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Utopia and Reality in the Philosophy of Ernst BlochAuthor(s): ZE'EV LEVYSource: Utopian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1990), pp. 3-12Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20718997 .

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Utopia and Reality in thePhilosophy ofErnst Blochze'ev levy

1. "Urgrund" m? "Endziel."Ernst Bloch was one of themost original and least dogmatic Marxistthinkers of our time.1 In addition to the impact ofMarx, especially the earlywritings, one can discern in his oeuvre salient influences of classical philosophy?Kant, Hegel, Schelling?as well as of Neo-platonism. In the latterone also encounters many traces of Christian and Jewishmysticism. Blochmet Jewishmystical trends intheZohar, themagnum opus of theKabbalah,with which he became acquainted through the writings of GershomScholem. All these different components gave birth to a world-view whichconceived of theUtopian endeavour as an elementary activity of the humanmind: yearning, anticipation and fantasy. In this sense he frequently spokeabout "dreams as wish-fulfillment" and "anticipatory consciousness"(Prinzip II chs. 14, 21, 22), and viewed the world as a "laboratory ofpossible good" ("laborat?rium possibilis salutis"), i.e. something thathasnot yet been completely realized (T?binger 212-242). He thus strove to laydown the "blueprints" ("Grundrisse " alluding toMarx's famous firstdraft of Capital) of a better world (Prinzip title of part IV). The worldcomprises unlimited possibilities which have not yetbeen actualized. In thisconsists the significance of utopia.Bloch deduces his notion of utopia from his all-encompassing philosophical conception. Following Hegel, he conceives of reality as a"mediation" between subject and object. The whole of being takes placebetween two poles. One precedes the process of mediation; it is its"primordial cause" ("Urgrund") which existed before the dichotomy ofsubject and object, ofmatter and spirit (mind). The second pole is the "finalgoal" ("Endziel"), the ultimate merger of subject and object. However,what distinguishes Bloch as a philosopher is his almost prophetic visionwhich isperpetually turned toward the future: the veritable act of creationwas not in thebeginning but will occur at the end. This is thegenuine meaningof "utopia" inBloch's thought, namely a typically religious experience,although without God. This end he often designated as "Ultimum" i.e. theembodiment of ultimate realityand ultimatemeaning. Unlike the traditionaltrend of philosophy, inaugurated by thePresocratics, and recently taken upagain by some thinkers inthe aftermath of French structuralism (e.g.Michel

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Utopia and Reality 5

cannot even become an object of hope, and will never become a utopia. Itwould be no more than an illusion or, to use a Freudian term, a delusion.Hope, Bloch's principal notion, embodies the tendency and the tensiontoward the future, toward the "Novum. " In this sense he characterizes theUtopian future as "dawn forwards" ("D?mmerung nach Vorw?rts")(Prinzip 129).The singular characteristics are not yetbright because the sunwhich radiates its lighton everythinghas not yet risen; it is stilldawn, but nolonger dark. The direction which one ought to follow isalready visible. Allthismetaphorical rhetoric is intended to show thathope isnotmerely a projection of reason, a "mental creation" of human thought, but an expressionofwhat is reallypossible. This futurepossibility, which looks to us today asa distant dream, isnot simply a dream, but a "day-dream"; itresults fromconscious thought. Bloch insists on the essential distinction between daydreams and night-dreams. In linewith Freud's interpretation, he characterizesnight-dreams as the effectsof unconscious and repressed desires anddrives, usually relating toone's own personal problems. Day-dreams, on theother hand, represent a free"expedition" forwards, rich in fantasy,but thistime the ' 'dreamer' ' is conscious. These dreams manifest the inclination4 'tomend theworld" (Weltverbesserung"). (Perhaps Bloch borrowed this termfrom theKabbalistic termTikkun Olam Dili) jlpift ? ) It isone of themanymetaphorical speculations which abound in Bloch's philosophy. The resultisa very complicated systemof relationships between subject, object, realityand possibility.Reality holds within itself the anticipation of a possible future. Blochwas perhaps influenced on this issue by the Jewish philosopher FranzRosenzweig; in the twenties he belonged, with Erich Fromm amongstothers, to Rosenzweig's circle. Rosenzweig emphasized, in his Star ofRedemption, the idea (which he formulated in religious terms) that theindividual's task consists in transmittingGod's love of humanity to others.But themain point tobe underscored inthis context is the following: according toRosenzweig's argument, the redemption of theworld consists of thetransformation of the good, looming in the future, into a reality of thepresent. Both philosophers conceive of true reality as the reality of something imminentwhich, for the timebeing, is still absent but can come intobeing. Only Bloch elaborated this idea explicitly.Rosenzweig expressed it ythe Schellingian formula of (

