civprodigest

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I.

Bernabe vs. Alejo (EDZ)Jan. 21, 2002Panganiban, J.

FACTS:The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three

(23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalinadied on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Carolina, inbehalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledgedillegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabesestate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. The RTC dismissed thecase, citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father hadbarred the action. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should beallowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action forrecognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. Thesubsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimatedaughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putativefathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.

HELD:YES.Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to besynonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under thelegal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the lawwhich creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which giverise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; asopposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtainsredress for their invasion.

Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition forrecognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannotimpair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vestedprior to its enactment.

Petition Denied.

B.Ko vs PNB (LEO)

Facts:

Petitioners filed in the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 14 for Annulment of Mortgage,Extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale, Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-21064 and T-21065 and Deed of Sale with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. Thecomplaint alleged that the assailed mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings were null and voidsince the written consent of petitioners, as beneficiaries of the mortgaged property, were notsecured. Respondent bank denied the claim and alleged that in the execution of the mortgage,petitioners in fact gave their consent.

During the course of the proceedings, petitioners and their counsel failed to attend a scheduledtrial. Upon motion of respondent bank, the complaint was dismissed.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that they have been continuously pursuingnegotiations with respondent bank to purchase back the property and have gained positiveresults. Respondent bank countered that from the time the complaint was filed, a period of threeyears had elapsed but petitioners failed to prosecute their case, showing lack of interest in theearly resolution thereof. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners filed an appeal in the Supreme Court.

Issue: W/N the appeal is proper.

Held: Petition is denied

Petitioners erred in filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

instead of filing an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court

provides:

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If, for no justifiablecause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of hisevidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an

unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of thecourt, the complaint may be dismissed upon the motion of the defendant orupon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of the de fendant toprosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. Thisdismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,unless otherwise declared by the court.

Upon the order of dismissal, petitioners counsel filed a timely motion for reconsideration whichwas denied by the trial court. Considering that an order of dismissal for failure to prosecute hasthe effect of an adjudication on the merits, petitioners c ounsel should have filed a notice ofappeal with the appellate court within the reglementary period .[5] Instead of filing a petition underRule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper recourse was an ordinary appeal with the Court of

Appeals under Rule 41, which provides:
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Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal.The appeal to the Court of Appeals incases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its originaljurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court whichrendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copythereof upon the adverse party x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

The rule is clear. In order to perfect an appeal all that is required is a pro forma noticeof appeal. Perhaps due to failure to file a notice of appeal within the remaining two days of theappeal period, petitioners counsel instead filed the instant petition. The rules of procedure,however, do not exist for the convenience of the litigants. These rules are established to provideorder to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. They are not to be trifled with lightly oroverlooked by mere expedience of invoking substantial justice. In Balindong v. Court ofAppeals[6]we stated:

Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when forpersuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injusticenot commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure.Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be aneffort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain its failure to complywith the rules. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderlyadministration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement ofsubstantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness,caprice, despotism or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Theenforcement of procedural rules is not antithetical to the substantiverights of the litigants. The policy of the courts is to give effect to bothprocedural and substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the justand speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.

C.

SPS DELOS SANTOS V. VDA DE MANGUBAT OCT 10, 2007 (SAM)

FACTS:

Respondents are registered owners of Lot 1033 in Sta. Cruz, Sta. Maria Bulacan with an area of793 sqm. Located at east of the Lot 1033 is Lot 1034 where petitioners house is erected in nameof Elena San Jose. Respondens filed with RTC Bulacan a Complaint for damages with prayer forwrit of preliminary injunction against petitioners alleging that respondents cannot reach the publicroad without passing upon a portion of Lot no. 1034 being the shortest passage way, owners ofLo 1034 executed a duly notarized Deed of Assignment of Right of Way conveying a strip of LotNo. 1034 in favor of the private respondents to be used as a permanent right of way, third: thepetitioners, without any authority over the strip of land, deliberately placed sand and gravel along

the passageway which violated the right of way of the private respondents and caused irreparabledamage and injury to the rights of the private respondents.

Petitioners denied liability on grounds that persons who executed deed of assignment are neitherowners nor possessors of Lot 1034 thus deed of assignment was null and void. RTC granted apermanent right of way in favor of the private respondents measuring 2.7 meters wide and 21

meters long, upon payment of the proper indemnification in the amount of P28,350.00; but whichdenied the private respondents prayer for damages. Petitioners filed an MR but was denied byRTC.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed notice of appeal on Aug. 15,2000. However RTC denied due courseto the Appeal in Aug 17,2000. RTC held from records that MR of petitioners was filed out of timemore so the notice of appeal. Petitioners filed petition for certiorari with CA. Oct 27,2000. CAissued a Resolution dismissing petition on two grounds: first, the verification and the non-forumshopping certification is signed by petitioners counsel which is proscribed by law; and second,

the petitioners failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration before resorting to petition for certiorari.Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON CA abused its discretion when it issued resolution (oct. 27,2000) based solely

on technical considerations, as well as affirming null and void order( Aug 17, 2000)

denying due course to the petitioners notice of appeal even as it was filed in reglamentary

period?

2. WON CA gravely abused its discretion when it issued order of July 3, 2001 denying

petitioners motion for recon NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT HAD MERITORIOUS

GROUNDS AND WAS TIMELY FILED.

HELD: YES. petition is GRANTED. CA Resolutions October 27, 2000 and July 31, 2001 areSET ASIDE and the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, is directed to GIVE DUE COURSE to the Notice ofAppeal filed by the petitioners on August 14, 2000. The temporary restraining order issued by theCourt during the pendency of herein petition is LIFTED.
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In 2005, pending resolution of herein petition, the Court amended the Rules of Court on theappeal period in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[17] to wit:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fairopportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from

receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days fromreceipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the

final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new

15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision

becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule

41, Section 3.

This fresh period rule served as the beacon of light that guided the Court in theresolution of the present petition. However, there are existing procedural rules that would have

blocked the outright application of Neypes to the present case.

First, the dismissal by the CA of the petition for certiorari filed before it by the petitioners wasbased on the grounds that the verification and non-forum shopping certification were signed bypetitioners counsel; and that petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the order

denying due course to the appeal before resorting to a petition for certiorari. SC Circular 28-91amended by SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94, specifically provided that the verification andcertification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principalparty seeking relief and failure to do so shall be a cause for the dismissal of the petition. This rule

is now embodied in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the issue whether the RTC committed an error in awarding a right of wayin favor of private respondents, together with the other issues mentioned in the petition for

certiorari filed with the CA, are proper subjects of appeal. The fact that litigants have beengiven a fresh period of appeal, constrains the Court to give due course to the petition.

