本本中中心心辦辦理理「「東東協協稻稻米米貿貿易易論論壇壇：：糧糧食食

安安全全之之區區域域合合作作」」專專題題演演講講

編輯部

本中心於今（2013）年 8 月 8 日邀請菲律賓

大學（University of the Philippines）經濟學院院

長克萊瑞特（Ramon L. Clarete）蒞臨，以「東協

稻米貿易論壇：糧食安全之區域合作」（ASEAN

Rice Trade Forum: A Regional Cooperation for

Food Security）為題進行專題演講。克萊瑞特院

長係夏威夷大學（University of Hawaii）經濟學

博士，主要專攻領域為農業經濟學、發展經濟

學、多邊貿易政策、國際經濟學與公共經濟學。

本次演講活動供吸引近 80 人報名參加，包括來

自政府、企業、智庫與學界等人士共同與會，現

場討論亦相當踴躍。

在本次專題演講中，克萊瑞特院長指出，糧

食價格之極端變動將對發展中國家造成較大衝

擊，更將破壞糧食貿易信心（ confidence in

trade）。以 2008 年糧食危機為例，2008 年糧食

價格飆漲，印度、越南及泰國等稻米輸出國限制

稻米出口，使稻米輸入國菲律賓因此受到衝擊，

並使東協各國承諾在稻米生產上致力於達到自

給自足，卻也導致各國必須花費更多成本，使稻

P.1 ◆本中心辦理「東協稻米貿易論壇：糧食安全之區域合作」專題演講

P.7 ◆外交部趙錫麟前大使專訪

P.13 ◆What has ASEAN offered or could offer to the European Union in their relationship?