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edifyingand convincing, but?this is thecrux of thematter?it also displaystheways and means for itsrealization. Utopia isa strivingtoward the "realpossible,'' since present realityalready contains theelements for itspossiblefuture changes (i.e. possibilities thatdo not exist inactu but are at hand inpotentia). Humanity's creative capacities which are still dormant can bearoused and realized?this is implied by the idea of utopia. Utopias embodythese possibilities; therefore theyplay such an essential and decisive role inhuman consciousness.But now, suddenly, Bloch introduces one more surprising, unexpectedidea. The utopia isa real possibility, but itsessence consists in that,notwithstanding being anchored in the present as a "real possibility," it is at thesame timeunconditioned. By this idea Bloch's outlook differs from thatofvulgarMarxism, though perhaps not somuch fromMarx's thought. Thelaws of social development, contrary to the simplistic and dogmatic versionsofMarxism, are not necessary in the same sense as natural laws. Let meillustrate thispoint by an example which has been popular with dialecticianssinceHegel. The seed already contains, as a real possibility, theplant, treeoranimal which will grow out of itor be born from it (it is irrelevant to ourproblem thatnot every seedwill bring forthfruit).What ought tobe underscored here is that nobody would define the treewhich grows here as autopia. The very term isout of place here. In other words, what is conditioned (i.e. stems from predetermined conditions) cannot be included inwhat Bloch calls utopia. It certainlywas not incidental thatvulgarMarxismdenied the significance of utopia. According to its pseudo-"scientific"conceptions, socialism would grow out of capitalism by necessity (althoughrevolutions are likely to accelerate theprocess), due to the "inevitable contradictions" between the forces and relations of production. This willhappen in the same way that capitalism evolved from feudalism. Such amechanistic view leftno place for the concept of utopia. The proclaimedidealwas, according toEngels' famous slogan, to transform socialism froma "utopia into a science." Bloch, who repudiates this simplistic view, rehabilitates at the same time the "lost face" of utopia. This implies a dialecticalprocess too: neither to conceive of utopia as a "theoretical possibility" (seeabove), as preached by thepre-Marxist Utopian socialists; nor to adopt theallegedly "scientific" antithesis, preached by traditionalMarxism; but toconceive of utopia as a synthesis that overcomes the regrettable onesidedness of the two former versions. Utopia can become an objective and realpossibility onlywhen it isnot bound by predetermined conditions. Only anunconditioned utopia can become a realizable utopia.Bloch did not recanthisMarxist outlook; he intertwined intohisworldview the two chief philosophical components ofMarxism: dialectical andhistorical materialism. He added, however, an original layer to each one ofthem. Inorder toovercome theplatitudes of thevulgar versions of dialecticalmaterialism, he introduced the notion of "primordial hunger"("Urhunger") which serves as a more or less natural motive ("agens"). Itremains questionable, however, whether this can be considered as anordinary materialist conception, as Bloch wishes to affirm. The notion of