Second, the general rule is that before certiorari under Rule 65 can be availed of, a motion forreconsideration must first be filed. However, this rule admits of exceptions. In a plethora of

cases, the Court held that when the Rules of Procedure are rigid and strict in application, resultingin technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, the Court is empowered tosuspend them. The Court finds that the present case is one of the instances where the rigidapplication of the rule on filing a motion for reconsideration before filing a petition forcertiorari may be suspended to give way to the application of the new rule enunciated inNeypes.

Third, the present Petition for Certiorari filed with this Court is an improper remedy inbringing the instant case before this Court. The proper remedy to obtain reversal of the CAs

October 27, 2000 and July 3, 2001, Resolutions is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45of the Rules of Court.

While the Court may treat a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as having been filed under Rule45 to serve the higher interest of justice, such liberal application of the rules finds no application ifthe petition is filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review without anyreason therefor.

Herein petition for certiorari was filed on the 60th day from date of receipt of the denial of themotion for reconsideration,[29] well beyond the 15-day period within which to file the petition forreview under Rule 45. However, considering that rules of procedure are mere tools designed tofacilitate the attainment of justice, it is well-recognized that the Supreme Court is empowered tosuspend its operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than to promotethe ends of justice.

Taking into account the fact that private respondent is entitled to the fresh period rule, in the

interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of

compliance may be relaxed.

Thus, setting aside technicalities, the Court will proceed to determine the merits of herein petition.

The Court elucidated in Neypes that in order to standardize the appeal periods provided in theRules of Court and to afford litigants a fair opportunity to appeal their cases, it is practical

to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional

Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion

for reconsideration. Thus, the Court held that petitioners Neypes seasonably filed their notice of

appeal within the fresh period of 15 days counted from the date of receipt of notice denying theirmotion for reconsideration.[38]


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Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in orderthat courts may be able to administer justice.[39] Procedural laws do not come within the legalconception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues -they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of theirpassage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.[40]

The fresh period rule is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days

within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is

denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the freshperiod rule should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.

Also, to deny herein peti tioners the benefit of the fresh period rule will amount to injustice, if notabsurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or inthe year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which wereissued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment andfinal orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the fresh period rule while those later

rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.

Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal on August 15, 2000 or 12 days from receipt of theOrder denying their motion for reconsideration on August 3, 2000. Hence, following the fresh

period rule, the notice of appeal filed by petitioners may now be considered as having be en filedwell within the fresh period of 15 days.

Borre vs Ca (JEHAN)

BORRE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:On August 29, 1979, petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent Manotok Services,Inc. to recover rentals paid by them alleging that the land leased to them by the company wasactually public land, forming part of the Estero de Sunog-Apo and Estero de Maypajo and did notbelong to the company. On motion of the respondent company, the trial court dismissed thecomplaint on November 11, 1980 on the ground that the company's ownership of the propertywas recognized by the State with the passage of Pres. Dec. No. 1670. On December 13, 1980,petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that respondent company's titles covered lots whichwere portions of the Estero de Sunog-Apo and Es tero de Maypajo and therefore should not havebeen included in those titles because these portions are public property which cannot beappropriated and titled by private persons like the respondent company. The trial court denied themotion in its order dated December 22, 1980 which was received by petitioners on January 12,

1981. A second motion for reconsideration was filed on January 14, 1981 on the ground that asubsequent survey showed that the lots occupied by petitioners are not covered by respondent

company's titles, and hence, are neither covered by Pres. Dec. No. 1670. In its order datedJanuary 20, 1981, the trial court denied the second motion. Petitioners received the court order onJanuary 30, 1981. The next day, January 31, 1981, the last day for perfecting their appeal fromthe dismissal of their complaint, petitioners filed by registered mail a notice of appeal and amotion for extension of time to file the record on appeal. However, they did not file their appealbond until February 2, 1981 for which reason the court dismissed their appeal, the thirty-dayperiod for perfecting appeal having expired. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certioraribut their petition was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the late filing of the appeal bond of the petitioners was due to"excusable negligence". Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in dismissing the appeal of the petitioners.

HELD:Petition is denied. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a question on thetimeliness of filing the appeal bond, a requirement for perfecting an appeal which had beendispensed with by Section 18 of the Interim Rules of Court. Although this new procedural rule maybe given retroactive effect, the extent of its retroactive application is, however, limited to actionspending and undetermined at the time of its approval and does not extend to actions which hadalready become final and executor . Before the Interim Rules of Court took effect, the 1964 Rulesof Court required the filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or

judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. In the case at bar,although the notice of appeal and the motion for extension of time to file the record on appealwere filed within the reglementary period, the appeal bond was filed two days late, or after theperiod for perfecting an appeal had lapsed. Inasmuch as the appeal was not perfected on time,the decision of the trial court became final and executory on January 31, 1981. The trial judgecommitted no error in dismissing the appeal. This is clearly set forth in Section 13, Rule 41 of theRules of Court: SEC. 13.Effect of failure to file notice, bond, or record on appeal.

Where the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not filed within the period of timeherein provided, the appeal shall be dismissed. There is, therefore, no cogent reason to reversethe findings of the Court of Appeals. This Court has repeatedly held that perfection of an appeal inthe manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. As

Justice J.B.L. Reyes has pointed out, "The right to appeal is not a natural right nor part of dueprocess; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and inaccordance with the provisions of the law Unless there is a showing of excusable negligence

justifying the failure to file the appeal bond on time, the period within which to perfect an appealcannot be extended to accommodate the appellant. Petitioners' mistake in believing that theOffice of the Clerk of Court would be closed on Saturdays does not constitute "excusablenegligence" which would justify a liberal application of the pertinent rules on the perfection of anappeal. Petitioners' counsel, a practitioner in the Metro Manila area, should have known orexerted effort to inquire about office hours in courts on Saturdays instead of assuming thatSaturdays are not working days. No abuse of discretion, much less a grave one at that, asalleged, was committed by respondent Judge in dismissing petitioners' appeal.

Republic vs. CA (MARCO)


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March 18, 2003Corona, J.

FACTS:In line with the centennial celebration of Philippine Independence on June 12, 1998, thegovernment embarked on several commemorative Centennial Freedom Trail (CFT) projects. Oneof these projects was the construction of the Tejeros Convention Center and the founding site ofthe Philippine Army on the 3,497 sq. m. property of respondent Fe Manuel located in Tejeros,Rosario, Cavite. The said property was declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as ahistorical landmark. To carry out the Tejeros Convention Project, the government, through theNational Centennial Commission (NCC), filed on a complaint for expropriation againstrespondents Fe Manuel and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank). The RTCdismissed the complaint for expropriation on the ground of lack of cause of action. Petitioner fileda petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the partof Judge Christopher Lock for summarily dismissing its complaint and denying its motion forreconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippinesbefore the Court of Appeals was filed out of time.

HELD: NO. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Bar MatterNo. 803 effective September 1, 1998, was recently amended by A.M. No. 00 -2-03-SC effectiveSeptember 1, 2000. The recent rule no longer provides that the 60-day period shall be reckonedfrom receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution. Instead, it provides that the 60-dayperiod shall be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

The amendment under A.M. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is procedural or remedial in character. Itdoes not create new or remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy orconfirmation of rights already existing. It is settled that procedural laws do not come within thelegal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes.They may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of theirpassage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Petition Granted.

