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FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, R-II BUILDERS, INC., R-II

HOLDINGS, INC., HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC., and MR. REGHIS ROMERO II,Respondents.

FACTS:

On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) entered into a JointVenture Agreement (JVA) for the development of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite and reclamation area to

be converted into a low cost medium rise housing complex and industrial/commercial site. The Project will

involve 79 hectares of reclaimed land (it was initially 40hectares but the JVA was amended). The JVA also

provides that as part of the consideration for the Project, NHA will convey a portion of the reclaimed lands

to RBI. The reclamation of the area was made; and subsequently, Special Patents were issued conveying

the reclaimed land to NHA. On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed this

Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to declare NULL and VOID the Joint Venture Agreement

(JVA) and the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, and all other agreements in

relation thereto, for being unconstitutional and invalid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and

submerged lands

RULING:

The DENR exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public

domain. As such, it decides whether areas, like foreshore or submerged lands, should be reclaimed or not

and whether they should be classified as alienable and disposable. In this case, when the President

approved and ordered the development of a housing project with the corresponding reclamation work,

making DENR a member of the EXECOM (committee tasked to implement the project), the required

authorization from the DENR to reclaim land can be deemed satisfied. Also, the issuance of the

Environmental Compliance Certificates by the DENR shows its ratification of the reclamation project.

The DENR is tasked to oversee the implementation of the Project. The DENR has power of supervision and

control over the laws affected by the Project since it was tasked to facilitate the titling of

the Smokey Mountain and of the area to be reclaimed, which shows that it had tacitly given its authority

to the NHA to undertake the reclamation. The issuance of ECCs by the DENR for SMDRP is but an exercise

of its power of supervision and control over the lands of public domain covered by the Project. Also, the

Clean Air Act made the establishment of an incinerator illegal and effectively barred the implementation of

the planned incinerator project under Phase II.

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE and the METROPOLITANMANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,Petitioners, vs. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION andJANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA,Respondents.

FACTS:

After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA, Jancom won a contract for the MMDAsSan Mateo waste management project. A BOT contract for the waste to energy project was signed on Dec

19, 1997, between Jancom and the Philippine Government, represented by the Presidential Task Force on

Solid Waste Management through DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR chair Dionisio dela Serna, and

MMDA chair Prospero Oreta. The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was too

close to the end of his term. He endorsed it to President Estrada, but Estrada refused to sign it, for two

reasons: the passage of RA8749, or the Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamor of San Mateo residents for the

closure of the dumpsite.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a valid and perfected contract between the parties

RULING:

As to the necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the contract, these are outside the realm of judicial

adjudication. These considerations are primarily and exclusively a matter for the President to decide. While

the Court recognizes that the garbage problem is a matter of grave public concern, it can only declare that

the contract in question is a valid and perfected one between the parties, but the same is still ineffective or

unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President, the contract itself providing that such

approval by the President is necessary for its effectivity.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City,

HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF

CALOOCAN,respondents.

FACTS:

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-

complaintwith the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the open garbage

dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the

residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation. The LLDA Legal and Technical

personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin

area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental

Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and clearance from

LLDA.The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Orderordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan


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Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping

any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in

August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City

Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of

Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias

Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin

area being utilized as a dumpsite. The City Government of Caloocan filed with the RTC of Caloocan City for

the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan

sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the

right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue a cease and decease order

RULING:

The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if not

prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental

Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series

of 1987. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution

Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping

its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act

No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws,cannot be stamped as an unauthorized

exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D.

No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to " make, alter or modify order

requiring the discontinuance or pollution." Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA

to makewhatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedureunder the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and

its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City

Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

Richard Hizon, et al., petitioners, Vs. Honorable Court Of Appeals and the People of the Philippines,

Respondents, G.R. No. 119619 , December 13, 1996

FACTS: In September 1992, amid reports, members of Task Force Bantay Dagat and some other policemen

went to investigate an alleged muro ami fishing in the coastal waters of Puerto Princesa, but only saw

several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat. They saw two Hong Kong nationals with

only copies of their passports, the crew, the captain and the boat engineer. After inspection of the boat

and other pertinent documents, they did not found anything amiss. They then invited the crew, including

the two aliens, to Puerto Princesa for further investigation. The next day, Spo3 Enriquez the head of the

investigation unit, asked the captain to bring samples of the lapu lapu fish found in the boat, in order that

they may send it to NBI Manila for testing. The specimen was found to be positive with sodium cyanide,

which is a violent poison. In view of the findings, a complaint was filed by the PNP Maritime Command in

Puerto Princesa against the operator of the boat, the fishing company, represented by the boat captain

Richard Hizon and his crew.