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primordial hunger as a natural motive has sense only when it is directedtoward some end. But then it isno more amatter of nature but a humanaffair. Vico (whomMarx held inhigh esteem) asserted that history differsfrom nature because the first isperformed by humans whilst the second isnot. Similarly, inorder to overcome theplatitudes of thevulgar versions ofhistorical materialism, Bloch added the central concept of his wholephilosophy, the concept of hope. Here again one encounters the religiousdimension of Bloch's Marxism, although it is an atheistic religiosity.In this context it is also important to stress the following point. Blochconceives of utopia as some kind of merger between subject and object,which impromptu reduces theproblems of nature tohuman history: firstly,to theyearning of romanticism fora betterworld; secondly, to themessianicexpectations which draw their inspiration from Jewish and Christian mysticism.Although he declares himself to be aMarxist, he presents his thoughtsin an entirely different garb to that of common Marxist reasoning. Theunusual force of his argumentation isalso verymuch reinforced by his impressionistic and idiosyncraticmanner ofwriting, which isquite unique incontemporary philosophical and scientific literature. This evidentlyengenders many difficulties for readers who wish to come to gripswith hisphilosophy, which often looks almost esoteric. He describes, for example,utopia ina quasi-religious styleas "the Kingdom of the children ofGod,"borrowing the expression from Thomas M?nzer, the revolutionarytheologian of the Reformation (M?nzer). But he conceives of this"Kingdom of the children of God" at the same time as the "realm offreedom" ("Reich der Freiheit"), employing the renowned expression ofMarx. Then all exploitation of people by one another will disappear. Hetherefore acclaims the Bible (including the New Testament), and inparticular the books of prophecy, as the firstannouncement of this greatfuturewithout exploitation and oppression. This endows theBible with itsunique significance amongst all the religious scriptures of humankind. (Thisview perhaps expresses some kind of inadvertent ethnocentrism, but this isirrelevant inthepresent context).When he draws inspiration from theBible,Bloch is evidently less concerned with the God of Job, who answers Job'squestions as a God of nature, than with Isaiah's God of justice. Only thelatter isa worthy source of authentic religiosity.The Bible is, therefore,notto be considered as the particular property of the Jewish people, for itshumanist and universal message belongs to the whole of humanity. In linewith his own philosophy, Bloch interprets the Bible, perhaps a little bitarbitrarily, as theproclamation of a Utopian betterworld for all. The Bibleon theone hand, and thehumanist principles ofMarx's theoryon theother,thus form together the two fundamental cornerstones of Bloch's Utopianvision.Freedom?the ultimate end of hope?is not an abstract, empty freedombut a concrete, real freedom. This means that there is thepossibility to reachand realize it. Itwill be freedom from hunger and distress, from fear andanxiety; at the same time itwill be the freedom todevelop, without restraints,the manifold inclinations, capabilities and potentialities concealed in

