german unification lessons for korea

International Conference in Celebration of the 20th Anniversary of German Unification

Politics of German Unification: Lessons for the Korean Peninsula :

Date Venue

2010. 10. 15() , Friday, October 15, 2010 Orchid Room, The Westin Chosun Hotel

The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES), Kyungnam University

Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty Korea Office (FNF)

University of North Korean Studies

09:20~10:00 10:00~10:40 ( ) ( ) - () ( ) 20 10:40~12:30 Session I : ( )

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12:30~14:00

Luncheon

Program09:20~10:00 10:00~10:40 Registration Opening Session

Opening Address LEE Su-Hoon (Director, IFES, Kyungnam University) Welcoming Address Walter KLITZ (Resident Representative, FNF Korea Office) Congratulatory Address Hans-Ulrich SEIDT (German Ambassador to the Republic of Korea) Keynote Speech Manfred RICHTER (Treasurer of the Board of Directors of FNF, Former Chief Whip of the FDP Parliamentary Group within the German Bundestag) Twenty years of Reunification in Germany 10:40~12:30 Moderator Presenters Session I : Unification in Global and Regional Context HAMM Taik-young (Professor, University of North Korean Studies) LEE Kyu-Young (Professor, Sogang University) German Foreign Policy after Unification: Continuity and Change Uwe WISSENBACH (Counsellor, Charg daffaires a.i. European Union Delegation to the Republic of Korea) Unifying Europe and German Unification PARK Myung-Lim (Professor, yonsei University) Globalization, East Asian Regional Order, and the Korean Unification - Viewing from the Historical - Comparative Perspective Discussants KIM Haknoh (Professor, yeungnam University) KO Sangtu (Professor, yonsei University) KOO Kab-Woo (Professor, University of North Korean Studies) Luncheon

12:30~14:00

14:00~15:50 Session II : , ( ) ( - ) ( ) - ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

15:50~16:10 16:10~18:00

Coffee Break Session III : ( ) ( ) ( ) 1989/90 ( )

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Program14:00~15:50 Moderator Presenters Session II : Issues of Political and Economic Integration LIM Hyun-Chin (Director, Seoul National University Asia Center) Klaus GOLLERT (Former Minister of the German Federal State of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) The Role of Political Parties in the Process of German Unification SONG Tae-Soo (Professor, Labor Administration Training Institute, Korea University of Technology and Education) Process and Effects of Germanys Economic Integration - Focusing on the Labor Market KOO Choon-Kweon (Professor, yeungnam University) The Political Economy of German Unification and the Unification of the Korean Peninsula Discussants KANG Won-taek (Professor, Seoul National University) KIM Heungchong (Director, Center for Regional Economic Studies, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy) SON Gi-Woong (Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification) Coffee Break Session III : Civil Society and Unification Falk BOMSDORF (Former Resident Representative of FNF to Russia) Reinhard SCHLINKERT (Chief Representative, Infratest dimap Gesellschaft fr Trend- und Wahlforschung mbH) Social Impacts of German Unification LEE Dong-Ki (Professor, University Bonn, Germany) Criticisms and Alternatives from the Left during the Unification of Germany in 1989/1990 PARK Sun-Sung (Professor, Dongguk University - Seoul) Korean Unification and Civil Society Discussants CHO Dae-Yop (Professor, Korea University) KIM Ho-Ki (Professor, yonsei University) LEE Yong-Sun (Co-President, Korean Sharing Movement)

15:50~16:10 16:10~18:00 Moderator Presenters

CONTENTSOpening SessionOpening Address LEE Su-Hoon (Director, IFES, Kyungnam University)

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Welcoming AddressWalter KLITZ (Resident Representative, FNF Korea Office)

Congratulatory AddressHans-Ulrich SEIDT (German Ambassador to the Republic of Korea)

Keynote Speech Manfred RICHTER (Treasurer of the Board of Directors of FNF, Former Chief Whip of the FDP Parliamentary Group within the German Bundestag) Twenty years of Reunification in Germany

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Session I : Unification in Global and Regional ContextGerman Foreign Policy after Unification: Continuity and Change LEE Kyu-Young (Professor, Sogang University) Unifying Europe and German Unification Uwe WISSENBACH (Counsellor, Charg daffaires a.i. European Union Delegation to the Republic of Korea) 26

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Globalization, East Asian Regional Order, and the Korean Unification: Analysis from the Historical-Comparative Perspective 54 PARK Myung-Lim (Professor, yonsei University) Discussants KIM Haknoh (Professor, yeungnam University) KO Sangtu (Professor, yonsei University) KOO Kab-Woo (Professor, University of North Korean Studies)

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Session II : Issues of Political and Economic IntegrationThe Role of Political Parties in the Process of German Unification Klaus GOLLERT (Former Minister of the German Federal State of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern)

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Process and Effects of Germanys Economic Integration - Focusing on the Labor Market SONG Tae-Soo (Professor, Labor Administration Training Institute, Korea University of Technology and Education)

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The Political Economy of German Unification and the Unification of the Korean Peninsula 120KOO Choon-Kweon (Professor, yeungnam University)

DiscussantsKANG Won-taek (Professor, Seoul National University) KIM Heungchong (Director, Center for Regional Economic Studies,Korea Institute for International Economic Policy) 142 SON Gi-Woong (Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification) 144

Session III : Civil Society and UnificationSocial Impacts of German Unification 148Reinhard SCHLINKERT (Chief Representative, Infratest dimap Gesellschaft fr Trend- und Wahlforschung mbH)

Criticisms and Alternatives from the Left during the Unification of Germany in 1989/1990 166LEE Dong-Ki (Professor, University Bonn, Germany)

Korean Unification and Civil Society 180PARK Sun-Sung (Professor, Dongguk University - Seoul)

DiscussantsCHO Dae-Yop (Professor, Korea University) KIM Ho-Ki (Professor, yonsei University) 206 LEE Yong-Sun (Co-President, Korean Sharing Movement) 208

Biographical Information 212

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Politics of German Unification: Lessons for the Korean Peninsula

Opening SessionOpening AddressLEE Su-Hoon (Director, IFES, Kyungnam University)

Welcoming AddressWalter KLITZ (Resident Representative, FNF Korea Office)

Congratulatory AddressHans-Ulrich SEIDT (German Ambassador to the Republic of Korea)

Keynote SpeechTwenty Years of Reunification in GermanyManfred RICHTER (Treasurer of the Board of Directors of FNF, Former Chief Whip of the FDP Parliamentary Group within the German Bundestag)

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Opening Address

LEE Su-Hoon (Director, IFES, Kyungnam University)

International Conference on

Politics of German Unification: Lessons for the Korean PeninsulaCo-organized by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, and University of North Korean StudiesOctober 15, 2010

Good morning! Excellencies, distinguished guests, and ladies and gentlemen. It gives me great pleasure to open this international conference on Politics of German Unification: Lessons for the Korean Peninsula, in celebration of the 20th anniversary of German unification. Our event today has been made possible by the cosponsors the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty. On behalf of IFES, Id first like to thank our partner, Walter KLITZ and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, whose initiative and support helped to make this event possible. We are also very privileged to have with us His Excellency Ambassador Hans-Ulrich Seidt of the German Embassy in Seoul. We are grateful that he will be able to speak to us today. Let me also thank the Former Chief Whip of the FDP Parliamentary Group within the German Bundestag, Mr. Manfred Richter, who has graciously agreed to give the keynote speech. We are very fortunate to have in attendance several distinguished participants from Europe, and I welcome you all, along with our own Korean scholars and experts.