P.20 ◆TRADE POLICY AND SERVICES LIBERALISATION IN MALAYSIA: OPPORTUNITIES FOR TAIWAN

P.28 ◆The Challenges of the CLMV Countries and the Role of Development Partner

P.35 ◆Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP

本本 期期 目目 錄錄

2 東協瞭望 008

米貿易低落與高成本稻米自足計畫間形成了惡

性循環。

圖：「東協稻米貿易論壇：糧食安全之區域合作」專題演講

會場

此外，克萊瑞特院長指出，造成糧食價格上

升的因素，除了貿易條件衝擊（ trade shocks）外，

不充分及低品質（ low quality）的市場資訊也是

造成糧食價格波動的原因。對此，在降低稻米價

格極端波動上，可從三方面著手改善：第一、提

升稻米儲存量：在國家及區域層面增加稻米供

應，以提升可供使用之稻米儲存量；第二、稻米

市場資訊與情報分享：東協糧食安全資訊系統

（ ASEAN Food Security Information System,

AFSIS）係區域層面之糧食資訊系統，而區域合

作對糧食安全相當重要；第三、促進稻米貿易。

在「東協稻米貿易論壇」（ASEAN Rice

Trade Forum）方面，克萊瑞特院長提到，「東

協糧食安全儲備理事會」（ASEAN Food Security

Reserve Board, AFSRB）為東協稻米貿易論壇之

召集單位，此論壇係分享市場資訊與情報、整合

回應糧食危機政策及促進稻米進出口國協商之

平臺，其使用稻米與相關糧食統計資料，如

AFSIS、聯合國糧食及農業組織統計資料庫

（ FAOstat ） 、 美 國 農 業 部 （ United States

Department of Agriculture, USDA）、農業市場資

訊系統（Agricultural Market Information System,

AMIS），並利用全球稻米市場模型分析糧食政

策與其他衝擊之影響，而東協稻米貿易論壇提供

了東協稻米市場現況與展望之資訊，並在加強稻

米貿易及相關措施上給予建議。

現場討論時間時，克萊瑞特院長亦提到，小

麥為西方國家之主食，而西方國家有較高之人均

所得，因此人民有較多糧食來源可選擇，稻米則

為亞洲國家生產與食用之主要作物，加上東南亞

國家多數為開發中經濟體，替代性主食之選擇較

少，因此稻米價格變動性較小麥大。

圖：克萊瑞特院長

此外，克萊瑞特院長指出，東協各國雖聲稱

開放稻米市場已有進展，然稻米的確仍為政治敏

感性很高之項目，只有少數會員國對稻米市場開

放具有共識，可預見稻米在未來十年仍僅屬於自

由化的第二順位。在東協市場中，稻米關稅已逐

漸調降，如菲律賓最惠國待遇下關稅為 50%，並

另有配額限制，但對東協國家之稅率為 40%，未

來亦可能降至 35%。克萊瑞特院長認為，菲律賓

本中心辦理「東協稻米貿易論壇：糧食安全之區域合作」專題演講 3

係糧食進口國，高關稅將導致走私猖獗，反而不

易控管且傷害本國農民，政府應降低稅率，使糧

食市場正常化，如此一來，一方面可增加農民收

益，另一方面國內消費者也會因稻米價格降低而

受益。

外外交交部部趙趙錫錫麟麟前前大大使使專專訪訪 編輯部

伊斯蘭文化簡介

全球約有 17 至 18 億伊斯蘭人口，主要分布

於東協、南亞、中亞、阿拉伯國家、土耳其、伊

朗、西非等地區。伊斯蘭文化強調信仰融入生

活，崇拜唯一真神─安拉。而伊斯蘭主要有 5

大功課，分別為「誦唸清真言」、「每日 5 次禮

拜」、「伊曆 9 月奉行齋戒」、「出散天課」及

「若有能力，一生需至聖地麥加朝覲一次」。

伊斯蘭文化將宗教信仰與經濟運作結合，其

經濟觀強調人本精神、保障與互助、生產與分

配，且認為城市的形成增加了經濟運作的成本。

此外，伊斯蘭經濟的特色在於：「代理經營大

地」、「公私取捨分明」、「鼓勵經營開發」、

「倡導貨暢其流」及「推動社會均衡」；而伊斯

蘭 經濟概念 中的 「義 產」（ Auqaf, Islamic

Endowment）制度，則為現代慈善或公益基金的

濫觴。

問題一：請問東協伊斯蘭市場之發展現

況與未來趨勢？

趙大使：在東協國家中，伊斯蘭文化可謂具

有相當程度之重要性，惟伊斯蘭文化與其他宗教

文化之間的衝突卻時有所聞。目前，緬甸境內有

伊斯蘭教徒與佛教徒之宗教衝突，至今仍待雙方

進一步和解協商；而菲律賓南部的伊斯蘭自治區

若可維持穩定，則該國經濟將能持續發展。儘管

如此，伊斯蘭金融對許多東協國家而言，是不可

或缺的金融運作制度，目前東協國家中具伊斯蘭

銀行制度之國家為：汶萊、馬來西亞、新加坡、

印尼及泰國。

馬來西亞為東南亞地區第一個推動伊斯蘭

金 融 的 國 家 ， 1992 年 渣 打 國 際 商 業 銀 行

（Standard Chartered Bank）在馬國設立伊斯蘭

金融服務銀行，成為伊斯蘭金融邁入國際金融體

系的重要里程碑。而泰國雖非伊斯蘭教國家，但

體認到伊斯蘭市場所具有的商機與利益，對於推

動伊斯蘭金融不遺餘力。首先，因泰國南部四個

府合計約有 400 萬人信奉伊斯蘭教，推動伊斯蘭

金融可維繫政權穩定，屬政策考量；另一方面，

泰國長期以來對阿拉伯國家輸出勞工，泰國期望

藉此加強並引進阿拉伯產油國家資本；最後，因

泰國物產豐富，且食品加工業發展興盛，欲進一

步藉此拓展伊斯蘭市場。

對於我國而言，東協擁有相當廣大的伊斯蘭

市場，因印尼與馬來西亞經濟發展極具前景，臺

灣業者可至該等伊斯蘭國家進行生產加工作

業，並將產品就近銷往鄰近之伊斯蘭市場。而泰

國正積極推動伊斯蘭金融制度，我國應可進一步

了解泰國在伊斯蘭金融制度與法規之作法，做為

未來推動國內伊斯蘭金融之借鏡。另有專家指

出，我國可利用經建會積極推動之「自由經濟示

範區」，進口符合伊斯蘭宗教戒律之原物料，在

臺灣加工後直接將產品出口，有效拓展伊斯蘭市

場。

問題二：請問何謂伊斯蘭金融？我國若

推動伊斯蘭金融，可從何種面向著手？

外交部趙錫麟前大使專訪 5

趙大使：伊斯蘭金融係依照伊斯蘭律法所制

訂的金融運作模式，除伊朗外，目前為止尚未有

其他國家的金融體系完全屬於伊斯蘭金融，例如

沙烏地阿拉伯仍是以西方經濟體系為主，僅能盡

量使其國內金融制度符合伊斯蘭金融之要求。而

伊朗雖宣稱完全遵循伊斯蘭金融體系規範，但由

於該國經濟長期以來受到國際制裁，與國際接軌

程度相對較低。

就發展起源來看，伊斯蘭金融之發展最早始

於埃及，至 20 世紀 1960～1970 年代，部分阿拉

伯國家的金融業者開始倡議設立「伊斯蘭銀

行」， 1975 年「伊斯蘭開發銀行」（ Islamic

Development Bank, IDB 或 IsDB）遂正式成立。

至此，伊斯蘭金融已開始逐步累積發展經驗，使

得符合現代社會需求的伊斯蘭金融制度也愈趨

成熟，而 IDB 也透過提供會員國貸款，鼓勵會

員國之間貿易往來，並利用利息收入做為推動伊

斯蘭教育計畫之資金來源。1999 年，道瓊伊斯

蘭市場指數（Dow Jones Islamic Market Index,

DJIMI）正式推出，進一步提升伊斯蘭金融在國

際金融市場之重要地位。

此外，伊斯蘭金融具備 5 大特色，包括：「金

銀本位與重要物資交易禁止賺取差價」、「禁止

利息」、「禁止不當牟利」、「分散資本」，並

「採更多互助、互利，共同分擔以降低風險」，

以「普遍公平交易」等。而伊斯蘭金融同時也具

備 6 項優點，亦即：「公平交易」、「誠信互助」、

「共同承擔」、「腳踏實地」、「自我監督」及

「造福社會」。

針對我國推動伊斯蘭金融之可行策略，基本

上可循 7 大步驟進行：瞭解學理、觀摩取經、妥

善籌備、諮詢監督、模擬試驗、長遠規畫、逐步

執行。整體而言，我國應可從 4 大層面開始著

手，即從學理方面加強培養伊斯蘭金融人才、向

國外取經觀摩他國伊斯蘭金融發展模式、將他國

發展模式改良並運用於我國金融市場、相關政府

部會則須進行長期政策規畫。

就臺灣拓展伊斯蘭金融的市場環境而言，我

國目前尚無任何足以擔負伊斯蘭金融認證之第

三公證單位，惟鑑於我國政府有意推動建立國內

之伊斯蘭金融認證制度，本人也刻正規劃與我國

銀行公會就伊斯蘭金融議題進行討論，期望能為

臺灣拓展伊斯蘭金融體系帶來實質貢獻。事實

上，引進伊斯蘭金融制度對於各國政府具有相當

大的挑戰性，各國政府須在相關金融法規修正並

符合伊斯蘭戒律後，方能正式展開伊斯蘭金融之

運作，而此舉將對國家金融法規體系帶來重大影

響，因此許多國家的中央銀行至今仍未引進伊斯

蘭金融制度。

問題三：請問臺灣業者在清真市場上具

有何種商機？

趙大使：就我國產業發展優勢而言，臺灣應

可優先推動以伊斯蘭人口為主要客群的觀光醫

療服務，主因在於我國醫療水準相對較高，若積

極推動相關醫療服務，國內醫療資源也可因此獲

得非健保營利，惟此方面執行困難度較高，外籍

人士來臺可能面臨因不黯中文而產生語言溝通

問題，且英文溝通在臺灣亦存有障礙，故須透過

翻譯人員協助。為有效解決語言問題，我國政府

應可針對伊斯蘭旅客來源鎖定特定區域或國

家，針對國內護理人員進行 6 個月密集語言培

訓，使其了解伊斯蘭國家的基本醫療用語，提升

拓展伊斯蘭醫療旅遊客群的可行性。

此外，清真市場的商機龐大，推動清真產品

（Halal）認證是目前不可忽視的發展趨勢，包

含東亞、非洲、歐洲等地區皆有清真認證之需

6 東協瞭望 008

趙錫麟大使曾先後留學利比亞與阿烏地阿拉伯，並獲得利比亞大學法學院法學學士，以及沙烏地阿拉伯麥加

大學法學院研究所伊斯蘭法學碩士、博士。學成歸國後，趙大使隨即展開外交官生涯，曾派駐於利比亞及沙烏地

阿拉伯擔任我國駐館大使，也曾擔任利比亞大學外國學生學院講師。趙大使於 2012 年正式從外交部退休，目前

則擔任中國回教協會顧問，並於國立交通大學講授伊斯蘭文明課程。

求。然清真認證不僅用於食品，銷往伊斯蘭市場

的相關藥品亦須經有該項認證，我國製藥廠應可

經過清真認證後將藥品外銷，以獲取較高利潤，

惟藥品通關較為費時，我國駐外人員應可協助對

此進行調查與協助，減少藥品等產品之外銷阻

礙。

問題四：臺灣 Halal 認證一般存在兩種

觀點：第一，馬來西亞 Halal 認證在國

際上較具有公信力，臺灣產品可經過馬

國認證後，再進入國際市場；第二，臺

灣已具有本國之 Halal 認證，應發展我

國認證系統。請問大使，我國在 Halal

認證方面應如何有效發展？我國政府應

給予業者何種協助？

趙大使：臺灣 Halal 認證機構─「臺灣清真

產業品質保證推廣協會」已與馬來西亞、印尼等

主要認證機構合作，並建立相互承認機制，因此

我國產品外銷時，臺灣 Halal 認證基本上已被馬

來西亞、印尼等其他伊斯蘭國家所承認，我國業

者亦可藉由馬來西亞或印尼之 Halal認證拓展其

他國家之清真市場。為進一步推動臺灣 Halal 認

證制度之健全，我國 Halal 認證機構可持續向外

國機構諮詢，但不宜再藉助外國機構進行認證，

以確實提升臺灣 Halal 認證之能力與品質。目

前，我國在 Halal 產品認證上已具有一定發展，

但往後仍將面臨伊斯蘭金融之認證問題。

目前臺灣業者針對各項產品進行 Halal 認

證，係因許多外國客戶對銷往伊斯蘭市場之產品

均提出認證要求，故當地政府如海關、食品藥物

管理局、標準檢驗局等機關，往往會查驗來自各

國的產品包裝上是否已具有 Halal認證，而從「臺

灣清真產業品質保證推廣協會」目前所擁有的會

員數目逐漸增加，顯示我國業者對於 Halal 認證

之需求也持續提升。事實上，清真食品與一般民

眾的健康訴求相吻合，由於伊斯蘭戒律禁止食用

不合規定宰殺或宰殺前已死亡之家畜或家禽，且

各項清真食品中皆不可含酒，若清真食品能為國

人所接受，其實相當符合當前的健康概念。

在政府提供業者之協助方面，我國政府應可

針對伊斯蘭市場進行深入研究。不同於日本或歐

美等主要國家，存在許多大型之跨國企業，我國

業者則多以「小而美」的形式前進外國市場，其

能承擔的經營成本相對較低，而對於當地政經發

展的敏感性理應較高，故我國駐外經貿人員應深

入調查當地市場情勢，以協助業者克服拓銷伊斯

蘭市場可能面臨之投資或貿易障礙。

趙錫麟大使簡歷

WWhhaatt hhaass AASSEEAANN ooffffeerreedd oorr ccoouulldd ooffffeerr

ttoo tthhee EEuurrooppeeaann UUnniioonn iinn tthheeiirr

rreellaattiioonnsshhiipp??

Paul Joseph Lim

INTRODUCTION

The Association of South East Asian Nations’

member countries have for long demanded that the

West, the European Union (EU) treat them as equal

partners. One reason why the South East Asian

countries came together was the realisation that each

on its own has no weight but together they will be

treated on a more equal basis.

The EU has responded to this demand of equal

partnership by a change of attitude i.e. recognising

the colonial legacy and not appearing to teach Asian

countries. The latest exemplification of this is the

partnership and cooperation agreements it is

negotiating individually with ASEAN countries.

Examining the concept of equal partnership

implies a level playing field, implies that each side

shares ideas, co-finances, have something to

contribute to the other. Etc. Etc. Etc.

This paper wishes to examine whether ASEAN

and its Member States have contributed or

something to offer the EU. More often we read of

what the EU commits to ASEAN.

The author has to admit that in writing this

paper, he is only examining what comes out

officially in the public domain not an assessment

from interviews conducted and so what he writes is

opened to questioning but if it does provoke

questioning then it is also good because it should

start a reflection, an evaluation of ASEAN and its

vision, policies, towards the outside world.

TO BEGIN

To begin we read the relevant paragraphs of the

Co-Chairs’ Statement of the 19th ASEAN-EU

Ministerial Meeting, 26-27 April 2012,Bandar Seri

Begawan, Brunei Darussalam. This AEMM as it is

called meets once in two years. The next will be in

2014.

Paragraph I of the statement referred to how

they could best work together to secure a more

prosperous future for the people of both regions.

This is a reflection of an equal partnership.

Paragraph II reflected this equal partnership

further with the EU welcoming the outcome of the

20th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh on 3-4 April

2012 particularly the adoption of the Phnom Penh

Declaration on ASEAN: One Community, One

Destiny; the Phnom Penh Agenda on ASEAN

Community Building, the ASEAN Leaders’

Declaration on Drug Free ASEAN 2015 and also on

the promotion of Global Movement of Moderates.

ASEAN welcomed EU measures to consolidate

public budgets, reduce public borrowing and put in

place an effective framework to underpin economic

growth and financial stability in the EU and in turn,

to support the international economy and world

trade. ASEAN congratulated the EU on its expanded

membership, with the accession of Croatia on 1 July

2013.

8 東協瞭望 008

Paragraph III had something which the EU had

been searching for: “The Ministers looked forward

to the EU’s early accession to the Treaty of Amity

and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), once the

Third Protocol Amending the TAC has entered into

force and all necessary arrangements have been

made. The Ministers emphasised the importance of

the TAC as a key instrument in governing inter-state

relations and contributing to peace, security,

stability and prosperity in the region.”

Paragraph IV touched on international issues

which both exchanged reflecting this equal

partnership. It had important sentences quoted here,

“…… The Ministers exchanged views on maritime

security and stressed the importance of promoting

cooperation in this area in accordance with

international law and UNCLOS 1982. As the world’s

two most integrated and dynamic regions, the

Ministers agreed that ASEAN and the EU should

work together more closely to address international

issues of mutual concern and advance their shared

interests in international fora. The Ministers also

discussed the various ASEAN-led processes such as

the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministerial

Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) in promoting greater

cooperation in East Asia. There is a focus on

ASEAN.

Paragraph V focused on Myanmar that had been

a thorn in EU-ASEAN relations. It states, “The

Ministers welcomed the positive developments in

Myanmar, including the successful holding of the

by-elections on 1 April 2012, as a significant step

towards democratisation. ASEAN welcomed the step

just taken by the EU to suspend restrictive measures,

and to open a new chapter in Myanmar-EU relations

while strengthening the overall ASEAN-EU

partnership.”

Paragraph VI touched on the satisfaction in

implementing the Plan of Action to implement the

Nuremberg Declaration of an ASEAN-EU Enhanced

Partnership (2007-2012), the Phnom Penh Agenda

for the Implementation of the ASEAN-EU Plan of

Action (2009-2010) and the Indicative List of

Activities for 2011-2012 and concluded that

ASEAN-EU relations have matured and diversified.

This looks very good but it does not say what made

them satisfactory.

Paragraph VII stated that, “The Ministers were

also pleased with progress in bilateral cooperation

between the EU and ASEAN Member States in

negotiating Partnership and Cooperation Agreements

(PCA) as well as Free Trade Agreements (FTA) that

would contribute to the enhancement of cooperation

at regional level. In this regard, the Ministers

welcomed the launching of PCA negotiations

between Brunei Darussalam and the EU.

From hindsight of 2013, we know that only

with Singapore has a PCA and FTA been concluded.

With Malaysia, both the PCA and FTA had been at a

standstill with the now past General Elections. With

Thailand, the PCA was stopped with the coup d’état

and resumed after but where it is? EU and Thailand

launched FTA negotiations in 2013 and one would

expect that this would boost the PCA negotiations to

conclude. With the Philippines, the PCA

negotiations concluded but no sign of FTA

negotiations. With Vietnam, the PCA has been

initialed and now FTA negotiations in the fourth

round. With Indonesia, the PCA had been initialed

but also no sign of FTA negotiations. With Brunei,

the announcement of PCA negotiations in April 2012.

No news on FTA negotiations. “Partnership” reflects

equal partnership but what is behind cooperation?

What has ASEAN offered or could offer to the European Union in their relationship? 9

Paragraph VIII stated, “The Ministers adopted

the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to

Strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership

(2013-2017) which aims to give a more strategic

focus to cooperation and dialogue. The Ministers

urged both sides to work for its effective and

comprehensive implementation.”

Paragraph IX touched enhance cooperation in

political and security areas, increasing ASEAN’s

institutional capacity and capability in conflict

management and resolution, complementing its

decision to establish the ASEAN Institute of Peace

and Reconciliation. Paragraph X welcomed the EU’s

offer to contribute towards enhancing capacity of

ASEAN Member States on crisis response.

In Paragraph XI, the EU reaffirmed its

commitment to intensify cooperation with ASEAN

in building disaster resilient societies; enhancing

maritime cooperation; combating sea piracy and

armed robbery against ships in accordance with

international law; combating terrorism and

transnational crime; promoting cooperation in

combating illicit drug production, trafficking and

use; mitigating chemical, biological, radiological

and nuclear risks.

Paragraph XII touched on supporting the work

of the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on

Human Rights (AICHR) with emphasis on capacity

building. Paragraph XIV touched on science and

technology, EU’s Framework Programme 7 and its

successor Horizon 2020, Krabi Initiative, Erasmus

Mundus and closer links between ASEAN

University Network and European University

Association.

Paragraph XVII welcomed the EU’s

commitment, through the new Plan of Action and its

Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (2011-2013), to

support the implementation of the Master Plan on

ASEAN Connectivity. ASEAN also encouraged the

EU to meet with the ASEAN Connectivity

Coordinating Committee (ACCC) and explore ways

to promote cooperation in this area. In this broad

context, the Ministers agreed that it would be

worthwhile to explore cooperation on, and exchange

of experience in water management such as between

the Mekong and the Danube region.

Paragraph XVIII touched on further technical

cooperation and peer support under the Plan of

Action in urgent areas, such as food security and

energy security; enhance economic cooperation,

notably in the fields of energy efficiency and

conservation, clean and renewable energy and food

and agriculture research and development.

Paragraph XIX was on intensifying cooperation

to promote technical support and capacity building,

including sharing of best practices and experience in

Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) development,

through the conduct of various activities such as

workshops, seminars, courses as well as business

portals.

Paragraph XX on continuing providing support

to further strengthen the capacity of the ASEAN

Secretariat.

What one wll see here in these paragraphs is

what the EU will or would contribute to ASEAN and,

of course, behind all these, EU funding to ASEAN,

although anyone involved in consultancy work with

the European Commission will also know that

European consultants and consultancy firms benefit

from the funds to ASEAN as they are engaged in

doing the work of the EU’s contribution. Behind the

demand for equal partnership is still development

assistance although “assistance” has been replaced

by “cooperation”; just new terminology? It remains

10 東協瞭望 008

a donor-recipient relationship. Question is where is

ASEAN’s contribution to the EU that will benefit

the EU? Are the FTA negotiations that will open up

the ASEAN economies to EU business penetration

the trade off? It is obvious that apart from Singapore

and to a lesser extent, Malaysia, no other ASEAN

country is in a position to invest in the EU? There is

no real level playing field for the weaker ASEAN

economies whose business community cannot invest

in the EU’s Single Market rather trying to export

into the EU under the Generalised System of

Preferences and facing anti-dumping procedures. An

FTA may solve such problems but not every ASEAN

economy is negotiating an FTA as we saw and

Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia benefit from the GSP

and the “Everything but arms” arrangement1 as a

member of the Least Developed Countries (LDC)

Group.