The petitioners were arrainged and pleaded not guilty. They alleged that they were legit

fishermen who emplyed hook and line method of fishing. The captain also narrated that Spo3 took only

four samples of fish from his crew member without his permission, but acknowleged five samples as he

was under threat by the policeman. The lower court found thirty one of the crew members guilty, since the

captain Hizon and some others were at large. An appeal was raised in the Court of Appeals, but the

appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of the petitioners in violating PD 704 was proved beyond reasonable

doubt.

RULING:Under Sect 33 and 38 of the PD 704, illegal fishing is committed when a person catches or gathers

fish, fishery or aquatic products from the waters of the Philippines by the use of explosives, electricity,

obnoxious or poisonous substances. The petitioners contended that the evidence used against them has

lost its integrity since it did not follow correct procedure in handling evidences. The Supreme Court held

that the evidence taken from the boat are only prima facie and may still be rebutted by the offended party.

The Court found out that after the filing of the information against the petitioners, that the latter asked

that the fishes found in their boat be reexamined. The result showed that the fishes were negative of

sodium cyanide, and the prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings and the mishandling of the

previous evidence. The reports on the case also showed that the crew were found to be fishing with hooks

and lines, and that the crew could not have been enganged in muro ami, since it will require 200 men to do

such, while the officers only found 28 men on board the boat. The evidence of fish caught with the use of

obnoxious and poisonous substance was disregarded as it has lost its integrity. Furthermore, all the

documents of the crew and the boat were found to be in order. Therefore, the Supreme Court acquitted

the petitioners.

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF

SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents,G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997

FACTS:On Oct. 1946 Sinfroso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore lease covering a

track of foreshore land in Balanga, Bataan, but was denied on Jan. 195u3, and so was his motion for

reconsideration. But sometime later on March 1960, Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his

title to a parcel of land. Said land is an accretion to his property, which is bounded by Talisay river on the

eastern side, Bulacan river on the western side, and the Manila Bay on its northern side. Unfortunately, the

Director of Lands as well as the Director of Forestry denied his application because the claimed land is a

portion of the public domain. On the othe other hand, Emiliano Navarro, now deceased, applied for a


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fishpond application with the Bureau of fisheries covering 25 hectares of foreshore land also in Balanga,

Bataan. The application was initially denied. However, upon motion of reconsideration, the bureau

approved only 7 hectares as suitable for fishpond purposes only. Navarro opposed the application of

registration by Pascual, contending that said parcel of land is of public domain and that he was already a

lessee of the said land by virtue of the fishpond permit granted him. Pascual filed and ejectment case

against Navarro, but was adversely decided against Pascual. An appeal was made which was also

consolidated with the land registration case. The lower court held that the land is classified as foreshore

land therefore forming part of the public domain and cannot be alienated and disposed. But upon appeal

of Pascuals heirs to the Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed and was granted permission to

register said accretion. An appeal by the heirs of Emiliano Navarro was then brought to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of application for registration of the accrection on the property of the

respondents was proper?

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the private respondents claim of ownership over the disputed

property under the principle of accretion was misplaced. Under Art. 457, accretion is the process whereby

the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank the owner of

such estate is called the riparian owner. The accretion is automatically owned by the riparian owner from

the moment the soil deposit can be seen but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to

acquisition through prescription by third persons. The accretion was not along the property on the side of

the river, but on the front side which is already the foreshore of Manila Bay. Furthermore, Sulpicio Pascual

admitted that the waves of the Manila bay used to hit the disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore

but, after he had planted palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began to rise. Therefore, it

cannot be considered as an accretion. The Supreme Court further held that the Art 4 of the Spanish Law of

Waters of 1866 shall be applicable, as it states that lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial

deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. Petitioners utterly fail to show

that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified,

under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of private respondents as owners

of the estates adjacent to the said lands.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENERIO P. VERGARA, ERNESTO T. CUESTA, JR.,

PEDRO G. DAGAO and BERNARDO P. CUESTA, accused. RENERIO P. VERGARA, accused-appellant.

FACTS: In the morning of July 04, 1992, the accused-appellant Renerio Vergara and 3 other companions

were apprenhended at sea by a team of Bantay Dagat and some police officers who at that time were on

preventive patrol along the municipal waters of Palo, Leyte. The accused along with his companions were

witnessed by the team as they used badil, or ammonium nitrate placed in a bottle with a blasting cap, in

catching bolinao or anchovies. Having been caught red handed, the accused and his companions were

brought to the police station and so are the paraphernalias. After the trial, Vergara was convicted and

appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the conviction of the accused was proper.

