bankingfinancial institutions, we should adopt strong safeguards against the negativeside effects caused by the industrial capital owning them, all the whilemaintaining the ownership restriction on banks.

In the long run, if the competition in the financial market will be tighteneddue to, for example, more penetration of foreign capital, inefficient financialinstitutions owned by industrial capital may eventually disappear. Then,some time in the future, it may be probable that finance and commerce willseparate due to the competitive pressures in the financial market.

For now, it is recommended that the Korean government immediatelyenacts the 6 policies prepared by Ministry of Finance (January 2004) whichseek to prevent the negative side effects caused by industrial capital’so w n e r s h i p of financial institutions. Policy makers also have to be verycautious about industrial capital’s attempts to circumvent bank ownershiprestrictions. If they allow some banking businesses to non-banking financialinstitutions, industrial capital can circumvent bank ownership restrictions.The primary examples are assurebank and narrow banking.

3. Penetration of foreign capital in the Korean financial sector

There are two compelling reasons to open our financial market toforeigners. Foreign firms increase competition in addition to importingsophisticated financial products and techniques. The increase of foreignfinancial institutions surely makes Korean financial market more competitive.As the competitive pressure rises, financial institutions will try to improvetheir corporate governance and management efficiency to survive. In addition,the experiences of Hong Kong and Singapore provide some useful lessons.Increasing the contestability of markets, especially by opening the financialsector to foreign investment, decreases the reliance of the economy on familyconglomerates (Litan et al. 2002). We may see this result in the Koreaneconomy.

H o w e v e r, the results may be mixed (in fact, quite disappointing) for



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introducing advanced financial know-how and techniques because foreigncapital quickly learns how to behave like Korean corporations (that is,quickly localized in many respects, especially for financial firms). Foreigndirect investors and multinationals also may engage in undesirable practicesof exerting (often illegal) influence in shaping regulations, laws, and policiesaffecting the overall financial sector (as shown by Kaufmann (2002)).

There are other benefits to opening the financial market to foreigners.First of all, foreign capital has accelerated Korea’s financial restructuringthrough acquisitions of insolvent companies and financial institutions. Theinflows of foreign capital into Korea’s stock market have expanded demand.Foreign capital has increased the degree of transparency in businessmanagement. In the financial sector, it has helped raise confidence in Koreaand improve expertise in financial supervision and financial laws and systems.

Despite all these benefits, there is still widespread criticism of the penetrationof foreign capital into Korea. As foreign investors have recently becomemajor shareholders in important domestic companies and now even ownsome banks (which play a significant role in allocating major resources),serious concerns about the negative effects of foreign capital have beenraised. Thus, we may think too much foreign capital is not desirable, eventhough the benefits can be great. However, there is no theoretical ore m p i r i c a l evidence which shows the existence of an optimal level of thepenetration by foreign financial institutions. Even though an optimal levele x i s t s , governments cannot control the level of the penetration by foreignfinancial institutions, once determined to open the market. Moreover, as ourfinancial market develops, more foreign capital is expected. Therefore,instead of restricting the penetration of foreign capital, it is more desirable tofoster domestic capital which can compete with foreign capital in the market.In addition, it is also important to equally treat domestic and foreign capitaland construct an environment for fair competition between them.

4. Improvement of the system of financial supervision

After the financial crisis in 1997, various financial supervisory bodieswere integrated to a single agency and new laws and regulations were

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introduced to raise an eff i c i e n c y, transparency and independence of financialsupervision. These changes are partially successful and partially disappointi n g .Even though there has been much effort to increase the independence offinancial supervision, it is still inadequate. Especially, financial supervisionin Korea is still not independent of economic policies, especially policiesstimulating the economy, large business groups and political powers.

As for the large business groups, even though they are private, they arenot a business-climate “t a k e r”anymore. They try to influence and shapelegal and regulatory environment, molding it in their favor. An extremeform of such undue influence is corporate capture1 2 ) of the state and regulatoryapparatus.13) In Korea, large powerful business groups, Chaebol, controlledby families, easily weaken the independence of bank supervision and makeit easier to reward supervisors for weak supervision. In this case, the adoptionof international best practices in bank supervision is not likely to suff i c e(Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2001). The reward that supervisors can get isthe possibility of taking a job with the financial institutions that they aresupervising, a possibility that surely could lead to less vigorous supervision.Due to this complex bidirectional (two-way) interplay between the privateand public sectors, it is recommended to introduce system-wide reforms.

After the financial supervisory bodies were unified, important informationabout the financial sector concentrates in the integrated supervisory institution,FSS. The FSS is reluctant to share this concentrated information with otherrelated supervisory institutions such as the Bank of Korea, Korea DepositInsurance Corporation, etc, and to disclose it to the public. Due to thisphenomenon, the FSS throttled the circulation and creation of informationand is now an institution of secrecy instead of service. In addition, due tothe lack of information, market discipline can not be activated. Therefore,more information should be disclosed and shared to increase the t r a n s p a r e n c yof financial supervision and activate market discipline. The check-and-balance



12) State-regulatory capture is defined as the efforts of firms to shape laws, policies, and regulationsof the state to their own advantage by providing private gains to public officials. In emergingmarket countries, elite enterprises manipulate policy formation and even shape the rule of gameto their own advantage. This is increasingly being recognized as the most intractable problem inthe political economy of reform.

13) For general regulatory capture, see the seminal earlier work by Laffont and Tirole(1991).

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system should be strengthened. The National Assembly, civil organizationsand other policy authorities may play an important role.

Inadequate quality and a lack of moral leadership at the FSS and the FSCadds to the problems of a unified FSS. The problems of capturing andinfluence-peddling still exist. Serious prescriptions are needed to mitigatethese problems. Whatever the prescriptions are, they have to improve theo rganizational problems inherent in the FSS and FSC, to strengthen thecooperation between FSS and other supervisory related institutions, and toimprove the quality of employees at the FSS and the FSC.

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<References>

Bae, Kee-Hong, Jun-Koo Kang and Jin-Mo Kim (2002), “Tunneling or Va l u eAdded? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups”, The Journal ofFinance, Vol. LVII, NO. 6

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Marcel Kahan (2000), “Adverse Selection and Gains toControllers in Corporate Freezeouts”, Concentrated Corporate Ownership, pp.247-264, The University of Chicago Press

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, Reinier Kraakman and George G. Triantis (2000), “S t o c kPyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms andG e o rge G. Tr i a n t i s”, Concentrated Corporate Ownership, pp. 295-318, TheUniversity of Chicago Press

B e c k , T., A. Demirguc-Kunt and R. Levine (2004), “Finance, Inequality and Poverty:Cross-Country Evidence”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3338

Bencivenga, V. R. and B. D. Smith (1991), “Financial Intermediation andEndogenous Growth”, Review of Economic Studies, 58, 195-209.

Caprio, Gerard Jr. and Ross Levine (2002), “Corporate Governance in Finance:Concepts and International Observations”, FINANCIAL SECTOR GOVER -NANCE, pp. 17-49, The Brookings Institution Press

C a r michael, Jeffrey (2002), “Public Sector Governance and the Finance Sector”,FINANCIAL SECTOR GOVERNANCE, pp. 121-162, The Brookings InstitutionPress

Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan and Larry H. P. Lang (2002),“ Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Lar g eShareholdings”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. LVII, NO. 6

G r e enwood, J. and B. Jovanovic (1990), “Financial Development, Growth and the Distribution of Income”, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1076-11 0 7

Holden, P. and V. Prokopenko (2001), “Financial Development and PovertyAlleviation: Issues and Policy Implications for Developing and T r a n s i t i o nCountries”, IMF Working Paper WP/01/160

Honohan, P. (2003), “Financial Development, Growth and Poverty: How Close Arethe Links?”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3203

K a h neman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision under Risk”, E c o n o m e t r i c a, Vol. 47, No. 2., pp. 263-292



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Kaufmann, Daniel (2002), “Public and Private Misgovernance in Finance: Perverse Links, Capture, and Their Empirics”, FINANCIAL SECTOR GOVERNANCE,pp. 81-118, The Brookings Institution Press

King, R. and R. Levine (1993), “Finance, Entrepreneurship and Growth”, Journal ofMonetary Economics, 32, 513-542

La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W.Vishny (1997), “Legal Determinants of External Finance”, The Journal ofF i n a n c e, Vol. 52., No. 3, Papers and Proceedings Fifty-Seventh AnnualMeeting, American Finance Association, New Orleans, Louisiana January 4-6, pp. 1131-1150

L a ffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole (1991), “The Politics of GovernmentDecision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture”, The Quarterly Journalof Economics, Vol. 106, No. 4., pp. 1089-1127

Litan, Ribert E., Michael Pomerleano, V. Sundararajan (2002), “S t r e n g t h e n i n gFinancial Sector Governance in Emerging Markets”, FINANCIAL SECTO RGOVERNANCE, pp. 1-13, The Brookings Institution Press

Morck, Randall K. (2005), A History of Corporate Governance around the Wo r l d,National Bureau of Economic Research, The University of Chicago Press

Morck, Randall K., David A. Stangeland and Bernard Yeung (2000), “I n h e r i t e dWealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease?”,Concentrated Corporate Ownership , pp. 319-372, The University of ChicagoPress

Wei, Shang-Jin (2002), “Valuing Governance: The “Corruption Premium”i nGlobal Capital Flows”, FINANCIAL SECTOR GOVERNANCE, pp. 51-79, TheBrookings Institution Press

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3. 발표자료

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4. 질의응답

질문 1재벌계와 은행계로 나뉘어 있는 증권산업 같은 경우 ROE 등의 성과를 보면 재벌

계가 더 높습니다. 이러한 측면에 대해서 의견을 부탁드립니다. 개인적으로 기업지

배구조 측면은 은행이 재벌보다 좋다고 보는데 성과는 반대라는 견해에 대해서

어떻게 생각하시는지를 여쭤보는 것입니다.

답변 1 기업지배구조가 중요하지만 성과를 올리지 못하는 다른 요인이 있는 것도 사실

입니다. 은행의 지배구조가 투명한 상태라고 봐야할지는 모르겠습니다만, 이와

관련된 가장 중요한 이슈 중의 하나는, 과연 멀티플레이어( mu lt i - player )로서 은행이

증권산업에 대해서 진지하게 생각하고 있느냐 하는 부분입니다. 제 생각으로는 결국

은행계 즉 신한, 하나 등 금융지주시스템으로 가는 회사들의 경우, 이제야 비로소

증권산업에 대해서 서서히 신경을 쓰기 시작하였기 때문에 향후에는 증권사들에

상당한 경쟁 상대가 될 것으로 생각합니다. 하지만 아직까지는 은행들이 증권의

중요성에 대해서 인식을 했다기보다는 형식 갖추기에 국한된 느낌이 듭니다. 그러나

미래에는 시장의 주된 참가자로 등장할 것이고 그때는 은행계와 재벌계의 성과가

달라질 수 있습니다.

그리고 제가 재벌계라고 해서 항상 성과가 낮다고 주장한 것은 아닙니다. 낮을 소지

가 상당히 있는데 이것은 대리인 문제를 지적한 것입니다. 즉 잘 나갈 때는 문제가

안 될 수도 있지만, 공유해야 하는 이익이 있으면 공유 하는게 아니라 다른 사람을

배제하고 내가 많이 가져야겠다고 하는 것, 바로 이것이 핵심 아닙니까? 이런현상은

재벌기업이 어려울 때 나타납니다. 대우증권을 예를 들자면 대우증권이 대한민국에서

가장 경쟁력 있는 증권회사 아니었습니까? 그런데 하루아침에 2조원인가 3조원이

펑크가 나서 도산한 경우를 보면, 결국 상황이 어려워지면 대리인 문제가 굉장히 심각

해질 수 있다는 것을 감안해야 한다고 생각합니다.

기업지배 구조라는 것이 항상 좋은 결과를 야기하는 것은 아니지만 장기적으로

좋은 결과를 결국 야기할 가능성이크다고 봅니다. 예를 들자면, 성과측면에서 민주적

지도자보다 독재적 지도자가 우수할 수 있지만 평균적으로 보면 민주적 지도자가

독재적 지도자보다 우수할 수 있기 때문에 우리가 민주적 지도체계를 채택하는 것과

마찬가지라고 생각합니다.

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질문 2지배구조와 관련된 좋은 설명 감사합니다. 여쭙고 싶은 것은, 최근 IMD 보고서

에서 조사대상국 중 우리나라의 투명성과 회계 적합성 비율이 58위로 나왔습니다.

IMD 방법이 문제인지, 아니면 무엇 때문에 이렇게 낮은 랭킹이 나왔는지 설명을

좀 부탁드립니다.

답변 2투명성과 회계의 적합성은 1997년 이후 굉장히 개선된 것이 사실입니다. 관련된

분들은 아시겠지만 최근 그 측면은 굉장히 개선되었습니다. 이것은 이론의 여지가

없습니다. 문제는 최근 2 ~ 3년 들어서 조금 후퇴한 기분이 든다는 것입니다. 아까

캡처링 문제를 말씀드렸습니다만, 정책입안이 될 때 보통 재벌이 관련되면 굉장히

시끄럽습니다. 제가 금감위에 있을 때도 뭐 하나 제대로 하려고 하면 온 사방에

법석이 납니다. 그런데 최근 2 ~ 3년 들어 재벌들이 굉장히 조용해졌어요. 그러면 재벌

들이 포기를 했느냐? 아니죠. 누가 이미 해주고 있으니까 조용히 있는 것이 유리하

다는 겁니다. 안될 때는 떠들고, 해주면 조용히 있는 것이 유리한 겁니다. 저는 이렇게

조용한 것이 뭔가 뒤에서 되고 있는 것이 아닌가 싶어서, 만일 그렇다면 투명성이

좀 후퇴한 것이 아닌가 하는 느낌을 갖고 있습니다.

그리고 부패문제에있어서 과거의 경우에는액수가 천문학적인 수치였습니다. 예를

들어 정치헌금은 조단위였습니다. 그런데 지금은 1 0억만 넘어도 문제가 됩니다. 즉,

기준 자체가 높아지니까 깨끗하지 않은 느낌이 드는 심리적인 요인도 있습니다.

마지막으로 IMD의 조사는 비정량적인 지수인 경우에는 우리나라 경영자에게 설

문조사해서 순위를 냅니다. 따라서 설문참가자가 기분 나빠서‘투명성 개판이다’

라고 하면 순위가 낮게 나오는 측면이 있습니다. 따라서 I M D도 이 순위 자체에

대해서는 심각하게 보지 않습니다. 단, 우리의 인식이 개선되어야 하고 꾸준히 이런

문제가 정화되는 것이 필요하다고 생각합니다.



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Ⅴ. Session 4 : 산업구조와기업금융

Ⅴ. Session 4 : 산업구조와 기업금융( I n du strial Structu re and Cor porate Finance)

발표 : 신현송 (프린스턴대학교 경제학과 교수)

김세직 (서울대학교 경제학과 교수)

1. 강연요지

이 강연에서는 우리나라의 특유한 어음제도가 고도화된 산업구조 채택을 촉진하고

이를 통해 경제성장을 뒷받침하는 역할을 수행했다는 가정을 세우고 이에 대한 이론

적인 분석을 시도하였다.

개발도상국 혹은 이머징마켓이보다 생산성이 높은 고도화된 산업구조를 구축하는

데 있어서 두 가지 주요한 장애요인이 존재한다. 첫째, 하청업체의 역할을 맡아 주어야

할 중소기업들이 초기 운전자금부족으로인해 여러 단계에 걸친 고도화된생산기술에

참여하기가 어렵다. 둘째, 각 하청업체들의 모럴해저드 문제를 제거하기 위해서 지불

되어야 할 렌트(rent)가 여러 단계에 걸쳐 과도하게 쌓이게 됨에 따라, 최종재 생산

기업이 고도화된 생산기술을 채택할 유인이 줄어든다.