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PLAN OF

ACTION TO STRENGTHEN THE ASEAN-EU

ENHANCED PARTNERSHIP (2013-2017)

When you read into Bandar Seri Begawan Plan

of Action and into its details referred to in the

Co-Chairs’ Statement, it is obvious that it requires

EU funding. Where is the funding contribution of

ASEAN and its Member States? It is to a large

extent a one-sided affair. This is an 11-page

document that is not laid out here but covers

paragraphs of the Co-Chairs’ Statement. It is

1 From the website of Directorate-General for Trade of

the European Commission: Tailor-made to the specific

needs of least developed countries, the EU’s

“Everything But Arms” arrangement (EBA) was born in

2001 to give all LDCs full duty free and quota-free

access to the EU for all their exports with the exception

of arms and armaments. This makes it the most

generous form of preferential treatment to LDCs

globally—an approach we encourage other partners to

follow. Entry into the EBA is automatic and, unlike

other GSP arrangements, the EBA has no time-limit.

organized under political/security, economic/trade,

sociocultural – reflecting as it states, the

multifaceted character of ASEAN – EU relations and

it goes into them.

OVERVIEW OF ASEAN-EU

DIALOGUE RELATIONS

When one goes to the ASEAN webite,

“Overview of ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations” as at

April 2013, 2 it transparently publicise the

cooperation of between the EU and ASEAN. It is

organised along Political-Security Cooperation,

Economic Cooperation, Functional and

Development Cooperation. Here it is very clear that

it is development cooperation. Let’s take a look at

this website.

Under Political and Security Cooperation, one

notes that this has been progressing well. Regular

meetings have helped ASEAN and the EU

understand one another and build higher comfort

level to further cooperation. ASEAN views these

meetings critical in reviewing and guiding

ASEAN-EU relations. It referred to the Action Plan

and stated that the EU acceded to the Treaty of

Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in

Phnom Penh on the sidelines of the 45th

AMM/PMC/19th ARF on 12 July 2012. The

accession demonstrated the EU’s commitment

towards ASEAN and reflected as the important

milestones in ASEAN-EU relations to promote

peace, security and stability in the region. The

region referred here is South East Asia and/or to

include North East Asia. In ASEAN’s mind, South

Asia is excluded. It went on to speak of 24

Ambassadors from the EU Member States and the

2

www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/european-union

/item/overview-of-asean-eu-dialogue relations.

What has ASEAN offered or could offer to the European Union in their relationship? 11

Commission accredited to ASEAN.

The above is

political-security and

nothing on funding.

Under Economic Cooperation, it gave statistical

data. Total trade between ASEAN and the EU grew

modestly by 12.6%, amounting to US$234.8 billion

in 2011. Exports to the EU increased by 10%

amounting to US$126.6 billion and imports from the

EU rose 15.6% totalling US$108.2 billion. Foreign

Direct Investment flow from the EU into ASEAN

increased by 7.2% totalling US$18.2 billion. The EU

remains ASEAN’s third largest trading partner and

continued to be ASEAN’s biggest source of Foreign

Direct Investment, with a share of 16%. It went on

to speak of Tourism, the ASEAN-EU Trade and

Investment Work Programme for 2013-2014, the

possibility of resuming negotiations of an

ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement, upon realisation

of the ASEAN Economic Community by the end of

2015 and the 3rd ASEAN-EU Business Summit held

on 8-9 March 2013 at the sidelines of the 12th

AEM-EU Trade Commissioner Consultations.

Finally, functional and development

cooperation which is where we will see EU funding

assistance. First mentioned was the Regional

EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI) that was

a policy dialogue mechanism/process for promoting

the ASEAN-EU dialogue relations in non-trade areas.

Following the introduction of the READI, ASEAN

and the EU had organised a number of

sectoral/experts consultations in trafficking in

persons, ICT, labour and employment, air transport,

climate change, energy and science and technology.

Next, the mention of the ASEAN-EU Programme for

Regional Integration Support Phase II (APRIS II)

which ended in Decenmber 2010 and the ASEAN

Regional Integration Support from the EU (ARISE)

with a foreseen budget of €15 million for the period

from 2012 to 2016 which was signed into existence

on 17 January 2013 at the ASEAN Secretariat.

Thirdly, ASEAN looked forward to EU’s continued

support to the implementation of the ASEAN

Agreement on disaster Management and Emergency

Response (AADMER) and the ASEAN Coordinating

Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster

Management (AHA Centre). Then, both sides agreed

to focus on three themes comprising four areas for

Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP)

2011-2013 of which the EU has allocated an

indicative budget of, as follows: ASEAN

Connectivity (covering Comprehensive Border

Management and Higher Education), Human Rights

and Institutional Capacity (covering ASEAN

regional statistics). Finally, the website stated that

the EU also provided funding support to the

ASEAN-EU Migration and Border Management

Programme (2009-2011), ASEAN-EU Statistical

Capacity Building Programme (2009-2012), ASEAN

Project on the Protection of Intellectual Property

Rights (2010-2012), Enhancing ASEAN FTA

Negotiating Capacity/Support to ASEAN-EU

Negotiating Process (2011-2013) and ASEAN Air

Transport Integration Project (2011-2013). Is that

all?

EU-ASEAN: NATURAL

PARTNERS

From the brochure of the EU entitled,

“EU-ASEAN: Natural Partners,”3 one notes:

“Another part of EU-ASEAN cooperation is

delivered through EU support programmes. In the

3 From

www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/indonesia/documents/e

u_asea/20130101_brochure_en_pdf.

12 東協瞭望 008

period 2007-2013, in addition to the € 2 billion

(about US$ 2.6 billion) granted to individual

ASEAN Member States, the EU is providing € 70

million (about US$ 90 million) at regional level

through the ASEAN Secretariat. Individual EU

Member States also provide further funds to

ASEAN.”

Then, it states:

“The EU financial contribution of € 70 million

(about US$ 90 million) directly supports ASEAN in

its efforts to implement the three Blueprints for the

three Communities in the ASEAN Charter.”

This brochure gives a breakdown of projects

the funds are allocated is not listed here.

What is forgotten is that EU has been funding

ASEAN’s activities for years along with other

donors from the US, Canada, Japan and Australia.

CONCLUSION

What is to be said? Definitely the whole

EU-ASEAN relations are focused on ASEAN not on

the EU. There is no contribution to the EU on the

European continent, on European issues apart from

exchanging views. It is the EU giving to ASEAN

rather and development cooperation in terms of

funds is the concrete expression which raises the

issue still of a donor-recipient relationship.

One wonders what ASEAN and its Member

States think of it? No self-pride? No shame? Part of

the game? If the West, Europe here, wants

something from us, they have to pay? They pay to

support ASEAN to be in the driver seat of regional

integration, of keeping the peace, stability and

security in South East Asia and Asia? At this level,

ASEAN feels important, an equal partner? Without

donors like the EU and its Member States, how

could ASEAN play a role on the South East Asian,

Asian and world stage? Is there no sense of ASEAN

solidarity where the richer countries foot the bill for

the activities of ASEAN? For that matter, no sense

of ASEAN solidarity to uplift its poorer members?

Mention was made of bilateral aid to individual

ASEAN countries by both the EU and its individual

Member States. The author does not have answers to

these questions but it is for ASEAN leaders to

answer these questions honestly to themselves with

their moral consciences.

In fact, this dependency on foreign assistance,

here the EU, is just another dimension. The other

dimension is of the ASEAN’s economies’

dependence on foreign trade and foreign investments

(the EU figures as ASEAN’s third largest trading

partner and biggest source of Foreign Direct

Investment), even among the richer countries since

they started off industrialization via Export-Oriented

Industrialisation (EOI) as a path of development to

“catch-up” with the developed countries, to

modernise. To be in inter-dependent in a global

world is different if this inter-dependence is on a

level playing field which is not the case for all

ASEAN economies.

Despite all the anti-colonial rhetoric, despite all

the unhappiness and critic of being talked down,

acceptance of the funds of the EU and other donors

is alright. Money talks.

Rightly, ASEAN has nothing to offer or could

offer to the Europe Union in its relationship except

talking at a comfort level focusing on itself in South

East Asia. The title of this paper should rather be

“What has the EU offered or could offer to ASEAN

in their relationship?

What has ASEAN offered or could offer to the European Union in their relationship? 13

The author is a pensioner Professor who is presently a MOFA Fellow in Taiwan. He was formerly Professor of

European Studies engaged to set up the Centre for European Studies in the Institute of Occidental Studies, National

University of Malaysia. However, his roots are in Brussels where he was a Political Adviser in a political group in the

European Parliament and in a think tank he co-founded called the European Institute for Asian Studies.

References

Co-Chairs’ Statement of the 19th ASEAN-EU

Ministerial Meeting, 26-27 April 2012,Bandar

Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam.

Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to strengthen

the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership

(2013-2017).

Website of Directorate-General for Trade of the

European Commission.

ASEAN webite, “Overview of ASEAN-EU Dialogue

Relations” as at April 2013,

(www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/europ

ean-union/item/overview-of-asean-eu-dialogue

relations.)

“EU-ASEAN: Natural Partners”,

(www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/indonesia/docume

nts/eu_asea/20130101_brochure_en_pdf

Paul Joseph Lim

TRADE POLICY AND SERVICESTRADE POLICY AND SERVICES

LIBERALISATION IN MALAYSIA: LIBERALISATION IN MALAYSIA:

OPPORTUNITIES FOR TAIWANOPPORTUNITIES FOR TAIWAN

Shankaran Nambiar,

Assistant Director and Senior Research Fellow

Malaysian Institute of Economic Research

Introduction

This paper seeks to argue that it is an opportune

time for Taiwan to establish deeper and more formal

economic ties with Malaysia in the services sector.

Malaysia, for its part, is pursuing an active trade policy

that is constantly seeking to expand the boundaries of its

trade with other countries. This is necessary given the

fact that Malaysia is an export-dependent small open

economy. In keeping with this fact, Malaysia has

completed and is negotiating a number of free trade

agreements.

Malaysia has been undertaking strategic domestic

reforms that are aimed at liberalizing the services sector.

This is being done both to upgrade the services sector

and to prepare Malaysia for greater participation in

FTAs. These trends place Malaysia in a situation that

makes it very attractive for foreign investors in the

services sector. It also offers a point of entry into the

ASEAN market.

The present paper proceeds as follows. The second

section discusses current trends in the services sector in

Malaysia. The third section is concerned with domestic

liberalization efforts. This is followed by an analysis of

trade policy and liberalization in the Malaysian context.

The fourth section argues that there are opportunities for

Taiwan in the Malaysian services sector that can be

tapped. Finally, some concluding remarks are made.

The Services Sector:

Current Trends

The services sector has been growing steadily in

Malaysia. In 2005 the services sector contributed

roughly 48% of Malaysia’s GDP. This figure has been

rising gradually, staying in the last few years at slightly

more than 50%. The services sector has been leading

growth in Malaysia, performing more strongly than the

other sectors. The manufacturing sector has performed

rather robustly, following in significance well below the

services sector. However, the manufacturing sector

registered a contribution of about 30% in 2005. More

recently it accounts for something like 25%, which is

still a sizeable contributor to the nation’s GDP. The

mining and construction sectors have been moving in a

flat manner, maintaining a contribution of less than 10%

and about 2%, respectively.

It is clear from the observed trends that the

construction sector is not a significant contributor,

although the mining sector is a little more prominent.

Agriculture as the traditional sector of importance to

Malaysia’s growth has been consistently slipping,

leaving the services and manufacturing sectors to lead

the nation’s growth. Of course, the services sector is

most important as a contributor to GDP.

TRADE POLICY AND SERVICES LIBERALISATION IN MALAYSIA: OPPORTUNITIES FOR TAIWAN 15

Services a Major Contributor to GDP, 2005-2012

As a yardstick for the contribution of the different

sectors, it is possible to refer to their contribution to

employment. In this respect, too, the services sector

comes out ahead. In recent years, the services sector

has been leading as a contributor to employment. In

2010, the services sector generated the most

employment (6.7 million). This was followed by the

manufacturing sector (1.9 million), and the agriculture

sector trailed by generating 1.5 million jobs.

The services sector was, again, the major

contributor to employment in 2011. The services

sector’s contribution to employment rose by 0.5 million

in 2011 as against its performance in 2010. Again in

2012, the services sector was most important as

measured by its ability to generate jobs, although it has

declined slightly.

Services as a Major Contributor to Employment

16 東協瞭望 008

It is useful to unpack the services sector so as to

examine those components that are more important than

others within the sector in Malaysia. An examination of

the scenario in 2012 reveals that in 2012, distributive

trade was by far the most important sub-sector,

accounting for almost a quarter (26.1%) of the sector’s

contribution to GDP. Next in importance was

government services (14.7%), and this was followed by

financial services (13.1%). The real estate and business

services sub-sector was not insignificant since its

contribution to GDP was 10.1% of the total.

