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Inventory Management: Cycle Inventory-II
Inventory Management: Cycle Inventory-II
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第五單元: Inventory Management: Cycle Inventory-II
郭瑞祥教授
1
Lessons From Aggregation
Aggregation allows firm to lower lot size without increasing cost
Tailored aggregation is effective if product specific fixed cost is a large fraction of joint fixed cost
Complete aggregation is effective if product specific fixed cost is a
small fraction of joint fixed cost
2
Holding Cycle Inventory for Economies of Scale
Holding Cycle Inventory for Economies of Scale
► Fixed costs associated with lots
► Quantity discounts
► Trade Promotions
3
Quantity Discounts
► Lot size based
► Volume based
How should buyer react? How does this decision affect the supply chain
in terms of lot sizes, cycle inventory, and flow time?
What are appropriate discounting schemes that suppliers should offer?
》Based on total quantity purchased over a given period
》Based on the quantity ordered in a single lot
Total Material Cost
C0
C1
C2
q1 q2 q3
Average Cost per Unit
Quantity Purchased Order Quantityq1 q2 q3
> All units> Marginal unit
4
Evaluate EOQ for price in range qi to qi+1 ,
》Case 1:If qi Qi < qi+1 , evaluate cost of ordering Qi
》Case 2:If Qi < qi, evaluate cost of ordering qi
》Case 3:If Qi qi+1 , evaluate cost of ordering qi+1
Choose the lot size that minimizes the total cost over all price ranges.
Evaluate EOQ for All Unit Quantity Discounts
hCi
DSQi
2
DCihCiQiSD
TCi
2Qi
DCi+1hCiSD
TCi
qi+12
qi+1
DCihCiqiSD
TCi
2qi
5
Marginal Unit Quantity Discounts
C0
C1
C2
q1 q2 q3
Marginal Cost per Unit
Quantity Purchased Order Quantity
q1 q2 q3
Total Material Cost
If an order of size q is placed, the first q1-q0 units are priced at C0, the next q2-q1 are priced at C1, and so on.
6
Optimal lot size
2D(S+Vi-qiCi)
hCi
Qi=
► Evaluate EOQ for each marginal price Ci (or lot size between qi and qi+1)
Evaluate EOQ for Marginal Unit Discounts
》 Let Vi be the cost of order qi units. Define V0 = 0 and
Vi=C0(q1-q0)+C1(q2-q1)+ +C‧‧‧ i-1(qi-qi-1)
》 Consider an order size Q in the range qi to qi+1
Total annual cost = ( D/Q )S (Annual order cost)
+[Vi+(Q-qi)Ci] h/2 (Annual holding cost)
+ ( D/Q ) [Vi+(Q-qi)Ci] (Annual material cost)
7
》 Evaluate EOQ for each marginal price Ci
– Case 1 :If qi Qi < qi+1 , calculate cost of ordering Qi
– Case 2 and 3 : If Qi < qi or Qi > qi+1 , the lot size in this range
is either qi or qi+1 depending on which has the lower total cost
》 Choose the lot size that minimizes the total cost over all price ranges.
Evaluate EOQ for Marginal Unit Discounts
2D(S+Vi-qiCi)
hCi
Qi=► Evaluate EOQ for each marginal price Ci,
DSD
TCi+[ Vi+(Qi-qi)Ci] + [ Vi+(Qi-qi)Ci]
QiQi
h2
11
11 2
,2
Min ii
ii
ii
ii
i Vq
DhVS
q
DV
q
DhVS
q
DTC
8
The Comparison between All Unit and Marginal Unit Quantity
Discounts
The order quantity of all unit quantity discounts is less than the order quantity of marginal unit quantity discounts.
The marginal unit quantity discounts will further enlarge the cycle inventory and average flow time.
9
► Coordination: max total profits of suppliers and retailers
Why Quantity Discounts?
► Quantity discounts are valuable only if they result in:
► Coordination in the supply chain
► Use price discrimination to max supplier’s profits》Quantity discounts for commodity products (in the perfect competition market, price is fixed)
》Quantity discounts for products for which the firm has market power (in the oligopoly market, the determined price can influence demand)
》 Improved coordination in the supply chain
》 Extraction of surplus through price discrimination
>Two-part tariffs > Volume discounts
10
► Assume the following data.– Retailer: D =120,000/year , SR=$100 , hR=0.2 , CR=$3– Suplier: SS =$250 , hS =0.2 , CS =$2
► Retailer cost
► Supplier’s cost is based on retailer’s optimal order size.
》Supply chain total cost = 3,795+6,009=$9,804
Coordination for Commodity Products
6,32430.2
100120,0002Q *
xxx
$3,79530.22
6,3246,324
120,000100TC xxx
$6,00920.22
6,3246,324
120,000250TC xxx
11
Coordination for Commodity Products
► Consider a coordinated order size=9,165.