Magallanes v Sun Yat Sen Elementary School (NEMO)G.R. No. 160876 | January 18, 2008SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:

Petitionerswere all employed as teachers in the Sun Yat Sen Elementary Schoolin Surigao City.Respondentsterminated (May 22, 1994) the services of petitioners. Thus, they filed (August 3)

with the NLRC, complaints against respondents for illegal dismissal, etc.

LA rendered a Decision declaring (June 3, 1995) that petitioners were illegally dismissed andordering respondents to reinstate them without loss of seniority rights, and to pay them theirbackwages, salary differential, 13th month pay differential.

On appeal by respondents, the NLRC reversed the Arbiters judgment, holding that petitioners arecontractual employees and that respondents merely allowed their contracts to lapse . MR wasdenied.

Petitioners then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was GRANTED reinstating theDecision of the Labor Arbiter. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, only full-timeteachers who have rendered (3) years of consecutive serviceshall be considered permanent.

Respondents filed an MR but it was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari which wasdismissed for lack of merit. Their MR was denied with finality July 19, 2000.

Meanwhile, petitioners filed (October 4) with the LA a motion for execution of his Decision asmodified by the CA.

LA computed the petitioners monetary awards reckoned from the time of their illegal dismissal in June 1994up to October 29, 1999. Respondents interposed an appeal to the NLRC contendingthat the computation should only be up to June 20, 1995.

NLRC modified the LAs computation and ruled that the monetary awards due to petitionersshould be computed up to June 20. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, butwas dismissed outright for their failure to attachto their petition copies of the pleadings filed withthe LA. On MR, they erroneously indicated the case number. Their error was compounded bystating a wrong Division.

On realizing their mistake, petitioners then filed with the Seventh Division a Motion to TransferThe Case to it which was denied on the ground that the motion is non-existent since it doesnot bear the correct case number. Petitioners filed an MR, but it was denied.

ISSUE: WON CA err in holding that affixing a wrong docket number on a motion renders it

non-existent?

HELD:The CA (7th Division) is correct when it ruled that petitioners MR is non -existent. Petitionerscounsel placed a wrong case number in their motion, indicating (Special 16th Division). If apleading bears an erroneous docket number and thus could notbe attached to the correct case,the said pleading is, for all intents and purposes, non -existent. The CA Divisionhas neither theduty nor the obligation to correct the error or to transfer the case. The duty to correct themistake falls solely on the party litigant whose fault caused the anomaly.

However, SC opts for liberality in the application of the rules to the instant case in light of thefollowing considerations. First, the rule that negligence of counsel binds the client may be relaxed

where adherence thereto would result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or propertyorwhere the interests of justice so require. Second, this Court is not a slave of technical rules, shorn


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of judicial discretion in rendering justice, it is guided by the norm that on the balance,technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights. Thus, if the application of the ruleswould tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within this Courts power tosuspend the rules or except a particular case from its application.

This case involving a labor dispute has dragged on for over a decade now. The Labor Code waspromulgated to promote the welfare and well-being of the working man.

SC sustains petitioners contention that theNLRC, in modifying the award of the CA, committedgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Quasi-judicial agencieshave neither business nor power to modify or amend the final and executory Decisions ofthe appellate courts. Under the PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENTS, anyalteration or amendment which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is void for lackof jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged Resolutions are REVERSED. The Orderof the NLRC is SET ASIDE. The Order of the LA is REINSTATED.

II. JURISDICTIONE) BASIC PRINCIPLES

Jurisdiction conferred by law not by agreement of the parties

[G.R. No. 139561. June 10, 2003] (KEN)

SPOUSES FEDERICO ATUEL and SARAH ATUEL and SPOUSES GEORGE GALDIANO and

ELIADA GALDIANO,petitioners, vs. SPOUSES BERNABE VALDEZ and CONCHITA

VALDEZ, Respondents.

Facts:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorariseeking to reverse the Decision of theCourt of Appeals dated 20 May 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 as well as theResolution dated 14 July 1999 denying the Motion for Reconsideration

o The Court of Appeals in its assailed decision affirmed the Decision of theDepartment of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which reversedthe Decision of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) in Malaybalay,Bukidnon

o The MARO of Bukidnon ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),Agusan del Sur, to segregate 2,000 square meters from the land of theSpouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez. The MARO of Bukidnon also

awarded the same segregated land to the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atueland the Spouses George and Eliada Galdiano

The present controversy springs from a battle of possession over a portion of a propertyin Poblacion (formerly Sibagat Nuevo), Sibagat, Agusan del Sur

Atty. Manuel D. Cab (Cab) is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Poblacion,Sibagat, Agusan del Sur

In 1964, Cab appointed Federico Atuel (Atuel) as administrator of the Cab Property Valdez (Valdez) arrived in Sibagat from Baogo Bontoc, Southern Leyte. Valdez is the

nephew of Atuel, who recommended to Cab to lease a portion of the Cab Property toValdezo Cab and Valdez entered into a Lease of Improved Agricultural Land under

which Valdez leased a 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property for P300.00per year for two years

Cab allowed the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel (Spouses Atuel) and the SpousesGeorge and Eliada Galdiano (Spouses Galdiano) to occupy a 2,000-square meterportion of the Cab Property

The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Bayan of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, approved thetown plan of the Municipality of Sibagat which classified the Cab Property as residential

Cab informed Valdez that their lease contract had already expired, and demanded thatValdez stop cultivating the 1.25 -hectare portion of the Cab Property and vacate the

same MARO of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur informed Cab that Valdez was properly identified as

a tenant, and thus deemed to be the owner of the land he cultivatedo pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, Emancipation Patent No. A-159969

was issued to Valdez for a 2.3231-hectare portion (PD 27 Land) of the CabProperty. The PD 27 Land included the 2,000-square meter Subject Lotoccupied by the houses of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano

Cab filed with the DAR in Manila a petition for cancellation of Valdezs emancipationpatent

o Cab claimed that his property is not planted to rice and corn and that Valdezis a civil law lessee, not a tenant

o DAR ordered the Regional Director of Cagayan de Oro City to conduct an

investigation regarding the petition Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez (Spouses Valdez) filed a complaint for

Recovery of Possession with Damageswith the DARAB in Malaybalay, Bukidnonagainst the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano

o alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano stealthily andthrough fraud entered and occupied a portion of the above-describedproperty with an area of 2,000 sq. m. more or less.

o Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano beordered to vacate and restore to the Spouses Valdez possession of theSubject Lot

Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano asserted that the Spouses Valdez had nocause of action against them because Cab is the owner of the Subject Lot while Atuel is

the administrator of the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdianoclaimed that upon Cabs instruction and consent, they had been occupying the Cab