어음제도는 이 두 가지 문제를 동시에 해결하여 고도 산업구조 채택을 가능하게

해 준다. 즉 어음은 하도급 업체가 별도의 재원 없이도 대기업 발행 어음의 할인을

통하여 원자재 구입 및 임금지급에 필요한 자금 문제를 해결할 수 있게 한다. 또한

하도급 업체들에서 누적적으로 증대되는 도덕적 해이 문제를 어음의 만기소지, 어음

할인시 배서 등을 통하여 완화시켜 준다. 물론어음제도는 대기업과 하도급 업체들을

공동 운명체로 만들어 모럴해저드를 완화시켜주는 반면, 경제에 외생적 충격이 있을

시 연쇄부도를 불러오는 등의 부작용이 존재한다.

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2. 발표자료

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3. 질의응답

질문 1저는 어음제도를 단순히 지급을 이연시키는 것으로 알고 있었습니다. 그런데

이것을 신용공여 수단으로 보아 초기 운전자금 자금 문제를 극복할 수 있는 도구로

보신 견해가 상당히 놀랍습니다.

이와 관련해서 어음이 계속 이서가 되고 배서가 될 수 있는 것은 결국 재벌기업의

신용력을 바탕으로 한 것으로 이해됩니다. 즉 다층구조(mutilayer)를 통해서 결과

( output )의 생산성을 가져오기 때문에, 중층구조를 통해서 생산성을 높이고, 동시에

모럴해저드 비용이 지불되기 때문에 최적( opt i ma l )한 중층 구조가 결정된다는

뜻으로 이해했습니다.

그런데 한국의 경우 수평통합( hor i z ontal int e g rat ion )이 일반화 되어 있어

생산성을 높이는 기여를 재벌에 연결하기에는 문제점이 있지 않느냐는 일반적인

질문이 있습니다. 또한 노력의 여부(high ef fort or low ef for t )와 관계없이 임금은

동일하게 지불되어야 할 것 같은데, 모형에서는 노력이 많으면 더 많이 지불하는 것

처럼 해석되는 것 같습니다. 이 점도 설명 부탁드립니다.

답변 1 이 모형에서 수직적 통합( ver t ical int e g rat ion )의 장점을 얘기하고 있지만 최종

생산기업( f i nal pro duct firm)이 굳이 재벌일 필요는 없습니다. 이것을 한국의 경우

재벌로 해석하실 수 있을지 모르겠습니다. 그러나 개인적 견해로는 재벌 내지는 최종

생산기업( f i nal pro duct firm)이 수직적 통합( ver t ical int e g rat ion )을 통해서

모럴 해저드를 줄여준다는 장점이 있으나 비관련분야 다각화를 할 경우에는, 개인적

으로 단점이 많다고 생각합니다.

우선 이 논문은 일단 재벌이 좋다는 논문은 아니라는 점을 분명히 말씀드리고 싶습

니다. p.28의 식을 보면, 우리가 높은 노력(high ef for t )과 낮은 노력( low ef for t )을

볼 때, r 하고 p, i 이하 항목과 관련을 짓는데, r이라는 것은 지금 이전의 생산 행위를

통해서 얻어온 이윤들의 합입니다. 즉 과거에 이루어진 이윤이고 여기에서 나머지는

앞으로 이루어질 이윤에 관한 것입니다. 따라서 우리가 높은 노력(high effort)을

하는지 낮은 노력( low ef for t )을 하는 지가 과거 우리가 축적해 놓은 이윤 중에 실제

거둘 수 있는 가치( va lue )에도 영향을 미치고, 앞으로 우리가 생산 활동을 통해서

얻을 수 있는 이윤에도 영향을 미치는 구조입니다.

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질문 2여태까지‘생산체인의 길이( length of pro duct ion ch a i n )’를 말씀하셨는데,

이것이‘생산시간의 길이( length of pro duct ion time )’와 관련해서도 거의 똑같은

결론입니까? 그러니까 생산체인( p ro duct ion chain) 자체는 심플할지 모르지만

항공기 제작처럼 생산기간( p ro duct ion tim e )이 굉장히 길 때, 운전자금조달

( working cap ital fina nc i n g )이 굉장히 어려운 경우에도 지금 이론에서 예측하신

문제들이 동일한 것인가요?

답변 2 여기서는 시간의 단위가 명시가 안 되어 있습니다. 이게 1주인지 한 달인지 일 년인

지 명시가 안됐습니다. 산업에 따라서 짧은 기간일 수 있고 긴 기간일 수 있습니다.

항공산업 등은 길 것이고 다른 제조업은 짧겠죠. 결국 시간단위를 어떻게 정하냐에

따라서 우리가 비용을 어떻게 책정하느냐 라는 문제가 나올 것입니다. 이자율이

연이자율이냐 월이자율이냐 그런 문제도 역시 나올 수 있습니다.

질문 3금융기관의 관점에서 보면, 최종생산 기업(final product firm)에 대해서 신용

제공시 예를 들어서 충격(shock)이 왔을 때, 그 충격(shock)이 체인에 속하는 기업

들에게 다른 형태의 충격을 줍니다. 결국 신용기관이 자금을 대여할 때는 최종생산

품시장( f i nal pro duct ma rket )에서 최종기업( f i nal firm)만 보고 신용을 제공하기

때문에, 프로덕트 체인(product chain)에서 발생할 수 있는 다양한 리스크를 평가

하지 못할 수 있습니다. 또한 금융시장관점에서 보면 리스크가 과소평가되어서

신용이 제공되는 문제가 있을 수 있습니다.

답변 3그러니까 리스크를 제대로 파악하기 위해서는 체인( chain) 전체에 대한 충격

( sho ck )과 상호작용을 다 명시를 해야 되겠지요. 이런 경우에는 성공할 때는 다 성공

하지만, 쇼크가 어느 수준을 넘어가면 전체 체인이 다 몰락하는 현상이 있을 수 있습

니다. 리스크 관점에서는 훨씬 분포가 양극화 됩니다. 그런 면에서 이게 하나의

부작용이라고 볼 수가 있습니다. 이것은 인센티브 측면에서는 바람직한 면이 많지만,

산업구조 자체는 유연하게 됩니다. 그런 부작용이 있기 때문에 100% 바람직하지는

않다고 말씀드리고 있습니다.



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결국 긴 안목으로 봤을 때, 이것은 어디까지나 전환기에 쓰는 수단이고 정상적인

선진금융체제가 성립이 된다면 여기서 탈피를 해야 할 것입니다. 실제로 한국에서도

어음사용률이 많이 떨어졌습니다. 이렇게 된 데에는 정부정책도 요인이지만, 중소기업

들이 기업여신을 좀 더 받을 수( ac c e s s )가 있게 되고 신용제약( c re d it con s t ra i nt )이

좀 더 완화되었기 때문이기도 합니다. 말씀하신 대로 부작용이 있습니다. 그렇기

때문에 이것을 하나의 전환기의 수단으로 생각해야 되지 않나 생각합니다.

질문 4우리나라 외환위기 이후에 중소기업 섹터에 대한 은행의 대출을 잠깐 보면 절대

규모는 늘어났을지 몰라도 전체 비중은 줄어드는 경향이 있었던 것 같습니다. 그렇

다면 어음을 통한 크레딧(credit)이 줄고 중소기업 대출된 은행의 대출비중이 줄어

들었다면, 이것은 우리가 느끼고 있는 경제위기를 의미하는 것이 아닌지, 특히 이런

체인( ch a i n )들이 무너지면서 대기업들이 생산프로덕션 라인을 중국이나 인도로

옮기도록 강제하는 것이 아닌지 의문입니다.

답변 4 중소기업들이 어음을 통한 지불지연에 대한 불평이 있었습니다. 연쇄도산 불평이

있는 가운데 심지어 9 0년대 말에는 어음폐지론이 나왔습니다. 그러면서 정부가

어음을 폐지까지는 아니더라도 억제하는 정책을 취했습니다. 어음대신에 가령 한국

은행에서는 기업구매자금대출 제도나 외상매출금 담보대출 등의 제도로 어음을 대체

하려는 노력을 했습니다. 지금의 모습에는 이런 정부의 영향이 있습니다.

또한 말씀하신 것처럼 외환위기 이후에 많은 기업이 중간단계의 생산을 아웃소싱,

즉 중국 하청업체나 혹은 자기 생산기지 자체를 중국으로 옮겨 생산하는 바람에

대기업과 중소기업들 사이의 하청관계가 약해졌기 때문에 이것이 어음량의 감소를

가져온 한 가지 원인으로 추측됩니다. 그리고 1990년대에는 투자율이 GDP 대비

39%까지 올라갔다가 2000대들어 29%대로 떨어졌습니다. 고정자본 투자가 줄어

들면서 더불어 고정자본과 보완관계에 있는 운전자본( working cap it a l )에 대한

수요가 줄어들었습니다. 이것이 저 그래프의 급격한 감소로 나타난 것 같습니다.

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Ⅵ. Session 5 : 패널 토론( Pa nel Discu s s ion )

사회 :박상용 (연세대학교 경영학과 교수)

토론 :Raghuram Rajan (국제통화기금 경제자문관 겸 조사국장)

Stijn Claessens (세계은행 수석자문역)

김홍범 (경상대학교 경제학과 교수)

박재하 (한국금융연구원 선임연구위원)

신현송 (프린스턴대학교 경제학과 교수)

이동걸 (한국금융연구원 선임연구위원)

전성인 (홍익대학교 경제학과 교수)

조원동 (재정경제부 경제정책국 국장)

최공필 (한국금융연구원 선임연구위원)

박상용 교수(사회자)안녕하십니까? 오늘 마지막 종합 토론 사회를 맡은 박상용입니다. 오늘 이런 호텔

에서 하는 컨퍼런스에서 듣기 힘든 수준 높은 논문 네 편 잘 공부했습니다. Rajan

박사님이 외국자본이 경제성장에 어떻게 기여하는지, 특히 개도국하고 선진국 사이

에서 외국자본이 경제성장에 미치는 영향이 다르다는 신선하고도 충격적인 연구

결과를 설명해 주셨습니다. 그리고 C lae s s ens 박사님은 금산분리 문제에 대해

말씀해주셨는데, 우리나라에서도 금산분리가 중요한 이슈 아닙니까? 이것과 관련된

그 동안의 이론적인 연구들, 실증적인 연구들을 소상히 잘 설명해 주셨습니다. 이동걸

박사님은 첨예한 이슈인 금융의 지배구조에 대해서, 단지 학자가 체계적으로 공부한

것만 갖고 말씀하신 것이 아니라, 실제로 금융감독 기구의 고위직을 수행하시면서

얻은 여러 가지 경험을 바탕으로 상당히 의미 있는 말씀을 많이 해주셨습니다. 신현송

박사님도 우리나라에 상당히 중요한 현실적인 시사점을 주는 발표를 하셨습니다.

특히 중소기업 부분이 취약한 우리나라에서 생산의 단계가 여러 단계인 산업의 고도

화를 이루려면 기업금융이 어떠한 역할을 해야 하는지, 특히 수직적인 통합문제가

나왔기 때문에 우리의 재벌구조와도 시의성 있는 논문을 발표해 주셨습니다.

시간상 오늘의 발표에 대해서 중요한 질문을 중심으로 해주십시오. 특히 해외에서



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Ⅵ. Session 5 : 패널토론

오신 분들은 한국 실정을 모르시기 때문에 우리나라의 실정을 잘 알고 있지 않으면

대답할 수 없는 그런 질문은 가능하면 삼가 주셨으면 합니다. 아까 언론사 기자분들이

그런 질문을 하셔서 발표자분들께서 당황하는 모습을 보였습니다.

전성인 교수귀한 자리에 초대해 주셔서 감사합니다. 오늘 페이퍼들은 정말 무척 유익한 내용이

었습니다. Rajan 교수님과 신현송, 김세직 교수님 논문에 대한 질문 혹은 코멘트를

한 두 개 하겠습니다. Rajan 교수님께 하는 질문으로, 가장 핵심적인 문제의식은

개발도상국에 있어서 과거의 교과서적인 견해는 무한대의 투자기회( u n l i m it e d

i nve s t ment opp or tu n it y )가 존재한다는 것이었는데 R ajan 교수의 말씀은 어쩌면

개발도상국에는 유한의 투자기회( l i m ited inve s t ment opp or tu n ity) 정도에 불과할

수 있다는말씀을 하셨습니다. 이에대한 검증을실증적으로 해 보신 적이 있으십니까?

보통 교과서에서는 자본이동이 있기 전에 개도국에서는 자본의 한계생산성이 높기

때문에 이자율이 매우 높은데 이것을 다른 말로 번역하면 무한대의 투자기회와

비슷한 말이 되지 않을까 생각합니다. 만약에 투자 기회가 제한( l i m it e d )되어 있다면,

혹시 선진국과 후진국 간에 이자등급차이( i nt erest grade different ia l )를 국가별로

비교해 보신 적이 있는지, 그리고 시장개방 이전과 이후를 비교하여 자본거래 사이에

체계적인 상관관계( c or relat ion )를 보신 적이 있는지에 대해서 R ajan 교수님에

대한 질문 드립니다.

그리고 신현송, 김세직 교수님께는 몇 가지 코멘트( c om ment) 겸 질문을 드리

겠습니다. 한 가지는 가격을조정하는 데 약간의메뉴 코스트같은 것이 있다면, 그래서

가격을 미세조정하는 것이 비용이 든다면(costly하다면), 때로는 가격 이외의 방법

으로 거래조건( t erms of trade )을 정할 수 있을 것도 같습니다. 예를 들면 어음으로

결제를 하되 어음의 만기를 상황에 따라 조정하는 겁니다. 예를 들어 신문사와 신문

용지공급업체 사이에 신문사가 잘 팔릴 때는 시장상황을 반영해서 거의 현금에

가깝게, 때로는 진짜로 캐시를 지급하고 때로는 선금을 주고, 반대로 상황이 나빠지면

3개월짜리 어음, 심지어는 6개월짜리 어음을 주는 것입니다. 그것이 사실 가격을

연속적으로( c ont i nuous) 조절하는 한 가지 방법이 될 수도 있습니다. 그런 의미에서

유연한 지급제도( flex ible means of pay ment )라고 생각할 수도 있을 겁니다. 특히

굉장히 중요한 발견 중의 하나는 하위계약기업( s ub - c ont ract firm)이 일종의

대부자( len der )이기 때문에 기업이 어려워지면 잔여청구자( re s idual cla i ma nt )가

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되죠. 그러데 다른 담보채권자와는 달리 매우 취약한 잔여청구자 ( re s idu a l

cla i ma nt )입니다. 그런데 실제로 회사정리에 들어가서 회생 계획안을 짤 때 보면,

상거래 채권자들은 거의 기업과 동일운명체로 취급되어 채권을 보전 받지 못하는

경우가 많이 있습니다. 따라서 하위계약기업( s ub - c ont ract firm)은 나쁜 결과

( b ad outc ome )가 나왔을 때 손실을 공유한다는 점에서 잔여청구자( re s idua l

cla i ma nt )라고 볼 수 있는데 문제는 하위계약기업( s ub - c ont ract firm)은

f i r m0에 대해서 거의 통제권( c ont rol right )을 행사하지 못한다는 것이죠. 바로

이것이 아까 말씀하신 수식으로 보여준 모럴해저드 문제(problem)의 핵심이 있는

것 같습니다.