Other sub-sectors of some importance are

information and communications (7.0%) and

transportation and storage (6.7%). Less significant were

utilities (4.6%), accommodation and restaurants (4.5%)

and insurance (4.1%). This breakdown points to the fact

that one can expect the emergence of greater

participation in a number of other sectors such as within

ICT and insurance. The financial services sub-sector

can also be expected to gain in importance as the

economy grows and as financial markets become more

sophisticated.

Contribution to GDP by Activity, 2012

Figures in the last eight years clearly indicate that

Malaysia is growing in its ability to be an exporter of

services. In 2005, trade in services was RM156.9

million, increasing in 2008 to reach a peak of RM205.7

million in 2008. In 2009, subsequent to the global crisis

trade in services took a dip, dropping to RM193.3

million. Subsequently, trade in services has been

climbing up at a more or less constant pace. It is

forecast that trade in services will reach RM248.0 in

2013, having been RM227.5 the previous year.

As far as trade in services is concerned, it has been

increasing in almost linear fashion, save for the years

between 2006 and 2009 when it was relatively high.

Trade in services was worth RM157 million and has

been rising. It amounted to RM228 million 2011 and

touched RM248 million in 2012.

TRADE POLICY AND SERVICES LIBERALISATION IN MALAYSIA: OPPORTUNITIES FOR TAIWAN 17

Trade in Services on the Uptrend

As the chart below shows, the services sector has

received the most approvals for investment. It has been

ahead of approved investments in manufacturing and

primary goods. It should be noted that approved

investments in services far outstripped that of the

manufacturing and the primary sectors in 2012.

Services Lead in Approved Investments

As far as approved investments are concerned,

there was a downtrend in approvals that were made by

the government from the year 2007 to 2010. It should be

noted that total investments is the aggregate of domestic

direct investments (DDI) and foreign direct investments

(FDI). FDI, like total investment, was on the downtrend

from 2007 to 2010, rising in 2011. In 2012 FDI fell

again. The bowl-shaped phenomenon can be observed

for DDI, the difference being that DDI witnessed a

sharp rise in 2012.

As can be noted, total investments in services are

driven by DDI rather than FDI. It is also noteworthy

that FDI in services exceeded the RM10 million mark in

2011 and 2012, reaching almost RM18 million in 2011

18 東協瞭望 008

and amounting to RM12 million the next year.The main

point, however, is that there is a rising interest in

approvals for investments in services. This is

symptomatic of the general interest in the services

sector and encouraging it as a sector that can drive

growth in the Malaysian economy. The very high DDI

in services also points to the demand for services that is

mostly serviced by domestic investors, once again

indicating that there are opportunities for foreign

investors who are interested in the Malaysian market.

Approved Investments in Services: DDI and FDI

Domestic Liberalization

Efforts

A variety of policy measures were put in place in

recognition of the fact that the services sector was

contributing immensely to the economy. Some of the

indicators that were considered included the

contribution of the services sector to GDP (55%).

Services can be broken down into government and non-

government services. The latter constituted about 48%

of the services sector. More significant was the scenario

with regard to employment, since the services sector

accounted for 57% of total employment. Taking into

account the contribution of the services sector to GDP

and to employment, is itself indicative of the importance

of the services sector.

On the side of investments, approved investments

in the services sector amounted to about RM50 billion.

The bulk of these approvals was for domestic

investments. Approvals for foreign investments in the

services sector amounted to 11%. It is worth

commenting at this point that the low level of foreign

investments in the services sector is, perhaps, due to the

restrictions that were prevalent at that juncture in time

and also due to the limited interest that foreign firms

had in investing in services.

There is no doubt that as the economy grows and

liberalizes there will be more opportunity for foreign

investors to seek opportunities in the country.

Nevertheless, trade in services was high and it continues

to increase rather rapidly. Even in 2008, exports of

services was RM102 billion and imports of services

amounting to almost RM100 billion.

It has been recorded that Malaysia is among the 30

leading exporters of services. It goes without saying that

this ranking can be improved if there is more foreign

investment in the country. If policies are introduced to

encourage this, then with the inflow of foreign

TRADE POLICY AND SERVICES LIBERALISATION IN MALAYSIA: OPPORTUNITIES FOR TAIWAN 19

investment in services in Malaysia it can be expected

that the quality of services will improve, and

accordingly the export of services will improve. This

will lead to Malaysia having a higher position as an

exporter of services.

In 2009, as part of a mini-budget a Second

Stimulus Package was announced with the express

intention of liberalizing the services sector. The aim of

this policy was to attract more investments with the

express intention of attracting more investments,

technology, and encouraging more professionals to

come into Malaysia.The ultimate objective was to

strengthen the competitiveness of thes sector. With

these aims in mind, the government decided to liberalise

27 services sub-sectors with no equity condition

attached. These sub-sectors included:

1. Computer and related services

2. Health and social services

3. Tourism services

4. Transport services

5. Sporting and other recreational services

6. Business services

7. Rental/leasing

8. Supporting and auxiliary transport services

Other services that the government targeted at

improving were Islamic finance and related legal

services. With respect to the latter, it was decided that

up to five top international law firms with expertise in

international Islamic finance be allowed to practice in

Malaysia.

To facilitate investments into the services sector, a

National Committee for Approval of Investments was

established under the Malaysian Industrial Development

Authority (MIDA). This Committee was given the

mandate of receiving and processing applications of

investments in the services sector. However,

investments in financial services, air travel, utilities, the

Economic Development Corridors, the Multimedia

Super Corridor, Bionexus status companies and

distributive trade were excluded from the purview of the

Committee.

It was announced in the mini-budget of 2009 that

continuous efforts would be made to liberalise the

economy. This promise was upheld. In 2011, it was

declared that a further 17 services subsectors would be

liberalized. The understanding was that these sectors

would eventually be permitted to allow up to 100%

foreign equity. The said sectors are as follows:

1. Telecommunication servces (network service

provider and network facilities provider

licences)

2. Telecommunication services (applications

service provider licences)

3. Courier services

4. Private hospital services

5. Medical specialists services

6. Dental specialists services

7. Private higher education institutions with

university status

8. International schools

9. Technical and vocational secondary

education services

10. Technical and vocational secondary

education services (for students with special

needs)

11. Skills training centres

12. Accounting and taxation

13. Architectural services

14. Engineering services

15. Legal services

16. Departmental stores and specialty stores

17. Incineration services

The subsectors that were liberalized in 2012 can be

broadly grouped into five categories, that is,

telecommunication and communication services,

healthcare services, education, professional services and

20 東協瞭望 008

distributive trade. As we can see, this is a progression

over the liberalization exercise of 2009. The particular

choice of services that were liberalized in 2012 is

specific and purposeful in so far as it lays the foundation

for the free trade agreements (FTAs) that were

subsequently signed. In fact, the purpose of selecting the

subsectors that were earmarked in 2012 was, perhaps, a

pro-active more so as to prepare the nation for entry into

subsequent FTAs. This will become clear shortly.

The establishment of 12 national key economic

areas (NKEAs) is a part of the Tenth Malaysia Plan.

Under this programme, the government selected the

following areas:

1. Oil, gas and energy

2. Education

3. Tourism

4. Wholesale and retail

5. Electronics and electrical

6. Healthcare

7. Palm oil

8. Communications content and infrastructure

9. Agriculture

10. Business services

11. Greater Kuala Lumpur/Klang Valley

12. Financial services

The above list includes a number of areas that very

much fall with the domain of the services sectors. While

the 12 NKEAs are meant to spearhead the economy to

developed country status, a number of these are

obviously ones that would impinge upon the services

sector. Some of the sectors appearing in these NKEAs

are among those that were mentioned in the two

initiatives that were undertaken in 2009 and 2012.

Although the NKEAs were planned with a view of

propelling Malaysia into the horizon as a developed

nation and to improve GDP and incomes, these areas

also provide opportunities for the development of the

services sector. Internal reforms such as the NKEAs

should be taken together with the policy announcements

that were announced in 2009 and 2012. In combination,

we have a situation that works to promote the services

sector and which can occur only with the help of a

liberalized services sector. It is worth drawing attention

to the fact that the areas that appear in the NKEAs

appear in the two earlier policy initiatives. This shows

that there is a clear plan to liberalise the services sector

and to use appropriate reforms to drive growth in the

economy through the services sector.

Trade Policy and

Liberalization

At a broader level, Malaysia is participating in

services negotiations in the World Trade Organisation

(WTO). This is covered by the GATS. The main

objectives of GATS are increased transparency and

predictability of rules and regulations on trade in

services. GATS is committed to promoting progressive

liberalization in services through successive rounds of

negotiations.

It is well known that services negotiations under

the WTO are undertaken on a “request-offer” approach.

This is undertaken both on a bilateral and plurilateral

basis, whereby the liberalization of commitments of

members are multilateralised. Malaysia, like most of

the developing countries wants the progressive

liberalization of services sectors. In particular, Malaysia

wants market opening in sectors where it has export

potential. Therefore, Malaysia is prepared to undertake

commitments under the principle of progressive

liberalization. In the second revised offer under the

Doha Round 11 sectors were covered, which included

85 subsectors.

At the regional level, Malaysia and its ASEAN

partners established the ASEAN Free Trade Area

(AFTA) in 1992. AFTA is a regional arrangement

which focuses on trade in goods. Three years later, in

1995, the ASEAN Framework Agreement of Services

(AFAS) was signed by ASEAN. The purpose of AFAS

TRADE POLICY AND SERVICES LIBERALISATION IN MALAYSIA: OPPORTUNITIES FOR TAIWAN 21

is to establish complete liberalization of 128 services

subsectors as identified by the WTO services

classification. AFAS adopts the structure and approach

of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

Two points must be stressed with regard to AFAS.

First, it is necessary to point out that AFAS is meant to

enhance and strengthen cooperation among service

suppliers in ASEAN. Second, AFAs seeks to

progressively liberalise trade in services among ASEAN

countries through the reduction or elimination of

restrictions. The first round of services negotiations

was conducted between 1996 and 1998, with the first

package being signed in 1997. The ninth package is due

to be signed in 2014.

The timeline for AFAS is to ensure that the

liberalization of the designated sectors is achieved by

2015. In accordance with AFAS, there are equity

targets under Mode 3 that have been proposed. The

priority sectors are ICT, tourism, healthcare, air travel

and logistics. It was proposed that by 2010, the target

of 70% foreign (ASEAN) equity participation be

achieved for the priority sectors. Similarly, a target of

51% equity participation was set for the other sectors,

including professional services.

The importance of liberalizing the services sectors

under AFAS is twofold for Malaysia. AFAS acquires

much significance under the concept of ASEAN

centrality. In order for the notion of ASEAN centrality

to have any value, the liberalization of services must be

completed. Only then will ASEAN be attractive to

foreign investors, and only then can ASEAN be a hub

for investment in the region. Second, Malaysia wants to

liberalize its services sectors to be in line with

liberalization efforts in the region. But this is being

done not only in the spirit of belonging to the ASEAN

community but also to serve Malaysia’s own interests.

As the notion of ASEAN centrality takes root, and as

ASEAN develops into a global attractor of foreign

investment, it would be to Malaysia’s advantage if it

were in a position to leverage on its locational

advantage within the region. This adds another key

reason for Malaysia to liberalize its services sector; it

would, thus, allow Malaysia to be an important player in

ASEAN and to be a point of reference within ASEAN.

In other words, unless Malaysia liberalizes its own

services subsectors it will not be able to take advantage

of the larger liberalization that is to take place within

ASEAN as an entity.

The FTAs that Malaysia has or is in the process of

negotiating can be classed, under three categories, viz,

bilateral FTAs that have been concluded, multilateral

FTAs and FTAs that are under negotiation. Malaysia

has completed bilateral FTAs with Japan, Pakistan,

India, Chile and Australia. Malaysia has also concluded

a number of multilateral FTAs via its membership with

ASEAN. It has agreements with China, Japan, Korea,

India, and Australia and New Zealand by virtue of its

membership within ASEAN. Malaysia is also in the

process of undertaking FTAs with Turkey, the European

Union, the Developing Eight (D8) Preferential Tariff

Agreement, and the infamous Trans-Pacific Partnership

Agreement.