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Property since 1964, long before the Spouses Valdez leased a portion of the CabProperty and also pointed out that the Spouses Valdez never set foot on the SubjectLot nor cultivated the same, thus, there is no dispossession to speak of

Moreover, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano alleged that the emancipationpatent issued to Valdez is null and void

o

Cab Property, which is covered by the Free Patent issued to Cab, has alreadybeen classified as residential, hence, no longer covered by PD No. 27

DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, after hearing the case, issued a decision in favor of the

respondents, segregating the TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQ. METERS, more or less,from the land of the complainants Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano appealed to the DARAB Central Office. The

DARAB Central Office reversed the decision of the DARAB Provincial Adjudicatoro Enjoining the respondents-appellants from committing acts of intrusion and

maintain the possessory rights of the complainantso Ordering the MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer) or PARO (Provincial

Agrarian Reform Officer) concerned to assist the parties in determining theamount to be reimbursed in favor of the respondents

Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a petition for review with the Court ofAppeals

o Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB Central Office and

dismissed the petition for lack of merit In affirming the decision of the DARAB, the Court of Appeals ruledthat the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over casesinvolving the issuance, correction and cancellation of emancipationpatents. The Court of Appeals held that the DARABs decisionshould be respected because it enjoys the presumption ofregularity.

o Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a Motion for Reconsiderationwhich the Court of Appeals denied

On 14 January 1998, while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the SpousesValdez sold 5,000 square meters out of the PD 27 Land to the Municipality of Sibagat

Hence, the instant petition

Issue: W/N the Spouses Valdez are entitled to seek redress from the DARAB in

recovering possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot from the Spouses Atuel and

the Spouses Galdiano

Held: Yes. Decision of the CA is reversed.

Ratio:

We grant the petition based not on the arguments of the Spouses Atuel and the SpousesGaldiano but on an entirely different ground. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals

because of the DARABs lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present controversy

The DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses Valdezs complaint forrecovery of possession of the Subject Lot. Though the parties do not challenge the jurisdictionof the DARAB, the Court may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction

The Court has discretion to determine whether the DARAB validly acquired jurisdiction over thecase. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law. It may not be conferredon the court by consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

Zamora v CA (POX)

March 19, 1990

GR No 78206

Topic: Jurisdiction conferred by law and not by agreement of parties

Decision

RTC: Placed the properties in question under receivership (1985)

CA: Ruled that the petitioners are suing as stockholders and NOT as members of theassociation, hence SEC has

jurisdiction.

SC: Petition is denied. Affirmed CA decision.

Facts:

1. Sometime in 1966 the petitioners and private respondents formed an unregistered

partnership called the Medina Peoples Cockpit Association. They purchased a lot thruthe contribution of the members and constructed a building thereon. In 1976, acorporation called Medina Recreation Center was created where, Felomino Delgado(private respondent) along with other relatives was the incorporators. Subsequently, theproperties of the association was transferred to the corporation which prompted thepetitioners to file a case against the respondents (defendant) claiming irregularities inthe transfer. Initially the case was filed with the SEC (1979) but was eventuallywithdrawn by the petitioners, thereafter a case was filed with the CFI of MisamisOriental in 1980.

2. In the case with the RTC, petitioners (plaintiff) are claiming that they are suing asstockholders of the said corporation. In there reply, the respondents (defendant) was

questioning the capacity (legal standing) of the petitioners and further moved for the


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dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners filed an amended complaint,deleting their claim that they are suing as stockholders of the corporation but asmembers of the association. This was granted by the court.

3. In June 1985, after the decision of the CFI, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari,prohibition and preliminary injunction with the SC. This was granted.

Issue: Who has jurisdiction over the subject matter?

Held:

1. SEC has jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court tohear, try and decide a case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by theConstitution or law while jurisdiction over the person is acquired by his voluntarysubmission to the authority of the court. The SC ruled that though petitioners has theright to amend the complaint filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental, they were estoppedfrom alleging that they were NOT suing a stockholders of the corporation based on theclaim they initially filed with SEC. Based on that complaint with SEC, they stated that(1) they were suing as STOCKHOLDERS of the said corporation requiring thecorporation, among other things to provide (a) Annual/periodic financial report, (b)

Statements of Assets and Liabilities, etc. (2) that there was a Deed of Transfer inExchange of Shares of Stocks on Feb 1977 and (3) records also showed thatpetitioners received stock and cash dividends from the corporation (though petitionersclaimed that they later tried to return these). In addition, there is no question that theclaim of the petitioners against the respondents is under the concept of intra-corporatedispute, where the petitioners is claiming irregularities against the respondents (asofficers of the said corporation) regarding the transfer of their properties to thecorporation. This is covered under Sec 5 of PD 902A.

Note: The SC stated that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be objected to at anystage of the proceedings, for such jurisdiction is conferred only by law and CANNOT be acquiredthru waiver by, any act or omission of the parties. This may be alleged for the first time on, onappeal or considered by the Court motu propio.

2.

Dela Cruz v Moya (GIL)

Dela Cruz v. Moya

G.R. L-65192 April 27, 1998

Facts:

Dela Cruz, is a member of the Armed Forces assigned to Intelligence and Operations. Hereceived a mission order to apprehend persons who were allegedly engaged in illegal cockfightingoperations. He caught the operators in flagrante delicto, but they resisted arrest. A scuffle ensuedand Dela Cruz shot Cabito. He was then charged with homicide in the CFI.

While the case was pending, PD 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated vesting jurisdiction overcrimes committed by members of the Armed Forces or Constabulary in the performance of theirduties with the courts-martial.

Claiming that he was charged for a crime committed in the performance of his duties, Dela Cruzfiled a motion to transfer the case to the military officials.

Issue:

Whether the courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Criminal Case.

Held:

The court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, otherwise theproceedings are void. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force atthe time of the commencement of the action.

By virtue of General Order no. 59, which was the governing law at the time, military tribunalsexercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel in theperformance if their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in theperformance of their official duty. Provided that for the purposes of determining whether anoffense was committed while in the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the

Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive unless modified or revoked by thePresident.

Even as no certificate issued by the Secretary or National Defense was presented in court, therecord contains a copy of the Mission Order signed by a Lieutenant Huerta, directing Dela Cruz toverify and apprehend persons reportedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. The evidence of theprosecution likewise shows that Cabito was shot while petitioner was executing his Mission Order.Thus the respondent court was without jurisdiction to try the case.


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3.

Ching v Malaya (BRENT)

Facts:

This petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks a reversal of the decision ofthe respondent court nullifying the judgment of the municipal court in a forcible entry case on theground of lack of jurisdiction. .