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Opening Session

As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the historical German unity, it is obvious that social and economic differences still exist between the eastern and western parts of Germany. We know that the expectations of the speed of the catching-up process in the east cannot be fulfilled. However, the gap is closing, thanks to the genuine efforts of the government and the German people. Indeed, the Cold War has ended in Germany, and the country is becoming a region of national reconciliation and a center of the European Union. Because of this we truly can celebrate. But what of Korea, the other symbol of Cold-War division? Unfortunately, the two Koreas have not come close to the reunification euphoria felt in Germany. Of course, in June 2000, the first-ever inter-Korean summit was held. It was a big step forward toward reconciliation and cooperation. In the years that followed, the two Koreas seemed to be moving in the right direction. There was a definite cooperative spirit between them to reconcile their differences. That is now missing. Instead, the two countries seem to be returning to the confrontation that characterized their cold-war relationshipas we can see from the Cheonan incident and its aftermath. Both countries must share degrees of responsibility for this current situation. Somehow, we must find a way to return to a path of peaceful dialogue and reconciliation. Prospects of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula depend on it. Peace and stability in Northeast Asia depend on it. And of course, peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula depends on it. Can the two Koreas return to this path? I believe so. But it is hard to say when. Recently, the two governments have taken a small positive step toward returning to that path by agreeing to hold inter-Korean family reunions at the end of this month and early next month. Hopefully this step can lead to greater efforts to restart dialogue on higher levels in the near future. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you again for coming this morning. I hope you will find todays presentations enlightening, and we welcome your constructive participation. Thank you very much.

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Keynote SpeechManfred RICHTER (Treasurer of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation)

Twenty Years of Reunification in GermanySeoul, October 15th, 2010

Ladies and Gentlemen, I was born in 1948, I did not know anything else than a divided Germany. I was 12 years old when the wall was built, I remember my father saying on that day This means a new war! , we all were lucky that he was wrong but the hardships of the German division, the effects of the Cold War on almost everybody in Westor East-Germany should be a burden for a long time. It was one of the results of the New Policy towards eastern Europe and East Germany, the GDR (German Democratic Republic), that the government of Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel had introduced that from the 70s on at least some progress was possible. East Germans in pensioners age were allowed to travel to their relatives in the West for a visit under certain circumstances, also visits of West German relatives to their East German families were possible from then. But the destabilisation of GDR, the unrest, the public protests, the escape of thousands of East German citizens into West German embassies in Hungary and Czekoslovakia, it took much more time to develop and it had the background of a changing system in the USSR, Gorbatchevs Glasnost and Perestroika Policy that was strictly opposed by the East German Communist Government. So said Gorbatchev to East German Leader Honecker: Life punishes those who come too late. Using the term reunification I should mention that there was a debate in Germany at that time as to whether that was the appropriate word.

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Opening Session

In 1990 for political and diplomatic reasons, West German politicians carefully avoided the term reunification during the run-up to what Germans frequently refer to as die Wende (the turn). The official and most common term in German is Deutsche Einheit (in English German unity). German unity is the term that Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher used in front of international journalists to correct them when they asked him about reunification in 1990. After 1990, the term die Wende became more common. The term generally refers to the events (mostly in Eastern Europe) that led up to the actual reunification; when referring to the events surrounding unification, however, it carries the cultural connotation of the time and the events in the GDR that brought about this turnaround in German history. The East German regime started to falter in the summer of 1989, when Hungary opened a hole in the Iron Curtain. It caused an exodus of thousands of East Germans fleeing to West Germany and Austria via Hungary. The Peaceful Revolution, a series of protests by East Germans, led to the GDRs first free elections on 18 March 1990, and to the negotiations between the GDR and FRG that culminated in a Unification Treaty, whilst negotiations between the GDR and FRG and the four occupying powers produced the so-called Two Plus Four Treaty (Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany) granting full sovereignty to a unified German state, whose two halves had previously still been bound by a number of limitations stemming from its post-WWII-status as an occupied nation. The united Germany remained a member of the European Community (later the European Union) and of NATO. Immediately after the opening of the border, with a still existing East German GDR, massive problems came up in the west, particularly traffic problems. There were not enough border crossings to cope with the flood of visitors from GDR. The east-west-road connections that had been interrupted for 40 years had top be rebuilt in no time. And a very serious problem was the thousands of people who wanted to move from the east to the west, settle down, get a job and make a living in the west rather than in the east of Germany.

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Almost exactly twenty years ago, on March 18, 1990, the citizens of the German Democratic Republic, or East Germany, went to vote in the first free elections in 40 years. A stunning 93 percent of voters went to the polls that day, and their decisions ensured that these would be the last elections in the GDR as well. The 1990 elections were a far cry from the typical voting process in East Germany, when it was always clear that the ruling Socialist Unity Party would continue to control the government. In the months before the election, scores of new parties and alliances were formed, and the candidates engaged in a real exchange of ideas about how to move East Germany out of its crisis and into a closer union with West Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel, who was once a citizen of East Germany herself, has said that the elections marked the penultimate victory of the peaceful revolution. The outcome showed the clear desire of the East German people for a swift reunification, and it established a legitimate basis for negotiating that union. It was essentially a vote in favor of speedier reunification. In April, Lothar de Maiziere took charge of a new government, heading a super-grand-coalition of all non-communist parties. The Kohl government in the Federal Republic negotiated a timetable with this government for monetary, economic and social union with effect from July 1, 1990. On 18 May 1990, the two German states signed a treaty agreeing on monetary, economic and social union. This came into force on 1 July 1990, with the Deutsche Mark replacing the East German mark as the official currency of East Germany. The Deutsche Mark had a very high reputation among the East Germans and was considered stable. While the GDR transferred its financial policy sovereignty to West Germany, the West started granting subsidies for the GDR budget and social security system. At the same time many West German laws came into force in the GDR. This created a suitable framework for a political union by diminishing the huge gap between the two existing political, social and economic systems. Essentially, the new democratic government of GDR began the business of swiftly dissolving itself. There was no longer an economic basis for the GDR to continue on its own as an independent state. In August 1990, the Volkskammer (Peoples Chamber) of the GDR (the parliament) resolved to push for the fastest possible accession to West Germany. At the end the Unification Treaty of August 31 designated that the five newly formed federal states Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia become states of the Federal Republic of Germany.

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The question of German unification arose as soon as the wall fell on November 9, 1989, but a swift unification was hardly a forgone conclusion. At that time it was not clear how both East and West Germanys allies and neighbors would react to unification, and there were enormous structural obstacles to overcome. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl submitted a roadmap for unity as early as November 1989, but it was unclear how quickly unity should happen and what form it should take. Kohl also made it clear that his government would not negotiate a treaty with East Germanys single-party communist government. East Germanys economy was in crisis and the communist government was literally broke, unable to pay the interest on their foreign credits. And it lacked the legitimacy it needed to move forward. In order to advance East Germanys prospects for reforming its government and receiving aid from the West, a round table of political parties, churches, and civic organizations agreed to hold new parliamentary elections on March 18. Before long, the Monday Demonstrations that had brought down the wall gave way to boisterous campaign events featuring East German candidates and West German leaders. The main burden of the process of reunification was with the governments. The governments of the two German States, and the governments of the War-time Allies USSR, USA, France and Britain. Internationally there were also some other players, namely Poland whose concern about their western border was mainly driving their activities. But also the Parliaments of the two German States were involved. The Treaty on Unity was accompanied by the parliaments during the negotiating process. That was necessary because an enormous amount of legislation would have to be completed once the treaty and the 4+2 Treaty with the Allies would enter into power. This was particularly difficult for the freely elected new parliament in East Berlin. The freely elected Peoples Chamber existed only a few months, from April through October 1990. None of the noncommunist members had any experience in a parliament at all, end even the communists had no idea how a real parliament ticks. They were in session every week, often through until the morning hours, 164 laws were passed and 93 decisions, resolutions etc. were produced, documented on 4400 pages of paper. The minutes are a book of 1900 pages. The West German Bundestag was also working like hell, but it was easier, because its members were used to parliamentary procedures. I recall, being chief whip of the governing FDP at that time, that over and over again we were forced to keep speeding up, particularly by Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher. They were well aware at