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humanity's inner being, which embody trulyhuman nature. (Well-knownideas fromMarx's work, including theearlywritings and theCritique of theGotha Programme, reverberate here.) The realisation of the true identityofsubject and object which Bloch tries to elaborate in his book on Hegel(Subjekt), relies, therefore, onMarx's idea of humanisation of nature andnaturalisation of humanity. Naturalisation implies that people are capableof achieving optimal fulfillment of their inherent human nature.Unfortunately this still remains a utopia because until now such a realityhasnowhere come into existence. But it is a real possibility; it isunconditionedand depends ultimately on free human activity.Bloch inverts the traditional Marxist theory of knowledge. It is notenough to reject thevulgar 'mirror' theory (which predominated inMarxistthought for so long, triggered off mainly by Lenin's Materialism andEmpiriocriticism). Many Marxist thinkers had already done this beforeBloch. He, however, changed the very assignment of epistemology; nolongerdealing with cognition of the' 'become' ' ("Gewordenen "), but of the"becoming" ("Werdenden"), focussing attention once more on the "notyet." This opens up far-reaching opportunities forboth epistemology andontology: the firstmanifests "anticipatory consciousness" (the titleof thesecond part ofDas Prinzip Hoffnung) whilst the second is concerned with"Noch-nicht-Sein" (T?binger 210). Bloch pursues the same idea, whichappeared for the first time inSchelling's later philosophy and which waslater taken up by Rosenzweig. Notwithstanding these striking influences,one ought not, however, to overlook one decisive difference. Rosenzweigdistinguished, inhis Star ofRedemption, between "nicht Sein"and "nichtseiend Sein "(it is impossible to render this distinction intoEnglish), inorderto accommodate the biblical conception of creation with his ownphilosophy (whose three fundamental elements?God, world, humanity?he apprehended as being completely distinct and independent from eachother). He was concerned with a theological problem, namely to explicate acosmic event of thepast in linewith his own religious belief. Bloch, on theother hand, although he was also fascinated by certain mystical andmessianic ideas, dealt with a philosophical problem, inorder to explicate aforeseeable event of the future. But this too does not yet exhaust thewholedifference. According to Rosenzweig "nicht seiend Sein" is a "Sein"("being") which has not yet become "seiend" ("extant"). According toBloch "Noch-nicht-Sein" is a possible being; although not yet extant, itspossibility imposes on humanity, not on God, theurgent task to do everything to bring it into existence. Utopia thus embodies the good and thecommendable, which for the time being is stillwanting. It does not onlyexpress the longed-for positive being which has not yet come intobeing, butreflects and entails the negation of the negative being that prevails atpresent. The famous dialectical concept of "negation of negation" whichhas been so strongly eopardized by dogmatic abuses andmisinterpretationssinceMarx and Hegel, thus recovers some of itserstwhile dignity. IthelpsBloch togive an adequate expression of the relationship between the idea ofutopia and true reality.

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What fascinates Bloch more than anything else is,perhaps, the following.He attempts to elucidate why people are attracted to somethingwhich isnot yet there.How can this strange phenomenon be accounted for?Why dopeople engage in fantasies and day-dreams of this sort?What is thepeculiardrive thatgenerates hope? Since thinking thepossible has no limits,one canalways suppose and postulate new possibilities. There will always beutopias. People will never cease to ponder over possibilities that are not yetrealities. Utopian yearning is an inseparable part of human consciousness.This leads Bloch to the surprising conclusion that, in contradistinction tocustomary belief, the true roots of utopia have to be looked fornot in thesocial tier but in the anthropological. It is the will?a will, based onhumanity's latent creative capabilities?to liberate oneself from one'simmediate factual surroundings, inorder to create new "possibilities" suchas have not even been "dreamed" of. It belongs to the very concept ofutopia, notmerely to predict new possibilities, but to discover those possibilities with which thepresent reality ispregnant (i.e. already comprehendsin otentiel). By nursing them, people change the reality inwhich they live.This is the "principle of hope" ("Das Prinzip Hoffnung"). Hope mustderive from something given, and at the same time implyan active attitudeto it. There ought to be a clear linkage between exposition of possibilitiesand scientific investigation of such possibilities; thismust include ex temporeways for their realization.This entails an interestingmutual relationship of the kind explored bymodal logic. Since the relevant possibilities for the improvement of thehuman condition are necessary, theyare indeed possible. In this connectionBloch enlarges his earlier dichotomous distinction between "theoreticallypossible" and "really possible," and speaks about four "layers of thecategory possibility" (Prinzip 258-288):1. The "formally possible": This is the naive optimistic position whichdisregards the given reality; itbrings forthan abstract and irresponsible

idea of utopia. Moreover such a Utopian idea isnomore than the thoughtof one singular person. Such persons formulate the content and goals oftheUtopian idea as a corollary to theirnegation of theexisting reality,butdo not take into consideration how to bring the new reality into being,and by what means. They are also unaware of those possibilities ofchange which, as we have seen, are already concealed in the existingreality. For this reason all the famous classical utopias were doomed tofailure. Bloch devotes much space and attention to their analysis. Theycame too early, and were therefore severed from the real possibilities ofthe social realityof theirtime. Such was thepredicament ofOwen, SaintSimon and Fourier, and before them,Thomas More, Bacon, Campanellaand the like.2. The "cognitively possible" (259 ff.): This means reflectingon new problems, as well as proposing new solutions. It leans on reason, but, like theformerposition, remains stuck in the limited frame of subjectivity. It isalso still incapable of becoming a social programme.