The petitioners had alleged in their complaint for ejectment that the private respondents hadforced their way into the disputed premises without any right whatsoever and had refused tovacate the same despite repeated demands. These demands were based on the petitioners' casethat they were the owners of the said property, having acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. Theprivate respondents, in their answer, had challenged the claimed sale, arguing that the propertybelonged to them by right of inheritance. At any rate, they had argued, as the basic question wasone of ownership and not of mere possession, the municipal court had no jurisdiction and shoulddismiss the complaint..

The municipal court, ** affirming its jurisdiction, proceeded to trial and thereafter rendered

judgment ordering the private respondents to vacate the disputed property. It also required themto pay the petitioners back and current rentals at P 1,000.00 a month until actual surrender of thepremises, as well as a P 3,000.00 attorney's fee plus the costs of the suit. 1 On appeal, thisdecision was set aside by the respondent judge, who held that the municipal court had nocompetence to resolve the case as it involved a question of ownership.

Issue:W/N Petition should be granted.

Ruling: Yes,

The petitioners, disagreeing, then came to us. At the outset, we reject the private respondents'submission that this petition is improper because the questions involved are merely factual. Ofcourse they are not. What we have to decide here is whether or not, in the light of the records ofthe case, and particularly the adverse assertions of ownership over the property in issue, themunicipal court had the authority to try and decide the same in the first instance. This may beraised on certiorari. .

As the original complaint was filed on January 6, 1979, the question before us should beexamined under the provisions of R.A. No. 296, as amended, which was the law then in force.That law allowed the municipal court to receive evidence upon the question of ownership inejectment cases, but only whenever it was necessary to do so for the purpose of determining thecharacter and extent of possession and damages for detention. .

There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an action- andcorrespondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it-is the allegation made by the plaintiff in his

complaint. 3Accordingly, the present case being one for forcible entry, it should normally comeunder the jurisdiction of the municipal court, before which it was in fact filed. There was acomplication, however, as in their respective primary pleadings, the parties both injected the issueof ownership to support their adversary claims to the possession of the property. This issue ofownership, in view of the respondent court, had removed the case from the jurisdiction of themunicipal court. .

It is settled that the mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not

oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. This has to be so, for "were the principleotherwise, the ends of justice would be frustrated by making the efficacy of this kind of actionsdepend upon the defendant in all cases. Accordingly, we have repeatedly held:

The mere circumstance that proof of title, or evidence of ownership, had been introduced duringthe trial before the Municipal Court would not deprive said court of jurisdiction to rule on thequestion of who had the prior physical possession.

Even where defendant in a detainer or forcible entry alleges title to the property in his answer, it isdeclared in a great number of cases that the Justice of the Peace or the Court of First Instance onappeal will not be divested of its jurisdiction by such allegations alone.

There is one exception, however, and that is where it appears during the trial that, by the natureof the evidence presented, the issue of possession cannot be decided without deciding the issueof ownership. In such a case, the jurisdiction of the municipal court is lost and the action shouldbe dismissed.

After examining the facts of this present case, the Court finds that it does not come underthe exception to the rule. .

The property in question consists of a residential house and lot covered by TCT No. T-85126 andregistered in the name of petitioner Jose Ching in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. The basis ofthe registration is a deed of sale executed in his favor by Felix Carpio, the former owner, who hadacquired it from Brigido Alvarado, Cesar Alvarado's supposed father. The record does not showthat such registration has been challenged since the issuance in 1978 of the said certificate oftitle, which in the absence of evidence to the contrary should be presumed valid. There is noencumbrance on the land, and there is no adverse claim or notice of lis pendis annotated in thecertificate. Such registration, it may be added, is binding against the whole world unless annulledfor cause in proper cases. .

It is true that petitioner Cesar Alvarado had filed a complaint in the court of first instance ofLaguna against the petitioners and several others for the annulment of the deed of sale invokedby the petitioners. However, that fact alone could not divest the municipal court ofjurisdiction to continue trying the question of possession, more so since the question ofownership was appropriately being litigated in the annulment suit. Significantly, the deed of

sale being challenged in that action was different from the contract involved in the exception justcited. .


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In the instant case, the private respondents were not a party to the contract of sale invoked bythe petitioners. It was being challenged by respondent Cesar Alvarado only as an alleged heir ofBrigido Alvarado, who had transferred it to Felix Carpio, who in turn had sold it to the petitioners. .

Without preempting any decision in that annulment case, we make the observation that even ifthe private respondents should succeed therein, he would not thereby necessarily acquire fullownership of the property in question. Assuming the validity of the holographic will be invoked, hewould be entitled to only an indefinite portion of the testator's estate as long as no partition thereof

shall have been effected. For this reason alone, the respondent's claim of ownership over theparticular house and lots in question could be dismissed as untimely and untenable. .

Finally, the fact that the petitioners themselves adduced evidence of ownership over the propertyin question did not, as claimed, have the effect of divesting the municipal court of its jurisdiction .As permitted in the above-cited Section 88 of R.A. No. 296, the plaintiff in an ejectment case mayintroduce such evidence for the purpose of proving the character of his possession and theamount of damages he is claiming for unjust deprivation of such possession. The petitionerswere only trying to prove their right to possession and damages by establishing their right ofownership. .

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 5,

1981, is set aside and that of the municipal court dated July 5, 1979, is reinstated, with costsagainst the private respondents. This decision is immediately executory. .

TIME V REYES (EDWARD)

Time, Inc v Judge Reyes, Mayor Antonio Villegas, Juan Ponce Enrile

Facts:

1. Times Inc, a magazine based in New York, New York published an article narrating thecorruption in the Philippines, mainly on the mayor of Manila.

2. Due to this, Mayor Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile, undersecretary of Finance, filed alibel case against the magazine in Rizal.

3. The complaint lodged did not allege that the article was printed and first published in theprovince of Rizal.

4.

Time Magazine filed motion to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction of the court in Rizal5. Due to this, the judge a quo issued a deferment on the motion to dismiss until after the

trial of the case on the merits.6. Petitioner filed an MR but was denied by the court, hence this appeal.

Issue: WON, the courts in Rizal has no jurisdiction on the case at bar.

Held:

Answer: Yes.

Law: RA 4363 states that in the case of libel, the case against damages should be filed either:

1. In the place where the article was published or2. Or where any of the offended parties actually reside or where the public officer

holds office

Application: In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint failed to state where it waspublished. Hence, respondents can only file the case in Manila, where they hold office.

It is basic principle that the jurisdiction of the court shall be determined by the allegation of thecomplaint or other initiatory pleading.

For failure to state the place of publication, the respondents were left with no other option but tofile in Manila which they did not do.

Hence, the petition is with merit and ruled in favor of Times.

4.

[G.R. No. 48324. March 14, 1990.] (NADZ)

JOSE AGRAVANTE, and JUAN AGRAVANTE, Petitioners, v. JUANA PATRIARCA,

substituted by Rosita Ordoez, and HON. ALFREDO REBUENO, Judge, Court of First

Instance of Camarines Sur, Respondents.