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that time that the Soviel Union would not last for long and we needed their signature on the 4+2 treaty. We were in direct contact to our counterparts in the East German parliament and very often it got very hard to make them understand what certain wordings in laws would actually MEAN. They had never done anything like that before. So it is not surprising that even some funny mistakes happened. In the wording of the resolution of the peoples chamber that actually ment the entry of the GDR into the Federal Republic of Germany it said The peoples chamber declares the entry to the Federal Republic effective October 3rd. This was voted on and got a majority and it was the communist delegate Gregor Gysi who stated that this was lacking an element: the resolution did not say that GDR would enter, it only said that the Peoples Chamber would enter. This mistake had to be repaired and it was repaired, but it is somewhat typical for the obstacles that we found in the cooperation with the East German Parliamentarians. By the way: This formal decision of the freely elected East-German Parliament, the Peoples Chamber, now had to be formally conveyed to the Federal Republic of Germany. You will never guess how the Peoples Chamber did that - by ordinary mail. A letter was postmarked on August 25th of 1989, it reached the West-German Chancellory and received the green stamp of receipt on August 28th, was then as it is the routine with mail reaching the Chancellory transferred to 3 or 4 heads of departments who set their initials on the paper, before it actually reached the office of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. His assistant was outraged that nobody had noticed the significance of this document, but how could they, coming with regular mail. He probably anticipated an angerful eruption of his boss when the Chancellor would see that this document was sent through several stages before he got to see it, so his assistant decided to telephone East Germany and ask for a new printout, that was indeed produced and transported by air through a messenger from the Chancellery. A somewhat typical example for the activities at that time. Our counterparts in East-Berlin were absolutely well-meaning but not prepared at all for this gigantic task. The more repect they deserve for what they achieved in these 180 days of their existence. The reunification treaty between West Germany and the GDR was negotiated in mid-1990 and finally approved by large majorities in the legislative chambers of both parts of Germany on 20 September 1990. After that last step Germany was officially united at 00:00 CET on 3 October 1990. The five re-established federal states (Bundeslnder) of East Germany Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, SaxonyAnhalt, Thuringia formally joined the Federal Republic of Germany, along with the city-state Berlin which formally came into being at the same time, created out of the still formally occupied West Berlin and East Berlin, and admitted to the federation. In practice however, West Berlin had already acted as an 11th state for most purposes, so Berlin is generally not included in the list of New Lnder.

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The process chosen was one of two options implemented in the West German constitution (Grundgesetz). As these five newly-founded German states formally joined the Federal Republic in accordance with (the then-existing) Article 23, the area in which the constitution was in force was simply extended to include them. Article 23 had opened the possibility for former territories of the German Reich to enter FRG by unilateral declaration. The alternative would have been for East Germany to join as a whole along the lines of a formal union between two German states that then would have had to, amongst other things, create a new constitution for the newly established country. Under the model that was chosen, however, the territory of the former German Democratic Republic was simply incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany, and accordingly the Federal Republic of Germany, now enlarged to include the Eastern States, continued legally to exist under the same legal personality that was founded in May 1949. But in this context it must be very clear that previous to this technical decision the East-German citizens had chosen in free self-determination, articulated through a general election, that they wanted the unification and it got very clear that they it wanted it as soon as possible. The reunification was not a merger that created a third state out of the two, but an incorporation, by which West Germany absorbed East Germany. Thus, on Unification Day, October 3, 1990, the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist, giving way to five new Federal States, and East and West Berlin were also unified as a single city, forming a sixth new Federal State. The new Federal States immediately became parts of the Federal Republic of Germany, so that it was enlarged to include the whole territory of the former East Germany. The practical result of that model is that the now expanded Federal Republic of Germany continued to be a party to all the treaties it had signed prior to the moment of reunification, and thus continued the same membership of the U.N., NATO, the European Commmunities, etc; also, the same Basic Law and the same laws that were in force in the Federal Republic continued automatically in force, but now applied to the expanded territory. To facilitate this process and to reassure other countries, some changes were made to the Basic Law (constitution). Article 146 was amended so that Article 23 of the current constitution could be used for reunification. After the five New States of East Germany had joined, the constitution was amended again to indicate that all parts of Germany are now unified. We needed to make sure that it was not to be understood as an invitation to others (e.g. Austria or Kaliningrad) to join, although the main idea of the change was to calm fears in (for example) Poland, that Germany would later try to rejoin with former parts of Germany that were now Polish or parts of other countries in the East. The changes effectively formalised the Oder-Neisse line as Germanys permanent eastern border. These amendments to the Basic Law were mandated by Article I, section 4 of the Two Plus Four Treaty.

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On 14 November 1990, the German government signed a treaty with Poland, finalising Germanys boundaries as permanent along the Oder-Neisse line, and thus, renouncing any claims to Silesia, East Brandenburg, Farther Pomerania, Gdask (Danzig), and territories of the former province of East Prussia. The treaty also granted certain rights for national minorities on either side of the border. The following month, the first all-German free elections since 1932 were held, resulting in an increased majority for the coalition government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. On 15 March 1991, the Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany (2+4 Treaty), that had been signed in September 1990 between the USSR, the USA, the United Kingdom, France, East Germany and West Germany, and that was ratified by the reunited Germany, entered into force, putting an end to the remaining limitations on German sovereignty that resulted from the post WWII arrangements. A long way had to be walked to get to that point and at the beginning not all our friends were helpful. According to Kremlin records that became public in 2009, the British and French governments did not want German reunification. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told Soviet President Gorbachev that neither Britain nor Western Europe wanted the reunification of Germany. Thatcher also clarified that she wanted the Soviet leader to do what he could to stop it. Thatcher said to Gorbachev We do not want a united Germany. Similarly, a representative of French President Franois Mitterrand reportedly told an aide to Gorbachev, France by no means wants German reunification, although it realises that in the end it is inevitable. Ultimately, however, both the U.K. and France ratified the Two Plus Four Treaty, thus finalizing the reunification for purposes of international law. In October 2009, France released its archives from 1989-90 relating to the process of German reunification. It was revealed that President Mitterand agreed to German unification in exchange for a commitment from Chancellor Kohl to the European Economic and Monetary Union. In January 1990, Mitterand told Thatcher that a unified Germany could make more ground than even Hitler had. In March 1990 the French ambassador in London reported that Margaret Thatcher had told him, France and Great Britain should pull together today in the face of the German threat. During the negotiations with the Soviet Union the question of United Germanys integration into the European Union and particularly the NATO took quite some effort but and the end showed to be solvable. Gorbachevs Soviet Union was indeed cooperative and realistic. We were able to overcome the reluctance of France and Britain at the end with the strong support of the

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US government and president George Bush. The USA had supported Germanys reunification from the very beginning and very actively, too. We have every reason to be thankful to the United States for that support, encouragement and friendship demonstrated to us in these complicated times. A big bunch of problems came up after the reunification had entered into force. Not only was GDR bancrupt, the economy that was outdated and not competitive at all collapsed and the unemployment that derived from that created a serious problem and still is a problem. The property rights of former proprietors of the nationalised economy had to be reinstalled. The transformation from a communist economical system into a market economy got very burdensome and also very expensive. The infrastructure was rundown. New roads, highways, railways, telecommunication systems had to be constructed. The buildings in the towns and cities needed to be repaired, rebuilt, brought to an up-to-date standard. The agriculture that was a Sovielt-type collective one created massive problems. To make a long story short: Today if you want to see modern infrastructure: go to east Germany. But this was very, very expensive. Much more expensive than we anticipated. It depends on the way you calculate, what you include in the costs of reunification. But serious estimates say that probably some 1.3 trillion Euros (or 1.9 trillion US $) have been transferred from the west to the east to rebuild east Germany. The east has cast off many shackles from its Communist past, thanks partly to the transfers, but unemployment remains nearly double that of the west and economists say it is still years away from catching up with the richer part of the country. The Cologne-based IW economic research institute said that eastern output per capita would rise to around 80 percent of western levels from 70 percent now over the next decade. Eastern output was around 33 percent of the west in 1991. So we have seen quite some progress. But still there is discontent in the east, mainly because of the still too high unemployment rate. But we also see a certain nostalgia of GDR coming up which is worrying me. There is still in some peoples minds the idea that socialism is a good idea that was only handled the wrong way by the communist GDR-leaders. And still in the east results of over 20 % for the Left Party, the successors of the former rulers are a fact that I cannot get used to.