그런데 신교수님은 이런 모럴해저드 문제에도 불구하고 firm0가, 그러니까 최종

생산기업( f i nal pro duct firm)이 충분히 신용도가 있다면, 어음제도가 일종의

순기능이 있는 것이 아닌가라는 말씀을 하셨는데, 저는 신용도가 좋다고 하더라도

모럴해저드 문제를 방지하지 않는 한 문제는 계속되는게 아닌가 합니다. 아까의 예를

들면, 신문시장을 생각해 보면 때로는 선금을 주기도 하거든요. 마찬가지로 신용도가

좋다면 최종생산기업( f i nal pro duct firm)이 어음을 발행하는 것이 아니라 은행

에서 돈을 많이 빌려서 그 돈을 하위계약기업(sub-contract firm)에 출자를 해도

좋고 편의상 대부( len d i n g )를 해 주고, 나한테 갚을 때, 중간재( i nt er me d iat e

good)를 제공하는 방식으로 갚으라고 할 수 있다는 얘기입니다. 먼저 자기가 모럴

해저드를 하지 않을 것이라는 것을 채권계약( b ond posting)으로 하는 방식이 있을

수가 있습니다. 이것이 사실상 협력업체를 거느리는, 특히 대기업들이, 자동차 공업

쪽에서 나올 수 있기 때문에, 그런 것도 한번 생각해 볼 수 있지 않겠습니까? 최종

생산기업( f i nal pro duct firm)의 신용도가 좋을 때, 자연스러운 산출( natu ra l

outcome)이 될 가능성은 그다지 많지 않습니다. 그런데 현실에서 왜 이런 경우가

발생하는지 다른 방식으로 본다면 예를 들어 기업(firm) 사이의 관계가 불가역적

( i r rever s ible )이라면 몇 가지 문제가 생길 수 있습니다. 사후적( ex ant e )으로는

하위계약기업(sub-contract firm)과 최종생산기업(final product firm)이 서로

경쟁( c omp et it ion) 관계에 있지만, 일단 둘 사이에 관계가 시작되면 시차( lag )가

걸리고 그러면 둘 중에 한 사람이 그 경쟁의 시차( lag of comp et it ion )를 갖고 시장

지배력 ( ma rket powe r )을 인식해서 개발 ( ex p loi t at ion )을 하려는 유인

( i nc entive)이 생길 수가 있습니다. 이런 면을 추가로 생각해 볼 수 있지 않겠는가

생각합니다.



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재경부 조원동 국장R ajan 박사께서는‘외자를 도입하는 국가( host cou nt r y )’의 능력이 충분히 되지

않아‘외자를 흡수( ab s orb )’할 수 없다고 하면 부작용이 많다고 말씀하셨는데, 우리

나라에는 외국자본의 공과에 대한 논란이 많이 있습니다. 관련해서 R ajan 박사께는

과연 박사님의 논문에서 한국이 어느 위치에 있는지 여쭤보고 싶습니다.

두번째는이게외자가금융에갔을때에금융섹터의외국인지분( foreign ow ner sh ip )이

어떤 영향을 미치는지와 관련해서, 제가 IMF에 있을 때도 그런 논문을 많이 봤고,

최근에도 한국에서 K DI가 레포트를 냈는데, 이것과 관련해서는 전반적으로 결론이

일관되게 나오는 것 같지 않기 때문입니다. 이런 논문을 많이 봐 오셨던 전문가

입장에서 특히 은행부문(banking sector)의 외국인지분(foreign ownership)의

장단점에 대해서는 실증(empirical) 결과들을 종합해주는 의미에서 말씀해 주시면

좋겠습니다.

신용상 박사님과 김세직 박사님 논문에 대해서는, 마지막에 최종기업( f i na l

f i r m )에 대한 리스크는 별로 없이 그 리스크가 하청업체에 걸리는 리스크가 많기

때문에 국내시각에서는 이것은 완전히 원청업체에 대한 하나의 복종관계로 보실 수가

있습니다. 그래서 이런 부분들이 자본시장이 발달하지 않은 경우에서는 어음의

유용성에 좋은 측면이 있다는 점을 증명( p ro of) 해주신 것 같습니다. 따라서 이것이

발전된 상태에서 어떤 상태로 진화될 수 있을지, 이것을 이용해서 여러 가지 정책제안

(policy implication)을 낼 수 있는 경우들이 상당히 많을 것 같습니다. 예를 들자

면 최근에 우리가 시도하는 네트워크 론이나 원청업체가 기금을 내서 해당업체에만

특별보증을 하게 하는 수급펀드가 있습니다. 바로 이것이 저희가 말하는 대기업·

중소기업 상생협력기금입니다. 논문에 따르자면 최종생산회사( f i nal pro duct

c omp a ny )가 나름대로 자금이나 신용을 일으키면서 해당 하청업체에게 이러한 운전

자금을 제공해 주는 분화( va r iat ion) 모델도 상당히 나타나고 있기 때문에 이런 모델

들을 원용을 하시면 충분히 증명을 하실 수 있을 것이라고 생각합니다. 그런 쪽으로

노력을 해주셨으면 아주 더 좋은 논문이 되지 않을까 생각을 하고 있습니다.

박재하 선임연구위원R ajan 박사님 논문에 대해서 여쭤보겠습니다. 자본이 결국 선진국에서 후진국

으로만 이동하는 것은 아니라는 말씀에 전적으로 동의합니다만, 최근 아시아에서

베트남, 인디아, 중국 등 사례별(case by case)로 보면 전체적으로 볼 때와는 다를

수가 있다는 생각입니다. 즉 거시( mac ro )적인 접근과 미시( m ic ro )적인 접근이

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때로는 상충되는 결과를 낼 수 있을 것 같습니다. 혹시 이에 대한 연구를 진행하신

것이 있는지 여쭤보고 싶습니다.

그리고 그럼 왜 자본이 선진국에서 후진국으로 흐르지 않느냐? 기본적으로 후진

국의 금융시스템 위기나, 또는 환율절상 우려 때문에 결국 수익을 충분히 올릴 수

있는 투자기회가 없어서 그런 것 같다는 하나의 추론을 제시하셨는데, 그것을 받아

들인다면, 과연 외국자본의 교과서(text book)에서 보는 순기능도 분명히 있을 것

입니다. 그런 긍정적인 외국자본의 기능을 살리기 위해서 우리가 무엇을 하는 것이

좋겠는가에 대해서, 물론 이 논문의 분석 범위는 벗어나있지만, Rajan 박사님의

개인적인 견해를 듣고 싶습니다.

C lae s s ens 박사님은 최근 금산분리의 추세를 잘 설명해 주셨습니다. 아울러 최근

각국이 정도의 차이는 있지만 F TA나 세계화( g lob a l i z at ion) 등을 통해서 금융

산업의 세계화를 추진하고 있는 상황입니다. 박사님이 논문에서 말씀하셨다시피

개도국의 경우 금융시스템의 정비가 안 되어 있기 때문에 섣불리 금산분리를 허무는

것이 위험할 수 있다고 말씀하셨는데, 과연 이런 상충적인 내용을 어떤 전제조건

하에서, 어떠한 속도(speed)로 추진하는 것이 과연 적절할 것인지에 대한 개인적인

의견을 여쭤보고 싶습니다.

김홍범 교수I am very pleased to participate in this panel discussion of the KIF’s 15th

Anniversary Conference and to share with you some of my thoughts ontoday’s theme of finance and economic development in Korea. I find quiteappropriate the developing country context each these papers have broughtin to look at the issues of finance and development in Korea. For the rest ofmy discussion, I will add to those contexts some of my thoughts on the systemof financial supervision in Korea from a regulatory governor’s perspective.In particular, I will discuss the issue of checks of and balances between thepublic sector agencies that are responsible for financial stability in Korea.In so doing, I will mainly focus on the behavior on the Ministry of Financeand Economy (MOFE). Before doing that I will briefly spend a fews e c o n d s mentioning the last paper by Professors Kim and Shin. Theirmodel portrays the current promissory note system found in Korea as onethat enables a subcontracting firm to utilize credit worthiness of a final



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good firm. In their model the promissory note is issued by the final goodfirm, as a financial instrument, to advance payment. I am afraid that thismay counter the reality in Korea. The reality is that the promissory note isissued by the final good firm as a financial instrument to defer a payment.When the subcontracting firm sends an intermediate good to the final goodfirm, it gets paid on the spot, not in cash, but in the promissory note issuedby latter. Then it is the subcontracting firm that extends credit to the finalgood firm, and not the other way around as their paper describes. This extensionof credit merely reflects the subcontracting firm’s weaker bargaining position,as we usually observe in Korea. Consequently, the promissory note, ifa n y t h i n g , will aggravate the financial situation of many subcontractingfirms which already suffer a severe lack of working capital. Since this doesnot seem to be a trivial point, it can be duly taken care of within the model.And then, for the implications, if any, to the current industrial structure inKorea may be explored accordingly. Now I will turn to the regulatoryg o v e r n a n c e issue in Korea. There are five public agencies, each of which ischarged with a legal mandate relating to financial stability in some way oranother. They include, the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), theFinancial Supervisory Commission (FSC), The Financial SupervisoryService (FSS), the Bank of Korea (BOK) and the Korea Deposit InsuranceCorporation (KDIC).The present financial supervisory architecture wasnewly introduced through institutional reforms undertaken in the aftermathof the financial crisis. The spirit underlying those reforms was to help issuechecks and balances between the public agencies. This largely reflected thegrowing criticisms that MOFE, monopolizing too many powers andf u n c t i o n s , contributed to aggravating the crisis to unbearable proportions.Even MOFE itself formerly admitted that, “policy decision making hadbecome overly concentrated, thereby undermining the checks and balancesrequired for effective government.”Therefore, institutional reforms tookthe form of removing some powers and functions from MOFE and reallocatingthem to other agencies. For instance, the BOK was mandated to pursueprice stability and was granted legal independence, while the FSC, togetherwith the FSS was newly created in 1998 as the supervisory authority thattakes charge of all types of financial institutions and markets. Please notethat the FSS acts as the executive arm of the FSC, taking orders from it.

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The KDIC, having operated as a deposit insurer only for banks before thebreakout of the crisis, became the integrated deposit insurer for non-bankfinancial institutions as well as banks. What is meant by all of thesechanges in institutional structure? The answer is Korea has set up ad e c e n t r a l i z e d supervisory architecture that is supposed to operate on thebasis of institutional division of labor. If such a system is to operatesmoothly, functional cooperation and horizontal checks and balances mustwork eff e c t i v e l y. Unfortunately, this basic precondition has yet to hold inKorea. The IMF and the World Bank have already shown their concernsabout this matter. For example, a report by the World Bank recommendsthat, “the division of responsibilities between MOFE, FSC and FSS shouldbe made more transparent. Steps should be taken to reassure markets thatthe independence of the regulator is important.”The disappointing reality isthat there have been virtually no changes at all in the supervisory modusoperandi even after the new supervisory system was brought in by theinstitutional reforms. This suggests the traditional institutional hierarchythat had been prevailing between public agencies in Korea for decades, survivethose institutional reforms in financial supervision. Although it was formerlydivested of part of its powers and functions, MOFE successfully engineeredits power to propose financial laws, remaining on the top rung of thei n s t i t u t i o n a l l a d d e r. Furthermore, MOFE officials find their closest alliesthe FSC, which is, like MOFE, part of the government. In fact, that is thepolicy whereby FSC staff sometimes move to and from MOFE. Thus FSCoperational independence is not warranted. BOK is certainly legallyi n d e p e n d e n t . But, its being independent often turns synonymous withbeing alienated from MOFE, and other public agencies. Given thesecircumstances, MOFE naturally comes to dominate the other public agenciesin terms of policy. This is what I call “politicus dominus of MOFE”, inwhich MOFE’s inherent tendency to use economic policy to boost domesticdemand overrides the policy judgment of other public agencies. We allknow that MOFE delayed the timing of the FSC and FSS in taking thenecessary supervisory measures for one year, inviting the March 2003breakout of the credit card fiasco, after all. I remember that Mr. Feldman ofthe IMF coined the term “the ubiquitous hand,”when he pointed out theinterventionist approach of the Korean government as reflected in the



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household debt and credit card problems. The message is quite simple andc l e a r. MOFE must learn to keep other agencies at arms length during normaltimes. Whereas, BOK and FSC together with FSS must learn to creep fromM O F E’s cozy umbrella, and stand on their own feet. By the way, do wehave only to have to expect it to happen? Are we justified in doing nothingabout this matter with just a wait and see attitude. Let us think again. Thereis an old saying, “If the sky falls, you shall catch the lark.”Reforming theinstitutional structure of financial supervision is an urgent matter in thiscountry. Thanks.

최공필 선임연구위원순서상 I M F의 R ajan 교수님께 질문을 드립니다. 아무래도 개도국에서 환율

안정이 매우 중요한데 이것 때문에 지불하는 대가가 점점 커지고 있는 것이 현실입

니다. 그런데 제가 알고 있기로는 안정화( s t ab i l i z at ion) 대신에 증권화( s e cu r it i z at ion )

를 통해서 외화 유동성 관리 부담을 덜면서 시장발전을 촉진시킬 수 있는 제안

(proposal)을 Rajan 교수님이 내셨거든요. 그걸 좀 설명해 주시겠습니까?

두 번째로는 FASP 연례회의( F SAP con s u lt a ion) 관련해서 아쉬운 것은 최근

에도 한국의 부동산 버블이 없다고 연례회의에서 발표를 했습니다만, 아까 Rajan

교수님 발표와 일맥상통하는 얘기입니다만, 사실은 투자기회 ( i nve s t ment

opportunity)가 그렇게 많은 것이 아닙니다. 그 배경에는 비거래부문(non trade

s e ct or )의 발달정도가 제약이 되어서 부동산 외에는 돈이 갈 데가 없게 됩니다. 특히

소득 수준이 높아지면서 교육서비스는 대치동 외에는 다른 데서 공급이 안 되니까

그쪽으로 당연히 서비스 수요가 몰릴 수밖에 없는 것이고 공급이 제약되는 상황에

서는 불가피한 것이라고 생각하는데, 이런 일련의 구조적인 문제에 대해서는 IMF

에서 별로 언급이 없습니다. 그래서 책상에 앉아서 서로 좋은 말만 하는 것도 좋겠

지만, 10년 전이나 지금이나, 우리의 근본적인 불안정성을 야기하는 요소에 대해서는

별로 획기적인 결과가 보이지 않고 있는데, 이런 부분이 연례회의( c on s u lt at ion )에서

강조되어야 할 부분이라고 생각합니다. 물론 지배구조가 이슈이긴 합니다만, 이런

이슈가 지금 문제의 상당부분을 차지하고 있다는 것을 적시를 하고 그 부분에 힘을

주면 되지 않겠습니까? 정치권이나 전교조나 등등 필요한 개혁을 못하고 있는 사실

상의 이유가 있는데, 그런 부분에 가시적인 결과를 내기 위해서 우리가 힘을 얻을

수 있는 많은 부분이 있을 것 같아요. 내부적으로 하지 못하는 이슈에 대해서 IMF

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에서 좀 강조할 필요가 있다고 생각합니다.

사실 위험 관리면에서 보면, 글로벌 환경에서는 리스크가 지역별로 집중되어

있습니다. 글로벌 불균형은 문제가 아니라고 미국에서 생각하는데, 사실상 개도국

에서 감수할 만한 시장 인프라 같은 것이 별로 없습니다. 우리는 금과옥조라고 생각한

원칙에 따라서 자산배분도 하고 했습니다만, 그 원칙이라는게 위기상황을 거쳐서

얻은 교훈이 아니라, 좋을 때, 이자율이 낮을 때 한 것이기 때문에 실제로 그것이

얼마나 견뎌낼 수 있을지에 대해서는 아무도 확신을 할 수가 없습니다.