RULING: Sections 33 of P.D. No. 704 (Fisheries Decree of 1975), as amended by P.D. No. 1058, states that it

shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or

fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance,

or by the use of electricity. In the case, the accused along with his companions were caught red handed by

the patrolling team engaging in such unlawful activity. Their contention that it was not them who threw the

badil was not substantiated even in their affidavits. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed in its entirety

the decision of the lower court.

MMDA vs Concened Residents of Manila BayDecember 18,2008;G.R.Nos.171947-48(Mickey)

Facts:

1. January29,1999,respondents ConcernedResidents of ManilaBay(withAtty. Oposaas theirlawyer) filedacomplaintbeforetheRegional

TrialCourt(RTC) inImus, Caviteagainstseveralgovernmentagencies,amongthemthepetitioners,forthecleanup,rehabilitation,andprotection

of theManilaBay.

2.The complaint alleges that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below theallowablestandards set

bylaw,specificallyPresidentialDecreeNo.(PD) 1152orthePhilippineEnvironmentCode.

3.That the c ontin ued neglect of p etiti oners in a bating the pollut ion of theManilaBayconstitutes aviolationof:

(1)Respondentsconstitutionalrightto life,health,anda balancedecology; (2) TheEnvironmentCode(PD 1152);

(3) ThePollutionControlLaw(PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 106 7); (5) TheSanitationCode(PD 856);

(6) The Ill egal Disp osal of Wast es Decr ee (PD 825); (7) TheMarinePollutionLaw(PD 979);(8) ExecutiveOrderNo. 192; (9) TheToxic andHazardous Wastes Law(Republic ActNo. 6969);

(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) TheTrustDoctrineandthePrincipleof Guardianship; and

(12) InternationalLaw

4. It was shown by the respondents that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000

to 8 0,000 most probab le nu mber (MPN) /ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-

90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recrea tional activities, or the SB

level , is one no t exc eedin g 200 MPN/100 ml.

5. The RTC held the petitioners and other agencies jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate

Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other

forms of contact recreation. And within 6 months haveaconcerted,consolidatedandcoordinatedplanforthecleanupof the

bay. The var ious agencies have been instruc ted to perfor m their duties

including defendant DPWH, to remo ve and dem ol ish str uct ure s an d other nuisances that obstruct

the free flow of waters to t he bay.

These nuisances discharge sol i d and l iquid wastes which eventual l y end up in Mani la

Ba y. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate

in remo vin g debr is, such as carcass of sunkenvessels,andothernon-biodegradablegarbageinthebay.

6 . T h e p e t i t i o n e r s a p p e a l e d t o t h e C A c o n t e n d i n g:

1 . a r gu i ng i n th e m a in t ha t th e pertinent provisions of the Environment Code

(PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of spe cif ic pol lut ion inc ide nts and do n ot c ove r

c leaning in general and

2. that the c leaning of the Mani la Bay is not a minis ter ia l act

which can be compel led by mandamus.

7. CA affirmed in toto the trial courts decision as itdid not require petit ioners to do ta sks outsideof theirusual

basic functions underexistinglaws.

Issue:


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I. Is the cleaning and/o r restorat ion of Manila Bay a minist erial act of the pet itione rs that canbecompelledby

mandamus?

I I . Does sec. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 pertain only to specif ic c leaning of pol lution and

no t cleaningingeneral?

*Note: Itis theMMDA andDPWHtogetherwiththeLGUs thataretheprimaryagencies tasked to remove and

demolish the nuisance structures and obstructions along the bayHeld:I. Yes, It is a ministerial act.

a. A writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A

ministerial duty is onethat requires neithertheexerciseofofficial discretion

nor judgment. It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the

discretion of the person execu ting it . I t i s a s imple, definite duty

ari sin g und er co ndi tio ns admittedorprovedto existandimposedbylaw.

b . T h e c o u r t s a i d t h a t t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o p e r f o r m t h e i r ( b a s e d

o n M M D A s argument) duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how

they are to ca rry out suchduties,ontheother,aretwo differentconcepts.

c. The MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary

landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative

garba ge disposa l systems is ministerial,its dutybeingastatutoryimposition.