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Today, a lot of wise guys write smart articles about what was done wrong in the period before reunification. For instance the monetary union with GDR. Of course, if you look at it from an academic economical point it was a mistake to offer the hard currency Deutschmark at a rate of 2:1 for worthless GDR-marks. But we knew that at that very time. People tend to forget that then a big portion of well-trained, flexible people in the east were literally sitting on packed suitcases. In the demonstrations they carried posters saying: If the Deutschmark comes we stay, if not we go to where the Deutschmark is. Should we have waited until everybody except the sick and the old would have left East Germany? Lothar de Maiziere, the Prime Minister of the freely elected GDR government in 1990 said: After the fall of the wall 2000 to 4000 people left us, every day. I recall telling chancellor Helmut Kohl that if this would go on we would ask him for Christmas 1990 to send the Armed Forces to run the tramway in Leipzig, we would not be able to run the infrastructure any more. It was only after the monetary union that the number of those leaving the east dropped from 4000 to 300 per day.. Vast differences between the former East Germany and West Germany (for example, in lifestyle, wealth, political beliefs and other matters) remain, and it is therefore still common to speak of East and West Germany distinctly. The East German economy has struggled since unification. The former East Germany area has often been compared to the underdeveloped Southern Italy and the Southern United States during Reconstruction after the American Civil War. While the East German economy has recovered recently, the differences between East and West remain. Politicans and scholars have frequently call for a process of inner reunification of the two countries and asked whether there is inner unification or continued separation. Since 1989 the question of this inner reunification has been widely discussed in the German public, politically, culturally, and also constitutionally. If you would ask me: Would you do it again ? - Yes I would, without hesitation. Would you do it the same way ? - Probably in general yes, in detail no. But today that is easy to say; we have learned. At that time we did not only have no experience but we were under significant time pressure. And the costs? - Yes it is expensive but it is worth it. After unification we were flooded with Korean delegations that wanted to learn from our experience. When they saw how much money we spend the interest was decreasing. I would wish for everybody in East Germany to understand that they are much better off than any other transition country who do not have a wealthy western part of the country to support. I would wish for a growing identification of everybody in the New States of FRG with not only the advantages of a market economy but also with the values of democracy, freedom and a constitution that

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safeguards the rights of man. This has not been achieved completely yet, and perhaps it will take another generation.The Chinese say: Even the longest journey starts with a first step. We have taken many more since 1990, but it is almost exactly 20 years ago that we were courageous enough to take a first step into a future that at that time was pretty unclear.

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Session IUnification in Global and Regional ContextModeratorHAMM Taik-young (Professor, University of North Korean Studies)

PresentersGerman Foreign Policy after Unification: Continuity and ChangeLEE Kyu-Young (Professor, Sogang University)

Unifying Europe and German UnificationUwe WISSENBACH (Counsellor, Charg daffaires a.i. European Union Delegation to the Republic of Korea)

Globalization, East Asian Regional Order, and the Korean Unification: Analysis from the Historical-Comparative PerspectivePARK Myung-Lim (Professor, yonsei University)

DiscussantsKIM Haknoh (Professor, yeungnam University) KO Sangtu (Professor, yonsei University) KOO Kab-Woo (Professor, University of North Korean Studies)

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German Foreign Policy after Unification: Continuity and ChangeLEE Kyu-Young (Professor, Sogang University)

AbstractDuring the Cold War, Germany was widely perceived as economic powerhouse but weak political state. But upon reunification, German rose to become both economic and political powerhouse. When comparing Germany of pre to post-reunification, post-reunified foreign policy of Germany revealed much more stability and complex and multilayered confidence packed with foreign dynamism. As a result, neighboring countries began to pay more attention to the future course of Germany and even viewed its actions as an attempt to strengthen national power. In other words, there were rising concerns about Germanys possible return to seeking independent and nationalistic policy after reunification. There are many events that hint at changes in German foreign policy since the reunification. Not only did its foreign policy change but also security environment took a major turn, changing from security importer to security exporter. Surely it is difficult to refute, to view Germany as a potential hegemon from European and international political stance since reunification. The major reason for this can be attributed to the very fact that many of its neighboring countries still have engrained in their memory of the unforgettable past atrocities and experiences engendered by Germany. However, judging from the past 20 years, clearly there is a lack of evidence that point to the direction that Germany is actually headed towards that path. In actuality, it is more likely Germany will pursue to become a gentle giant rather than a hegemon, refraining from being overly expressive on its own national interest with still high set of internal and external institutional restrictions imposed on them.

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1. 2 1989~1991 45 . , 20 . . , . 1990 10 3 20 , (NATO) (EU) . , 1) . . . 20 . , , . . (1 ) 1991 43%, 1997 69%, 2002 70%, 2008 71% .( 1, 2 ) 50% , 2000 75%, 2008 78% .( 3 ) 1991 39%, 1997 69%, 2002 77%, 2008 78% .( 4 )

1:

: , ??2009 ?? (2009) OECD, OECD Economic Surverys: Germany (2010), p. 25: 20 , ????, 10-35 (2010.9.17), p. 2 .

1), NO , 2010 9 20 , ,

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2: 1 GDP ( = 100)

: , ??2009 ?? (2009), p. 7

3: ( = 100)

4: (= 100)

: 20 , op. cit.

: Ibid.

. , . . . 20 : , 4 . 1990 9 12 2()+4 . 2) , . . 1997 . .3) . . 40 NATO, 30 . ,2) 20 : , 2010 9 20 . , 3)Ibid., p. 543.

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NATO EU . . . , , . , 20 .

2. 2.1. . . (national interest) , . . . : (1) 4) , (2) , (3) , (4) , (5) , (6) ( )5). . 20 . 1990 10 3 . . 4) , . , 4 : (1) ; (2) ; (3) ; (4) (1990): S. Bierling, Die Auenpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Normen, Akteure, Entscheidungen (Wien: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), p. 9ff. 5)W. Woyke, Auenpolitik, U. Andesen/W. Woyke (Hrsg.), Handwrterbuch des politischen Systems der BRD, 2. Aufl. (Bonn: BpfB, 1995), p. 24.

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(Deutschlandpolitik)6) . 20 .7) . . . , . , .

2.2. . . . . . , . 20 , , . . . . , 60 37 . . . 6)Frank R. Pfetsch, Deutschlandpolitik 1949-1969, Werner Weidenfeld & Karl-Rudolf Korte (Hrsg.), Handwrterbuch zur deutschen Einheit, 2. Aufl. (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung, 1992), pp. 170-175; Christian Hacke, Deutschlandpolitik 1969-1982, ibid., pp. 176-182; Friebert Pflger, Deutschlandpolitik 1982-1990, ibid., pp. 183-190; Christian Hacke, Deutschlandpolitik der CDU/CSU, ibid.., pp. 191-201; Peter Juling, Deutschlandpolitik der FDP, ibid., pp. 202-208; Annette von der Heyde, Deutschlandpolitik Grne, ibid., pp. 209-215; Rudolf H. Brocke, Deutschlandpolitik der SPD, ibid., pp. 216-227; Andreas Mensch, Deutschlandpolitik der Siegermchte, ibid., pp. 227-235. 7) 1949 10 . . , , , 12, 2 (2002 ), pp. 22-23 (pp. 21-51) .

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, (neue Ostpolitik) . 8) : (1) ; (2) ; (3) ; (4) CIS ; (5) .9) ? . NATO EU . . . , , , ( ) . , , . , ? UN . (peacekeeping operation) . . . . NATO EU . .

2.3. . (directions) (context) . 20 , 90 . , , , . . 20 (Macht), (Interdependenz) (Wertgrundlagen) . . . 357 Km2, 8,230 (2010 7

8), , op. cit., pp. 31-34 . 9)Th. Paulsen, Die deutsche Rolle in Europa, W. Weidenfeld (Hrsg.), Europa-Handbuch (Bonn: PfpB, 1999), p. 540.