The above-mentioned FTAs are stringent to

varying degrees. Generally, the FTAs that have been

signed through ASEAN are less demanding. Some

FTAs do not, yet, have a services agreement, and the

FTA with India is a clear example of an FTA where the

agreement on trade with goods has been signed with the

agreement on services to follow soon. In any case, there

is no doubt that Malaysia wants to liberalize its services

subsectors. There is a willingness to work towards the

liberalization of its services sector. Were it not for the

political will to do so, Malaysia would not be

negotiating the TPP or its FTA with the EU. Although

these particular FTAs have not been completed, and

with the TPP attracting a great deal of domestic

resistance, there is no doubt, nevertheless, that Malaysia

would like to go ahead with the liberalization of its

services sectors.

22 東協瞭望 008

One particular FTA that is worth discussing in the

context of the liberalization of services is the Malaysia-

Australia FTA (MAFTA). MAFTA is built on the

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA).

Under the MAFTA, Malaysia and Australia cut tariffs

on a wider range of goods than under the AANZFTA.

In addition, these tariff reductions are scheduled to

come into place earlier.

A prominent feature of the MAFTA is the

commitment that Malaysia shows with regard to the

liberalization of its services sector. MAFTA is a clear

demonstration of the will to open up subsectors in the

Malaysian market to foreign investors. This is a clear

indication that the government is willing to put in

practice the policy announcements that it makes.

One of the consequences of the MAFTA is the

opening up of education services to Australian service

suppliers. The current 70% ownership limit that is

extended to Australian investors in education will be

relaxed and 100% foreign investment will be allowed in

this subsector in 2015. The highly restricted financial

services subsector will also see greater liberalization

under MAFTA, leading to 70% ownership by potential

Australian companies. The same limit will be extended

in the case of the telecommunications subsector. It

should be noted that these were contentious subsectors

that the government was reluctant to liberalize earlier.

The MAFTA signals a new attitude that is being taken

by the Malaysian government towards the liberalization

of the services sector.

More far-reaching measures have been agreed to

for professional services. In the case of accounting,

auditing and book-keeping services, MAFTA permits

100% ownership by Australian companies. Similar

flexibility has been extended in the case of management

consultant services. There is tighter control over

taxation services, tourism, research and development

(R&D) and mining-related services. In these areas

majority ownership is allowed, but Australian

companies will not be permitted to own more than 51%

equity.

Trade in services is not possible only with the

relaxation of limits to equity participation by foreign

investors. The supporting environment has to be made

more conducive for trade in services and this has been

accommodated in MAFTA. MAFTA will make it easier

for Australian expatriates (senior managers and

executives) to work and stay for longer periods in

Malaysia. It will also be easier for the spouses and

dependents of Australians working in Malaysia to

obtain visas.

A very important step that has been included in the

MAFTA is the mutual recognition of qualifications.

Supporting arrangements of this sort are essential for the

successful implementation of the FTA. Unless there is

clear understanding on the mutual recognition of

qualifications, the outcomes that can be expected from

the liberalization of services, particularly professional

services, will be constrained. Equally, important for the

successful execution of the FTA is a strong environment

for intellectual property rights (IPR). This is an

important feature of the MAFTA which assures that

stronger protection will be provided for Australian

trademarks and copyright.

Opportunities for Taiwan

The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement

(ECFA) between the People’s Republic of China and

Taiwan in June 2010 is a landmark agreement. The

significance of the ECFA far exceeds the benefits that it

can bring to Taiwanese business because the agreement

has wide implications that go beyond its immediate

impact on trade relations with China.

In the context of the present paper, the ECFA

signals China’s acceptance of Taiwan as an entity with

which it is willing to have economic relations. The

question of sovereignty is a separate one. Nevertheless,

the ECFA is, in a manner of speaking, China’s

acknowledgement of Taiwan as a political entity with

which it agrees to have economic relations, and by

TRADE POLICY AND SERVICES LIBERALISATION IN MALAYSIA: OPPORTUNITIES FOR TAIWAN 23

extension, it agrees to Taiwan’s position in the global

economy as an entity that may enter into trade with

other countries. Further, keeping in mind that China has

no problems in conducting business with Taiwan, offers

confidence to other countries in trading with Taiwan

and in having formal trade relations with them. This

point must be emphasized because countries may not

want to have economic agreements with Taiwan for fear

of losing their privileged political relations with China

which they will, naturally, have cause to value.

In effect, with the presence of the ECFA there is no

fear for a third country to engage in formal trade and

economic agreements with Taiwan and run the risk of

antagonizing China. The most striking illustration of

this is the case of Singapore. There is not the slightest

doubt that Singapore is on friendly terms with China.

Yet, Singapore has been able to enter into talks with

Taiwan. Taiwan and Singapore have concluded

negotiations for ASTEP (“Agreement between

Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of

Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu”). Knowing

Singapore’s ties with China, one would expect that

Singapore would not want to enter into an agreement

with a country in such a manner as to endanger its

relations with China.

Taiwan’s ascension into the WTO was concluded

in 2002. Taiwan joined the WTO under the name of

“Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,

Kinmen and Matsu.” This manner of joining the WTO

did not aggravate China on the question of having a

single China. In fact, this model provides a way of

forging economic and trade ties with other countries

without challenging the question of there being more

than one China.

Taiwan, indeed, can use the WTO model to engage

with ASEAN in a deeper and more useful manner. This

is the right time for Taiwan to consider building its

relations with ASEAN. It would be a waste if Taiwan

did not engage more actively with ASEAN. There are

two ways in which this can be done: one would be to

form an economic or trade agreement with ASEAN; and

the other is to form bilateral agreements with ASEAN

member countries. If the latter route were to be chosen,

the first-tier countries that should be considered would

include Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. The CLMV

countries also do provide valuable opportunities for

Taiwan.

A country like Malaysia, in the context of ASEAN,

offers attractive opportunities for Taiwan. Besides, the

internal reforms that are being carried out in Malaysia,

as we have seen in earlier sectors, can be employed to

Taiwan’s advantage. Taiwan has had a long history of

trade and manufacturing in Malaysia. This, itself,

works to Taiwan’s advantage since Taiwanese business

has much experience in dealing with the Malaysian

climate, in terms of the local culture, the bureaucratic

environment, the process of setting up business in

Malaysia and dealing with government agencies.

Clearly, there are exciting opportunities for Taiwan

in Malaysia, particularly in the services subsectors. The

avenues that are available arise in part from the internal

reforms that are being undertaken within the economy.

Thus, Taiwan can take advantage of the promoted

services sectors as they can leverage on the

opportunities that open up with a policy such as the

NKEAs. Of course, Taiwanese business will have to do

an assessment of the areas in which investment is

possible. But on a perfunctory basis it seems that

services related to telecommunications, healthcare,

tourism, ICT, engineering, logistics, environmental

management, solar and renewable energy and education

will be areas of interest for investment.

Taiwan will have to take forward the idea of

arriving at an economic partnership or free trade

agreement with Malaysia. The best course of action

will be to begin second track diplomacy on this issue

with Malaysia. This could be done by engaging the

relevant ministries in both countries through seminars

and conferences. Think tanks should also be invited to

take an interest in a possible Malaysia-Taiwan FTA.

24 東協瞭望 008

This will encourage thinking in the area and will also

push government officials to deliberate on the

practicalities of the matters. Finally, ministers and

ambassadors (serving and retired) should be coopted to

provide their input and advice. There are, obviously,

clear opportunities in such an agreement. What has to be

done is introduce the idea to policy makers and thinkers

so that the idea of such an FTA is floated in policy

circles.

Concluding Remarks

Malaysia has recently been carrying out a number

of domestic reforms to transform the services sector.

The objective of these reforms is to make the services

sector more competitive for a number of reasons.

Among them is the intention of attracting more foreign

investment and making Malaysia a hub for the services

sector (in different areas). This will result in the

services sector driving growth and contributing more to

GDP. Consequently, more employment will also be

generated. Malaysia has more or less reached the edge

of the envelope as far as the manufacturing sector is

concerned and there is a great deal of potential in the

services sector which awaits to be exploited.

Malaysia is also carrying out many domestic

reforms to so that it can engage more actively in trade

agreements. As part of this package, it is essential that

fundamental reforms be carried out in the services

sector. In that sense, this restricting is a necessary

adjunct to trade policy. It is not possible to proceed

without the liberalization of the services sector.

The developments in Malaysia should make it an

attractive destination for foreign investors, and Taiwan

should be no exception. Taiwan has long had trade and

economic ties with Malaysia. It is, thus, only logical that

Taiwan would want to deepen this relationship and

formalize it. As for Taiwan, an agreement with

Malaysia would open the country’s services market to

Taiwan. But more than that, it is one possible route of

entry into the ASEAN market for services.

“The Challenges of the CLMV Countries and “The Challenges of the CLMV Countries and

the Role of Development Partner”the Role of Development Partner”

Pou Sovachana

Professor Paññāsāstra University of Cambodia

After the cold war ended in the late 1980s,

ASEAN tried to strengthen itself by expanding its

members on the hope that an increased in population

would translate in to economic growth, and

strength. Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995, Laos

and Myanmar in July 1997, and Cambodia in April

1999. The admission of the four new

members noticeably widened the political,

economical, and cultural diversity of ASEAN. The

ten members states have agreed that political stability

and long term economic growth could only be

attained if they all cooperate (ASEAN

Charter). However, with the expansion of Cambodia,

Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV), political and

economical disparities have ensued between the old

and the new member states. Moreover, the

development gap among the member states in the

region has also persisted. The challenges of the

CLMV countries and the role of development partner

will be discussed and examined.

Present Situation of the

CMLV Countries

Despite serious attempts for economic

development throughout the South East Asian region,

there remains a large gap between the CLMV

countries and other nations within ASEAN. To

achieve the ambitious goal of having an ASEAN

Economic Community (AEC) by 2015, it is essential

to reduce this development gap, which in turn

necessitates further reforms in the CLMV countries.

I begin by describing the present economic

condition of each of the four CLMV countries and

discuss broadly their economic challenges as follows:

Cambodia: Since peace and national

reconciliation had returned after the 1991 Paris

Accord, Cambodia has enjoyed a broad degree of

macroeconomic stability and development. Starting

from a very low base, Cambodia is now considered as

one of the fastest-growing economies in the region,

enjoying double-digit growth rates before the global

economic down turn. Growth in 2013 has been

estimated by the Ministry of Finance and Economy at

7.6 percent this year, driven by garment exports,

agriculture, tourism and construction. The ministry

said that the GDP volume would be around 15.19

billion U.S. dollars and GDP per capital would be

1,036 U.S. dollars in 2013. The industry sector is

expected to go up by 9 percent this year, agriculture

by 4 percent, service sector by 9 percent, hotel and

restaurant sector by 14 percent, financial sector by 12

percent, and real estate by 11 percent. However, the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) had predicted in

April 2013 that Cambodia's GDP growth would be at

6.7 percent, while the Asian Development Bank

(ADB) and the World Bank (WB) put the country's

growth at 7.2 percent and 7 percent, respectively.

Despites steady economic growth, the UN Economic

26 東協瞭望 008

and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

(ESCAP) said in its annual report that Cambodia

remains one of the least-developed countries in the

Asia-Pacific region and face challenge of diversifying

its economy and moving up the production value

chain. There are still widening income inequalities

and depleting natural resources. Government should

tackle economic policies that are more inclusive and

sustainable to stamp out high poverty rate, large

income gap and low production base, and inadequate

human resources. Cambodia still experiences

difficulty with its neighbors in terms of exports.

Lao PDR: Lao PDR is aiming to remove itself

from the list of least developed countries (LDC) by

2020 and eradicate mass poverty by 2010. However,

to achieve those goals, it must first deal with a

number of constraints such as a low production base,

lack of highly skilled human resources, poor

infrastructure, and an unfavorable geographical

position as a landlocked country. The government

hopes that infrastructure development, tourism

development, and promotion of natural resources-

based industries will change the country from being a

landlocked one to a land-linked one. It is also hoped

that this will provide Lao PDR full access to the

seaports of neighboring countries and other regional

networks of roads and railways. These priority sectors

are expected to significantly enhance the process of

economic development and poverty reduction

Myanmar: Myanmar’s huge and untapped

potential for future economic development lies in its

large local market, abundant natural resources, and

young labor force. Although the country is dealing

with a number of challenging domestic and

international problems, it is committed to regional

economic integration. Myanmar’s four economic

objectives (Basic Economic Guidelines towards

Democratic State) are the following: 1) to develop

agriculture as the base of the economy along with the

other sectors; 2) to allow the a market-oriented

system to evolve properly; 3) to spur economic

development with the technical assistance and

investment of local and foreign partners; and 4) to

maintain the initiative to shape the national economy

in the hands of the state and the people of Myanmar.