TOPIC: Jurisdiction over the parties

FACTS:

- Juana Patriarca Pea (petitioner here are the hei rs) filed an action to quiet title with CFI of

CamSur with damages against Jose Agravante and Juan Agravante. Answer was in duecourse filed by the defendants.

-

The case was set for pre-trial but before it could be held, a fire broke out in the capitol, hence,the records were burned.

- The record of said case was reconstituted and the case was once more scheduled for pre-trial. The defendants counsel moved for cancellation of this setting.

-

The Court reset the pre-trial but again, the defendants attorney, pleading illness, sought tohave this second pre-trial setting cancelled. This motion was denied by the Presiding Judgewho promulgated the following Order, notice of which was served on defendants counsel. Itwas denied, being not in accordance with the rules of lack of notice to the adverse party, forlack of setting of the date of hearing, and for the reason that the medical certificate attachedthereto is only a xerox copy of an alleged medical certificate indicating that if rest is what is


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only needed by Atty. Pacamarra, from that date to the date of the nex t hearing of the case, hehas sufficient period to rest, and therefore, the motion is not meritorious.

- Pretrial pushed through despite the absence of the defendants and counsel and the court

declared them in default and allowed the plaintiff (Juana) to present evidence ex parte.- When Juana died, her heirs (the petitioners herein) presented a motion advising of her

demise and praying that they be substituted in her stead in the actionthis was granted bythe court on account of lack of objection to the motion.

- Defendants moved for MR for these 3 orders (cancellation of pre-trial, pre-trial, and the

substitution by the heirs as plaintiff).-

MR denied, hence, this petition for certiorari. They contended that pre-trial setting was voidsince notice thereof had not been given to the defendants personally, only their counselhaving been notified; that when the Trial Court authorized the plaintiff to present evidence exparte, she had already been dead for some time and therefore the court failed to acquire

jurisdiction of her person; and that they had no opportunity to object to the motion for plaintiffssubstitution by her heirs.

ISSUE: WON the Court acquired jurisdiction over Patriarca.

HELD: YES.

Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the court by the filing of complaint.Subsequent death will not affect jurisdiction, all that is entailed is the substitution of the heirs forthe deceased in accordance with Rule 3, Sec 17. In this case, theres no showing that Agravanteshad any ground to oppose the substitution or that they had suffered any prejudice of any sort byreason of the substitution.

Navale v CA (KEVIN)

FACTS:

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry and damages with the municipal trial court in

cdo. With prayer for the issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction and for the return of thepossession of a portion of the Bagting Estate i Carmen, cdo over which they claimed absoluteownership but which had been allegedly occupied by petitioners with force and violence.Moreover, the latter constructed a house against private respondent's will.

Mtc in cities granted the petition and issued writ. Petitioner however ignored the writ promptingp.r. To file a motion to have petitioners in contempt. The mtcc then issued an order directingpetitioners to comply with the writ of injuction and for p.r. Not to demolish the fomer!s housespending a decision on merits.

Petitioner were declared in default for failure to appear and to present their own evidence. Mtccthen rendered judgment based on respondents evidence and ruled that p.r. Are the rightful

possessors of the land and ordered petitioners to immediately vacatethe premises and to pay the

damages.

Petioners filed a petition for certiorari with the rtc questioning the order of default and writ ofdemolition saying that they had never been summoned to answer the complaint. They contendthat summonses were never validly served on them and they did not appear voluntarily in theaction as to be covered by sec 23 rule 14 of the rules of court in what is equivalent to service.

Issue : w/o mtcc acquired jurisdiction over the pet

Held. Yes, jurisdiction cannot be acquired over the defendant without service of summons.However, sec 23 of the rules of court provides that the defendant's voluntary appearance in theaction shall be equivalent to service. In this case, the recordshows that summonses were dulyserved on petitioners but that they, not only refused to receive the same, but that they alsodeclined to give their names.

Granting that there was an invalid service of summons, still they which is not the case here, stillthe mtcc acquired the jurisdiction over the petitioners through their voluntary appearance thereat.

5.

Platinum Tours Incorporated v Panlilio (SEFF)

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Courtof Appeals

FACTS:

- Petitioner Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum ofmoney with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its presidentNelida G. Galvez (Galvez). Platinum sought to collect payment for the airline tickets

which PATC bought from it. On October 24, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of MakatiCity, Branch 62, rendered a judgment by default in favor of Platinum and ordered PATCand. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum actual damages of P 359,621.03 with legalinterest, P 50,000 attorneys fees and cost of suit.

- Writ of execution was issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila PoloClub Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Galvez was leviedupon and sold for P479,888.48 to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo.

- Private respondent Jose M. Panlilio (Panlilio) filed a motion to intervene in Civil CaseNo. 94-1634. Panlilio claimed that, in October 1992, Galvez had executed in his favor achattel mortgage over her shares of stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her P1million loan and that Galvez had already delivered to him the stock certificates valued at

P5 million.


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TC: denied Panlilios motion for intervention

- TC denied the motion because (1) a decision had already been rendered in this caseand that the only matters at issue is the propriety of the execution; (2) it will only delayor prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties; and, (3) theIntervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate action.

- TC declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities in the conduct thereof.- Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of preliminary

attachment of the disputed Manila Polo Club shares , docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365. The case was raffled to Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

- In the meantime, Panlilio again attempted to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634, thistime by incorporating in his complaint a motion to consolidateCivil Case No. 96-365and Civil Case No. 94-1634.

- Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the motion for consolidation oncondition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62, who was trying Civil Case No. 94-1634, would not object thereto. Judge Diokno later issued an order, allowing theconsolidation of the two cases and setting for hearing Panlilios application for a writ of

preliminary attachment.-

Platinum, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the order of JudgeDiokno but its motion was denied.- Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the CA assailing, among others, the July 23,

1996 order of Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 andCivil Case No. 94-1634.CA: annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to returnCivil Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in his docket anddecide it as a separate case.

- Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court ofAppeals, praying that Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled toanother RTC Branch of Makati. However, the motion was denied by the CA.

Petitioners contention:

Platinum insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62, has no jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 96-365.It argues that, when Judge Dioknos July 23, 1996 order allowing the consolidation of the two

cases was annulled and set aside, RTC Branch 62s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over CivilCase No. 96-365 was likewise extinguished.

ISSUE: WON Makati RTC Branch 62 has no jurisdiction to try Civil Case 96-365

HELD: NO.

Ratio: Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. Ingeneral, jurisdiction may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over theperson of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings.

- Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred by law. It isdetermined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not theplaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the time he files his

complaint; while jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by hisvoluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercivepower of legal processes exerted over his person.

Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does notdepend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on thecorrectness of its decisions.

- In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case docketed as CivilCase No. 96-365 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The factthat the Court of Appeals subsequently annulled Judge Dioknos order granting the

consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634, did not affect thejurisdiction of the court which issued the said order.

- Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction

refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein.Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as inthe instant case, the decision on all questions arising from the case is but an exercise ofsuch jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdictionis merely an error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the case,much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.