► Coordination through all unit quantity discounts.
– $3 for lots below 9,165
$2.9978 for lots of 9,165 or higher– Increase in retailer’s holding cost and order cost can be compensated
by the reduction in material cost. 120,000(3-2.9978)=$264– Decrease in supplier’s cost = supply chain savings = 903–264=$639
(can be further shared between two parties)
》Supply chain total cost=4,059+5,106 =$9,165(decreased by $639)
29,165
9,165120,000Suppler's TC=250x + x0.2x2 =$5,106
29,165
9,165120,000Suppler's TC=100x + x0.2x3 =$4,059 (Increased by $264)
$3,795
(decreased by $903)
$6,009
12
Coordination for Commodity Products
Since the price is determined by the market, supplier can use lot-
size based quantity discounts to achieve coordination in supply
chain and decrease supply chain cost.
In practice, the cycle inventory does not decrease in the supply
chain because in most firms, marketing and sales department
design quantity discounts independent of operations department
who works on reducing the order cost.
In theory, if supplier reduces its setup or order cost, the discount it
offers will change and the cycle inventory is expected to decrease.
Lot size-based quantity discounts will increase cycle inventory.
13
Quantity Discounts When Firm has Market Power
RetailerSupplierpCRCS =$2
Demand=360,000-60,000p
► No inventory related costs.
► Assume the following data
Demand curve = 360,000-60,000p (p is retailer’s sale price)
CS = $2 (cost of supplier).
► Need to determine CR (Suppler’s charge on retailer) and p.
14
► Maximize individual profits and make pricing decision independently
► Demand = 360,000-60,000(5)=60,000
Profit for retailer = (5-4)(60,000)=$60,000
Profit for supplier = (4-2)(60,000)=$120,000
Profit for supply chain = 60,000+120,000=$180,000
RetailerSupplierpCRCS =$2
Demand=360,000-60,000p
Scenario 1: No Coordination
ProfitR
CR=4; p=5
2
CRp
=(p-CR)
0p
(ProfitR)
0CR
(ProfitS)
ProfitS=
(360,000-60,000p)
2
CR=(CR-2)[360,000-60,000( 3+ )](CR-2)(360,000-60,000p)
15
Quantity Discounts When Firm has Market Power
Demand=360,000-60,000p
► No inventory related costs.
► Assume the following data
Demand curve = 360,000-60,000p (p is retailer’s sale price)
CS = $2 (cost of supplier).
► Need to determine CR (Suppler’s charge on retailer) and p.
CR
Variation
p
Fix
CS =$2RetailerSupplier
16
How to increase the total profit through coordination ?
► Profit for supply chain
► Demand = 360,000-60,000(4)=120,000► Profit for supple chain = (4-2)(120,000)=$240,000 > $180,000
Maximize Supply Chain Profits
p=4
=(p-Cs) (360,000-60,000p)
=(p-2) (360,000-60,000p)
0p
(Profit)
Microsoft。
Microsoft。
Microsoft。
17
Scenario 2: Coordination through Two-Part Tariff -I
► Supplier charges his entire profit as an up-front franchise fee.
Supplier sells to the retailer at production cost (CS).
► Proof:Assume demand function = a-bp (a, b are constants)
Then retailer’s profit = (p-cR)(a-bp)-F (F: franchise fee)
The supply chain’s profit = (p-cS)(a-bp)Maximize both profits will obtain
18
Scenario 2: Coordination through Two-Part Tariff-II
► Supplier charges his entire profit as an up-front franchise fee.
Supplier sells to the retailer at production cost (CS).
► Proof:Assume demand function = a-bp (a, b are constants)
Then retailer’s profit = (p-cR)(a-bp)-F (F: franchise fee)
The supply chain’s profit = (p-cS)(a-bp)Maximize both profits will obtain
19
Scenario 2: Coordination through Two-Part Tariff-III
CR= CS
► Supplier charges his entire profit as an up-front franchise fee.
Supplier sells to the retailer at production cost (CS).
► Proof:Assume demand function = a-bp (a, b are constants)
Then retailer’s profit = (p-cR)(a-bp)-F (F: franchise fee)
The supply chain’s profit = (p-cS)(a-bp)Maximize both profits will obtain
P = + = +2ba
2ba
2CR
2CS
In our example, CR =CS =2 , p =4, demand=120,000Assume a franchise fee of 180,000Retailer’s profit =(4-2)(120,000)-180,000=$60,000 (same as before) Supplier’s profit = F = $180,000 Supply chain’s profit = 60,000+180,000=$240,000
20
Scenario 3: Coordination through Volume- based Quantity Discounts
In our example, design the volume discounts
CR =$4 (for volume < 120,000)
CR =$3.5 (for volume 120,000)
To sell 120,000, the retailer sets price at p = 4.(from the demand function)
Retailer’s profit =(4-3.5)(120,000)=$60,000 (same as before)
Supplier’s profit = (3.5-2)(120,000) = $180,000
Supply chain’s profit = 60,000+180,000=$240,000
► The two-part tariff is really a volume-based quantity discounts.