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), GDP(PPP) 2 8,100 (2009 ) 610), 1 1,590 (2009 ) , 311) . . .12) . . , , . , . . . . , . , . .13) . , . , . 14) 15) 16) . EU NATO , . . . (Machtstaat)

10)(14 4,300 ), (14 1,400 ), (8 7,480 ), (4 1,500 ), (3 5,700 ), (2 8,100 ), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/gm.html . 11)(1 9,520 : 2007), (1 2,040 ), (1 1,590 ), (1 460 ), ibid. . 12) 6,442 , 2 970 ; 6,111 , 2 1,280 . ibid. . 13)W. Weidenfeld, Deutschland in Europa: Schlsselstaat mit Fhrungsrolle? W. Weidenfeld (Hrsg.), Was ndert die Einheit? Deutschlands Standort in Europa (Gtersloh, 1993), pp. 9-16. 14)H.-P. Schwarz, Das deutsche Dilemma, K. Kaiser/H. W. Maull (Hrsg.), Deutschlands neue Auenpolitik, Bd. 1: Grundlagen (Mnchen: Oldenbourg, 1994), pp. 81-97. 15)W. E. Hanrieder, Deutschland, Europa, Amerika. Die Auenpolitik der BRD 1949-1994, 2. Aufl. (Paderborn: Schningh, 1995). 16)P. J. Katzenstein, Die Fesselung deutscher Macht im internationalen System, B. Blanke/H. Wollmann (Hrsg.), Die alte Bundesrepublik. Kontinuitt und Wandel. Leviathan Sonderheft 21 (Opladen: Westdt. Verl., 1991), pp. 68-80.

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(Handelsstaat)17) . . 2 . , - . (cooperative internationalism) . (Zivilmacht Deutschland)18) . 2 (zivilisiert), . (Zivilisierung der internationalen Politik) .

3. 3.1. : , , . 19) (Westbindung: 1949-1955), (Ostvertrge: 1969-1972), (Nachrstungsdebatte: 1977-1983) (Normalisierung: 1990~) . 1990 - . .20) , . 17)R. Rosecrane, The rise of the Trading State. Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York, 1996); L. Gutjahr, Vom Handelsstaat, Deutschland zum Standort Europa, sterreichische Zeitschrift fr Politikwissenschaft, 3 (1995), pp. 329-345. 18)Zivilmacht . , , : Hanns W. Maull, Zivilmacht Deutschland, Gnther Hellmann u. a. (Hrsg.), Handwrterbuch zur deutschen Auenpolitik (Opladen: VS Verlang, 2006) . 19)Sebastian Harnisch, Deutsche Auenpolitik nach der Wende: Zivilmacht am Ende? www.sebastianharnisch.de/vortr/ DVPW2000Vortrag.pdf (2010 9 1 ) 20)Gunther Hellmann, The Sirens of Power and German Foreign Policy: Who is Listening? German Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1997), pp. 29-57; Gunther Hellmann, Jenseits von Normalisierung und Militarisierung: Zur Standortdebatte ber die neue deutsche Auenpolitik, APuZ, B1-2 (1997), pp. 24-33; A. James McAdams, Germany After Unification. Normal At Last? World Politics, Vol. 49 (1997), pp. 282-308; Ingo Peters, Vom Scheinzwerg zum Scheinriesen - deutsche Auenpolitik in der Analyse, Zeitschrift fr Internationale Beziehungen, Vol. 4, Nr. 2 (1997), pp. 361-388.

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. . . . . . , . , , .21) , . , . 1992 . (EMU) (European Identity) . (Zentralmacht in Europa) . . , EU, NATO, OSCE . 1990 . (Reaktion auf materielle Anreize oder strukturelle Gewichts- verschiebungen)22) . , .23) . . . , (Weltanschauung) . , , . 21)John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; Kenneth Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; Stephen Walt, Over-achivers and under-archivers, 21 April (2009) http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2009/04/21/over_ archievers_and_under_archievers (2010 9 1 ) 22)Sebastian Harnisch, op. cit. 23)Thomas Risse, Identitaten und Kommunikationsprozesse in der internationalen Politik Sozial-konstruktivistische Perspektiven zum Wandel in der Auenpolitik, Monika Medick-Krakau (ed.), Auenpolitischer Wandel in theoretischer und vergleichender Perspektive Die USA und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), 33-57 .

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(anti-militarism) . . 20 .24) NATO EU (Einbindungspolitik) . , . , 20 . , , , 25) . (1) (multilateralism), (2) (European Integration), (3) (diplomacy), (4) (anti-militarism)26) .

3.2. : ? ? . . . . 1990 . . . , . ?

3.2.1. 1990 . 1990 , . 24)Thomas Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed. Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995 (Ann-Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Peter Katzenstein, United Germany in an Integrating Europe, Peter Katzenstein, Tamed Power. Germany in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997), pp. 1-48. 25)Regina Karp, The New German Foreign Policy Consensus, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 20052006), pp. 61-62; Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy, 1990-2003 (Manchester, UK: Manchester UP, 2004). 26)Beverly Crawford, The Normative Power of a Normal State: Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys Post-Wall Foreign Policy, German Politics & Society, Vol. 28, Issue 2 (2010), p. 165. (pp. 165-184.)

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(civilian power) . (Wirtschaftswunder) , .27) . 1980 . 1985 , . (European Monetary Union) (European Monetary System) .28) (patron) , . . , . , . . (an honest broker) . , , . . , .29) , . (Ostpolitik) , . . 1990 -(semisovereign) . , . 1989 Imhausen-Chemie . , , . 1970 , . . . , , . , . , . 27)1990 25.6%, 16%. Andrei Markovits & Simon Reich, Should Europe Fear the Germans? John Huelshoff et al., (eds.), From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland: German Politics after Unification (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 278. 28)William Wallace, Is Germany Europes leading Power? World Today, Vol. 51 (1995), pp. 162-165; Helen Milner, Regional Economic Cooperation, Global Markets, and Domestic Politics: A Comparison of NAFTA and the Maastricht Treaty, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 2 (1995), pp. 337-360. 29)A. J. P. Taylor, Bismarck: the Man and the Statesman (New York: Sutton Publishing, 1969),

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, . . . . .

3.2.2. ,

. , . , . 2008 1.30) . , 6.31) . . (a regional hegemon) . . ,

(institutional power) 32) , . , . , . , .33) . . (WMD) . .

30)Leading exporters and importers in world merchandise trade, 2008, http://www.wto.org/english/ res_e/statis_e/ its2009_e/its09_world-trade_dev_e.htm (2010 9 3 ) 31)SIPRI Yearbook 2008, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (20008), http://www. defencetalk.com/sipriyearbook-2008-armaments-disarmament-and-international-security-15581/ (2010 9 1 ) 32)Gnther Hellmann, Ein fordernder Multilaterialismus. Deutschlands Fortschreibung seiner auenpolitischen Traditionslinie ist gefestigter als gemeinhin unterstellt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4. Feb., 2009; Simon Bulmer et al., Germanys European Policy: Shaping the Regional Milieu (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2000) . 33) 2000~2010 http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/fin_reports/fin_ report_08_data_ en.pdf (2010 9 2 ), http://ec.europa.eu/budget/budget_detail/last_year_en.htm (2010 9 2 ), http:// ec.europa.eu/budget/budget_detail/current_year_en.htm (2010 9 2 ) .

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.34) , . 35) . (Europes patron) . , . . , . , , , (normative power) . Katzenstein , 36) . , . 2008 .37) 2008 , ,38) (ODA) 2009 .39) 1990 .40) . , . 15% , 67 34 . 34) , Christian Hacke, Germanys foreign Policy under Angela Merkel, The AICGS advisor (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.aicgs.org (2010 9 5 ) 35)nice guy who picks up the check and turns a blind eye to others free-riding on him: Adam S. Posen, If America Wont, Germany Must, Internationale Politik, Vol. 6 (2005), pp. 32-37. 36)Germanys identity has become European and its European identity is more pronounced than that of its neighbors: Beverly Crawford, op. cit. 37) Green Growth: Overcoming the Crisis and Beyond, www.oecd. org/dataoecd/43/24/1894385. xls (2010 9 5 ) . 38)2009 : 64,976,552$, 153,512,281$, 29,235,794$, 161,820,119$, 598,292,101$. 208,962,836$, 4 . 405,013,197$, 52,941,150$. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=ST/ ADM/SER.B/755 (2010 9 5 ) 39)2009 12,431 Mil. $, 11,982 Mil. $, 28,665 Mil. $ . 9,480 Mil. $, 816 Mil. $: ODA Net, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/24/1894385.xls (2010 9 5 ) . 40) . Hanns W. Maull, Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Vierzehn Thesen fr eine neue deutsche Auenpolitik, Europa-Archiv, Vol. 47, No. 10 (1992), pp. 269-278: Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Zentralmacht Europas: Deutschlands Rckkehr auf die Weltbhne (Berlin: 1994): The Berlin Stonewall, The Economist, October 30, 2008 .