이런 차원에서 국제기구가 위험집중에 대해서 사전적으로 보고서에만 끝내지 말고

가시적인 가이드라인을 제시할 필요가 있다고 생각합니다. 이런 것이 없으면 결국은

문제 터질 때 개도국에서 쪽박을 찰 수밖에 없고 그런 가능성에 대해서 완전히 배제할

수 없는 상황에서 이런 역할에 대해서 강조를 할 수 밖에 없습니다. 더군다나 파생이나

위험 이전 상품이 개발이 많이 개발이 됐는데 지배구조위험에 대해서 이런 위험을

트레이딩할 수 있는 제반 인프라를 IMF 주도로 유도( i n it iat e )할 필요가 있다고 생각

합니다. 우리가 막연히 알고 있는 위험을 거래하고 분산시킬 수 있는 뭔가를 보여줘야

하는데, 아직도 이런 부분이 미진한 것이 안타깝습니다. 이 세 가지에 대한 의견을

듣고 싶습니다.

그리고 제가 사회를 본 것에 대해서 코멘트하는게 우습지만, 이동걸 박사님이

지배구조 관련된 제반 이슈를 포괄적으로 말씀해주셨는데, 핵심은 결구 지배구조

개선의 분위기 환경 조성이 미흡하다는 점입니다. 그리고 개방을 통한 환경조성의

필요성을 강조하셨는데 외국자본에 대한 입장이 보다 명확하게 제시될 필요가 있다고

생각합니다. 론스타처럼 별로 훌륭하지 않은 기구를 이용해서 지금 이 난리를 펴고

있는데 당시에 시간에 쫓기지 않고 매각 가격에 좀 더 신경썼다면, 글로벌 플레이어를

충분히 유치할 수 있지 않았나 생각을 합니다. 사실 최근에 연구결과를 보면 씨티나

H S BC 같은 글로벌 플레이어들을 국내에 유치했을 때, 국내 신용흐름이 굉장히

안정적이고 다양한 충격에 대해서 더 건전( robu s t )하다는 실증분석 결과를 봤습

니다. 그렇다면 우리가 배워야 한다면, 괜찮은 기구를 유치할 필요가 있다고 생각되고,

이것 때문에 생기는 정치적 우려는 사실상 경쟁하기 싫어하는 사람들이 구차하게

내세우는 변명에 지나지 않다고 생각합니다. 우리의 금융역량이 이 정도로 머문

것은 사실상 보호된 환경 때문이지, 개방된 환경 때문이라고는 생각할 수 없습니다.

이런 차원에서, 지배구조 개선을 위한 환경개선에 있어서 해외자본의 보다 적극적인

역할을 적극적으로, 예를 들어 중국 같이, 그런 전략이 필요하다고 생각합니다.



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Rajan 박사Those were very useful comments. One of the points I was making is that

perhaps the investment opportunities in non-industrial countries may not beas high or as unlimited as thought of. He suggests a very useful way of testingit, which is to compare the marginal product of capital across countries.That would suggest that in non-industrial countries the marginal productshould be very high. One way to look at the marginal product is if you cansomehow look at the real interest rate, the risk-free real interest rate, thatshould represent the marginal product. Maybe one could compare interestdifferentials. That is possible. The problem is that we never really observe arisk-free interest rate in emerging markets. What we do is observe a riskpremium associated with the interest rate. You just can’t compare interestrates directly. The fact that the interest rate is 10% say, in India, and 5%s a y, in the US does not necessarily mean that the marginal product of capitalin India is twice as large as in the US. People have done these calculationsof marginal product, and I think the growing consensus among economists,is that the marginal product of capital in emerging markets and developingcountries is not as high as might be suggested by the simple neo-classicalmodel. It is, in fact, substantially lower. That is consistent with the idea thatmaybe the investment opportunities are not unlimited in developing countries.There is a little bit of that consensus emerging. Dr. Cho asked about theKorean situation. Where would Korea in terms of this hierarchy? Is it acountry that can use foreign capital well, or is it a country which cannot useforeign capital? I would tend to lean, because Korea is nearing the OECDaverage, its per capita income is now approximately 70% of the OECDaverage, it is certainly much further from the developing country situationand much closer to the OECD situation. I would say it is getting to the pointwhere one would presume, at least if one went strictly by the model and theestimates, that it could be in a position to benefit from foreign capital ratherthan necessarily not benefit. None of these statements can be blankets t a t e m e n t s. It really depends on how foreign capital is attracted, the formsin which it is attracted, the kinds of institutions that come in, the kind ofcompetition that is created and how best use is made of it. So certainlythere is much more than simply just the quantum, which is really what thestudy measures.

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Dr. Park asked a question about the difference between macro and microviews. This is really very important. When you look at the micro evidenceon the benefits of foreign capital, typically studies seem to find somewhatpositive benefits. So it is a puzzling question that even though you findpositive benefits at the micro level, you don’t find that much at the macrolevel, certainly for non-industrial countries. Now, one of the explanationsmay be that there are threshold effects. So when we, for example, look atmicro evidence on where foreign capital can help industries grow, especiallyindustries dependent upon external finance. It turns out that even when youlook at the micro evidence, in countries that have underdeveloped financialsystems, foreign capital is not particularly effective in helping industriesg r o w. It is only when beyond a certain level of development that foreigncapital can help. And if you think about it, it sort of makes sense. When youhave a domestic financial system which can intermediate the funds, thenforeign capital coming in can flow through the domestic financial systemand finally reach borrowing firms and then can help growth. If the domesticfinancial system isn’t particularly good, it serves as a sort of buffer betweenthe foreign capital coming in and the ultimate borrower, that can make itharder to grow. In that sense, there might not be that much of a dichotomybetween the macro evidence and the micro evidence. But I also think thatthe other reason for the difference is that the micro evidence looks at firm-by-firm evidence on whether foreign capital is helpful. Now, firm-by-firm,it can be helpful. But at the aggregate level, it can hurt if it works throughthings like spillover effects. For example, studies look at firms that usef o r e i g n capital. Are they doing the right thing? Foreign capital can be agood source of governance and can make firms do the right thing. I was justat Korea National University where one of the professors was telling me hewas doing study on whether foreign investors were predatory, whether theymade firms pay out too much in terms of dividends and whether theyreduced the ability of firms to make long-term investments. And his studysuggests that these foreign investors do make firms pay out a lot ofd i v i d e n d s , but only if they are performing badly. So if they are performingb a d l y, they force these guys to pay out money, while if the firms areperforming well, the investment rate is more than the investment rate ofcomparable firms without foreign investors. Foreign investors are playing a



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good governance role here, slowing down the growth of poorly performingfirms, and enhancing the investment rate of good performers. In that sense,I think you can have good micro-economic governance effects. Thep r o b l e m , h o w e v e r, comes at the macro level. In fairly poor countries, as Iargued, you could sometimes have exchange rate effects at the macro level.Even though each firm borrowing capital is made better off, collectivelywhen they borrow foreign capital and rely on it, they are allowing theexchange rate to appreciate, making it much harder for them to be competitiveon the international arena. So they may individually be better off, butcollectively worse off, if they don’t manage it properly. With all the cautionthat this doesn’t mean a blanket disapproval of foreign capital, it doessuggest there could be differences between the micro studies and the macrostudies, and there could be good reason, the micro studies point to microindividual effects, which at the macro level, may be washed away byspillover effects.

Finally, Dr. Choi asked a question about the scheme that we had proposedfor maintaining the exchange rate. Actually, it wasn’t so much a scheme formaintaining the exchange rate. But the argument was suppose you have acountry which is sterilizing inflows, a lot, for whatever reason. Are thereways that it can reduce the cost associated with that sterilization, evenwhile improving the quality of domestic industry? So the argument was,you have all these countries which have a lot of capital flowing in, they arevery reluctant to let capital flow out because if you open the channels forcapital to flow out, it could create instability in the country. The capitalwould all flow out at the wrong time. What we proposed was a way to controlthe outflow of capital, even while taking the job of holding foreign assetsaway from the government. And the idea would be something as follows,suppose you have a country which has been sterilizing foreign capitalinflows. What does sterilization mean? Essentially, the central bank buysthe dollars in the market and it issues won. Then it sells bonds in the marketto soak up the won it has issued to make sure there isn’t an excess of moneysupply in the market. Instead of doing that, what it could do is license abunch of mutual funds. In our case we proposed closed-end mutual funds.It could license them to take out of the country a certain quantity of dollarsin terms of assets and those funds could issue similar quantities of liabilities

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in local currency to investors. So investors would buy shares in the fund bypaying won, the fund would take the won to the central bank and buy dollarsfrom the central bank and then it would take those dollars and buy foreignassets. Essentially what you’ve done is taken away the process of taking o u tthe dollars from the country from the central bank directly to the householdswho now hold shares in the mutual fund which invests abroad. There are anumber of benefits to this scheme. One, you’ve taken it off the governmentbalance sheet; it is now a private venture. Two, households get diversificationbenefits. Instead of indirectly holding foreign assets by the central bank,they directly hold foreign assets by buying shares of the mutual fund and asa result have direct access to foreign investment. Third, the governmentdoesn’t bear the cost of sterilization anymore. The cost of sterilization wasthat you were investing in US Treasury Bills which earn 3%-4%, but youpaid 6%-7% in domestic currency interest rates. Here, because the mutualfunds can invest in anything, basically you avoid that cost, you are taking ito ff the government balance sheet. How does this solve the problem that Italked about initially; that all of the money could flow out if they openedthe channels for money to go out all of the sudden? You prevent that hereby doing it in a controlled fashion. The government licenses mutual fundsto take out the money, only to a certain extent. Maybe this year it licenses$5 billion worth of currency to be taken out and as reserves build up, itlicenses another $5 billion or another $10 billion. He can do this in acontrolled way depending on how much he thinks can be taken out withoutopening the taps completely. By complete capital account liberalization,you open the taps completely and then you subject yourself to volatility. S o ,this way of doing it, in a controlled fashion, allows you to gain experiencewith opening up the capital account and, over time, it can be extended toget full capital account liberalization.

On the issue related to real estate in Korea, clearly, as Dr. Choi pointedout, the supply-side is part of the problem and how to expand the supply isan important question. And I’m sure the IMF team has on many occasionsdiscussed this with the relevant parties. On the risks associated with theglobal imbalances, I think there is an issue that if the global imbalancesunwind, the US current account deficit narrows abruptly, it could haveimplication for financial markets, including a sharp rise in interest rates and



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possibly a more severe depreciation of the dollar. This is a relatively smallprobability event. I don’t think it is the highest probability even, I think it isa relatively small probability. But if it happens it can be extremely costly. Anumber of financial markets, a number of countries, that tap into those marketscan be hurt. I think the way to deal with this is what the IMF is trying to do,which is trying to bring the countries that are major parties in the globalimbalances together, to talk to one another to find ways that they canenhance the domestic policy agenda to bring down the level of imbalancesover time. Now, as I pointed out this morning, there are many complicatedfactors which have led to these global imbalances, not just a matter ofgovernment policy. But what governments can do is get out of the way ofthe process of adjustment. If they are impeding the process of adjustment,make sure that policies change so they don’t impede it. So, I think the kindsof policies we would advocate on the government side, these includenarrowing of the fiscal deficit in the US, more exchange rate flexibility inChina, but also a variety of structural reforms in a number of countries,including China, the US, the Euro area and Japan- in the Euro area andJapan to increase the rate of growth, but in China perhaps to increase theextent of the social safety net so that people can consume more and saveless. Financial sector reform is also part of this set of reforms and similarlyreforms to increase savings would also be part of the agenda.

Claessens 박사I think I only had one question, but let me maybe comment on some of

the other questions a little bit as well. The question was from Mr. Park as toit is not so easy to get a separation between banking and commerce in ane m e rging market in place given the shortage of institutional investors andmore generally the lack of strategic investors. I agree with that. Although Ithink there are opportunities and we already heard as Mr. Choi said thatthere were some missed opportunities, in some sense, when banks thatwere nationalized during the crisis were privatized. Lone Star may not havebeen the global player that we all wanted and now looking back has evencreated other problems as well. I think those are opportunities one should

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go for. There are these opportunities out there to invite these foreigninvestors that can bring a lot in terms of competition and also technology.Short of that, can banking and commerce live together in emerg i n gm a r k e t s ? Well I tend to think, yes. I’m looking at examples that are actuallyless developed in many ways than Korea. If I take, for example, Brazil.Brazil has two state banks that are very large, 50% of the system or so. Butthey also have a number of privately held banks that are excellent in termsof their capacity to lend. Brazil is obviously in a very volatile macro situationfrom time to time so it is not easy to operate as a bank, but neverthelessthese banks have been doing that quite successfully for periods of timeseparate from the commerce side. Although there are links, probablythrough the ownership to the commercial sector, they operate in quite anindependent way from the commercial sector. So I think it can be done.Does it need additional measures? Probably, yes, in emerging markets. Ofcourse we can think of limits on the banking side. Once can say,“Let’s nothave these banks engage in the same set of activities that we would havethem engage in normal markets. In the extreme end, you can think of narrowbanking as being the solution to the banking/commerce problem. We justhave the banks do very narrow lending to the government or some safeassets. I don’t think that is going to be the answer, definitely not for a countryas Korea is in terms of the level of development. Rather I think that therehave to be some limits on the commerce side. I think that goes back to theproblem that we’ve discussed for quite some time here. We see the bankingsystem or the financial system in Korea not functioning all that well or atleast not as well as we would like to be, partly because there is still a largeinfluence of the conglomerates, the chaebol and the corporate sector, bothdirectly through the ownership in the non-banking financial institutions,but indirectly we hear about pressure on the FSS and the FSC from thechaebol. The parachute model has been mentioned in several respects. Weprobably have to think of Korea being special on the corporate side, interms of the business groups, so if there is any policy recommendation, Iwould definitely say mitigate those special features the chaebol have,improve their transparency, limit their influence more generally in theeconomy. I think that was the main question I had to answer.



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이동걸 선임연구위원우선 최공필 박사님께서 제가 발표한 내용에서 기업지배구조의 환경의 필요성에

대해서 강조했다고 하신 것은 맞는데, 저는 개방의 필요성에 대해서 특별히 강조한

적이 없습니다. 저는 개방론자도 아니고 반대하는 사람도 아닙니다. 개방이라는 것은

다른 개혁( refor m )하고 보조를 맞추어 나가면 족하다고 생각하는 사람입니다.

최박사님께서 제 논문에서 외국자본에 대한 입장을 밝히지 않았으니 밝히라고 하셨

는데, 제가 외국자본에 대해서는 중립적입니다. 저는 외국 자본이 구세주라고 보지도

않고 또 우리나라에 들어와서 해악을 끼치는 악이라고 생각하지도 않습니다. 단지

자본은 자본일 뿐이라고 생각합니다.

이와 관련해서 론스타 문제를 거론하셨습니다. 그런데 론스타와 외환은행 문제는

제가 보기에는 합리적으로 냉정한 논의를 할 수 있는 여건이 아닌 것으로 생각합니다.

지금 감정적인 문제로 되어 있기 때문에 이에 대해서는 발언을 신중하게 할 수밖에

없습니다. 여기서 제가 외국자본에 대한 입장이 중립적이어야 한다고 생각하는 이유

중의 하나는 우리가 개방을 한다면, 론스타건 누가 들어왔건, 어떤 여건에서 들어왔건

돈 벌어서 나가는 외국자본에 대해서 배 아파하면 이건 개방 문제가 아닙니다. 우리

가 일단 개방했다면 돈을 벌어 나가건 실패해서 나가건 그것은 그대로 수용해야

하는데, 지금 론스타 문제의 배경에는, 지금 국민들이 보는 론스타의 해법은 딱

한가지입니다. 한 1조 4천억 투자해서 한 천억 벌어나가든지 손해보고 나가면 딱

좋겠다는 것이 국내 감정인 것 같은데, 어쩌다 보니 돈을 벌어나가고 돈을 벌어

나가니 배가 아프다 보니 여러 가지 문제를 지적하는 것 같습니다. 우리가 냉정한

논의를 하기 위해서는 외국자본에 대한 입장이 매우 중립적이어야 한다는 것을 말씀

드리고 싶습니다. 깊게는 말씀 드리지 않겠습니다만, 론스타의 외환은행 매입이라는

것은, 물론 지금 감정적인 문제로 달리 해석하시는 분들이 많이 있으시지만, 그 당시

2 0 0 3년을 돌이켜 보면 1 9 9 7년 이래 대한민국이 가장 어려웠던 시기입니다. 거꾸로

말하면 1997년을 제외하고 가장 어려웠던 시기의 하나라고 생각하시면 됩니다.

