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Commission SensitiveMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration Headquarters, (FAA H Q)Type of event: Interview w ith David C annolesDate: Thursday, March 25, 2004Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Num ber; 8Location: 10th Floor, FAA HQ, W ashington, D.C.Participants - Non-Com mission: David Weeguard, FAA Legal CounselParticipants - Comm ission: John A zzarello, Miles Kara, Dana H yde, Geoffrey BrownNote: Please refer to the recorded interview fo r further details.Background:

Cannoles is in his thirty third year with the FAA. He started as an Air TrafficController (ATC), an d progressed through a management position at an En Route Centerto the executive staff offices of the FAA. In November of 2001 he became Director ofEm ergency Managem ent Operations and Com munications, and recently became D irectorof Air Safety Oversight. The position he is assuming as Director of Air Traffic SafetyOversight was very recently created by the TS A Secretary.On September 11, 2001 (9/11) he was AA T-20, and was responsible for

investigating air traffic incidents and supporting air traffic litigation. They also performedseveral hundred facility investigations pe r year from four regional off-site stations. Theywere briefed by their staff on air traffic incidents, and in turn we re responsible fo revaluating, briefing an d providing recomm endations to the air traffic leadership after airincidents. He reported through the Deputy of Air Traffic to the Air Traffic Director. InSeptember of 2001 his reporting structure was to Jeff Griffith through Bill Peacock; buton 9/11 Peacock was out of town. Griffith an d Peacock both have access to the DeputyAdministrator and Administrator of the FAA.9/11:

On 9/11 Cannoles arrived betwe en 5:30AM an d 6:OOAM, an d began to review thesystem anomalies from the previous day. He recalls receiving a text page at a pointbetween 8 and 8:30 AM that informed him there was a "confirmed hijack" out of Boston.This came from a Quality Assurance (QA) specialist at the Eastern Regional OperationsCenter (Eastern ROC). He turned on a media b roadcast, and - due to his time as managerof Newark Tower - imm ediately realized that it was a large aircraft that hit the tower, nota small aircraft [American Airlines Flight 11 (AAL 11) at 8:46AM (approx.)]. He toldDan Diggins an d Tony M ello to come with him to the tenth floor to see Jeff Griffith, an d

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on the tenth floor saw the broadcast of the second impact at the World Trade Center(WTC) [United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175) at 9:03AM (approx.)]. He saw Griffith inthe tenth floor hallway. Cannoles informed him that the hijacked aircraft was the same asthe aircraft that struck the World Trade Center, and that it would be handled as anaccident instead of a hijacking. He then went to establish a telephone conference w ith theappropriate parties. This teleconferen ce began in the Director of Air Traffic 's (BillPeacock) conference room. He believes the teleconference began after the second aircraftstruck the WTC.The Regional offices were connected to both the teleconferen ce established byCannoles, as well as the other conferences (like the Primary N et). For exam ple, FrankHatfield informed Cannoles' staff of information he was receiving through othercommunications.Cannoles had no communications with National Military Command Center(NMCC) or the White House Situation Room (SitRoom).The size of Cannoles staff on the conference grew quickly. Since there was adedicated conference line fo r events that would be handled by his department in the caseof aircraft incidents, Tony M ello, per C annoles instruction, was able to q uickly establishconnections to Eastern and New England Regions. Cannoles focus was to contact theexecutives at the Regions, and allow them to contact the appropriate m anagers of NewYork En Route Center (ZNY), New York TRACON (N90), Boston En Route Center(ZBW), Washington En Route Center (ZDC), Newark T ower, Boston Tow er, ClevelandCenter (ZOB), and - by the endof thedayaccording to Cannoles - they had "virtuallythe entire nation on line." They dealt with the event as an accident, an d searched fo r thatinformation. "Slowly the picture came together that these were hijackings and eventuallythat they were intentional crashes". Cannoles does no t recall hearing any of the specifics

of the threats that were overheard from ZB W from AAL 11. They collected as muchinformation as possible by that afternoon, and he comm ented that "it took me two orthree iterations to make out what the individuals (hijackers) were saying." HerndonCommand Center was initially on the conference, but he does not recall hearing a specificcommunication from Terry Biggio, Manager of ZBW, of the overheard communicationfrom the hijacker pilot of AAL 11. The conference was on the speaker phone, an dCannoles was moderating it.They began initially putting notes on a white board, and then into a laptop.Cannoles recalls Diggins trying to operate it, and they produced a chronology "which isfull of errors based on my subsequent review" of the ongoing events. Cannoles recalls

hearing man y reports of d eviating aircraft such as: "a high speed target headed toBoston", "four aircraft headed towards Norfolk", "Delta won't take instructions he's overCleveland".Cannoles commented that Herndon C omm and Center was "doing what theyshould be doing which was interaction with the facilities."



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Commission SensitiveHatfield made a statement saying "we don't know what's going on here, maybe itwould be prudent to stop the traffic". Cannoles agreed an d informed Griffith that thetraffic ha d been stopped in the northeast, and Griffith informed him that they had justinstituted a National G round Stop.At the Eastern R egion Hatfield was Cannoles main contact. C annoles does notrecall any difficulty contacting Hatfield. Cannoles spoke with Mike McCormack as well,McCormack was Facility Manager at ZNY.Cannoles recalls that the teleconference was established before the Pentagon wasstruck by Am erican A irlines Flight 77 (AA 77). Th ey were looking for at least two otheraircraft before the Pentagon w as struck. Dulles TRACON was on line and informed thatthere was a "fast moving target m oving towards Washington". One of his staff members,Jeffrey Lode, went to the wind ow to look for the aircraft. Lode told Cannoles that he hadseen smoke from the Pentagon.Cannoles also noted that they received a report from G reat L akes that there was amissing aircraft from Minneapolis.