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NATO . 7,400 8 . . 20 (the honest broker) , . , , . .41) . , .42) , , . 1991 . (EMU) . - . . , . (incrementalism) . . , . (multilateralism) -(anti-militarism) . . 20 .

4. 4.1. . . 41)Beverly Crawford, The Bosnian Road to NATO Expansion, Journal of Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 21, No. 2 (August 2000) . 42)Beverly Crawford, The Normative Power of a Normal State: Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys Post-Wall Foreign Policy, op. cit.

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. . . . . . . . . , , . , - , . . 20 , . . , . . ? . . 2 . . , , . (multilateralization) (institutionalization). (Ostpolitik) , . NATO, WEU EU , . . , , .43) . 20 .

4.2. . 20 , . , . 43)James Sperling, Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post Cold-War Europe, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31 (2001), pp. 419 . (pp. 389-425.)

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. , , . , . . . (culture of reticence), . . . , , 2 . . . . 20 , (a gentle Giant) . .

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. .. 12. 2. (2002 ), pp. 21-51. . 2009 (2009). 20 : . , 2010 9 20 . 20 . , 10-35 (2010.9.17). , NO . , 2010 9 20 . Banchoff, Thomas. The German Problem Transformed. Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy, 19451995. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. Bierling, S. Die Auenpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Normen, Akteure, Entscheidungen. Wien: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999. Brocke, Rudolf H. Deutschlandpolitik der SPD. Weidenfeld, W. & Korte, K.-R. (Hrsg.). Handwrterbuch zur deutschen Einheit. 2. Aufl. Bonn: BfpB, 1992, pp. 216-227. Bulmer, Simon et al. Germanys European Policy: Shaping the Regional Milieu. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2000. Crawford, Beverly. The Bosnian Road to NATO Expansion. Journal of Contemporary Security Policy. Vol. 21. No. 2. (August 2000). Crawford, Beverly. The Normative Power of a Normal State: Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys Post-Wall Foreign Policy. German Politics & Society. Vol. 28. Issue 2. (2010), pp. 165-184. Gutjahr, L. Vom Handelsstaat, Deutschland zum Standort Europa. sterreichische Zeitschrift fr Politikwissenschaft. Vol. 3. (1995), pp. 329-345. Hacke, Christian. Deutschlandpolitik 1969-1982. Weidenfeld, W. & Korte, K.-R. (Hrsg.). Handwrterbuch zur deutschen Einheit. 2. Aufl. Bonn: BfpB, 1992, pp. 176-182. Hacke, Christian. Deutschlandpolitik der CDU/CSU. Weidenfeld, W. & Korte, K.-R. (Hrsg.). Handwrterbuch zur deutschen Einheit. 2. Aufl. Bonn: BfpB, 1992, pp. 191-201. Hacke, Christian. Germanys foreign Policy under Angela Merkel. The AICGS advisor (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.aicgs.org. (2010 9 5 ) Hanrieder, W. E. Deutschland, Europa, Amerika. Die Auenpolitik der BRD 1949-1994. 2. Aufl. Paderborn: Sch?ningh, 1995. Harnisch, Sebastian. Deutsche Auenpolitik nach der Wende: Zivilmacht am Ende? www.sebastianharnisch.de/vortr/DVPW2000Vortrag.pdf (2010 9 1 ) . Hellmann, Gunther. Ein fordernder Multilaterialismus. Deutschlands Fortschreibung seiner auenpolitischen Traditionslinie ist gefestigter als gemeinhin unterstellt. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4. Feb., 2009. Hellmann, Gunther. Jenseits von Normalisierung und Militarisierung: Zur Standortdebatte ber die neue deutsche Auenpolitik. APuZ, B1-2 (1997), pp. 24-33. Hellmann, Gunther. The Sirens of Power and German Foreign Policy: Who is Listening? German Politics. Vol. 6. No. 2 (1997), pp. 29-57.

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konstruktivistische Perspektiven zum Wandel in der Auenpolitik. Medick-Krakau, Monika. (ed.). Auenpolitischer Wandel in theoretischer und vergleichender Perspektive ? Die USA und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999, pp. 33-57. Rosecrane, R. The Rise of the Trading State. Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World. New York: Basic Books, 1996. Schwarz, H.-P. Das deutsche Dilemma. Kaiser. K./Maull, W. (Hrsg.). Deutschlands neue Auenpolitik, Bd. 1: Grundlagen. Mnchen: Oldenbourg, 1994, pp. 81-97. Schwarz, Hans-Peter. Die Zentralmacht Europas: Deutschlands Rckkehr auf die Weltbhne. Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1994. SIPRI Yearbook 2008. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (2008). http:// www. defencetalk.com/sipri-yearbook-2008-armaments-disarmament-and- international-security-15581/. (2010 9 1 ) Taylor, A. J. P. Bismarck: the Man and the Statesman. New York: Sutton Publishing, 1969. Wallace, William. Is Germany Europes leading Power? World Today. Vol. 51. (1995), pp. 162-165. Walt, Stephen. Over-achivers and under-archivers. 21 April (2009) http://walt.foreignpolicy. com/ posts/2009/04/21/over_archievers_and_under_archievers. (2010 9 1 ) Waltz, Kenneth. The Emerging Structure of International Politics. International Security. Vol. 18. No. 2. (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79. Weidenfeld, W. Deutschland in Europa: Schlsselstaat mit Fhrungsrolle? Weidenfeld, W. (Hrsg.). Was ndert die Einheit? Deutschlands Standort in Europa. Gtersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1993, pp. 9-16. Woyke, W. Auenpolitik. Andesen U./Woyke, W. (Hrsg.). Handwrterbuch des politischen Systems der BRD. 2. Aufl. Bonn: BfpB, 1995. Green Growth: Overcoming the Crisis and Beyond. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/24/1894385. xls. (2010 9 5 ) Leading exporters and importers in world merchandise trade, 2008. http://www.wto.org/ english/res_ e/statis_e/its2009_e/its09_world-trade_dev_e.htm. (2010 9 3 ) ODA Net. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/24/1894385.xls. (2010 9 5 ) The Berlin Stonewall. The Economist, October 30, 2008.

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( EU )

, . , , () (Ostpolitik) . , . . , . . . ASEAN . 1997 , , , ASEAN+3 ASEAN . . , .

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Unifying Europe and German Unification

Uwe WISSENBACH (Counsellor, Charg daffaires a.i. European Union Delegation to the Republic of Korea)

AbstractGerman unification is an appealing success-story, hard to replicate, that strongly contributed to unifying of Europe. Reunification was negotiated not given, only feasible due to preceding achievements of the European Community, NATO and Ostpolitik. It was part of a bigger unification process that followed the collapse of the Soviet Unions socialist satellite states. Economically North East Asia as well is integrating. However, more trust, political will and leadership is needed to push forward the agenda of cooperation and security in Asia. Political integration is regularly held hostage in the region and the task remains to persuade the population that their well-being will be best served by moving away from a competitive system, based on a balance of power. ASEAN may be considered the paradoxical driving force behind cooperation in North East Asia because it was the association that, as a consequence of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, invited China, Japan and Korea to the ASEAN+3 summits. In this paper, a clear picture of the German and European Unifications interaction is depicted. In addition, a description of how Asian integration takes place in a very different setting is provided and implications are construed for Korea.