신용카드 시장에서 채권이 90조원이 펑크가 생겨서 국가의 운명이, 금융시장이

휘청휘청 할 때였고, 달리 외국금융기관이나 국내 금융기관이나, 전략적 투자자

(investor)가 아무도 외환은행에 투자를 하고 싶지 않은 상황이고 더 이상 미룰 수

없는 상황에서 내려진 결정이기 때문에 이 부분에 대해서 감정적인 대응은 좀 절제

해야 하는 것이 아니냐고 생각합니다. 그래서 전략적 투자자( s t rat e g ic inve s t or )가

국내에 들어와서 많은 역할을 해 줬으면 좋겠다는 최박사님 말씀을 저도 바랍니다만,

제가 논문에서도 말씀드렸듯이 개방의 효과는 굉장히‘혼합된 결과 ( m i xe d

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re s u lt )’를 보여줬다고 생각합니다. 성공도 있었고, 실패도 있었고. 왜냐하면 우리가

기대했던만큼효과를얻지못했기때문인데, 기대했던효과는‘경쟁적시장( c omp et it ive

ma rket )’을 조정하는 것하고 외국의 선진기술( adva nced knowledge), 노하우

(knowhow)나 기법(technique)이 들어오는 건데, 그리고 외국금융기관들의 역할

모델( roll mo del )을 보여주는 것입니다. 사실상 기업이라는게 쉽게 돈 벌 수 있으면

어렵게 안 벌고 쉽게 버는 것이 속성이거든요. 깨끗한 물에서 놀 수밖에 없던 외국

시장에서 선진화된 금융기관도 국내의 흙탕물에서는 흙탕물에 맞게 행동하는 것이

외국의 금융기관이라고 생각합니다. 이런 점에서 저는 외국금융기관이 국내에 들어

와서‘치사한 속임수(dirty trick )’을 쓰고 속이는( che at i n g ) 것을 많이 봤기 때문에

결국은 누가 들어오느냐가 중요한 것이 아니라, 그 시장(market)에서 어떻게 기능

( play )하게 만드느냐가 중요하다고 생각합니다. 해외자본의 전략적이고 적극적인

역할을 부정하지는 않지만 그것을 유도하기 위해서는 국내 금융시장의 환경이 조성

되어야 한다고 생각하는 사람입니다.

신현송 교수Thank you. For the benefit of our guests, let me speak in English. Thank

you for all the very good comments and the deep interpretations. Both ofyou made a very similar point about the disparity in the power relationshipbetween the firm who issues the promissory notes and the firm that mustuse is it to fund its production and I think one can put it in both a mutualeconomic sense, but also in terms of political economy. In a mutual sense,any relationship has a surplus, and the question is how that surplus is to bedivided between the interested parties. Of course, if that surplus is taken byone of the parties, it is a very uneven relationship. One can also describethis in terms of the power relationship of a very strong economic actor whocan demand a larger proportion of the surplus in the bargaining relationship.Then clearly this is something that is one-sided. I think these are wellknown and well acknowledged shortcomings of the promissory note system.I would like to take you back to the first slide I started with, which was theslide in Ragu Rajan’s paper with Luigi Zingales on the corporate balancesheets of the advanced countries. If you recall, the most important featureof that was the very large equity base of the small firm sector in theadvanced countries. And the question is how we can go from here, to there.



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As I said in my presentation, the promissory note system was very much atransitionary device, to build up the length of the production chain to gofrom shoes, to computer chips in a space of 20 to 30 years. But any usefuleconomic system will have a tendency to entrench itself. For example ifyou recall, not so long ago, everyone was using cassette recorders, and ittakes some time make a leap to a higher technology, to CDs, let’s say. Insome ways, once the system starts to work, it becomes entrenched and ittakes a much bigger push to remedy the weaknesses, to remedy the injusticesand the disparities in the power relationship. And I think there we neednational debate. We need greater guidance from policy makers to make thattransition, and it is not going to be easy. As Professor Kim pointed out, oneof the problems with the promissory note system is that whenever a surplusis made, that surplus is taken away in the process of adjusting the length ofmaturity or other types of greater bargaining pressure from the firm that hasissued. So I think such devices as network credit, with credit guarantees,the final product firm can extend, this will in some ways capture some ofthe good points, make the first small steps to escape from the persistentdisparities which tend to reinforce itself as time goes on.

질문 1C lae s s ens 박사님께 질문 드립니다. 우선 위험관리( r i sk ma nag ement )에 관한

질문인데요. 운영위험( op erat ional risk )에관한내용입니다. 규제완화( dere g u lat ion )와

기술진보( t e ch n ical adva nc e )에서 소위 새로운 위험( r i sk )이 발생하고 그로 인해서

‘부문별 점진적인 접근( s e ct oral slow app ro ach )’보다는‘일반적인 관리적 접근

( g eneral risk ma nag ement app ro ach )’이 더 필요하다고 말씀하셨는데 우리가

잘 알다시피 규제완화( dere g u lat ion )와 기술진보( t e ch n ical adva nc e )에 의해서

나타나는 새로운 형태의 위험이라고 한다면 기존의 신용위험이나‘신용유동성 위험

( c re d it liqu id ity risk )’보다는 운영위험( op erat ional risk )이라고 얘기할 수 있습

니다. 박사님께서는‘일반적인 위험관리( g eneral risk ma nag ement )’를 위해서는

대차대조표 정보( b a la nce she et infor mat ion )가 중요하다고 말씀하셨는데, 운영

위험( op erat ion risk )을 우리가 대차대조표( b a la nce she et) 상에서 어떻게 필요한

정보( i n for mat ion )를 추출( ab s t ract) 할 수 있는지에 관한 질문을 드리고 싶습니다.

어떤 측면에서 운영위험은 여전히‘부문위주 접근( s e ct oral cyl i n der app ro ach )’이

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유용한 측면이 있다는 생각을 개인적으로 하고 있습니다.

Gla s s - S t e agall 법과 관련해서 박사님 논문에서 법이 폐기( ab ol i shed) 되었다

고 말씀하시는데, 기본적으로 section20과 31은 삭제되었지만 여전히 s e ct ion 16

과 2 1은 남아 있습니다. 아시겠지만 이것은 s e ct ion 20과 3 2는 은행지주회사

(bank holding comp a ny )와 관련된 것이고, 자회사( s ub s id ia r y )를 이용한 겸업화에

관한 사항이고 여기 남아있는 1 6과 2 1은 i n - house 형태의 통합( c on s ol idat ion )에

관한 사항이라고 말씀드릴 수 있겠습니다. 여전히 남아있는 두 개의 조항은 왜 남아

있는지 또한 어떤 조건하에서 나중에 폐지하라는 요청이 생길 수 있는 건지 그리고

남은 두 개의 조항이 미국의 자본시장의 개발( develop ment )에 저해요인이 되는지

아니면‘도움을주는( help i n g )’측면이있는지여쭙고싶습니다. 또 논문에서 금융위기

게임( f i na nc ial crisis game )이라는 표현이 나옵니다. 그 표현이 혹시나 시장참가자

( ma rket player) 가운데, 재정이익기회추구( t heir own arb it rage opp or tu n it y )를

위해서 인위적인 위험( r i sk )을 선호하는 시장참가자( ma rket player )가 있다는 것을

의미하는 것인지 여쭙고 싶습니다.

질문 2Claessens 박사님께 여쭤보려고 합니다. 금융선진국의 경우를 보면 주요주주나

지배주주가 없는 것으로 나타나고 있습니다. 실질적으로 금융선진국에 가깝고, 특히

서비스 산업에서 금융산업이 차지하는 비중이 높다고 생각합니다. 이런 측면에서

우리나라의 금융시스템도 그런 시스템을 본받아야 할 필요성이 있다고 생각하는데,

개인적인 생각이 어떠신지 궁금합니다. 특히 우리나라 경제가 굉장히 선진화되어

있는 입장에서 볼 때, 시스템적인 모델이 되어야 하는 것은 아닌지 생각합니다. 이에

대해서 견해를 말씀해 주시면 감사하겠습니다.

답변 Claessens 박사(1, 2)Yes, the first question, on operational risk, this is a new concept that is

being introduced and I think that all around the world people are strugglingwith as to how to measure it. Operational risk is not such an easy concept. Ithink eventually as we get more financial conglomerates we are going tohave to think about this more at the overall institutional level. I would pushit even further. Let’s go back to what we are trying to achieve here withcapital requirements more generally. We are trying to induce banks to operate



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safely and we are also trying create systemic stability. If we look atsystemic stability, operational risk, of course, is only one component of it.The whole response of Basel II should probably be more geared towardsidentifying what the risks are to the system. You may have to a lot morewith clearing and settlement or with payment systems, so you may have tostrengthen the operational side and those backbones of the infrastructuremore going forward than we used to do already and maybe that should bethe focus rather than at the individual institutional level.

Your question on Glass-Stegall, parts of it are still in place and parts of itare still valid. Not that the US has done away with unnecessary regulation,there is still some regulation, I think, in the US that is still impeding theoperation, but more on the practical side, some of these structures, like bankholding structures are not always the most efficient to deliver financials e r v i c e s . So we probably could do away with some of these regulations still.Some other ones are there for good reasons. There are conflicts of interestbetween the various components of the banking activities and those wewould not want to do away for. Frankly, I missed your third question in thetranslation. So I have to pass on that one, I’m afraid. The question on theownership structure of financial institutions, probably, yes, we’ll see a movetoward more widely-held financial institutions but I think that is only theright move if we have the proper regulatory and legal requirements in place.So without good shareholder rights, without good transparency, withoutgood disclosure, this widely-held institution ownership structure would notnecessarily be good. In a sense you had that model before. In 1980 here inKorea, you had widely-held financial institutions that were privatized atsome point, but you all had to nationalize those institutions as they raninto trouble because, in some sense, there was no governance in theseinstitutions and that is not what we want either. In order to have widely heldinstitutions you need to have the proper laws in place and I don’t thinkKorea is all the way there, yet. So I would not expect that, not in thes h o r t - r u n .

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질문 3신현송 교수님께 질문 있습니다. 약속어음( p rom i s s ory note) 보다는 상거래신용

( t rade cre d it )이 많이 우리나라에서 사용되고 있고, 재무제표 상에 나타나니까 신규

상장( I PO) 들어가기 전에 정보비대칭( i n for mat ion asymmet r y )이 있는 IT 기업

들이 시장( ma rket )에 신호를 보내기 위해서 신용( c re d it )을 계속 쐈다. 그게 증가가

되었다. 이게 IT 저평가( u n der pric i n g )를 악화시키는 영향을 주거든요? 그래서 저는

대안으로 상거래 신용( t rade cre d it )을 활성화시키고 보증기금을 통해서 정책적으로

보조( s upp or t )하는 것을 생각했습니다. 이에 대한 견해를 듣고 싶습니다.

답변 신현송 박사 3 Trade credit and accounts receivable are the same things. As the small firm

sector becomes financially stronger, it would be more desirable to see thetrade credit reflected much more on their balance sheets. As I showed you inthe opening slides, that is exactly what we see in the balance sheets of thecompanies in the advanced countries. So this would be a very positive sign.

박상용 교수(사회자)혹시 패널 중에 간단한 말씀 추가하실 분 계십니까?

조원동 국장김홍범 교수가 재경부를 언급하셨고, 재경부의 현역은 여기 저밖에 없어서 반응을

보이지 않을 수가 없습니다. 김교수님께서 여러 감독기관들의 분업( d iv i s ion of

labor)에 대해 말씀해 주셨는데, 시장에 관계하는 기관하고 혼동하신 것이 아닌가

생각합니다. 감독기관과 관련해서 우리나라는 금융감독( f i na nc ial sup er v i s ion )에

관한 한 통합적 접근(unified approach)을 택했고 이는 세계에서 몇 안 되는 사례

( c a s e )이기도 합니다. 이런 차원에서 이것이 통합적 접근( u n i f ied app ro ach )이

좋은지, 혹은 분야별 접근(sectional approach)이 좋은지에 대한 것은 국제 금융

체계(international financial architecture) 부문에서 굉장히 중요한 논의 중의

하나입니다. 물론 우리는 통합적 접근(unified approach)을 택하고 있습니다.

그런데 물론 금융감독은, FSC, FSS 기관들이 담당을 하고 있지만 한국은행이나

예금보험공사 또 제가 몸담고 있는 재경부 등, 이런 기관들간에 분업( d iv i s ion of

labor)이 분명이 있어야 되겠죠. 그런데 명분상으로는 있다고 봅니다. 그러나 그런



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것이 때때로 불투명( blu r )해지는 현상이 있다고 생각합니다. 그러면서 이런 현상들은

아까 이동걸 박사께서 말씀하신 대로 여러 가지 우리나라가 카드채 등을 처리하면서

이런 접근(approach)이 될 수밖에 없었던 그런 어떤 현실적인 면도 이해를 해주셨

으면 좋겠다는 말씀을 드립니다. 한 가지만 최공필 박사께서 말씀하신 왜 I M F나

OE C D나 이런 국제기구들이 한국의 부동산대책에 대해서 이렇게 침묵하고 큰 일이

아니지 않느냐 하는 태도를 보이는 것에 대해서 좀 불만족스러운 말씀을 하셨는데,

실제로 저는 어떻게 보면 I M F나 OE C D의 이런 미션팀( m i s s ion team)이 왔을 적에

그것을 맞이하는 실무자(receiving end)입니다. 그 쪽의 얘기를 들어보면 오히려

한국이 이런 어떤 부동산 대책이라고 마치 거시수준( mac ro level )으로 올려서

정책을 쓰는 것에 대해서 오히려 불만스럽게 생각하는 부분이 있습니다. 왜냐하면

이것이 그나마 어떻게 보면, 고립(isolate)된 현상이라고 생각할 수 있는데 이것을

어떻게 전국적인 현상으로 생각을 하고 더군다나 거시수준( mac ro level )이라고 생각

해서 어떻게 그런 정책을 쓸 수 있느냐, 그런 대책을 논의를 해야 하느냐에 대해서

의아스럽게 생각하는 점이 있었습니다. 오히려 저희가 그런 면에서 한국의 특수한

사정 같은 것들을 설명하는 데 애를 먹었다는 것을 말씀드리고 싶습니다.

김홍범 교수조원동 국장께서 좋은 말씀을 해주셔서 대답드리자면, 제가 시장에서 기구와

감독기구를 혼동한 것 같다는 말씀을 하셨는데 이해가 안되는 말씀입니다. 저는 우리

나라가 통합감독기구체계를 갖고 있다는 것을 너무 잘 알고 있고, 그런 의미에서

통합적 접근( u n i f ied app ro ach )을 한다는 것을 잘 알고 있습니다. 그런데 제가 아까

분권시스템( de c ent ralized sys t em )이라고 말씀을 드렸을 때, 그것은 우리나라에서

K DIC는 예금보험을, FSC, FSS는 감독을, 한국은행( BOK )은 통화정책을, MOF E는

정부의 부처로서 금융에 관한 최종책임을 지는 분업구조를 갖고 있습니다. 말하자면

이 5가지 기구가, 또는 4개의 기구가 금융안정망을구성하고 있는 요소( c omp onent )

역할을 하고 있다는 얘기입니다. 그래서‘안정망을 구성하는 기관( s a fet y - net

i n s t itut ion s )’이라는 얘기입니다. 이들간의 협력과 견제가 굉장히 중요하다는 의미

에서 분권시스템( de c ent ralize sys t em )이라고 말씀을 아까 드렸는데 아마 혼란이

있지 않으셨나 생각이 듭니다.

