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    Siraprapa Watakit

    5502310013

    The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure

    on Information Asymmetry and Trading:An Intraday Analysis

    Chiyachantana, Jiang, Taechapiroontong, Wood [2004]

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    Agenda

    Overview of The Paper

    Contribution

    Development of Hypotheses

    Empirical Results Conclusion

    2

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    Overview of The Paper3

    The paper study the impact ofRegulation of Fair Disclosure (FD)

    towards 3 main focused topics

    Market liquidity, information asymmetry, trading behavior of

    retail and institutional investors

    The advocate of FD says that FD promote fair/openness to the

    market and reduce information asymmetry

    While the critics of FD argue that FD introduces more volatility to

    the market because it may reduce quantity and quality of

    information released by companies To investigate the effect of FD, the paper compares intraday activity

    during the earning announcement period at pre-FD and post-FD

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    Contributions4

    Using trades and transaction data, the paper provides empirical

    evidences to support the finding results

    Major findings are

    FD improves market liquidity

    FD reduces information asymmetry

    At post-FD; the results show that intuitional investors activities

    decrease; while retail investors activities increase

    The decline in information asymmetry is +associated with

    institutional investors; and the higher participation of retail

    investor contribute to lower information risks

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    Development of Hypothesis5

    FD

    Liquidity

    InformationAsymmetry

    TradingBehavior

    Retail

    Institutional

    Bid-Ask

    Spread,

    Depth

    Trading.Freq

    , Volume

    Component

    of Bid-Ask

    Spread

    Info.Asym

    vs investors

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    Development of Hypothesis6

    Hypothesis 1: Bid ask spreads are lower and depths aregreater before earnings announcements in the post-FD periodthan in the pre-FD period

    Hypothesis 2a: The adverse selection component of the spreadis expected to be lower before earnings announcements in thepost-FD period than in the pre-FD period.

    Hypothesis 2b: The adverse selection component of the spread

    is expected to be the same after earnings announcements inthe post-FD period than in the pre-FD period

    Improved

    liquidity

    lower

    information

    asymmetry

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    Development of Hypothesis7

    Hypothesis 3a: Compared to the pre-FD period, the post-FD period has alower participation rate from institutions prior to earnings announcements.

    Hypothesis 3b: Compared to the pre-FD period, trading activities from retailinvestors are heightened after earnings announcements.

    Hypothesis 4a: The change in adverse selection cost in the pre-announcementperiod post-FD is related to the change in institutional trading during thesame period.

    Hypothesis 4b: The change in adverse selection cost after earnings releasespost- FD is related to the change in retail trading during the same period.

    less institutional activity,

    more retail activity

    find linear relationship

    between spread and

    investor activity

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    Data and Methods8

    Earning announcement: CRSP

    Transaction data: TAQ separate retail/institutional trades by size and dollar value cutoff

    rules

    pre-FD

    (November 1,1999 to August

    15, 2000)

    Benchmark

    half-hrs (-14days)

    pre-announcement

    half-hrs (-26,-1)

    eventhalf-hrs (0,25)

    post-FD

    (October 23, 2000to July 31, 2001)

    Benchmark

    half-hrs (-14days)

    pre-announcement

    half-hrs (-26,-1)

    eventhalf-hrs (0,25)

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    Data and Methods9

    Liquidity

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    Empirical results10

    Table 1: Trading.freq is high during pre-announce period for pre-

    FD; but less for post-FD

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    Empirical results11

    Table 2: spread decrease and depth wider at post-FD

    H1:Improved

    liquidity

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    Empirical results12

    Table 3: adv.select cost is high during pre-announcement period at

    pre-FD; but decrease at post-FD

    H2:lower

    information

    asymmetry

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    Empirical results13

    Table 4: at post-FD, more retail and less institutional

    H3:less

    institutional

    activity, more

    retail activity at

    post-FD

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    Empirical results14

    Table 6: Dependent variable is The change in adverse selection

    component between pre-FD and post-FD

    H4:more institutionalmore

    adv.selectcost, moreretailsless adv.select cost

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    15

    Major findings are

    FD improves market liquidity

    FD reduces information asymmetry

    At post-FD; the results show that intuitional investors activities

    decrease; while retail investors activities increase

    The decline in information asymmetry is +associated with

    institutional investors; andhigher participation of retail investor

    contribute to lower information risks

    Conclusion