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Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,20 years on in a context of a European Union which is becoming ever more integrated economically, but also politically German unification increasingly needs to be looked at as a success story that has contributed to unifying Europe. In the current context of North East Asia which is becoming ever more integrated economically with the exception of North Korea but where political cooperation, while increasing, is regularly held hostage by incidents of all kinds, this European success story looks ever more appealing, yet difficult to emulate. From an EU perspective, both the international and the socio-economic aspects of Germanys unification a key EC Member State - were particularly relevant and the EC (as the EU was then called) and European Member States have played important roles in the unification process. The German unification was part of a bigger European unification process following the socialist system collapse in the USSRs satellite states following the USSRs internal reforms (glasnost and perestroika). There is one fundamental difference here when comparing Germany and Korea while east Germany could only survive as a creation and dominion of a hegemonic power the USSR (as long as it applied the Brezhnev doctrine), North Korea has early on (under Kim Il Sung) pursued a nationalist policy and freed itself from the need of an outside protector and thus survived the fall of communism in Moscow and market reforms in China. The GDRs system was built on socialism and Soviet support, not on nationalism. The centrality of Germanys role in Europe which played out so positively for the European continent after 1990, had, however, been the root of many European problems and wars in the 19th and 20th century. In that period a balance of power, zero-sum competition prevailed among European nation states. The so-called German question and Germanys economic and political rise after it unified under Prussian dominance in 1871, had sparked two World Wars. This analogy now preoccupies pundits concerned about Chinas rise. Even after WWII when a defeated West Germany was part of NATO there were two famous sayings that describe the satisfaction with the status quo of a divided Germany: A French writer, Franois Mauriac, famously said: I love Germany so much that I am glad there are two of it. And Lord Ismay, NATO Secretary General described the functions of NATO as keeping the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down. Thus an automatic re-unification could by no means be taken for granted. And when Germany re-unified the USSR was still a nuclear power and a one-party state. Its status as one of the four allied powers controlling German sovereignty had to be reckoned with and few analysts then realised the extent of the USSRs economic and political bankruptcy which led to its collapse in 1991. The role of the USA and the European and trans-Atlantic organisations were crucial in facilitating the German unification process. The US insisted on a united Germany to be a member of the EC and NATO. Three institutional anchors were part of the post-War achievements of Germany that allayed the worries about the German question and they were crucial to be considered a trustworthy partner on the eve of reunification: European integration (EC), trans-Atlantic military integration (NATO) and Ostpolitik (bilateral treaties and CSCE). These three policy achievements made the speedy agreement of the 4 allied powers to

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German unification possible. Unification was not a birthright, but had to be negotiated with more or less benevolent neighbours. The border agreements of the CSCE (Poland) had to be re-affirmed. What looks with hindsight as the only possible outcome, was at the time, not the only scenario which was seriously debated or promoted. A confederation was on the table, a neutral Germany (leaving EC and NATO) or a continued division were all discussed in chancelleries across the globe. The West-German Basic Law itself contained two different provisions for re-unification: Art 23 foresaw a simple joining of those parts of Germany that were not yet covered by the Basic Law (Beitritt) whereas Art 146 foresaw the possibility to achieve unification on the basis of a new Constitution to be approved by Germanys people. In 1990 the speedier Beitritt option was preferred given migration pressure and the possibility that the open window of international agreement may soon close. There is another aspect of German unification which was important for European integration: a further step in European integration to form a European Union and a decisive leap forward in economic integration by creating Economic and Monetary Union. The Maastricht Treaty created the EU on the basis of the EC and introduced the Euro. These decisive steps should be seen as a consequence of German unification (not a simple trade-off though): designed to tie Germany definitely to the European neighbours, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992) was the real definite seal on the German question while deepening European integration to the benefit of all. It was also the basis for widening the EU to the formerly neutral European countries (Sweden, Austria and Finland joined in 1995) and later the central European countries after they had managed their transformation from socialist planned economies to democratic market economies (2004 and 2007).

The role of the EC in Germanys unificationA year before the Berlin Wall fell, the reform policies in some socialist countries had actually led to the setting up of diplomatic and trade relations through cooperation agreements between the then EC and Hungary and Poland. The EC took on an important role when it proposed itself to the USA and other important countries to coordinate the technical assistance for reform policy in 1989 (Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies PHARE). This laid the foundation for Europes modern external relations. In the German case, the EC also reacted speedily and made aid for economic restructuring available through its regional policy instruments. Even before unification on 3 October 1990 the EC flexibly paved the way for structural fund interventions. Between 1991 and 1993, 3 bn Euro went to East Germany. Its GDP per capita at the time was 37% of the EC average (12 Member States at that time). Within a year the economic output and employment went down by 25%. The situation then was disastrous: ecological damage and contamination, rotten industries, lack of skills and entrepreneurs. And people had to learn to take their lives into their own hands. In short a major structural reform process had to be implemented and financed. The EU has a lot of experience with structural reform and regional policies through different funds (regional

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development, social development and agricultural development) that aim at helping backward regions to catch up with richer regions in Europe. It is important to underline that these are not simply money transfers, but co-financing of locally and nationally designed and agreed development plans. The first interventions in East Germany aimed at facilitating commercial investments and economic infrastructures. In subsequent years funds were geared to promote growth, innovation and employment. An important aspect was the training of local officials in devising local development strategies (in line with the bottom-up approach of EU structural funds). By end of 1993 the EC funds had realised 6.400 projects and created 200.000 jobs. The period 1994-1999 saw a massive increase to 14 bn Euro that would leverage 58 bn investments and create 700.000 jobs. The objectives became more diverse including SME promotion, R&D, environment, reconversion of mining regions and regions with ex-USSR military bases as well as urbanisation. From 2000-2006 the EU contributed 22bn Euros to the new Lnder with a priority on infrastructure. In the current period 2007-2013 the funding is more limited, because the gap between the West German and East German Lnder has narrowed considerably (per capita GDP 66.5% of West Germanys). The current programmes are strategically geared to innovation, R&D, competitiveness and key infrastructures. The EU context also changed, as in 2004 and 2007 other Central European countries joined the EU, with much lower economic indicators. They are also benefitting from EU cohesion funds. All in all the EU structural funds from 1991-2009 have helped the new Lnder with more than 47 bn Euro while the old Lnder received more than 14 bn Euros (regions below EU average and with specific problems). It is important to consider this EU support to the transformation of East Germany as an expression of solidarity, but another aspect is that the European integration also allows for centralised mechanisms which like clearing houses avoid direct bilateral transfers, which may politically be sensitive. One can think of the current Asian currency SWAP arrangements under the Chiang Mai initiative, which were not activated during the crisis and the attempts to multilateralise the Chiang Mai initiative or to create a regional financial safety net as a similar mechanism to avoid politically difficult direct transfers.

Implications for KoreaFrom the EU and German experience the key issues facing Korea in any future unification scenario seem to me: First, the importance of embedding the process in an international framework and second to take a long-term perspective on the socio-economic implications. Both these key issues require a certain amount of preparedness and planning as well as enhanced regional cooperation. In the German case the preparedness was not in the form of contingency planning no one expected unification to happen but in the existence of a European peace-regime (the CSCE) that had addressed territorial and border issues as well as a limited amount of economic cooperation since the 1970s and the strong degree of integration of West-Germany in the EU and NATO. Already before unification the GDR was de-facto in a customs union with the EC

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as intra-German trade was not considered foreign trade for political reasons. In terms of intra-German relations there had been years of (arduous) talks, trade and cooperation across the system divide that had established channels of interaction and produced levels of information on each other that simply do not exist in the Korean context. For instance, both sides had quasi-Embassies in each others capitals with several hundred staff that ensured constant communication and intelligence. Summits were rare events nevertheless. On this basis and despite a degree of opposition to unification in some countries a negotiated settlement could close the German question in a wider European settlement in 1990 and 1992. It is a concern for the international community, given the economic importance of North-East Asia for us, that unification of Korea might open more questions than close. Unification scenarios all lead to key security and border questions for Korea and the neighbouring countries during and at the end of a process for which solutions would have to be found ad hoc and certainly in an atmosphere of deep mutual suspicions. Even in the German case, Germanys European partners were not all comfortable with the prospect of a united Germany despite decades of cooperation. The absence of a security community or of an agreement to shelve security problems such as the CSCE are also obstacles for economic integration, as the steps to be taken to pool sovereignty, to engage in multilevel governance, not to speak of integration and supranational governance, require trust and political will. It needs leadership and trust to bring cooperation and integration forward.