- Instant petition premature and speculative. Had Platinum waited until Judge Diokno

decided on what to do with Civil Case No. 96-365, the parties would have been sparedthe trouble and the expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in turn wouldhave had one petition less in its docket.

- All told, nothing legally prevents the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, from proceeding withCivil Case No. 96-365. Should it decide to retain the case, it is hereby directed toresolve the same with dispatch.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.

6.Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (EDZ)Aug. 20, 2001De Leon, Jr., J.


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FACTS:Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. filed a complaint for damages against private respondentFrancisco Tesorero before the RTC. In l ieu of an answer, private respondent filed a motion todismiss claiming that: (a) the complaint did not state a cause of action; (b) the plaintiffs claim hasbeen extinguished or otherwise rendered moot and academic; (c) there was non-joinder ofindispensable parties; and (d) venue was improperly laid. Of these four (4) grounds, the lastmentioned is most material in this case at bar. The trial court dismissed the petitioners complainton the ground of improper venue, reasoning that the plaintiff being a private corporationundoubtedly Banilad, Cebu City is the plaintiffs principa l place of business as alleged in thecomplaint and which for purposes of venue is considered as its residence. The CA dismissed thecomplaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case was properly dismissed because of improper venue.

HELD: NO. Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferredby consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consentof the parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may bewaived by the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the court mayrender a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of

the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration.

Private respondent is not a party to any of the contracts presented before us. He is a completestranger to the covenants executed between petitioner and NAPOCOR, despite his protestationsthat he is privy thereto, on the rather flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for whosebenefit the electric generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased or acquired. Weare likewise not persuaded by his argument that the allegation or representation made bypetitioner in either the complaints or answers it filed in several civil cases that its residence is inDavao City should estop it from filing the damage suit before the Cebu courts. Besides there isno showing that private respondent is a party in those civil cases or that he relied on suchrepresentation by petitioner.

Petition Granted.

NOCUM V. LUCIO TAN (LEO)

Doctrine: Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since thelatter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constitutin the plaintiff's cause of action.Objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve aquestion of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. Venue relatesto trial and not jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is

jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.

FACTS:

Lucio Tan filed a complaint for damages (moral and exemplary) for alleged malicious anddefamatory imputations against him in 2 articles of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. PetitionersInquirer and reporter Nocum , and ALPAP and Capt. Umali, in their respective joint answersalleged that the complaint stated no cause of action. ALPAP and Capt. Umali also allegedthat the venue was improperly laid. The complaint failed to state the resdience ofcomplainant Lucio Tan at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the placewhere the libelous article was printed and first published.

RTC of Makati: Complaint was dismissed without prejudice on the ground of improper venue

Lucio Tan filed an omnibus motion seeking reconsideration and admission of the amendedcomplaint now alleging that "This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati"and that " This caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati."

RTC then set aside the previous order of dismissal stating that the defect in the originalcomplaint has already been cured in the Amended complaint which can still be properlyadmitted purusuant to Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of CivPro since the Order of Dismissal wasnot yet final. Also, the amendment was merely formal.

2 petitions for certiorari were then filed (one by Nocum and PDI, one by ALPAP and Umali)but CA dismissed the petition. The motions for reconsideration were likewise denied. Thus,the appeal at the SC. After the filing of comment by Tan and the reply filed by PDI andNocum, SC resolved to give due course to the petition.

Contention of PDI and Nocum: Art 360 of RPC vests jurisdiction over all civil and criminal

complaints for libel on the RTC of the place (1) where the libelous article was printed and firstpublished; or (2) where the complainant, if pirivate person, resides; or (3) where thecomplaint, if a public official, holds office. Thus, since the original lcomplaint stated only thebusiness adress of Lucio Tan and not his actual residence or the place of printing and firstpublication, the original complaint failed to confer jurisdiction on the RTC.

iSSUE:/ HELD:Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case on the basis of the original complaint? YES.

RATIO:Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the lattercomprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.Here. RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. Tan's cause ofaction is for damages arising from libel, jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Art. 360 ofRPC provides that is the CFI that is specifically designated to try a libel case.

Jurisdiction is different from venue. (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a casewhile venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter ofsubstantive law; venue is a matter of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relationbetween the court and the subject matter, venue establishes a relation between the plaintiff andthe defendant, or the petitioner and the respondent; and (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannotbe conferred by the parties while venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.

In this case, the additional allegations in the Amended Complainant as to place of printing andfirst publication referred only to the question of venue and not jurisidiction. They would neitherconfer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would failure to include them divest RTC of its jurisdiction over


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the case. Tan's failure to allege these allegations gave the court, the power upon motion by aparty, to dismiss on the ground that the venue was not properly laid.

The amendment was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court,where originally it hadnone. The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. Venue hasnothing to do with jurisdiction except in criminal actions. Assuming that the venue was improperlylaid, the issue would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In civil cases, venue may bewaived. By dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue, RTC had jurisdiction over thecase. PDI and Nocum recognized RTC's jurisdiction by filing their answers to the complaint byquestioning the propriety of venue instead of a motion to dismiss.

Objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve aquestion of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. Venue relatesto trial and not jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is

jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.

7.MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., (SAM)

Petitioners , vs. COURT OFAPPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREWLUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP,

Respondents

G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987

FACTS:

Originally, this was a case of an action for torts and damages and specific performance with aprayer for a temporary restraining order. In the present case the damages were not specificallystated in the prayer but was alleged in the body of the complaint which assessed

78.75 million as damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of the docket fee paid wasonly 410.00. With leave of court the petitioner then amended the complaint with the inclusion ofadditional co-plaintiffs and by eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body ofthe complaint thereby reducing the amount of damages to 10 million pesos only.

ISSUE: WON THE COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE WHENTHECORRECT AND PROPER DOCKET FEE HAS NOT BEEN PAID.

HELD:

No.The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only

410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdictionupon the Court.

The basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in theoriginal complaint and not in the amended complaint. All complaints, petitions, answers and othersimilar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of

the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment ofthe filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bibaccepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

SUN INSURANCE V ASUNCION (JEHAN)

Sun Insurance vs. Asuncion

FACTS:

the Court is asked to resolve the issue whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a casewhen the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid. On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun

Insurance Office, Ltd (SIOL) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of a premiumrefund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity againstprivate respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent declared in default for failure to filethe required answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, on March 28, 1984,private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund ofpremiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil CaseNo. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J.Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual,compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigationand costs of their suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount ofdamages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint. Only the amount ofP210.00 was paid by private respondent as a docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to

raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who wasthen presiding over the case.Upon the order of the Supreme Court, Civil Case Q-41177, togetherwith twenty-two other cases, regarding docket fees were re -raffled and said Civil Case wastemporarily assigned to Judge Antonio P. Solano. In January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, acautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30, 1984, an amended complaint was filedby private respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated. The case was thenassigned to Judge Maximiano Asuncion.In compliance to the order of the court, respondent filed"Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" alleging actual and compensatory damages andattorney's fees of about P44,601,623.70.The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based onPrivate respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual andcompensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 and this was subsequently paid by therespondents. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning

the order of Judge Asuncion. On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplementalcomplaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages, amounting the total claim


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to P64,601,623.70. The private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00.TheCourt of Appeals granted the writ of preliminary attachment to the respondent but requiring thecourt to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent. Petitioners alleged thatalthough the respondent paid the amount of 182,824.90 as docket fee, the docket fee that shouldbe paid by respondent is P257,810.49.