Myanmar’s economic development will also be

boosted by accelerating economic reforms, especially

financial reforms, and realigning exchange rates;

promoting small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and

special economic zones (SEZs); and taking advantage

of Myanmar’s geographical location between China,

India, and the ASEAN.

Vietnam: Vietnam began its economic reform

process in 1986 with a view to proactively engaging

in international economic integration. Due to its early

head-start, it is now in a relatively good place in its

reform process. It has, in fact, achieved important

socioeconomic gains and laid a more concrete

foundation for future economic development. Since

joining ASEAN, the country has attracted more

investment; multinationals such as Intel and Nike

invested heavily. Its share of trade in 1995 within

ASEAN was at 2.8 percent; by 2010 that share had

moved up to 17 percent. However, it still faces many

reform challenges, which makes realizing its

development goals a difficult task.

The Challenges of CLMV

Economic Integration

At this time, I would like to discuss the ASEAN

The Challenges of the CLMV Countries and the Role of Development Partner 27

economic integration and highlight some thoughts on

policy measures that are required to integrate the

CLMV’s economy amidst serious concerns that

ASEAN economic integration can be hampered by the

development gap that exist between the older

ASEAN-six and the four-newer members and offer

some recommendation measures to widen the scope of

the work plan in order to improve.

On 8th August 1967, five Southeast Asian

countries comprising of Indonesia, Malaysia, the

Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand formed the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to

try to response to the then fragile regional political

situation and its function was aimed at for economic,

social, and cultural cooperation.

The “Bangkok Declaration”, the document upon

which association was founded, displayed ASEAN

solidarity against communist expansionism and

insurgencies, which described as the common

problems among countries of Southeast Asia, as well

as to also emphasize the grouping’s determination to

ensure their stability and security from external

interference in any form or manifestation.

In 1976, the ASEAN Secretariat was established

to improve coordination among ASEAN members. In

the same year, the grouping’s first formal agreement,

the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) was

signed to enshrine one of ASEAN’s fundamental

principles: the non-interference.

Brunei joined ASEAN immediately upon

achieving its independence from the United Kingdom

in 1984. Vietnam was admitted in 1995, even though

it was still under a communist system. Laos and

Myanmar followed in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

Although in the early day ASEAN sought to

stabilize the region politically, the grouping has

started out as a geo-political organization, set up in

response to the fluid regional political situation at that

time, but its dynamic has shifted the direction towards

economic cooperation during the 1970s, and later

towards economic integration, especially from the

1990s onwards.

In February 1976 during the First ASEAN

Summit in Bali, economic cooperation, not economic

integration, moved onto the ASEAN agenda. The

Declaration of ASEAN Concord called for economic

cooperative action by member states, aiming at the

promotion of their national and regional development

programs, by utilizing as far as possible the resources

available in the ASEAN region to broaden the

complementarity of their respective economies, while

hoping that regional cooperation in large-scale

industries in critical sectors could spur economic

development via industrialization.

It was globalization and growing economic

regionalism that forced ASEAN to make an economic

turnaround toward enlarging their market, attracting

investments, cutting costs, increasing efficiency,

improving productivity, and thus generating jobs and

raising people’s incomes.

At the Fourth ASEAN Summit in 1992, member

countries agreed to create the ASEAN Free Trade

Area (AFTA), a step toward regional economic

integration, in which tariff and non-tariff barriers to

trade among the members would be reduced and

eventually abolished. However, ASEAN regional free

trade alone was (and is) seen as inadequate for the

regional grouping to be able to tap effectively into

unprecedented opportunities as well as cope with

28 東協瞭望 008

challenges being unleashed by globalization,

especially with the rise of China and India.

In December 1997, ASEAN leaders resolved to

build an economic community to increase the region’s

economic potential. This resolution was followed

through when the ASEAN leaders agreed during the

Ninth ASEAN Summit in October 2003 in Bali to

establish an ASEAN Economic Community by 2020,

the end-goal of regional economic integration.

Now let me point and discuss how ASEAN ought

to bridge the development gap, which exists within

the CLMV.

When the CLMV countries became members of

ASEAN from the mid-1990s, there had already

existed economic disparities within and between the

six older members. Economic disparity, perceived to

be a hindrance to economic integration, grew larger

within the enlarged grouping with the admission of

the CLMV countries, raising concerns about

difficulties arising out of and now transitioning from

a two-tiered to three-tier regional structure that

includes high, middle, and low incomes countries.

Because of regional economic divide and the

effect of unevenly distributed the benefits of

globalization, ASEAN may not be able to effectively

forge forward successfully its economic integration

and fear looms large that the grouping may become

irrelevant in the global economy.

The CLMV countries have also realized that they

must progressively and steadily integrate their

economies with those of the older members if they do

not want to be left behind. If the development divide

persist and widen, ASEAN member states are certain

to face more difficulty to advance together.

As such, ASEAN has resolved to assist its less

developed newer members to achieve their economic

potential, with a view to ensuring effective economic

integration. This will in turn better equip ASEAN to

face the increasingly stiff economic headwinds of

global competition. In the process, the less developed

members will also be able to reap the benefits of

ASEAN’s economic integration process more equally

as compared to the more developed members, and

therefore ensure that prosperity is shared among the

grouping’s more than 600 million inhabitants.

Notwithstanding the existence of much

international development assistance programs since

the early 1990s, including ASEAN initiatives, to

assist the Mekong Delta countries, the CLMV face

grime prospect in catching up with the six more

developed ones. To improve the situation and

effectively assist the CLMV countries, various

international forums and cooperative efforts, using a

variety of approaches to promote wider economic

development in the region should be deployed. Some

of these development assistance initiatives should be

placed in the following ways:

Attentions toward the CLMV countries should

focus on development projects include programs to

promote transport, energy, telecommunications,

environment, human resource development, tourism,

trade, and agriculture. To this end, the Asian

Development Bank (ADB) sponsored Economic

Cooperation Program within the Greater Mekong Sub-

region (GMS) should be vigorously pursued in

facilitating greater private sector involvement in the

GMS program.

Emphasis should also be gearing toward the

promotion economic growth of the Southeast Asian

The Challenges of the CLMV Countries and the Role of Development Partner 29

region as a whole by strengthening the economic

linkages between CLMV countries with other ASEAN

countries. The strategy here is to pursue the

enhancement of the competiveness among the CLMV

countries, the redirection of agriculture and

manufacturing growth centers to the place where

relative economic exist, and the reduction of the

income disparity and create employment. It would be

much beneficial if the model of this type of economic

integration which has been well documented in the

“Ayeyawady – Chao Phraya – Mekong Economic

Cooperation Strategy” (ACMECS) could be

vigorously pursued. As such, ACMECS focuses on six

areas of cooperation namely, trade and investment

facilitation, agricultural and industrial cooperation,

transport linkages, tourism cooperation, human

resource development, and public health.

It would help the CLMV countries tremendously

if other suitable approaches could be targeted. Efforts

should be concentrated to enhance economically

sound and sustainable development of the Mekong

Basin, encourage a process of dialogue and common

project identification which can result in firm

economic partnerships for mutual benefit, and to

strengthen the interconnections and economic

linkages between the ASEAN member countries and

the Mekong riparian countries. This method of

development can also be found in the ASEAN

Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC),

established between ASEAN and China since 1996 to

tackle development issues and challenges in the

Mekong regions.

The Role of Development

Partner

Before my conclusion, I would like to give my

assessment on the initiatives as described in the

Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation

Program (GMS-ECP) as part of the ‘development

partners’ approaches to mitigate the development gap

within the CLMV.

Effort to reduce regional gaps have been at the

forefront of the Greater Mekong Sub-region

Economic Cooperation Program (GMS-ECP) which

was inaugurated in 1992 by six countries, namely,

Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, and

Yunnan (and in 2005, Guangxi Zhuang autonomous

region of China also became a member of the GMS-

ECP) Province of China through the initiative of

Asian Development Bank (ADB).

The GMS-ECP is expected to play an important

role in narrowing existing gap and reducing poverty

while expanding and deepening the regional

integration. It started with six development sectors,

and now it is now composed of nine sectors, namely:

1) Transportation; 2) Telecommunication; 3) Energy;

4) Human Resource; 5) Environment; 6) Trade; 7)

Investment; 8) Tourism; and 9) Agriculture.

The key feature of the GMS-ECP has been the

focus in the development of transport infrastructure to

effectively allow goods that have been produced by

remote villages among the CLMV countries to reach

major markets in the region as well as overseas. This

effort include the improvement of the functional of

the transportation networks, lowering of cross-border

barriers through an effective Cross Border Trade

Agreement (CBTA), improving exports capability,

creating marketing demands for the remote areas, and

developing special economic regions at the borders

between relatively developed countries, like Thailand

30 東協瞭望 008

and underdeveloped countries.

Conclusion: The Role of

Taiwan

ASEAN has done much to contribute to peace,

stability and prosperity in the CLMV countries by

promoting initiatives to improve the development

gaps and reducing poverty in the lesser-developed

countries. However the effect of Asia financial crisis

coupling with the global slowdown has left many

nations in Asia lag behind in their national economic

development. In Southeast Asian region, the CLMV is

still witness profound disparity between the ‘haves’

and the ‘have-nots’. Well-off country needs to help

lesser one from breakdown so as to promote

prosperity for the region as a whole. To achieve

greater stride in this endeavor, ASEAN and other

development partners should continue to work

together to achieve even more positive outcomes.

While I am sure countries such as the China,

Japan, Korean and the international organization such

as the ADB continue to have important role to play in

assisting the CLMV countries, Taiwan can also join in

these development partners in thinking creatively how

to contribute to the alleviation of poverty and

lessening the burden of development gap in

Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam by bringing

the level of the economic development in those

countries to be at par with the other six nations within

ASEAN in the foreseeable future.

Well-off country needs to help lesser one from

breakdown so as to promote prosperity for the region

as whole. There is a common responsibility to create a

community of peace, prosperity and progress with

equitable development among nations, which can

make peace and prosperity more enduring and ensure

that livelihoods of the people in the region are better-

off.

Being the 12th most competitive nation (Global

Competitive Report 2013-2014 by the World

Economic Forum) among 148 nations and rank 4th

behind only Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan, Taiwan

could use its soft power to lift CLMV nations through

its strength in technological advancement, financial

market development, macro economic environment,

business sophistication, health and primary education,

higher education and training, and innovation to

stimulate and boost the economic development and

limit the staggering disparity that still exist within

and among the CLMV countries. The followings are

my thoughts and perspectives on how Taiwan can

contribute to equitable and sustainable development

in CLMV countries.

First and foremost, understanding the region’s

diversity is key for Taiwan to play a constructive role

in promoting the economic development and engaging

in ASEAN economic community building. ASEAN

looks powerful because it is able to unite 10

politically, economically, and culturally diverse

Members States towards common development goals.

After all, ASEAN, among the leaders and elite group,

is about personal relationship and trust.

Taiwan must help reduce the development gap by

addressing the root cause of development disparity

and removing the stumbling block to economic

growth in the CLMV countries, otherwise inequality

among nations could jeopardize the integrity of the

regional integration as a whole. One of the most

effective ways is to extend assistance in human

resource development to up-grade the capacity of

The Challenges of the CLMV Countries and the Role of Development Partner 31

CLMV officials in good governance and other related

training programs as well as assisting on improving

investment climate.

Taiwan, with its buying power, can be a

propelling force to break economic stagnation in the

CLMV countries. Taiwan should identify consumable

products, especially agricultural goods, which are

abundantly produced in the CLMV countries, such as

rice and other cash crop and consider importing them

at large quantities. This would allow goods produced

in CLMV to have greater market access, which can

potentially expand trade and commerce between the

two sides.

Taiwan can help improve less-developed CLMV

countries to improve their technological capabilities

in agricultural and manufacturing industries, by

providing technical assistance to upgrade the best

practice and transferring the managerial know how.

This effort will promote concrete measure to

institutionalize regional economic cooperation

between the two sides.

Taiwan could come up with possible measure to

enhance the free movement of tourists by removing

the restrictive immigration regulations and provide

freer opportunities to visit each other country, to learn

about the history, culture and society of the CLMV

countries. This people-to-people through cultural

exchange is key to develop and build relationship.

Taiwan could also strengthen educational

cooperation with the CLMV countries through the

creation of appropriate study programs that focus on

increasing the knowledge on regional’s history,

languages, politics, economic, culture, and society as

these curricular would deepen mutual understanding

and build a stronger bond between Taiwan and

CLMV.