► Supplier offers the volume discounts at the break point of optimal demand.
► Supplier offers the discount price so that the retailer will have a profit the profit of no coordination and no discount.
21
Lessons From Discounting Schemes
Lot size-based discounts increase lot size and cycle inventory in the supply chain.
Volume-based discounts with some fixed cost passed on to retailer
are more effective in general
Lot size-based discounts are justified to achieve coordination for
commodity products.
Volume-based discounts are better using rolling horizon to avoid the
“hockey stick phenomenon”.
22
Price Discrimination to Max Supplier Profits
► Price discrimination is the practice which a firm charges differential prices to maximize profits.
► Price discrimination is also a volume-based discount scheme.► Consider an example
Demand curve (supplier sells to retailer)=200,000-50,000CR
CS =2
Profit of supplier = (CR-2)(200,000-50,000CR)
► What is the optimal “ fixed ” price CR to maximize profit ?
CR $0CR
(Profit)
Demand=200,000-50,000(3)=50,000
Profit =(3-2)(50,000)=$50,000
23
Demand Curve and Demand at Price of $3
Price p=4
p=3
p=2
100,000 200,000 Demand
Marginal cost = $2
► The fixed price of $3 does not maximize profits for the supplier. The profit is only the shaded area in the following figure.► The supplier could obtain the entire area under the demand curve above his marginal cost of $2 (the triangle within the solid lines) by pricing each unit differently.
50,000
24
An Equivalent Two-Part Tariff to Price Discrimination
► The entire triangle under the demand curve (above the marginal
cost of $2) = franchise fee = 1/2(4-2)(100,000)=$100,000
► The selling price to retailer: CR =CS =2.
► Demand = 200,000-50,000(2)=100,000
Profit of supplier = F = $100,000Price p=4
p=3
p=2
100,000 200,000 Demand
Marginal cost = $2
50,000
Price p=4
p=3
p=2
100,000 200,000 Demand
Marginal cost = $2
50,000
50,000
50,000
25
Demand Curve and Demand at Price of $3
► The fixed price of $3 does not maximize profits for the supplier. The profit is only the shaded area in the following figure.► The supplier could obtain the entire area under the demand curve above his marginal cost of $2 (the triangle within the solid lines) by pricing each unit differently.
Price p=4
p=3
p=2
100,000 200,000 Demand
Marginal cost = $2
50,000
50,000
50,000
26
Holding Cycle Inventory for Economies of Scale
Holding Cycle Inventory for Economies of Scale
► Fixed costs associated with lots
► Quantity discounts
► Trade Promotions
27
Trade Promotion
► Goals:
– Induce retailers to spur sales
– Shift inventory from manufacture to retailer and the customer
– Defend a brand against competition
► Retailer options:
– Pass through some or all of the promotion to customers to
spur sales
– Pass through very little of the promotion to customers but purchase in greater quantity to exploit temporary reduction
in price (forward buying)
28
Inventory Profile for Forward Buying
t
I(t)
Q* Q* Q* Q* Q*
Qd
Qd: lot size ordered at the discount price Q* : EOQ at normal price
29
Forward Buying Decisions
► Goal:
► Assumptions:
– Discount will only be offered once.– Order quantity Qd is a multiple of Q*.– The retailer takes no action to influence the demand.