Flights:Cannoles comm ented that he recalls attempts to locate both AAL 11 and UnitedAirlines Flight 93 (UAL 93) at the same time. C annoles recalls receiving preliminaryinformation that they had lost radar capability with UA L 93 som ewhere in "Indianapolis"airspace.Cannoles has no knowledge of A AL 11 being reported headed south after8:46AM. Cannoles noted that if there was something of serious importance he would

send a runner to Jeff Griffith. He does no t recall specifically when he did so.Cannoles did recall informa tion regarding searches for the status of AA L 77, asuspect Delta flight, and a K orean airlines flight. Cannoles stated that they were "pollingdifferent facilities" for information on the missing aircraft, but the first reports that theyequated with UAL 93 was an erroneous report from a police officer that an aircraft ha dcrashed. They initially associated this report with UA L 93. Cannoles does no t recallinformation on a flight with a "bomb on board" being passed over the teleconferencefrom Cleveland that can be equated with UA L 93. He does recall an aircraft believedheaded towards Pittsburg. He does not recall any information on UAL 93 - or a targetassociated with UAL 93 - inbound to Washington DC at approximately sixty miles

distance.Cannoles ran the telecom until mid-late afternoon. They briefed the FederalBureau of Investigations (FBI) im mediately. C annoles staff created a report on theevents. He did not personally comm unicate with North Am erican Aerospace De fense(NORAD), bu t believes Jeff Griffith did. He recalls that Griffith showed him a copy ofNORAD's logs.



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M ilitary notification in the event of a hijack was one of the first priorities for AirTraffic, and Cannoles recalls that for this reason the military liaison was needed to assistin comm unication. Cannoles also knew that the primary interface with NORA D (NorthAm erican Aerospace Defense) was at the facilities, and he was quite confidant thatcommunication was ongoing and timely at that level. Cannoles did not know the preciseprocedures for the FA A and military to contact one another. Cannoles believes Canahanwas the hijack coordinator for the FAA. Jeff Griffith had formally headed the office, bu tMike Sorrelo was "probably in charge of it" on 9/11.He recalls that information on the fighter scrambled in response to the hijackreports was passed by pa rticipants on the conference call. Cannoles believes he w asaware of the scramble before the Pentagon was struck by AAL 77. He commented thatbetween the second attack and the third he realized the hijackings were part of acoordinated event.Cannoles commented that there was a "debate" over the timeliness of FAAnotification to the military of the flights involved in the attacks as being either confirmedand/or suspected as being hijacked. He had always assumed that after the first twoaircraft crashed the military was highly plugged into the FAA. Cannoles came to theconclusion that there did not hav e to be m ultiple notifications from the FAA to themilitary after the first notification is made, and the entities, both operationally andadministratively, are connected.Cannoles commented that since the third aircraft was assumed to have crashedbased on simultaneous loss of comm unications and radar. Th us, as an event, it wastreated as an accident. A s an accident, there w as no need to notify the m ilitary. Hementioned that since the military and FAA began speaking after the initial tw o attacks, he

always assumed that someone was informing the military of wh at was ongoing.Cannoles noted that during the course of the investigation he reached theconclusion that appropriate notifications were being mad e regarding the second tw ohijacked flights between the FAA and the military. Cannoles comm ented that not basedon the product they prepared, but based on the conversations he h ad w ith members of hisstaff he reached the "comfortable" conclusion that the military and FAA w erecomm unicating, and he applied that thought to the second two flights.Cannoles comm ented that based on A AL 77 as a presumed crash, he is notsurprised if there was little to no notification; with UAL 93, he is surprised that there was

no comm unication of its status to the military. Cannoles recalls efforts made through andwith Herndon C omm and Center to discover definitively what h appened to UAL 93 .Cannoles recalls seeing the log from NORA D that was reviewed by Jeff Griffith;he recalls discussing the log with Griffith; and he recalls that he and Griffith noticed thatthere were some am biguities between the tim ing of events understood at the FA A and thereflection of events displayed in the log.



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Cannoles staff performed the accident packages for the four flights involved in theattacks.Changes since 9/11:

In Novem ber 2001 Belger called Hatfield to look at the communications from9/11. Hatfield contacted Cannoles, and then Cannoles was asked to head th e emergencycomm unications group. T hey looked at Com mand Center personnel and theirresponsibilities. Cannoles noted that the teleconference that he began on 9/11 becameinstitutionalized as the Dom estic Events Network (DEN ). This network links FAA,military, and other agencies on a twenty-four seven basis. It has consistently betweenforty and fifty participants. H e brought in individuals with specific crisis m anagementcapabilities, as well as a liaison from TSA. Griffith, and later Linda Shusler, both wereinvolved with communicating with NORAD. In total, there were physical changes to theW OC with equipm ent upgrades, staffing changes, and the creation of the DEN network.Cannoles noted that Air Traffic continues to liaise with NO RAD due to securityrequirements. Cannoles noted that there was a m assive effort to bring FAA radarcapabilities to NOR AD , bu t he does not know where this effort stands.

Recommendations:Cannoles emp hasized the im portance of the ability to com m unicate rap idly withNO RAD and others (DEN ) as well as the ability to anticipate threats.


t8 b6 faa hq dave canoles fdr- 3-25-04 mfr

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