사실은 카드사태 때를 보아도 MOF E가 내수정책을 일단 포기를 한 상태에서 다른

공공기관 ( publ ic ag enc ie s )들이 전부 그쪽으로 갑자기‘방향을 전환( tu r n

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around)’했어요. 그 당시에 정책에 있어서, 카드 이거 문제 없다 이렇게 나가다가

2 0 0 2년 7월달 쯤에 완전히 바뀌었습니다. 저는 이것을 일종의 쏠림행태( herd

b eh av ior )라고 생각합니다. 시장( ma rket )에서 금융회사들만 쏠림행동을 하는 것이

아니라, 공공영역( publ ic sect or )에서도 공공기관들( publ ic ag enc ie s )이 쏠림

행동을 보인다. 이렇게 저는 생각을 합니다. 이건 사실(fact)이기 때문에 조국장도

반박을 못하실 것으로 생각합니다. 가계 부채의 경우에도 요새 갑자기 문제가 되니까

여론에서 갑자기 떠들게 되는데 이것도 쏠림현상이라고 생각합니다.

박상용 교수(사회자)금융감독기구의 문제도 첨예한 이슈이고 외국자본 문제, 금산분리문제, 재벌

문제, 이런 것들이 모두 중요한 현안 이슈인데, 오늘 노동( lab or )에 관한 이슈는

나오지 않았습니다. 단지 이것에 대하여 토론하면 더 재미있는 토론이 되었을 것이

라고 생각합니다만, 시간이 없어서 이 주제에 관해서는 이만 마쳐야 할 것 같습니다.

감사합니다.



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한국금융연구원(KIF) 발간물 현황

1. 정기간행물

■ 주 간○ 주간 금융브리프

■ 계 간○ 금융동향 : 분석과전망○ Korean Econom ic and Fina nc ial Rev iew

■ 연 2회간○ 한국경제의분석○ 경제전망시리즈

2. 연구 발간물

■ 연구보고서2 0 0 6 - 0 2 '93 SNA에따른 분기별 거시경제모형: KIF05Q, 2006.5./박종규2 0 0 6 - 0 1 산업·금융자본결합규제에관한 연구, 2006.5./김동환2 0 0 4 - 0 1 국채경매방식이경매수입에미치는 영향, 2004.7./김경록·오성환2 0 0 3 - 0 3 담보대출제도에관한 연구, 2003.12./김동환2 0 0 3 - 0 2 기업 지배구조와금융기관의역할, 2003.8./장대홍2 0 0 3 - 0 1 한국 통화위기의성격과 발생 원인에 대한 연구, 2003.5./이충렬2 0 0 2 - 0 2 벤처기업과인터넷기업의한국형 가치평가모형의개발, 2002.10./오세경2 0 0 2 - 0 1 선행지표를이용한 실물경제 예측시스템의개발, 2002.7./최공필2 0 0 1 - 0 1 은행의 재무건전성분석 및 예측, 2001.7./손상호9 9 - 0 1 은행과 기업의 관계와 금융시스템의향방, 1999.5./김동환9 8 - 0 2 기업합병과인수의 경제적 동기와 기업가치 증대요인, 1998.9./강준구9 8 - 0 1 생명보험상품의가격자유화와계약자 배당제도, 1998.2./구본성9 7 - 0 5 겸업은행제도의도입에 대한 연구, 1997.11./김선호9 7 - 0 4 우리나라 은행산업의경쟁력과 M&A, 1997.8./이창규외9 7 - 0 3 은행의 기업통제 역할, 1997.8./전성훈9 7 - 0 2 금융산업에대한 행정규제의합리화 방안, 1997.4./송희준9 7 - 0 1 스왑거래에관한 법적 연구, 1997.2./김건식9 6 - 0 9 금융기관의지급보증, 1996.12./박상용9 6 - 0 8 고용보험제도의일반균형적분석, 1996.12./김병덕9 6 - 0 7 주가지수선물을활용한 자산운용전략, 1996.12./김성우9 6 - 0 6 은행의 위험가중자본규제와유상증자, 1996.12./강효석9 6 - 0 5 APEC 지역에서의자본이동성변화와 한국경제, 1996.11./남종현외

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9 6 - 0 4 은행합병의이론과 분석, 1996.11./양원근9 6 - 0 3 한국경제의모형과 예측, 1996.8./박원암9 6 - 0 2 우리나라 은행의 리엔지니어링, 1996.7./김병연·지동현외9 6 - 0 1 개인연금제도정착을 위한 정책방안 연구, 1996.6./김원식9 5 - 0 4 우리나라 은행의 내부금리제도, 1995.11./지동현9 5 - 0 3 우리나라 은행자산의증권화에 관한 연구, 1995.9./신성환외9 5 - 0 2 자본자유화의영향과 정책대응에관한 연구, 1995.9./함상문9 5 - 0 1 한국기업의해외증권 발행 및 유통시장에관한 연구, 1995.3./김동순9 4 - 0 5 증권산업과주식시장의효율성에관한 연구, 1994.10./박경서9 4 - 0 4 기업경쟁력과지배구조, 1994.10./정광선9 4 - 0 3 시중은행과지방은행의수익성과자금효율성 비교분석, 1994.8./김태혁9 4 - 0 2 비은행금융기관의발전방향, 1994.6./김병주외9 4 - 0 1 우리나라의자금순환 금융모형, 1994.4./박재하9 3 - 0 5 금융세제의문제점과 개선방향, 1993.11./이명훈9 3 - 0 4 우리나라 통화금융정책의추이, 1993.11./오성환9 3 - 0 3 우리나라 은행의 자산부채종합관리, 1993.9./지동현9 3 - 0 2 자금조달의자본구조와투자행태에미치는 영향, 1993.8./김규형9 3 - 0 1 은행산업의진입규제와구조조정, 1993.3./김동원

■ 정책조사보고서2 0 0 7 - 0 1 F TA와 금융산업의경쟁력, 2007.2./김자봉·하준경·이석호·구정한2 0 0 6 - 0 5 자산운용업특화 금융허브 구축방안, 2006.12./박재하2 0 0 6 - 0 4 자본시장 관련법 통합에 따른 금융법 통합의 기본방향과 주요과제,

2 0 0 6 . 7 . /이지언·구본성2 0 0 6 - 0 3 신용정보업의현안과 정책 과제, 2006.6./정재욱·이상제·남재현2 0 0 6 - 0 2 채무면제·채무유예금융 서비스와정책 과제, 2006.2./이상제2 0 0 6 - 0 1 역모기지 활성화 방안, 2006.1./강종만·이석호2005-04 금융지주회사의효율적 운용을 위한 제도개선 방안 연구, 2005.12/

이건범·김우진2 0 0 5 - 0 3 금융회사의내부통제기능정착방안, 2005.12./손상호2 0 0 5 - 0 2 통합금융법의제정 논의와 과제, 2005.10./구본성2 0 0 5 - 0 1 금융겸업화의가능성과한계, 2005.9./손상호·구본성·임병철·김자봉·

남재현·이석호2 0 0 4 - 0 5 자금중개시장의현황과 과제, 2004.12./서근우2 0 0 4 - 0 4 금융감독방식의선진화 방안, 2004.9./손상호2 0 0 4 - 0 3 가계신용증가의경제적 영향, 2004.6./최공필·이명활·이병윤·이건범2 0 0 4 - 0 2 금융기업 결합 심사방안 연구, 2004.4./이병윤·김우진2 0 0 4 - 0 1 신용불량자급증의 원인과 대책, 2004.4./최공필·이명활·이건범·임병철

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2 0 0 3 - 0 9 잠재성장률및 성장잠재력의추이와 시사점, 2003.12./최공필2 0 0 3 - 0 8 고객주의의무도입 방안 연구, 2003.12./이상제·이장영·강임호2 0 0 3 - 0 7 개인 신용정보시장인프라 개선방안, 2003.12./임병철2 0 0 3 - 0 6 한국금융산업의발전과제, 2003.9./최흥식·권재중·구본성2 0 0 3 - 0 5 국민의 정부 5년 -금융·기업구조개혁 종합평가-, 2003.6./이상제·

김우진2 0 0 3 - 0 4 전자금융거래법제정방향, 2003.4./강임호2 0 0 3 - 0 3 합리적인 은행금리결정시스템정착방안, 2003.3./김상환2 0 0 3 - 0 2 공적자금 회수규모 추정 및 금융부문 상환대책, 2003.2./최흥식외2 0 0 3 - 0 1 우리나라 은행산업의주요 과제와 전망, 2003.2./구본성·김우진2 0 0 2 - 0 5 은행의 소비자금융업진출, 2002.12./김상환·이건범2 0 0 2 - 0 4 보험업법 개정방안, 2002.11./박재식2 0 0 2 - 0 3 최근 가계금융부채의현황과 시사점, 2002.6./최공필·이명활·이건범·

이병윤 ·한상일2 0 0 2 - 0 2 재도약하는금융산업, 2002.6./김병덕·김우진·이상제2 0 0 2 - 0 1 일본경제의위기와 시사점, 2002.5./김동환2 0 0 1 - 0 5 은행위기 조기경보시스템개발, 2001.12./김상환·손상호2 0 0 1 - 0 4 은행 수수료체계선진화 방안, 2001.12./이재연2 0 0 1 - 0 3 은행법 개정방안, 2001.12./강종만·한상일2 0 0 1 - 0 2 프로젝트 금융 투자회사법(가칭) 제정추진방향, 2001.12./강종만2 0 0 1 - 0 1 금융이용자보호에관한법률(가칭)의도입, 2001.7./김병덕·이건범·정재욱2 0 0 0 - 0 7 국경간( C ro s s - b order) 금융서비스 거래 확대에 따른 규제 재정비 방안,

2 0 0 0 . 1 2 . /김정한·차백인2 0 0 0 - 0 6 금융기관 퇴출제도의개선방안에관한 연구, 2000.12./김병덕·손상호·

이지언·정재욱2 0 0 0 - 0 5 은행의 수익성 제고를 통한 경쟁력 강화방안, 2000.11./정지만·지동현2 0 0 0 - 0 4 은행신탁제도발전방향, 2000.11./손상호2 0 0 0 - 0 3 금융지주회사제도개선방향, 2000.7./지동현2 0 0 0 - 0 2 신BIS 기준자기자본비율산출기준의 도입과 과제, 2000.7./김성훈외2 0 0 0 - 0 1 국내은행의지배구조개선방안, 2000.3./김우진9 9 - 1 0 한국 금융시스템재구축 방안, 1999.12.9 9 - 0 9 비은행금융기관의소유 및 지배구조 개선, 1999.12./김세진9 9 - 0 8 금융기관 인허가제도개선방안, 1999.12./권재중9 9 - 0 7 생명보험사의기업공개, 1999.9./최흥식·강종만·정재욱외9 9 - 0 6 자산건전성분류기준 및 대손충당금제도 개편방안, 1999.7./손상호99-05 구속성예금규제제도 개선방안, 1999.5./김병연99-04 종금사 발전방안, 1999.4./김병덕

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9 9 - 0 3 태국 바트화 위기의 원인과 시사점, 1999.3./이장영·송치영9 9 - 0 2 부실자산관리은행( b ad bank) 설립방안, 1999.2./고성수9 9 - 0 1 소프트웨어중심의 금융·기업구조개혁, 1999.2./김우진·남일총9 8 - 0 7 21C 전략산업화를위한 금융산업경쟁력 강화방안, 1998.12./양원근9 8 - 0 6 은행소유 및 경영구조 개선방안, 1998.12./이건호9 8 - 0 5 어음제도의거시경제적기능과 통화정책, 1998.9./최공필외9 8 - 0 4 우리나라 외채의 효율적 관리방안, 1998.6./정한영9 8 - 0 3 금융기관 진입기준의재정립 방안에 관한 연구, 1998.6./김병연·김병덕9 8 - 0 2 여신전문금융업법의이해, 1998.6./김병덕9 8 - 0 1 팩토링제도발전에 관한 연구, 1998.2./서근우·이소한9 7 - 0 7 민간베이스프로젝트파이낸싱의활성화 방안, 1997.9./이장영9 7 - 0 6 여신전문금융기관구조개편방안, 1997.9./서근우·김병덕·김세진9 7 - 0 5 은행의 소유·지배구조에관한 연구, 1997.6./박경서9 7 - 0 4 신용카드업의효율성 제고방안, 1997.4./서근우9 7 - 0 3 기업의 재무구조 개선을 위한 금융 및 조세정책방향, 1997.4./박경서외9 7 - 0 2 국채시장의활성화에 관한 연구, 1997.3./박경서외9 7 - 0 1 은행의 금융상품 표시·광고기준제정에관한 연구, 1997.2./양원근9 6 - 0 9 신용정보 관리제도의현황과 과제, 1996.12./서근우9 6 - 0 8 금융산업의구조개선 방안, 1996.12.9 6 - 0 7 시중은행의금융중개비용구조와특성, 1996.11./김동원9 6 - 0 6 우리나라 벤처캐피탈시장의활성화 방안, 1996.10./고성수9 6 - 0 5 상호신용금고의발전방안, 1996.10./손상호·김병덕9 6 - 0 4 개방경제에서의통화신용정책, 1996.9./박원암9 6 - 0 3 개방시대의금융산업 경쟁력 제고방안, 1996.7.9 6 - 0 2 은행의 예금보험제도도입방안(Ⅱ), 1996.7./박경서·최장봉9 6 - 0 1 어음제도 개선방안, 1996.5./손상호9 5 - 0 3 Money and Banking Sys t em in North Korea, 1995.5./김병주9 5 - 0 2 은행의 예금보험제도도입방안(Ⅰ), 1995.3./박경서9 5 - 0 1 자본자유화의투자다변화효과 : 해외 주식투자의경우, 1995.2./

이창용·박준용9 4 - 0 6 O p ening Up of Stock Ma rkets: Lessons from and for Emerg i n g

E c onom ies, 1994.11./E.Han Kim·Vi jay Singal9 4 - 0 5 금융기관 소유구조 개선방안, 1994.8.94-04 금융개방과정책대응, 1994.6./정기영외9 4 - 0 3 Real Int erest Rates in Korea, 1994.5./이종화외9 4 - 0 2 선별금융제도개선방안, 1994.4./양원근94-01 금융개방의정책적 교훈, 1994.4./박영철·D or nbu sch