This is providedin Sec.3(c) of Republic ActNo. (RA) 7924creatingtheMMDA.

d. A discretionary duty i s o n e t h a t a l l o w s a p e r s o n t o e x e r c i s e

j u d g m e n t a n d c h o o s e t o p e r f o r m o r n o t t o p e r f o r m . Any

suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform i ts

sol id waste di sposal-re lated duties oughtto bedismissed forwantof legal\

basis.

e. Thefollowingagencies arethereforeprecludedfromchoosingnotto perform

these duties DENR, MWSS, LWUA, DA, DPWH, PCG, DILG, PPA, DOH,

DepE d, DBM andMMDA.

Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao, and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon vs. Hon. JoseL. Atienza, jr., in his capacity as Mayor of Manila

G.R. No. 156052March 7, 2007

Facts: Pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units. the City of Manila enacted Ordinance

No. 8027. The said ordinance, in essence, reclassified portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its

adjoining areas from industrial to commercial areas [reservoir of oils of big oil companies are located in this

area- this is called as the Pandacan terminals] and owners or operators of industries and other businesses,

of the Pandacan terminals are given a period of 6 months from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance

within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are disallowed.

Subsequent to the approval of the ordinance, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)

entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed tha t the

scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option and not total removal

of the Pandacan terminals as demanded by Ordinance 8027. Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to

scale down the oils reservoir and agreed that the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan

Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. The Sangguniang Panlungsod

ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution No. 97.and declared that the memorandum of

understanding was effective only for a period of six months and then was extended again until April 30,

2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies.

Petitioners filed a mandamus compelling respondent in his capacity as Mayor of Manila to enforce the

said ordinance and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

Atienza contended that Ordinance 8027 was superseded by t he MOU, hence he cannot enforce it.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent can be compelled to enforce Ordinance 8027.

Whether or not the MOU superseded Ordinance 8027.

Ruling:

Yes, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to 'enforce all laws

and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.' One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief

executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by

theSanggunianor annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. The

Court ratiocinated, "these officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged

invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the

transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the

constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been

declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the

law and are bound to obey it."

As to the second issue, assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027,

the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and

effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from

enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

Henares v LTFRB

GR No. 158290

October 23, 2006

FACTS:


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Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land

Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and

Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas ( CNG) as

alternative fuel.

ISSUES:

(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?

(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord

with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC. 4.

Recognition of Rights.Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the follo wing rights of citizens are

hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:

a) The right to breathe clean air;

b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable

development;

c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of environmental

policies and programs and in the decision-making process;

d) The right to participate in t he decision-making process concerning development policies, plans and

programs, projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and public health;

e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity, undertaking or

project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or

deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;

f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights effectively

under this Act;

g) The right to bring action in co urt or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of

environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitatio n and cleanup of affected area, a nd to seek

the imposition of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and

h) The right to bring action in co urt for compensation of personal damages resulting from the adverse

environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.

RULING:

(1) YES. There is no dispute that petit ioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. Moreover,

as held previously, a party's standing before this Cou rt is a procedural technicality which may, in the

exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside

this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if

these cases demand that they be settled p romptly.

(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus

commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to

compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the

respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will not

generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is

inferior to the other.

It appears that more properly, the legislatu re should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the

complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is

taken.

Azucena O. Salalima vs. ECC and SSS, G.R. No. 146360, May 20, 2004.

Facts:Petitioners husband, Juancho Salalima, was employed as a route helper and subsequently as route

salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. In 1989, Juancho was diagnosed with

minimal pulmonary tuberculosis. In February 1995, he was found to be suffering from pneumonia. After he

died, a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626 as amended was filed by his surviving wife, Azucena,

petitioner herein, with the SSS. The claim was denied on the ground that cancer of the l ungs had no causal

relationship with Juanchos job as a route salesman. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

The ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The ECC argued that lung cancer is not an occupational disease

nor is the risk of contracting lung c ancer increased by Juanchos working conditions.

Issue: Whether of not petitioners claim should be allowed.

Held:Yes. Under the present law, Adenocarcinoma of the lungs which was the immediate cause of

Juanchos death as stated in his death certificate,while listed as an occupational disease, is compensableonly among vinyl chloride workers and plastic workers. This, however, would not automatically bar

petitioners claim for as long as she could prove that Juanchos risk of contracting the disease was increased

by the latters working conditions. The degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial

evidence, which means, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to s upport

a conclusion. What the law requiresis a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation.

Juanchos job required long hours on the streets as well as his carrying of cases of soft drinks during sales

calls. The combination of fatigue and the pollutants that abound in his work environment verily contributed

to the worsening of his already weak respiratory system. His continuous exposure to these factors may have

led to the development of his cancer of t he lungs.

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