– Identify Qd that maximizes the reduction in total cost (material cost + order cost + holding cost)I(t)
Qd
Qd: lot size ordered at the discount price Q* : EOQ at normal price
t
Q* Q* Q* Q* Q*
30
Decision on Q*d
► Assume the following data Normal order quantity = EOQ = The discount = $d. The discounted material cost = $(C-d )
► Now estimate the total cost of ordering Qd in the discount period TC(Qd) = material cost + order cost + inventory cost
=(C-d)Qd
=(C-d)Qd + S + (Qd/D)2 (C-d)h / 2D
Note: Discount period =Qd/D
hC2DSQ* =
+ S + Qd/2 (C-d)h [ Qd/D ]
t
I(t)
Q* Q* Q* Q* Q*
Qd
Qd: lot size ordered at the discount price Q* : EOQ at normal price
31
Decision on Q*d
2hCDS=CD+=CD hC2DS+(D/ )S
► Now estimate the total cost of ordering Q* in the discount period
Annual TC(Q*) = material cost + order cost + inventory cost
hC2DS+hC/2
Discount period TC (Q*) = Qd/D [Annual TC(Q*) ]=Qd/D [CD+ 2hCDS ]
► Define the cost reduction in the discount period
F(Qd) = TC(Qd) – Discount period TC(Q*)
C-dF(Qd)
Qd=0 Qd= +
CQ*
[C-d]hdD
► Forward buy = Qd – Q*
32
Decision on Q*d
2hCDS=CD+=CD hC2DS+(D/ )S
► Now estimate the total cost of ordering Q* in the discount period
Annual TC(Q*) = material cost + order cost + inventory cost
hC2DS+hC/2
Discount period TC (Q*) = Qd/D [Annual TC(Q*) ]=Qd/D [CD+ 2hCDS ]
► Define the cost reduction in the discount period
F(Qd) = TC(Qd) – Discount period TC(Q*)
C-dF(Qd)
Qd=0 Qd= +
CQ*
[C-d]hdD
► Forward buy = Qd – Q*
33
Decision on Q*d
2hCDS=CD+=CD hC2DS+(D/ )S
► Now estimate the total cost of ordering Q* in the discount period
Annual TC(Q*) = material cost + order cost + inventory cost
hC2DS+hC/2
Discount period TC (Q*) = Qd/D [Annual TC(Q*) ]=Qd/D [CD+ 2hCDS ]
► Define the cost reduction in the discount period
F(Qd) = TC(Qd) – Discount period TC(Q*)
C-dF(Qd)
Qd=0 Qd= +
CQ*
[C-d]hdD
► Forward buy = Qd – Q*
34
Example
Assume the following data without promotion. D =120,000/year , C =$3 , h =0.2 , S =$100 then →Q* = 6,324 Cycle inventory = Q*/2 = 3,162 Average flow time = Q*/2D =
0.02635(year) = 0.3162 (month).
Qd = + =dD
[C-d]hCD*C-d
0.15X120,000[3-0.15][0.2]
+3(6,324)3-0.15
=38,236
► Assume a promotion is offered (d =$0.15)
Cycle inventory = Qd/2 = 19,118
Average flow time = Qd/2D = 0.1593(year) = 1.9118 (month).
► Forward buy = 38,236 – 6,324 =31,912
► Trade promotions generally result in reduced supply chain
profits unless the trade promotions reduce demand
fluctuations.
► Trade promotions lead to a significant increase in lot size
and cycle inventory because of forward buying by the
retailer.
35
► Assume demand function = a-bp (a, b are constants)
Then retailer’s profit = [p-CR][a-bp]
Maximizing retailer’s profits will obtain
If a discount d is offered, the new C R=CR-d
Then the new
► Retailer’s optimal response to a discount is to pass only 50% of the discount to the customers.
Promotion Pass through to Customers
2
CR
2ba P =
p
2dp
2d
2CR
2bap
36
Demand curve at retailer: 300,000 – 60,000p
► Normal supplier price, CR = $3.00
► Promotion discount = $0.15
► Retailer only passes through half the promotion discount
Example-I
》Optimal retail price = $4.00
》Customer demand = 60,000
37
Demand curve at retailer: 300,000 – 60,000p
► Normal supplier price, CR = $3.00
► Promotion discount = $0.15
► Retailer only passes through half the promotion discount
Example-II
》Optimal retail price = $4.00
》Customer demand = 60,000
38
Demand curve at retailer: 300,000 – 60,000p
► Normal supplier price, CR = $3.00
► Promotion discount = $0.15
► Retailer only passes through half the promotion discount
Example-III
》Optimal retail price = $4.00
》Customer demand = 60,000
》Optimal retail price = $3.925
》Customer demand = 64,500
》Demand increases by only 7.5%》Cycle inventory increases significantly
39
Counter measures
Trade Promotions
Goal is to discourage forward buying in the supply chain
– EDLP– Scan based promotions– Customer coupons
Wikipedia
Microsoft。
Microsoft。
40
Levers to Reduce Lot Sizes Without Hurting Costs
Cycle Inventory Reduction
► Reduce transfer and production lot sizes
► Are quantity discounts consistent with manufacturing and logistics operations?
► Are trade promotions essential?
》Aggregate fixed cost across multiple products, supply points, or delivery points.
》Volume discounts on rolling horizon》Two-part tariff
》EDLP》Base on sell-thru rather than sell-in
41
頁碼 作品 授權條件 作者 /來源
17 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft 服務合約及著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65條合理使用。
40 本作品轉載自WIKIPEDIA (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wal-Mart_logo.svg),瀏覽日期 2012/2/20。
40 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft 服務合約及著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65條合理使用。
40 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft 服務合約及著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65條合理使用。
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