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■ 금융조사보고서2 0 0 7 - 0 2 원/달러 환율 예측력 분석에 관한 연구, 2007.3./이윤석2 0 0 7 - 0 1 은행 투자상품의효과적 판매, 2007.2./지동현2 0 0 6 - 1 0 지급결제 안전성에 관한 실증연구, 2006.12./김자봉2 0 0 6 - 0 9 운영리스크추정과 손실분포 적합성 검증, 2006.12./선우석호·전은영2 0 0 6 - 0 8 우리나라 금융시장의쏠림현상, 2006.11./강경훈2 0 0 6 - 0 7 주가지수 선물 및 옵션가격의효율성에 대한 연구, 2006.8./이충언2 0 0 6 - 0 6 최근 전자금융의발전과 주요 이슈, 2006.6./김자봉2 0 0 6 - 0 5 외환시장의구조변화와제도개편에대한 소고, 2006.4./박해식2 0 0 6 - 0 4 인적자본에대한 투자 증가가 금융시장에미치는 영향, 2006.3./하준경2 0 0 6 - 0 3 신용파생상품구조설계와금융회사의위험노출, 2006.2./임병철2 0 0 6 - 0 2 우리나라 금융회사의환경위험관리도입 방안, 2006.2./홍정훈2 0 0 6 - 0 1 경기변동과중소기업 자금조달간의관계에 대한 연구, 2006.1./신용상2 0 0 5 - 1 6 국내보험사의중국 진출 전망과 방안, 2005.12./이석호2 0 0 5 - 1 5 농업금융의특성과 규모의 경제 분석, 2005.12./강종만2 0 0 5 - 1 4 외국자본 진출 확대의 영향과 대응방안, 2005.12./이병윤2 0 0 5 - 1 3 우리나라 은행산업의 스트레스 테스트를 통한 주택대출의 신용위험 관리,

2 0 0 5 . 1 2 . /이지언2 0 0 5 - 1 2 은행지배구조의평가와 과제, 2005.12./박재하2 0 0 5 - 1 1 금융업무의특성과 겸업화 방향, 2005.11./손상호2 0 0 5 - 1 0 저성장기의은행 비즈니스 모델, 2005.10./지동현2 0 0 5 - 0 9 국제자본시장에서의가격결정에관한 연구 : 글로벌주식및 유로채를

중심으로, 2005.9./김동순2 0 0 5 - 0 8 아시아 역내 신용보증기구설립방안, 2005.7./박재하·오규택·이명활2 0 0 5 - 0 7 인구고령화의경제적 영향과 시사점, 2005.6./최공필ㆍ남재현2 0 0 5 - 0 6 외국인투자자의주식투자행태와성과 분석, 2005.6./강종만·이상제2 0 0 5 - 0 5 국내 금융심화와산업성장의관련성에 대한 연구, 2005.6./신용상2 0 0 5 - 0 4 I T투자확대와은행산업의수익성 간의 관계 분석, 2005.6./안종길ㆍ

이명훈ㆍ최창규2 0 0 5 - 0 3 결제통화의환율 변동성이 무역에 미치는 영향, 2005.3/강삼모2 0 0 5 - 0 2 개인구좌제도의 도입을 통한 우리나라 연금시스템의 발전 방안,

2 0 0 5 . 3 . /장동한2 0 0 5 - 0 1 은행시스템의진화에 관한 연구, 2005.1./김동환2 0 0 4 - 0 4 효율적 외환위기 예측시스템의구축 방안, 2004.12./김경수2 0 0 4 - 0 3 국내은행의중국진출 유인과 방안, 2004.11./박해식2 0 0 4 - 0 2 소액전자지급시장의경제학적 이해, 2004.6./강임호2 0 0 4 - 0 1 금융회사집단감독체계의구축방안, 2004.3./최장봉

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2 0 0 3 - 0 9 자산가격 버블이 민간소비에미치는 영향, 2003.12./정한영2 0 0 3 - 0 8 Korea's Fina nc ial and Cor p orate Restructuring, 2003.12./손상호2 0 0 3 - 0 7 중소기업금융의현황과 과제, 2003.12./서근우2 0 0 3 - 0 6 은행산업 시장집중도 증가가 산업간 자원배분에 미치는 영향, 2003.8./

이병윤2 0 0 3 - 0 5 우리나라 기업의 환노출 분석, 2003.8./정찬우2 0 0 3 - 0 4 기업의 재무건전성과은행의 기업고객 전략, 2003.8./권재중·이동걸2 0 0 3 - 0 3 중국 금융제도의발전, 2003.5./박찬일2 0 0 3 - 0 2 외환당국의구두개입 효과분석 : 일본의사례연구, 2003.5./박해식·

송치영2 0 0 3 - 0 1 인터넷전문은행의진입에 관한 연구, 2003.4./강임호2 0 0 2 - 0 8 방카슈랑스가은행의 안전성 및 효율성에 미치는 효과, 2002.12./

정재욱·이지언2 0 0 2 - 0 7 금융위기 이후 신용위축의원인과 통화정책, 2002.10./백웅기2 0 0 2 - 0 6 금융지주회사의설립과 운영, 2002.9./김우진·이건범2 0 0 2 - 0 5 통화선물거래가현물환 가격변동성에미치는 영향력분석, 2002.6./장원창2 0 0 2 - 0 4 자기자본규제와은행경영, 2002.5./김상환2 0 0 2 - 0 3 효율적 은행규제방안에대한 연구, 2002.4./위경우2 0 0 2 - 0 2 국제대부시장의특징 및 최적자금조달에관한 연구, 2002.4./정한영2 0 0 2 - 0 1 중국의 금융시장과주요 이슈, 2002.3./김정한2 0 0 1 - 0 6 T he Early Warning Sys t em for Cu r rency Crises in Korea, 2001.12.

/최공필2 0 0 1 - 0 5 외환위기 이후 원/달러환율의해외충격에대한 민감도 분석, 2001.9.

/박해식2 0 0 1 - 0 4 An Emp i r ical Inve s t i g at ion of the Effic iency and Scale

E c onom ies of Com merc ial Banks in Korea, 2001.9./곽승영외2 0 0 1 - 0 3 A Study of Asian Fina nc ial Crisis and Over - t he - C ou nt er

Ma rket, 2001.8./이봉수2 0 0 1 - 0 2 금융감독체제의개선 방향, 2001.5./안상욱·최흥식2 0 0 1 - 0 1 자본자유화시대하에서 우리나라의 통화 및 환율정책, 2001.5./박해식·

정한영2 0 0 0 - 0 4 자본통제가 금융변수에 미치는 영향 : 태국, 말레이시아 사례 연구,

2 0 0 0 . 1 2 /장원창2 0 0 0 - 0 3 금융부문의비효율성과금융위기, 2000.10./이종화2 0 0 0 - 0 2 예금은행의예대금리차결정요인분석, 2000.9./김상환2 0 0 0 - 0 1 금융기관 부실자산 정리방안, 2000.8./고성수9 9 - 1 3 부실금융기관정리방안, 1999.12./김성훈·김우진

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9 9 - 1 2 Va R를 이용한 포트폴리오위험측정과관리, 1999.11./김성훈9 9 - 1 1 통화안정증권의국채전환에대한 경제적 효과분석, 1999.11./정한영9 9 - 1 0 자본유출입이실질실효환율과외환시장압력에미친 영향, 1999.10./

김정한 외9 9 - 0 9 유로화 도입과 유럽금융제도의변화, 1999.9./임준환9 9 - 0 8 변동환율제하에서미시구조적정보를 이용한 원/달러 환율의 단기변동 분

석, 1999.9./박해식외9 9 - 0 7 여신사후관리의개선, 1999.7./손상호9 9 - 0 6 금융구조조정의중간평가및 향후과제, 1999.6./김우진·차백인·이건호9 9 - 0 5 T he Korean Exper ience with Fina nc ial Crisis: A Chronolo g y ,

1 9 9 9 . 6 . /최공필9 9 - 0 4 중소기업 신용평가체제개선방안, 1999.5./손상호·김동환9 9 - 0 3 신용파생상품의이해와 위험관리에의활용, 1999.4./이건호9 9 - 0 2 미국의 예금금융기관부실경영에대한처벌및 제재시스템, 1999.3./이재연99-01 국내은행의신용위험 관리체제 개선방안, 1999.2./이건호9 8 - 0 4 국가별 금융구조조정사례연구, 1998.9./고성수9 8 - 0 3 신용경색과은행대출 개선방안, 1998.6./지동현9 8 - 0 2 은행의 위기관리시스템도입 및 활용방안, 1998.2./함유근9 8 - 0 1 은행의 적정 점포수에 관한 연구, 1998.2./지동현9 7 - 1 5 북구3국의부실채권 정리사례, 1997.12./고성수9 7 - 1 4 F i na nc ial Crisis in East Asia and Pro sp e cts for Recover y ,

1 9 9 7 . 1 2 . / Rud i g er Dor nbu sch9 7 - 1 3 은행경영평가제도에관한 연구, 1997.12./김병연9 7 - 1 2 영업점 평가제도 개선방향, 1997.12./고성수9 7 - 1 1 E xchange Rate Pol icy for Developing Cou nt r ies, 1997.12./Anne

O . K r ue g er9 7 - 1 0 국내 부실은행의경영전략 수립방안, 1997.11./지동현9 7 - 0 9 금융산업 개편에 따른 종금사의 전략적 포지셔닝, 1997.10./김병덕9 7 - 0 8 제4단계 금리자유화와은행경영, 1997.8./지동현9 7 - 0 7 한미양국 은행의 수익성 비교 분석, 1997.8./지동현9 7 - 0 6 우리나라 은행의 만기대응 내부금리제도도입방안, 1997.7./윤석헌9 7 - 0 5 일본의 금융빅뱅, 1997.7./김동환9 7 - 0 4 금융거래전자화를위한 하부구조구축: 현황 및 과제, 1997.7./김병연9 7 - 0 3 은행가치평가, 1997.6./지동현9 7 - 0 2 금융환경변화와금융제도의안정성, 1997.5./박경서9 7 - 0 1 Key Int er nat ional Monetary Pol icy Issues at the Turn of the

C entury, 1997.2./M. Gu it ia n

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9 6 - 0 4 단기금융시장개선방안, 1996.12./이태봉9 6 - 0 3 금융산업 정보화의 과제와 전략, 1996.11./함유근9 6 - 0 2 환율제도와원/달러 환율의 변동성, 1996.11./정찬우9 6 - 0 1 일본의 부실금융정책과시사점, 1996.8./고성수9 5 - 0 9 최근의 금융시장 동향 및 금융소득종합과세의영향, 1995.10.9 5 - 0 8 금리자유화가경제에 미친 영향, 1995.8.9 5 - 0 7 W h at Does the Ha l i fax Com mu n ique Imply for the Int er nat iona l

F i na nc ial Sys t em?, 1995.11./Stanley Fisher9 5 - 0 6 우리나라 일반은행의성과분석과구조조정, 1995.8./유관희9 5 - 0 5 자산시장과거시정책, 1995.7./이양팔9 5 - 0 4 유럽통화통합의문제점과전망, 1995.5./채희율9 5 - 0 3 E c onom ic Reforms of India, Latin Amer ica and the Po s t

C om munist Cou nt r ies, 1995.4./Jef fery Sach s9 5 - 0 2 지방 투금사의 종금사 전환에 따른 금융시장의변화, 1995.1./유극렬9 5 - 0 1 멕시코 금융위기의배경 및 교훈, 1995.1./송치영외9 4 - 0 1 자본시장개방과한국의 실질이자율, 1994.11./이종화

■ 기타 보고서

◎ 일반 보고서•지속적 경제발전을위한 금융의 역할, 2007.3.•4개 시중은행의바젤 Ⅱ 추진 현황과 향후 과제, 2007.2./송연수•지급결제제도의이해, 2006.9./지급결제연구회•사모투자펀드(PEF) 활성화: 현황 평가와 향후 과제, 2006.6./임병철·김자봉•증권사의소액결제시스템참여에대한평가와과제, 2006.6./지동현·구본성·김자봉•금융투자업의이해상충 문제와 시사점, 2006.6./구본성·구정한·이명활•한국경제어떻게 보고, 어떻게대응할 것인가, 2006.6./조윤제•해외 대안금융기관의현황과 시사점, 2006.4./정찬우•주요국의퇴직연금 현황과 시사점, 2005.8./남재현•신용카드시장의현황과 과제, 2005.3/정찬우•디지털 금융의 이해, 2003.9./강임호외•유럽 자본시장 및 결제시스템의주요 변화, 2003.5./곽선호·이경형•금융상품의법률관계, 2003.2./함귀용•아르헨티나공기업의 민영화와 시사점, 2002.12./강종만•I M F자금 조기상환의의미와 향후과제, 2001.12./최흥식·박해식·박종규•자본이동과환율변동 : 분석 및 예측, 2001.12./김정한·박해식·장원창·차백인•한국 금융산업의과거·현재·미래, 2001.11.•은행 자산관리 및 은행 경영전략, 2001.9.

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•금융소비자보호제도의실태조사결과및 개선 방향, 2001.9./김우진외•미·일 자본시장의구조 및 변화, 2001.7./이경형외•은행구조조정및 사이버뱅킹, 2000.9. •동남아 주요국의 금융제도, 1999.12./이광상외•금융기관의내부통제 제도, 1999.12.•자산건전성분류 사례집, 1999.11./손상호·김동환외•은행산업연봉제 도입방안, 1999.11./김병연외•가치경영을통한 은행의 경영혁신, 1998.7./지동현·함유근•F i na nc ial Lib era l i z at ion and Opening in East Asia, 1998.3.•금융정보화의추진방안, 1998.3./지동현·함유근•국제화 환경에서의금융개혁, 1998.2.•금융지주회사제도에관한연구, 1998.2./박경서·김선호•스웨덴의금융위기와정부의 지원정책, 1997.12./이장영·박해식외•경제자유화와자본자유화, 1997.12./이천표•개방시대의금융산업 경쟁력 제고방안, 1997.6.•전자기술의발달과 은행산업의미래(CD Rom 포함), 1997.3.•외국의 은행합병현황, 1996.9./김병연·박경서외•남미 주요국의 금융제도, 1996.8./이경형·정승원외•우리나라사금융시장에관한 연구, 1996.8./박영철·양원근외•체제전환국의금융제도, 1995.4.•외환제도개혁연구, 1994.11.•금융제도개편연구, 1993.12.•외환시장하부구조 구축을 위한 연구, 1993.9.•외국환관리법공청회, 1991.10.

◎ 자료 보고서•2 0 0 5년도 K I F금융논단 모음집, 2005.12.•2 0 0 4년도 K I F금융논단 모음집, 2004.12.•2 0 0 4년도 K I F은행경영브리프모음집, 2004.12.•2 0 0 4년도 K I F국제금융 : 동향과구조변화, 2004.12.•2 0 0 3년도 K I F금융논단 모음집, 2004.2.•2 0 0 3년도 K I F은행경영브리프모음집, 2004.2.•2 0 0 3년도 K I F국제금융 : 동향과구조변화, 2004.2.•2 0 0 2년도 K I F금융논단모음집, 2003.2.•2 0 0 2년도 K I F은행경영브리프모음집, 2003.2.•2 0 0 2년도 K I F국제금융: 동향과구조변화, 2003.2.•K I F금융논단 모음집 2001, 2002.2.

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•K I F은행경영브리프모음집 2001, 2002.2.•국제금융: 동향과구조변화 2001, 2002.2.•경제이슈분석Ⅰ(1998.7~1999.9), 2001.12./최공필•금융부문현안 과제( 1 9 9 8년 하반기~ 2 0 0 0년 상반기), 2001.8.•K I F금융논단 모음집 1999~2000, 2000.12.•K I F은행경영브리프모음집 1999~2000, 2000.12.•국제금융: 동향과구조변화 1999~2000, 2000.12.•K I F금융논단 모음집 96~98, 1998.12.•KIF 금융논문집제2집, 1998.12.•KIF Stud ies in Fina nc ial & Monetary Issues 96~98, 1998.12.•국제금융해외논단 96~98, 1998.12.•국제금융: 동향과구조변화 96~98, 1998.12.•K I F금융논단 모음집, 1997.2.•KIF 금융논문집제1집, 1997.1.•KIF Stud ies in Fina nc ial & Monetary Issues, 1997.2.•국제금융해외논단, 1997.3.•국제금융: 동향과구조변화, 1997.3.