The Leadership issuePolitical will and leadership are needed to take the current Asian agenda of economic and monetary cooperation and security forward. The value of personal interaction between political leaders can never be underestimated. Leaders in Asia will hopefully resist the temptation to fan nationalism. They must persuade their populations that their well-being will be best served by moving away from a competitive system, based on a balance of power. The move away from a competitive, balance of power system in East Asia will only happen if it is propelled by strong domestic political leadership in each country. In the European Union, civil servants from junior to ministerial level meet several times a month. In addition to more effective policy implementation, interaction creates a sense of common endeavour. Familiarity and working together dispels fears that ones neighbours could be planning an action that could damage your interests. With time, the institutions become part of a genuine feeling of community. The driving force behind cooperation in North East Asia has paradoxically been ASEAN, which invited China, Japan and Korea to the so-called ASEAN+3 summits in 1997. This initiative came as a consequence of the Asian financial crisis in which on the one hand these three countries played a key role and on the other hand Asian leaders had concluded that the regions problems needed to be tackled at home rather than in Washington. So far ASEAN has to a certain extent been able to take a catalyzing role by organizing ASEAN

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+ 3 meetings, the ARF and other processes. ASEAN has assumed a leadership from behind or external federator role as a policy champion, but it is unclear how strongly ASEAN can influence the bigger powers in NE Asia. In 2008, prompted by the global economic crisis, the first stand-alone trilateral summit between China, Japan and Korea was perhaps paving the way for a stronger leadership in Asia complementing that of ASEAN.

Lessons of European integration for Asia?Many factors, political preferences, bargaining, external considerations and individual leaders and ideas have shaped the European integration process and there were various failed attempts to bring about a single market or an EMU in earlier stages. Arguably, this is the kind of mix East Asia needs to emulate to progress with regional responses to the crises and challenges of globalisation and the shift to regional economic integration. However, Asian integration if it takes off in an integrationist logic at all takes place in a different historical situation: First, many Asian countries are still in a nation-building process, although there is now a growing maturity and sense of need for regional approaches. Integration in Asia, unlike Europe, was not promoted by the USA after WWII and the US maintains bilateral military alliances. Second, there is not yet an overall, shared sense of common vision or purpose. Again in recent years, there has been progress on this front with ASEAN leading the way and engaging NE Asia in the ASEAN+3, the East Asia summit and the new trilateral summitry between Japan, China and Korea initiated in 2008. Third, while the European integration essentially happened before globalisation, liberalisation, and free floating currency systems with independent central banks, the Asian countries operate essentially in a framework of open markets, global competition and mostly market-driven currencies. The traditional obstacles to trade like tariffs and subsidies are of lesser importance in the current regional and global context than in the European integrations first 30 years. This could lead to less importance attached to single market style integration, or to the contrary, allow East Asia to leapfrog certain integration stages. Fourth, Asian trade and investment have not been as focused on its own region as the European trade and investment have. Essentially, the EU and US markets remain crucial for most Asian nations which to some extent compete between themselves. In other cases the trade relations form global value chains with suppliers and assemblers/exporters. These arguments weaken the case for a customs union or single market as a precondition for closer monetary cooperation. However, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and in particular the current global economic crisis have created a new context which is more prone to an Asian purpose of integration. Indeed, the export-led growth model centred on the US and EU markets is no longer sustainable (Kawai 2009). Thus, domestic and regional markets gain in importance. Consequently, regional market integration and regulation is on the agenda. A flurry of FTAs has sprung up in Asia since the 1997 financial

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crisis and the deadlock in the Doha negotiations. But a look at some trade patterns in NE Asia reveals a more sober aspect: Because of the isolation of the DPRK and lack of cross-border cooperation and infrastructure in the Greater Tumen region the landlocked parts of NE China, but also Mongolia cannot emulate the rapid economic growth of Southern coastal China. Similarly Russias Far East is hampered in its development. There are no shipping links from this region to Japans West Coast and currently the shipping lanes from Rajin and Chongsin ports in DPRK to Busan and Southern China are interrupted. There is a growth potential and economic complementarity in the region which cannot be exploited because of the deadlock over the denuclearization of the DPRK and lack of reform and openness (currently there seems to have been some progress between China and DPRK on the latter). Fifth, differences in political systems and the size of countries are much larger than in Europe. Similar political systems are a precondition for EU membership (e.g. democratization of fascist, military or socialist dictatorships in the 1970s and 1990s) but not for ASEAN or EAS membership. Finally, the presence of a security community in Europe had created a stable framework in which mutual trust could develop. In Asia bilateral alliances with the US guarantee some countries security, while others perceive them as constraining them. The DPRK remains a black hole for security (and economic) cooperation in East Asia. In conclusion, while there are many differences in the European and Asian contexts, Ladies and Gentlemen, I hope you can remember one thing from my paper: German unification went hand in hand with and built on earlier achievements of European unification. Both the European economic community and the (transatlantic) security community were key factors in enabling a peaceful and prosperous unification which in turn helped Europe as a whole to enhance prosperity, peace and freedom.

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Globalization, East Asian Regional Order, and the Korean Unification: Analysis from the Historical-Comparative PerspectivePARK Myung-Lim (Professor, yonsei University)

AbstractSouth Koreas role as a bridge state in the regional integration is an important shift from being a weak state of the past to the current middle-power nation. This will transition the role of South Korea from being a hub of conflict to a peace hub, allowing it to take on a more leading role in the regional integration. More than ever, South Korea should pay special attention to the formation of regional organizations in various domains in East Asia and to attract these organizations to Seoul. Development of such regional multilateral organizations and attracting them to Seoul will be a dual task of promoting integration, peace, stability and solidarity in the East Asian region and fulfilling South Koreas role as a bridge state. Analogously, South Korea will be taking on a similar role and status as Germany, Poland, Finland (Germany vs. Russia, Europe vs. Slav), Belgium, Switzerland, or Paraguay of South America. Therefore, South Korea has an important lesson to learn from Germanys experience in reunification and contribution to peace in Europe for achieving its own unification and peace in East Asian regionalthough, it is also important to reiterate that Germany separated after the Cold War as a powerful but a war criminal state in Europe, setting it apart from South Koreas case of becoming a divided country from regional disintegration as nation in the frontier region in East Asia. Secondly, it is important to learn from other bridge nations like Poland, Finland, Switzerland, Belgium, Israel, and Paraguay, for they will serve as an important model for South Korea. It is critical to incorporate both the experiences of Germany and other bridge nations. By doing so, will allow South Korea to resume the 300 years of peace in East Asia while building a more solid and longstanding nation of stability and peace, and to achieve reunification and become the hub of peace in East Asia and the world.

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2) . . A.G. Hopkins ed, Globalization in World History (W. W. Norton & Company, 2002) 3) , , 2000 (50) . 4) , - . , , 272(2006 2), pp.5-31.; ----, , ,pp.79-120 ; , 21 : , ,pp.43-96 ; , , , 45 3(2002),pp.269-290 ; , - - 41 1(2007. 3) pp. 101-121, , (, 2009) . 5)Myung-Lim Park, Metopia Through Mezzo Integration: Regional Order and Regional Integration in East Asia --- Some Peculiarities, Uniqueness, and Future Vision, Paper Presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting 2010, Mar, 2528, 2010. Philadelphia Marriott Downtown, Philadelphia, USA 6) , Kim Key-Hiuk, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire,1860-1882 (University of California Press, Berkeley: 1980) ; , (, 2009). .

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7), : , , , , 22 1(2006 ),,p.9 8) David Shambaugh, Chinas Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order, International Security 293(Winter 2004/5), pp.64-99; Thomas J. Christiansen, Fostering Stability or Creating Monster?: The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia, International Security Vol.31.No.1(Summer, 2006),pp.81-126 ; Divad C. Kang, Ch1. The Puzzle and Chinas Amazing Rise, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (Columbia University Press, 2007), 9) , , , : - ( ),pp. 1-70 .

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3. 10) , , 1953 ? . . , , , . . , . 3 . (global), (regional), (national) , , . -- -- 1953 (Koreanization) -- 3 . , , , 3 . 20 3 , . . . , . , , - , (hub-and-spokes) .11) . . . , , , , , , , 8 . . 8 4 4 . 4 4 .10) , , : , , , , 22 1(2006 ), pp.1-32 . 11) , - . Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism, International Organization 56, 3, (Summer 2002), pp.575-607.; Amitav Acharya, Why Is There No NATO in Asia? The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism, Working Paper 05-05, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, (Harvard University, July 2005) ; , : (2010 8. ) .

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german unification lessons for korea

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