I believe that Taiwan has a vital role to play by

using its soft power in supporting and promoting a

durable peace, prosperity and progress across the

region and especially among the CLMV countries.

This economic partnership will yield extensive

benefits in term of jobs creation and long-term growth

for Taiwan and ASEAN. A shared commitment to

economic prosperity is the key to this viable

endeavor. While the CLMV are on the road to

economic growth and sustainability in term of more

training, better education, and practice, I am sure that

we (at least from the Cambodian perspective) would

like to walk that road together with Taiwan.

Lastly, since the current government of

Cambodia has close ties with China (PRC) and has

adopted the One China policy, the political link with

Taiwan is not presently possible. However, Taiwan

investments are welcome and both countries can

jointly explore possibilities through which

relationship can be developed in the areas of

humanitarian and technical assistance, education,

agriculture and science & technology.

References:

Hing, Vutha. Working Paper: Leveraging Trade for

Economic Growth in Cambodia. Cambodia’s

leading independent development policy research

institute (CDRI), June 2013

Ishida, M. (2008), ‘GMS Economic Cooperation and

Its Impact on CMLV Development’, in

Sothearith, C. (ed.), Development Strategy for

CLMV in the Age of Economic Integration,

32 東協瞭望 008

ERIA Research Project Report 2007-4, Chiba:

IDE-JETRO, pp.115-140.

Loffelholtz, Martin and Arao, Danilo. The ASEAN

Guide: A Journalist’s Handbook to Regional

Integration in Southeast Asia. GIZ, International

Institute for Journalism, 2010.

Quah, B. H. (2008), ‘CMLV Development Assistance

Programmes: Background Approaches,

Concerns’, in Sothearith, C. (ed.), Development

Strategy for CLMV in the Age of Economic

Integration, ERIA Research Project Report 2007-

4, Chiba: IDE-JETRO, pp. 82-114.

Southeast Asia in a New Era: Ten Countries, One

Region in ASEAN edited by Rodolfo c. Severino,

Elspeth Thomson, and Mark Hong. Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archieves/201

3/09/05/200357187. Retrieved on 15 October

2013

TTaakkiinngg AASSEEAANN++11 FFTTAAss ttoowwaarrddss tthhee RRCCEEPP Ikumo Isono

1. Growing production

networks and FTAs in

ASEAN and East Asia

ASEAN and East Asian countries are the ones

that utilize FTA (Free Trade Agreement or Free

Trade Area) strategically and effectively. FTAs had

started as a complement of WTO scheme. However,

partly due to the slow progress of WTO initiative,

FTA changed to one of the most powerful engines of

the economic integration. FTA benefits involving

countries by expanding trades, improving

competitive conditions and helping industrial

upgrading.

In ASEAN and East Asia, proliferation of FTA

is strongly linked to proliferation of production

networks, because main users and beneficiaries of

FTA are multinational enterprises in manufacturing

sector. Now FTA is utilized by local firms, SMEs, as

well as firms in services sectors.

We have witnessed expanding intra-ASEAN

trade, expanding trade between ASEAN-China and

ASEAN-India, lowering relative importance of

Japan and Korea as suppliers of parts and

components, and lowering importance of USA as a

final destination of exports. Figure 1 illustrates the

changing trade structure among ASEAN, China,

Japan, India, EU and USA in 1990, 1999 and 2009.

Arrows in red in 1999 and 2009 indicate that these

directions of export increased four times and more

compared with 1990 and 1999, respectively. In 1990,

trade was mainly carried between Japan and USA.

Trade between Japan and ASEAN was relatively

high, reflecting the proceeding of Japanese

manufacturing firms to ASEAN countries, while at

that time intra-ASEAN trade was not so active. In

1999, situation has dramatically changed with

China’s presence. ASEAN’s intra-trade was

substantially increased and surpassed the trade from

Japan to ASEAN. Even though the largest direction

was still from Japan to USA, China’ export to USA

increased more than seven times compared with

1990.

34 東協瞭望 008

Figure 1: Trade among ASEAN and big economic partners (Billion USD)

1990

1999

2009

Note: Red arrows indicate that these directions increased four times and more than the previous period.

Source: Author compiled from RIETI-TID 2010.

ASEAN

China

JapanIndia

EU USA

16.1

8.111.3

14.0

25.8 28.0

22.629.3

36.82.71.2

24.9

23.4

11.9

8.7

4.6

3.0

92.5

52.1

ASEAN

China

JapanIndia

EU USA

118.5

19.325.8

52.7

65.5 88.2

45.745.0

54.34.44.9

35.2

60.6

42.6

33.8

12.9

14.7

158.0

66.0

ASEAN

China

JapanIndia

EU USA

283.9

75.9125.5

296.8

143.8 84.5

62.372.5

72.724.421.8

70.0

97.6

114.3

126.4

75.2

101.3

89.5

57.8

Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP 35

We can see two more red arrows from

ASEAN to China and from ASEAN to India. They

reflect the rapid economic growth of ASEAN,

China and India. In 2009, all export directions see

substantial increase, except for the trade between

Japan and USA. Trade between ASEAN and China

and between ASEAN and India clearly increased,

thanks to their economic development as well as

proliferation of production networks. Now many

multinational enterprises in manufacturing sector

make the best use of industrial clusters in ASEAN

and China based on various conditions, and they

are incorporating CLM (Cambodia, Laos and

Myanmar) countries and India into the existing

production networks. Production networks can be

successful only when we have efficient

information technology networks and efficient

logistics networks with international just-in-time

systems, as well as various policy schemes such as

tariff exemption scheme on imported raw materials,

capital goods, parts and components under the

foreign direct investment (FDI)/special economic

zone (SEZ) policies, information technology

agreement (ITA), and FTAs.

FTA directly affects these manufacturing

firms in East Asia. For example, after

Thailand-Australia FTA has taken into effect in

January 2005, Thailand’s export of commercial

vehicles to Australia has increased 1.99 times from

2004 to 2009, while Japan’s export of the vehicles

has decreased by 46.6% during the same period. In

2010, original member states of ASEAN

eliminated virtually all tariffs among the countries.

Also, we completed the all “ASEAN+1” FTAs in

ASEAN+6 countries on trade in goods. The

ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) came

into effect in 2005 on trade in goods, and the

agreement on trade in services and another

agreement on investment followed in 2007 and

2010, respectively. The ASEAN Japan

Comprehension Economic Partnership (AJCEP)

took into effect in 2008 on trade in goods. The

ASEAN Korea Free Trade Agreement (AKFTA) on

trade in goods took into effect in 2007 and the

agreements on trade in services and investment

followed in 2009. The ASEAN-Australia-New

Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA)

covering trade in goods, trade in services and

investment came into effect in 2010. The

ASEAN-India Free Trade Area (AIFTA) went into

force in 2010 on trade in goods.

To maintain and strengthen current production

networks, ASEAN need to take a leadership to

utilize ASEAN+1 FTAs, ASEAN connectivity

framework, and various cooperation schemes as

building blocks and establish a new region-wide

FTA in East Asia.

2. Consolidation of

FTA+1 under the ASEAN

Centrality

Now ASEAN-China FTA, AJCEP, AKFTA,

AIFTA and AANZFTA have been completed on

trade in goods. The next step will be creation of a

new region-wide FTA in East Asia to strengthen

the production networks and regional stability in

East Asia. At the same time, ASEAN can enhance

the effectiveness of ASEAN integration, because

it’s a way to achieve a good balance between the

consolidation of ASEAN+1 FTAs and the ASEAN

centrality, under the changing economic

environments (Figure 2)

Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP 35

Figure 2: Consolidation of FTA+1 under the ASEAN Centrality

Source: Author.

It is essential to identify what kind of

region-wide FTA ASEAN can have, what are the

additional gains of region-wide FTA for the

region, and how ASEAN can enhance the

liberalization level of existing FTAs.

First, ASEAN can target comprehensive

coverage in the coming region-wide FTA. Many

current FTAs include trade in goods, ROOs,

customs and trade facilitation, standards and

sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, trade

in services, labor mobility, investment,

intellectual property right, competition policy,

Government procurement, dispute settlement and

economic cooperation. Also, environments and

sustainable development issues, human resource

development, small and medium enterprises

development, tourism and improving the business

environment can be incorporated. Gradual and

practical approach should be taken. Enhancing

transparency and stability in rules is

indispensable. Committees on the improvement of

the business environment will help us to address

cross-sectoral issues and urgent issues as well as

to create a better business environment that

facilitates international production networks.

Second, inviting India to the coming region-wide

FTA benefits the region, because it directly

contributes to expanding production networks in

East Asia. Third, the governments of East Asia

can have clear goal and clear liberalization

schedule under a region-wide FTA, with careful

consideration of CLM countries and India, and

then implement higher liberalization

commitments to achieve the FTA.

Figure 3 summarizes the impact of various

FTAs on GDP for AMSs by a Dynamic GTAP

simulation. Impact is evaluated in percentage

point deviation from the baseline, accumulated

from 2011 to 2015. Compared with the baseline

scenario, FTAs involving ASEAN countries will

provide positive economic impacts on all AMSs.

Moreover, the coexistence of all ASEAN+1 FTAs

creates higher economic impacts than ASEAN’s

FTA, except for Lao PDR. Interestingly, if there

is a CJK FTA on top of the 5 ASEAN+1 FTAs,

ASEAN’s impacts will be lower than the previous

scenario. The CJK FTA does not involve ASEAN

countries, so ASEAN countries will suffer from

36 東協瞭望 008

adverse effects. The ASEAN+6 FTA will provide most benefit for most AMSs.

Figure 3: Economic Impact of ASEAN’s FTA and Five ASEAN+1 FTAs (Percentage Point,

Accumulated from 2011 to 2015)

Note: RoSEAsia includes Brunei and Timor Leste. Myanmar is missing due to the data availability.

Source: Fukunaga and Isono (2013), originally based on Itakura (2013).

In fact, significant progress has been made

towards the establishment of the RCEP. Two East

Asia-wide FTAs has been proposed: EAFTA for

ASEAN+3 (CJK); and CEPEA for ASEAN+6 (CJK,

Australia, India, and New Zealand). The Phase II

Studies of the two initiatives were completed before

the summer of 2009 when the Reports were

submitted to the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6

Economic Ministers Meetings respectively. At these

meetings, Economic Ministers agreed to commence

discussions on ROOs, tariff nomenclature, customs

related issues and economic cooperation as

building-blocks in the process of realizing East

Asian integration. The studies were conducted

through “ASEAN Plus Working Groups,” with

participation by ASEAN+6 members. The study

outcomes, including tentative templates for customs

procedures and ROOs, were submitted to the

ASEAN+3 and EAS (East Asia Summit) Economic

Ministers Meetings in August 2011 (and

subsequently to their Summits). ASEAN promptly

started work on the structure and template for the

RCEP. Also, three ASEAN Plus Working Groups

(Goods, Services and Investment, respectively) were

newly and jointly proposed by China and Japan. In

November 2011, the ASEAN Summit adopted the

ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive

Economic Partnership, which sets the general

principles to be respected in the RCEP negotiations.

The establishment of the three ASEAN Plus

Working Groups was agreed in the AEM Retreat in

February 2012, “to facilitate the scoping exercise in

time for the launch of negotiations for a

comprehensive RCEP agreement by the end of this

2.3

9.5

5.8

3.0

5.0

3.3 2.9

8.3

13.4

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

ASEAN

Coexistence of Five ASEAN+1 FTAs

Coexistence of Five ASEAN+1 FTAs and CJK FTA

ASEAN+6 FTA (RCEP)

Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP 37

year” (Chairman's Statement of the 20th ASEAN

Summit, April 2012). After prior consultations in the

RCEP Working Groups (Trade in Goods, Services

and Investment), the leaders agreed to launch a

negotiation at their summit in November 2012, with

“Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating

the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership”

(hereafter “Guiding Principles”).

The Guiding Principles endorsed by all the

ASEAN+6 leaders set key characteristics of the

RCEP. First of all, RCEP is recognized as a “modern,

comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial

economic partnership agreement”. The Guiding

Principles stipulate eight principles, including;

significant improvements over the existing

ASEAN+1 FTAs; consideration of the different

levels of development among the members; and

parallel negotiation of different chapters. The

Guiding Principles also list eight negotiation areas:

trade in goods, trade in services, investment,

economic and technical cooperation, intellectual

property, competition, dispute settlement, and other

issues.