ISSUE/S:whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketingfee paid was not sufficient.

HELD:

It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of theprescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matteror nature of action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment ofthe fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementaryperiod.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Barangay Piapi vs. Talip (MARCO)Sept. 7, 2005

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

FACTS: Petitioners filed with the said RTC a complaint for reconveyance and damages withprayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction againstrespondent. Petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, peaceful,continuous and open possession for more than 30 years of a parcel of land consisting of 3.2hectares situated in Piapi, Padada, Davao del Sur. The same land was subdivided into lotsconsisting of 100 square meters each, where the individual petitioners built their houses. On theremaining portion were constructed their barangay center, multi-purpose gym and health center.Respondent fraudulently obtained from the said Registry of Deeds a Transfer Certificate of T itle(TCT) in his name. In 1998, he paid real estate taxes and subsequently, he threatened to build abarb-wire fence around the land. In their opposition to the motion to dismiss, petitioners alleged

that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC considering that the total assessed value of the property isP41,890.00, as shown by a Real Property Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet dated August20, 1996 issued by Atty. Marcos D. Risonar, Jr., Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. The trialcourt issued an Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners directly filed withthis Court the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the trial courts Order dismissing thecomplaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, asamended, the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance since it is incapable ofpecuniary estimation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack ofjurisdiction.

HELD: NO.The nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of thecomplaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where the ultimate

objective of the plaintiffs, like petitioners herein, is to obtain title to real property, it should be filedin the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.

It can easily be discerned that petitioners complaint involves title to, or possession of, realproperty. However, they failed to allege therein the assessed value of the subject property.Instead, what they stated is the market value of the land at P15,000.00.

The assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof, shall bealleged by the claimant. What determines jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and thereliefs prayed for. Petitioners complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of land. Consideringthat their action involves the title to or interest in real property, they should have alleged therein itsassessed value. However, they only specified the market value or estimated value, which isP15,000.00. Pursuant to the provision of Section 33 (3) quoted earlier, it is the Municipal CircuitTrial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.

Petition Denied.

Proton Pilipinas Corp v. Banque Nationale de Paris (NEMO)

GR 151242 June 15, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed of the credit facilities of hereinrespondent, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). To guarantee the payment of its obligation, its co-petitioners Automotive Corporation Philippines (Automotive), Asea One Corporation (Asea) andAutocorp Group (Autocorp) executed a corporate guarantee.

BNP and Proton subsequently entered into three trust receipt agreements, under the terms of thetrust receipt agreements, Proton would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold themin trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the condition that it woulddeliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it. In case the vehicles

are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP, together with all the accompanying documents oftitle.

Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale and return the unsold motor vehicles.Pursuant to the corporate guarantee, BNP demanded from Automotive, Asea and Autocorp. ButThese guarantors refused to pay. Hence, BNP filed on September 7, 1998 before the MakatiRegional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against petitioners praying that they be ordered to pay (1)US$1,544,984.40 plus accrued interest.

The defendants-herein petitioners filed on October 12, 1998 a Motion to Dismiss on the groundthat BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees to thus prevent the trial court from acquiring


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jurisdiction over the case. As additional ground, petitioners raised prematurity of the complaint,BNP not having priorly sent any demand letter.

By Order of August 3, 1999, the Makati RTC denied petitioners' Motion to Dismiss and so holdthat the docket fees were properly paid. It is the Office of the Clerk of Court of this station thatcomputes the correct docket fees, and it is their duty to assess the docket fees correctly, whichthey did. Even granting arguendo that the docket fees were not properly paid, the court cannot

just dismiss the case. The Court has not yet ordered (and it will not in this case) to pay the correct

docket fees, thus the Motion to dismiss is premature, aside from being without any legal basis.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Dismiss, but it wasdenied by the trial court. Petitioners thereupon brought the case on certiorari and mandamus tothe Court of Appeals which also denied it.

Contention of the petitioners

Citing Administrative Circular No. 11-94,23 petitioners argue that BNP failed to pay the correctdocket fees as the said circular provides that in the assessment thereof, interest claimed shouldbe included. There being an underpayment of the docket fees, petitioners conclude, the trial court

did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. Additionally, petitioners point out that the clerk of court,in converting BNP's claims from US dollars to Philippine pesos, applied the wrong exchange rate.Furthermore, petitioners submit that pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 7,25 the complaintshould have been dismissed for failure to specify the amount of interest in the prayer whichprovides that :To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and

other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in thebody of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in theassessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirementshall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

In the instant case before the court, it appears that Respondent did not, however, pay the filing

fee corresponding to its claim for interest from August 16, 1998 until the filing of the complaint onSeptember 7, 1998. And this is required under Rule 141, as amended by Administrative CircularNo. 11-94, which was the rule applicable at the time.

Issue: whether or not the non-payment of corresponding docket fee would automatically

result to the automatic dismissal of the case.

Held: No. While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even itsnon-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as longas the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when theparty involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.

It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of theprescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature ofthe action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docketfee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond theapplicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The same rule applies to permissivecounterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed untiland unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said feewithin a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementaryperiod.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading andpayment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specifiedin the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additionalfiling fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerkof Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additionalfee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in part. The July 25, 2001 Decision and the December18, 2001 Resolution of the Court Appeals are hereby MODIFIED. The Clerk of Court of the

Regional Trial Court of Makati City is ordered to reassess and determine the docket fees thatshould be paid by respondent, BNP, in accordance with the Decision of this Court, and directrespondent to pay the same within fifteen (15) days, provided the applicable prescriptive orreglementary period has not yet expired. Thereafter, the trial court is ordered to proceed with thecase with utmost dispatch.

Spouses de Leon vs. CA, 287 SCRA 94 (KEN)

FACTS:- Private respondents Elayda filed a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale oftwo parcels of land against petitioners De Leon before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.- Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction

over the case because of non-payment of the correct amount of docket fees.- On October 21, 1991, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss but required the privaterespondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the parcels of landin litigation as stated in the complaint. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,private respondents brought the matter to the Court of Appeals.- On February 26, 1992, a decis ion was rendered by the respondent court annulling the orders ofthe trial court and holding an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible ofpecuniary estimation and, therefore, the docket fees should not be based on the value of the realproperty, subject matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded.- Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition for review oncertiorari.


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