■ Working Pa per 2006-02 B a rgaining Power and Delay in Bankruptcy Ne got iat ion ,

2 0 0 6 . 1 2 . /서병호2 0 0 6 - 0 1 Money, Price Level and Output in the Chinese Mac ro Economy ,

2006.2. /Gre gory C. Chow2005-10 F i na nc ial Dep en dence, Growth Opp or tu n it ies, and Indu s t r ia l

Growth in Korea, 2005.11./신용상2 0 0 5 - 0 9 D i sclo s u re Ma n ipu lat ion and Ela s t ic ity of Int er t emp ora l

S ub s t itut ion, 2005.11./김자봉2005-08 Por t fol io Decisions and the Opt i mal Deduct ible for an Insura nc e

Pol icy, 2005.9./장인원외2005-07 A Road map for the Asian Exchange Rate Me chanism :

A Com mon Cu r rency App ro ach, 2005.8./최공필2005-06 Home Pro duct ion Mo del and Foreign Trade: The Case of the

Korean Economy, 2005.5./남재현2005-05 S o c ial Gover na nce, Growth Pa radigm, and Mismatch Problem s ,

2 0 0 5 . 2 . /최공필2005-04 W hy Con s u mpt ion Growth Exc e e dcd GDP Growth in Korea? :

A Bubble App ro ach, 2005.2./정한영

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2005-03 T he Dol lar and the Pol icy Mix Redux, 2005.2./Barry Eichen g re en 2005-02 Jap a nese Vocal Int er vent ion and the Yen / Dol lar Exch a n g e ,

2 0 0 5 . 2 . /박해식·송치영2 0 0 5 - 0 1 O r t ho gona l ity Con d it ions of Instruments in the First-and

S e c ond- Order App rox i mat ions, 2005.1./김자봉2 0 0 4 - 0 8 R obust N-Asympt ot ic Estimat ion in Short Dyna m ic Pa nel

Mo del, 2004.12./김자봉2 0 0 4 - 0 7 T he Fre e - F lo ating Exchange Rate Sys t em, Real Exchange Rat e

M i s a l i g n ment, and Lon g - Term Exchange Rate Risk, 2004.11./강삼모2 0 0 4 - 0 6 D ebt - d r iven Recession and Sys t em ic Risks in the Kore a n

Banking Sect or, 2004.7./최공필2 0 0 4 - 0 5 T he Home Pro duct ion Puzzle: The Role of Hu man Cap ital and

A d j u s t ment Cost, 2004.6./남재현2 0 0 4 - 0 4 Bank Merg ers and De Novo Banks: A Sys t em Evolut iona r y

App ro ach, 2004.6./김동환·M ich ael Jer i s on2 0 0 4 - 0 3 S ever ity of Per s onal Del i nquency Problem in Korea and It s

I mpl ic at ions, 2004.6./최공필2 0 0 4 - 0 2 Bu i lding a Set t lement Infra s t r uctu re for the Asian Bon d

Ma rkets: Asia S et t le, 2004.2./박재하·오규택·박대근·이창용2 0 0 4 - 0 1 F i na nc ial Stab i l ity of a Small Open Economy under Cre d it

C on s t ra i nts, 2004.1./최공필2 0 0 3 - 0 6 Korea as an Int er nat ional Fina nc ial Hub, 2003.12./이장영2 0 0 3 - 0 5 T he Impl ic at ions of Globalized Fina nce for Growth and Stab i l it y

in Emerging Econom ies, 2003.11./최공필2 0 0 3 - 0 4 D eveloping the Asian Bond Ma rkets using Secu r it i z at ion and

C re d it Gua ra ntees, 2003.10./오규택·박재하2 0 0 3 - 0 3 S t a n da rd i z at ion of Ele ct ron ic Money, 2003.5./강임호·김정유2 0 0 3 - 0 2 F i na nc ial Sect or Reform in Korea: A Sys t em ic Risk App ro ach ,

2 0 0 3 . 4 . /이장영2 0 0 3 - 0 1 Changes in Ma rket Volat i l ity and Risk Prem ia in the Kore a n

S t o ck and Opt ions Ma rkets in the Aft er math of Sept emb er 11th,2 0 0 3 . 3 . /한상일·강장구·윤창현

2 0 0 2 - 0 4 W h at will be the Main Indic at ors of a Debt Crisis in East Asia nC ou nt r ies?, 2002.12./정한영·이상제

2 0 0 2 - 0 3 CMI Con d it iona l ity and Post-CMI Arch it e ctu re, 2002.9./최공필·장원창

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2 0 0 2 - 0 2 An Early Warning Sys t em for Cont ag ious Cu r rency Crisis,2 0 0 2 . 5 . /최공필

2 0 0 2 - 0 1 R efle ct ions on Fiscal Pol icy React ions to the Korean Econom icCrisis, 2002.4./박종규

2 0 0 1 - 0 6 C omp a r i s on of Monetary Pol icy Ru les for a Fina nc ia l lyVu l nerable Economy : The Case of Korea, 2001.12./최공필

2 0 0 1 - 0 5 Post-Crisis Fina nc ial Develop ment in Korea and Challenges forMonetary Pol icy, 2001.12./최공필

2 0 0 1 - 0 4 D iver s i f ied Bu s i ness Groups and Diver s i f ic at ion Va lue inD evelop ment Cou nt r ies, 2001.12./이건범

2 0 0 1 - 0 3 T he Va luat ion of Caps, Flo ors and Swapt ions in a Mu lt i - Fact orS p ot - R ate Mo del, 2001.8./Sandra Pet er s on 외

2 0 0 1 - 0 2 T he Term Structu re of Int ere s t - R ate Futu res Prices, 2001.7./R ich a rd C. Staplet on 외

2 0 0 1 - 0 1 Case Study of Daewoo Restructuring, 2001.2./이동걸2 0 0 0 - 0 4 G over na nce Structu re of Korean Banks, 2000.11./정해왕·김우진2 0 0 0 - 0 3 F i na nc ial Alt er nat ives for the North Korean Develop ment ,

2 0 0 0 . 8 . /이장영2 0 0 0 - 0 2 Was Korea's Fina nc ial Crisis Sel f - Fulfilling, 2000.4./최공필·박원암2 0 0 0 - 0 1 Monetary and Fina nc ial Pol ic ies in Korea aft er the Crisis,

2 0 0 0 . 2 . /이장영9 9 - 0 7 Non - Per forming Loans in Korea's Fina nc ial Sect or and

R e s t r ucturing Costs, 1999.10./권재중외9 9 - 0 6 Cu r rency Bloc and its Evolut ion in Asia: Fo cusing on the Yen ,

1999.8. /김동환9 9 - 0 5 T he Relat ion sh ip bet we en Developed Equ ity Ma rkets and the

Pac i f ic Basin's Emerging Equ ity Ma rkets, 1999.7./차백인외9 9 - 0 4 S t o ck Ma rket React ions to Bank Industry Restructuring: the

Korean Exper ience of 1997 and 1998, 1999.5./강종만외9 9 - 0 3 T he Asian Fina nc ial Crisis and the Bala nce She ets of Banking

and Cor p orate Sect ors, 1999.5./곽승영9 9 - 0 2 I nt erdep en dence Bet we en Developed Equ ity Ma rkets and Asia -

Pac i f ic Emerging Equ ity Ma rkets, 1999.4./차백인9 9 - 0 1 T he Tra n s m i s s ion of Pricing Infor mat ion of Dua l ly - l i s t e d

S t o cks, 1999.2./차백인외9 8 - 0 3 C ro s s - B order Cap ital Flows and Asset Price Volat i l ity: The Case

of Korea, 1998.12./최공필·송치영

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9 8 - 0 2 Hong Kong's Inflat ion under the Linked Exchange Rate Sys t em ,1998.11. /차백인

9 8 - 0 1 T he East Asian Fina nc ial Crisis: A Year Lat er, 1998.8./박영철외9 7 - 0 4 I nve s t or's Myop ia and Cycl ial Ex-post Returns, 1997.12./구본성외9 7 - 0 3 C ent ral Bank Indep en dence and Inflat ion and Output

Va r iab i l ity: The Role of an Exchange Rate Goal, 1997.6.9 7 - 0 2 Forecasting Per for ma nce of Emp i r ical Monetary Exchange Rat e

Mo dels Revised, 1997.5./차백인외9 7 - 0 1 T he Short-run Dyna m ics of a Small Open Economy's Exter na l

D ebt, 1997. 5./차백인9 6 - 0 8 B id - A sk Spre ad and Arb it rage Prof it ab i l ity, 1996.12./함상문9 6 - 0 7 Monetary Bands and Monetary Neut ra l ity, 1996.12./배기홍외9 6 - 0 6 T he Fina ncing Hiera rchy and the Role of Banks: Ev idence from

t he Korean Bank-Loan Ma rket, 1996.11./고성수9 6 - 0 5 A New Me a s u re of the Effe ct ive Bid - A sk Spre ad, 1996.9./김성훈9 6 - 0 4 T he Role of Col lat eral in the Bank-Loan Ma rket, 1996.7./고성수9 6 - 0 3 A General Equ i l ibr ium Ana lysis of the Ret i rement Benef it s

P ro g ram, 1996.6./김병덕9 6 - 0 2 O pt i mal Secu r ity Design for a New Firm, 1996.4./위경우9 6 - 0 1 Is There Mean Rever s ion in the ERM?, 1996.2./정찬우9 5 - 0 4 O pt i mal Ta rg et Zones and Price Va r iab i l ity, 1995.11./정찬우9 5 - 0 3 On the Relat ion bet we en Bu s i ness Cycles and Stock Ma rket

Volat i l ity, 1995.10./이충언9 5 - 0 2 T he Real Exchange Rate and the Cu r rent Accou nt Bala nce in

Japan, 1995.9./송치영9 5 - 0 1 C ou ntry Fund's Prem iums and Disc ou nts, 1995.2./김동순9 4 - 0 6 C re d it Ma rket Signalling Equ i l ibr ia Un der Fixed and Free Loan

R ate Regulat ions, 1994.1./윤석헌9 4 - 0 5 주가수익률 변화와 관련한 주가의 단기 과민반응에 대한 증권분석,

1994.10. /김진호·김동순9 4 - 0 4 E x i s t ence of Insura nce Ma rket Equ i l ibr ium Un der a Non -

P rop or t ional Indem n ity Pol icy, 1994.8./장유성9 4 - 0 3 금리와 인플레이션간의관계분석, 1994.7./김세진외9 4 - 0 2 국내 금리의 장기 피셔효과및 실질금리의정상성 분석, 1994.7./김진호9 4 - 0 1 Evolut ionary Changes in the Institut ional Fra mework of the

Jap a nese Banking and Fina nce, 1994.6./Shoichi Roya ma9 3 - 0 9 Fa i rly Priced Dep o s it Insura nce, Inc ent ive Comp at ible

R e g u lat ions and Bank Asset Choices, 1993.10./윤석헌외

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9 3 - 0 8 C or p orate Merg ers and Acqu i s it ions: A Bargaining Game ,1 9 9 3 . 9 . /박경서

9 3 - 0 7 T he Shift of Equ i l ibr ium Inve s t ment by the Ex-Post Asymmet r icI n for mat ion, 1993.12./이승엽

9 3 - 0 6 R eturn Pre d ict ab i l ity and the Time Varying Risk Prem iums inC om mo d ity and Fina nc ial Futu res Ma rkets, 1993.11./윤창현

9 3 - 0 5 Is Te ch n ical Ana lysis Us eful? Econom ic Eva luat ions of OLS, Neu ra lNet work and Moving Average Trading Ru les, 1993.11./신성환

9 3 - 0 4 A s s et Prices and Trading Strat e g ies under Different ia lI n for mat ion, 1993. 11./이건호

9 3 - 0 3 Money and Int erest in a Simple Pro duct ion Economy Structu reof Fina nc ial Sys t ems, 1993.11./함상문

9 3 - 0 2 S t e ady - s t ate Prob ab i l it ies under Non - add it iv ity, 1993.10./유극렬9 3 - 0 1 E xchange Risks, For wa rd Ma rkets and Prices, 1993.7./곽노성9 2 - 1 1 Loan Mon it oring, Comp et it ion and Socia l ly Opt i mal Bank

C ap ital Regulat ions, 1992.12./윤석헌외9 2 - 1 0 P ro sp e cts for Banking Industry in Korea, 1992.10./이재웅9 2 - 0 9 T he Jap a nese Banking Sys t em App ro aching the 21st Centu r y ,

1992. 10./Yo sh io Susuki9 2 - 0 8 Eu ropean Banking, Int e g rat ion or Frag ment at ion, 1992.10./ Je a n

D er m i ne9 2 - 0 7 R e s t r ucturing the US Banking Industry Towa rds the 21st

C entury, 1992. 10./Ant hony Sau n der s9 2 - 0 6 A Fra mework for the Opt i mum, 1992.10./Ingo Wa lt er9 2 - 0 5 I nc reased Risk i ness and the Demand for Insura nce, 1992.9./

장유성9 2 - 0 4 은행산업의금융자율화와국제경쟁력, 1992.9./정지만9 2 - 0 3 C ap ital Movement, Real Asset Specu lat ion, and Mac ro e c onom ic

A d j u s t ment in Korea, 1992.9./박영철외9 2 - 0 2 T he Role of Fina nce in Econom ic Develop ment in South Kore a

and Ta iwan, 1992.8./박영철9 2 - 0 1 E x p ort-Led Growth and Econom ic Lib era l i z at ion in Sout h

Korea, 1992. 8./박영철

■ K I F금융PAPER 9 9 - 0 2 고객정보시스템구축 및 활용전략, 1999.1./함유근·정철용9 9 - 0 1 Va R의 이해와 국내금융기관의Va R시스템 구축방안, 1999.1./이건호

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9 8 - 0 1 고객정보를 활용한 은행 데이터 베이스 마케팅 전략에 관한 연구,1 9 9 8 . 6 . /박찬욱

9 7 - 0 1 우리나라 일반은행의 수익구조 : 현황분석 및 개선방안모색, 1997.10./김병연

9 6 - 0 3 은행산업의국제화 및 현지경영전략에관한 연구, 1996.6./이광철9 6 - 0 2 할부금융업의도입과 은행의 대응전략, 1996.2./강병호·이소한외9 6 - 0 1 한국증시에서의외국인의 주식투자 행태 및 영향력, 1996.2./연강흠9 5 - 0 3 은행자기자본비율규제의이론과 실제, 1995.12./채희율9 5 - 0 2 F i na nc ial Sys t em and Pol icy(1961~79): An Assessment of Pa rk ' s

L e g acy, 1995.5./김병주9 5 - 0 1 자본자유화, 실질환율및 정책대응 : 남미, 아시아제국의경험 및 한국의

정책, 1995.1./왕연균9 4 - 0 3 일본의 금융국제화, 1994.7./민상기9 4 - 0 2 금융기관과기업의 소유구조 및 새로운 관계정립, 1994.4./장현준9 4 - 0 1 개방화에 대응한 우리나라 은행의 국제화 전략, 1994.1./김병연외9 3 - 0 2 한국에 진출한 외국은행의경쟁전략 및 성과분석, 1993.11./정창영9 3 - 0 1 일본의 금융개혁, 1993.11./민상기

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15주년내지3차 2007.3.14 5:17 PM 페이지190

ISBN 89-503-0351-5 93320 값 1 3 , 7 0 0

2 0 0 7年 3月 9日 인쇄

2 0 0 7年 3月1 6日 인쇄

발행인 최 흥 식

발행처 한 국 금 융 연 구 원

서울시 중구 명동 1가 4-1 은행회관 5·6·7·8층

전화 : 02-3705-6300 FAX:0 2 - 3 7 0 5 - 6 3 0 9

http://www.kif.re.kr; [email protected]

등록 제1-1838(1995. 1. 28)

기타보고서 - 개원 1 5주년 기념 심포지엄

지속적 경제발전을 위한 금융의 역할

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