2.1. Tariffs, NTMs and ROOs

As for the tariff component, pursuing high

liberalization level is indispensable (Table 1).

ASEAN countries may have unified tariff

decrease/elimination schedule to all the Dialogue

Partners in the regional-wide FTA. Unifying the

schedule gives users additional gains even from the

trade between ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners, in

addition to from the trade between big dialogue

partners, such as between China and Japan. Now

ASEAN Member States set different commitments

on tariff elimination to the Dialogue Partners in

ASEAN+1 FTAs. If each ASEAN Member State

may want to have homogenous tariff structure

vis-à-vis all the Dialogue Partners in the coming

region-wide FTA, additional efforts are needed to

achieve certain liberalization target, e.g. 90%. In

fact ASEAN countries commit to eliminate tariffs in

nearly 90% tariff lines in each ASEAN+1 FTA while

only 73.3% of tariff lines is commonly eliminated

vis-à-vis all the Dialogue Partners (ASEAN average,

Table 2). These additional efforts by ASEAN

countries would provide benefits to the

multinational enterprises in East Asia, especially in

ASEAN countries. In addition, harmonizing the

tariff commitments to the Dialogue Partners is

expected to reduce the trade/investment diversion

effect that FTA originally inherits.

38 東協瞭望 008

Table 1: Tariff Elimination Coverage by Country under the ASEAN+1 FTAs

ASEAN-ANZ ASEAN-China ASEAN-India ASEAN-Japan ASEAN-Korea Average

Brunei 99.2% 98.3% 85.3% 97.5% 99.1% 95.9%

Cambodia 89.1% 89.9% 88.4% 85.1% 90.8% 88.7%

Indonesia 93.1% 92.3% 48.6% 91.2% 91.1% 83.3%

Lao PDR 91.8% 97.4% 80.1% 86.3% 90.0% 89.1%

Malaysia 97.3% 92.6% 79.7% 93.9% 92.4% 91.2%

Myanmar 88.1% 93.6% 76.6% 84.9% 91.6% 86.9%

Philippines 95.1% 92.5% 80.9% 97.1% 89.6% 91.1%

Singapore 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Thailand 98.9% 93.5% 78.1% 96.4% 95.1% 92.4%

Viet Nam 94.8% 92.2% 79.5% 94.2% 89.3% 90.0%

Australia 100.0%

China

94.7%

India

78.8%

Japan

91.9%

Korea

90.4%

New Zealand 100.0%

Average 95.6% 94.3% 79.6% 92.6% 92.7%

Notes: HS2007 version, HS 6-digit base.

Source: Kuno (forthcoming)

Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP 39

Table 2: Distribution of Tariff Lines by Liberalization Status

% of "eliminated to all"

products

% of "depends on FTA"

products

% of "protected to all"

products

Brunei 84.1 15.9 0.0

Cambodia 64.3 35.3 0.4

Indonesia 46.0 52.8 1.2

Lao PDR 68.0 31.6 0.4

Malaysia 76.0 22.9 1.1

Myanmar 66.6 31.8 1.6

Philippines 74.6 24.4 1.0

Singapore 100.0 0.0 0.0

Thailand 75.6 24.3 0.1

Viet Nam 78.1 19.1 2.8

Average 73.3 25.8 0.9

Note: Based on HS2007 version, HS 6-digit base. Data on Viet Nam under the ASEAN-China FTA are

missing. Data on Myanmar under the ASEAN-China FTA are also missing for HS01-HS08.

Source: Fukunaga and Isono (2013), originally obtained from Kuno (forthcoming)

As for rules of origins (ROOs), unified ROO

table is necessary. ATIGA and ASEAN+1 FTA have

different ROO tables across FTAs, although each

FTA has a unique table across countries and we see

the substantial convergence to co-equal-rules among

FTAs. Unifying the ROO definitions will generate

additional gains for the region and recue spaghetti or

noodle bowl effect. The unified ROO table is

expected to have co-equal rules in most tariff lines so

that users can select their preferable rules. In addition,

operational certificate procedures can be unified

across countries and accumulation can be allowed.

Partial accumulation and De Minimis rule can also be

included. In an ERIA study on the comprehensive

mapping of FTAs, we define “co-equal rule” as

“RVC40 or CTH” as well as more liberal rules, e.g.

“RVC40 or CTH or SPR” and “RVC40 or CTSH”,

and compile them as shown in Figure 4. ATIGA,

AANZFTA, AJCEP, and AKFTA frequently use

co-equal ROOs: ATIGA (3844), AANFTA (3301),

AJCEP (3090) and AKFTA (4137) out of 5224 tariff

lines (6-digit). Dominant rules in ACFTA are

“RVC40” which is less liberal and not revised yet.

Co-equal is used only in 122 tariff lines. General

rules in AIFTA are “RVC35 + CTSH” which is much

less liberal. If China and India change their ROOs in

most tariff lines to join the coming region-wide FTA,

it will encourage the users and contribute to the more

resilient production networks.

Common operational certificate procedure can

be adopted even in ASEAN+1 FTAs. It is because

these procedures are converging across FTAs in East

Asia, such as allowing back-to-back certificate of

origin and third country invoicing.

40 東協瞭望 008

Figure 4: Commonality in ROOs (HS2002)

Source: Fukunaga and Isono (2013), based on Medalla (2011) and Medalla (forthcoming)

HS ATIGA AANZFTA ACFTA AIFTA AJCEP AKFTA

“RVC(40) or CTH” or more flexible RVC40 Others

1-5

25-27

39-40

50-63

68-70

86-89

72-83

6-14

16-24

28-38

41-43

47-49

84-85

90-92

95-96

Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP 41

2.2. Services

As for services sector, there is much room

left to improve the liberalization level. Ishido

(2011) showed a Hoekman index in selected FTAs

in ASEAN and East Asia. The Hoekman index is

an indexation methodology for measuring the

GATS-style degree of commitments in services

sector (Hoekman, 1995). This method assigns

values to each of 8 cells (4 modes1 multiplied by

2 aspects---market access (MA) or National

Treatment (NT)---) in the following manner;

Unbound=0; Limited (or restricted) but

bound=0.5; and No limitation (and bound)=1;

then calculates the average value by services

sector and by country. Figure 6 illustrates

compiled “Hoekman Index” by mode, by country

and by FTA. ASEAN Member States set lower

liberalization level in FTAs with the Dialogue

Partners than AFAS 7th package (Table 3).

ASEAN can set the higher goal with gradual

liberalization schedule as in the tariff elimination

schedule by adopting AFAS as a starting point.

Foreseeable liberalization under definite schedule

helps the countries and firms to cope with it,

especially in regard to the sensitive sectors.

Coming region-wide FTA may have same

coverage as existing FTAs in terms of sub-sector

and pursue a high level of liberalization.

1 Mode 1 is cross-border trade in services, Mode 2

is consuming services abroad, Mode 3 is

commercial presence, and Mode 4 is presence of

natural persons.

42 東協瞭望 008

Table 3: WTO Plus in AFAS and ASEAN+1 FTAs (in terms of the Hoekman Index)

AFAS (5) AFAS (7) AANZFTA ACFTA (1) AKFTA

Total WTO+ Total WTO+ Total WTO+ Total WTO+ Total WTO+

Brunei 0.17 0.15 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.06

Cambodia 0.40 0.03 0.41 0.04 0.51 0.14 0.38 0.01 0.38 0.01

Indonesia 0.18 0.12 0.36 0.30 0.29 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.18 0.11

Lao PDR 0.09 NA 0.34 NA 0.24 NA 0.02 NA 0.07 NA

Malaysia 0.22 0.12 0.34 0.24 0.31 0.21 0.11 0.01 0.20 0.10

Myanmar 0.20 0.18 0.36 0.33 0.26 0.23 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03

Philippines 0.22 0.12 0.33 0.23 0.26 0.17 0.11 0.02 0.17 0.08

Singapore 0.28 0.17 0.39 0.28 0.44 0.33 0.30 0.19 0.33 0.22

Thailand 0.30 0.07 0.50 0.26 0.36 0.12 0.25 0.02 NA NA

Viet Nam 0.31 0.04 0.38 0.11 0.46 0.19 0.34 0.07 0.32 0.05

ASEAN

Average 0.24 0.11 0.36 0.22 0.33 0.20 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.08

Australia 0.52 0.18

New Zealand 0.51 0.26

China 0.28 0.04

Korea 0.31 0.09

Notes: Based on Specific Commitments and some Horizontal Commitments (where explicit reference is

made in Specific Commitments). AFAS (ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services), as a living

agreement, moves toward deeper commitments by releasing new “packages” almost every year;

AFAS (5) means its package 5, while AFAS (7) means its package 7.

Source: Fukunaga and Isono (2013), originally obtained from Ishido (forthcoming)

3. Conclusions and

Policy Recommendations

These discussions on the components of

ASEAN+1 FTAs for the RCEP will lead us to

three major points to take into consideration in

designing the new architecture. First, the RCEP

should aim at a high-level and comprehensive

FTA. In order to bring additional and real gains

for ASEAN countries, the RCEP should aim at a

higher level than the contents of the current

ASEAN+1 FTAs in terms of tariff, ROOs, trade

facilitation, services, investment and economic

cooperation. Other issues such as IPR protection

and competition policy are increasingly important

under the second unbundling of economies (Ando

and Kimura, 2013). Secondly, the new RCEP

regime should introduce as many convergent rules

as possible so that the noodle-bowl situation will

be eased. This applies to all the chapters:

common concessions in tariff structure; clear

definition and approach in non-tariff barriers

(NTBs); a general rule in ROOs; a region-wide

approach in trade facilitation and economic

cooperation; and fewer types of limitations in

services regulation. Lastly, ASEAN should take

the lead in making the new framework more

attractive than its rivals, i.e., CJK FTA and TPP,

so that it can maintain the “ASEAN Centrality”.

The speed of RCEP negotiation will also be a key

Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP 43

This paper is a modified version of Fukunaga and Isono (2013), prepared for the international

conference on “Towards and Integrated ASEAN Economic Community: Strategies, Progress, and

Prospects for Enhanced Taiwan-ASEAN Economic Collaboration” held on 30 October 2013 in Taipei.

in creating an attractive package. ASEAN should

move more quickly than other initiatives, and

with a clear goal, e.g., conclusion of RCEP

negotiations by 2015.

References

Ando, M and F. Kimura (2013) “What Are the

Opportunities and Challenges for ASEAN?”,

ERIA Discussion Paper Series 2013-31,

ERIA.

Fukunaga, Y. and I. Isono (2013) “Taking

ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP: A

Mapping Study” ERIA Discussion Paper

Series 2013-02, ERIA.

Hoekman, B. (1995) “Assessing the General

Agreement on Trade in Services”, World

Bank Discussion Paper No.307, World Bank.

Ishido, H. (2011) “Liberalization of Trade in

Services under ASEAN+n: A Mapping

Exercise”, ERIA Discussion Paper Series

2011-02, ERIA.

Ishido, H. (Forthcoming), ‘FTA Mapping Project

on Services Part II: Further Analysis of

ASEAN+1 FTAs’, in Lee, C. J., S. Urata and

I. Isono (eds.) Comprehensive Mapping of

FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia Phase II,

ERIA Research Project Report, ERIA.

Itakura, K. (2013), ‘Impact of Liberalization and

Improved Connectivity and Facilitation in

ASEAN for the ASEAN Economic

Community’, ERIA Discussion Paper

2013-01, ERIA.

Kuno, A. (Forthcoming), ‘Revealing Tariff

Structures under the ASEAN+1 FTAs and

ATIGA: Implications for a Possible

ASEAN++ FTA’, in Chang Jae Lee, Shujiro

Urata and Ikumo Isono (eds.)

Comprehensive Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN

and East Asia Phase II. ERIA Research

Project Report. Jakarta: ERIA.

Medalla, E. (2011), ‘Taking Stock of the ROOs in

the ASEAN+1 FTAs: Toward Deepening

East Asian Integration’, in Chang Jae Lee

and Misa Okabe (eds.) Comprehensive

Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia.

Available at:

http://www.eria.org/publications/resaerch_pr

oject_reports/comprehensive-mapping-of-fta

s-in-asean-and-east-asia-1.html.

Medalla, E. (Forthcoming), ‘Comprehensive

Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia

Study: Phase 2 Study on Rules of Origin

(ROOs)’, in Chang Jae Lee, Shujiro Urata

and Ikumo Isono (eds.) Comprehensive

Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia

Phase II. ERIA Research Project Report.

ERIA.

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