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3. The "objectively possible" (264 ff.): This ismore or less the same as the"theoretically possible" whose shortcomings Bloch had criticized.Although it springs out of the social reality itself, itnevertheless lackspractical usefulness because itrestricts itself to theoretical aspects only.4. The "dialectically possible" (271 ff.):As one would expect, thiskind ofpossible iswhat Bloch most cherishes inhis concept of utopia. It expressesmost strikinglythedialectical bond between theutopia which possesses afirm relationship with reality and reflects itsprogress, and the utopiawhich embodies human freedom. This means that it is unconditioned(see above) and not subjected passively to objective reality.A propos,this conception of the "dialectically possible" has been furtherdeveloped by the sociologist Zygmunt Baumann, who characterizedutopia as a group of "ideal possibilities"; itsopposition to the existingsocial reality exposes those possibilities which can be found there inpotentia. This sounds perhaps a littlebit strange, but it engenders thevision?Bloch would probably say "the hope"?of novel formations ofhuman reality.The Utopian vision grows out of thepresent reality. It isnot somethinghovering over it. Itmanifests ideaswhich (can) function in thepresent, andbelongs therefore to the realitywhich it endeavours to transform. Blochinfers from all this that no profound social changes can occur withouttaking into account the significant role that the utopia fulfils as a guidingvisionary principle.

3. Utopia and Ideology.There looms, however, another danger, namely that all themultiplemeanings bestowed upon the concept of utopia will leave it ultimatelywithout any fixed and definitemeaning. If Imay use a current termof poststructuralist literarycriticism, theconcept of utopia runs the riskof "deconstruction." Bloch tries to evade this danger by his "principle of hope."Hope forms the linkbetween theory and praxis. The fact that it udges theexisting reality critically demonstrates that hope always transcends theexistent. Otherwise itwould be useless as well as meaningless to hope foranything. Everything would become hopeless. Exdefinitio, hope relates tosomething which is still absent. So, by explicating utopia through theconcept of thepossible, by establishing iton theprinciple of hope, and bylinking itto the future,Bloch distinguishes it from the concept of ideology.This ought to prevent its devaluation. It seems, however, questionablewhether this intention, to remove the concept of utopia from the realm ofideology, does not impair after all the proper understanding of ideology.

Bloch defines ideology, quite caustically, as themaid-servant of the rulingclass. He conservesMarx's idea of "ideological superstructure" but does soinamuch more simplistic form.According to his argument, utopias, unlikeideologies, can never representor serve a ruling class. Is this really the case?Moreover, what happens on the other hand to a concept such as "socialistideology"? Would it e no more than ameaningless contradict io in djecto?

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Bloch iscertainly right in saying that every ideology comprises certain formsof deceit and falsity. It ismost oftenmeant to conceal the true intentions ofits spokespersons. Ideology indeed turns, as shown very convincingly byRoland Barthes, into a "myth." Itmight, nevertheless, stillmake somesense to speak of a Utopian ideology. Bloch indeed does so. It should focuson thehumanly "possible"; it should also include the "principle of hope."But such an ideology is, by Bloch's own criteria and definitions, not anideology but a utopia.Perhaps this issue can be resolved in the followingmanner. Every singleUtopian category ought tobe judged by theyardstick of criticismof ideology.Ifafter such a critical scrutinyof theutopia there remain substantial Utopiancomponents, it gains more value qua utopia. This would be no mere"wishful thinking" or abstract expectation; itwould truly establish thefoundation of a concrete utopia ("Herausbringen" 186-191). Bloch did notrestricthimself to an analysis ofMarxism as a critique of prevailing socialconditions and ideologies, supplementing it, as itwere, by some Utopiansurplus-value; he conceived of itas a realistic scrutinyof the future,basedon firmrelations between theoryand praxis (see above). This iswhat Blochcalls "future-latency in thepresent" ("Zukunfts-Latenz in der Gegenwart")which ipsofacto indicates a "future-tendency" ("Zukunfts-Tendenz"), i.e. areal possibility (188). Instead of dealing with ideologies by categories, oneought to treatcategorieswithout ideology (hehad, of course, inmind thecategory of possibility). Then theutopia will represent a "pure Utopian surpluswithout ideology" ("lauter utopischer ?berschuss ohne Ideologie") (189).With regard to this lastpoint, I should like, at the end of thisarticle, toventure another definition of theconcept of ideology; this is toovercome itssimplistic identificationwith the interests of the ruling class, which regrettably remains part of Bloch's analysis. It seems tome that the followingdistinction between ideology and utopia ispreferable. Utopia manifests theprogramme of an ideal and perfect social orderwhich does not yet exist anywhere. This order differs substantially from the present existing reality.Ideology, on the other hand, isa thought-systemwhich does not necessarilymanifest or proffer a perfect social order. Therefore it can also serve theexisting social order. This does not contradict, however, theassumption thatthereare ideologies which express the strivingfora better world-order. Afterall, as we have seen above, Bloch himself had no qualms about employingthe term"utopian ideology." Ideology as such isnot to be condemned, foritdepends on what it stands for.One could therefore recapitulate: utopia isalways struggling for the realization of the possible best; it ismotivated byhope for the "optimum. "Ideology is something different; itcan fulfil threedifferent roleswhich must not all be disparaged:1. A covert defense of the existing order and itsruling class. This isBloch'sconception of ideology.2. A call forchanges in thepresent order. This does notmean support of the"ruling class" (I do not deal here with the question of towhat extent thenotion of a "ruling class" is still applicable).

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3. To strive fora better social order in the future, guaranteeing a dignifiedlife for all human beings.This third role of ideology sharesmuch with the concept of utopia. Italone can be designated as44Utopian ideology." According to these criteria,Plato's Republic could be apprehended as a utopia par excellence (it isagainof no concern in this contextwhether Plato's state ought to be also judgedcritically for displaying totalitarian features, etc.). On the other hand,Plato's last book, theLaws, which he wrote after his failure to realize hisblueprint inSicily, could then be apprehended as some kind of ideologicalplatform. The simple identification of ideology with the defense of theinterests of the ruling class certainly cannot be upheld any more.

NOTES1. A similar, though not identical, version of this article has appeared, inGerman, inBlochAlmanach 7. Ludwigshafen: Folge, 1987: 25-51, and, inHebrew, in the "Introduction" toErnst Bloch: Selected Writings. Tel-Aviv: Sifriat-Poalim, 1987: 5-29.

REFERENCESBaumann, Zygmunt. Socialism, theActive Utopia. London: Allen and Un win, 1976.Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. Paris: Seuil, 1957.Bloch, Ernst. Atheismus imChristentum. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968._Das Prinzip Hoffnung. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1959.

_"Herausbringen, unverf?lschtes Ordnen?Uber die M?glichkeit eines Systems,aber eines Offenen." Der Mensch als geschichtliches Wesen?Festschrift f?r M. Landmann. Ed. Klaus-J?rgen Grundner. Stuttgart: Klett, 1974._Subjekt-Objekt?Erl?uterungen zuHegel. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1962._Thomas M?nzer als Theologe der Revolution. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969._"Zur Ontologie des Noch-nicht-Seins." T?binger Einleitung in die Philosophie.Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970.